Commons Sitting of 13 March 1876

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Halifax (Vicar's Rate), appointed.
RESOLUTION IN COMMITTEE—Manchester Post Office [Expenses] *.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—NAVY ESTIMATES—Resolutions [March 10] reported.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Coroners (Dublin)* [104]; Poolbeg Light-house* [105].
Second Reading—Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) Provisional Orders (No. 2) * [99].
Committee—Manchester Post Office (re-comm.) * [72]—R.P.
Committee—Report—Burgesses (Scotland) * [48].

ARMY VETERINARY SURGEONS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. STACPOOLEasked the Secretary of State for War, If he would explain to the House why the principal Veterinary Surgeon to the Army is permitted to hold office for an indefinite period, when the heads of all other branches of the service are periodically changed; and under what warrant he does so?
  MR. GATHORNE HARDY, in reply, said, there was no Warrant relating to the holding of his office by the principal Army veterinary surgeon, and there was no regulation fixing the period during which he should hold the office. Whether it would be prudent to make a change, and put him on the same footing as the Medical Director General of the Army, was a question well worthy of consideration.

GAME LAWS (SCOTLAND) BILL—LEGISLATION.—QUESTION.
MR. KINNAIRDasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether, having regard to the very general feeling of the House as manifested on the occasion of the late debate and division on the Game Laws (Scotland) Bill, the Government will bring in a Bill to effect a settlement of the question?
MR. ASSHETON CROSS, in reply, said, that it was not the intention of the Government to introduce any Bill on the subject. The House had assented to the second reading of the Bill brought in by the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. M'Lagan), and that Bill now stood for discussion in Committee on some distant day. If the hon. Member would put himself in communication with the Government, some satisfactory solution of the question might perhaps be arrived at.

THE ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE, GREENWICH—EXAMINATIONS.—QUESTION.
MR. KAVANAGHasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, Whether it is true that in the examinations held at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, in December last, eight out of eleven Sub-Lieutenants were plucked, and that since six out of the eight had been dismissed the service; whether those young

1865
officers had not all served for eight years or thereabouts; and, whether there was any other cause for the dismissal of the six than that they had failed to obtain the requisite number of marks laid down in the rules?
MR. HUNT, in reply, said, that the facts stated in the Question of the hon. Gentleman were correct, with this addition—that the six who were dismissed were dismissed in accordance with the rules of the Service, after failing twice in their examination.

NAVY—SCREW PROPELLERS.

  QUESTION.
  CAPTAIN PIMasked the First Lord of the Admiralty, If the trials made on board H.M.S. "Bruizer," with a casing round the screw propellers for the prevention of fouling and excessive vibration, have proved satisfactory; and, if he will have any objection to lay the official Report upon the Table of the House?
  MR. HUNT, in reply, said, the trials referred to in the Question of the hon. and gallant Member were satisfactory as far as they had gone. Papers on the subject would be placed on the Table in due course?

INTEMPERANCE (IRELAND).

  QUESTION.
  MR. SULLIVANasked the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If his attention has been called to the language used by the Eight Hon. Mr. Justice Fitzgerald, in his charge to the Grand Jury of the county Kerry, as to the alarming increase of drunkenness as revealed on the calendar, to which cause he attributed nine-teen-twentieths of the whole crime on Irish calendars; whether Mr. Baron Dowse, at the Westmeath Assizes, made a like complaint, declaring that, whether by Permissive Bill, Sunday closing, or other means, something should be done to arrest such a spreading source of crime; whether Lord Chief Justice Whiteside, at County Meath Assizes, and Mr. Justice Keogh, at County Tyrone, have not raised like complaints; and, whether the Grand Juries of Clare, Limerick, Tipperary, Westmeath, Sligo, Meath, and Leitrim counties have not petitioned for some legislation on the subject?
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: Sir, I have no official information on this subject, but have noticed the reports in the newspapers of the Charges of the learned Judges referred to, and have no reason to suppose that the remarks attributed by the hon. Member to Mr. Justice Fitzgerald and Mr. Justice Keogh are not correct. I find, however, that although Baron Dowse said that "something should be tried" to stop this evil, he expressed himself as "completely powerless to suggest" what the remedy should be, and "could not say whether Sunday closing or Permissive Bills would be of any use;" and that Lord Chief Justice Whiteside, after alluding to the increase of drunkenness, said, with reference to the more serious crimes, "that he differed in toto from those who attributed to intemperance most of the crime of the country." I am not aware that any Petitions for legislation on the subject from the Grand Juries named have reached the Government.

POST OFFICE—SAVINGS BANK DEPARTMENT—SITE.—QUESTION.
MR. REDMONDasked the Postmaster General, If he has succeeded in obtaining a site for the erection of a building for the Savings Bank Department of the Post Office in the Metropolis?
LORD JOHN MANNERS, in reply, said, he had not yet succeeded in finding a site for the erection of a building referred to. The question was under consideration.

CRIMINAL LAW—BUXTON REFORMATORY.—QUESTION.
MR. BURTasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he has received a communication complaining of the employment by Mr. Le Casse, of Haydon, Norfolk, of juvenile criminals belonging to the Buxton Reformatory, in a case in which Mr. Le Casse's labourers were on strike resisting a reduction of wages and an increase in their hours of labour; and, whether such employment of criminals supported from the rates is according to Law?
MR. ASSHETON CROSS: My attention, Sir, has been called to the matter, and I have communicated upon it

1867
with the managers of the school. I think it right to say that in all cases these hoys should only be employed where it is quite clear that the kind of labour would not interfere with the honest labour of others. The general rule and understanding has been that where a dispute arises in regard to wages the reformatory boys are not to be employed. I entirely disapprove of the use made of them on this occasion, and I have so informed the managers, requesting them to take care that the boys shall not be used in a similar manner in future.

METROPOLIS—THE VICTORIA EMBANKMENT.—QUESTION.
COLONEL BERESFORDasked the Chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works, Whether it rests with that Board, as having the management of the Victoria Embankment, to remove the hoarding which has so long obstructed the eastern end of the Embankment at Black-friars Bridge; and, if so, when the public may expect its removal?
SIR JAMES HOGG, in reply, said, the ground enclosed by the hoarding near Blackfriars Bridge was the property of the Corporation of London, as the purchaser from the Gaslight and Coke Company. Large claims had been made on the Metropolitan Board by the Gas Company and the District Railway Company in respect of the works of the Thames Embankment. The Board was endeavouring to arrange for a settlement of these claims, and it would, no doubt, form part of any settlement that the hoarding should be removed and the thoroughfare widened.

ROYAL STYLE AND TITLES—THE NATIVE PRINCES OF INDIA.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ERNEST NOELasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether he will lay upon the Table of the House any Papers or Despatches from the Governor General or any other authority in India, stating that it is the wish either of the Princes or of the people of India that Her Majesty should make any addition to the Royal Style and Titles?
  MR. DISRAELI: Mr. Speaker, it is the duty of the Government to furnish the House with all the information in
  1868
  their power on any subject of public interest, such as the hon. Gentleman's Question refers to, provided it can be done with due regard to the public good. I have conferred with my noble Friend the Secretary of State for India upon the point dealt with in the Question of the hon. Gentleman, and we are of opinion that these despatches or Papers, such as the hon. Gentleman asks for could not be produced. We are of opinion that it is not expedient to produce them, and for this reason, they involve political considerations with reference to the particular title contemplated by Her Majesty—considerations which we have scrupulously refrained from introducing, and I trust that these debates may be closed without their being introduced. For these reasons, I am unable to comply with the request of the hon. Gentleman, and hope he will not press for the Papers.
  MR. ERNEST NOEL: As the House is not to be furnished with any more information on the subject, I beg to give Notice that on Thursday next, in going into Committee on the Royal Titles Bill, I will move—
  "That seeing there is no literal translation into the Indian languages of the title of Empress, and that Her Majesty's new title in the Indian Empire cannot therefore be rendered as the highest dignity, whatever may be the English addition made to the Royal title, it is the opinion of this House that it would be inexpedient for the First Minister of the Crown to recommend Her most gracious Majesty to adopt a title so novel and so unpopular with her British subjects as that of Empress."

POST OFFICE—THE MAILS TO THE HEBRIDES.—QUESTION.
MR. FRASER-MACKINTOSHasked the Postmaster General, Whether his attention has been called to the serious defects in the carriage of the Mails from the main land to and also within the Inner and Outer Hebrides; and, what steps he proposes taking to remove the grievance complained of?
LORD JOHN MANNERS, in reply, said, his attention had been called to the subject, and he bad now under his consideration the best mode of improving the postal communication with the Hebrides.

MERCANTILE MARINE—WRECK OF THE "ROYAL ADELAIDE."—QUESTION.
CAPTAIN DIGBYasked the Secretary to the Board of Trade, If it is the in-

1869
tention of Her Majesty's Government to take any steps to remove the wreck of the "Royal Adelaide," which is doing great damage at the present time to the fishing interest in the neighbourhood of the Island of Portland?
SIR CHARLES ADDERLEY: I regret to reply to the hon. Member for Dorset-shire that the Government have no funds at their disposal for the removal of wrecks in such localities. The Admiralty have, however, in the case of the Royal Adelaide, offered to place at the disposal of the parties interested half-a-ton of powder for the purpose of dispersing what remains of the wreck; but I have no information whether those interested or responsible are likely to avail themselves of the offer.

INDIA—UNCOVENANTED CIVIL SERVICE.—QUESTION.
MR. DALRYMPLEasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the question of the leave rules of the Uncovenanted Civil Servants in India has yet been decided; and, whether instructions have been issued by the Secretary of State for India which will put an end to the suspense which has for a considerable time existed on the subject?
LORD GEORGE HAMILTON, in reply, said, that the question referred to had been decided, and that a few weeks ago a despatch was sent by the Secretary of State to the Government of India which would enable them to issue instructions that would put an end to the suspense complained of.

NAVY—H.M.S. "VANGUARD"—PAPERS.

  QUESTION.
  CAPTAIN PIMasked the first Lord of the Admiralty, Whether he has any objection to append the following particulars to the Papers, ordered on Thursday the 9th instant, relative to the loss of the "Vanguard," namely:—The ascertained dimensions of chasm which the stem of H.M.S. "Iron Duke" made in the side of H.M.S. "Vanguard" off the Wicklow coast last autumn; also similar dimensions, &c, rent by the prow or spur of H.M.S. "Hercules" in the side of H.M.S. "Northumberland" off Madeira, Christmas 1872; and, further, with the view to elucidate the water-tight arrangements, structural,
  1870
  and typical difference of construction, that the same be accompanied with shaded and perspective midship sectional plans of both the "Vanguard" and "Northumberland" class of ships, illustrating the "wing-passage bulkhead," its purposes and uses, and such other descriptive details as published at pp. 284–5, chap. 12, of the late Chief Constructor's Text Book on "Our Iron-clad Navy?"
  MR. HUNT, in reply, said, he had no objection to add to the Papers ordered on the 9th instant, those mentioned in the Question of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, and some other Papers bearing on the question, if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would move for their production.

EGYPTIAN FINANCE—MR. CAVE'S REPORT.—QUESTION.
MR. J. W. BARCLAYasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether Her Majesty's Government have received Mr. Cave's Report on the finances of the Khedive of Egypt; and if it is to be made public?
MR. DISRAELI, in reply, said, that he had not yet seen the Report, which, he understood, had only been delivered to the Foreign Office that afternoon. Perhaps the hon. Member would on a future day repeat the Question.

ARMY—HOME DISTRICT COMMAND.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ANDERSONasked the Secretary of State for War, If the command of the home district is a staff appointment subject to the five years' rule, and if there is any reason why that rule has been set aside in the case of the officer now holding the command, whose appointment dated from April 1870; and, if there is any rule under which this command is restricted to Major-Generals promoted from full pay of the Guards; and, if there are at present only two unemployed officers falling within that category, affording a very limited field of selection?
  MR. GATHORNE HARDY, in reply, said, the command of the Home District was an appointment under the five years' rule, but that rule was not absolutely imperative. The reason for exception in this case had been in con-

  1871
  sequence of changes that were going on in respect of the command of depôt stations, and for the re-organization of the military police. The officer now holding the command would retire in a short time. Although the selection had to be made from a limited number, an officer very eminently qualified for the post had been nominated as his successor. It had been customary to choose from full pay of the Guards, because that brigade was under the home command.

EQUITY COURTS (IRELAND)—LORD JUSTICE CHRISTIAN.—QUESTION.
MR. CALLANasked the First Lord of the Treasury, If his attention has been called to the statements in a letter which appeared in "The Times" newspaper of Monday March 6, under the heading of "Lord Justice Christian and the Irish Equity Courts," and signed "J. Christian," charging Her Majesty's Government with having revived the Second Court of Landed Estates in Ireland "against their better judgment," and with being parties to ostracising from promotion "one of the ablest of living Judges," because "he had earned the hatred of a priesthood which is a power in politics over a class which are the enemies of England;" and asked is there any truth whatever in either of these grave charges; and, if not, are Her Majesty's Government prepared to take steps to prevent the advancing of grave charges by individuals holding judicial positions in that Country?
MR. DISRAELI: It is not very easy for me to reply to the inquiry of the hon. Gentleman, as it involves three separate questions, and, besides three separate questions, two charges; but I will endeavour, as far as I can, to meet his wishes. He desires to know whether I have seen a letter in The Times newspaper of March 6, signed "J. Christian," containing the two charges to which he refers. I am sorry to say I was not able to see that letter, but I will assume that it has appeared as he says, and I will try to meet those two charges. The first charge is that Her Majesty's Government have "revived the Second Court of Landed Estates in Ireland against their better judgment." Upon that I will remark that the Government revived the Second Court of Landed Estates in Ireland, because there was a strong ex-
1872
pression of opinion in this House in favour of that revival, and from hon. Members of the House who on that subject spoke with authority. One of them, for example, was the hon. and learned Gentleman who occupied the position of Attorney General in the late Government, and another the hon. Member for Cork, who certainly on such matters addressed the House with considerable influence. Both of those hon. Gentlemen spoke in favour of the revival, and it is, I believe, the fact that nearly the whole body of solicitors in Ireland memorialized the Government in favour of it. I cannot therefore, agree with the gentleman who wrote the letter that the revival was against our "better judgment," but rather, I should say, in consequence of that better judgment. The next charge which is made by the letter-writer is one with which it is more difficult to deal, because the mode of expression is extremely obscure. It speaks of the Government as "being parties to ostracising from promotion one of the ablest of living Judges, because he has earned the hatred of a priesthood which is a power in politics over a class which are the enemies of England." The language of the letter, I have been told since I entered the House—for unfortunately I have not been able to obtain it—is of such a character that the imputations which it conveys seem to be directed against various Governments. Confining my answer to the present Government, I can only say that, so far from ostracising any Judges, we have made legal appointments which have, I believe, met with general approbation. Dismissing these two charges, I come to the next question, "whether there is any truth whatever in either of those grave charges;" and after the remarks which I have already made the hon. Gentleman will, I think, not be surprised if I observe that there is no truth whatever in them. Then the hon. Gentleman wants to know, if there be no truth in them, "whether Her Majesty's Government are prepared to take steps to prevent the advancing of grave charges by individuals holding judicial positions in that country." I have only to say on that subject that I think a Government should avoid as much as possible entering into controversy with those who use certain expressions in high judicial positions. I would trust rather to their

1873
own sense of propriety on reflection, and to the dignity of the office which they occupy.

THE MUTINY BILL.—QUESTION.
MR. P. A. TAYLORasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he is aware that the Mutiny Bill, which stands for second reading, has not been printed?
MR. GATHORNE HARDY, in reply, said, that he was aware the Bill had not been printed, but it would be printed before the Bill went into Committee. As it only involved details, he proposed to take the second reading nevertheless, in accordance with usage.
MR. P. A. TAYLORsaid, he would give Notice that on the second reading, he should move that the Bill ought to be; printed before it passed that stage.

SUPPLY. COMMITTEE.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

THE ADMIRALTY—CIVILIAN FIRST LORDS.

  OBSERVATIONS. RESOLUTION.
  MR. BENTINCK, in rising to move—
  "That, in the opinion of this House, the practice of placing at the head of the Admiralty civilians, who from their antecedents cannot be conversant with the business of that Department, is detrimental to the interests of the service,"
  said: Sir, the importance of the subject to which I am about to refer must be my apology for asking for the attention of the House. It is not over stating the case, if I say that not only the honour and the welfare, but that the very existence of this country must depend mainly on the efficiency of our Navy. When we consider our insular position, our many and distant colonial possessions, and, still more, when we consider that in time of war this country must depend on our Navy for her supplies of food, it will be admitted that I have not over-stated the importance of the efficiency of our Navy. But, Sir, if the efficiency of our Navy is at all times of the highest importance, it becomes in the present aspect of the affairs of Europe, if possible, more important still. That which is
  1874
  commonly known as the "Eastern Question" may, at any moment, lead to consequences of the gravest kind. We have heard much also lately of the question of the Suez Canal. Well, Sir, without going further into that question, I contend that the country which will control matters with respect to the Suez Canal, will be the country which holds a naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. How do we try to maintain the efficiency of our Navy? A system prevails in the constitution of the Board of Admiralty, under which we attempt to combine responsibility with an utter want of knowledge of all professional details. Now, Sir, in adverting to this system, I beg to be understood that I am not attacking individuals, but that I condemn a system which places men in a false position. I give full credit to the many distinguished civilians, on both sides of the House, who have held the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, for the energy and ability which they have shown, but I contend that a civilian, with no knowledge of naval matters, cannot fill that post, either with advantag to the country, or with credit to himself; and I contend that the combination of responsibility with ignorance must lead to the most disastrous results. It is said that the First Lord is guided by the advice of his Naval Colleagues; but those Colleagues are not responsible, and men devoid of responsibility will often sanction that which they would not endorse under a sense of responsibility. Many events have occurred lately which may be traced to the evil influence of the present system. I will advert to only a few of such cases. Take the case of the Megœra. Had there been a sailor at the head of the Admiralty, responsible for the conduct of the business of that Department, I cannot believe that after the report received from the naval authorities at Queenstown, that vessel would have been sent to sea on a long voyage in the condition in which she was, and the consequence of which was the loss of the ship, and a narrow escape from the loss of many lives. A sailor would have understood that the vessel was not in a condition to be be sent to sea with safety, and he would not have sanctioned a piece of paltry economy, which could be the only motive for not substituting another vessel for the service which had to be performed. Take the

  1875
  more recent case of the Vanguard. Again, I cannot believe that a sailor, solely responsible for the conduct of the business of the Admiralty, would have sanctioned the practice of sending to sea a fleet of heavy iron-clads, to cruise in narrow waters, under-manned, and with scratch crews, a practice to which the loss of the Vanguard must be chiefly attributed. I would remark also, that had a sailor been at the head of the Admiralty, I doubt whether the Admiralty Minute on the Vanguard Court-martial would ever have appeared. All these incidents show that the political and not the naval element is in the ascendant at the Admiralty. I will only further advert to the practice of supplying Her Majesty's ships with chain cables insufficient for the weight of the ships, if the old scale of the cables for tonnage is to be relied on. This practice is another specimen of mistaken economy, which would not be sanctioned by a sailor responsible for the safety of Her Majesty's ships. All these cases show, with hundreds more which I could quote, how civilian mismanagement is destructive of the efficiency of our Navy. There is no precedent for, the practice of selecting a man who can have no knowledge of its business, to preside over a great Department of the Government. Such a practice would be scouted as an absurdity in any other Department, and in any business, naval or other, conducted by private enter-prize. Would any man in his senses embark his capital in an undertaking if he knew that its management was to be confided to a man who had no previous knowledge of the business to be conducted? I will take the case of my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty. He is a man highly educated, of great ability, and of high moral character. Well, Sir, it would create some surprise if we were told some morning that my right hon. Friend had been made Archbishop of Canterbury. And yet I contend that my right hon. Friend could fulfil the duties of an Archbishop, with more advantage to the Church, and with more credit to himself, than he possibly can perform the duties of First Lord of the Admiralty. It has been said that Parliament must have control over the Admiralty, and therefore that the head of the Admiralty must be in Parliament. Why, Sir, so long as the money for the Admiralty
  1876
  depends on the Vote of the House of Commons, that control must always exist. What is wanted is a Naval Secretary in the House of Commons, who without interfering with the business of the Admiralty, would bring forward the Estimates, and state the condition and requirements of the Navy. Moreover, I should prefer to see the Estimates presented to the House in print rather than in a long speech, which is susceptible of misconstruction. It has further been urged by the opponents of my views that naval men are apt to be prejudiced. Sir, I would ask whether civilians have been always found exempt from that weakness, and if it were so with naval men, I would ask whether total ignorance is not of the two the greater drawback to the discharge of complicated duties? It has been also urged that as a rule naval men are not to be found equal to the position. I believe this to be a libel upon the higher ranks of the Navy. Nothing conduces more than a sea life to give a man habits of thought and general knowledge, and I believe that a Cabinet might easily be formed from the higher ranks of the Navy which would contrast favourably with any Cabinet of civilians. I have by me a list of the First Lords of the Admiralty, for nearly a century, which shows that in almost all the most important periods of our history naval men have been at the head of the Admiralty, and that civilians have been chiefly resorted to in time of peace. Another drawback to the present state of things is the recurrence of a change of system in the Admiralty, with every change of Government. But, Sir, I should wish to quote one, and only one opinion upon the question to which my Motion refers, but it is an opinion, the weight of which must be admitted by the House. I will read to the House what Sir George Cockburn, who was for 17 years First Naval Lord of the Admiralty, says upon the subject. Sir George Cockburn, in a pamphlet devoted to this question, writes—
  "I have no hesitation in stating that I consider the present establishment of the Board of Admiralty to be the most unsatisfactory and least efficient for its purpose that could have been devised."
  Again, Sir George Cockburn writes—
  "Secondly, as regards the proceedings of the Board, when united for general business, I must

  1877
  premise that nothing can well be more contrary to reason, and, I may say, to common sense, than for a person to he selected to preside at such professional Board, who is totally unable, and admits his inability to understand three-fourths of the professional statements, or even expressions, contained in the various documents read on such occasions to the Board, and which therefore the professional members of the Board, become obliged to occupy time in explaining, and endeavouring to make him comprehend, which nevertheless cannot be always sufficiently effected."
  Sir, I could quote much more that Sir George Cockburn has written to the same effect, but I have shown the opinion of the highest authority extant on the subject involved in my Motion. This is no Party question. Both sides are interested in the efficiency of the Navy, but the post of First Lord is too good a prize in the political lottery to be readily abandoned, and the efficiency of the Navy is sacrificed to the cupidity of professional politicians. Sir, the importance of the efficiency of our Navy cannot be over estimated. That efficiency is impaired by the present system. My Motion involves an assertion which cannot be contradicted, and I ask the House not to sanction the continuance of a system, which has lowered the efficiency of the Navy, which is in itself a practical absurdity, and the disastrous consequences of which are constantly forced upon the attention of the country. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Resolution.
  MR. MONK, in rising to second the Motion, said that, as a considerable portion of his hon. Friend's remarks did not reach that side of the House, he trusted he should be forgiven if he should inadvertently travel over any portion of the ground which had been gone over by his hon. Friend. A Motion affecting the constitution of the Board of Admiralty was one of great moment, and was surrounded by many difficulties; while, at the same time, it was one of such vital importance to the Navy, that, as a civilian, he should have shrunk from offering any opinion if he did not think it necessary that the views which he held, and which were certainly entertained largely out-of-doors, though they might not meet with a responsive echo in that House, should be fairly and fully stated. He agreed with his hon. Friend that the practice which had been so long pursued was detrimental to the
  1878
  public service, and he wished to know why a different principle should be adopted in appointing the First Lord of the Admiralty from that which was followed in the appointment of the heads of other Departments. When the Woolsack was vacant did they take a nonprofessional man, however able, and place him at the head of the law? On the contrary, they looked for one of the most distinguished lawyers at the Bar and made him Lord Chancellor. When a vacancy occurred at Lambeth did the Government recommend any one to fill the See of Canterbury but an eminent divine, distinguished for his learning and his piety? Yet when appointing a First Lord of the Admiralty, instead of seeking for a man of great naval experience, they selected a civilian, who had had no special training, and whose previous official life had been spent at the Board of Trade, at the Treasury, or at the Home Office. How was he to gain his naval experience? It could not be acquired by mere summer cruises, or visits to Dockyards, or consultations with his Naval Advisers; but even when the First Lord began to acquire some knowledge of his Department, he was either transferred to some other office or lost his post by the incoming of a new Government, and another civilian took his place who was equally inexperienced. The witnesses examined before the Duke of Somerset's Committee were unanimously of opinion that the present constitution of the Board of Admiralty was unsatisfactory; and Mr. Vernon Lushington expressed his opinion that it was a great advantage that the First Lord should be a professional man. The position of the First Lord was most exceptional. His power was paramount, and he was wholly irresponsible. True, he was responsible to Hoi-Majesty and to Parliament, but everyone knew what that responsibility meant. Practically he was irresponsible, unless it were to public opinion, and even against that he might be upheld by the Parliamentary majority of his Party. He had three Naval Advisers, indeed, but it was not obligatory on him to take their advice. The recent reversal of a portion of the finding of the Court-martial on the loss of the Vanguard was far from satisfactory to the Service, and certainly caused a great deal of surprise among all classes of the coun-

  1879
  try. He believed that all the naval officers who had spoken in the debate on the subject had found fault with the mode in which the First Lord had dealt with the finding of the Court-martial. Was it right that a civilian should set up his opinion against that of distinguished officers such as those who sat on that Court-martial? No doubt, on such an occasion, the First Lord would consult the Naval Advisers of his Board; but were they as competent to form an opinion as those who sat on the Court-martial and heard all the evidence? He would go further, and say, that in his opinion a civilian was not the best judge of what was due to the personal and professional honour of officers of the Navy. In the case of the Army, a distinguished military officer was at the head of it, and he did not see any reason why a distinguished naval officer should not be placed at the head of the Navy. For these reasons, he had great pleasure in seconding the Motion.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, the practice of placing at the head of the Admiralty civilians, who from their antecedents cannot be conversant with the business of that Department, is detrimental to the interests of the service,"—(Mr. Bentinck,)
  —instead thereof.
  MR. DISRAELI: Sir, several Motions of a similar character have been brought forward before by the hon. Member for West Norfolk, and now he calls upon the House to declare—
  "That the practice of placing at the head of the Admiralty civilians, who from their antecedents cannot be conversant with the business of that Department, is detrimental to the interests of the Service."
  Now, when a Motion is brought forward of this character, and when we are called upon to declare what the Motion asserts it is exceedingly desirable that the House should, before they decide, obtain, as far as they can, an accurate idea of what the business of that Department is which the civilian First Lord of the Admiralty is called on to perform. Now, at the Admiralty there is a programme of duties apportioned to the different Members of the Board, and among them there is what is called a table of
  1880
  duties to be performed by the First Lord. I will read that table to the House. In that table the following duties are allotted to the First Lord:—First, he has the general direction and supervision of the Department; second, he has to attend to all political questions; third, to promotions; fourth, to honours; fifth, to civil appointments; sixth, to the conservancy of the River Mersey; and, seventh, to appointments to naval commands. Now the House will at once see that, so far as that table of duties is concerned, the civilian First Lord of the Admiralty is called upon to fulfil no duties which an experienced statesman ought not to be perfectly prepared to perform. As, however, the business has increased and time advanced, that table of duties, though still in record at the Admiralty, is not a sufficiently complete and full one of those which the civilian First Lord of the Admiralty is called on to perform; and I think we may add to it the following duties:—He is directly responsible to Parliament for the expenditure of £10,000,000 or £12,000,000 of the public money. In him is centred all naval, political, and civil questions generally. He is responsible for the disposition of the Fleets abroad, and for all political complications where the Navy is concerned. He is answerable for the entire Dockyard management, involving the employment of from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and for seeing that the money voted annually is economically and properly administered. The financial policy of the Board is under his exclusive control. In addition to these duties, all new works, questions of pay—naval and civilian—training ships, Reserves, stores, and numerous other matters are directly under his management. I think the original table of duties, with those which I have now enumerated, will give the House a complete account of the duties which have to be performed by a civilian First Lord, and I ask the House to consider whether there is anything in the items which I have mentioned which a man who has been long in either House of Parliament, whose life has been devoted to the study of public questions, and who is not only by courtesy, but in reality entitled to be styled a statesman—I ask whether there are any of those duties which such a man is not able adequately to discharge? Well, there are other duties unquestion-

  1881
  ably which have to be performed at the Admiralty. There are the purely naval questions, such as the construction and building of ships, their armour, guns, and the innumerable technicalities attaching to naval architecture and naval warfare. Besides these there are the appointments to naval commands, and the delicate and important question of promotions. These are questions for the settlement of which it may truly be said that a civilian competent to form an opinion on public affairs—a man, generally speaking, of great ability and considerable political experience—might not be found inadequate. On these points, however, the First Lord is not asked to take the initiative, but, being advised by the Naval Members of the Board, he sifts the pros and cons, and decides as he deems best for the Service. Although he certainly possesses a supreme command—and without that the administration of such a Board would soon be anarchy—yet, practically, the decision of professional questions is left to the Naval Lords. It is, therefore, I think, advisable that in considering this question the House should have a clear, though a general, idea of the duties which the civilian First Lord of the Admiralty, whose employment is said to be detrimental to the interests of the nation, is called on to perform. The gist of the argument of the hon. Member for West Norfolk is, that in the office of First Lord there is a combination of responsibilities, or rather, I think he said a knowledge combined with ignorance of the subject, which comes to pretty much the same thing. I have heard the hon. Member speak upon this subject before, and not only once. I remember that nearly 20 years ago he seconded Sir Charles Napier, who brought forward a Motion on the unsatisfactory state of the Navy; and it is only justice to him to say that from the first he has been thoroughly consistent in his views upon this matter. The object of Sir Charles Napier was to prove that the Navy was going to ruin, and that that lamentable state of affairs was to be attributed to the fact that the Chief of the Admiralty was a civilian. Unfortunately, it came out on that discussion, as I well remember, that Sir Charles Napier had solicited a post of Lord at the Admiralty from the civilian Chief of the then existing Board; and
  1882
  though that fact might in some degree affect the arguments of the gallant Admiral, it did not affect that of the hon. Member for East Norfolk, who seconded him, and who now adheres to the position he has always taken. His two objections to the present system are that it is attended by too frequent changes, and that there is too much of a jobbing propensity in such a Board of Administration. With regard to changes which occur in the Board of Admiralty, which is a Parliamentary Board, we must remember that if you are to have a strictly professional Board, the tendency to change would rather be increased. Generally speaking, the Board of Admiralty is disturbed now only on the occurrence of a change in the Ministry; but if you are to have exclusively Naval Members it would be altered, not by change of Ministry but by change of service, because its members naturally look to the preferments to which they have a right to succeed. With regard to the jobbing propensities of the Board, I would recall what was said by Sir Sidney Dacres in his evidence before a Committee in 1871.
  "Admiral Sir Sidney Dacres was asked by the Duke of Somerset, 'Is the recent Order in Council which prevents Admirals employed on the Board of Admiralty from counting their services at the Admiralty as sea time calculated to interfere with the future efficiency of the Board of Admiralty?' He replied, 'No, I do not think so. I think that the fact of officers remaining long at the Admiralty destroys their usefulness as sea officers.' "
  If that is a sound opinion—the authority is great, and it seems to have been accepted by the Committee—it destroys the argument of the hon. Member based on the objection that the present arrangement leads to constant changes. As to the jobbing propensities of these Parliamentary Boards, I would cite the opinion of Sir James Graham, Sir John Barrow, Sir Charles Wood, and, still later, Admiral Lord John Hay, who agree in substance that civilians are much less likely to be prejudiced in making appointments than naval officers would be. I will read the opinion of Lord John Hay, which is the most recent one, and many of us know him, for he was long a Member of this House. He said—
  "I think that with reference to the question of promotion and patronage, and all that, it is absolutely necessary it should not be in the

  1883
  hands of naval men; not that they are not as honest and conscientious as everybody else is, but simply because their views with regard to promotion and patronage all run in grooves: they are too much influenced (although insensibly) by people whom they have known upon particular stations, and by their followers. I think that they are not so well fitted for dispensing the patronage as a statesman and a civilian."
  These remarks apply appositely to the two great objections which are always urged against the present system by the hon. Gentleman. His chief argument is that there is a combination of responsibility and ignorance, and the consequence of that is the occurrence of naval disasters; and he adduces two cases in proof, one of which is that of the Megœra. I put it to any hon. Gentleman on the other side who heard that case as stated by the hon. Gentleman, whether it had really anything to do with the question of the Chief of our Naval Administration being a professional man or a civilian. If it means anything, it means, so far as the ease goes, that there was false economy at work, and that, I imagine, may occur with a naval Chief as well as a civilian Chief, for economy depends upon a greater power than any Board of Admiralty. Then the hon. Member brought forward the case of the Vanguard, and he considered that all the accidents that led to the disastrous loss of that vessel were due to a civilian being at the head of the Admiralty. If he had said it had resulted from a civilian being at the head of the Squadron I could have understood the argument, and I think it probable that things would have been as well managed as they were by the professional officers. I really think the two instances brought forward are not such as ought to lead us to adopt his Resolution. The hon. Member rested his arguments mainly upon the authority of Sir George Cockburn, whom I remember in this House; he was a most gallant officer and a man of stern and severe character, and I acknowledge the weight of his authority. I believe that during his 17 years' naval administration he had pretty well his own way, and therefore he was hardly the witness I should have thought would have been brought forward against the present system, because it was very well known—certainly while Lord Melbourne was First Lord of the Treasury—Sir George Cockburn exercised a preponde-
  1884
  rant power, and the generally satisfactory state of the British Fleet during that period was attributed by the country mainly to the character and influence of Sir George Cockburn. In the latter part of his life he became, as we are all accustomed to become, too critical; when he was no longer in office he probably thought affairs were not managed as well as they were during his 17 years' tenure of office, and he left a legacy to his countrymen, from which the hon. Member has quoted profusely this evening. The Duke of Somerset has been quoted more than once. He is a member of the Liberal Party; he is a statesman who is much respected on both sides of the House. He is a man whose capacity is always at the service of the country, and at this moment he is engaged upon business of grave importance. He was, although a civilian, a most able First Lord of the Admiralty for six years. He was examined before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1861, and in his examination by the Chairman these questions and answers occur—
  "I wish to know whether your Grace thinks that any difference would arise if the First Lord were a professional man, instead of, as hitherto has been the case, a civilian?—I think there would be some advantages and some disadvantages from that. The first question is, whether the First Lord of the Admiralty is to be a Minister or not. I do not think that, with a Representative Government in the country, you could go on without having the First Lord of the Admiralty a Cabinet Minister. I consider that that would be found to be necessary; and if you are to have the First Lord a Cabinet Minister, it will not often happen that no officer will be found in the Navy in that position in Parliament to be made a Cabinet Minister. That is the first difficulty that I see in what the hon. Member seems to point at—namely, having the First Lord essentially a naval man.
  "Has your Grace formed any opinion as to any advantage which might be derived by such a change as having a naval person for the First Lord?—I think it an impossible condition. If Parliament is to manage and control the Navy affairs, and the Admiralty is to be represented in Parliament, I think it would be an impossible condition to make it essential to have a naval man at the head. I observe that even in France, where they have not that same necessity, they do not put a naval man at the head of the Admiralty. At the present moment they have a civilian; and in years back there have been more civilians than naval men as Ministers of Marine in France.
  "I think I rightly understood your Grace's opinion as expressed on a former day, turning to a different subject, to be rather against than in favour of an idea which prevails in some

  1885
  quarters, that the First Lord of the Admiralty ought to be a naval officer?—I do not think that there is any reason against a naval officer if the naval officer is in a position to he First Lord of the Admiralty. But, as far as we know from history, naval officers have not been very successful First Lords; and it has had this effect—it has not tended so much to bring naval knowledge to the Admiralty, but it has tended to carry politics into the Navy, and if we were to refer to past times, we should see that when naval officers were at the head of the Admiralty, there was a question of even whether an officer of opposite politics could safely take the command of a fleet. Therefore, it will be seen that Naval First Lords were not successful in administering the affairs of the Navy. I think if I were to go through the periods of Lord Keppel, Lord Howe, or Lord St. Vincent, they are not successful examples of Naval First Lords of the Admiralty, and they are the last examples that we have had."
  There has been one since the Committee—the Duke of Northumberland—but his period of Administration was brief. Then we have the evidence of Sir James Graham, a Member of the Liberal Party, who is also recognized by both sides of the House, I believe, as a successful First Lord of the Admiralty. He was supposed to combine great efficiency in the Service with admirable financial reforms. He was four years at the Admiralty, and, as we all know, was one of the most experienced men who have ever taken part in public affairs. On this subject—I do not know whether it was before the same Committee, but it was, at all events, before a very modern Committee—he was asked—
  "May I ask your view with reference to the opinion held by a great number of individuals as to the office of First Lord being held by a naval officer?—At my present age, and in my present state, I am a dispassionate spectator. I have no interest whatever in that question personally, but I have some experience, and I am strongly of opinion that while our Government is Parliamentary, it is greatly in favour both of the Service and of the State that a civilian should be at the head of the Board of Admiralty.
  "Would you hold that opinion as strongly if the office was entirely divested of any political bearing?—Under our Parliamentary Government, I cannot conceive it to be divested of political hearing. Next to the Army, and almost equal to the Army, the expenditure of the Navy is the largest branch of the annual outlay of the State submitted to Parliament in annual Estimates; and my strong opinion is that the House of Commons, being now the great centre of power (I wish to speak respectfully of the House of Peers, and should be very sorry that Peers were hold disqualified from being First Lords of the Admiralty), on the whole, it is desirable that the
  1886
  First Lord should be a Member of the House of Commons, and a man who, by Parliamentary experience and Parliamentary training, has fitted himself for high office, or is supposed to be fitted for high office."
  Mr. Austin Bruce, a Member of the Committee, who now sits in the other House as Lord Aberdare, then addressed Sir James Graham—
  "You have expressed a decided opinion in favour of a civilian First Lord, rather than a professional First Lord. Does that objection to a professional First Lord arise from the difficulty of obtaining a man of adequate Parliamentary weight and capacity, and of securing for him a seat in the House of Commons?—No, it rests on more general grounds. Certainly, as the question conveys, there is a great difficulty in finding a naval officer, however eminent in his own profession, consistently with Parliamentary government, capable of performing adequately the political functions; and, looking at the matter historically, I see that all the most successful naval administrations have been the administrations of civilians, and, speaking generally, the most unfortunate and the worst have been those of Naval First Lords.
  "The Administration of Lord Chatham was perhaps the most successful Administration in English history. You recollect that Lord Anson was his First Lord of the Admiralty?—Yes.
  "Was Lord Anson's administration a failure?—I cannot answer particularly with respect to Lord Anson's administration; but, coming a little nearer, I have strong historical evidence of the greatest evils arising from a Naval First Lord, and his professional prejudices. I would illustrate it by the case of Lord Keppel in 1782. There is this remarkable fact, that Lord Keppel had serious quarrels and misunderstandings with Lord Rodney; and Lord Keppel, being First Lord, recalled Lord Rodney from the command in the West Indies in a manner the most summary and the least considerate that can well be imagined. The historical statement will be found in the seventh volume of Lord Mahon's History. It so happened that the order for his recall from the West Indies crossed the despatch bearing Lord Rodney's account of his great victory of the 12th of April, and it was by mere accident that Lord Rodney was not recalled on the eve of the battle of the 12th of April."
  I do not know whether the House will bear any further recollections of this kind, but it is important that we should decide this question by the authority of the most eminent men we have produced. In the evidence of Sir James Graham we have the opinions of an able statesman, entirely free from passion or interest. He was asked further—
  "Besides Lord Keppel and Lord Anson, who have been mentioned, there have been the administrations of Lord Howe and Lord St. Vincent. What is your opinion of the administration of Lord St. Vincent as First Lord?—I regard Lord St. Vincent as one of the greatest

  1887
  of our naval heroes, and, on his own element, almost unrivalled in history. I have read the debates when Lord St. Vincent was First Lord of the Admiralty, in which Mr. Pitt, after the Peace of Amiens, discussing the naval preparations and the defences generally of this country, made a Motion for inquiry, which Mr. Fox supported; and I find that by almost universal consent at that time Lord St. Vincent's naval administration at the Admiralty was condemned, he being certainly, on his own element, one of the greatest of naval commanders."
  Thus, when Lord St. Vincent was First Lord, Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox agreed—in what? In condemning the administration of the Navy by a naval officer. The evidence continues—
  "Then the popular motion that Lord St. Vincent's administration laid the foundation, to a great extent, for the triumphs of Lord Nelson, you conceive to be fallacious?—I should certainly say it was not Lord St. Vincent's naval administration that led to Lord Nelson's triumphs in 1805. Lord St. Vincent was not then at the Board of Admiralty, though it does so happen that a naval officer was at the head of the Board of Admiralty, a man of very inferior naval reputation to Lord St. Vincent—I mean Lord Barham. Lord Brougham, who was a young man then, and may be said to have been a contemporary of Lord St. Vincent, states' that Lord St. Vincent and Lord Eldon were the only two eminent statesmen in the Administration of Mr. Addington;' and he adds that while he was First Lord of the Admiralty he laid the foundation of a system of economical administration, which has since been extended from the Navy to all Departments of the State.' I need not ask you whether you share the opinion of Lord Brougham as to the efficiency of Lord St. Vincent's administration?—No; I do not share Lord Brougham's opinion in the smallest degree upon that point. Is there not a great deal in the career of an eminent naval officer which naturally prepares him to take a useful political part in the Cabinet? Being much employed in negotiation, and large discretionary powers being constantly vested in him, he must necessarily acquire a familiarity with great political questions. Would not ail those points be of great importance in preparing him, in addition to the professional and administrative knowledge which he must necessarily have, to play an important part in the Government of the country?—If you find that happy combination, I would certainly say it would be so; but I do not admit that the professional training and habits of the most distinguished officers lead to that combination. They have great opportunities, at any rate, of exercising their judgment in matters of great political importance?—I do not think they have the opportunity of exercising much judgment from their being instruments acting under orders that have been issued; but, with regard to negotiations, they constantly exercise a wide discretion. It is a great characteristic of the profession that they are subject to rigid command, and that their obedience is implicit. They are the very best instruments of Government which can be found, but their habits are obedience and reliance on authority."
  1888
  I have now laid before the House the evidence of Sir James Graham—reports of this kind are only too easily forgotten, though they should be of perennial interest—and I think it is not difficult to trace his character in all his observations. Coming to the evidence of the late Lord Northbrook, then Sir Francis Baring, on this subject, I find he says very properly that he should be sorry to see the Crown limited in its choice, and I think all of us must agree with him in that. I am not at all to be understood as contending that a naval officer should not be made First Lord of the Admiralty if he has the necessary qualities for the office. As the matter at present stands, the Crown has the power of appointing either a naval officer or a civilian. Sir Francis Baring says—
  "The difficulty with regard to appointing a naval man is the selection of a fit person; looking at the age of those who are high in the naval service, and the importance of having a person responsible to Parliament in whom Parliament has confidence, I think there is a great difficulty in selecting a naval man; but I am not at all prepared to say that a naval man may not be found who would make a very good First Lord, and, if so, I do not know that there are not some advantages in having a naval man; as to whether a naval man would make a good First Lord, I cannot give an opinion; but I remember the opinion of a much better judge than I am—namely, Lord St. Vincent. Lord St. Vincent was himself First Lord of the Admiralty, and there is in Mr. Tucker's work a letter published of Lord St. Vincent's, in which he announces to Lord Keith his appointment of First Lord of the Admiralty. He first announces to Lord Keith that he is appointed; he then says—' How I shall succeed remains to be proved; I have known many a good Admiral make a wretched First Lord of the Admiralty.' That is Lord St. Vincent's opinion; and when you look back upon the names of naval men who were First Lords of the Admiralty, it is remarkable. There were Lord Howe, Lord Keppel, Lord Hawke, Lord Anson, and Sir Charles Saunders. I think those must have been the naval Lords from the beginning of the reign of George III., whom he must have alluded to."
  Again, Sir Charles Wood, now Viscount Halifax, who was First Lord for three years, being asked whether he considered that the First Lord had better be a civilian than a naval man, said—
  "My opinion is that, upon the whole, without excluding a naval man, it is better that he should be a civilian. He must be a Member of the Cabinet; and the choice, of course, of men of business is greater among the whole class of civilians than among the limited class of naval officers; and I think that, upon the whole, he is more likely to exercise an impartial judgment,

  1889
  so far as relates to the question to which I understand you refer—namely, the promotion and appointment of officers."
  Now I have read to the House the evidence of three distinguished civilians who were First Lords—Sir James Graham, Lord Northbrook, and Viscount Halifax. I cannot venture to go at any length into the evidence which I have before me from the Naval First Lord, or, rather, the Naval Lord of the Admiralty. There is, however, one piece of evidence by Sir Maurice Berkeley which I must read. He says—
  "I am quite aware that civilians who have filled the office of First Lord of the Admiralty are men who are trained to Parliamentary practice, and are always Cabinet Ministers, as they ought to he; and if you could find me an Admiral who, as well as being at the head of his profession, and being a man who is looked up to by the profession, has great administrative powers, and who is in the Cabinet, I should prefer him; but unless you can combine all those qualities in an Admiral I do not think it desirable for him to be First Lord."
  That is the opinion of a distinguished officer. I should now like to read the opinion of a man who was Under Secretary and Secretary to the-Admiralty for 40 years; a man of unrivalled experience, the late Sir John Barrow, who recorded his opinion in the Life of Lord Howe. He says—
  "Naval officers in general would naturally enough ask, Who is the description of person most likely and best qualified to do justice to those who have had the labouring oar in fighting the battles of the country, in the issue of which is involved all that we hold dear? And the answer would naturally be, a Naval First Lord;' and yet they will find that on taking a retrospect many bitter complaints have been made from their own corps against a purely naval administration, on the score of partiality. How, indeed, can it be expected that a professional man should be able to divest himself of prejudice in favour of those individuals with whom he has associated, sometimes almost exclusively for years, in a confined and uninterrupted intercourse? How can it be expected he should cast aside the best feelings of human nature and disregard those early and ancient friendships from the moment he takes his seat at the head of the Admiralty Board—that he should turn aside from these companions of his early days, who gained laurels by his side, who shared with him his dangers 'of the battle and the breeze,' and participated in his pleasures? Such are the officers, whether most fit or not, who will expect to share, and who will share, largely in a Naval Lord's patronage. Besides, the education of a seaman is not exactly such as is suited to fill an important place in the Ministerial Cabinet. The time that is taken up in acquiring that degree of professional skill and eminence of character which could alone
  1890
  justify the appointment to such a situation almost precludes the acquisition of that general knowledge, and of those broad and comprehensive views inseparable from the character of a great statesman. Take the list of admirals as it now stands, and let any one ask himself how many flag-officers there are upon it whom he conceives the Minister would deem qualified to fill the office of First Lord of the Admiralty? Then, if distinguished success against the enemy be allowed to furnish a criterion of good management as it regards good ships and good officers, it will be found that the proudest triumphs, the most brilliant victories, have been achieved by fleets and squadrons prepared and distributed under the direction and management of landsmen as First Lords. Thus the battle of Rodney with Don Juan do Langara, and his splendid victory of the 12th of April, 1782; the defeat of the French fleet on the 1st of June, 1794; the victories of Cape St. Vincent and of Camperdown in 1797; of the Nile in 1798; the battle of Copenhagen in 1801; and the total defeat of the combined fleets of France and Spain before Trafalgar, were all obtained by fleets prepared and commanded by officers appointed by First Lords who were landsmen. Though Lord St. Vincent actually sat at the Board when the battle of Copenhagen was fought, the preparations were made under Lord Spencer's superintendence. It was also a Naval Lord who presided on the 12th of April, 1782, yet the arrangements and disposition were actually made by his able predecessor, Lord Sandwich. It was on this occasion that Lord North, addressing himself to the new Ministry in the House of Commons, observed—'It is true you have triumphed, but you fought with Philip's troops.' It must be admitted, however, that without the assistance of two or three able, honest, and judicious naval coadjutors no landsman, whatever his talents might be, could attempt to carry on the numerous duties of this important office. On the other hand, a naval First Lord may not always be disposed to seek for such assistance."
  That is the opinion of Sir John Barrow, written towards the end of his life, after mature thought and under a due sense of his professional responsibility. I cannot help thinking that this evidence which I have placed before the House will make them hesitate before adopting the Motion of the hon. Gentleman the Member for West Norfolk, which I confess, and I have always admitted, is of a very plausible character. I will not trouble the House with many more extracts; but there is a modern one, from the evidence of Lord John Hay, in 1871, which I wish to read to the House. He is asked if he thought there would be any advantage in the First Lord being a naval man, and he says—
  "Certainly not; I have hardly ever seen a Naval Lord whom I thought fit to be the First Lord of the Admiralty; but I think we sailors should always like to have a statesman of great

  1891
  weight and authority and importance in the country, representing us in Parliament; I think that we should go rather to the wall if we had no man of that sort, whereas we at present hold our own very well."
  That is the opinion of Lord John Hay. You are asked, and not for the first time, to terminate this system; but I have adduced evidence which must weigh heavily with every impartial mind. The evidence is contributed by statesmen who have been connected with the Liberal Party chiefly—men like Graham, Halifax, and Northbrook, with whom we were proud to mingle in political life. I have also placed before you the testimony of Mr. Secretary Barrow, a man of high consideration, and whose judgment must carry great weight. But beyond all this, look to the practical results of the present system. The hon. Gentleman who brought forward this Motion, I believe, stated that our disasters might be attributed to having civilians at the head of the Administration, and that all our glories, our chief glories, were owing to administrations presided over by professional men. But the contrary is really the fact. Prom 1782, from the days of Rodney to the Peace—from 1782, that battle when the line was first broken, to the great day of Trafalgar—the whole series of glorious victories were achieved under naval administrations headed by civilians—by Sandwich, Spencer, and Melville. It appears to me we should be taking a rash step if we adopted the Resolution of the hon. Gentleman, and therefore I give it my opposition.
  Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  The House divided:—Ayes 261; Noes 18: Majority 243.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN IRON-CLAD NAVIES.—OBSERVATIONS.
MR. E. J. REED, in rising to call attention to the number and condition of our Iron-clad Ships and to the strength of certain Foreign Iron-clad Navies, said, the standard by which they must judge the strength of the Navy was a relative, not an abstract one. No doubt it was somewhat invidious, for political reasons, to be continually referring to the strength or weakness of foreign Navies, and recently Ministers had
1892
avoided that. But there was no reason why he, a private Member, should not place before the House the information which he happened to possess about foreign Navies. Our strength in respect of unarmoured ships was of small importance in comparison with our strength in armoured ships, for we could quickly remedy defects in the former, but not in the latter. His present object was not to advocate anything like sudden or extravagant expenditure. Indeed, his object was an economical one, for he did not sympathize with those hon. Gentlemen who always regarded a reduction of expenditure as being synonymous with economy. He was in favour of the true economy which made the normal reasonable and proper expenditure equal to the occasions which might be fairly expected to arise. This had not been the case of late years. We had experience to guide us in this respect. In 1870 war was declared by Prance against Germany, and Her Majesty's Government did not say the Navy was sufficient, but hastily asked for an additional expenditure of £400,000 on the Navy, and laid down four ships—the Cyclops, the Hecate, Gorgon, and the Hydra. Being the designer of those vessels, he did not wish to disparage them; but he might mention that the design was prepared for a colonial Government and for a colonial purpose, and that the ships were not such as the Government of England would have sanctioned if they had not been ordered in the urgency of probable war. It happened that the war was at an end before we got even one of those vessels, and, consequently, that expenditure was useless for its purpose, and had given us four ships which we should not have built for English purposes under more deliberate circumstances. Any one who called attention to the state of the Navy was sure to be accused of creating a panic. Of late years, however, the grounds of the necessity for our expenditure had not been laid before us, and there was a tendency to glide into a purely artificial expenditure. It was, therefore, desirable that an independent Member should occasionally direct attention to our actual position. First of all, he would make a few remarks on iron-clad ships themselves, for some people asked whether it were wise to continue expending money on iron-clad ships, instead of constructing unarmoured rams and unarmoured tor-

1893
pedo vessels. Now, in his opinion, unarmoured rams and torpedoes could not possibly carry out the naval service of the country. Such rams and torpedo vessels could only attack ships, and were unfit for the general purposes of the British Navy. What was the last important duty which the iron-clad fleet of England was called upon to perform? It was the removal from under the guns of Cartagena of the two Spanish ironclads by Admiral Sir Hastings Yelverton. Those vessels had to be withdrawn from under batteries offering the most favourable position for attacking ships and armed with powerful ordnance. He would ask the House to consider whether an admiral in command of unarmoured torpedo boats could have attempted the operation he had described? The Spanish forts would have been able to destroy any unarmoured ships which had entered the harbour, even though those ships had, in the first place, destroyed the vessels of the insurrectionists—a very improbable event in view of the fact that the harbour was surrounded on all sides by forts armed with heavy guns. He therefore asked the House to consider very carefully before superseding iron-clads in the British Navy by vessels marked by so absolute a degree of inefficiency as was possessed by many of the ships to which reference had been made. For many years past the principal services which the British Navy had been called upon to perform had been executed against land forts and ports and harbours—a kind of service which could not possibly be performed in a satisfactory manner by unarmoured vessels. It was perfectly true that armour-clad ships cost large sums of money, and it could not but startle the country when an event occurred like the sinking of the Vanguard by her sister ship in an accidental collision. The loss of that ship was not, however, due to any intrinsic weakness in her construction, but to neglect of an obvious duty on the part of some one to close the compartments between the engine and boiler rooms. The officer who ought instantly to have closed these compartments, instead of doing so, applied himself to other duties, one of which was going on deck and imparting to the captain his conviction that the ship was sinking. The loss of the Vanguard, therefore, did not influence his belief that the ships of the Navy must be so
1894
armour-plated and so armed as to fit them alike for fighting at sea and acting on the offensive against land forts. There had grown up a habit in some quarters of slighting the importance of England having iron-clad ships in distant parts of the world. It was urged by some persons that, in reference to the matter, regard should be had to European operations only; but this view he held to be based on great and grievous error. For some time past England had had iron-clad flag-ships on the China, North American, and Pacific stations, and he did not think any one would be found bold enough to say that the circumstances of foreign countries were such as to diminish the demand for the presence of British iron-clads in distant waters. He would not refer to the Suez Canal further than to express his opinion that it would be necessary for England to station iron-clads at either end of the Canal in case of either war or the rumour of war in that part of the world. The fact of England purchasing or neglecting to purchase an interest in the undertaking would not, in his view of the case, affect this necessity in the slightest degree. Foreign countries all over the world were building iron-clads at the very time we were urged to cease doing so. Even the Chinese and Japanese Governments were having iron-clad ships built in England and Scotland at the present moment. Vessels of the kind were already possessed by the Brazilian, Chilian, and Peruvian Governments, and the Argentine Republic on the coast of South America; and the United States Government had a considerable number of powerful armour-plated ships for the defence of her coast and ports, which, though not exactly sea-going vessels, could yet make considerable coast passages. In view of the existence of these vessels it would be unreasonable to say that the demand for the use of additional ironclads abroad was likely to diminish rather than increase. He had gone carefully into the question of the amount of money expended during the last 18 years on the Navy, and he found that, although £200,000,000 had been so disbursed, not more than £18,000,000 had been expended in the building and first equipment of iron-clad ships. This statement might be doubted, and he would, therefore, mention, in illustration and further-

1895
ance of his view, that of the 16,000 workmen for whom it was proposed to provide in the Estimates for the-current year, not more than 3,000 were to be employed upon the construction of ironclad ships. He could not add anything about another part of our expenditure for the coming year, as there had fallen out of the Estimates for the last year or two a piece of information which was very valuable, and which he hoped they would have in future—namely, the division of contracts between iron-clad ships and unarmoured vessels. He now came to the relative position of this country and other nations with respect to iron-clads. He would throw out of consideration all wooden vessels covered with armour-plates, for this reason—that the greater part of them had been placed by the Admiralty on the list of ships which were not fit for sea-going purposes, and most of the remainder were known to be far gone into decay. He would not exclude all the wooden iron-clads of other countries, although he did the purely wooden ships, because some people believed in wood still. The French, for instance, had recently built wooden iron-clads, and it would be unreasonable to throw out new ships merely because they were wooden—his objection being to ships which were decaying or decayed. There were, as far as he was aware, two classes of vessels of ours which did not exist in any foreign Navy, the first a very curious class—one in which the armour was extended fore and aft all over the gun battery, but fell short at the water line, so that an enemy could riddle them at either end below the water line, and render them useless. Two vessels only of that class were constructed—the Hector and the Valiant—and these he would also leave out. They were among the earliest of our armoured vessels, but they had that very bad feature, and he did not believe in them, nor did he believe that any Board of Admiralty would send them into line in case of war, except when very hardly pressed. He threw out, also, the Defence and Resistance. Their batteries were small in proportion to their size. They could not be regarded as fit to work among armoured vessels, and he was not aware that any ship like these was to be found in any foreign Navy. Then, again, he would leave out another class—namely, long ships. They had five
1896
vessels of what he might call preternatural length—the Warrior, the Black Prince, the Minotaur, the Agincourt, and the Northumberland. He could not understand how any one could have made such ships of war, unless, indeed, for chasing purposes—for speed only. He threw them out because he believed they would become an easy prey to a powerful enemy. They were, however, valuable vessels for the purposes he had indicated, and if a part of their armour were removed, which might be easily effected without interfering with their speed, they would be still more valuable. That brought the number down to 12 vessels, and these he considered as extremely powerful vessels, although he had been reproached for including second-class iron-clads in his list. The 12 were the five of the Audacious and Swiftsure class, and the Hercules, Sultan, Bellerop hon. Monarch, Penelope, Devastation, and Thunderer; and he would also include the Alexandra, Dreadnought, and Shannon, which would be ready for sea early next year, and this he did to avoid, if possible, all cavil and question in reference to his figures. He would, of course, also take such ships into view in the case of other countries. Well, those 15 ships gave a total displacement tonnage of 113,500 tons, and an aggregate horse power of 91,300. A great deal had been said of their expenditure on iron-clads, and they were often told that they spent so much on the Navy in comparison with other nations, but what was the fact? He found that the grand total of English iron-clad displacement tonnage was 317,000 tons. That was the tonnage of all the iron-clads that had been built in this country from the commencement, while the grand total of the displacement tonnage of all European iron-clads during the same time was 697,500 tons. The first thing, therefore, he wished the House to understand was that this country had not built altogether nearly half as many iron-clads—comparing the displacement tonnage—as had the other European Powers. He had stated the tonnage of what he considered to be our efficient ships for general purposes at sea, and generally for the work of the country. He would now briefly refer to one or two other Powers. Germany had at this moment, including one or two vessels which were nearly completed, eight sea-going iron-

1897
clads. The weakest of these were not very strong ships, but they would bear in mind that he had not excluded from his list of English ships any iron-clad on account of mere weakness of armour. He had excluded none except where the armour was not extended over the whole water line. In addition to those vessels Germany had three ships with 10-inch armour and armed with 14½ton guns. Some authorities said 18-ton guns, but he preferred to state what he knew them to have when he last saw them. One of those ships had 18 of those guns, each of the others had eight, and not one of the German ships was armed with less than 9-ton guns. Two other of the ships had 9-inch armour, and they were armed with 21-ton guns. They had besides a small vessel, which he put down because she had 6-inch armour and at least a 9-ton gun. That was all he would say with reference to Germany. The next he came to was the Turkish Navy, because, curiously enough, Turkey, whatever she might have failed to do, had not failed to provide a goodly array of ironclads to he in front of the Imperial Palace on the Bosphorus. He was not aware that they did much else, or were very successful when they tried to do much else; but that was not the fault of the ships, for they were good ships, and would become formidable instruments in the hands of another Power. He had shown what would have happened if we had had to depend upon unarmoured rams and torpedoes at Cartagena. The Eastern Question had undergone great changes, and the House had been told that England had followed in the wake of three Great Powers and had not stood alone. But if he were to vaticinate, he would say that we might be compelled to stand alone, and that if the Eastern Question was to give us our next trouble in the future, the first duty of our Navy might be to he alongside the Turkish Navy and to take practical possession of it. Could such a duty be performed by unarmoured rams and torpedoes? The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were strongly defended by batteries, against which unarmoured vessels would stand no chance, and if it ever became the duty of the English Navy to take possession of the Turkish Navy, it could only be done by iron-clads of the most powerful class. This was a list of the Turkish Navy. One ship had 12-inch armour and 15
1898
guns, of which 12 were 18-ton guns. Then came four vessels of an earlier date, with 5½ inch armour, each carrying eight 12-ton guns, and a considerable number of 6½ ton guns. Those vessels were likely to receive a largely increased armament. Then there were two little vessels, one of which he had designed himself, with 9-inch armour and four guns, all of 12 tons; and there was another vessel exactly like her, which Turkey had had the skill to build for herself. Two more vessels he included among sea-going vessels though his hon. Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Samuda), who had built one of them, might perhaps take exception to his so including them. Had they belonged to the English Navy he should not have done so, but for naval purposes in the East they were very formidable ships, and therefore he did not exclude them. They had 7-inch armour, with four 12-ton guns. There were next some small vessels, each carrying a 12-ton gun; and three of them had been transferred from Egypt to the Sultan, when he objected to the Khedive having armoured ships of his own. Another vessel, which his hon. Friend had also built, had been recently launched, carrying 12-inch armour and four 25-ton guns. Altogether there were 13 ships, and the two most powerful of them were being repeated in this country; but he did not include these in the present calculation, as they were not likely to be completed within the coming year. The total tonnage of the Turkish efficient ships was 66,500 tons, with an indicated horse power of 50,000. He now came to the Navy of France, and here again some of the vessels were weak like the Penelope of our own Navy. He was, however, obliged to include such vessels, because they could not be altogether left out of the comparison. The French had very few finished iron vessels of war. They were believers in wood; they had been so from the beginning, and had paid for believing in it. This country also resorted to wood, and paid for doing so. But the French Government, resorting to it much more, had paid for it much more heavily than we had done, and he was quite alive to everything that had been said as to the decay and waste of the French wooden vessels. The oldest of the iron-clads of the French Navy which he considered as efficient was the Ocean, launched in

1899
December, 1868, the Marengo, and the Suffren. They were 7¾ inch armoured and carried eight guns, of which four were guns of 21 tons. France had also two iron ships of a less strength—the Couronne, of 5-inch, and the Heroine, of 6-inch armour—but both carrying 14-ton guns. She had also the Friedland, of 7¾ inch armour, carrying 14-ton guns; the Triomphante, Victorieuse, and Laga-lissonnière, of 6-ineh armour and 8-ton guns; and the Riehelieu, Colbert, and Trident, of 8½ inch armour and 21-ton guns. Some of them were not completed, but they were all likely to be finished during the year. Mr. Martin, in his Statesman's Year Book, said—
"By a Resolution of the National Assembly passed in the Session of 1875 large additions are to be made to the Navy of war, an annual credit of 30,000,000f., or £1,200,000, being set aside for the purpose, to be applied to 50 vessels, the construction of which is either to be finished, continued, or simply commenced within five years. Of these 50 vessels, there are to be seven iron-clads of the first class; five iron-clads of the second class; eight iron-clads for coast defence, of which five are to be of the first class and three of the second class; four gunboats of the first class; nine cruisers; four avisos; eight transports; and four gunboats capable of being taken to pieces. The vessels which have to be finished in 1876 are the following:—The Colbert and the Trident, iron-clads of the first class; the Triomphante and the Victorieuse, ironclads of the second class; the Tonnerre, ironclad for coast defence of the first class; the Lutin and the Lynx, gunboats of the first class; the Tourville, cruiser of the first class; the Deputit Thouars, cruiser of the second class; and the four gunboats which are to be capable of being taken to pieces. The greater number of these vessels are being or will be built in the Government dockyards at Brest, Cherbourg, and Toulon."
The aggregate tonnage of the French efficient sea-going iron-clads was 84,000 tons, with an indicated horse-power of 55,500. He had excluded from the French, as from our own Navy and other Navies, all ships that had been ordered to be completed, but which would not be finished during the coming year. There were other vessels in the course of construction for France, and of these one was of 12-inch armour with 35-ton guns; another, 15-inch and 4 guns of 21 tons; a third of the same character, and four other powerful vessels. One or two of them had not been actually commenced, but he had also included in his English list ships such as the Ajax and the Agamemnon, in which progress would be
1900
made during the coming year. He would go lightly over the remaining Navies. Russia had, or would have at the end of the year, five iron-clad sea-going vessels. The names of these ships were the Prince Pajarski, with 4½ inch armour and 9½ton guns; the Peter the Great, with 15-inch armour and 40-ton guns; the General Admiral, with 6-inch armour, and 12½ ton guns; the Duke of Edinburgh, with 6-inch armour and 12½ ton guns; and the Minin, with 7-inch armour, and 12½ ton guns. The Peter the Great was not yet finished, and progress in constructing her had been very much delayed by the fact that two ships in succession went to the bottom with armour plates for the Peter the Great on board. He was laughed at when he talked of the Peter the Great; but he reminded the House that there were two ships of ours which were begun before he left the Admiralty in 1870; and one of which, the Dreadnought, was only to be finished next July twelvemonth. We had, in fact, been longer in building the Dreadnought and the Thunderer than the Russians had been building the Peter the Great. The Russian sea-going armour-clad Navy, however, was hardly worth discussing. Exception, indeed, might be taken to including three of their ships as armour-clads at all; but they were all protected at the water line, and came within the class to which he was referring. Besides, as he had said, they were all armed with 12½ton guns, and would be powerful as cruisers. The iron-clad Navy of Italy consisted of eight ships, four all alike, comprising 37,500 tons, with 30,500 horse-power. Besides these, Italy was building two very powerful ships, but he thought that neither of them would be finished during the present year. As to these ships he wished to say a word. Soon after he left office a powerful Committee was appointed to sit upon the British Navy, consisting of Gentlemen who knew very little about the subject, and not numbering among them a single shipbuilder. It was an unfair Committee, because, though consisting of able men, there were none who were masters of his work; but he was happy to say that this Committee, though probably brought together to ban his ships, really blessed them, and he had no fault to find with their Report. He was requested to go before the Committee, and he was asked

1901
by the Chairman, Lord Dufferin, to explain the project of a ship which he had designed to meet the future requirements of the country. He did so, and his successor was afterwards examined to give further information about it. What followed was, he thought, not creditable to our prudence in these matters. This Report was shown to him in Berlin, and it contained the description given by him to the Committee. This was many months before the Report was laid on the Table of the House, and the Department had not the courtesy to show him the Report. But it was, as he had said, shown to him in Berlin, and by the time he had got into Russia, it had become so cheap that he was offered a copy. The point to which he was coming was that the two Italian ships he had mentioned were the consequences of this Report. The Chief Constructor of the Italian Navy and his assistants tried their hands upon carrying out the plan he had described to the Committee, which was intended to give great superiority to the first Power who turned out a vessel upon this model. He thought, however, that the persons who had adopted his plan did not quite understand it; and he was of opinion that these vessels, when completed, could never be sent into action with safety, for if penetrated with shot and shell in their unarmoured part above the armour deck, they would capsize. This should be a caution to persons who undertook the construction of ships without sufficient information. The Italian vessels were the Venezia, with 6-inch armour and 18-ton guns; the Principe Amadeo, with 9-inch armour and 18-ton guns; the Palestro, with 9-inch armour and 18-ton guns; the Ancona, the Regina Maria Pia, Castelfidardo, and the San Martino, each with 5-inch armour and 12½ ton guns; and the Affondatore, with 5-inch armour and 12-ton guns. The Austrian iron-clad Navy consisted of the Custozza, 9¼ inch armour and 21-ton guns; the Albrecht, 8¼ inch ar-mour; the Kaiser, 6¼ inch armour; the Lissa, originally a wooden vessel, with 6¼ inch armour, the Kaiser Max, the Bon Juan, and the Prince Eugene, three vessels also originally of wood, but transformed now into iron vessels, with six inches of armour and 12½ ton guns. He had not mentioned Spain, Portugal, Denmark, or any of the Northern Powers, but confined his comparison to
1902
the six Powers, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Turkey, and Austria. The results were these—France had 84,000 tons of these ships, or would have at the end of the year; Germany, 53,000; Italy, 37,500; Russia, 29,000; Turkey, 59,900; Austria, 35,500. The aggregate was 298,900, against 113,500 of English. He had been asked whether he could name any three Powers which, putting their efficient iron-clads together, would be equal to our own. His answer was that a combination of three Powers was not necessary. Prance and Italy, or Prance and Russia, or Prance and Turkey, or France and Austria would have a combined fleet which would come up to ours. He did not mention the combination of Germany with France, because he was asked not to put them together, and the chances were that for some time to come these two Powers would not be united. But there were four combinations of a single Power with France that would be equal to us, and a combination of three Powers would give a force that would exceed ours. As for Turkey, he did not believe in the fighting capabilities of the Turks; but a Turkish Navy existed, and if we allowed it, that Navy might fall into hands that might cause the consequences to be serious. The Turkish fleet was at present in hands that might act wilfully, and if offended with England, steps might be taken which we might have occasion to regret. If any one could show his figures to be seriously wrong by all means let it be done; but he had prepared them with the utmost care, and he had stated as to Foreign Navies every point of their weakness. He believed most firmly that our expenditure upon iron-clad ships was not what it ought to be. There might be room for many opinions as to our aggregate expenditure upon the Navy, but iron-clads we could not produce quickly, and he believed that it was the duty of the House, and even of the greatest economists in it, and for the sake of the economy which they cherished, to insist upon a due and proper expenditure upon our iron-clads in relation to the power of other Navies, so as to secure to us that great strength and that independence which we ought to have when any European complications might happen to arise.
MR. HUNTsaid, the House was much indebted to the hon. Member for his interesting statement, and he himself

1903
derived great gratification from the views which the hon. Gentleman had expressed as to the necessity of keeping up our iron-clad fleet. He was aware, as the hon. Gentleman had reminded the House, that since the recent disaster the opinion was extending that we ought to discontinue the building of iron-clad ships. He did not share that view; for with regard to the disaster there was this to be said, that the ship was not prepared as a ship would be if going into action. If the Vanguard had been going into action all her water-tight compartments would have been closed; and, secondly, the blow which she received was struck in that part of the ship where she was likely to receive the greatest injury; and in war we should be very unfortunate if the impact of an enemy's ship would always find out the very spot where the greatest injury would be inflicted. It should be remembered, too, that, notwithstanding the great injury done to the Vanguard, she kept afloat for an hour and 20 minutes after she was struck, and therefore the system of water-tight compartments had answered to some extent. But it might not be in the knowledge of the House that very great improvements in the construction of water-tight compartments had been made since the Vanguard was built, both as regarded the height of the compartments and the number of them. The Vanguard had 23 water-tight compartments; but the Devastation had 68, the Dreadnought 61, the Nelson and Northampton, in course of construction, 83, and the Inflexible, 89. But it was not only the number of the compartments that was to be considered, but the way in which they were built. The compartments were now not only transverse, but longitudinal fore and aft, and if they had been so constructed in the Vanguard when she was struck, one set of engines would have been left untouched by the water, and could have been worked. He agreed with the hon. Member that it would be absurd to think of having our fleet composed of torpedoes and unarmoured rams, or to trust to unarmoured ships against armoured; because an unarmoured vessel in presence of an armoured one would be powerless, and they could not possibly meet upon equal terms. Therefore, whatever the expense, we must build armoured ships, since we might have to meet Navies com-
1904
posed of such vessels. He was anxious io say this, because, as he did not propose to lay down any new iron-clads this year, he might be thought to be taking what the hon. Member had described as a view that was extending in the country—namely, that the further building of iron-clad vessels ought to be discontinued. The fact was, we had a great number of iron-clads in hand, and he thought the proper course would be this year to proceed with unarmoured vessels, not, however, with any intention of relinquishing the building of armoured ships. The hon. Gentleman had gone over the question of the comparative strength of our iron-clad fleet and that of the iron-clad fleets of foreign nations. He (Mr. Hunt) had hitherto avoided discussing in this House that question, because he thought it a matter which would be better considered in his office, in the direction of determining what addition should be made to the strength of our own fleet, than made a subject of debate in the House of Commons. It was a matter of great delicacy for a Minister to criticize the naval force of another Power, though he found no fault with the hon. Gentleman for having done so. A celebrated cynical philosopher had said that we should treat our friends as if they might one day be our enemies, and our enemies as if they might one day be our friends. Well, we might, perhaps, carry our discussion on this subject so far as to convert our friends into enemies, but he doubted if by the same means we could convert enemies into friends. The hon. Gentleman, however, had rather forced this discussion upon him, and therefore he felt bound to take some notice of his remarks. He was not at all aware of the mode in which the hon. Gentleman would treat his subject, and he felt unable to follow him in the line he had chosen. He did not expect to hear the hon. Gentleman discuss the question as a matter of tonnage; if he had expected it he would have been prepared. But he had no Papers before him which would enable him to deal with it as a question of tonnage, though he had gone into it from every point of view. In a remarkable letter, signed with his name, and which all who took an interest in the subject had read, the hon. Gentleman discussed the composition of Her Majesty's iron-clad fleet. On that occasion

1905
the hon. Gentleman excluded all ships not yet ready for sea, but this evening he had included those which might be taken to sea in the present year. He (Mr. Hunt) preferred the hon. Gentleman's original classification for the purpose in view to that which he had adopted to-night, and if the hon. Gentleman would confine himself to the ships actually ready for sea, we should stand rather better than he had placed the case before the House. In the classification which the hon. Gentleman had given of those ships he did not agree; and, moreover, the hon. Gentleman had rather underrated the value of the ships which he said he put on one side. There were altogether 27 iron-clad ships, putting aside the two sea-going rams, the Hotspur and Rupert. He thought it was a mistake to put all our iron-clad ships aside except 12; but if only 12 of our iron-clad fleet were to be taken into account, the hon. Gentleman should have contrasted these with those of similar powers in other fleets. The hon. Gentleman had given them an interesting account of the Navies of other Powers; but he did not think he had dealt with the Navies of other countries quite as hardly as he had done with our own. It was exceedingly difficult to make any comparison as regarded numbers, for three or four different people would divide them in a different way. There would be a difference as regarded the numbers even in our own fleet, and some would reject ships which others would consider effective. And if there was that difference as regarded our own ships, there was far more likely to be such a difference with regard to the fleets of our neighbours. Then there was the difficulty of making a comparison as to their efficiency. We know all the imperfections of our own fleet, but we did not know the imperfections of our neighbours'; therefore, we were more likely to discard ships in our own fleet than in the fleets of other countries. The hon. Gentleman spoke of only 12 ships in our iron-clad fleet as being worthy to be taken into account as fighting ships. He (Mr. Hunt) would take the number at 11, excluding the Penelope and the sea-going rams; but what he would point out was this—if we were only to take account of 12 or 11 iron-clads in our fleet as fighting ships, we should
1906
apply the same standard to foreign fleets. If they did that, it would be found, he believed, that France, which had the most powerful Navy, had only five ships of that class, Italy four, Germany three, Russia one, and Turkey one. The hon. Gentleman had compared the tonnage of the different fleets, but he confined himself to this one view; and, taking that view, supposing we had only 11 ships for a great naval battle, they could not find, as regarded that class of ships, any combination of two Powers equal to our own, or of three that would be more than equal to our own. He ventured to think there was no ship now fit for service amongst the ships of other nations that was equal to the Devastation and the Thunderer. The hon. Gentleman told them that in the classification he had given to-day he had reckoned the ships to be completed in the course of the year; but with regard to such ships we were far ahead of other nations. We had now three iron-clads that were launched last year; in the course of the next two months one more ship would be ready, with another to follow; whereas of the ships building in France only one was launched last year, and another would be probably launched in July. So that we were three ships better than France. He had his account of the French Navy drawn up in a different way from that drawn up by the hon. Gentleman. It stated the case thus—Iron-clad ships in commission, 1876, English, 14, of which only one was of wood; French, nine, all wood. Iron-clad ships in First Reserve, 1876, English, 12, all of iron; French, 17, only three of iron. Ships completing for sea, 1876, including those repairing—English, nine, two of wood; French, three, all wood. Of those building, of which three were very nearly ready—English, six, all of iron; French, 13, only one of iron. And with regard to one French ship spoken of as likely to be completed this year, his information was that no work was going on upon her at present. He really hardly liked to go into the particulars of all the different Navies, although he had them all before him. He had endeavoured, however, to show that if we were to take only 12 or 11 as really fighting ships in our iron-clad Navy, as regarded that class of ships we certainly stood in a very fair position. He knew it would

1907
be said that a change of position made a great deal of difference in regard to a question of this kind—that two years ago he had made a very different statement, and that now he was inclined to take a more rosy view of matters. He had no wish to revive a controversy which he hoped to a great extent had passed away, but when he made his statement in 1874, he said that only 14 iron-clad ships, with the exception of the Devastation, were in an effective state in the proper sense of the word; at the present time, 20 iron-clads were in a thoroughly effective state in every sense of the word. The hon. Gentleman said that of these 20 ships a great many were not fit to be put in front of the battle, but they were effective for every purpose for which they were built—equal to meet any ship of the same character. In the course of two years, therefore, during which he had held his present office, the effective strength of these ships had been increased from 14 up to 20, setting aside the Devastation and the Thunderer, and notwithstanding the loss of the Vanguard, and in the course of August another ship would be ready. He therefore thought he was justified in taking a more favourable view of matters than he did two years ago. In addition to this, the ships laid down by his Predecessors had been very considerably advanced. Three ships could be completed in the course of this year—two certainly, if all went well, and a third next year. In addition to that, a fourth laid down had made considerable progress in the hands of contractors. He was quite aware that other countries were making progress with their iron-clad fleets. It was our duty to watch their progress and see that we did not fall off; but as things stood at present, without venturing to say that we had got a great preponderance over any two fleets of other nations, as far as we could judge, he thought we were in a safe state as regarded our iron-clad fleet. Taking France, which had the most powerful Navy next our own, his comparative estimate of the French and English fleets was drawn up by the most competent persons in his Department, and the iron-clad ships of the two countries stood thus—England, 100; France, 75. If that view was accepted, even in ease of the combination of France with any other Power, we might
1908
still consider this country safe as regarded our iron-clad fleet. He should have made this statement, or something like it, in Committee; but, in answer to the hon. Gentleman, he had been obliged in some degree to forestall it. Still he had been very glad to have had this conversation, and he should be glad to have the benefit of the hon. Member's remarks when he laid down any more iron-clad ships.
MR. GOSCHENsaid, he was reluctant to interpose between the right hon. Gentleman and the statement he was about to make, but the question brought forward by the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed) was of such extreme importance that it ought not to be lost sight of in the details of a discussion on the Estimates. The statement of the hon. Member, which was somewhat difficult to follow, was likely to cause considerable alarm and apprehension, because, on a comparison of the tonnage of different Navies, he arrived at the conclusion that there were several possible combinations even of small Powers that would be superior to the naval strength of England; and if there were any hon. Member who agreed with this conclusion, it would be his bounden duty to give Notice of a Motion declaring that the iron-clad fleet of this country was not equal to its requirements. The country certainly would not be content that those combinations which the hon. Member for Pembroke pointed out as giving a superiority over our own naval power should be a possible danger to us. He would not dispute the figures of that hon. Member; but there were two views which could be taken of his general statement. It was made in answer to a challenge, and if he wished theoretically to show that the tonnage in iron-clads of various countries put together in certain combinations was superior to our tonnage, no doubt, if his figures were correct, he had proved his case. But if the hon. Gentleman went beyond that theoretical conclusion, and meant to say that the actual fighting naval power of those possible combinations which he had indicated—such, for instance, as that of France and Turkey, or that of Italy, Turkey, and Russia—was superior to our own, then it would be the duty of every one who agreed with him to push the Government to the utmost in order to increase our naval power, because the

1909
country would not be satisfied with such a state of things. But he demurred to some of the statements of the hon. Member for Pembroke. They had not only to count the number of ships or the quality of tonnage in instituting their comparison. Suppose they had the Devastation, the Thunderer, and the Dreadnought, and had with them to engage a fleet of 16 ships with iron plates of five inches in thickness, and with the guns which that class of ships would carry, was it to be said that because the tonnage of 16 ships was greater than that of the three, therefore they would be superior to them in fighting power? It was on the strength of the individual ships that reliance was to be placed rather than on the number of weak ships with their plates. The possession of one such ship as the Thunderer was of incalculable advantage, and as soon as we could multiply ships of such a character our means of safety would be greatly increased. Then there was the question of the difficulty which foreign countries had in building iron ships. The hon. Gentleman had referred to the Peter the Great and mentioned the delay caused by the loss of her iron plates on their transit from this country. Well, there was a foreign Power wanting to build iron-clads, but she could not build them without applying to this country for a portion of the material; and that was the case with many foreign Powers besides Russia. The completion of the Peter the Great was delayed because her iron plates had to be obtained from England, and they were lost on their way. Surely it gave us an immense superiority to be the great manufacturers of iron-clads, and those iron-clads which were on the stocks in this country could not be regarded as belonging to the foreign Powers which had ordered them until they were completed, because if, before they were finished, a war broke out between us and those Powers they would be confiscated and added to our Navy and deducted from the strength of our enemies. The hon. Member had compared the delay in completing the Thunderer and the Dreadnought with the delay in completing the Peter the Great, but he forgot to state that the delay in the former case was voluntary and intentional on the part of our Admiralty, while in the latter it was owing to the inability of Russia to make iron plates.
1910
The delay in regard to the Dreadnought was due to the desire to make alterations in her, and in regard to the Thunderer to the desire to introduce the new hydraulic machinery for fighting turrets. He was sure his hon. Friend would not by any means desire that the impression should go forth that we could not and did not build iron-clads much faster than other countries. Again, in instituting his comparison with the Turkish Navy, the hon. Member began by excluding in the most extraordinary manner about half the English Navy. He excluded, for example, the Minotaur, the Northumberland, the Achilles, the Warrior, and the Black Prince, which would be very awkward customers for some of the shorter Turkish iron-clads, mentioned by the hon. Member, to deal with. The hon. Member said, the reason he excluded them was because they were too long, but he (Mr. Goschen) thought that such vessels, manned by English crews, would be found very difficult to deal with by a hostile force. The First Lord of the Admiralty spoke of what he had done during the last two years, and told them that having had before only 14 effective ships in the Navy, he was now able to count 20, exclusive of the Vanguard. The right hon. Gentleman had also at enormous cost repaired six ships, yet those ships, with one single exception, were excluded from the hon. Member for Pembroke's comparison. That was practically rather a serious indictment to make against the First Lord of the Admiralty. He did not think he exaggerated the importance of the statements of the hon. Member for Pembroke, because, coming as they did from such a high authority, they were calculated to raise great alarm; and from the cheers which they elicited from some parts of the House, it would appear that they were accepted by some hon. Gentleman. If some of those statements were really correct, all he could say was that no time ought to be lost by the Admiralty in taking action. If the views of the hon. Member for Pembroke were only proximately correct, then our naval power was in a state which ought to be remedied by the Government. It was impossible for any one to support the views of the hon. Member for Pembroke and at the same time not to feel that the Government would incur a very grave responsibility if this year, instead of

1911
increasing our iron-clads, they turned their attention to any subsidiary object, however important. He (Mr. Goschen) had already shown that the hon. Member for Pembroke had omitted all the long ships—the Warrior, the Black Prince, the Achilles, the Agincourt, the Minotaur, and the Northumberland. He had also omitted some other vessels, such as the Repulse and the Hotspur, because he thought they were not sufficiently good ships, but in his (Mr. Goschen's) opinion they were capable of doing us good service. Again, why should a vessel like the Hotspur be excluded from calculation, if a naval action had to be fought? There was also the Glatton, which would be a match for many an iron-clad. The Cyclops, the Hecate, the Hydra, and the Gorgon were likewise vessels of a class likely to prove very effective. He would not go into further detail with regard to the statement of the hon. Member, but he thought the House would not be satisfied to leave the matter in its present state. It must be cleared up, and he trusted that the Government would enable the House to get as much information as possible on the subject. He hoped that the figures which had been published in that House by the hon. Member for Pembroke would be followed by the laying on the Table of the House such official information as could be got as to the Navies of other countries. It appeared that the horse-power of the Turkish Navy was 48,500, while that of the French Navy was 50,000. The hon. Member had done good service by bringing these statistics before the House, but he (Mr. Goschen) thought it was impossible to assent to the hon. Member's views with regard to a combination of various Powers, and an endeavour ought to be made to set the matter right.
SIR JOHN HAY: The interesting statement of the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed) has, I am happy to say, confirmed the views which I have thought it my duty to urge upon successive Governments on whichever side of this House I may have had the honour of a seat. For several years I urged these views upon the right hon. Gentlemen the Member for the City of London (Mr. Goschen), and I am glad to see that he has at last taken alarm. No doubt he has done so because the hon. Member for Pembroke has urged the subject with more knowledge, with more detail,
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and, I am sure, with much more ability.
MR. GOSCHEN: I have not taken alarm. I said—if the statements of the hon. Member for Pembroke were correct, then our Navy is not in a satisfactory condition.
SIR JOHN HAY: Well, the statements of the hon. Member for Pembroke have so entirely confirmed all that I have ever stated, and which I have continuously urged upon the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that if he has not taken alarm I am sorry for it. My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty has admitted that the relative proportion of the naval force of this country and of France in iron-clads is as 100 to 75. Now, I am not, one of those who depreciate the power of that gallant nation, nor do I believe that, because in a war in which 700,000 Germans, splendidly led, triumphed over 300,000 Frenchmen, ill-commanded, therefore their Navy may now be safely despised. The siege of Paris showed that the best of its gallant defenders were the French Navy, and Admiral de la Ronciére de la Nourry showed how gloriously the officers of the French Marine can conduct themselves in difficult circumstances. The House must remember that the iron-clad fleet of France is always at hand for European contingencies, and in European seas. They are to be found in Toulon or in Brest, or in Cherbourg. But if we take the statement of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Pembroke as accurate, then one-fourth of our iron-clad ships are in distant seas. I do not admit the entire accuracy of the comparison of the hon. Member for Pembroke, but it is absolutely necessary that in India, in the Pacific, and in the West Indies, we should have an iron-clad ship. It was from no vain desire that an ironclad was originally sent to those distant seas. Many Members of this House must remember that the Ocean, the first iron-clad sent to China, was sent there because the Spaniards had a ship, the Numantia, of equal, if not greater, power, which could do as it pleased; was, in fact, cock of the walk, unless we had sent a ship of equal power to maintain at least a just equilibrium. The House must also remember that the Zealous was sent to the Pacific, because an iron-clad in the harbour of Valparaiso made it

1913
impossible for Admiral Denman in a wooden frigate, which might have been blown out of the water, to enforce the just demands of this country. And now that Chili has two iron-clads and Peru one, as we are informed by the hon. Member for Pembroke, we are more than ever bound to maintain at least one iron-clad in those waters. I need not go into the reasons which make it desirable to maintain an iron-clad on the North American and West Indian Station. But necessities of this kind diminish our naval forces in European waters, and by so much altered our available power in these seas. I hold in my hand a Return, as I believe, quite correct, of the naval iron-clads of France; but before I come to that I should be glad to give the House, with its kind permission, my view of the available ironclads of this country as well as of France, and though I name as available more ships than the hon. Gentleman, I do so for both countries, and leave their relative strength much the same. Of sea-going iron-clads of the first-class now ready or nearly so, I believe we have three—namely, the Alexandra, the Hercules, and the Sultan. Of the second class we have seven—namely, the Audacious, the Bel-lerophon, the Invincible, the Iron Duke, the Monarch, the Swiftsure, and the Triumph. These 10 ships are equal to any other 10 ships belonging to any navy in the world. In the third class, most of which the hon. Member discards, I place 11 ships—namely, the Achilles, the Agincourt, the Black Prince, the Defence, the Hector, the Minotaur, the Northumberland, the Penelope, the Resistance, the Valiant, and the Warrior. I do not consider the Pallas, the Favourite, or the Research, in these days fit to be considered in the strength of our iron-clad Navy, nor so far as I am able to judge are the few remaining wooden ironclads worth much repair, or fit to be reckoned on in the event of a war. There are four of these, and I discard them, as the hon. Member for Pembroke has also done—they are the Lord Warden, the Repulse, the Royal Alfred, and the Royal Oak, and I am happy to think the latter name has only been by inadvertence retained on this year's Navy List. Of coast-defence ships we have the Devastation and the Thunderer in the first class, and though they would be very formidable vessels near home, in
1914
the Channel, or the Mediterranean, they cannot be looked upon as sea-going ships, and their great draught of water prevents them going through the Suez Canal, and they cannot be regarded as such valuable additions to our Fleet as the right hon. Gentleman seems to consider them. The second class coast-defence ships are the Glatton, Gorgon, Hecate, Hotspur, Hydra, and Rupert; but they would be of no avail for-sea-going operations, although invaluable for attacking a European fortress. We are building eight iron-clads, seven of them sea-going—namely, the Agamemnon, the Ajax, the Inflexible, the Nelson, the Northampton, the Shannon, the Teme-raire and one coast-defence ship, the Dreadnought. But the French are also building nine iron-clads—the Friedland and the Richelieu of the first class, nearly complete, and the Devastation, Du Guesclin, and Fowdroyant, also of the first class, lately commenced; and of the second class, the Condé, Tu-renne, Triomphante, and Victorieuse, now building in France. They have afloat, of the first class—Marengo, Ocean, Suffren, Magenta, Solferino, Flandre, Gauloise, Guyenne, Magnanime, Provence, Revanche, Savoie, Surveillante, Valeureuse, Heroine, Gloire, Couronne, Redoubtable, Colbert, Trident; and of the second class, the Galipomére, Alma, Armide, Atlante, Bel-liqueuse, Jeanne d'Arc, Montcalm, Reine Blanche, and Thetis, making 29 sea-going ships afloat and nine building, without counting 19 coast-defence ships. Now I do not know the condition of all these ships; but the French have 29 sea-going iron-clads afloat and nine building, to compare with our sea-going Fleet all told, and reckoning the three wooden iron-clads which my right hon. Friend desires us to reckon, of only 28 and eight building—that is, 36 to 38. Now, I do not wish to blame my right hon. Friend. He is gradually trying to restore our iron-clad Fleet, without any sudden or spasmodic effort. He is building eight iron-clads against the five which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London was going to build, and this the House must acknowledge to be a great improvement; but I cannot think that the country will rest satisfied until it is assured, not only that our Fleet is equal in number to that of France, but that it is sufficient to meet any possible combination of hostile forces.
MR. SAMUDAconsidered that the naval force of this country, though great, was not so much in excess of that of other countries as it ought to be. He agreed with his hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke on his general points, but with his details he did not feel the same concurrence. For instance, his hon. Friend was quite right in saying that but a small proportion of the money expended upon our Navy had been spent upon the construction of iron-clads. He could not agree with his hon. Friend, however, as to the number of vessels that should be discarded in estimating our naval force, and he did not think he was right in excluding from it vessels of such importance as the Minotaur, the Agincourt, the Northumberland, and others of that class simply on account of their length. His hon. Friend had designed vessels which were shorter, and therefore handier, but the longer ships would be, nevertheless, very powerful and formidable antagonists. His hon. Friend had dealt with the subject in a very practical manner by considering what was likely to take place, and the position we should be placed in if an European war broke out in which we were involved, but in such an event he would find that ships of the Gorgon and Hotspur class ought not to be excluded in reckoning the force we could take into Continental waters. They did not, it was true, possess the qualities of cruising vessels, or carry coal enough to take them across the Atlantic, but there was nothing to prevent them taking their places in line-of-battle in any of the European seas. If requisite, they could carry coal enough to take them to Gibraltar, and they could coal there and go on to Malta. With these corrections, 27 was nearer the number of our vessels available for line-of-battle than 12, as stated by the hon. Member for Pembroke. It might, however, be doubtful whether naval line-of-battle would ever again be formed, because, while the stronger Power would sweep the seas, the weaker Power would remain in harbour, under the protection of their guns, until an opportunity served for them to turn out and harass the enemy. France in the Franco-German War had a preponderating Fleet, and Germany, aware of that, kept her ships in port during that war. Germany had now, however, a formidable Fleet; but
1916
he believed, from the long friendship that subsisted between that empire and England, Germany would unite with England in any struggle; and with regard to Turkey, he believed the Turkish Fleet would also be with England. This country should keep a Fleet of the most powerful character, so as to have at all times a large available force ready, for in the number of her ships would consist her great safety. He agreed with his hon. Friend in thinking that, although unarmoured corvettes and torpedo vessels were of considerable value, the possession of such ships did not relieve the country from the responsibility of keeping up a complement of armoured ships sufficient, in case of war, not only for all possible service in case of an unexpected combination of Powers against us, but also to form a reserve force which could be called into action during the time occupied in repairing vessels which had been injured or disabled in action. In his opinion, it was perfectly right to spend the surplus wealth of the country in perfecting the condition of the Navy, if only as an insurance against foreign invasion.
CAPTAIN G. E. PRICEsaid, attempting to estimate the strength of the British Navy by comparing it with the Navy of another great Power, was a difficult process by which to obtain a correct opinion. The right hon. Gentleman had quoted the strength of the British Navy 100 as against 75 of France. He did not know that that was correct; but he thought they would go a great way in arriving at a correct estimate by looking at the sum which their Navy had cost the country. He regarded the amount of money expended upon the maintenance of the Navy as a premium paid upon the policy of insurance covering the Mercantile Marine of the country. In 1860 the total value of the imports and exports of this country amounted to £375,000,000, against £682,000,000 in last year; the expenditure upon the Royal Navy to the same period being £12,324,000 in 1860 and £10,425,000 in 1875. In 1860 the tonnage of the ships employed in the Mercantile Marine of this country was 4,591,000 tons, while in 1873—the latest Return he had been able to obtain—it had increased to 5,682,000 tons, showing an increase of 25 per cent during a period when the tonnage of ships be-

1917
longing to France had increased by only 6 per cent. Dividing the tonnage into inward and outward bound craft, he found that in 1860 the tonnage of vessels entering British ports was 12,000,000 tons, as compared with 22,000,000 tons in 1873; while that of British and foreign ships cleared outwards from British ports was in 1860 12,500,000 tons, against 22,500,000 tons in 1873. The income of this country returned as taxable in 1860 was about £282,000,000, while in 1873 it amounted to no less than £511,000,000. If, therefore, the premium on the policy of insurance was to be based upon the imports and exports, it was clear, comparing the amount of them with the cost of the Navy, that in 1860 it was at the rate of 3½ per cent. and that in 1873 it was not more than 1½ per cent. If it was more correct to compute the premium upon the taxable income of the country, it was about 4 per cent in 1860, and not more than 2 per cent in 1873. He thought it clear, therefore, that the expenditure upon the Navy; instead of having increased in proportion to the wealth of the country, had positively declined, and that instead of having provided "bloated armaments," the country was not spending a sufficient amount on the Navy.
MR. T. BRASSEYsaid, the amount of naval force, which it was necessary that this country should maintain, must depend on the naval strength of other countries. Various comparisons might be made; and he should make a comparison, in which all vessels should be excluded from consideration, which were plated with less than 7 inch armour. The able French writer, Dislere, had laid it down as an axiom that armour, which was easily penetrable, was a mere incumbrance; and that armour of less than 7 inches could not be reckoned capable of resisting the projectiles of the naval guns which were ordinarily carried in iron-clad ships. The French Navy had five vessels actually launched which had plating exceeding 7 inches in thickness, and they had building eight such vessels. The programme of the French Government for 1872 included seven first-class and five second-class ironclads, and eight coast-defence ships. Of the first class three were actually launched, three of the second were being built, and four of the vessels for for coast defence were built. The Ger-
1918
man Admiralty in 1873 proposed to build eight first-class frigates, all of which were now built; six iron-clad corvettes, of which one was built; and seven vessels for coast defence, of which two were built. The remaining five were abandoned and torpedo boats substituted. The Russian Navy had only two vessels built which had plating exceeding 7 inches in thickness. On reviewing our situation, he thought the House ought to be satisfied that even supposing such an inconceivable thing to occur as a combination against this country of France, Germany, and Russia we ought to be able to maintain the contest on very equal terms. It so happened that the annual naval expenditure of the three Powers amounted as nearly as possible to the sum now proposed for this country. He would not detain the House at a time when all were anxious to hear the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty. While it was important that our Fleet should at all times be maintained in a condition of efficiency for the emergency of war, he would remind the House, in conclusion, of our unrivalled resources for building iron-clad ships in case of need in the private yards. With those resources at their command, the handsome sums voted by Parliament should be sufficient, if wisely appropriated, to create and maintain a fleet of such incontestable superiority that the country must henceforth be preserved from the panics and alarms which had been far too frequent, and which at the present time were, he thought, wholly unjustifiable.
Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
60,000 Men and Boys, including 14,000 Royal Marines.
MR. HUNT, in moving the Vote for 60,000 Men and Boys for the Sea and Coast Defences, of the year 1876–77, including 14,000 Royal Marines, said, the preliminary discussion that had arisen before the Speaker left the Chair must, of necessity, take from the interest which might otherwise be felt in the Statement

1919
he had to make, because the question of the iron-clad fleet and how far it was adequate for the defence and honour of the country were the most important of the subjects to which he would have to allude.
It was usual on occasions like the present to allude to changes which had occurred in the affairs of the Navy and the Admiralty, and the first change which he had to notice was one affecting the Estimates, and arose in this way. He had been very much dissatisfied with the financial administration of the Admiralty. For the year 1874–75 he found that there was an excess over the Votes of something like £250,000. The same thing happened the year before, but with that he had nothing to do; but last year, as he said, in the first year of his holding office, the excess amounted to no less than £250,000 over the sums voted by Parliament. Such a thing might have taken place with the knowledge of those at the Admiralty; but he regretted to say that the excess was incurred without his being conscious that the expenditure was going on, and it was not until the very close of the year, when it was too late for a Supplementary Estimate to be brought in, that the enormity of the excess was brought to his notice. In fact, only a few days before, a very small excess had been presented to him as that which had been incurred. The fault, however, he was bound to say, was to be found in the system which had existed, and not in the officials. He found that, although they had a financial department at the Admiralty, the Accountant General was not made aware of the basis of the Estimate, except as regarded a few cases, and the consequence was, that they looked to an officer to present a statement of expenditure who had not acquired a knowledge of the facts necessary to enable him to do so. He had made a change in that respect. He required that the Accountant General's department should be made acquainted with the basis of the Estimate prepared in each branch of the Admiralty, and that full information should be given to him from time to time of every liability incurred, so that the Accountant General should be charged with the responsibility of knowing what was the basis on which the Estimate was constructed, and to guarantee the accuracy of the expenditure in the course of the year according
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to that basis. He trusted that the change would have the effect of avoiding what he considered to be a great blot in the Admiralty administration—namely a great excess of expenditure on grants without the knowledge of the head of the Department.
He would now pass on to that which was of great interest to hon. Members—namely, the expenditure on the manning of the Navy. The Committee was aware that they had to depend almost entirely for the manning of the Navy on the training ships in which boys were trained for the Service. He found that there was a slackness among the boys of this country in joining the Service, and last year, as an inducement to join, a free kit was offered to them, so that they might have the enjoyment of the money which they earned. That gave a stimulus at first, but, he was sorry to say, it only answered the purpose to a small extent, and he had found it necessary to lower the standard of height by 1 inch, and to be less exacting as to the educational requirements of boys joining the Service. That was only a temporary measure, and what the ultimate effect of it might be he did not know, but he was not at all assured that he was likely to get a worse class of boys on account of reducing the educational standard. The question always arose every year whether the supply had made up the waste of the Service. From the last Return he found that as regarded the men the supply was 215 more than the waste, while with regard to the boys, the supply had been 260 less than the waste, and the difference between the two—namely, 45—showed how far the supply was being kept up. He was bound to add that the difficulty of getting boys had increased, and in the course of a few months he should see how the new system worked. In a few months he should expect to obtain a larger number of boys from the Mercantile Marine training ships. He had told the Committee a few nights ago the inducements he intended to offer, and he hoped to get some boys from that Service.
With regard to the class of naval cadets, he would not go into the vexed question of competitive examination, but a question having arisen last year as to the number required, he calculated that in the coming year about 80 cadets should enter the Service for all purposes,

1921
navigating and executive. It might not be possible to enter that exact number each year, but that was the number he should aim at. Last year when he proposed to build a new Naval College at Dartmouth a great difference of opinion manifested itself as to whether Dartmouth was the right spot. He had no predilections in favour of Dartmouth, but it seemed to him, upon the whole, to be the most eligible site. It appeared, however, that hon. Members on both sides of the House wished for further evidence on the subject. Instead, thereof, of deciding at once to build the College at Dartmouth, he had determined to postpone the matter until a small Committee which he ventured to appoint had reported which was the most eligible spot for the College.
An hon. Member had suggested that there should be an amalgamation between the Navigating and Executive Officers of the Navy. He had considered the matter as he promised, but had been unable to see his way to the adoption of the suggestion, because it would interfere so materially with the claims of officers on the executive list by altering their seniority by the number added to the list. It would thus create a great deal of injustice, and he believed it would be better that the navigating officers' lists should be left as they were, with this exception, that he proposed to allow navigating midshipmen, who were only 14 in number, to go on the executive list, either with their present rank, or after passing their examination for sub-lieutenants, and the wish of the navigating officers would be so far granted. The increase would be so small in amount as hardly to interfere with the executive list. The claims put forward on behalf of the navigating officers had been anxiously considered by the Admiralty, and some addition had been made to their pay, not to all, but to those on board the larger iron-clads, who would receive an increase of 2s. 6d. a-day. The total cost of that increase of pay would be £600 a-year, and an Order in Council was being prepared to carry out that increase.
It would be in recollection of the Committee that a new Order in Council had been issued improving the condition of the Medical Officers of the Service. He was anxious to ascertain the operation of that Order, and he found that
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by the retirement of four Inspectors General at the age of 60, four steps had been given to Deputy Inspectors and four to Fleet Surgeons. Six Fleet Surgeons had retired, and 10 had gained promotion who would not otherwise have obtained that step. That Order in Council had thus operated to procure a flow of promotion. With regard to the inducements to young men to enter the Service, he found that whereas in February, 1875, before the promulgation of the Order, there were only four candidates at the medical examination, last February the number of candidates was 13, so that the operation of the Order in Council had been highly satisfactory in inducing more men to come forward and join the Service.
He now came to the case of the Marines. It would be satisfactory to the Committee to know that he had abolished his patronage as to the first commissions in the Marines. He had availed himself of the examinations of the Army, and had told the Marine candidates that they must go up for the Army examination. That had been done on the occasion of the last examination with very satisfactory results. It had been said that he had only got an inferior set of men, who were not qualified for the Army; but that was not what had happened, because several officers who had qualified for commissions in the Line had preferred to join the Marines, and several of those who were high up in the list had given the preference to the Marines over the Line. He could hardly allude to the Marines without adverting to the stagnation of promotion in that corps. The matter had been several times brought before the House and discussed, and almost immediately after he came into office in 1874 he had had to consider it, and it had been a great annoyance to him that hitherto he had been unable to improve the position of the officers of the Marines. As, however, the question of promotion and retirement in the Army was under the consideration of a Royal Commission, that Department of the Government whose consent in matters involving expense had to be obtained were unwilling that any scheme relating to promotion and retirement in the Marines should be adopted until the Commission on the Army had reported. That decision had, he feared, caused great dissatisfaction in

1923
that gallant corps, but all he could say-was it was unavoidable. As soon, however, as the Commission had reported it would not be difficult to lay down a scheme for the Marines, on the lines adopted for the Army. Although the hope was still deferred, he trusted that it would not be long deferred. He was asked the other day by the hon. and learned Member for Reading whether the additional pay given to the Line would not be extended to the Marines. There were many circumstances which had to be considered in the Marines, such as the pensions, the pay of the petty officers of the Navy, and so forth, so that it was impossible after it was decided to increase the pay of the Army to go with proper care this year into the pay of the Marines, and it was absolutely necessary that the matter should be postponed.
He now came to the question of the educational establishment at Greenwich, established by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Goschen), and he thought the right hon. Gentleman would be interested by what he had to say on the matter. There were at the present time 231 officers studying at Greenwich, together with nine naval architects and nine private students. It had been asked how it happened that so many sub-lieutenants had failed to pass their examination. At the examination last December a very large number did so fail, and, being very much startled and in a state of some anxiety at such a result, he had felt it his duty to make inquiry. He had been assured that the examination had been rather easier than the year before; but that a large number of the students going up to that examination had been unusually wanting in efficiency. He was also told that those who instructed them felt sure that a large number would fail, although the examination was such that any sub-lieutenant of ordinary ability and ordinary industry ought to pass it. It was unfortunate that so large a number had failed; but, looking to what had happened before, he did not think that an undue proportion failed on this occasion. Of course, he had since watched the matter with great interest and attention, because it was most important in these days to have officers thoroughly well educated, as they had to take charge of ships and pieces of mechanism which were very complicated.
1924
The requirements of the service were greater as regarded scientific attainments than they used to be, and a proper examination for sub-lieutenants was indispensable. If the present standard was too high it would have to be lowered; but he had yet to learn that such a step was necessary. He wished to mention how desirable it was that their young seamen should be practised, and he had availed himself of the brigs that were used as training brigs to send them out for winter cruising. He was happy to say that he had received from the Commander of the Channel Squadron, under whose orders they were, a very good account of them, and he proposed, with the sanction of the Committee, to take money with which to refit the Eurydice, because he felt that the great fault of the Service with regard to seamen was the want of practice at sea. Young sea-men rated as ordinary seamen at the age of 18 now passed a long time in harbour ships. They learnt no good, and it was only fortunate if they learnt no harm, whilst practice at sea must conduce to their efficiency.
The hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor) had called attention last year to the absence of Returns of Crime and Punishment in the Navy. Since then, he (Mr. Hunt) had considered the matter, and as there was no objection to those Returns being published in a general form, he had given orders for their preparation, but it would be some time before they were ready. As soon, however, as they were they should be laid upon the Table of the House, and he hoped they would be satisfactory to those who wished to have an opportunity of seeing how far the morality of the Fleet was improving or not.
The Committee were well aware of the importance attached to torpedoes. He thought the time had come when an independent torpedo school should be established, and he had accordingly given orders to that effect. The great part which torpedoes were likely to play in future rendered it necessary to have special instructions in that branch of warfare.
Another change which had been made was the addition of 1,000 men to the Dockyard establishment. In view of the probable agitation in the labour market, it was deemed extremely desirable to

1925
attach to the Dockyards a larger number of men.
The next subject he had to touch upon was the Naval Reserve. He had paid great personal attention to this subject, and had placed Sir Walter Tarleton at its head, in order that greater attention should be paid to their enlisting and drilling. As a result of that attention, he had to report a considerable increase in the number of men. In February, 1874, the total strength of the Force was 13,728; in February, 1875, it was 16,991; and in February, 1876, it had increased to 17,958. Of this last-mentioned number of men 12,603 belonged to the first class and 5,355 to the second. Taking the two years, the addition to the first class was 1,000, and to the second class 3,200 men. He had given directions that the last satisfactory Report of Sir Walter Tarleton on the men of the Northern District should be laid' on the Table, and hon. Members would find in it an excellent account of the fishermen of the North of England and of Scotland. Of the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers there were now three brigades—the London, 405; the Liverpool, 172; and the Bristol—a new brigade started since he came into office—52.
He could not very well make a statement on the Navy without referring to the Arctic Expedition, which was a matter of great interest to this country, for fear lest it might be thought that because they were to be away for a long time, they were not in our minds; but he had only to repeat what he stated the other day—namely, that an arrangement had been made with Mr. Allan Young, who intended to go into the Polar Regions this season in his yacht, for the purpose of making explorations on his own account, to go to Smith's Sound. It was extremely doubtful whether any despatches would be found there; but as Captain Nares had expressed his intention of sending them, if possible, this spring, it was thought advisable to make the arrangement referred to. Mr. Young had consented to make this the primary object of his voyage, and if he found any despatches he would either bring them himself to England, or put them on board a homeward-bound whaler.
Another question which had been much discussed at the Dockyards was the amalgamation of the offices of Chief
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Constructor and Storekeeper. That was an experiment made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), and there had been much discussion whether that change should be continued and extended. The question had been referred to a Committee of which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Shoreham (Mr. S. Cave) was Chairman. In consequence of the right hon. Gentleman's leaving England on a special mission Sir Frederick Peel was induced to take his place, and I hope soon to receive the Report of the Committee.
The Committee on the Deterioration of Boilers had not yet made its final Report. It had made experiments and taken a vast amount of evidence, but the inquiry, it appeared, was still incomplete.
Another subject of great importance, which had also been referred to a Committee, was that of naval engineers. It had long been felt that the present system of engineering ships could not be continued; and there was a great difference of opinion as to how far engineer artificers should be increased in numbers, and engineer officers reduced, also what should be the position of these officers in the Service. The Committee had already reported; but, as the financial effect of its recommendations had not yet been fully ascertained, he was not in a position to state the result to the Committee.
He passed now to the question of shipbuilding in the year 1875–6. As the Committee were aware, the tonnage programme for many years had not been fulfilled; about 20,000 tons had been intended to be built, and the amount accomplished had for a long time fallen short by 4,000 or 5,000 tons. The tonnage intended to be built in the dockyards when he made his Statement last year was 13,812. According to the system of calculation then in force, the actual tonnage built was 13,556, or 256 tons less than was intended. But according to the revised system of calculation there were 14,056 tons built, or 244 tons more than the estimate. Practically, therefore, it might be said that in the dockyards the proposed tonnage had been completed. As regarded the tonnage intended to be built by contract, the result was nearly as satisfactory. The intention was to build 5,853 tons. The tons actually built were 5,566,

1927
leaving a difference of only 287 tons. As regarded the wages paid in dockyards, there had been an allowance by the Treasury of £5,000 to Chatham and £4,000 to Portsmouth. As regarded the boiler work done in the Dockyards, it was contemplated that boiler labour to the extent of 14,000 horse-power would be completed in the year, but what would be completed would be 2,276 more than was expected, making a total of 16,276.
He now came to the proposal which he had to make as regarded the building of unarmoured ships. He was sorry that it should again fall to his lot to make a statement somewhat disparaging to the Fleet. Two years ago he made a statement which was complained of in some quarters, in reference to the condition of the iron-clad fleet. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed) seemed to say that evening that he (Mr. Hunt) on that occasion had not gone far enough; but, at all events, what had been stated by the hon. Gentleman would convince a great many people that he (Mr. Hunt) had not taken an exaggerated view of the matter. The condition of the unarmoured fleet, of course, was not so material a matter as the condition of the armoured fleet; but, at the same time, it was a matter which could not be neglected. The condition of the unarmoured fleet did not improve upon acquaintance, and after two years' experience of his Department he did not take so favourable a view of it as he did a year ago. Looking at the Navy List, a great many ships appeared as part of the Fleet, but he was sorry to say that many of them were entirely unserviceable. He thought it better to speak plainly to the Committee on the matter, and he hoped he should not be considered as desiring to create a panic. He did not think it was a case for panic; but he thought it was a case for endeavouring to improve the state of things. With regard to the frigates, there were 20 on the list; eight of these were condemned, and two more would probably be condemned. There were five that required heavy repairs, one required repairs, three were in good condition, and one was altogether new. There were 32 corvettes on the list, eight of them were condemned, two more probably would be condemned, four were
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under repair, five required to be repaired, 10 were building, and three were good. There were 25 sloops on the list, 11 of them were unserviceable—and when he said unserviceable, he meant for cruising purposes—one required heavy repairs, 13 were good, five were building, and two were ordered last year. The gun vessels were 42 in number; five were unfit for general purposes, and not worth repair; 13 wanted repairs; four were under repairs; and 20 were good. There were 15 gunboats, of which three would want repairs this year. There were, besides, gunboats for harbour purposes, and 18 gunboats for home defence; and there were also ships of different kinds used as store ships, tenders, and harbour ships; but what he referred to was ships for cruising purposes, sent to various stations. When he came to consider the reliefs for the year, he found it was impossible to provide reliefs for all the ships, and he purposed, therefore, notwithstanding the remarks of the hon. Member for Pembroke, to send an unarmoured vessel as flag-ship to the Pacific. They required, in order to keep up their present force on foreign stations, 84 ships, consisting of 40 corvettes and sloops, 41 gunboats, and three despatch vessels. For that purpose he found that they had only 80 effective to serve, or four short. In 1869 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract considerably reduced the ships on foreign stations, and he settled the number after consultation with the Foreign and Colonial Ministers of the day; but now they were 10 vessels short of the establishment which had been fixed by the right hon. Gentleman. If they took into account three ships added to the Indian stations to put down the Slave Trade, they were actually seven short; but these three ships were sent out for special purposes. That was the state of the case with regard to service in 1876, and he confessed that they had been entirely at a loss to know how to supply these reliefs. Under the circumstances, with the consent of his Colleagues, he gave an order for certain ships to be commenced before he obtained the Vote of the House; feeling confident that he should be supported in what he was doing. It was so desirable that no time should be lost that he gave an order for six gunboats and two sloops, the estimates for which he should ex-

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plain to the House. Although it was open to question whether the ships should be built without the express authority of Parliament, he was not exceeding the expenses sanctioned for the year 1875–6, and he therefore had confidence in throwing himself on the indulgence of the Committee. The Committee were well aware that great complications had arisen in the East during the year in more than one quarter, and he had had the strongest and most urgent applications from the Commander-in-Chief in China to supply him with gunboats with a shallow draught of water and considerable speed. The gunboats that were in use in the last war in China had entirely gone to pieces, and they felt it necessary that orders should be given for the construction of some gunboats for river service. They had, therefore, entered into a contract for the construction of six such gunboats. [Mr. GOSCHEN: Besides the other six?] Yes; but that was not all he was going to ask the Committee to sanction. He should ask the Committee to sanction the construction of 12 such gunboats, and that was not all that he was urged to provide by the Commander-in-Chief in China. After considering the matter with his naval Colleagues, it was considered that 12 might be sufficient; but at present they had no boats of the kind in the service, and he considered it an absolute necessity that the want should be supplied. [Mr. GOSCHEN: Does that make 18 gunboats altogether?] Yes, but 12 are for river service. They were to be of light draught of water, and of nine knots speed, and to carry three 64-pounder and two Gattling guns. He should say that the six gunboats already contracted for would be completed within the year, and that the six river gunboats would be partially built in the same time. But that was not the whole of the demand he had to make upon the Committee. What he had already said as to the state of our unarmoured fleet showed, he thought, a deficiency in fast cruising vessels, and he proposed that six corvettes of the Opal class—it might be with some modifications—should be built. They could not be completed under two years, and therefore about one half the cost would fall upon this year, and one half the next. Those were the proposals which he had to make as regarded shipbuilding by contract in addition to three small vessels for tor-
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pedo service, one for special fast service, and one of a modern class. Then in the Dockyards it was proposed to commence three new sloops of the Osprey class—one at Sheerness and two at Devonport. The question might arise whether all that addition to the unarmoured fleet was to be made at our Dockyards or by contract, and if the normal state of things had been at work it might have been divided between the two; but the case was a special one, and though he could not say to the Committee that the Vote might not be repeated in future years, he hoped that we should in two or three years have regained the ground we had lost. He had taken, he might add, 16,000 as the normal number of men employed in the Dockyards, and he did not wish, if he could avoid it, to exceed that number, for he thought it extremely objectionable to have constant fluctuations in the numbers employed, now hiring and then discharging men, and thus causing a great deal of distress and agitation. He had stated what was the number of ships required to complete the establishment on foreign stations, as laid down by the right hon. Member for Pontefraet, and adding those to the number which would be necessary to provide proper relief, he found that the total number of vessels wanted would be 118, whereas there were available, striking out those condemned or under repair, only 105. Adding six others of the Mallard class, besides two sloops of the Arab class and six corvettes of the Opal class, we should have 14 additional, which would give one more than the total number required. That, he thought, was a matter of necessity or extreme expediency, and having added the number which he mentioned, we should not have more than one vessel to spare. He thought nothing less than those proposals ought to satisfy the Committee, or would place us in a proper position to protect our commerce in the event of war. He had endeavoured to be perfectly frank with the Committee on the subject, and our exertions ought not, he thought, to cease with the expenditure of this year, but ought to be continued.
He had now stated the proposals with regard to shipbuilding. Before the House went into Committee, he said that it was not his intention to propose laying down any new iron-clads

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this year, not because he thought that the time had come to discontinue their construction, but because they had so many already in progress which they could accelerate if need be. It seemed to him that the crying want at present was not in iron-clads, but in additions to their unarmoured fleet. The increase of tonnage was about 4,000 tons upon that proposed last year, and the amount of iron-clad tonnage to be built by contract was about 3,200 tons.
He would now state what was the total amount of the Estimates as compared with last year. The gross amount was £11,288,872. From that must be deducted extra receipts and repayments and contributions by the Indian Government, amounting to £215,000, leaving £11,073,872. Then there were cross-charges between the Army and Navy Estimates for Ordnance, Torpedoes, and materiél of that kind. That left a net charge for the Navy of £11,400,000. That sum might be apportioned as follows:—For Effective Services, £9,504,000, and for non-Effective Services, £1,896,000. The charge for Effective Services might be divided thus—For the personnel of the Navy, including Marines, Coast Guard, and Naval Reserve, £4,237,000; and the materiél, £4,817,000; for the administrative and scientific branches, land charges, and miscellaneous, £449,000. At that hour of the evening the Committee would hardly wish him to go through the different Votes, as there would be ample opportunity of discussing them hereafter when the Votes came before the House in the usual way. The Committee, however, would perceive that while making a large addition to one particular Vote, he had endeavoured as far as possible to curtail the expenditure on other Votes; and that, to use the old expression in Her Majesty's gracious Speech, the Estimates had been prepared with a view to economy and efficiency. The Vote which stood out beyond all the others and showed a very considerable excess, was Vote 10, Section 2. There had been a slight decrease on Vote 10, Section 1, but the increase on Vote 10, Section 2, was £450,000. That, of course, was a very grave matter to present to the Committee; but he hoped that after hearing his statement as to the necessity of taking urgent steps to supply the deficiencies in our unar-
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moured Navy, hon. Members would think he was justified in making that proposal. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Vote.
MR. GOSCHENsaid, the Committee had listened with interest to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. After the right hon. Gentleman had been two years in office, and had moved the Estimates for the third time, it appeared that there was no crying want with regard to our iron-clad Navy, but that there was a deficiency with regard to certain sloops and gun-vessels for foreign stations. He thought the right hon. Gentleman might fairly congratulate himself that in the course of two years, with the extra men that had been voted, he had been able to reverse the picture he had formerly presented to the House, and to say now that the further commencement of iron-clads had become of second-rate importance, while the urgent want was for a large and somewhat sudden increase in our unarmoured ships. The right hon. Gentleman had not, however, gone through the forces required on our foreign stations or shown the existence of urgent need on any foreign station, except China, for gunboats or gun-vessels. The right hon. Gentleman assumed that the state of things fixed in 1869 by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract must still continue; that there must be a particular number of vessels on various stations; and that, in order to keep up that somewhat arbitrary number, he was right in ordering gun-vessels even before Parliament met. He did not know whether he quite understood the programme of the right hon. Gentleman as to gunboats. He understood that liabilities had been incurred in this financial year for the construction of six gun-vessels in addition to 12 gunboats laid down for China. [Mr. HUNT: Not to be paid for this year.] But put out to contract, so that the liability was incurred; and they were not required for China, but for the ordinary service. Further, there were to be 12 other gunboats laid down for China, so that there were to be 18 gunboats and six vessels of the Opal class also. He would not now speak of the gunboats for China, because they were required for a distinct political object; but the other ships would not add to the fighting or aggressive power of the country, they being

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required rather for routine and police duties in our foreign possessions, and he knew there was a constant tendency at the Admiralty to press forward the vessels required for routine and police duty rather than those which were required for the higher interests of the country, such as iron-clads. If the right hon. Gentleman were content to offer this programme of gunboats to the Committee as his policy for the present year, it was a distinct admission on his part that as regarded the most important point of the fighting power of the country, we could wait a year and postpone it to the routine part of the service of the Admiralty. He thought the right hon. Gentleman could not object to the way in which he (Mr. Goschen) had just stated the case. Earlier in the evening there had been an interesting discussion on the subject of our iron-clads, and the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. E. J. Reed) had made a statement in which he excluded from the fighting force of the country as compared with the Navies of foreign nations, all the principal ships on which the right hon. Gentleman had expended money during the last two years. That brought him (Mr. Goschen) to the Dockyard programme. The right hon. Gentleman had omitted this year to state in Appendix 11 what vessels were to be repaired. That information was given only in the case of Chatham Dockyard. Perhaps the omission would be supplied on a future occasion; but, at present, it had made it somewhat difficult to follow the right hon. Gentleman's proposals. For the last few years it had been customary to state in a note how many men were employed in the various Dockyards in repairing ships. This year 5,700 men were required for shipbuilding and 10,300 for repairs. Were the latter required for repairing the iron-clads, or the frigates and corvettes? On that point the Committee was absolutely without information. Looking at the 16,000 men who were to build 5,600 tons, it was to be lamented that the right hon. Gentleman was unable to build a larger tonnage in the Dockyards, instead of putting out so many ships to contract. He quite admitted that it was undesirable to make a sudden increase in the Dockyards, with the prospect of having soon to throw the men off again; but he thought it should be made clear to the Committee why the
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right hon. Gentleman was not able to produce more in the Dockyards with the large number of men now employed there, especially as he said he had now turned the corner with the iron-clads. It seemed that the right hon. Gentleman was going to build three small sloops of the Osprey, or rather of the Pelican class. Surely it was rather a disappointing programme that, with so large an expenditure for the coming year, a larger addition was not to be made to the fighting force of the country. On the other hand, he cordially congratulated the right hon. Gentleman on having been able to build the 20,000 tons which he had estimated, with the help of additional money granted by the Treasury and of the extra amount voted by the House. It must also be satisfactory to the Controller of the Navy and his assistants that for once they had been able to build the amount of tonnage proposed at the beginning of the year. The right hon. Gentleman had read a list showing how many frigates, corvettes, and sloops we were short. But the right hon. Gentleman did not propose to build a frigate or a large-class of corvettes, though he proposed to build six corvettes of the Opal class. He understood that there were six gunboats already contracted for, and that they were of the Mallard class, and that there were to be six of a different class. [Mr. HUNT: The 12 were to be river service boats, with light draught, and fast.] But those were all small vessels; and he thought that the right hon. Gentleman, when he talked about frigates, might have added to his statement that no country in Europe was building frigates, and that, therefore, the question of frigates was becoming a subsidiary one. Light armoured ships of the Shannon class would, it seemed, supersede the old frigates, and it was unlikely that any more frigates would be constructed. He questioned the policy of sending a large frigate, the Shah, to the Pacific Station. What was she to do there? Was she to fight those Chilian iron-clads of which the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Reed) had spoken? To send a large ship of that type to those distant waters involved the important question of desertion. Vessels sometimes lost almost half their crews upon the Pacific Station, and he doubted the expediency of sending a frigate there at all. There was the

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same difficulty with an iron-clad; but it was always held desirable to have one iron-clad upon that station to meet the iron-clads of any other country that might be there, and he did not see why the practice should be changed. Passing to another point, the Committee would remember that since last year we had lost the Vanguard, worth about £500,000. He had, therefore, said to himself—"If the right hon. Gentleman proposes to replace the Vanguard, and increases the Estimates by a similar amount in order to make up this loss of power by new iron-clads, I shall probably think it my duty to support the proposal." The right hon. Gentleman had increased the Navy Estimates by £400,000 or £500,000, and yet he did not replace the Vanguard. We were, therefore, short of some 5,000 tons, which was about the tonnage of the Vanguard, and about the amount which the right Gentleman built in a year. Comment was superfluous on that point. He read in it the confidence which the right hon. Gentleman felt in the force at his disposal. It was not that he could not persuade his Party to vote the money. Hon. Gentlemen opposite would have been better pleased to vote £1,000,000 increase to the Estimates than £500,000. ["No, no!"] He ventured to say that a Vote of £500,000 to replace the Vanguard would have been received with acclamation; but he would be glad if hon. Gentlemen opposite took the view that, notwithstanding the loss of 5,000 tons, we were still in a position with which we might be perfectly satisfied. That was an answer to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman two years ago. There were some other matters to which the right hon. Gentleman had called attention to which he wished to allude. The excess of expenditure over amount voted was not without precedent; but he trusted that means would be taken to prevent a recurrence of that excess. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken of an increase of pay to the Marines, and of the absolute necessity that it should be deferred. The question was, whether this body of 14,000 should have this increase of pay assigned to them. He could not help regretting that after an increase of pay had been announced to the Army, it should be thought necessary to postpone an increase to the Marines. The corps of Marines, being neither sailors,
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nor in a sense soldiers, it would be said that they did not receive the same amount of attention as sailors received from the Admiralty and soldiers from the War Office. The result of the postponement was to be regretted, inasmuch as the increase of pay would now be agitated for, instead of being regarded as a spontaneous act of grace. With respect to the College at Greenwich, he rejoiced to hear that the attendance of officers was so good, and that the College was likely to do a large amount of benefit to the Service generally; but he trusted that no pressure would induce the right hon. Gentleman to consent to lower the standard once fixed. The question relating to engineers was a most important one, because it not only affected their promotion, but their actual position in the Service. He hoped, however, as the subject, together with those relating to boilers and promotion generally, had been referred to Committees, their Reports would be made within a reasonable time, so that they might have the opportunity of discussing them before the Session closed. He was glad to hear there was a great increase in the number of the Reserves, particularly of the second class, which had been established shortly before the late Government left office. He rejoiced that their anticipations in that respect had been verified, and he believed that the Report of Admiral Tarleton would be looked for with great interest. With respect to the Third Class Reserve, established for boys, he was afraid that there would be some difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of boys for that class. With reference to them, he thought the proposed payment of £25 to training ships for every boy that entered the Navy was a very fair arrangement; but he wanted to know whether that payment would relieve the Admiralty of the expense of the boys' education. That would, of course, depend on the age at which they left the training ship. If they left at 16, how would they be utilized till they entered the Navy at 18? It was very important to look into this question of age, for nothing was laid down in the Regulations which threw any light on the subject. The question of recruiting the numbers was one which would be brought under the notice of the House by his hon. Friend the Member for Reading (Mr. Shaw Lefevre), and the

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right hon. Gentleman opposite might then give them further information on the subject. He (Mr. Goschen) might say that it was his privilege to attach a cruiser to the Mediterranean Fleet, the design being that boys might secure a better training, and Admiral Yelverton had stated that the plan had proved a success. If that were so, the question was whether the plan might not be extended. Some of the changes in minor matters which the right hon. Gentleman had indicated might be very beneficial; but the programme of shipbuilding which he had submitted to the Committee was so important that it would require great consideration before they could give it their final assent.
SIR JOHN HAY: The right hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the House, with his usual ability, but in a spirit of hostile criticism, has called attention to the Excess Votes due to shipbuilding in the last financial year; but he seems to forget that my right hon. Friend has completed his programme; whereas the right hon. Gentleman was only able to keep down the Votes by neglecting to fulfil his promises to the House. My right hon. Friend has completed within a few tons all the shipbuilding which the House sanctioned a year ago; and, for reasons which he has explained, has found out that his ships have cost more than was expected. What was the practice of the right hon. Gentleman opposite not in one year, but in every year? I hold in my hand the figures already laid on the Table of this House, which show the differences between promise and performance in every year from 1870 to 1875, when the late Administration was in power. In 1870–1, 3,426 tons less than were estimated for; in 1871–2, 614 less; in 1872–3, 5,175 less; in 1873–4, 2,557 less; in 1874–5, 3,317 less; and as to the money voted for shipbuilding in 1870–1, £153,000 voted for shipbuilding was spent for other purposes; in 1871–2, £267,000; in 1872–3, £188,000; and in 1873–4, £247,000. It is very easy by this process to keep the expenditure within the Votes, and this was the process adopted every year by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City of London. He came down to Parliament every year and said the programme is not fulfilled but all the money is expended—I have no ships to show
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and I have no money left. Nor is it right to say that it is always the practice to fail to fulfil the programme or to exceed the Vote. This Return shows that in 1867–8 my noble Friend (Lord Hampton), then First Lord, added to the Navy in one year 33,701 tons, having only promised 33,206 tons in his programme, and that this excess of building was completed, whilst £15,000 was available for other services at the Admiralty. The right hon. Gentleman has challenged my right hon. Friend as if the weakness of the wooden fleet was a new discovery; but I must say I think this is extremely disingenuous. What did my right hon. Friend say in 1874 with regard to reliefs, even in time of peace? He said—
"I have gone into the scheme of reliefs established by the late First Lord, and although I am not prepared to dispute that that scheme might suffice for the present year, the right hon. Gentleman himself will doubtless admit that it provides no margin, and that if a single important ship in that scheme came to an untoward end there is nothing whatever to take its place."—[3 Hansard, cexviii. 870.]
Now, that was never contradicted by the right hon. Gentleman. The number of ships for foreign service were settled by the Administration of which he was a Member, too few, in my judgment, adequately to perform the police of the seas and to protect our commerce; and how did it come about that the ships were so reduced in numbers? The First Lord, in 1870, had assured the House that the ships were then in good condition and amply sufficient for every purpose. He gave due credit to his Predecessors in office, and recognized the fact that Lord Derby's Administration and that of my right hon. Friend had by great efforts left the fleet in good condition. But after that nothing was done to supply the inevitable waste and deterioration of the fleet until my right hon. Friend came into office in 1874. Since that, not by sudden or violent efforts, but gradually, my right hon. Friend has been endeavouring to complete the iron-clad fleet; and now finding that he has only 105 wooden ships to perform duties which require 118, he has asked the Committee to enable him to build 14, or 1 more than we require. Indeed, so pressing is the necessity, that he has wisely taken the responsibility of commencing six of them before the Vote of to-night has been granted, a course

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which I feel sure the Committee will approve. The right hon. Gentleman opposite taunts my right hon. Friend with having failed to replace the Vanguard, and argues from that, that my right hon. Friend is satisfied that we have more than enough of iron-clads, but the discussion in the earlier part of this evening has, I think, answered that taunt; and it is ominously significant that the loss of the Vanguard has deprived my right hon. Friend of the power to retain an iron-clad in the Pacific, where, as has been seen, her presence is so necessary to the strength and power of England. But, unfortunately, we cannot restore in two years the neglect of five. Sloops and gunboats must be built as well as iron-clads, and at least those must be built which both Administrations have considered to be absolutely essential for the public interest. I do not doubt but that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the City did his best with the late parsimonious and niggardly House, which would not cheer a First Lord of the Admiralty who proposed to endeavour to maintain an efficient Navy; but now, fortunately, as the right hon. Gentleman sees, there is a majority which will support a First Lord in all reasonable demands, and which will support him in his endeavour to restore the preeminence of our Navy.
MR. SHAW LEFEVERsaid, it was not his intention to follow the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just sat down into the comparison he had instituted of one Administration with another, and of which, he thought, the House, and no doubt the country also, had had enough. To hear the right hon. and gallant Gentleman, any one would imagine that the Government came into office yesterday, instead of having been in power for more than two years. During that time it was open to them to build as many sloops as they thought fit; yet it was only now that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty called attention to the state of the Navy in reference to these sloops. He might, however, have stated what the Government now in office had done in the way of shipbuilding, when he was showing how they had fulfilled their programme. In the first year they were in office they increased their Estimate by £450,000; in the second year they in-
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creased it by £500,000; and this year they had increased it by £450,000. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that the Government had fulfilled their programme, but had said nothing about the Supplemental Estimates which they brought in, nor anything about the actual tonnage built by their Predecessors. There was one proposal made by the right hon. Gentleman which would require most careful consideration. In our Dockyards there were two classes of workmen—the shipwrights and the factory men. The former had established wages, and in due time retired upon pensions; the latter were paid the market rate of wages, and were only engaged from time to time. The right hon. Gentleman now proposed to place 500 factory men on the establishment, but had not stated how it was to be done. If the factory men put on the establishment were to have their wages reduced so as to afford an equivalent for their pensions, they would think the change no boon, and if the pensions were to be added to the present rate of wages the stop would inflict a considerable loss upon the country.
MR. E. J. REED, in explanation of some remarks in his speech in the earlier part of the evening, said, that when he spoke of displacing ships he only meant taking them from one important branch and adding them to another branch of the Fleet, and in doing so he made the right hon. Gentleman a present of so many frigates. He did not look upon the money spent in the repair of those vessels which he had thrown out of consideration as fighting ships as having been thrown away. Frigates which might not be fit to take a place in the first rank as fighting ships might be useful in other ways. He regretted that while it was intended to send an unarmoured frigate to the Pacific, no step would be taken to replace the Vanguard, a fact which would justify him to urge upon the House on all possible occasions the necessity of increasing the number of our iron-clads. In 1871 and 1872 the cost of iron-clads was £65 per ton; but experience since then had shown that, with the growth of the armour and other requirements of such ships, their cost had very much increased. The present Government, since it had been in office, had laid down, to the best of his knowledge, only four iron-clad-ships

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—two of the Shannon class, and the Ajax, and the Agamemnon. The two of the Shannon class he believed were the least important sort of armour-clads, and the Ajax and the Agamemnon were practically not begun. He could assure the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Hunt) that he wished to support him in the arduous duties of his office; but he must say he felt disappointed when he found the programme of the year was almost entirely comprised in the building of a number of unarmoured gunboats. The right hon. Gentleman ought to state why he asked for so large a number of that class of vessels. There might be State reasons for building more unarmoured gunboats; but he believed that, in the main, the proposition was the outcome of the naval element in the Board of Admiralty. The Sea Lords wished to keep up the same number of men as there were in the Service before iron-clads, which required only a few men, were introduced, and, in order to keep up the same number of men, they asked for more gunboats to put them in. It might be that all these wooden vessels were required, and the First Lord of the Admiralty might be perfectly right in proposing that they should be built, but the House ought to have more information on the subject.
CAPTAIN G. E. PRICEapproved of a number of men being employed in the Government Dockyards, where they could acquire a knowledge of machinery that might be of the greatest value to the country in time of emergency. He wished to know why the sailors on the China Station were paid in Mexican dollars, which were, as a rule, at a considerable discount, a practice which involved much loss to the sailors without any gain to the Government.
MR. GOURLEYthought that the First Lord of the Admiralty, before asking Parliament to grant increased Estimates, should have endeavoured to economize. A reduction of expenditure might be effected in several Departments of the Navy. For example, although in 15 years the number of ships had been diminished by 619, the number of men and boys in the Service remained the same. He contended that it was unnecessary to spend £25,000 on new buildings for the Coastguard, and that a great reform was possible in that branch of the Service; and, further, sub-
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mitted that the time had arrived for reducing the number of Dockyards.
MR. HUNTstated that in the Dockyards it was proposed during the year to proceed with 8 iron-clads, 8 corvettes, 10 sloops, 2 despatch vessels, and 6 gunboats, in all 34 vessels, and to repair 41 vessels, including 7 iron-clads. The Lord Warden was considerably advanced, and would, probably, be ready by August.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Rylands.)
MR. HUNTopposed the Motion. There would be plenty of opportunity for discussing general questions when other Votes were under consideration. He was informed by the Treasury that it was very desirable the Vote should be agreed to that night.
Question put.
The Committee divided:—Ayes 63; Noes 105: Majority 42.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do now leave the Chair."—(Captain Nolan.)
MR. HUNThoped that another division would not be taken, as the hon. Member for Beading would not lose the opportunity, if the Wages Vote were agreed to, of calling attention to the state of the Navy on going into Supply.
MR. BIGGARobjected to taking Votes after half-past 12 o'clock.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, it was usual when the number of men had been agreed to for the Wages Vote to follow as a matter of course. To postpone the Vote was only throwing impediments in the way of Public Business, and he therefore trusted the Committee would come to a conclusion upon it that evening.
THE CHAIRMANsaid, if the Vote were agreed to it would be competent to raise the Motion of the hon. Member for Reading on the Question that the Speaker leave the Chair on the Navy Estimates.
SIR PATRICK O'BRIENwished to know whether if the Wages Vote were agreed to now, it would be competent to raise a Motion on that subject when the House next went into Supply.
MR. BIGGARsaid, that if the Motion of his hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Nolan) were negatived, he should immediately afterwards move, notwithstanding, that the Chairman report Progress.
Question put.
The Committee divided:—Ayes 62; Noes 104: Majority 42.
Vote agreed to.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Dillwyn.)
MR. HUNTsaid, it seemed to be the wish of hon. Members opposite that the Committee should not then proceed, and he therefore assented to the Motion.
Question put, and agreed to.
House resumed.
Resolution to be reported To-morrow; Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.

SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.
  HALIFAX (VICAR'S RATE).
  Ordered, That a Select Committee of Five Members, to be nominated by the Committee of Selection, be appointed to inquire into the operation of the Act 10 Geo. 4, c. 14, relating to the Vicar's Rate at Halifax, and to report their opinion to the House whether any and what amendments should be made in the said Act.—(Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson.)

  MANCHESTER POST OFFICE [EXPENSES].
  Considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Resolved, That it is expedient to authorise the Purchase, out of moneys to be provided by Parliament, of any Land that may be acquired in pursuance of any Act of the present Session for enabling Her Majesty's Postmaster General to acquire a Site for the extension of the Manchester General Post Office.
  Resolution to be reported To-morrow.

  CORONERS (DUBLIN) BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. SULLIVAN, Bill to amend the Law relating to Coroners and Inquests in the county of the city of Dublin, ordered to be brought in by Mr. SULLIVAN, Sir ARTHUR GUINNESS, Mr. MAURICE BROOKS, and Mr. PATRICK MARTIN.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 104.]

  POOLBEG LIGHTHOUSE BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. EDWARD STANHOPE, Bill for vesting Poolbeg Lighthouse in the Dublin Port and Docks Board; and for other purposes
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  relating thereto, ordered to be brought in by Mr. EDWARD STANHOPE and Sir CHARLES ADDERLEY.
  Bill presented, and road the first time. [Bill 105.]
  House adjourned at half after One o'clock.