Commons Sitting of 7 August 1871

MINUTES.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—NAVY ESTIMATES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Ordered—First Reading—Street Accidents* [288]; Expiring Laws Continuance* [289].
Second Reading—Union of Benefices Acts Amendment* [264]; Charitable Donations and Bequests (Ireland)* [277].
Committee—Metropolis Water (No. 2) (re-comm.)* [257]—R.P.
Committee — Report — Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment (re-comm.)* [276].
Considered as amended—Elections (Parliamentary and Municipal) [282].
Third Reading—Beerhouses (Ireland)* [259]; County Boundaries (Ireland)* [268], and passed.

GREECE—THE LOAN.—QUESTION.
MR. ALDERMAN W. LAWRENCE (for Mr. CRAWFORD)asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether provision has been made for assuring to the holders of the Bonds of the Guaranteed Greek Loan of 1832, the interest due to them for the period intervening between the 1st of March 1871, when the Bonds would have become payable under ordinary circumstances, and the date on which they could have been presented for payment under the notification advertised in the "Times" on the 13th July 1871?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Yes, Sir, provision was made by the Government for the payment of this loan, which is a loan, as the House is aware, guaranteed by Russia, France, and England. As it has never been paid by Greece, we have always had to make provision for it, which we did with the agents for the loan, Messrs. Rothschild. I must refer the hon. Gentleman and those interested to Messrs. Rothschild for the reasons why the money has not been paid; but I do not think there will be any difficulty in discovering them when we consider the events that have passed in France during the last 12 months.

EDUCATION—LONDON SCHOOL BOARD.

  QUESTION.
  CAPTAIN GROSVENORasked the Vice President of the Council, Whether he is aware that Captain Armstrong, a well known political agent in Westminster, has been appointed to take the Census within that city for the London School Board; and, whether, having regard to the facility with which such an office may be connected with the registration of voters at Parliamentary Elections, he is of opinion that a political agent is a proper person to hold, it?
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, in reply, that he imagined that this Question applied to the appointment of an officer by the School Board under Section 35 of the Act. That section did not give the Education Department any power to control the School Board, or even to give any

  957
  opinion to the School Board in regard to any such appointment. The Department was brought so much into contact with the School Board that they thought that they should not interfere except when they were empowered by the Act to do so. Under these circumstances he could express no opinion upon such appointment. His own opinion was that no appointment by the School Board should be of a political nature, and his knowledge of the Board led him to suppose that no appointment could have been made with any political object.

INDIA—COMPENSATION TO MILITARY OFFICERS—THE ABOLITION OF PURCHASE.—QUESTION.
COLONEL JERVISasked the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether it is the intention of the Secretary of State for India to take into consideration the sanction given in Parliament to a Bill to refund to the Officers of the British Army, over-regulation as well as regulation prices on the abolition of the purchase system, although the illegality of the former had always been duly notified in Her Majesty's Regulations; and to propose to revise the rules which have been in force hitherto with reference to the compensation of Officers of the late Indian Army in respect to the abolition of the bonus system, so far that each Officer may be recouped in full such amount as he has actually paid towards the bonus fund, such bonus system having been officially approved of by the Board of Directors of the late East India Company, and such approval having been duly notified to the late Indian Army by order of the Governor General in Council?
MR. GRANT DUFF: Sir, without expressing any opinion as to the views implied in the hon. and gallant Member's Question, I have no hesitation in saying that the Secretary of State in Council will, if this Bill becomes law, most carefully consider whether its provisions have any, and, if so, what, bearing upon the decision come to by his predecessors, in respect to the claims of Indian officers.

THE NEW TABLE OF LESSONS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. LOCKE KINGasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether he is aware that some of the Clergy have
  958
  already commenced using the new Table of Lessons, and that a Bishop has written to the Rural Deans to advise the Clergy to begin using the new Table of Lessons on Advent Sunday; and, whether, under these circumstances, he will not feel it his duty to recommend their waiting until the Act of Parliament will permit them to make the change?
  MR. GLADSTONE,in reply, said, he thought that he was somewhat behind his hon. Friend in information upon the subject, for he did not know that a Bishop had written to the Rural Deans, as his hon. Friend described. He (Mr. Gladstone) was aware that in certain cases the clergy had used the new Table of Lessons. Any recommendation of his, he was afraid, would avail very little indeed, but if it would avail he would recommend them in the sense anticipated by his hon. Friend; for he did not know why the date should be anticipated. He was entirely of his hon. Friend's opinion, and he hoped that their joint opinions might prevail.

SPAIN—IMPRISONMENT OF WILLIAM PIPER.—QUESTION.
MR. CANDLISH (for Mr. STEVENSON)asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether it is the case that an English sailor named Piper, having been concerned in a publichouse quarrel at Alicante, has been sentenced to three years' imprisonment in Spain, without having been charged, and without trial; and, what efforts Her Majesty's Government have made for his release, and what prospect there is of their efforts proving successful?
VISCOUNT ENFIELD: Sir, a British seaman, named William Piper, was tried at Alicante on the 13th of May last, on a charge of having, four months previously—namely, on January 12—assaulted a watchman who had been directed by the Alcalde to arrest him for creating a disturbance while intoxicated in the streets of Alicante. He was convicted and sentenced to three years' imprisonment and a small fine; this sentence was confirmed by a higher Court on July 15. Our Minister, Mr. Layard, having received a report of the proceedings from Consul Barrie, and thinking the severity of the sentence was disproportionate to the nature of the offence, applied, on May 15 and June 16, to Senor Martos for a free pardon for

959
Piper, who had received several sabre cuts on the head, and had been lying in prison four months before being brought to trial. These representations were not, however, attended with success, and the sentence having been confirmed, Mr. Ffrench (in the absence on leave of Mr. Layard) renewed the application for a free pardon on the 15th of July, the result of which application has not yet been notified to the Foreign Office.

IMPRISONMENT OF A BRITISH CREW.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ALDERMAN LUSKasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether it is true that the crew of a British ship, imprisoned in Sandwich Gaol, Kent, for refusing to proceed to sea in their ship, have been unconditionally released; and, if so, under what circumstances their release has been advised; and, whether he will lay the Papers referring to this matter upon the Table?
  MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUEsaid, in reply, that the circumstances stated in the Question were substantially true, the case being shortly this—the Balaclava anchored in the Downs in a leaky state, and several of the seamen refused to go to sea in her, alleging that she was in an unseaworthy state. They were taken before a magistrate and sentenced to one month's imprisonment with hard labour, and subsequently the vessel proceeded to sea, but had to put into Portsmouth, where she was found to be leaky and unseaworthy, and her cargo was now being discharged. Upon these facts coming to the knowledge of the Board of Trade, he communicated with the Home Office, and the men were very properly discharged.

ARMY—INFANTRY EQUIPMENT.

  QUESTION.
  SIR JOHN GRAYasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether the recommendation of His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, for the adoption of the valise equipment in the Infantry, was not made prior to the application of the officer commanding the 1st Battalion of Grenadier Guards to His Royal Highness for a renewed trial of Lieutenant Colonel Carter's plan of equipment, consequent upon the discovery that the trial of that
  960
  equipment, his own regiment had been improperly conducted; and, whether he will lay upon the Table of the House a Copy of the application referred to?
  SIR HENRY STORKS: Sir, the recommendation of His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief that the trials of Lieutenant Colonel Carter's plan of equipment should cease and the question be closed by the adoption of the valise equipment was dated February 18, 1870. This recommendation, together with the report of the officer commanding the Grenadier Guards on which it was founded, has been already laid on the Table of the House. On the 13th of March, 1870, the officer in command of the Grenadier Guards wrote to say that Lieutenant Colonel Carter had called on him, and had pointed out that many of the objections to his mode of equipment would be removed by certain alterations he wished made, and that he (Colonel Ponsonby) was ready to give the equipment another trial. A day or two later Colonel Ponsonby called on the Adjutant General, and stated that he was himself convinced of the superiority of the valise equipment; but that, to satisfy Colonel Carter, he had no objection to make further trial, if considered advisable. As, however, the reports had been so uniformly in favour of the valise equipment, and condemnatory of Colonel Carter's plan, His Royal Highness felt that he would not be justified in reopening the question, and causing the equipment of the Army to be delayed because Colonel Carter was not satisfied with the trials, and was anxious to make further alterations. Under these circumstances, I do not see the advantage of producing a copy of the application referred to.

SCOTLAND—CHARTERS TO COLLEGES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. MACFIEasked the Lord Advocate, Whether, under the Act 34 and 35 Vic. c. 63, or, if not, whether independently of that Act any existing College in Scotland not now having a charter, would be entitled to expect that a charter would be granted to it as freely as to any new college; and, whether charters to be granted under the above Act are intended to permit the granting of degrees in divinity, law, and medicine,

  961
  and when and how the conditions and requirements to which institutions desiring to be chartered must conform may be ascertained?
  THE LORD ADVOCATE,in reply, said, his hon. Friend the Member for Leith had kindly communicated to him a copy of the Question in the course of the forenoon. He had done his best to understand it; but he must confess he had failed. The Act referred to did not affect the granting of charters to colleges, beyond imposing this restriction—that no new charter should be granted until the application for it and a copy of the charter asked for had been laid before Parliament for a certain number of days. In no other respect did it affect the granting of charters at all. By "any existing colleges in Scotland not having a charter," he supposed his hon. Friend meant private institutions which had taken the name of colleges. [Mr. MACFIE said, he meant the colleges connected with the Free Church.] They were not public, but private institutions, which had very properly assumed the name of colleges, and such colleges were entitled to expect that charters would be granted or refused to them as freely as to any other new colleges. In answer to the latter part of the Question, he had already stated that no charters could be granted under this Act otherwise than in the way they were previously granted.

SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

  QUESTION.
  SIR WILFRID LAWSONasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether he intends to introduce the promised Government measure for dealing with the sale of Intoxicating Liquors at an early date next Session?
  MR. BRUCE,in reply, said, he was sorry not to be able to give an answer to his hon. Friend. The Government had not yet had an opportunity for considering what measures they would introduce next year, still less the order in which they would introduce them.

NAVY—LOSS OF THE "MEGÆRA."

  QUESTION.
  SIR JOHN HAY: Sir, since I have had the honour of a seat in this House, now ten years, I have never asked its
  962
  kind indulgence in the manner in which I am now going to do; but in order to enable the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty to give a full explanation, so that the House may learn how 380 of our seamen are now upon a desert island, how they got there, and how it is proposed to release them from their perilous position, I hope the House will allow me to make a short statement in explanation of the Question which stands in my name on the Paper, and I am the more anxious to make it, because at the time when I gave Notice of that Question, the right hon. Gentleman seemed to imagine I was making a personal attack on himself. I can assure him, however, that I had no such desire; but I may remark that, seeing by the papers that in replying to the hon. Baronet the Member for Manchester (Sir Thomas Bazley), although the right hon. Gentleman exculpated himself with regard to the Question put by my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Mr. F. Walpole), he said nothing respecting his predecessor at the Admiralty. Now, that I consider he ought to have done for this is a departmental question and has nothing of a personal nature. [Mr. GOSCHEN: I said I would reserve that for my statement to-day.] Observing that the right hon. Gentleman had thought I intended some personal attack on himself, I deemed it proper to make these remarks, but I will not now pursue that subject further. For the two years and upwards that I had the honour of occupying a seat at the late Board of Admiralty, I had charge of this special Department, and the Megæra was one of the fleet of transport and store-ships, of which there were 11, under my charge. Besides the vessels employed to convey men to distant places, among them there were certain store-ships used for other purposes. The Megæra belonged to the latter class, and I conceive it would have been unjust to have sent to Australia a ship of that character, which was so unable to sail, and with imperfect steam-power, on any such voyage, not with reference to safety if she were a sound ship, but with reference to the great amount of time that would be occupied in performing the voyage. The Megæra went to Ascension and to other places with stores, a duty for which she was well qualified

  963
  at that time. Early this Session the noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox) and my hon. Friend the Member for Carlow (Mr. Kavanagh) called attention—the latter twice—to this matter, as did the hon. Member for Kent (Mr. J. G. Talbot), while the hon. Member for North Norfolk, who had a son on board, asked a Question at a later period which has been replied to by the right hon. Gentleman. The facts of the case are as follows:—I have had the advantage of seeing Mr. Reed, the late Chief Constructor of the Navy, who has personally assured me of the correctness of these facts, and I need hardly say that his word is above suspicion, and that he is one of the best officers ever employed by the Admiralty of this country. His attention was called, not by the right hon. Gentleman the present First Lord of the Admiralty, but by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), to the necessity of investigating the state of certain ships, and Mr. Reed reported that the Megæra was in such a condition that she could only continue her service for a certain period of time, though what that period of time was I do not know. [Mr. GOSCHEN: In what year was that?] I understand that Report was presented in the year 1869; but Mr. Reed himself is unable to state the precise date, as he has not access to the documents which are preserved at the Admiralty. At all events, he expressed his opinion that the Megæra was only fit for service during a certain period of time, and that this period had elapsed at the time when she was ordered to proceed to Australia. Early in the present Session the attention of the House was called to the condition of this ship, which had been recently surveyed at Sheerness. That information I did not obtain from Mr. Reed, but through another source. The ship was ordered to be surveyed at Sheerness; but the cost of a thorough survey being greater than the Department thought it right to incur, the expenditure was checked, although it was reported that the plates at the bottom of the vessel were considerably worn. The ship was sent round to Devonport, and the officers on board her reported that she was overcrowded, and not in a fit condition to proceed to sea. The Admiralty ordered her to proceed to Cork, and the Admiral there, having been instructed to inspect her, I believe
  964
  that 100 tons of cargo were taken out of her, under his personal supervision, in order to make her safe. It is obvious, however, that neither he nor any other officer could have inspected the plates at the bottom of the vessel; but they took it for granted she was a sound ship, and it was considered a mere question of stowage. Well, the ship left this country, and afterwards my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk asked his Question. I should have thought and hoped the right hon. Gentleman would then have made inquiries, or took measures to stop her voyage round the Cape; but what steps he took I really do not know, though, of course, they will be mentioned in the course of his statement; but I know that the representatives of the Admiralty in this House—I mean the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), whom I do not now see in his place—on very many occasions when he was questioned on the subject treated it with the greatest possible scorn. The hon. Member went so far as to tell my hon. Friend the Member for Carlow (Mr. Kavanagh) that there was not a word of truth of what he was stating. During the time I have sat in this House I have heard many curious things said; but if it is not un-Parliamentary the term "insolent" is the term which I should naturally apply to such an answer. A report had been made that she could only run for a certain time, and the cargo having been improperly stowed, had to be re-stowed and re-adjusted, and certain stores had to be taken out of her before she was sent on. Notwithstanding all that, a Question in regard to her condition was treated in the most flippant manner by the representative of the Admiralty in this House. It is quite evident from the telegram received to-day why she went down. The plates were worn out, and there was a hole in her bottom; and, consequently, it was necessary to run her ashore in order to save the lives of those on board. What quantity of stores and provisions was saved I do not know; but it is clear that the crew cannot be relieved, except by some passing ship, until the 3rd or 4th of September. I have myself passed St. Paul's Island amid hail and snow in mid-winter — that is, in the month of June, and I am sure the climate is by no means an agreeable one for persons to live in for so long a period. The

  965
  officers and crew will, at all events, have to remain there until some time in the month of September. I think it is a misfortune that no man-of-war was available for taking them away, instead of sending a hired steamer from Hong Kong, and that it was wrong to trust to one ship to rescue all those people. The right hon. Gentleman has ships at Gibraltar, only 40 days off St. Paul's, and I think he ought to have sent a vessel at once from Gibraltar, in addition to the steamer chartered at Hong Kong, so that he might have had two strings to his bow, and have been certain of preventing these men from starving after they had run the risk of being drowned. I will now put the Question of which I have given Notice, and ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, If he will state to the House the circumstances under which the "Megæra" storeship was run on the island of Saint Paul's to save the lives of her crew and passengers; whether he has any information which leads him to think that she left England in an unseaworthy condition; and, if he will lay the Report of Mr. Reed, late Chief Constructor of the Navy, on the condition of the "Megæra" upon the Table? To ensure my being in Order, I further beg leave to move the adjournment of the House.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Sir John Hay.)
  MR. GOSCHEN: Sir, I can assure the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay) I do not think he wished to treat this question as a personal one. I can also assure him that I look upon the loss of this ship as so serious a matter as not for a moment to allow of any personal considerations being mixed up with it. Anyone who has read the letter of Mr. Reed, published in The Times newspaper, must have gathered, from the mode in which allusion is made to his Report, that the Report was made before the Megæra was despatched. It is not, indeed, absolutely so stated, but it is inferred, and I think Mr. Reed believed in his own mind when he wrote that letter that such must have been the case, or he would not have made use of the expressions which occur in it. According to his own statement, Mr. Reed, when the Megæra sailed, had a knowledge of a certain fact, and
  966
  the Admiralty and myself had not that knowledge. It was not brought to our notice till a week after the departure of the ship. I will deal, in the first place, with what is, perhaps, the most important part of the Question asked by the hon. and gallant Baronet—namely, that relating to the ship, and the circumstances under which she went on shore; and at the outset I may remark that I have no knowledge of those circumstances beyond what was stated in the telegram which was communicated to the Press, and which the hon. and gallant Baronet, in common with all of us, has seen. I think the hon. and gallant Baronet is a little quick at jumping to a conclusion as to the cause of the accident. He may be right, but I trust the House and the country will suspend their judgment until full particulars have been received as to the actual cause of the accident. And now I will say a few words with regard to the provisions and the means which have been taken to relieve the crew. The first Admiralty telegram was silent as to the provisions being landed or not, but the hon. and gallant Baronet must have seen in the telegram received this morning a statement that the provisions were landed safely. It appears from these particulars sent to the Admiralty that there was no hurry at the time, and that, therefore, there was ample opportunity for landing the provisions; and it was a fortunate circumstance in this very unfortunate affair that there were 40 tons of provisions intended for Sydney on board the Megæra besides the provisions which she carried for herself. Consequently it is not anticipated, though provisions may be somewhat short, that any suffering will arise. As to the means which are being taken to relieve them, I concur with the hon. and gallant Baronet that, in an emergency, it is not sufficient to have one string to one's bow, and accordingly the Admiralty, besides ordering a steamer to be chartered at Hong Kong, caused inquiries to be made at Bombay and Batavia, and, in consequence of the latter inquiries, Her Majesty's ship Rinaldo has been ordered to proceed to St. Paul's with all haste possible from Singapore, that being the closest point to St. Paul's from which it is possible to communicate easily with that island. At this moment, no doubt, the Rinaldo is on her way there with provisions,

  967
  besides the steamer being chartered at Hong Kong. The hon. and gallant Baronet must, I think, have no doubt that a steamer will proceed much quicker to St. Paul's from Singapore than from Gibraltar. We are informed, moreover, that the steamer from Hong Kong is expected to arrive at St. Paul's on the 29th of this month—some days earlier than the date mentioned by the hon. and gallant Baronet. Indeed, the Rinaldo may perhaps arrive before that date. I have now communicated to the House that which I know of the circumstances connected with the loss of the Megæra and the steps taken for the relief of the passengers and crew. I believe that we have done all we could to relieve the crew, and that no step has been left untried to secure their speedy release. I now come to the second part of the Question, and I trust the House will not think me tedious if I describe in some detail what occurred when the ship was at Queenstown, as great interest is felt on the subject, and as such very serious charges have not unnaturally been made. I must, in the first instance, ask hon. Members to dismiss from their minds for the moment the first and second letters of Mr. Reed, and all that has arisen from them, because the facts therein mentioned were not before us between the 1st and the 14th of March, when the ship was at Queenstown, and although hon. Members may now look at the matter in the light of those letters, I and my colleagues at the Admiralty had not an opportunity of regarding it in that light, as the Report was not before them. I do not ask the House to pronounce any judgment on the present occasion, but I entreat them for the moment to dismiss from their minds the statement about the thin plates, as to which not a single word was said in any of the Questions put in the House, and to listen to the evidence which I shall adduce; and here I may distinctly remark that if I quote the evidence and statements of subordinates, I do not do so in order to relieve the Board of Admiralty or the First Lord from any responsibility whatever in connection with this matter. I must quote their Reports, however, in order that the House may form a judgment, although the responsibility of sending the ship to sea rests on the First Lord of the Admiralty. It is true I had not been long in office, but I sifted the evidence
  968
  to the best of my ability and I must be responsible. The Megæra, having fitted up at Sheerness, went to Plymouth, whence, after some events to which I shall call attention presently, she proceeded to Queenstown. The first serious remonstrance which reached the Admiralty was in the shape of a letter from the captain of the Megæra, dated the 28th of February. This was after the journey from Plymouth to Queenstown, during which it had been found that the ports on the main-deck leaked, and that the officers and men suffered some discomfort. The captain wrote—
  "I have the honour to inform you that, owing to the leaky condition of the main-deck ports and the connecting piece of the outer bobstay having broken off in the stem, I have thought it advisable to bring Her Majesty's ship under my command into this harbour that these and a few more defects may be made good. 2. We left Plymouth Sound on Saturday, the 25th inst., and used steam to insure a good offing, banking the fires on Sunday at noon. Since then the wind has been contrary and the weather bad, during the whole of which time the main-deck has had water washing from side to side, wetting the men's bags, clothes, &c. The officers' cabins have been literally afloat the whole time, although the watch have been constantly employed to bale the water up. The main-deck ports were lined with fearnought and well greased; but, from being warped and old, would not keep the water out, some of the bolts drawing out when screwing them up. 3. On Monday, the 27th inst., the outer bobstay carried away, and, having secured the foremast, we bore up for this anchorage."
  When that letter arrived I think I was not in office; but when I saw it I made inquiries respecting the serious defects to which allusion is therein made, and the measures taken for remedying them. In what I am stating now not a single word shall be omitted which goes, if I may use the expression, against the Board of Admiralty, and I will accordingly read the further evidence we had against the ship. On the 2nd of March the captain wrote a letter to Admiral Forbes, the Commander-in-Chief at Queenstown. It was in the following terms:—
  "I have to inform you that the officers and ships' companies on board this ship have represented to me the extreme discomfort of the ship in consequence of every available space below being taken up for cargo, bringing the ship considerably deeper in the water than she ever was before, and rendering her very wet. That the whole of the troop-deck and part of the main-deck are stowed with cargo, thus curtailing considerably their sleeping and living place. That the troop-deck being filled up there is no place for the men's bags except on the deck under the mess tables, and that they have been continually wet

  969
  from the ports leaking. To remedy these defects I have to request that you may permit me to land 100 tons of the cargo. I beg to enclose a list of articles proposed for landing, and a letter from the officers and one from the medical officer of the ship, trusting that this application may meet with your approval."
  The Commander-in-Chief sent the letter to the Admiralty, accompanied by this memorandum—
  "Submitted for the information of their Lordships with reference to my telegram of this date. I have been on board the Megæra and examined into the causes of complaint; both officers and men appear to be in great discomfort owing to the crowded state of the decks and to the quantity of water which has found its way to the main-deck. The ship is very deep in the water, and as it will be difficult to keep the ports tight in a seaway, I think it would be a great advantage, if space could be obtained on the orlop-deck for the stowage of the men's bags, and also for such portions of the officers' property as they may not be able to find a place for in their store-rooms and cabins."
  I will now read to the House the remonstrances of the officers themselves; but I ask the House to suspend their judgment on the facts till they have the reply to these letters. In a letter dated "Her Majesty's ship Megæra, March 2, 1871," they say—
  "We consider the Megæra is too heavily laden and too crowded to successfully encounter such weather as reasonably may be expected in making the long voyage to Australia. The cabin accommodation for officers entitled to them is inadequate. In consequence of the ship's deep draught (17 feet), the ports at sea are generally barred in the mess-place, which has but one small ventilator. The water-closets are insufficient for the number of officers using them. There is insufficient stowage for officers' wines and provisions."
  There was also a letter from the surgeon pointing out, with regard to the sanitary view of the question, the inconvenience of the main-deck ports having been closed. It should be borne constantly in mind that the remonstrances from the captain and the officers arose principally from two causes—namely, the overloading of the ship and the leakage of the main-deck ports. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON inquired whether there were any military officers on board?] No; the Megæra took out the crews and stores for the Blanche and the Rosario stationed in Australia, but they were all naval officers on board. Having read the remonstrances of the officers, I come next to the Report of the Flag Captain at Queenstown, in the absence at the moment of the Admiral upon the station. He says—
  970
  "Mersey, at Queenstown, March 2, 1871.
  "1. Submitted for the information of their Lordships, observing that the repair of the bob-stay plate appears absolutely necessary, and is now being made good; it would be desirable to caulk the waterways if a few days fine weather could be obtained. 2. The chief carpenter for Haulbowline, Mr. James Burnett, could find no defect in foremast."
  But I will further show the House that it is not true, as has been reported, that we took no pains at the Admiralty to inquire into the truth of those allegations. We took three steps. First of all, we telegraphed to Admiral Forbes, at Queenstown, and directed him to—
  "Proceed on board Her Majesty's ship Megæra, inquire strictly and carefully into her state and condition, and report by telegram and letter his opinion as to the fitness of that ship to undertake the service upon which she had been ordered."
  In thus applying to the responsible officer and asking him to report, we thought we were taking the step which was proper under the circumstances; and the following is the answer which we received from the Commander-in-Chief at Queenstown—
  "I find the Megæra much crowded with stores, and I have ordered a part to be landed to give more comfort to the officers and men. I am of opinion that she is fit to undertake the service she has been ordered upon."
  That reply came by telegram from the Admiral after he had enjoyed the opportunity of examining the ship and speaking to the officers. He afterwards sent a long letter upon the state of the vessel. I will read to the House the summing up of that letter, but if any hon. Gentleman wishes to have the whole of it there will be no objection on our part, as we do not wish for one moment to withhold a single particle of evidence which we possess. The Admiral reports that having closely and carefully inspected the Megæra, and having already telegraphed his opinion that the ship was fit for the service on which she was employed, he now forwards in detail fuller particulars of her state. He states that her draught of water forward is 17 foot, and aft 17 feet 3 inches; that her full supply of coal is on board; and
  "All the decks are much lumbered, but she is very ill stowed, and much clearance may be made when this is better done."
  He then goes on to the accommodation of the ward-room officers, says that the troop-deck is much choked with cargo; that the men's bags are

  971
  "Most inconveniently stowed under the mess-laths, where they have got wet from water shipped through leaky ports, to the great discomfort of the men," but that "the ports are now mended and re-lined, and new ones placed where necessary;" he says that "the main-deck is also inconveniently crowded for sleeping," but "by clearing out the troop-deck below, as suggested, many men now berthed above may be berthed there;"
  he then enlarges upon the question of how further accommodation might be given in the sick-bay; and the Admiral sums up as follows:—
  "The result of my inspection is that the Megæra has been inconveniently crowded with cargo, considering the quantity of stores and effects accompanying the number of officers and men she takes out; that landing about 100 tons weight would rid her of this evil; that the officers taking passage have also been crowded, considering the length of the voyage. If the number of them was reduced by four the remainder would also be relieved."
  And the Admiral concludes thus—
  "The ship is of old pattern, and wanting in many of the conveniences of later days, but I see no reason whatever of unfitness for performing the service she is employed in."
  The hon. and gallant Baronet opposite made use of one expression—either I caught it across the House, or it fell from him in his opening remarks—to the effect that the Admiral, in the inspection which he made, could not get at the thinness of the plates. [Sir JOHN HAY: Hear, hear!] Precisely so; but the hon. and gallant Baronet will see that the remonstrances which brought about this inspection had nothing to do with the thinness of the plates; we were dealing with the ship as it had been despatched from Sheerness, and with circumstances that had happened from that time. One of the charges brought against the Admiralty, as I understand, is that, in spite of what happened between Plymouth and Queenstown, and in spite of the Question asked in this House, we sent, as I understand it, a leaky ship to sea. The fact, however, is that we took the greatest pains to inquire into every detail of what had occurred between Plymouth and Queenstown, with a view of having those matters remedied. I will not say at this moment that they were actually remedied; but I will say this, that I have seen extracts from a letter written by the captain of the Megæra from Madeira, in which he states that the ship had been going on satisfactorily; and that I have also heard of a letter received from the
  972
  engineer on board the ship, written from the Cape, in which he states that everything had been working satisfactorily. I do not wish to make out a case for the Admiralty upon this occasion at all; I wish to answer every allegation made against us, and not to go an inch beyond that point. So far we have been dealing with these considerations; certain defects were discovered, and those defects were dealt with upon the responsibility of the Admiralty; and I say most distinctly that I do not hold Admiral Forbes responsible for one moment for what occurred afterwards. The matters brought to his attention by the letters before him he dealt with; and I believe they were effectually dealt with, and none of the questions which were asked pointed to any of the defects which led to the loss of the Megæra. The fault, if fault existed, must be sought for elsewhere. Meanwhile, in the next place, we asked Admiral Codrington also to report as to the truth of the statements which had been made. Sir Henry Codrington, in replying, with regard to the occurrences, wrote a long letter, the general drift of which was that Captain Thrupp never remonstrated with him for one moment as to the seaworthiness of the ship, but brought some trifling defects to his notice; and that the point upon which he expressed reluctance to leave was with regard to the stowage of the cargo. Of course, I cannot say what may have passed verbally; but as far as the Admiralty are aware, no question was raised as to the unseaworthiness of the ship. The captain wished to delay longer in order to stow the cargo better and to arrange the officers' and seamen's baggage; but no questions as to more serious matters, or the unseaworthiness of the ship, appear to have been raised at all. A statement was published to the effect that Admiral Codrington, by direction of the Admiralty, had ordered Captain Thrupp peremptorily to proceed to sea, in spite of the captain saying he was not ready. On reading that statement, we applied to Admiral Codrington for his account of the transaction, and I am perfectly willing to lay that letter on the Table of the House should there be any wish to see it; but I can assure the House there is nothing whatever in it as regards the seaworthiness of the ship. In the third and last place, we telegraphed to Sheerness, and asked the

  973
  authorities there to state their views as to the seaworthiness of the ship. The reply was as follows:—
  "With reference to your Minute on Chief Constructor's letter of the 3rd inst., s. 1733–1767, respecting defects in Her Majesty's ship Megæra, we have the honour to report that a list of defects sent in on the 29th of July, 1870, and reported on by us on the 2nd of August last, showed no complaints of the main-deck ports or the shackle for the bobstay. The defects were made good, and had the ship not been paid off she would have again proceeded to sea without any further repair. While in the 1st Division of Reserve the ship was refitted by the Reserve, when the ports in question were thoroughly overhauled and left efficient for temporary service. Before being commissioned she was docked for repairing the bottom, and had any defects been then apparent in the ship they would have been made good."
  I have now dealt with all the complaints which have been made, and I have shown the House all the evidence which the Admiralty had before them, brought about by those circumstances which it is stated ought to have warned the Admiralty as to the condition of the vessel. So far from treating the matter lightly, or, as the hon. and gallant Baronet seemed to suppose, cross-questioning nobody, and knowing nothing about the ship, we questioned, among others, the Director of Transports, the Chief Constructor and the Controller of the Navy, and we communicated with the authorities of Sheerness Dockyard, where the local knowledge was to be obtained. I venture, therefore, to say that we did all that was possible under the circumstances to ascertain the truth. Then I come to the question as to what information we had before us to warrant us in sending this ship to sea at all. I have just stated that she was docked in January, and that she had been docked in August and was then carefully examined. But before she was actually employed a telegram was sent to the Captain Superintendent of Sheerness Dockyard, as follows—
  "If the Megæra were wanted for a nine months' service at sea, is she in a fit state to undertake it, and what time would be required before she could receive her crew and a large body of supernumeraries?"
  The reply received was in the following terms:—
  "Megæra is ready, with the exception of completing the stores and coal, but she has been five months out of dock and would require to have her bottom cleaned. The tides will not admit of docking her until Friday, the 20th. She might receive her crew the following Monday (23rd inst)."
  974
  Upon receipt of this telegram the authorities at the Admiralty, the then Controller of the Navy, the First Naval Lord, and all the responsible officers, assented to the Megæra being sent out. However, to make still more certain, the Junior Naval Lord at that time put this distinct question to the Assistant Constructor, Mr. Barnaby—
  "Please tell me in what condition is Megæra as to seaworthiness, as we talk of her for a trip to Australia."
  The answer was as follows:—
  "I beg leave to state that the Megæra, having undergone repair at Sheerness, is reported to be complete. She is a good seaboat, and, although more than 20 years old, is sound and strong. Her boilers are, however, only good for one year's service."
  That term, however, was sufficient, for the voyage contemplated was only one of nine months; no question moreover arises as to the state of the boilers. Thereupon, the Captain Superintendent at Sheerness was told that he might dock the ship. But what had been the character of the ship before, for the question has been put before the House, as if we ought never to have entertained the notion of sending such a vessel to sea at all? Hon. Members might, indeed, at first sight, think that the character of the Megæra was such that she ought not and could not have been employed with safety; but, from an Admiralty document relative to the sailing and other qualities of Her Majesty's ships, she showed no signs of weakness. We keep a book at the Admiralty in which the opinions of the captains themselves with regard to their ships are recorded, and I will tell the House the answers which were made by successive commanders of the Megæra to the queries which were put to them. In the report of sailing qualities, the question put is as follows:—"Is she, generally speaking, a well-built and strong ship, or does she show any symtoms of weakness?" Captain M. B. Dunn, who commanded her in 1865, writes—"Appears to be a well-built ship and shows no signs of weakness; a good seaboat in heavy weather." In 1866 Captain Dunn again writes—"Appears to be a well-built iron ship." In 1867 Captain J. Simpson, a fresh captain, writes—"Appears to be a well-built iron ship; a good seaboat in a gale." In 1868 Staff Commander J.

  975
  Loane, a fresh captain, reports—"Appears quite strong and well-built, and shows no signs of weakness, and appears an excellent seaboat in heavy weather." In 1869 Staff Commander H. D. Sarratt, a different captain, writes—"Appears quite strong and well-built, and shows no signs of weakness; an excellent sea-boat in heavy weather;" and again, in 1870, Staff Commander Sarratt wrote in precisely similar terms. Now, as regards her draught of water, that is said to have been so excessive as to endanger the ship. But even before the 100 tons of cargo were taken out the draught was not in excess of what it had been in former years. Her draught of water in 1870 was 17 feet forward and 17 feet 3 inches aft; in 1871 her draught was 17 feet 3 inches forward and 16 feet 9½ inches aft; and on the day prior to her sailing from Queenstown it had been reduced to 16 feet 6 inches forward and 17 feet 1 inch aft. I have shown to the House that we really did take pains to ascertain whether the Megæra was a good and a seaworthy ship, and that we did not take this matter lightly, but investigated it thoroughly. My surprise was great when I heard for the first time, on Saturday, on seeing Mr. Reed's letter in the newspapers, that the plates had been so thin as to endanger the vessel. ["Hear, hear!"] That was the first time I heard of it. Now, let me say a word about Mr. Reed's Report. I was asked on the 21st of March whether there was not a Report from Mr. Reed upon this subject. I made inquiry, and search was instituted, but no such Report could be found. The hon. and gallant Baronet opposite states that, after a conversation with Mr. Reed, he believes that the Report was made in 1869. [Sir JOHN HAY: Yes, about 1869, I think; but the date was not given.] I do not know why the hon. and gallant Baronet should say it was 1869. Mr. Reed states that my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) was in office at the time. The date, however, is not 1869, but 1866, when the hon. and gallant Baronet himself was in office. When I saw that statement I asked for a copy of the Report—I know the House will feel that I desire always to state not merely what is true in fact, but what is true in spirit—and I was told that no such Report could be found, and there is no such Report now
  976
  to be found. But it is true that Mr. Reed surveyed the ship in 1866.
  MR. DISRAELI: What month in 1866?
  MR. GOSCHEN: Late in the month of July or August. I do not know exactly whether the right hon. Gentleman was in or out of office.
  LORD HENRY LENNOX: We came into office on the 14th of July.
  MR. GOSCHEN: I think it was at the end of July. At all events, it was the hon. and gallant Baronet who would have to deal with the Report. I do not make any charge against him with respect to it. I merely state that Mr. Reed now says, inaccurately, he made a Report, five years ago, as to the thinness of the plates to Mr. Childers, of which Report not a trace can be found at the Admiralty; and, unless the matter were brought to the notice of Mr. Childers, I do not see how it was possible for him to have acted on it. The information seems to have remained in the mind of one man above all others—Mr. Reed, and he communicated that knowledge to an hon. Member of this House, whether before or after the ship sailed I know not. A week after the ship sailed, however, a Question was put to me in the House, and I will only say that I would rather be myself, with my ignorance of that Report, than I would be anyone else who knew that the plates were thin and did not state it. Mr. Reed states that Mr. Childers insisted upon his not making any communication to his successors. ["Hear, hear!"] I see that there are two hon. Members in the House who accept that statement as true to the full extent. Does the House really believe that in the full sense of the term? But, if true, there are many ways in which that may be explained. I have had access to Mr. Childers's private papers, though, of course, I cannot be sure that I have seen them all. But I think it may be said in Mr. Childers's absence, that this is a very serious charge to bring against an absent man, who has no opportunity of immediately replying. Mr. Reed, at all events, worked in his Department with able subordinates, one of whom has himself certified to the fitness of the ship for going to sea, and is a near connection of Mr. Reed himself. I have asked this officer—indeed, I have asked them all—"Have you had any hint or warning whatever upon this

  977
  matter by a single line from Mr. Reed, either before he went out or since?" And he and all of them have assured me that no such warning whatever has been given. But Mr. Reed says Mr. Childers insisted upon the condition that he should not communicate with his successors. Mr. Reed has been good enough to offer assistance to me—and I fully appreciate his kindness—and to state that he would give me information as to any matters which I might require. These offers, however, were made after the sailing of the Megæra. Why, then, should Mr. Reed have felt himself precluded from doing a few weeks earlier what a few weeks later he voluntarily did—namely, to offer me courteously the information he possessed? I do not, moreover, understand what intimation from Mr. Childers prevented Mr. Reed from communicating upon a matter of such great importance with his friend and relative of whom I have spoken. By a single line he could have warned any one of his friends in the Department—"Look up the records of four or five years ago, and you will find this ship badly spoken of by me, in which the lives of 380 seamen are now about to be endangered." That was not done, and yet a week after she had sailed I was asked whether I had known of that Report of Mr. Reed's. I do not wish to make any charge against Mr. Reed; but I do say, when these letters are written to the newspapers charging us with want of knowledge, and charging us with every conceivable negligence in connection with this ship, I certainly do regret that no public or private hints were given, and that no official letter even was written by Mr. Reed—for I believe there was nothing whatever to preclude Mr. Reed from writing an official letter upon the subject. I am aware that Mr. Reed wanted to make some private communications to Mr. Childers, and that Mr. Childers replied by asking him to put them into an official form, which Mr. Reed refused to do, having written them as a private letter. I believe it will turn out that this view of Mr. Reed about Mr. Childers not wishing him to communicate arose from the reluctance of Mr. Childers to receive any communications not capable of being used as public letters. In a letter this morning Mr. Reed alleges that he spoke to Mr. Lushington, the Secretary to the
  978
  Admiralty, and got him "to point out to Mr. Childers the perils which might and would ensue" if he was not listened to. But is the Navy of this country in such a position that if Mr. Reed suddenly dies there is no means of obtaining information as to the perils with which any of our ships may be threatened? I refuse to believe that matters are in such a state that the whole safety of our Navy depends upon the knowledge that is enshrined in the breast of one man. I have received from Mr. Lushington a memorandum which does not correspond with the recollection of Mr. Reed. Mr. Lushington says—
  "With reference to Mr. Reed's statement in to-day's Times—'I got Mr. Lushington to point out to Mr. Childers the perils which might and would ensue'—I beg to state my recollection of what took place. A short while after Mr. Reed had resigned and had quitted the office, and after, I believe, Mr. Childers had declined to enter into any private correspondence with him, he (Mr. Reed) called at the office and asked to see me. I am not sure whether he was shown up to me in the first instance. If so, I had no conversation with him, but said at once that I could receive no verbal communication from him without instructions from Mr. Childers, and went at once to the First Lord's room. I recollect seeing Mr. Childers, and being instructed by him to inform Mr. Reed that I could not receive any oral statement from him, but that any official letter would receive due attention. I remember seeing Mr. Reed, and stating this to him in as civil and friendly terms as I could (for I had always been on friendly terms with him). He was somewhat angry, and went away. Mr. Reed at no time entered into any statement to me about the Megæra, or any other ship, and I cannot accept his statement that he got me 'to point out to Mr. Childers the perils which might and would ensue.' 'Perils' were never named or suggested to me by him. I never was at any time aware of any perils likely to ensue to any of Her Majesty's ships."
  I heard an hon. Member say that Mr. Reed would not write an official letter because he was no longer in office. But Mr. Reed had marked his letter "Private," with two dashes under the word "Private." Mr. Childers asked him to remove that word, and he refused to do so. The only objection on the part of Mr. Childers was to receive communications which could not be produced by him; but he said that if Mr. Reed would make his communication public it would receive full consideration. I do not know what further evidence I have to communicate. All I can say is, that upon the evidence I do not believe we could have acted in any other way. If Mr. Reed had made any communication

  979
  about the Megæra he would have done great service. I do not think that it can be justly alleged against Mr. Childers that he has refused to receive such hints. I know that so far from my refusing to receive them, I should have been very glad if they had been offered me. Mr. Reed says, in the letter which he addressed to The Times of Saturday—
  "I reported her fit only for a very brief period of further service, in consequence of the extreme thinness to which her plates had become worn by many years of almost continual use at sea. That period has long been exceeded."
  Now, I say I can find no Report whatever from Mr. Reed; but I do find that he surveyed the ship, and I find Reports upon the subject alluding to that survey. The word "only" is, however, interpolated by Mr. Reed, for the actual documents state that £250 would be required to repair her, and that then she would be fit for eighteen months' or two years' service. They do not say that at the end of that period she would not be fit for service. [Mr. DISRAELI: What is the date of those documents?] Yes, I ought to have given the date. The first is dated Woolwich Dockyard, July 30, 1866, and the next the 31st of July, 1866. The latter says—
  "With reference to the enclosed supplementary estimate for the repair of the hull and fittings of the Megæra, amounting to £250, to be performed by the Factory at Woolwich, I beg leave to report that the Chief Constructor has made a careful examination of the ship, and is of opinion that this supplementary estimate should be allowed, as the ship may remain fit for service for eighteen months or two years longer when repaired. I therefore submit that the estimate be approved, and directions for the work to be proceeded with be given."
  Here is a remarkable little rough paper on which this submission appears to be based, and it is to this effect—"To allow vessels running for eighteen months or two years longer, £250." In the Reports it is stated how long the ship will last with the repairs then recommended, but it is never stated what is to be done at the end of that time. But does the hon. and gallant Baronet contend that the ship should never have been employed at the end of the two years? If that be the case, I may remind the hon. and gallant Baronet that Mr. Reed remained Chief Constructor of the Navy long after that time, and that year after year he passed estimates for the repair of that ship without any remark. In no scrap of paper that I have read—and I have
  980
  read all I can find—is there any allusion to this investigation made in 1866. There may be some parties to blame for not having carried these circumstances in their minds, and that requires the strictest inquiry, but the position of the Admiralty at this moment with respect to the ship is this—that when these repairs were made in 1866, the Report on which they were made was accompanied by one received from Woolwich, in which it was said that, owing to the thinness of the vessel's plates round the water-line, if the ship were used beyond the time stated she would require to be more thoroughly repaired. Now, I do not wish the House to absolve the Admiralty if they have done wrong in this matter. I admit that we did not go back to 1866, but we went back to 1870, when the ship was last docked. The hon. and gallant Baronet says that when the ship was docked, the estimate furnished for her repairs was reduced. That is perfectly true, and it is equally true that that estimate was certified by Mr. Reed as Chief Constructor of the Navy. Mr. Reed did not then say that the ship's plates were so thin that she was not fit for sea, and, what was more, the authorities at Sheerness certified that her bottom was better than had been expected, and that it was not necessary to incur further expense. With the matter at the time, too, the political department of the Admiralty had nothing to do—it belonged to the Chief Constructor's Department, the Department which possessed this information, and with them it remained. Nor did the colleagues of Mr. Reed either in 1870 or 1871 have their attention called to what had occurred in 1866. The ship has been docked several times since 1866, and on each occasion it has been reported that after the repairs recommended she would be ready for the service on which she was ordered. Mistakes may have been made, and I do not wish the House to think that because I quote the whole of the facts I or my colleagues wish to be relieved of any responsibility with regard to the vessel. Possibly we ought to have surveyed the whole of these records from year to year, in order to ascertain what repairs had been done to her; but we took the Reports made with respect to the Megæra when docked, the Reports of her captains, and the Report which was made

  981
  about her at Queenstown, and we gave the whole subject our most anxious consideration, in order that we might answer any Question that might be asked as fully and as satisfactorily as we possibly could. Do hon. Members think there is not a great responsibility in ordering any ship to be sent to sea? The responsibility is a great one. We may be accused of not having gone back years enough; but we did make every effort to ascertain if she was fit for service. I do not wish judgment to be pronounced upon myself, or upon others at present; but I say, of course, the most rigid inquiry must be made into the whole of the circumstances of this case. I feel the disaster as much as the hon. and gallant Baronet. I naturally feel the loss of this ship infinitely more than the hon. and gallant Baronet possibly can feel it, because I know that we have lost more than the ship by this loss, in the lessening of public confidence that may arise, and therefore I do not regard it as any personal or light matter, but as a very serious one. It is one calling for rigid inquiry, and if we have done wrong we must bear the responsibility and blame. I have now laid before the House, as far I can, all the circumstances as I know them, and in the order in which they have reached me, and I ask the House and the public to suspend their judgment until they know more, and until proper inquiries can be instituted. And I do ask all those who have influence over public opinion in this House, or out of it, to do nothing by way of exaggeration which can tend to increase this disaster by spreading panic and alarm. I trust that every man will recognize that there is a great responsibility incurred by anyone who exaggerates that which I and everyone feel to have been a very miserable calamity.
  LORD HENRY LENNOX: I have no intention, Sir, I beg to assure the House, of making any personal attack upon the right hon. Gentleman opposite the First Lord of the Admiralty, in reference to this unfortunate disaster; but as some remarks have been made with reference to the Board of Admiralty of which I was a Member, I cannot allow that the statement of the right hon. Gentleman is in any respect satisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman tells us that the Report which he cannot find was made by Mr.
  982
  Reed between July and August, 1866. That was at the very moment when a change of Government took place, and when my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Stamford (Sir John Hay) assumed the command of the ships belonging to the Transport Department. After, however, having seen and studied the Report of Mr. Reed, and the Report from Woolwich, in which it was stated that the ship might be made seaworthy for eighteen months or two years, the then Board of Admiralty placed the ship at the bottom of the store-ships to be employed, and though during our tenure of office a great pressure came upon us to provide ships for carrying stores in connection with the Abyssinian War, we did not employ the Megæra, and did not deem her sufficiently seaworthy for such a voyage as would then have been necessary. It is not, however, only because I was then at the Admiralty that I feel I have a right to address a few words to the House upon this question; for I was one of the two hon. Members who in March last received such a snubbing at the hands of the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter). I then asked if it was true that the ship was in such a state that the baggage was floating about and the decks were under water, and we were told by the hon. Member for Montrose that there was not one word of truth in the statement so made. I must here also regret very much that the Admiralty did not adopt the rule laid down in the Controller's Department — a rule sanctioned by the Board presided over by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers)—namely, that when a store-ship is fitted out at a port, if on her voyage to the next port she is found to be unseaworthy from damage not notorious to her commander, her stores and troops shall be transferred to the port where they were embarked, and the officers at that port held responsible for the insufficient examination which must have been made. All through the right hon. Gentleman's statement he takes that for granted which it is my privilege to deny, and he says that the leakage which was apparent in the Megæra came from the main-deck ports. Then the right hon. Gentleman said that no examination of the ship's plates took place at Queenstown; but I am not surprised that Admiral Forbes should not have examined the plates at the bottom

  983
  of the vessel, because it could never have entered his head that the Admiralty at London would have sanctioned a vessel being sent on a voyage round the world without a thorough and satisfactory examination on this point. What I object to in the statement of the right hon. Gentleman is the idea of there being any question raised in England or elsewhere as to the seaworthiness of any vessel, after she has been ordered to go round the world. We have abundance of vessels seaworthy, and fit to do the passage, which could have been employed for the purpose on which the Megæra was sent. If I am not mistaken, there are documents at the Admiralty upon this subject; and on another occasion I will ask the right hon. Gentleman whether there is any Paper from the late Controller of the Navy, in which he recommended that the old line-of-battle ships which had already been prepared should be used for this service, as the Donegal had been on a previous occasion. [Mr. GOSCHEN: Instead of the Megæra?] No: a Paper in general terms; and whether he did not recommend that the Revenge should be prepared for this service. Now, the right hon. Gentleman has quoted a great many opinions of the captains who commanded the Megæra, as to her being a good seaboat; but I fail to see what they have to do with the question. No one disputes that the Megæra was a good vessel in her day; what we say is, that her plates had been worn so thin as to admit the water, and consequently she was not in a fit condition to go to sea. The right hon. Gentleman has attacked a gentleman of great eminence in the shipbuilding world, and has partly charged him with knowing that the Megæra was in an unseaworthy condition, and with not communicating the fact either to himself or to the Department. I believe that at the time this occurred Mr. Reed was in the heart of Russia, where owing to the fact that our Government had turned him out of office—[Mr. GOSCHEN: No; they did not turn him out of office.] Well, they made office impossible for him, and by a series of manœuvres or evolutions, as I will call them, on the part of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract, they made it impossible for him to remain with honour to himself in the office which he held with advantage to the country, just
  984
  in the same way as on a later occasion the same Board of Admiralty managed to dispense with the services of his able and gallant chief. ["Hear, hear!"] Sir Spencer Robinson did not resign; he was ignominiously expelled. Mr. Reed did not wait to be expelled; he found the place too hot to hold him, and preferred to resign. Mr. Reed was at the time in Russia, and was designing, as I believe he now is for Germany, a powerful fleet of iron-clad vessels. [Mr. GOSCHEN dissented.] I am by this time perfectly accustomed to the right hon. Gentleman's silent contradictions; but if between this time and three months' hence, the right hon. Gentleman is able to tell me that my statement is erroneous, and that Mr. Reed is not designing vessels for the Emperor of Russia and for the Emperor of Germany, I will retract what I have now said.
  MR. GOSCHEN: I beg the noble Lord's pardon. I did not wish to contradict that portion of the noble Lord's statement; my contradiction related to the part in which noble Lord said that Mr. Reed was in Russia on the 1st of March last. I believe Mr. Reed was not in Russia in the early part of March.
  LORD HENRY LENNOX: I did not say that Mr. Reed was in Russia on the 1st of March; but he has been in Russia all the summer, and has returned only within the last few days. I should not have referred to the general question of Mr. Reed's treatment by the Admiralty at all, had not the right hon. Gentleman quoted Mr. Reed's letter. I had intended to mention the subject of the treatment of iron ships when the Navy Estimates came on; but the First Lord of the Treasury has taken good care to prevent me from having that opportunity.
  MR. GLADSTONE: The noble Lord forgets that he had the offer on Monday week of the next Tuesday evening and declined it.
  LORD HENRY LENNOX: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government for his correction, and am equally indebted to him for the offer of an evening which belongs by right to private Members, when the House resumes its sitting at 9 o'clock, and on which, moreover, for the last four or five previous weeks every subject has been well nigh counted out. Now, a

  985
  very grave question arises with regard to the letter which appeared in the papers this morning, and I say that the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract, in refusing all further communication with Mr. Reed after what the First Lord of the Admiralty calls his resignation, was in the highest degree unwise and unpatriotic. Mr. Reed had been designing ships of the most novel kind—of a kind not hitherto designed by naval architects. When Mr. Reed went out of office the internal fittings of these ships were appointed to be carried out, and are being carried out by men with whom the designs never originated, and who were deprived of the opportunity of communicating with Mr. Reed. The right hon. Gentleman has laid great stress upon the fact that a great many of Mr. Reed's letters were regarded as "private" documents by that gentleman; but will he consent to lay on the Table of the House a Paper which was not marked "private," but which entreated the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract to call Mr. Reed back, in order that his designs might be looked over by himself, and the Admiralty might have the benefit of transferring to his successors the original ideas on which he had based those designs? It is my intention to ask the right hon. Gentleman to name a day on which he will lay on the Table that Paper from the late Controller of the Navy to the late First Lord—a Paper which cannot be described as a private document. Having been in office with my hon. and gallant Friend near me (Sir John Hay), I feel bound to say that the idea never even occurred to me, or to my colleagues, that the Megæra should do anything but temporary service—indeed, she was at the very bottom of our list at that time—and we certainly never contemplated sending her on a voyage such as that she had last attempted under the direction of the present Board of Admiralty.
  MR. LIDDELL,claiming the right of any hon. Member to address the House on a question involving the credit of the Admiralty administration, as well as the lives of 380 men, said, that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty had that evening made a very candid statement, and his position was one in which the House, no doubt, tho-
  986
  roughly sympathized. The right hon. Gentleman had said he did not wish to make out any case for the Admiralty, but he was afraid that the judgment of the House would be, after the speech to which they had that evening listened, that the right hon. Gentleman had made out a very strong case against the Admiralty. To ascertain the responsibility they must go back to the first starting of the ship, and he should be glad to learn why she was sent over a stormy ocean to Australia, on a voyage that would last nine months, when it had been declared in August, 1870, that her boilers were good for one year only. He (Mr. Liddell) believed that the thinness of her plates was not the only point of unseaworthiness in the Megæra, for it was found that she was deep in the water, her ports leaked, her bolts drew, and she was ill stowed before she was examined by an officer of the Navy on her arrival at Queenstown. It was, however, impossible for that officer to examine the ship's bottom. He desired to know who was responsible for sending the ship to sea in the condition in which she arrived at Queenstown. That was a question which the country had a right to ask, and the answer must be given by a searching inquiry being made into all the circumstances of the case, and he ventured to suggest that such an inquiry should be held in England. [Mr. GOSCHEN assented.] He was glad to see that the right hon. Gentleman assented, for besides the unseaworthy condition of the Megæra, there was the fact that she had been at the bottom of the list of storeships and was not on the list of troopships, which justified any hon. Member in challenging the administration at the Admiralty for having ventured upon such a risk as to send this ship to sea in her known condition. With respect to Mr. Reed, his complaint was that with regard, not to the Megæra alone, but also to a number of other ships, he had not had the opportunity of communicating with those who succeeded him at the Admiralty. He knew but little of official life, yet it appeared to him to be unjust to a man who had held such a responsible position that he should not, after leaving his office, be allowed to communicate with those who were responsible for the condition of Her Majesty's ships. He wished to remind the House of another circumstance. A Bill had been before

  987
  the House for the Regulation of the Merchant Navy, by the provisions of which to send to sea an unseaworthy ship was made a misdemeanour, and the opportunity was afforded to a seaman to leave his ship if it was unseaworthy, and go before a Justice of the Peace, who might order a survey of the ship to be made. If that was the spirit in which the Government regarded the saving of life and the prevention of accidents at sea with respect to merchant shipping, they ought not to be less careful as regarded the Royal Navy. The country would not be content without a searching inquiry being made, and he was glad that the First Lord had said he would insist upon it.
  MR. SHAW LEFEVREsaid, he did not intend to prolong the discussion, as his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty in his candid statement had laid before the House every fact in the possession of the Admiralty connected with the loss of this ship. There were, however, one or two points in the observations which the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox) and the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Liddell) had offered of which he felt bound to take notice. The noble Lord stated that it was the duty of the Government to have made further inquiries as to the leakage of the vessel on her way from Sheerness to Queenstown, and assumed that the Admiralty ought to have known that it was due to the defective state of her plates. But the captain in his letter to the Admiralty stated that the leakage was due to defects in the ports; and in the letters from the Cape nothing was said about a leak at all. The noble Lord regretted that that course had not been followed which was prescribed in the Admiralty instructions, according to which when she was found at Queenstown to be improperly loaded, she should have been sent back to the port from which she started. Now there was a General Instruction, to the effect that when a vessel was unseaworthy she should return to the port of starting; but in that case, the cause of complaint was defective ports and overloading, and in consequence 100 tons of cargo were taken out of her, and the defects in the ports were remedied. It had been said that Mr. Reed had not been consulted by the First Lord of the Admiralty; but all Mr. Childers had objected to was,
  988
  the receipt of information by "private" letters which could not be afterwards produced, and both the present First Lord and himself had had more than one interview with Mr. Reed, from whom they were always ready to receive information with respect to this or any other vessel of the Royal Navy. It was not the case that the Department was in ignorance of the designs of Mr. Reed, for there were three very able men doing duty as a Council of Instruction, one of whom was the brother-in-law of Mr. Reed, and all of whom were brought up in the same school as Mr. Reed, and were equally able and experienced; and certainly with all the knowledge they acquired while Mr. Reed was at the Admiralty they must be assumed to have all the information necessary for carrying out his designs. It was the wish of the Admiralty that every inquiry should take place in this case, and they had already directed that the Court Martial should take place in this country.
  MR. CORRYsaid, he should be sorry to prejudge that question, and agreed with the First Lord that it would be premature to jump at a conclusion. But it appeared to him that there was a very strong primâ facie case in favour of the belief that the loss of the ship was to be attributed to the unsound condition in which she left England. He knew something of the Megæra, as he happened to be a Member of the Board of Admiralty in 1844, when she was ordered to be built. She was a very good seaboat; but iron shipbuilding was then much less understood than at present; she had since done much service, and had been put at the bottom of the list of those ships which were employed on the store service. Knowing what he did of the ship, he never should have thought of sending her to Australia with 380 officers and seamen, and to do so was a great risk on the part of the Admiralty, there being a strong presumption that she was in an unsound state. He was informed that it was a very unusual occurrence for iron ships to spring a leak, and the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Samuda) had told him that he never heard of such a case. It was, moreover, quite clear that the Megæra did not sail in a sound state, for her ports were old and leaky, and after the Report which the Board of Admiralty had received from Queenstown, they

  989
  should have taken greater precautions before ordering her to sea. The First Lord had remarked that the captain of the Megæra had said nothing as to her unseaworthiness; but that officer doubtless presumed that the Admiralty would not send a ship abroad in a dangerous state. He had no means of forming an opinion as to the condition of her bottom, for all he could see was water pouring into the ports, nor could the Admiral at Queenstown have seen more or made any further report. With respect to the fitness of the vessel to go on such a voyage, it was clear that, besides being defective, she was overloaded and crowded to an inconvenient extent. For that there was a grave responsibility somewhere, and it was as reprehensible to send a ship to sea overloaded as in an unsound condition. He did not think that sufficient precautions had been taken by the Admiralty, for as far as could be seen above water the ship was unsound. It was absolutely necessary that a searching inquiry should be made into the matter, for he was afraid there was in existence a feeling that the way to please the Admiralty was to do things as cheaply as possible. In former days, however, they thought of efficiency as well as of economy, and they would not have risked sending such a ship on a long voyage rather than incur the expense of sending another one to Queenstown to take her place.
  MR. SAMUDAsaid, he entirely agreed with previous speakers in thinking that all the circumstances of this matter should be known before a judgment was formed upon it; but there were some points which he wished to bring before the House, and he rose for the purpose of doing so. He had that moment ascertained by telegram that the ship had been lost in consequence of a leak in the bottom, which leak had been continuously increasing, till it was impossible to keep it under with the pumps. This was a vessel 22 years old; and that question of age had a great deal to do with the circumstances of the case, for the action of the sea, and especially of the sea water inside the ship, the bilge water, in the early days of iron shipbuilding, was very detrimental. Fifteen or sixteen years ago, he had ships placed in his hands of which not only the plates were considerably reduced by the action of the bilge water, but the
  990
  ribs were entirely washed away. About that time the plan was introduced of coating the inside of ships so as to prevent the plates and the ribs being washed away by the bilge water. A cement, sometimes composed of Roman cement, and sometimes of asphalte, was applied, and that formed an enamel upon the inside of the ship, which enamel was found 16 years afterwards as perfect as when first put on. If, therefore, a careful course of examination had been adopted during this long period, and such application had been made, the enamel would have prevented the reduction of the plates by the action of the bilge water. Either that course, or the opposite one should have been adopted, of seeing whether any worn plates had been taken out and replaced with new strong ones. He did not attach blame to the present First Lord, since his term of office precluded the idea of making him responsible in this matter; but as regarded the Admiralty the country had a right to expect that everything should be done that was necessary to maintain the efficiency of the Royal Navy, and that a ship should be in a condition to perform a voyage safely unless some untoward accident occurred. It was important to get at the facts of this case; but it was equally important for the credit of the Admiralty that the First Lord should make those facts public. It might be that the ship had given out from inherent weakness, or it might be that sufficient money had not been spent in restoring her; but whatever was the cause of the catastrophe, the country had reason to be dissatisfied at the state in which this vessel was sent to sea. It was absolutely necessary that the First Lord should place before the country a clear statement of the causes that had led to this calamitous end.
  MR. W. H. GREGORYsaid, he had never been a member of the Admiralty, nor was he at all acquainted with Mr. Reed; but he wished to express a view which he thought would be shared by the country at large, and that was that if blame were fixed on any persons, there was one above all on whom it must rest, and that was Mr. Reed himself. Here was a letter from Mr. Reed, speaking in a kind of Cassandra tone of the shortcomings of the English Navy, saying that the Glatton was unfit to go to sea, and the Devastation was in such a

  991
  state that she would probably go to the bottom unless some important information was received from him. He admitted being aware of the condition of the Megæra before she sailed; but did he go down and tell his friends at the Admiralty, or give any intimation of an official character that such was his opinion? If Mr. Reed had done that he would have stood in a far different position in the estimation of the public than he would now in reference to this unfortunate affair. But it appeared that Mr. Reed was one of those persons who, when they had a private quarrel to fight out, were perfectly unscrupulous as to the means they employed. ["No, no!" and "Hear, hear!"] He must repeat those strong observations, for he believed it was his duty to do so. By withholding his information till a week after the vessel sailed, Mr. Reed showed that he preferred to take an amount of discredit upon himself in the eyes of the public, in order that he might injure a person with whom he had had a quarrel.
  SIR GEORGE JENKINSONsaid, he also thought the House ought to look at the matter with respect to what the country would say, and from that point of view it seemed that there was much yet to be ascertained. The First Lord of the Admiralty had admitted that some of the bolts had been drawn out of the ship, and that Mr. Reed had reported in July, 1866, that she was then fit for eighteen months' or two years' service. This led one to presume that some later investigation had been made.
  MR. GOSCHENsaid, the ship was actually docked in August last, examined and reported upon.
  SIR GEORGE JENKINSONsaid, the fact remained that five years after the ship had been reported fit for only two years' service she had been sent on a voyage to Australia. The public could not be blamed if under the circumstances information was demanded. It was clear the state of the Megæra was no secret, for in The Globe of March 2 the following passage appeared:—
  "We are asked to intercede with the Admiralty on behalf of 400 British sailors whose lives are in peril. Her Majesty's ship Megæra has just been commissioned at Sheerness to take out crews for the Blanche and Rosario at Sydney. An officer on board the Megæra communicates to us from Queenstown the astounding fact that the vessel is absolutely unseaworthy; that she 'leaks from the bow to the stern;' that upwards of 50
  992
  tons of water were found in the bilges on the first watch after leaving Plymouth, the men's mess-deck being from 15 in. to 18 in. deep in water, with their boats floating about; and that the men on board the Megæra had been up twice on the quarter-deck about the ship leaking, and on Wednesday last were about to enter a third protest, this time against the vessel rounding the Cape in the middle of winter. Under these alarming conditions it is hardly surprising to hear that all on board the Megæra 'shudder at the prospect of sharing the fate of the Captain.' But another statement excites amazement, and shows at least the necessity for public investigation. 'Captain Thrupp distinctly told Admiral Codrington on Saturday night last,' writes our informant, 'that we were not ready for sea,' but he said 'go we must,' as he had orders to send us off.'"
  Clearly, due diligence had not been exercised by some one in allowing the vessel to be sent to sea with a number of valuable lives on board. The telegram in this morning's papers showed how precisely the fears expressed by the paragraph he had quoted had been realized. The Consul at Batavia telegraphed under date August 5, as follows:—
  "Leak reported about June 8. Kept under for several days by hand pumps. Leak increased; steam then used; water kept under. Insufficient coal to reach Australia."
  Why was the coal insufficient?
  "Steered for St. Paul's. June 17 anchored. Survey held; diver employed; reported unsafe to proceed; hole through bottom; landed provisions; weather stormy; lost three anchors. June 19 ship was run on the bar full speed and filled. Lieutenant Jones left July 16, all well; men under canvas; 80 tons cargo saved. Steamship Rinaldo left Singapore yesterday for St. Paul's, viâ Batavia."
  As one of the taxpaying public he demanded a bonâ fide inquiry. Her Majesty's ship had been lost according to red tape and routine; there was blame somewhere, and the public had a right to know where. Ship after ship seemed to be going to the bottom, through nobody's fault, and this was not a kind of thing the public would allow. A full and searching inquiry must be made, and there must be no garbled reports or equivocal statements made in the course of it.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: Sir, I take no exception whatever to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Goschen), and I think no one can have heard it without feeling that he admits the greatness of the calamity and the necessity for inquiry. I frankly admit that as the right hon. Gentleman

  993
  had only recently acceded to office at the time when the Megæra sailed, he was under the necessity of accepting the statements of others as to the condition of the vessel. But, on the other hand, I think the feeling of the whole country is that the transaction is discreditable to the Admiralty. My name has been alluded to as having been at the Admiralty in 1866, and I can fully confirm the statement that the Megæra has had a bad name for a long time to this extent, that she was known to be a worn-out ship—an old ship; and although it is quite right that we should suspend our judgment, to a certain extent, until we have further details, I think no one can doubt what was the real cause of the disaster. I therefore wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman in what manner he proposes to conduct the investigation, which he admits to be absolutely necessary. We know, of course, that there will be a Court Martial into the circumstances of the loss of the vessel; but I doubt if that Court will go into an inquiry as to the state of the ship, as it ought to have been ascertained by the authorities at the Admiralty. I should therefore like to know what sort of inquiry the right hon. Gentleman proposes to conduct, because I am sure he will admit what everyone feels, that a most searching investigation ought to be instituted, and that there would be some inquiry in addition to that of the Court Martial. Another circumstance that calls for inquiry is the one that has been referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry)—namely, the discreditable and shameful state in which this ship left Plymouth and went to Queenstown. It is very discreditable to some one—whoever he may be — that one of Her Majesty's vessels should be allowed to leave Plymouth in such a condition as that in which the Megæra made the passage to Cork. It must be remembered that when she left Plymouth it was in the state in which those who thus despatched her intended that she should make the voyage to Australia; but it is clear that, in order to make her decently safe, 100 tons of her cargo had to be taken out at Cork. But I want to know why they were ever put in? Who is responsible for having thus overloaded the ship and endangered the lives of all on board? I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman whether that will be
  994
  inquired into, as well as the immediate cause of the loss of the vessel?
  MR. GLADSTONE: The questions which the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) has asked of my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty are not of such a strictly departmental character that I am precluded from answering them in his stead. He asks what sort of investigation my right hon. Friend intends to institute. I reply that the Government—and my right hon. Friend in particular—have not yet had time to decide upon any positive measures on the subject. The immediate duties connected with the exigency, and the collection of information on the subject, have sufficiently accounted for the hours that have elapsed since the news of this sad occurrence reached us. But this much I may say, we agree cordially with the right hon. Baronet that the investigation by the Court Martial will not be sufficient. It will, doubtless, bring out some points of the case; but it will not bring out the whole of the case as regards the Admiralty. On that important part of the subject the inquiry before the Court Martial will only throw an incidental and partial light. But I think that the inquiry by Court Martial should precede any other investigation; it would be better that it should precede any other investigation, and that when it is finished, or has proceeded towards its completion, arrangements should be made for the other inquiry. I am quite convinced that it is my right hon. Friend's intention to make the inquiry as searching as he can make it. And even if he was disposed otherwise, I am sure that it is the determination of the House of Commons, if any Executive Government should fail to discharge its duty in that respect, that nothing should be left undone in order to get thoroughly to the bottom of all the circumstances connected with the occurrence, because we must always bear in mind that it is by these crucial cases, when a calamity has occurred, that you get a valuable light upon the working of your system and are enabled to correct such errors as may exist in it. In regard to the second question of the right hon. Baronet, as to who is responsible for the overloaded state of the vessel when she left Plymouth, that, of course, will be the point for investigation; but I cannot

  995
  agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry) that it is so serious a matter as that of the seaworthiness of the vessel. Still it is a question that requires investigation; but I must add that no one supposes or professes that there was any idea of danger connected with that overloading. It was a question of inconvenience and suffering to the persons on board; but it was not connected with the safety of the ship. In the same way, I may explain that another point that has been referred to—the drawing of the bolts—really stands thus—that they were the bolts of the ports on the main deck and had no bearing on the structure of the vessel.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: Overloading makes a vessel low in the water, and therefore overloading may be said to be an element of danger.
  MR. GLADSTONE: I do not understand that that is admitted by anyone connected with the matter. In the official Reports the question of overloading is stated as a question of inconvenience and suffering rather than one of danger. The Megæra has been lower in the water before than she was on this occasion, and the right hon. Gentleman has assumed that she was intended to perform the voyage to Australia in the same condition as she left Plymouth. That is not quite so, because, according to the shipments she received, a considerable portion of her stores were to be left at the Cape. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: But she was to go on to Australia.] Well, there is this point of difference between the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman and the fact. The hon. Baronet opposite (Sir George Jenkinson) complained that she did not carry coal enough to perform the whole journey from the Cape to Australia; but that complaint is really one against the general regulations of the Admiralty. She had enough coal for the voyage according to the regulations of the Admiralty, and it would be very costly and inconvenient in many cases, and would entirely exceed the carrying capacity of many ships, if we were to attempt to put on board them the coal necessary for a voyage of that length. The computation of the Admiralty is, that the voyage will be performed partly by steam and partly under sail. Well, the hon. Baronet went on to say that it had been made out that nobody is to blame. Now,
  996
  I must say that that complaint is wholly inconsistent with the language of my right hon. Friend. If ever I heard a statement in which a person was anxious not to evade the responsibility, but was quite willing to accept the blame, it was the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. It seemed to me almost to court, instead of to shrink from, inquiry; and I am perfectly sure that, as far as the Government is concerned, when the right time comes, the hon. Baronet will not have to make any complaint under that head. I now wish to read to the House a material statement in reference to the Megæra. It is the Report of the master shipwright and chief engineer of Woolwich, who made a survey of her, and it is dated the 30th July, 1866. I may mention that we have not got any Report from Mr. Reed in reference to the survey of the ship; and we think it very likely that Mr. Reed has—not unintentionally—made an error of memory, and that he did not write any Report on her, but saw and adopted the Report I now hold in my hand, and that it represents the results of Mr. Reed's investigations. I am anxious to refer to this point, because the impression prevails that there had been a Report sent in as to the thinness of the plates at the bottom of the ship, and that impression has been coupled with the statement that has come to us by telegraph that a hole had been discovered in the bottom of the vessel. Well, the fact is, that the thinness of the plates observed in 1866 had reference to the plates, not in the bottom, but near the water-line, and that the bottom was in good condition. The Report begins—
  "We beg to forward herewith a supplementary estimate for the repair of the hull and fittings chargeable to hull of the Megæra, observing that we have examined the hull and find the bottom to be in good condition, the thinnest plates being ⅜in. thick; but the plates between wind and water all round the vessel to about 20 ft. from the stern, from the wall down to the first lap, about 8ft. in breadth in midships and about 5ft. in breadth forward and aft are very thin."
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: Very thin.
  MR. GLADSTONE: But there's a difference.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: It is just as dangerous.
  MR. GLADSTONE: Well, that is another matter, and entirely a matter of opinion. The point is, that you have got a statement that there is a leak at the bottom of the ship, and that has been

  997
  connected with the thinness of the plates. It is important, under these circumstances, to understand where this thinness was observed, and we find it was noticed near the water-line. For myself, though I do not pretend to any of the knowledge of a shipwright, I think that a leak between wind and water-line is not so dangerous as one near the bottom of a vessel. The Report goes on—
  "Though we consider that the vessel, if required, may be used for temporary services, we are of opinion that she will shortly require to be doubled in the parts above-named."
  This Report, I may, add, has only been discovered to-day among the archives of the Admiralty. I have nothing more to say, and I cheerfully admit the fairness of the demands that have been made in the course of this debate—and especially by the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Samuda). It is impossible to state too pointedly the necessity for inquiry, and I quite admit that it is a perfectly fair subject for inquiry whether an undue regard for economy had anything to do with the disaster. But this I must say—that the people of this country are in a very hard case indeed if when they pay £9,000,000 or £10,000,000 a-year for their Navy they cannot have their ships sent to sea in a seaworthy condition, and if they cannot have any retrenchment made whatever, or any limit put to the expense of the Navy, without its being purchased at the cost of risk to the lives of their seamen. I am obliged before I sit down to say a word on the serious charge that has been made by the noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox). I should have thought on a question of this kind that it would have been felt on all hands to be desirable not to drag in a matter of a controversial, and I may even say of an offensive, character; but the noble Lord coolly told me that I had taken very good care that the Navy Estimates should not come on. I decline to stoop to discuss with the noble Lord whether I am capable of such a breach of duty; but I will point out to the noble Lord that on Tuesday week last he had the opportunity—and I am only sorry that he did not have it much earlier—of raising a question connected with the naval Estimates; but the noble Lord said that the House was always counted out on Tuesdays, and he also said that it was a night given to private Members. As to the first plea,
  998
  it is true that it has happened on two Tuesdays this Session, on neither of which occasions did I see the noble Lord in his place to assist in carrying on Public Business; but it is also true that for the last six Tuesdays the House has resumed at 9 o'clock, and has sat either till 2 o'clock in the morning or later. And on the Tuesday night in question the House sat till 2 o'clock without, however, the presence of the noble Lord himself. With respect to the plea that Tuesday nights were given to private Members, I told the noble Lord distinctly that we had made arrangements with the private Members, and that through their kindness we were able to offer him the evening. I therefore leave it to the House to consider the fairness and the good taste of the charge which the noble Lord has brought, and the sufficiency of the answer he has made as to the Tuesday evening that we offered him. I regret extremely the postponement of the naval Estimates. ["Oh, oh!"] I really doubt whether any good can be done by that method of expression which, under the circumstances, is not a usual one among the Members of this House. I repeat that I regret extremely the postponement of the Estimates, and I do not believe that anyone who hears me believes that it has been owing to any such reason as the noble Lord imputed, or to any cowardly indisposition to meet discussion on the matter in question; and in regard to the offer of last Tuesday week I leave it to the noble Lord to consider whether he can justify the charge that he has made against me.
  MR. DISRAELI: Sir, I hope the House will not be led into any discussion of detail on this subject. A great calamity has occurred, and a full inquiry has been promised, and there, for the present, the matter should rest. I, myself, should not have risen but for the last remark of the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government respecting the noble Lord's (Lord Henry Lennox's) conduct. The right hon. Gentleman seems perfectly astonished that suspicion should have arisen at the end of the Session that some difficulties have been offered to the House in the consideration of the Navy Estimates. I was of opinion that for a considerable time past hon. Members generally, on both sides of the House, had been labouring under the impression that there was

  999
  some influence at work—what influence I do not stop now to inquire—which prevented our going into Committee of Supply and considering the Navy Estimates. It appears to me that on that point no doubt exists as to there being a unanimity of opinion. I think we have heard every day deploring accents uttered respecting the mode in which Public Business has been conducted, the result of which has been that the House of Commons has lost its chief privilege of controlling the public expenditure in Committee of Supply; and the matter of all others in which hon. Gentlemen on both sides were most interested was the consideration of the Navy Estimates. Therefore, Sir, I am astonished at the innocent surprise and indignation just expressed by the right hon. Gentleman, as if my noble Friend was the only individual who had ventured to intimate a suspicion that some influence was used which prevented the House from giving in Committee its attention to the public expenditure. As to the opportunity so generously and considerately offered by the right hon. Gentleman to my noble Friend for bringing forward a subject certainly not inferior in importance to that which has engrossed our attention this evening, I am ready to bear all the responsibility of my noble Friend's refusal of that occasion. I did not think that at a few hours' notice, if my noble Friend had accepted that very doubtful opportunity, under every possible disadvantage, the attention of the House could have been properly directed to such a question as the loss of the Captain, and I maintain that the right hon. Gentleman ought to have offered my noble Friend an opportunity for bringing forward that subject as would have ensured a discussion worthy of the occasion, and one that would have been satisfactory to the country.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

PENSIONS COMMUTATION ACT.

  QUESTION.
  MR. MONKasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether the Treasury have made arrangements for carrying into immediate effect the provisions of "The Pensions Commutation Act, 1871;" and, if not, when the necessary Rules and Regulations will be issued?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERreplied, that the necessary arrangements had been made, and the rules would shortly be issued.

RAILWAYS—SOUTH KENSINGTON STATION.—QUESTION.
MR. STAPLETONasked the President of the Board of Trade, Whether the new sidings at South Kensington Station have been examined and approved of on behalf of the Board of Trade; whether on entering or on leaving them on their return journey the trains have to cross a different line from that on which they have travelled or are going to travel; and, whether such an arrangement is considered compatible with the public safety on a line where there are so many trains?
MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUEsaid, in reply, that no examination had been made, and no Report had yet been received from the Railway Company. He was not prepared to say whether the construction of the sidings was a breach of the law; but in future, under the Bill which had been passed during the present Session, such sidings would have to be approved of by the Board of Trade. With regard to the second Question, he believed that trains had to cross the line in the manner described. With respect to the last Question, he was not able to give any decided answer; but it was obvious that the danger of such crossings would be reduced to a minimum by the introduction of the block system, which was in use on the Metropolitan lines, and which was being generally introduced.

INCOME TAX COMMISSIONERS.

  QUESTION.
  LORD GEORGE HAMILTONasked the Secretary to the Treasury, If he will reconsider the Memorial of the Special Commissioners of Income Tax (Repayment Branch) asking for an inquiry into the working of their office, and for an increase of salary corresponding to that made in the other branches of the office?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERreplied, that in 1866 the salaries were inquired into and increased, and as no extra work had been thrown on the office no further increase in the salaries would be made.

SCOTLAND—POLLING PLACES IN WIGTONSHIRE.—QUESTIONS.
LORD GARLIESasked the Lord Advocate, Whether he will object to lay upon the Table of the House the Correspondence which passed between the Sheriff's Office in Wigtonshire and that of the Lord Advocate in regard to the want of sufficient polling places for the Election of 1865; and further, the application made to the Sheriff of Wigtonshire to supply the same want immediately prior to the Election of 1868; and, whether he can state the reason for this application not having been granted?
THE LORD ADVOCATE,in reply, said, the office which he now had the honour to hold was, at the first period mentioned by the noble Lord the Member for Wigtonshire (Lord Garlies), held by his right hon. Friend (Sir James Moncreiff), and at the later period it was held by his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for the University of Glasgow (Mr. Gordon). He was not aware, however, of any correspondence having taken place with either of those right hon. Gentlemen. There was no such correspondence in his office, nor was he aware of any evidence that would show that any such correspondence as that alluded to had passed. Further, he was not aware of any application having been made to the Sheriff of Wigtonshire to increase the number of polling places in that county. If he was to assume from the Question of the noble Lord that such application was made immediately prior to the Election of 1868, and that the request contained in that application was refused, then he had to inform the noble Lord that the refusal might have proceeded from the Lord Advocate of the day—that was to say, from his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for the University of Glasgow, who then held office under the Government of the right hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), to whom he referred the noble Lord for the information he wished to obtain.
LORD GARLIESsaid, he never asked that question at all; what he wanted to know was, whether an application was made to the Sheriff's Office at Wigtonshire about polling in 1865, and if such correspondence would be produced?
THE LORD ADVOCATE,in reply, said, the noble Lord was at perfect liberty to apply to the Sheriff of Wigtonshire; he should not. There was no correspondence with the Lord Advocate respecting the subject referred to by the noble Lord in 1865 or 1868—at least, there was no evidence of such having taken place in the office over which he presided.

LICENCE DUTY ON AGRICULTURAL HORSES.—QUESTION.
MR. C. S. READasked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, If agricultural horses are used for the purposes of the Berkshire or other camps, and the owners are paid, they will be liable to the Licence Duty for such horses, from which they are now exempt?
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERreplied, that the case had been already provided for by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue giving instructions that no advantage should be taken of such employment.

PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.—QUESTION.
MR. BAINESasked the Postmaster General, If, for the convenience of Members who wish to read the Parliamentary Papers issued during the Recess, he could send those Papers, as soon as issued, free through the Post to their country or town addresses on receiving a written request from each Member at the close of each Session for this accommodation?
MR. MONSELL,in reply, said, he had no legal power to do that at present. Parliament could, of course, give him such a power if it pleased. He was informed that during the last Recess the weight of the Papers which would have been sent according to the suggestion of his hon. Friend was about 70 pounds for each Member. If hon. Gentlemen fixed on what Papers they desired to have during the Recess, and gave notice at the office that they should be sent to them, they would have to pay a very small charge.

ARMY—TRAINING IN THE CHANNEL ISLANDS.—QUESTION.
MR. WHALLEYasked the Secretary of State for War, with reference to the National Defences, If his attention has been called to the system of general

1003
military training long in use in the Channel Islands; and if such system might not be extended to other parts of the kingdom; and, whether it would not in any case be expedient during the process of re-organizing the Standing Army, and with a view to economy in that service, to afford further facilities and encouragement to those who may be willing to give their time to the acquisition of military qualifications, and especially to promote military training in the public schools as in Switzerland and elsewhere?
MR. CARDWELL: I am not of opinion, Sir, that the system of general military training in the Channel Islands could with advantage be extended to these islands; but I think it is very useful to promote military training in the public schools, and the following passage has this year been included in the Revised Code:—
"Attendance at drill, under a competent instructor, for not more than two hours a week, and twenty weeks in the year, may be counted as school attendance."

ARMY—YEOMANRY.—QUESTION.
MR. M. T. BASSasked the Secretary of State for War, If he will direct that the letters P. S. should be placed in the Monthly Army List against the name of such Officers of the Yeomanry who have and been attached to the regular Cavalry, who have obtained a Certificate under the Regulations of the Reserve Forces Circular of the 1st of April 1871, such distinctive mark being now placed against those Officers of the Militia who have passed a School of Instruction?
MR. CARDWELL: Sir, the addition of P. and P. S. to the names in the Army List was given as an encouragement at first; but I expect the day is not distant when every officer will be qualified, and no such distinction will have place. In the meantime P. S. signifies having passed a school, and, if the Yeomanry wish it, there will be no objection to adding P. to those who have passed for a certificate.

ARMY—3RD WEST INDIA REGIMENT.

  QUESTIONS.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTONasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether he ntends to realize the hope he held out ast year to the officers of the 3rd West
  1004
  India Regiment, that they should as speedily as possible be restored to full pay, or in any other way to mitigate the hardship which has befallen the officers of that Regiment, in consequence of its having been so suddenly disbanded?
  COLONEL BARTTELOTasked a similar question respecting the Cape Mounted Rifles and of the Canadian Rifles?
  MR. CARDWELL: Sir, my right hon. Friend knows how little patronage is at the disposal of the Secretary of State. I have employed that little exclusively in providing for claims of this nature, and I have every reason to believe that in the disposal of his patronage His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief has not been unmindful of their claims. Although provision had to be made for all the officers of four regiments, including the Cape Mounted Rifles, and Canadian Rifles, and ten Depôt Battalions, I am informed that in the particular regiment referred to two field officers, two captains, eight lieutenants, and all the ensigns have already been provided for.

IRELAND—DISTURBANCES IN DUBLIN.

  QUESTIONS.
  MR. PIMasked Mr. Solicitor General for Ireland (in the absence of the Chief Secretary), Whether he could give the House any information respecting the riots which occurred yesterday in Dublin, in consequence of the dispersal of a meeting intended to be held in Phœnix Park for the release of the Fenian prisoners still in confinement? He further asked whether the meeting was illegal, and, if not, by what authority it was dispersed? Also, how it happened that such a meeting was forcibly dispersed by the police in Ireland when meetings intended to influence the action of that House were allowed to be held in Hyde Park and Trafalgar Square?
  MR. CALLANwished to know, Whether there was any difference between the meeting held in Phœnix Park and the meetings which had been held in London? Whether the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland had the right of suppressing the meeting by force, and whether they had issued any Proclamation on the subject?
  MR. M'CARTHY DOWNINGasked, Whether it is true, as reported in the papers, that the police, by the authority

  1005
  of Mr. Hornsby, Secretary to the Board of Public Works in Ireland, had prevented the meeting being held in Phœnix Park; whether it is not the fact that, up to that deplorable occurrence, the Royal Princes had met with a respectful and even cordial reception in Dublin; and what steps the Irish Executive mean to take in the matter?
  SIR JOHN GRAYinquired, Whether any sworn informations had been laid before the authorities in Dublin stating that a breach of the peace was apprehended; whether the proclamation prohibiting the meeting was issued by Mr. Hornsby, Secretary to the Board of Works; whether there was any Act of Parliament conferring on the Board the power of putting down such meetings, and calling on the police to enforce such Proclamation; and by what authority the police were authorized to disperse a meeting convened for a legal purpose?
  THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR IRELAND (Mr. DOWSE)said, that as that unfortunate occurrence only happened yesterday between 4 and 5 o'clock, the House would easily understand that he could not now give very much information in regard to it. On receiving his first intimation of it that morning, from the morning papers, he at once caused a telegram to be sent to Ireland to obtain such information as it was in the power of the authorities to furnish on the matter. After that, he received notice of the hon. Member for Dublin's Question; but when he came down to the House that afternoon all the knowledge that he possessed of those unhappy disturbances was derived from the public journals. Since then a telegram from Ireland had reached him, from which it appeared that the reports in the public journals were very much exaggerated. It appeared from the telegram that when the Superintendent proceeded up the steps of the monument to remonstrate he was thrust back, and would have seriously suffered but for the intervention of some gentleman who was near. The gentleman who was about to address the meeting intimated that he should persist in so doing, whereupon the Superintendent ordered the police constables to clear the place. Some stones were then thrown by the mob and some of the constables were assaulted, that thereupon a riot ensued. That was all the information
  1006
  he possessed at the present moment, and under these circumstances it would be unreasonable to ask him to go into any detail respecting the riot. The question of law in such a case must depend very much upon the facts, and he was not now in possession of those facts. Mr. Hornsby, who was said to have signed the notice forbidding the meeting, was not, he believed, a Commissioner of Police or a magistrate of the city or county of Dublin, but was the Secretary of the Irish Board of Works; and the notice, as he understood, went to the extent of stating that the meeting would not be allowed to be held in the Park. He believed that Phœnix Park in Dublin was under the management and superintendence of the Irish Board of Public Works, and that the Board acted as private parties would do on their own property in forbidding the holding of the meeting there. Whether there had been any sworn information or what connection the Irish Government had with the matter he could not tell. If the Questions which had just been put to him were postponed till Thursday, he hoped he should then be able to answer them. In answer, however, to the hon. Member for Cork (Mr. Downing), he might now say that the Royal Princes had met not only with a respectful, but with a most cordial welcome in Dublin, and it was a very deplorable circumstance that anything should have occurred to disturb the harmony that prevailed in that city.

PARLIAMENT—BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.—QUESTIONS.
MR. NEWDEGATEasked, Whether the Government intend to proceed that evening with the Maynooth College Bill, the Glebe Loan (Ireland) Act Amendment Bill, and the Prison Ministers' Bill?
MR. GLADSTONEsaid, that they proposed to proceed with the first four Orders, and not to take any other Order that was opposed.
LORD GALWAYasked, Whether it was intended that any special provision for having polling-places would be made in reference to East Retford and similar boroughs?
MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, that there was no special provision in reference to such boroughs; but the local authority

1007
in the borough would have power to divide it into such districts as would be convenient.

ELECTIONS (PARLIAMENTARY AND MUNICIPAL) (re-committed) BILL— [BILL 282.]
(Mr. William Edward Forster, Mr. Secretary Bruce, The Marquess of Hartington.)
ELECTIONS (PARLIAMENTARY AND MUNICIPAL) (re-committed) BILL— [BILL 282.]

  CONSIDERATION.
  Bill, as amended, considered.
  New clause, to follow Clause 32—
  (Abolition of assessors.)
  "After the passing of this Act, assessors shall not be elected in any ward of any Municipal borough, and no Municipal Election need not be held before the assessors or their deputies, but may be held before the mayor, alderman, or returning officer only."—(Mr. William Edward Forster,)
  —brought up, and read the first and second time, agreed to, and added.
  MR. JAMESmoved the addition of a new clause after Clause 4, making the register conclusive as to the right to vote; but providing that any person whose name was not on the register, or who was forbidden to vote, or who was legally incapacitated from voting, but who nevertheless voted, should be liable to a penalty not exceeding £20.
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, he had no objection to the principle of the clause, provided the words inflicting a penalty were struck out. That could be effected by omitting all the words of the clause after "force."
  MR. JAMESexpressed his willingness to see it expunged from the clause, but warned the House that some such provision would be found necessary.
  Clause (Qualification of voter) brought up, and read the first and second time; amended, and added.
  MR. DIXONmoved a new clause authorizing ballot-boxes used at municipal elections to be lent for Parliamentary Elections.
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, he willingly acceded to the Amendment, for he thought the proposed clause was valuable, as tending to economy in the expenses of elections.
  Clause (Ballot boxes used at Municipal Elections to be lent for Parliamentary Election) brought up, and read the first and second time; amended, and added.
  SIR JOHN GRAYmoved, in Clause 2, page 1, line 21, to leave out "noon," and insert "ten in the forenoon;" and leave out "five," and insert "three." He proposed the Amendment for the purpose of changing the hours within which an election might be held from noon until 5 in the afternoon to from 10 until 3 in the afternoon.
  Amendment agreed to.
  MR. STAPLETONmoved, in Clause 2, page 2, line 8, after "seconder," to leave out "and by eight other qualified electors in a Parliamentary Election." There were ample safeguards in the Bill against the nomination of show candidates, and the provision in question would give rise to the utmost confusion and annoyance in small boroughs.
  Amendment proposed, in page 2, line 8, after the word "seconder," to leave out the words "and by eight other qualified electors in a Parliamentary election."—(Mr. Stapleton.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, he must object to the Amendment, on the ground that it was desirable that a certain number of electors should show their confidence in the person nominated. He hoped the words would be retained.
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he was also in favour of the retention of the words, because those eight persons were the only ones who could vote openly.
  MR. BERESFORD HOPEsaid, that if a man could not get ten persons to nominate him he was scarcely likely to obtain ten votes, and any candidate who could not get that number of individuals to vote for him would place himself in a very ridiculous position, and would impose much unnecessary trouble upon others.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  MR. M'CARTHY DOWNINGmoved to omit the words that required that there should be squares upon the ballot papers in which the electors should make their marks.
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, that Government, having made inquiries, thought that it would be better to omit the words. He therefore proposed to amend subsection 12 of Clause 3, by striking out

  1009
  the words which required a voter to place his mark in the figure of a square printed on the right hand side of the paper, and to substitute others, merely requiring the voter to place his mark on the right hand side of the name of the candidate printed on the ballot paper for whom he intended to vote.
  MR. MUNTZsaid, he was present on an occasion when the form of ballot paper having been presented to seven hon. Members of that House to fill in, six, of whom he was one, out of the seven, had placed their marks in the wrong place. Under those circumstances, it had become absolutely necessary that the form of ballot paper should be altered.
  MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCKsaid, he regarded that failure of the ballot paper, which had been agreed to by the House after considerable discussion, as a proof of the soundness of the objections which had been raised to that innovation on their old form of election.
  Amendment agreed to.
  MR. RAIKESmoved, in Clause 9, page 9, after line 22, to insert as a new sub-section—
  "In a Parliamentary Election the returning officer shall cause that portion of the register of the electors which contains the names of the electors to whom any polling station is allotted, to be examined during the days next preceding the day fixed for the poll by the presiding officer at such polling station (including the returning officer where he is the presiding officer), with the assistance of the overseers, assistant overseer, or collector of the rates in each parish (which assistance he and they shall give as required by the returning officer) and such presiding officer on examining the list shall mark the words 'dead,' or 'out of the United Kingdom,' or 'duplicate,' against every elector whom he knows or is informed by such overseer, assistant overseer, or collector to be dead or out of the United Kingdom, or to be entered elsewhere on the register as the case may be, and every presiding officer before delivering a ballot paper to any person claiming to be an elector whose name has been so marked, shall put to him the questions and administer the oath specified in Part One of the first Schedule to this Act."
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, he had no objection to offer to the proposed Amendment of the hon. Member for Chester (Mr. Raikes), with the exception of the word "duplicate," and other words depending on it, which he must ask the hon. Member to allow to be struck out of the sub-section.
  MR. RAIKESsaid, he would assent to the omission of the words as proposed by the right hon. Gentleman.
  Clause 9, new sub-section, to follow sub-section 3—(Mr. Raikes)—brought up, and read the first time.
  On Question, That the sub-section be read the second time,
  MR. W. E. FORSTERproposed, as an Amendment, in line 10, after the word "or," to omit the word "duplicate;" and in line 12, after the word "Kingdom," the words "or to be entered elsewhere on the register."
  Amendment agreed to; words struck out accordingly: sub-section read the second time, agreed to, and added.
  MR. GOLDSMID (for Mr. MAHON),moved, in Clause 9, sub-section 8, after "or," to leave out "otherwise," and insert "by other physical cause."
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, he had no objection to the proposed Amendment.
  Amendment agreed to.
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, the Amendment of which he had given Notice applied to Clause 16 of the Bill, as reprinted; and it was that the words "a Secretary of State" be struck out in line 19, for the purpose of inserting the words—
  "The judge appointed under the Statute thirty-first and thirty-second of Victoria, Chapter one hundred and twenty-five, for the trial of Election Petitions."
  That Amendment, and his subsequent Notices, indicated his objections not only to that clause, but also to Clauses 18 and 21. He had ventured on a former occasion, when the House was in Committee on the Bill, to draw the attention of the few hon. Members who were then present, to the very serious effect which would be produced by investing the Secretary of State, or rather "a Secretary of State," with the extensive power to make rules with reference to the conduct of elections which the Bill proposed. That would be a complete departure from the system of elections in the country. Hitherto, the House had been especially careful that no political officer, and especially no political officer of the Government, should be in any way concerned in the direction or regulation of elections of Members to sit in that House; and the House went so far as in

  1011
  the year 1866 to divest itself altogether of its jurisdiction over Election Petitions, and to commit the trial of Election Petitions to the Judges of the land, who were invited to select from their own number three Judges, who should try the questions arising out of contested elections. The House was jealous of its own feelings. It was afraid that partizan feelings had interfered with the justice of its decisions; and it regarded the matter as so vitally affecting the constitution of the House, so vitally affecting the character of the laws of the country, and so essentially affecting also the respect which had hitherto been entertained for the law in the country—which respect for the law had been one of main securities for the peace and order of society—that it determined that henceforth all such questions as to elections should be tried by the Judges. But previously to that, the Legislature had committed to the Judges of the land, by the statutes which regulated the registration of voters, the appointment of revising barristers, for the purpose of securing the due franchise of the electors of the country, and the Judges were in the habit of making the rules which directed the conduct of the revising barristers. They knew that among the Judges there were many who had been ornaments of that House, having filled the office of Solicitor or Attorney General. There was, therefore, an abundant supply of legal knowledge, and of practical knowledge also, upon all those questions if they could assume that there was any practical knowledge whatever with respect to the institution of a totally novel mode of voting, a mode of secret voting which would subvert the ancient system of election, and which was intended to change the whole of the habits of the people. He was therefore confident of this, that among the Judges there were eminent persons who were as well qualified as any persons could be, to deal with questions that might arise out of that novel institution of secret voting. But his object was this—He was told that officials, ex-officials as well as the present Government, would not interfere to deprive Secretaries of State of the powers which would be conferred upon them by the Bill. It had become very much the habit of the House to transfer power after power to the Executive. They had
  1012
  just passed an Act for creating a new Secretary of State. Whether it was from indolence on the part of the House, or whether it was that the majority of the House thought that the people of this country were tired of the freedom which they had so long enjoyed, he knew not, but every Session lately had shown him that the constitutional privileges of the subject, and now the constitutional privileges and independence of the House, were less and less valued in the House itself. He believed, moreover, that out out-of-doors there was a growing spirit of discontent at that apparent laxity on the part of the House, and that the people of this country did not view with indifference the transfer of their time-honoured local independence and self-government to officers of the State; and he was convinced of this, that if there was not, at present, an impression abroad that the Bill was not destined to become law during the present Session, the subject to which he now called the attention of the House would have occupied a far more prominent position in the consideration of the public than it did at present. They had no reason to congratulate France upon the success of her electoral system under the late Empire. ["Question!"] It was strictly to the question, and he alluded to it, because in France the Government of the day, sitting as they did in a permitted Parliament, were authorized to interfere in the elections throughout the country—authorized very much in the manner which that clause proposed to authorize the Secretary of State; and it was perfectly notorious, for it was published in all the newspapers, that the Prefects were the agents of the Government—officials who occupied the position which corresponded to that in which the Bill would place their Secretary of State—received secret instructions as to how they should regulate the elections, in order to favour the return of the Government candidates. Let them for one moment examine the powers which the Bill contained. In Clause 15 there was a remnant of the old system. It provided that in every Parliamentary Election the return of the Member should be made to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery. Now, the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery was not a political officer. He was a judicial officer, and his character gave a security

  1013
  that the return should be duly recorded; but let the House mark this—that function was the only function retained to the ancient jurisdiction, and it was a function which never came into play until the election had been consummated. Now, look at Clause 16. By Clause 16 the Secretary of State was to proscribe to whom, when, and in what manner copies of the marked register should be given—that was, of the register marked so as to indicate who of the electors had voted. Now that must be the basis of any Election Petition, or of any scrutiny; and the whole jurisdiction over that which was to form the basis of an inquiry, if any inquiry was to be made, was to be transferred wholesale to the political officer of the Government, an officer, who must be, according to the present system of that House, a political partizan, and might be a Peer; who would, except for the provisions of the Bill, if it passed, by reason of his position as a Member of the other House of Parliament, be disqualified from taking part in any of their elections. He recalled that, in order to show the wide departure in that particular from the ancient system by which the freedom of the country was secured, through securing the purity of elections to the House, and the freedom of those elections from control on the part of the Crown, and by the Crown he now meant the Administration of the day, which must consist of partizans representing the majority of the House of Commons for the time being. Let him also call attention to another point, to Clause 18, under which that political officer was from time to time to make, alter, repeal, or add to any rules respecting the matters following:—The erection of polling stations, the construction of ballot-boxes, the shape, size, colour, texture, and mode of printing the ballot papers; the nature of the instruments to be used in stamping or marking the ballot papers—and now let the House observe—and he may make rules, he has a legislative authority to make rules, touching any matter authorized by the Act to be prescribed by him; and, in the last subsection, touching any other matter or thing required to be provided for the purpose of carrying the Act into execution; and, further, it is proposed that any rules which the Secretary of State might think fit to make in pursuance of
  1014
  that section, shall be deemed to be within the powers conferred by the Act, and shall be of the same force as if enacted in that Act, and shall be judicially noted. Therefore, with respect to all these undefined subjects, the Secretary of State was appointed to legislate, and the Courts of Law were commanded to recognize his legislation as valid; his legislation being embodied in those rules which, if the Bill passed into law, must intimately affect the whole system under which candidates should become Members of that House. But it did not stop there. By Clause 21 all questions arising as to the division of the country into polling districts, which, by the present law, were committed to the independent jurisdiction of the local authorities, were by that clause to be reported to the Secretary of State; and if reported to the Secretary of State, it must be held that the rules for regulating the division of the country into polling districts were to be made under his authority; and although there was a provision that the Secretary of State should report his conduct to the House, and the rules which he had made, altered, repealed, or sanctioned, he would never report that which he might have done to the House, until it had taken effect on the elections, and very probably returned him a majority, which, owing their seats in great measure to those regulations, would be sure to sanction whatever the Secretary of State had done. He was anxious that the House should calmly consider that approximation to a vicious system, and he wished the House to test the effects of that system by an extreme case. He might be told that they had not here an Empire in the sense of the French Empire; but he would give the House an illustration of that to which he alluded—of the influence of committing to political officers the power of regulating elections during the second Republic in France. He had with him a copy of the Circular which was issued by M. Ledru Rollin, as the representative of the Provisional Government in France in 1848. It was a Circular addressed to the local commissioners on the 13th of March in that year, and in it M. Rollin said—
  "Cause, in all points of your department, the meeting of electoral committees, examine closely the qualification of the candidates, and stop only at those who appear to present the strongest gua-

  1015
  rantee of Republican opinion, and the greatest chance of success. No compromises; no complaisance. Let the day of election be the triumph of the Revolution."
  Now, that was not a novel system of interference invented by M. Ledru Rollin, though he (Mr. Newdegate) admitted that it was an exaggeration of the system of interference which was habitual in France on the part of the political officers of the Government, acting, as that very clause proposed, in many respects, upon and through the local authorities. He admitted that that Circular of M. Ledru Rollin was condemned; but it was condemned only as an exaggeration of the French system. He knew he might be told that the provisions in the Bill were not such as vitally to affect the election; but against that he set the conduct of the Legislature when it would not commit even registration matters to political officers, but reserved them to the Judges who were non-political, in order to secure fairness and freedom of election. He had now stated his objections to those clauses; he should not, however, move his Amendment, and for this reason—In the present state of the House it would only lead to a division unworthy of the subject. But he took that opportunity of drawing the attention of the House and of the country to the introduction of that novel principle—in contradistinction to the principle according to which the jurisdiction of that House itself in the matter of Election Petitions had been set aside by the Legislature, and the trial of all Election Petitions committed to the Judges. Her Majesty's Government had induced the majority of the House to reverse that arrangement, which was the latest exemplification of the ancient principle, by which the independence of the House of Commons had ever been secured, or rather secured during the last 200 years, which was surely not the darkest period in their Parliamentary history; the Government sought to induce the majority of the House to arm the Secretary of State, who must be a political officer, and who might be a Peer, with the power of framing regulations which must deeply affect the conduct of election to seats in the House, if the Bill should ever become law. He thanked the House for having allowed him to express to them the deep conviction he felt that, by adopting those
  1016
  clauses, they were entering upon a dangerous course, and that it would be far better they should even now, if the House were in "a condition really to consider" the subject, reflect upon the danger of the course upon which they were invited to embark.
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Newdegate) was hardly acting in accordance with the Rules of the House in making a rather long statement which he did not follow up by a Motion. By adopting that course, he was precluding hon. Members from the opportunity of replying to the arguments he had used.
  MR. GILPINappealed to the Speaker to know if the hon. Member for North Warwickshire was in Order?
  MR. SPEAKERsaid, that the hon. Member had trangressed the Rules of the House.
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, that in that case, and not wishing to prevent hon. Members from replying to his observations, he begged to move the Amendment which stood in his name.
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 12, lines 28 and 29, to leave out the words "a Secretary of State," in order to insert the words "the judge appointed under the Statute thirty-first and thirty-second of Victoria, chapter one hundred and twenty-five, for the trial of Election Petitions,"—(Mr. Newdegate,)
  —instead thereof.
  Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, the clause would not give the power to the Secretary of State to affect the return of Members as the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Warwickshire seemed to apprehend. It was found impossible to insert some provisions of detail in the Bill, and as some authority must be established for making those provisions, the responsible Government of the day appeared to be the proper authority; a security against abuse being found in this—that the regulations should be laid on the Table of the House for three weeks. The Secretary of State had no power whatever under Clause 20 to control the local authority. The hon. Member wished to give the Judges the power to make the regulations instead of the Secretary of State; but he was not

  1017
  aware of any case in which an administrative power was given to the Judges.
  MR. GILPINsaid, he agreed, to a great extent, in what had been stated by the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Warwickshire. To make the Bill acceptable to the public it should have, at least, the appearance of unquestionable fairness. Appeals on political points should be to parties who were assumed to be free from political bias; but no one could say that a Secretary of State was likely to be free from party bias, because, if he was, in all probability he would not be Secretary of State. Much less harm would result in extending the duties of the Judges than that an impression should go abroad that the decision of political disputes should be left to a party man.
  MR. JAMESsaid, he thought there was sufficient protection in the Secretary of State rendering himself liable to the censure of that House for the slightest abuse of his authority. It would be impossible to find persons less capable of performing these duties than the Judges. The majority of the Judges had no experience of election matters, and probably it would be better if none of them had; and the last thing they should do was to ask men who knew nothing about elections to make laws for their regulation. By the terms of the Amendment, if carried, it would be in the power of the then Election Judges to make within three years, if no election took place, nine different regulations for as many different ballot-boxes and the number of the elections.
  SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHsaid, he agreed that it was not desirable to place this power either in the Secretary of State or the Judges. The Secretary of State must be a party man, and his decision would, of course, be supported by his party. In former days it was the practice for the Speaker to name the Election Committee, and he would suggest that the Speaker should be substituted for the Home Secretary.
  MR. M. CHAMBERSsaid, he also objected to the decision being left to the Home Secretary or the Election Judges. He suggested that the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas should have the power. It was common knowledge among lawyers that when an Act of Parliament was passed, the duty of framing the rules was imposed on the particular
  1018
  Courts which had jurisdiction over the subject-matter; and no one could deny that the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction over this subject-matter; and he could not but think, if it could be accomplished, that it would be exceedingly desirable that his right hon. Friend who had the conduct of the Bill should, not in the terms in which the Amendment was moved, accept the Amendment; and that he should see whether he could not make the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas do that duty which was endeavoured to be imposed upon the Secretary of State for the Home Department for the time being, who was assuredly always a party man.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause 26 (Prohibition against hiring rooms at publichouse).
  MR. DIXONmoved the insertion in the clause of words, the effect of which was to free candidates from the penalty imposed by the clause, where they might happen to come from a distance, and might not be able to find a lodging in a town, in which case they would have to go to an hotel.
  MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, he would accept the Amendment.
  Amendment agreed to.
  MR. GOLDSMIDmoved the omission of the clause, which appeared to him to be quite unwarrantable. He had been in many places where there was no room whatever to be had except the public room of the local hotel. At the last election he had had to address the electors in two or three different places, and in such a case it was utterly impossible to carry about a tent, which, moreover, in wet weather would afford very inadequate shelter to the constituents.
  Amendment proposed, to leave out Clause 26.—(Mr. Goldsmid.)
  MR. C. S. READhoped the clause would be omitted, which would operate very inconveniently in counties.
  MR. EASTWICKsaid, it would cause extreme inconvenience also with respect to boroughs, and he hoped the clause would be omitted.
  MR. CANDLISHbelieved there was no more valuable and subsidiary clause in the Bill, and he was very unwilling to believe that any candidate who was

  1019
  extremely desirous of addressing his constituents would not find out the means of doing so, without going to a publichouse.
  MR. M. CHAMBERSsaid, he represented the borough of Devonport, which had reformed itself, and had resolved not to permit its candidates to have meetings or committee-rooms in publichouses. He had, therefore, had to address his constituents frequently at open-air meetings, and he could not understand why his bucolic Friends, who lived in the country when they came among the rustics whom they wished to be admired by, could not address them in the open air, either in the summer evenings or spring mornings. If they could not meet in the open air, why could they not use a threshing barn or some larger building? To meet at a publichouse meant simply that there should be plenty of drinking.
  MR. BERESFORD HOPEsaid, as the clause originally stood, meetings in publichouses were prohibited, but there was a reasonable provision that certain meetings should be allowed at which candidates could address their constituents. The clause was now absolute nonsense, endeavouring as it did to enforce what common sense showed to be utterly impossible—namely, the absolute prohibition of meetings in publichouses, although in many boroughs the public room at an inn was the only public room in the place. He would, however, prohibit the holding of any political meetings in beershops.
  Question put, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."
  The House divided:—Ayes 71; Noes 30: Majority 41.
  Bill to be read the third time To-morrow, at Two of the clock.

SUPPLY.
Order for Committee read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

NAVY—CONSTITUTION OF THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY.—RESOLUTION.
MR. CORRY,in rising to call attention to the Evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Board of Admiralty, and to move—
1020
"That it is expedient that the changes in the Constitution of the Board of Admiralty, under the Order in Council of 14th January, 1869, be reconsidered by Her Majesty's Government,"
said: I cannot conceal from myself that the subject of my Notice must be so little attractive, except to those who devote especial attention to naval affairs, that I can hardly hope to be able to invest it with any degree of interest to the great majority of the House; but I trust, nevertheless, that I shall experience its indulgence while I perform a task which I should gladly have avoided in the absence of my right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), but which a profound sense of duty compels me to undertake, convinced as I am of the incalculable importance to the Navy of the proper solution of the questions involved in the evidence to which I shall refer. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, in introducing the Navy Estimates, said that the services of his predecessor would prove of great value hereafter, and render the administration of the Navy an easier task to his successors. I do not know whether the right Gentleman at that time had read the evidence of the Committee, or whether having read it, he is of the same opinion still; but this I do know, speaking after an experience of Naval administration, which commenced just 30 years ago, in the course of which I have served in every political office at the Admiralty from the lowest to the highest, that if it should ever be my lot to be at the Admiralty again, I should absolutely despair of conducting the business of the Department either with credit to myself or without the risk of disaster—and, in truth, there has been disaster enough already—under the system whose practical working is revealed by this evidence. I might, indeed, have wished to have had it in my power to quote a Report of the Committee in favour of my views; but the constitution of the Committee will readily explain the absence of that advantage. It consisted of 11 Members, exclusive of the Chairman. Of these, three were noble Lords, whose political opinions coincide with my own; one was a noble Lord who sits on the cross-benches, and the remaining seven were habitual supporters, and two of them actual Members of the Government. That a Committee so con-

1021
stituted should have voted six one way and six the other can leave very little room for doubt that its real opinion was in favour of the admirable draft Report proposed by the Duke of Somerset. The Amendment moved by the Lord Privy Seal is by no means inconsistent with that view of the case, because it does not attack the Duke of Somerset in any one of his positions, but merely asserts that, as the late First Lord could not be examined on account of his absence from England, a Report, founded on imperfect evidence, would not be satisfactory to Parliament or to the country. But I will not further speculate on this point, for it appears to me to be absolutely impossible that any 12 gentlemen of ordinary intelligence could have heard the evidence contained in that Blue Book without concluding, whatever might have been their opinion respecting some of the changes in matters of detail introduced by the late First Lord, that the Order in Council of the 14th of January, 1869, had proved a failure, and, in the words of the Motion with which I shall conclude, "ought to be re-considered by Her Majesty's Government." On the night of the introduction of the Navy Estimates the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Samuda) said—
"It appeared to him most wonderful that a right hon. Gentleman, who, to say the least, was a very young Minister, should have been allowed by the House to usurp a position so different from that which all previous First Lords of the Admiralty had occupied.… . . He was astonished that a matter of so grave and serious a character should have been permitted to pass through the House without a protest on the part of those who usually take a part in the discussion of naval affairs; and, indeed, he had expressed his surprise in private to some of the leading Members on the other side, and among them the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tyrone, that they had not pointed out to the House the great leap in the dark they were taking in confirming this arrangement."—[3 Hansard, ccv. 726–7.]
I feel greatly nattered at the position my hon. Friend has assigned me as the mentor, whose duty it is to warn the House against the indiscretions of inexperienced First Lords of the Admiralty. The task is not a light one, but I have nevertheless sometimes endeavoured to perform it, and I can assure my hon. Friend that I did not neglect it on the occasion to which he adverted. If he will refer to Hansard, he will find that I addressed the House at some length on the subject
1022
on the 2nd of April, 1869, and that I left untouched hardly a blot which has been hit by the Duke of Somerset's Committee. I objected to the Controller of the Navy being made a Lord of the Admiralty, which, I said, placed him in a most anomalous position, and was in direct violation of the principle adopted by Sir James Graham when he suppressed the Navy Board in 1832. I objected to the discontinuance of Consultative Boards, because in a special Department like the Admiralty, where so much professional knowledge is required, it was necessary that the First Lord, usually a civilian, should have the assistance of a Council of Naval Advisers, and I objected to the reduction of the number of Naval Lords as throwing on the First Sea Lord an excessive amount of responsibility and labour; while, with respect to the whole scheme, I declared it to be entirely inconsistent with that simplicity and unity of action which Sir James Graham held, to be the essence and life of public business. The late First Lord answered me in a somewhat contemptuous manner. With respect to making the Controller a member of the Board of Admiralty, he said it secured unity of action, and brought all the business into one hand. The House would presently see what kind of "unity of action" it had produced. This change was excessively popular at the time it was made; yet now, with the exception of Sir Spencer Robinson, who had suggested it, the witnesses examined are unanimous against it. The late First Lord declared it, in 1869, to be the cardinal point of his reforms; but it appears from the evidence that he had seen the mistake he had made, and that if he had continued at the Admiralty the new Patent, on Sir Spencer Robinson's removal from office, would not have included the Controller among the Lords. Seven witnesses were examined on this subject, four actually, and three lately holding office at the Admiralty, and all except the late Controller condemn the present arrangement. Even the late Financial Secretary, Mr. Baxter, thinks it
"Questionable whether the Controller of the Navy ought to be a Lord of the Admiralty, and that it is objectionable that the same man should be the head of a subordinate department, and, at the same time, a member of the Board which has to decide upon submissions made by him."
Sir Sydney Dacres, the First Naval

1023
Adviser, but whose advice appears to have been seldom followed, thinks that "the Controller should not be a member of the Board," and, in reply to a question as to whether he was aware that Mr. Childers came pretty nearly to the same conclusion, he says—
"When Sir Spencer Robinson left the Admiralty I wrote to Mr. Childers, and I begged that he would not put in a Controller and a Lord in one person, and he wrote to me, and I have his answer, in which he says he will certainly attend to the matter and not do so."
After that evidence, I am surprised that the present First Lord should have issued a Patent in which the offices are combined. Sir Frederick Grey thinks—
"The system should be what Sir James Graham established—namely, that the permanent officers at the head of the departments should be the servants of the Board, and not parts of the Board."
Sir John Briggs, the late Chief Clerk, and who had served upwards of 25 years as reader at the Board, where he had, of necessity, a thorough knowledge of the whole business of the Department, says, in his answer to Question 677—
"My opinion was asked confidentially as to the Controller becoming a member of the Board. I replied that I did not think such an appointment would add either to the efficiency of the service or the harmony of the Board. Then you think that it was a mistake to put the Controller into the Board?—Decidedly."
Lord John Hay approves of almost every other change, but disapproves of the Controller being a member of the Board. He says—
"I think that the office of Controller is an unnecessary one altogether. I very much agree with what I believe was Mr. Childer's view upon the matter—namely, that there should be a Third Lord at the Board as there is now, for the purpose of looking after that department, and that there should be no Controller at all."
Captain Willes, the Chief of the Staff, in his answer to a question on another subject, says—
"Another difficulty has been the Controller being a member of the Board. I believe that Mr. Childers intended, if he had remained, to do away with the Controller and make him a Naval Lord as recommended by Sir Frederick Grey, with a Chief Constructor as principal officer under him."
Admiral Eden was not questioned on this subject; but it is well known that his opinion is strongly against the Controller being a Lord of the Admiralty. The only other witness besides those I have quoted whose evidence refers to this question is the late Controller him-
1024
self, Sir Spencer Robinson. Of course his opinion is strongly in favour of the change, as it was at his instance it was adopted. His reasons for having recommended it are stated at length in a Paper which he laid before the Committee, and I should not deny their soundness if the question could be treated in reference merely to economical considerations. Considered commercially, they are perhaps right. He says, page 43—
"It is in vain that the Controller will have carefully prepared a programme, distributed the labour to the best advantage, estimated accurately the cost to be incurred on the several services he has to direct, regulated and apportioned the work to be done during the month or the year. The First Sea Lord wants some work not provided for, and if he chooses to have it done, all else gives way for this desire. His very duties as to the management and distribution of the Fleet are in antagonism to economy in the dockyards."
But that is precisely the reason why the Controller should not be independent of the Senior Naval Lord, who always has been, and from his position ought to be, responsible for the movement and condition of the Fleet, of course under the sanction of the First Lord. If the Admiralty is, in its relation to the dockyards, a great ship-building and ship-repairing establishment, it is in another and still higher sense a great political Department, required to be ready at all times to adapt its resources to the demands rising out of the state of our relations with foreign countries, which it is impossible to foresee when the programme is prepared. The policy to be adopted in this respect—the number and the character of the ships to be brought forward for service as eventualities arise—is entirely outside of the sphere of the Controller's functions; and it appears to me that the member of the Board within whose sphere of duties it does lie must of necessity have a control over the work of the dockyards, which is incompatible with the independent exercise of authority by the Controller as a member of the Board of Admiralty. No doubt the exercise of this control is, as Sir Spencer Robinson states, in antagonism to economy; but it is essential to the fulfilment of the objects for which we maintain a Navy, and that ought to be the first consideration with the Admiralty. But the late First Lord, in answering my objections in 1869, said that his reasons for making the Controller a member of the Board was that

1025
it secured unity of action, and brought business into one hand. Unity of action, indeed! And what a graphic picture we have of it by Sir John Briggs, who, from his position as Chief Clerk for a whole year under the new system, must have been thoroughly conversant with the mode in which the business of the Department was conducted! In his answer to Question 677, speaking of the new arrangement in relation to the Controller's department, he says—
"The result of this has been that there are now virtually two offices at Whitehall—the one the Admiralty proper, under Sir Sydney Dacres, and the Controllers's Office, under Sir Spencer Robinson—not acting in harmony, but in opposition to each other. I do not think that anything could have been much more complete than the former system. If I was called upon to find a paper it was brought in a minute, because all papers had then passed thorough my hands; but during the last few months that I was in office I considered that the First Sea Lord, the Secretary, and myself, only saw half the papers. This unfortunately, as I predicted, caused a collision between the First and Second Sea Lords."
Here is a picture of unity of action and of a united happy family. Two independent offices at Whitehall, only half the papers coming to the notice of the First Sea Lord, the Secretary, and Chief Clerk—no wonder the service should complain, as it does, of receiving contradictory orders—two offices at Whitehall, only two naval advisers—for the Junior Naval Lord is by the Order in Council reduced to the rank of an assistant—and these two in collision the one with the other, which we must only hope was not of a material character. The evidence teems with instances of want of harmony, and in what did it culminate? Why, in the scandal presented to the world of a First Lord of the Admiralty inculpating his Colleague and Controller in a printed Minute, which was drawn up and published behind his back, and of the Controller, in self-defence, replying in a Memorandum, which was also printed and published, against his Chief, and his subsequent ejectment from office. So much for the unity of action which was to be secured by placing the Controller at the Board. I now come to the next great change—the disuse of Consultative Boards. Here, again, the present system has no friends. The late Financial Secretary says, in answer to Question 236, that he attaches very little importance to the question of a Board, and he thinks that the present
1026
formal Boards are a mere waste of time. But he says, in answer to the question—
"Do you think that the present system works well?—I think that it works admirably. I find that I have now very little to do. I believe that I am the best paid, and the least hard-worked officer in the Government."
That answer, however, is hardly consistent with another, where he says—
"I dare say that I have broken through many rules since I have been there. I know that I have done many things which were considered highly irregular by officers of the Admiralty."
It is difficult to understand why, if the system worked so admirably, he should have thought it necessary to act in violation of its rules. It is true that the Permanent Secretary, Mr. Lushington, favours the present system, for he is opposed on principle to Boards as Governing Bodies. But the former Boards were not Governing Bodies, and he and Lord John Hay were the only witnesses who disapproved of Consultative Boards. The other witnesses examined were Sir Sydney Dacres, Sir Spencer Robinson, Sir Frederick Grey, Admiral Eden, Sir John Briggs, and Captain Willes, and they are unanimously in favour of the old Consulting Boards. Sir Sydney Dacres says—
"A Board is of great value, and it gives an opportunity to all members of the Board to know every subject under discussion. Lord Lyveden: Then do you think that the disuse of the Board has facilitated public business?—No. Do you think that the business was more rapidly done under the old system?—Yes. Do you think that it was done less efficiently?—I think not."
And he added that there were less arrears before the change. He is then asked—
"It was stated in evidence by Sir James Graham that when a civilian First Lord came to the Admiralty it was of very great importance that he should hear day by day the things discussed at the Board, and the opinions of naval officers, and, hearing different opinions, should be able to make up his mind. Do you think that that is of great value?—Certainly."
These are the conclusions of Sir Sydney Dacres after five years' experience—one-half under the old system, and the other under the new. But the most remarkable evidence in favour of the old system of Boards is that of Sir Spencer Robinson. The changes had in a great measure been carried out by his advice. He had advised that the Controller should be made a member of the Board, and expected great results as the consequence, but all these have in his opinion been more than neutralized by the dis-

1027
continuance of the practice of holding Boards. He is asked—
"You contemplated the continuance of the Board of Admiralty as you had formerly known it?—As far as counsel and advice went, I could not have conceived that the abolition of a system whereby all the Lords could, with facility, consult each other, and in the presence of the First Lord (for I lay the greatest possible stress upon that), would have been initiated, or could have gone on with any satisfaction to the service. It appears to me to be absolutely essential, call it a Board or call it a Council, or arrange it how you will, that there should be upon every subject of importance, communication between all the members of that Council, or of that Board, in the presence of the First Lord, and not, as I have repeatedly seen, one member called in, and giving his opinion and advice, and as soon as he leaves the room another member called in and giving his opinion and advice, and a decision come to in the absence of both parties. The inconveniences which arose from the want of the Controller being a Lord of the Admiralty have been exceedingly increased, although the Controller has been made a Lord of the Admiralty, from the want of consultation between the various members of the Board and the First Lord, in each other's presence—not so much with reference to the departmental business of the Controller, but with reference to the general business of the Admiralty."
Sir Frederick Grey, who had five years' experience as First Naval Lord under the Duke of Somerset, entirely concurs with the late Controller in this respect. He says—
"I have a most decided opinion that the former system is by far preferable to that which I have heard described by the witnesses as now existing, and that the daily communication between the different officers sitting at the Board is absolutely necessary for the transaction of the business."
Sir John Briggs' evidence is equally decided. He says—
"I attach very great importance to a Board. It affords general information, enables each member to hear what the other thinks; and much benefit to the Department accrues from a free interchange of opinions."
Sir John Briggs also states that the work is not done so rapidly as it used to be. Admiral Eden is of the same opinion as to the value of Boards—
"Do you not think it better that the First Lord should obtain his professional advice from responsible members of the Board of Admiralty, meeting at the Board, than from advisers even though professional, to discuss a particular subject?—Most certainly. Do you think that officers generally would deliver their opinion with quite as much freedom and confidence before a Board of that kind, where they were exposed to the criticism of their colleagues, as they would in the confidence of private communication?—I should say so, certainly. Many of the questions which were brought before the Board were questions seriously affecting the character of a naval officer; for instance
1028
the loss of a ship. Is it not very desirable that such questions as those should not be merely decided by the First Naval Lord in his own room, and then communicated to the First Lord, but that they should be discussed where two or three other officers might have an opportunity of giving an opinion? — Yes; and if they differed, their reasons for differing be heard. They might very often mitigate a censure or alter the view which had been first taken of it?—I have often seen that done."
I can confirm this statement in the fullest manner, and it is undoubtedly for the interest both of officers and men that when charges are brought against them their case should be fully discussed at a Board. Captain Willes also adverts to the inconvenience resulting from the discontinuance of Boards, and speaks of the advantage which would result if the First Lord would make his arrangements afresh, and would discuss important subjects in the Board room, instead of in his own room. Lord John Hay is the only witness who objects directly to the old system of holding Boards. He gives two reasons, and it is difficult to say which is the worst. He says—
"I think that the number of people who can listen to a paper of great importance when it is read out before them, and can settle offhand what is to be done about it, is very limited, and while I think that my own profession are extremely intelligent, and just as intelligent as most people, yet I do not think that our habits or our education are of that nature which assists us very much in doing that."
I must do my naval colleagues the justice of saying that I never found any deficiency in them in this respect; but, of course, when any difficult question leading to difference of opinion was brought forward, the practice was to reserve it for further consideration. His second reason is as bad—
"I think that discussions in a formal manner are very useful, where all the persons who are discussing the matter are in some measure upon an equality; now that never is the case when a discussion of that sort is going on among naval officers in the presence of the First Sea Lord; there is not that freedom of discussion which makes discussion useful when you are ranged round a table formally with the First Sea Lord."
I, on the contrary, have always found the discussion of the most free character, as free as in this House, and Sir John Barrow, who held the office of Permanent Secretary for so many years, used to say the Second Sea Lord was always the leader of the opposition. It will thus be seen that the evidence in favour of Consultative Boards is overwhelming.

1029
But the great argument against what was called government by a Board was, in the words of the late First Lord, that it frittered away responsibility; but this very general mistake was the result of entire ignorance of the former system, under which the complete supremacy, and consequently the complete responsibility, of the First Lord was never questioned. Sir John Briggs, who, as Reader to the Board, had been constantly present at the Board for more than 25 years, is asked—
"In fact, as far as the First Lord goes, the change which was made in 1869 could not add to the responsibility which before that time was complete?—I have always considered the authority of the First Lord of the Admiralty supreme; he takes the opinion of the members of the Board; but it is for him to decide whether he will act upon their advice or otherwise. In your long experience of the Admiralty, do you ever remember divisions at the Board which were carried by a majority, as it were?—No, I cannot suppose that any First Lord holding that high office would allow anything of the sort. The use of a Board was to collect the opinions of naval men, and then for the First Lord to decide. Do you think that it in the slightest degree alters the responsibility either of the First Lord or of any other member of the Board?—In my opinion it does not."
Even Mr. Baxter doubts very much whether the new system has thrown greater responsibility upon the First Lord of the Admiralty. He says it is a mere question of consulting the gentlemen in one way rather than in another; he consulted them in his own room instead of in the Board room. He does not see what practical difference the Order in Council has made as to responsibility, although it has made some difference as to the distribution of business. Mr. Lushington, indeed, in answer to the question—
"So that by the new system a much greater responsibility is thrown upon the First Lord of the Admiralty?" says, "I should say so, certainly."
But, then, he was in complete ignorance of what the old system was, for he says in his answer to Question 77—"In short, the Board was the Governing Body, it was the deciding and determining body," which is distinctly at variance with the evidence I have already quoted, and with the fact. Mr. Lushington had no experience whatever of the old system, and entirely misconceives what it was. But it is unnecessary to multiply evidence on this point, because the late First Lord has himself given us conclusive proof that, in his opinion, when anything goes
1030
wrong, the responsibility rests not with the First Lord, but with his subordinates; for on the occurrence of a great catastrophe—the loss of the Captain—he drew up a Minute entirely exonerating himself, and throwing the whole blame on the constructive department. Under the old system this would have been impossible; because everything relating to the Captain after her delivery to the Admiralty would, of necessity, have been known and discussed at the Board in the First Lord's presence, and if anything which ought to have been done by way of precaution had been neglected, he could not have escaped the responsibility. But Boards, it was said, weakened the sense of individual responsibility on the part of the Junior Lords. On this point what does Sir Sydney Dacres say? Why, that he did not think he had a bit more responsibility than Sir Frederick Grey had, or any First Naval Lord who was ever at the Admiralty. As to the sense of individual responsibility being weakened by the practical working of a Board, he did not think it was in the slightest degree in a strong mind; the single. Lord could only do exactly what he thought was best and right—the sense of responsibility was not weakened a bit. If he had any question of importance he took it to the Board, and had the advantage of other opinions besides his own. So much for the greater sense of responsibility which the Order in Council was to establish. It is attempted to be shown in the evidence that, notwithstanding the discontinuance of Boards, the most ample consultation takes place between the First Lord and his colleagues on all important subjects in the First Lord's room. Mr. Lushington says there is the most free communication. The only thing to be said is that the day is too short; the First Lord is seeing them all day long, and I am not surprised at this under the cumbrous system of separate conversations which has been substituted for discussions at which all the Lords were present at the Board. Mr. Baxter also says—
"I think that if Mr. Childers had any fault at all, it was in too much and not too little consultation."
But this is hardly borne out by other evidence. A few facts are worth a thousand statements. Perhaps I know as much of nautical subjects as most

1031
First Lords as I have occupied much of my time "in great waters." But I should no more have thought of writing a Minute upon matters involving questions of seamanship without consulting my naval advisers than I should have thought of climbing up to the moon. But on what naval advice was the Minute on the loss of the Captain founded? There was only one naval adviser—Sir Sydney Dacres. And Sir Sydney was asked respecting the Minute of the First Lord relating to the Captain—"Was that Minute seen by you before it was published?" His answer was—"Never; I never saw a line of it, nor was I consulted upon a line of it." Again, as to the scheme of naval retirement, the late Controller of the Navy says, at the end of his answer to Question 453—
"There has been serious detriment to the public service, I think, from the want of the members who are called the Board of Admiralty meeting the First Lord, either in the Board room or in his own room, I do not care where it is, provided they meet together in his presence, and discuss their ideas before him."
It also appears that the Memorial to the Queen for the Order in Council of January 14, 1869, altering the entire constitution of the Board, was never discussed at the Board, although it is designated in the Order in Council as a Memorial from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. There are various other instances; but these are sufficient to show the want of consultation on important subjects, which would have been fully discussed, and thereby much mischief obviated, under the old system of Boards. But one of the greatest evils resulting from the abolition of Boards, where every important question of naval policy was freely discussed, is that no one has anything beyond the most superficial knowledge of the business outside his own department; and, consequently, in the absence of one Lord, from whatever cause, no other Lord is fully qualified to undertake his duties. This is shown by Sir Sydney Dacres, who is asked—
"Supposing that you yourself were able to attend when Sir Alexander Milne was unable to attend, you could take his business, having heard from day to day what was going on; but if you were now temporarily unable to attend, how would your business be managed?"
His reply is—
"That is the great disadvantage of the present Board, and the great advantage of the other."
1032
Sir Frederick Grey also describes what passed under the old system—
"Although you had special business, all the important part of your business was brought before the Board of Admiralty, was it not?—Invariably."
Again, he is asked—
"The second Sea Lord, for instance—Admiral Eden—who had his own special business, also was so far aware of your business, that if from any accident you had been obliged to be absent for a short time, he was in a position to undertake it?"
And he replies—
"Yes; and the practice was that either Admiral Eden or myself was always present in the office; we were never away together; it may have happened for a day; but, as a rule, when I was away he took my work, and if he was away I took his."
Sir John Briggs also points out the advantage of the old system in this respect. He says—
"It is very desirable that matters of general interest should be discussed, and that the First Lord should take the sense of the Board upon such matters; it facilitates business, and insures unity of action."
He is asked—
"Under that arrangement, of course, if one Naval Lord was occasionally absent, the other Naval Lords were conversant with the business, and were able to carry it on?—Certainly."
This is also shown by Admiral Eden. He is asked—
"When the First Naval Lord was absent at any time, either for his vacation, or from any accidental cause of absence, you, I think, undertook his duty?" He replies, "I did."
He is again asked—
"And from being at the Board, and hearing day by day what business he had to perform, you were perfectly conversant with it so as to be able to take his duty when he went away?—Quite so, without the slightest difficulty."
And the great inconvenience resulting from the want of general knowledge is not confined to the Lords, but extends to the Secretaries as well, and it would be impossible to continue the present system if the office of First Lord were held by a Peer. Sir John Briggs thus describes the position of the Secretary to the Admiralty as it used to be—
"Was not the Political Secretary in former times constantly present at every Board?—Certainly; he was the Secretary to the Admiralty. And he had perfect cognizance of everything which passed? — Yes. The Minutes which passed at the Board were initialled by him?—Yes; in fact the greater part of them were made by him. How much of the duties which the Secretary in olden times used to perform, did Mr. Baxter perform as long as you remained at the Admiralty?—None."

1033
His functions are now merely departmental. The late Financial Secretary, indeed, said—
"I am pretty well acquainted with the general business of the whole Department. I think that I know as much about it as some gentlemen who have been Secretaries to the Admiralty; and, of course, in the absence of the First Lord, it is my business to make myself acquainted with all details, and especially upon the matters which are likely to come before the House of Commons."
But he was asked only two questions, I think, out of his own department, and he could answer neither—
"As you say that you have a general knowledge of what is going on, can you tell us how the Coastguard is inspected, since the Controller and the Deputy Controller of the Coastguard have both been abolished?"
His answer is—
"By an officer acting under the First Sea Lord. Does he go round to all the different stations?—That is a question which I cannot answer. Has any alteration been made in the inspection of the force of marines?—That is a question which I cannot answer."
Both those questions related to important subjects connected with the national defence, with which formerly Secretaries would have been thoroughly conversant; they would have known these points as well as their A B C. We all know that any ignorance in these respects cannot be owing to any want of ability or of diligence on the part of the late Financial Secretary. But the system makes it impossible for him to have that general knowledge which the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty ought to possess. But perhaps the evil resulting from this want of general information is even greater in the case of the Permanent Secretary. He used to be the connecting link between an outgoing and an incoming Board, and the means of securing the continuity of administration, which is of the greatest importance in a Department like the Admiralty. And I must here bear testimony—and I am glad of the opportunity of doing so—to the invaluable services of Mr. Romaine, the late Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty. By the intimate knowledge which Mr. Romaine possessed of the various subjects which from time to time had been under discussion, and likewise by his good sense and judgment, I have myself on many occasion been prevented from making mistakes; and the advantages to the Department of a gentleman so thoroughly conversant with the business which it was called on to transact could
1034
hardly be exaggerated. But this inestimable advantage is now lost. How little the present Permanent Secretary, not from any fault of his own, is acquainted with the general affairs of the Navy and the policy of the Admiralty, the following questions and answers will show:—
"What does the person do who represents the storekeeper general—namely, the superintendent of stores; what is his duty?—I am not very well qualified to answer that question, because I have no daily supervision of his work. Does he merely take charge of the material stores, or does he keep any account of the value thereof?—I should not like to answer that question. I understand you to have said that you are not acquainted with these things because they are not brought before the Board of Admiralty?—I said that I was not acquainted with them because they were not brought under my daily view; but it is also correct to say that they are not brought before the Board. With regard to the superintendent of stores, I do not see from this paper that he has any power of objecting to the stores?—I am sorry to say that I cannot answer that question; I think that I can inform your grace who can answer it best; either the late Third Lord, Sir Spencer Robinson, or the present superintendent of stores, Mr. M'Hardy, or Mr. Baxter. The functions of the director general of the medical department have also been considerably altered; does he buy the medicines himself, or is that also part of the functions of the purchase department?—There has been some discussion about that matter. I am not sure how it was decided. The general officer who inspected the marines has also, I understand, been abolished; is not that so?—I believe so, but that was before my time. But, besides that, there was a naval officer and a master attendant, I think, in every victualling yard; and that is also abolished, is it not?—There have been considerable changes, but I could not speak upon that matter."
Judging from these answers, I should much doubt whether a new Board or a new First Lord would be likely to obtain much valuable information so as to secure continuity of administration from the Permanent Secretary under the existing system. Captain Willes points out the great disadvantage of this. He says—
"The chief difficulty of not having a Board is that, supposing there to be a change of Government next month, we have no person like a Permanent Under Secretary of State. I mean no disrespect to Mr. Lushington, but I do not think that by the present system the Secretary does know or can know everything that is going on."
This is also shown by Sir John Briggs, who says—
"There is nobody now in the office who has his hand upon the whole business of the office in the same manner as the Permanent Secretary and the Chief Clerk used to have before the alteration in the meeting of the Board."

1035
This is one of the innumerable evils resulting from the disuse of the Board. And what a picture does the evidence present of the disorder which ensues, entirely in consequence of the abolition of the old system of Boards, when the First Lord is absent. The Admiralty at once becomes like "all Israel, scattered on the hill side, as sheep without a shepherd." Let us imagine such a state of things in war as was described by Sir Spencer Robinson, when he said—
"It has so happened that when the First Lord has been away, nobody has known to whom to apply; there is no person really in charge at the Admiralty. We have always done the best we could; we have consulted each other, and made the work go on, but if there had been a serious difference of opinion between us, there was nobody to go to. How would it have been under the former system?—There would have assembled two Lords and a Secretary as a Board, and the whole thing would have been done without the slightest difficulty."
This state of affairs is again described by the Financial Secretary—
"Who was responsible for the conduct of the Department after Mr. Childers's absence from illness? — Each several principal officer took charge of his own department. The questions to be answered in the House, of course, I took charge of. I took charge of the Parliamentary business, and had daily consultations with all my colleagues upon such matters."
It would be laughable, if it were not deplorable, to read how the duty is carried on under this system of every man for himself, and God for us all. We have a striking illustration of it in the evidence, showing how the Navy Estimates for the current financial year were prepared in the absence of the late First Lord, but it is too long to quote on the present occasion. When the First Lord is away there is no captain of the ship, and this state of things, most dangerous in time of peace, would be fatal to the public interests in time of war; and it is really intolerable that if the First Lord were absent for a week or ten days the business of a great Department should come to a standstill. The next great mistake made by the Order in Council is the reduction of the naval element, as it is called. Formerly, there were four Lords, and each had a right to advise on matters of general policy; now there is only one, for the Controller is still merely the head of a department, and the third, or Junior Lord, is reduced by the Order in Council to the position of a mere assistant to
1036
the First Lord. This position is accepted by Lord John Hay. He was asked—"When the Senior Naval Lord is absent, who takes his business?" The reply was—
"I take his business—that is to say, I take all that I feel myself thoroughly competent to carry out, which would not include the most important portion, and those matters would be either deferred or sent to him to deal with himself."
Therefore, there was only one Lord to deal with and advise the First Lord on all important questions of naval policy. The result is, that an excessive amount of labour and responsibility is thrown upon the First Naval Lord, and that there is no one to undertake his duties if he is ill or absent. In 1869 I enumerated the duties of the First Naval Lord, and said the work was excessive, and the then First Lord replied that my statement was an example—
"How by setting out figures in a particular way almost any conclusion might seem to be justified."
But what does the unfortunate Sir Sydney Dacres say?—
"Under the present plan the duty falls very hard upon the First Naval Lord? He has a great number of branches to attend to, and he can hardly attend to them. You think the naval part of the Administration somewhat undermanned?—Certainly, I have not a doubt about it; and in case of sickness it would be thoroughly impossible to perform the duty. Working so hard continually is likely to produce sickness, is it not?—Yes, it does not strengthen me."
Sir Sydney then read a list of his various duties, and was asked—
"Does the list which you have read exhaust all the subjects which are assigned to you?—No. There are many other matters besides?—A great number. And it would be your duty to make yourself familiar with the papers relating to these matters?—Yes, it is more than one can possibly do. You consider that the work is more than can fairly be discharged by one Naval Lord?—It is impossible; one has no time to give attention to very important things which belong to the Fleet."
Not only, therefore, is the First Naval Lord overworked, but in consequence of the quantity of details with which he has to deal, important matters relating to the Fleet are of necessity neglected. Even in the opinion of the Permanent Secretary, who is naturally disposed to view the present system in the most favourable light, the First Naval Lord has too much business put upon him, for he says, in answer to Question 68—"In my opinion the Senior Naval Lord is an overworked man." There is other evidence con-

1037
firmatory of this objection to the reduction of the naval element, but it has been followed by greater evils in other respects. Sir Sydney Dacres, with nearly five years' experience at the Admiralty, one-half under the old and the other under the new system, is asked—
"If you had one or two eminent naval officers by your side, it would, you think, be more satisfactory to the Navy generally?—Certainly. And it would also be more satisfactory to yourself?—To myself most particularly. I wish to ask you first as regards the feeling of the Navy. Do you think the general feeling of officers of the Navy is that the naval element is sufficiently represented at the Board of Admiralty under the present system?—It is not only the feeling of the Navy that it is not, but it is my feeling also."
He adds—
"I think that is too much responsibility for any naval man in the world, whoever he is, to rule the whole Navy; and that his opinion will never be considered to carry so much weight as the opinion of a larger number would."
Sir Spencer Robinson confirms this opinion, for he says—
"I think the naval element is not strong enough to give the first-rate advice which would insure that everything connected with the administration of the Navy should be thoroughly considered by professional people. One naval man advising the First Lord upon all promotions, all movements of ships, all appointments, and all rules and regulations which affect the future well-being of naval officers, in my opinion is not enough. I think that the country at large hesitates to accept that as a proper solution of naval administration."
Sir Frederick Grey expresses a strong opinion to the same effect. He says—
"I should be very sorry, indeed, as the Senior Naval Lord, to be the sole adviser of the First Lord upon those matters; I think it absolutely essential that those important questions, very often involving the character of officers, should be discussed by the naval members of the Board."
Sir John Briggs says that in case of illness it is impossible for two Naval Lords to do all that is required; and Admiral Eden, who served five or six years as Second Naval Lord under the Duke of Somerset, shows the great advantage of the old arrangements, under which, in the absence of the First Naval Lord, he (the Second Naval Lord) was always available to undertake the duties of the First Naval Lord, and vice versâ. These advantages obtained under the old system are now quite lost; whenever the First Naval Lord is absent from illness the work comes to a standstill. The attempts made, in some of the questions put to the witnesses, to show that the
1038
naval element has not really been diminished, as the appointment of Captain Willes as Chief of the Staff is tantamount to that of another Lord available to be consulted on general questions, entirely breakdown and are effectually disposed of by Captain Willes himself. After having expressed the opinion that under the present system the naval advice is not sufficient, he was asked—
"Then you never communicated personally with Mr. Childers upon any matters?—No, except on the business of my own department. He has sometimes called for me with regard to the Coastguard, but nearly always in the presence of the First Naval Lord. He has never consulted me on any matters connected with the duties of the office generally."
There is no point in which the evidence is more conclusive than in respect of the insufficiency of the naval element, as reduced by the Order in Council of 1869. The only witness who disputes it is Lord John Hay, who is universally stated to have carried on his own business in a most satisfactory manner—working in a Paradise of his own, and unconscious of the disorganization which surrounded him. Not only does he differ from the other witnesses on material points, but his evidence is inconsistent with itself in many particulars. He thinks the naval element sufficiently strong, and would even introduce the War Office system (which Heaven forefend!) and have a Commander-in-Chief and only one Naval Lord. Yet he says—
"If there was a small war I would add one; if there was a very great war I might add half-a-dozen Lords."
Sir Sydney Dacres stated his work was more than one man could possibly do; but Lord John Hay thinks its entirely his own fault if it is, as there is a great deal of his business he might delegate to others. He thinks it more agreeable to the service that the First Lord should have only one naval adviser. But this is entirely contrary to the opinion of the other naval witnesses examined, and contrary, as I can positively state, to the fact. He does not think the First Lord an overworked man under the system of separate consultations which have been substituted for discussions at the Board. Yet he says—
"That he was a long time at business, and that he saw the Naval Lords more constantly than would have been possible with any other man."
And when told that it was in evidence that the business was done more slowly

1039
under the new system, he said—"I should like to know whose evidence that was;" and on being informed that it was the opinion of Sir Sydney Dacres and Sir John Briggs, he said it certainly was not the case as respects his own business; which is not surprising, as it appears he had very little to do. He added, "of course Sir Sydney Dacres is the best judge of how his own business is done." And he disposes of Sir John Briggs by saying that his experience of the new system was comparatively slight; forgetting that while Sir John Briggs had had a year's experience of the new system, he himself had had, as he states in answer to a question, only three or four months' experience of the old. These are some specimens of Lord John Hay's evidence which, except on the subject of the Controller being a Lord of the Admiralty, approves of the new system in almost every particular. But, although he is a very able officer, and was a most efficient Lord of the Admiralty, I think his opinions will hardly weigh against those of the numerous other witnesses of equal ability and much greater experience, who differ from him in almost every particular. Having now adverted to the evidence, so far as it relates to the changes effected by the Order in Council, it only remains for me to glance at a few of the collateral subjects on which witnesses were examined by the Committee. And, first, as to the reduction of the clerical establishment at Whitehall. Mr. Lushington thinks the present staff sufficient; but it would have been more satisfactory if some of the heads of branches acquainted with the old system had been examined, as they could have explained how far the reduction in the establishment had occasioned the greater slowness of the work, and the greater accumulation of arrears, which is complained of in the evidence. But the possibility of reducing the number of clerks was in a great measure due to the amalgamation of the Controller's with the Secretary's department, which, as Sir Spencer Robinson states (482)—
"Caused the entire cessation of the voluminous correspondence which the Controller had to carry on with the different branches of the Admiralty proper."
I do not, however, see how this amalgamation can continue in force if the Controller ceases, as I must take it for granted he will cease, to be a member
1040
of the Board, for in that case he must make written submissions, as they are called, and receive written instructions from the Board in the same way as the other principal officers, and for that purpose it will be necessary to increase the establishment of clerks as well in the Secretary's as in the Controller's department. No doubt, the present arrangement is an economical one; but like many other of the economies, it may have been purchased at too dear a price. Very little evidence was taken in respect of the abolition of the office of Storekeeper General and Controller of Victualling. The opinions differ; mine remains the same, more especially as regards the Storekeeper General—namely, that it was a great mistake. Certain I am of this—that the amalgamation of the offices of master shipwright and of storekeeper in the dockyards is absolutely incompatible with good management, and I think the First Lord of the Admiralty, when he visits the dockyards and compares how the service is carried on at Devonport, where there is a storekeeper, and at Portsmouth, for instance, where there is not, will arrive at the same conclusion. But it is impossible for a local storekeeper to perform his duties with sufficient independence unless he has a Chief at the Admiralty to whom he can appeal for support in case of difference with the master shipwright, or in other words, unless there is an officer at the Admiralty having some such authority as was exercised by the Storekeeper General. I believe it is quite contrary to commercial practice that the expenditure and the custody of stores should be in the hands of the same person, and I trust the First Lord of the Admiralty will see the advisability of giving greater independence to the store department at Whitehall as well as in the dockyards. The only other question on which I shall trespass on the time of the House is the abolition of the offices of captain superintendent and master attendant of the victualling yards. The late Financial Secretary admits that this was a measure of pure economy, and this paltry economy was carried out against the strongly-expressed opinion of Sir Sydney Dacres, who had himself held the office of captain superintendent at Gosport, and of Sir William Martin and Sir James Hope, the Commanders-in-Chief at Devonport and Portsmouth, who were consulted on

1041
the matter, and, in conformity with the recommendation of a noble Lord of no naval experience, but who has since been appointed Civil Lord of the Admiralty. The only witness who speaks in favour of these abolitions is the late Financial Secretary, who, when asked whether he knew that Admiral Hope, at Portsmouth, made a strong remonstrance against that abolition, and that Admiral Martin, at Plymouth, made a very strong remonstrance against it, gave the very characteristic answer—
"I suppose that nine people out of ten remonstrated against it, as they did against all changes involving reductions; I have no doubt that that is so."
This is hardly a satisfactory reason for the abolition, which is objected to in the strongest manner by every naval witness examined on the subject. Neither do I think it so respectful an answer as the three distinguished officers he had named were entitled to. Sir Sydney Dacres was asked—
"Did you differ from Admiral Hope and Admiral Martin upon that subject?—Not in the slightest. You agreed with them?—I agreed most perfectly with them; I had been captain superintendent of one of those places myself, and I most perfectly opposed the change all through. Then you thought that it was a mistake to take away the naval element?—Yes, and I think so still. In time of pressure, for naval operations the victualling of a Fleet rapidly is of very great importance?—Certainly, of vital importance. For that purpose you require some naval man to attend to the arrangements, do you not?—I think so; I think that nobody else can do it. Do you think it a satisfactory arrangement to leave these victualling establishments without professional superintendence during peace, in the belief that on the sudden breaking out of a war the deficiency could be supplied?—It is exactly in the same way as putting another Naval Lord into the Admiralty; if he is on the spot in peace he is better able to do the work when a pressure comes."
These are the opinions on this subject of the first naval adviser of the Crown. They are entirely confirmed by Sir Frederick Grey, who occupied the same position during six years. He says in answer to a question—
"I think that it would be absolutely impossible to work the victualling yards properly without a captain superintendent and a master attendant in time of war; and I doubt very much whether it could be done without them in peace time. You think that for the proper victualling of the ships some such person is necessary?—Yes; and I think that a captain superintendent is as necessary in the hospitals. I think that the maintenance of discipline is not one of the special duties of medical officers, as it is of the executive officers of the Navy; and I know no place where it is more necessary to maintain discipline than in a hospital.
1042
I had a great deal of experience in that matter during the Crimean War, at Constantinople, where we had a large hospital at Therapia; and I found it absolutely necessary to have a large ship lying off the hospital, with a captain who was responsible to me for discipline in the hospital, although we had one of the best medical men, and one fully equal to anything which could be required from him at the time."
Before the abolition the naval hospitals at Portsmouth and Devonport were under the captains superintendent of the victualling yards; and I thoroughly agree with Sir Frederick Grey that in the interests of discipline that arrangement ought to have been maintained. Again, we have the opinion of Admiral Eden on the subject—
"From your experience of victuallings ships of war, and the business which must go on in the victualling yard with regard to the Fleet, do you think that a naval officer is of importance in that position?—I think most decidedly that he is. You have seen a good deal of the working of the victualling yard in victualling ships of war?—I have; I do not see how it can go on satisfactorily without him. Some naval man, I suppose, must overlook the lighters?—Yes. And if there is no naval man to overlook them you think that in the course of the preparing of a naval expedition very great inconvenience might arise?—I should think very great confusion."
Such are the opinions of these distinguished and experienced officers, as well as of Sir William Martin and Sir James Hope, and none of them can have the slightest personal interest in the matter. In connection with this subject the evidence throws some light on a matter which was made the subject of great glorification of his department by the late Financial Secretary at the beginning of the Session, as proving that the stocks of the various articles in store were adequate to the demands of an emergency. On the first night of the Session my right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire drew an imaginary picture of the answer we might have received from the Emperor of the French, in August last, if we had announced the intention of resorting to an armed neutrality, at a time when our artificers were discharged and our dockyards empty of stores. A friendly Question was put to the Financial Secretary on the subject on the following day, and, in his reply, he stated that—
"Our stock of provisions at present in the victualling yards is so large that 2,500 tons, amounting in value to nearly £50,000, can be spared for Paris without the slightest inconvenience to the naval service. It will be a consolation to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, and to those who believe with him that our

1043
stores are in such a lamentable condition, to know that, if necessary, we could afford at least 1,000 tons more."—[3 Hansard, cciv. 125.]
But another story of this business is to be found in the evidence. Mr. Rowsell, the superintendent of contracts, the gentleman who makes the purchases, was asked by the Chairman—
"In the case of a large naval expedition being ordered, and a sudden peace coming, or a cessation of that naval force, there would be a much larger quantity in store, I suppose, than would be likely to be wanted for some time, would there not?—That is so; such a case has not, of course, arisen, but an analogous case has just arisen in connection with the re-victualling of Paris; I have at the present moment a quantity of soup and bouilli at Deptford which I shall be very glad to get rid of, as it is in excess of our wants. It was bought with the intention of sending it over to France?—Yes. And it is now not wanted for that purpose, and must be therefore got rid of?—Yes; it will be sold for the benefit of the Treasury."
So far, therefore, from this transaction proving that the stores in Her Majesty's victualling yards were in that plethoric condition which the hon. Member's answer led us to believe, it turns out that so small a quantity as 2,500 tons could not be spared without going into the market to purchase it; and I have the best reason for believing that a similar course would have been necessary in respect of naval stores, if the Navy had been increased as it ought to have been last summer; but, unfortunately, masts, yards, sails, rigging, and anchors for heavy ships of war, are not procurable in the market. And we heard a great deal of the wonderful expedition with which the victuals were sent to Paris under civilian management. But what does Sir Sydney Daeres—himself a quondam superintendent of a victualling yard—say on this subject. He was asked by Lord Camperdown, the Civil Lord—
"What was the special use of a master attendant in a victualling yard?—I do not wish to go into personalities, but very lately I saw that if a master attendant had been there the things would have gone faster to France. Was there any complaint as to the delay?—Yes. When there was a pressure they found out that there was not a vessel. I have never had any other opinion upon the matter."
So that not only was there delay—and expedition in victualling a Fleet in time of war, in the words of Sir Sydney Dacres which I have already quoted, would be of vital importance; but it appears to have escaped the civilian authorities that when victuals are to be conveyed over sea a vessel is an article which it is
1044
necessary should be provided. So much for the good management of the victualling department, of which we heard so much at the beginning of the Session.
I must now thank the House for the indulgence with which it has listened to me, and my appreciation of the importance of the subject must be my excuse for the length at which I have called attention to the evidence to which I have referred. It shows conclusively, not only as a matter of opinion, but as demonstrated by unfortunate results, that it was a mistake to make the Controller a Lord of the Admiralty; that it was a mistake to discontinue Consultative Boards; that it was a mistake to reduce the number of Naval Lords. I will not run the risk of weakening the force of the evidence by dilating further on these topics. This is no party question. On the contrary, nearly the whole—I am not sure that I might not say the whole—of the witnesses whom I have quoted in support of my views, profess the same political opinions as Her Majesty's present advisers, and many of them have held, or actually hold, office under what is called a Liberal Government. The First Lord of the Admiralty has announced the intention of modifying the existing system of naval government, and I trust that in considering the question he will remember that he has a solemn duty to perform to the great service over which he has been appointed to preside, to which any feeling of delicacy towards his predecessor ought to be made entirely subordinate. If I receive from him a satisfactory assurance in this respect I shall not think it necessary to put the House to the trouble of dividing; but otherwise I must press to a division the Motion of which I have given Notice.
Amendment proposed,
To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "it is expedient that the changes in the constitution of the Board of Admiralty, under the Order in Council of 14th January 1869, be reconsidered by Her Majesty's Government,"—(Mr. Corry,)
—instead thereof.
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
MR. GOSCHENsaid, he did not complain of the tone adopted by the right hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry), in treating of the

1045
subject he had introduced to the House, in reference to whose concluding remarks he might say that he desired to approach the subject in the same spirit. Indeed, he was anxious to receive as many suggestions as possible respecting the best mode of conducting the Admiralty business, and although he would have done wrong had he hastily effected changes on his accession to office, he now admitted there were many points which were open to re-consideration. In justice to his right hon. Friend the Member for Ponetefract (Mr. Childers) it should be borne in mind that he had not the advantage of being called before the Committee to explain his view of his own plan. Again, his right hon. Friend did not have the advantage of working his system with the aid of entirely converted or attentive colleagues, and unhappily personal differences also sprung up, so that there was not that amount of harmony which might have been desired among the members of the Board. That must of necessity have caused a great difficulty in working the new system, unless he had taken a step which no one would desire—namely, to change the whole personnel. It was natural that the system should not work smoothly at first, for many would think that the new system was inferior to the old. The same want of harmony would, however, have arisen under the old system. That difficulty was aggravated by personal differences which under the old system would have been attended with serious consequences, for he could not conceive that gentlemen were different meeting in a board room from what they were when assembled in the First Lord's room. Too great importance ought not to be attached to the difference in form between the two systems as regards consultation. No one could be at the head of a professional Department without being desirous to have a great deal of professional advice, and he cordially agreed with the right hon. Gentleman opposite that it was most important to check the professional advice of one man by the professional skill and knowledge of another. Having now been for some months at the Board of Admiralty, he must demur to the general view of the right hon. Gentleman that there was no consultation. In many ways the evidence before the Committee had not been fair to Lord John Hay, the Junior Naval
1046
Lord. It was generally supposed that his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract had but a single naval adviser, but the truth was that Lord John Hay daily gave him valuable advice on naval questions. Then, the right hon. Gentleman opposite spoke of the Controller as a mere departmental officer, but it should not be forgotten that he was also a captain in the Navy, and that the questions termed departmental by the right hon. Gentleman were, in fact, naval questions of the highest importance, on which the Controller's advice was asked and taken. He had now the advantage of the distinguished services of Lord John Hay and of Admiral Tarleton, the latter being consulted constantly with the heartiest concurrence on the part of Sir Sydney Dacres, and on all important subjects he had the advice of three or four officers of the highest experience. He had no objection to a Board, provided it was not Executive. But what the right hon. Gentleman opposite wanted was something more than a Consultative Board. [Mr. CORRY: No!] He would show him that he did. [Mr. CORRY: I can assure you I do not.] The House must judge between them on that point. The Board was not only to be consultative, but was to be a means by which the Financial Secretary and the Permanent Secretary were to learn the whole of the business; and therefore all the business of the Department would pass through it. [Mr. CORRY: All important business.] All the important business would pass through that Board instead of through the several departments. It was very desirable that the First Lord should meet his professional advisers and consult with them; but they had changed the system in some important particulars, and he believed it was working satisfactorily, and he was prepared to contend that to make the whole of the business of a great Department pass through a Board, was to adopt a mode which must lead to delay. In regard to the absence of the First Lord, the right hon. Gentleman opposite would make the Board other than consultative, for the proposal was that if the First Lord was absent his place was to be taken by two other Lords and the Secretary. They would thus at once become an Executive Board. But that was not the plan of his right hon. Friend (Mr. Childers.) In the absence of the First Lord the First Naval

1047
Lord assumed his position, and in the absence of the latter the responsibility of his position devolved on the Junior Naval Lord. When Sir Sydney Dacres had been away, and Lord John Hay had taken his position, he thought it right in the absence of the First Lord that there should be some distinct person to do his work, and that it ought not to fall back on the Board. With respect to financial matters, there were very few subjects unconnected with finance, and he thought the Financial Secretary, in the absence of the First Lord, might represent him efficiently, for those who held the purse-strings naturally became acquainted with all the business of the Department. But he did not think it desirable that the Parliamentary Secretary should be confined to the subject of finance, and he was not sure whether it would not be better, instead of having a Civil Lord and a Financial Secretary, to have a Financial Lord and a General Secretary. There was another point for consideration, and that was the mapping out of the duties between the different Lords. The right hon. Gentleman opposite had stated that under the present system the First Naval Lord was in danger of being overworked, and he had instanced the case of Sir Sydney Dacres in proof. That matter, however, had already been dealt with; a portion, of the work done by Sir Sydney Dacres, involving matters of detail, such as the appointments in the lower grades, had been transferred to Admiral Tarleton. It would be very desirable if no rigid rule were laid down as regards the distribution of duties, so that if the First Naval Lord were very strong, and were associated with a weak Second Lord, the work could be distributed accordingly; or if both Lords were equally able the work could be equally distributed. Perhaps a modification of the Order in Council in this respect would be desirable. The next point was the reduction in the naval element on the Board, and with reference to the Committee of the House of Lords the right hon. Gentleman had stated that the witnesses had been mainly Liberals in politics. The witnesses might be more accurately described by saying that they belonged to the naval element in Admiralty politics; and the chief point to which their evidence had been directed was that the civil element had been unduly fostered
1048
above the naval element. This was the complaint in respect of the post of Controller of the victualling yard. The evidence read by the right hon. Gentleman, it would be noticed, was directed against every reduction that had been made, and this could be easily explained. Those representing the naval Department were responsible neither to Parliament nor the taxpayer, and they desired to see things done on the grandest possible scale. Some, supposed to represent the naval element, however, had favoured reduction. Sir Spencer Robinson had done so, but evidence had in consequence been given against retaining him on the Board. The naval element, in fact, objected to anything depreciating its influence at the Board. He now came to the question of the presence of the Controller at the Board. With respect to that matter, and another subject on which the right hon. Gentleman had expressed an opinion in favour of—namely, the appointment of some official equivalent to the permanent Under Secretary of other departments, in order to preserve continuity in the management of the department. That was a point which presented the greatest difficulty. If the officers were working Lords of the Admiralty and superintended departments, they did themselves so much of the business that the permanent officers had not got the opportunity of performing those functions. Mr. Romaine knew the business by being present at the Board and reading all the papers, but his position was not analogous to that of an Under Secretary in one of the other departments, because he never executed anything himself. He was a Secretary, but he did not, as in other departments, take the place of the Chief during his absence—as Mr. Hammond, for instance, would do in the Foreign Office, or as other Permanent Under Secretaries would do in other departments. He (Mr. Goschen) attached great importance to continuity, and thought there ought to be some connection between all the Boards with the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the shape of officers who were perfectly conversant with all the work. It might be said they had such officers everywhere except in the naval branch. They had a storekeeper, a superintendent of stores, and a superintendent of contracts. In those outlying depart-

1049
ments they had now a certain amount of continuity; but in regard to the questions of manning, of the Reserves — matters purely naval—he did not see that they had the necessary continuity or that the permanent element was sufficiently strong. That seemed to him a defect. It might be remedied in more than one way; possibly by dealing with the secretarial arrangements, or by other arrangements that were under the consideration of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman had alluded to the creation of the Chief of the Staff, who was able to do the duties he performed as well in his present position as if he were a Lord of the Admiralty. The whole of the manning of the Fleet was under Sir Sydney Dacres, and managed by Captain Willes, for when Captain Willes said that he was only consulted by his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) upon his own business, it should be remembered that that was very important business, involving the manning of the whole Fleet. But the weak point about the appointment of the Chief of the Staff was that that new office was not continuous, so that when the new office had ben created it did not add to that to which he confessed he thought great importance ought to be attached—namely, the permanent strength of the Department. He was, therefore, prepared to re-consider the appointment of the Chief of the Staff, and he thought he should be able to arrange for the performance of the duties of the office so as in a great measure to remedy the evils complained of. With regard to the question of Boards, he was in favour of Consultative Boards, but was not in favour of Executive Boards, and he thought that some more definite arrangements should be made for carrying on the duties of the First Lord during his absence than were in existence at present. He was prepared to consider that point, and he also thought that the Parliamentary Secretary ought to be conversant with most of the business. He would like to see Consultative Boards established for matters of policy, and for the consideration of large questions, but not for considering the details of the office. On professional questions the First Lord must have professional advice, and the advice of one ought to be checked by the advice of another, but the personal re-
1050
sponsibility of the First Lord was a matter to which great importance ought to be attached. As to increasing the naval element of the Board, he did not see his way to accept the proposal, as he understood it, of the right hon. Gentleman, which was simply that another Naval Lord should be added to the Board of Admiralty. If anything could be done in the direction of increasing its naval strength, he should like it to be done in some manner by which they could secure continuity and permanence. If, for instance, another Naval Lord were added, he would prefer that he should be a captain, and should not go out of office with the other members of the Board, but should remain for five years, so as to afford some security that they would have a naval man at the Board who should be acquainted with all the details of the Department, and be able to carry out the same policy when any change of office took place. He did not say that that would be the best arrangement, but he was disposed to consider any means by which that defect might be remedied. He now turned to another point—the presence of the Controller at the Board. It was the Controller's presence at the Board which led him parenthetically to consider the permanent element, because it was very important that the officer mainly responsible for the construction of the ships should have more or less of continuity or permanence about him. The right hon. Gentleman opposite was in favour of the removal of the Controller from the Board for several reasons which he indicated; but the right hon. Gentleman did not give what might be called the most powerful reason of all—namely, that the presence of the Controller on the Board might involve his always leaving office with the Ministry. That was an argument which might possibly be strongly urged. He did not think the arguments used by the right hon. Gentleman were very strong. The right hon. Gentleman quoted a great deal of evidence, and he attached great weight to the evidence of Sir John Briggs, because he had been 25 years a member of the Board under the old régime; but that was the very reason why he (Mr. Goschen) did not attach so much importance to that evidence, because when men had spent a great part of their lives under one system, it was but natu-

1051
ral they should have a prejudice in its favour. The other witnesses called were mainly naval men, old Lords who had conducted business under the old system. He did not think the Committee had done full justice to his right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract by the selection of witnesses. They mainly examined ex-First Naval Lords, who, because they had conducted the business of the Department on the opposite principle, condemned the scheme of his right hon. Friend; and one Naval Lord, a colleague of his right hon. Friend, because he gave evidence in favour of that scheme, was called eccentric in that he differed from the others, and naturally differed from them, being a naval reformer. The evidence of Sir Sydney Dacres had been alluded to over and over again, but chiefly to show that the naval element ought to be supreme. Now, he admitted that the position of the Controller must be seriously considered with reference to this point; whether it was wise that he should be so placed that he would have to depart from the Board with the Government. That was a matter open to question. But his right hon. Friend attached great importance to there being no one between the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Controller, whereas the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Corry) proposed that the Controller should be under the First Naval Lord. Now, to that he demurred entirely. He understood the right hon. Gentleman to quote his right hon. Friend as having told Sir Sydney Dacres that he was converted to his opinion. All he could say was that within the last month he had received a letter from his right hon. Friend stating that he attached the greatest importance to no one intervening between the Controller and the First Lord of the Admiralty. His right hon. Friend held that the Controller should stand in direct relation to the First Lord, and that there should not be that intervention of the naval element between them which used to prevail under the old system. Upon that point his right hon. Friend was strong in his opinion, and he thought he was right in it. The position of the Controller was, however, under consideration, and he believed it was possible to make some arrangement to secure that the Controller should be an officer of some permanence, so as to obviate
1052
any great inconvenience on a change of Ministry occurring, but that he should still stand in direct relation to the First Lord of the Admiralty. The right hon. Gentleman opposite had concluded by referring to the position of the master superintendent in the victualling yards, of the abolition of the office of captain superintendent there, of the general arrangements with regard to stores, and he spoke of Mr. Rowsell, who, although merely a superintendent, was as competent as the old storekeepers and other superior officers who received much higher salaries. The present arrangement with regard to stores appeared to have given considerable satisfaction, and had obtained the approval of the Duke of Somerset, who, in his draft Report, had stated that the greatest advantage to the country had resulted from the power of purchase being concentrated in one hand. As regarded the point of the disadvantage resulting from the absence of the naval element from the victualling yards he did not think the right hon. Gentlemen had made out a case. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to forget that there was such a person as the Commander-in-Chief, who was responsible for the discipline of the dockyard, and, if he were not mistaken, of the victualling yard also. He could not hold out any hope, unless evidence was produced of the necessity of changing the present system, that naval officers would again be placed in their old position either in the victualling yards or in the hospitals. The right hon. Gentleman should remember the speech of the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. Seely), who had expressed a wish that the superintendence of such departments should be placed in the hands of civilians, and not in those of naval men. For his own part he wished to keep a due mean, and not to rush to extremes by excluding entirely either the civilian or the naval element. His right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract had, in his opinion, done great service in regulating the superintendence of the dockyards, and there was not that deficiency of stores which the right hon. Gentleman opposite had suggested. But the sufficiency of stores would not depend upon the naval storekeeper, but upon what was decided upon at Whitehall. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that there should be first a naval

1053
storekeeper in the dockyards, and then that he should be protected against the Contractor's department by a Storekeeper General at Whitehall to look after the whole business. Such an arrangement would undoubtedly lead to circumlocution and great confusion. Having dealt with all the points which had been raised by the right hon. Gentleman, in conclusion he would say that he entirely reciprocated the spirit in which the right hon. Gentleman had addressed himself to his task. He must further say that he was fully conscious of the interests of the Navy and the delicate character of the naval service, and of all the specialities that surrounded it. He had, he hoped, acted, and he would continue to act, in that policy, but as to the changes that had been made by his predecessor in strengthening the civilian element, that part of his policy it would, he thought, be wrong to reverse. He trusted that what he had said would be so far satisfactory as to induce the right hon. Gentleman not to press his Motion to a division.
SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he thought that some of the points that had been made by his right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry) required further discussion. It must be at least satisfactory to his right hon. Friend to hear that considerable changes were to be made at the Board of Admiralty. He sincerely trusted that the very serious losses that had recently occurred to the Navy, and that the great discontent which had prevailed for some time would be removed by the arrival in power of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Goschen), and by the changes which he was about to institute. The right hon. Gentleman alluded in his speech to the condition of the Board of Admiralty before the changes of his predecessor, and that the House would see what the character of those changes were. The Board, as it was constituted by Sir James Graham, and as it remained until his right hon. Friend left office, had a considerable portion of the naval element embodied in it; but it was a mistake to think that that naval element could reverse the decision of the First Lord of the Admiralty. There was no control over him, except in this way, that the First Lord, had the advantage of hearing the four Naval Lords, who debated before him any question that might be
1054
brought forward for consideration. There was no question of minority or majority, for after the First Lord had heard everything that could be said he decided as to the proper course to be adopted for the benefit of the country. The right hon. Gentleman had said that he liked a Consultative Board; but he would not get that, unless he assembled all the officers of his Board at once and heard each individual. It was a very different thing to send for them one by one, and hear what they had to say without any conflict of argument between them. What was necessary for the First Lord to hear was their free and undisguised opinions expressed in the conflict of argument. The right hon. Gentleman said that minor matters of detail should not occupy his attention at the Board, and that he (Sir John Hay) entirely agreed with. In his experience, no matter which involved a less expenditure than £500 was ever brought to the attention of the Board, whilst all matters which involved a larger expenditure was brought before the Board. Most matters were sanctioned without delay; but if it was considered of sufficient importance a statement was made about it, and mostly in writing. In that way all the information connected with the various departments which were under the control of the five Junior Lords of the Admiralty was so brought forward that each Lord was conscious of what was going on in the other departments. The Permanent Secretary also was present, heard the discussions, and made records, and the whole archives of that office were available for reference. He had reason to think that certain papers relating to the Captain had been ordered to be burnt by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers); but down to the time that he (Sir John Hay) left office every paper was duly kept in the record office, and the most minute particulars in reference to any past transaction could be produced within an hour. He had heard from various persons who had held high office that there was no other Department in the State in which information in reference to decisions which had been arrived at could be so quickly obtained as at the Admiralty. But the whole of the record department, the mode of copying, and reference had now been changed, and there were many papers now circulated of which no copies

1055
were kept at the Admiralty. He remembered the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) observing, in reference to a proposition of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract, to obtain a press for the copying of letters, which would enable him to abolish several clerks, that his experience was unfavourable to such a plan, and that in his opinion the mode of record was entirely insufficient. He (Sir John Hay) thought that there ought to be kept a more perfect record, and continuity. The right hon. Gentleman opposite said that he did not mean to increase the naval element on the Board. It was not for him (Sir John Hay) to say what might be most conducive to the interests of the service in that particular, but he could not see how the Board of Admiralty could be properly carried on with less than four Naval Lords. When he was in office he found that his three colleagues and himself had quite enough to do in the Department. With regard to the position those naval officers held, the right hon. Gentleman said he had no desire to give them that executive authority which must occasionally devolve upon them, under the circumstances pointed out by his right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone. But he must consult in some degree the sentiments of the profession, and the right hon. Gentleman would not get competent naval officers of rank and position sufficient to command the respect of the profession if he gave them merely the position of Under Secretaries. He might get second-class, but not first-class men; he would not get Admirals who had commanded Fleets to be entirely subordinate in naval affairs. The First Lord of the Admiralty was a civilian—an able and experienced statesman—who had the ear of the Government and of the House, and who, no doubt, was respected in the country; but he had no special knowledge of naval affairs, and he could not get a man of high standing commanding the confidence of the profession to combat his opinion unless he gave him some executive authority in the Department in which he was called upon to do duty. The right hon. Gentleman said no disasters had occurred in consequence of the changes made at the Admiralty. Now, during the short time the present Government had been in office five ships had been lost—two entirely lost owing
1056
to Admiralty mismanagement. These accidents would, most likely, not have occurred if the naval element had been strong at the Board, giving their unbiassed opinion to the First Lord. With reference to the store department, the right hon. Gentleman quoted the Duke of Somerset's Committee as favourable; but the Duke of Somerset's draft Report was not so, although it was quite true there were reasons why that Report was not carried. He might also remark that Sir Spencer Robinson, whose evidence had been quoted by the right hon. Gentleman, stated that though he was a Naval Lord and Controller, he never was consulted outside his own department. The store department, the victualling department, the medical department, and the department of works should have over them independent and permanent officers; but there was great difficulty in appointing any permanent Member of a political Board. It was utterly impossible that a naval officer could fairly give good advice to his political Chief, and when a change occurred continue to give good and fair advice to the political Chief on the other side. He therefore thought that the old system, by which a second Permanent Secretary, like Mr. Romaine, gave continuity of information without advice, was preferable, and the right hon. Gentleman was wrong in not reverting to it. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would take these views into consideration when making the changes he was about to make in the Board of Admiralty.
MR. SEELYsaid, he felt himself in the unfortunate position of disagreeing with both sides on the present occasion, for he must complain of the general mismanagement of the Board of Admiralty. He thought the losses they had sustained, and the loss of prestige that would follow, must be exceedingly damaging, and any fair business-like arrangements would have prevented them. The Megæra had been condemned five years ago; but the Admiralty did not appear to know anything about it. If any man had a number of ships under his control, would he not have had a ledger in which he would have entered them, and taken note of any reports or remarks bearing on them? In such a case, it would have been impossible for the Admiralty to have lost the Report of Mr. Reed, which was tantamount to the condemnation of the

1057
Megæra. He would go further, and say that the Admiralty ought to know how the captains had conducted their business in managing their ships, the number of desertions that had occurred, what services each ship had performed, and so on. He could not say that the present arrangements were satisfactory. But they were asked to alter those arrangements in the wrong direction. Had the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry) simply proposed that the Order in Council should be re-considered he should have voted with him. But the right hon. Gentleman wanted to retrograde; he, on the other hand, wanted to go forward. The right hon. Gentleman wanted to return to the old system; he wanted to abolish it altogether. Was there one single thing in the conduct of the old Board of Admiralty which the House could approve? Did it succeed in manning the Navy? There had been Commissions and Committees to inquire how best it could be effected, but the men who sat on them were nearly all of one class, and still worse, the witnesses who were called and who gave evidence were of one class. There would have been no difficulty in ascertaining how the Navy should be manned if they had summoned before them as witnesses seamen as well as officers. They would then have known why it was that seamen deserted, and why it was that the Peninsular and Oriental and the Cunard men did not enter the Royal Navy. It was impossible to ignore the discontent that existed in the service, and it was all moonshine to say that the past or present system was satisfactory. Then, again, the old Board had not attended to the interests of the taxpayers, and there was not a single thing which it did from 1832 to 1869 that any hon. Member could get up and defend. The old Board spent recklessly the money intrusted to them to spend thriftfully. They bought anchors at double the price they ought to have given, and paid for them in 25 years £170,000 more than the market price; and spent in nine years £73,000 more than was right for chain cables. They repaired and converted ships at a greater cost than they could have built new ones for, and they paid for building ships 50 per cent more than contract ships could be obtained for. They kept in harbour old obsolete vessels
1058
at a cost of at least £280,000 a-year. They spent £1,500,000 recklessly and wastefully, and they were, moreover, behindhand in everything that ought to be done, and when sailing-ships and paddle-ships were going out of fashion the Board of Admiralty still clung to them. Therefore, it was impossible to return to the old, obsolete, and, he was going to say, good-for-nothing Board of Admiralty. Hon. Members on both sides of the House had admitted that something must now be done with the present Board of Admiralty; but, in his opinion, there was something ridiculous in trying to manage a large business—for the Admiralty was really nothing further, being only a business relatively so much larger than that of the Peninsular and Oriental or of Messrs. Cunard—by means of men who were constantly changing. The Board had been strongly condemned, and yet the Opposition wished to revive it for consultative and executive management, whilst the Government supported it for consultation only. The Members of the Board depended on political expediency, by being able to make good speeches, or by making themselves very unpleasant. He was aware that that House paid great respect to the weight of authority. There were arrayed on the one side the right hon. Member for Tyrone and the hon. and gallant Baronet opposite (Sir John Hay); and on the other the right hon. Member for Pontefract and the half-and-half sort of right hon. Gentleman the present First Lord of the Admiralty; but he had in his possession the Report of the Royal Commissioners of 1861, and he found that they condemned the Board of Admiralty, and he might further quote the evidence tendered before the Select Committee on the Board of Admiralty in the same year. Before that Committee only four witnesses unconnected with the Admiralty were summoned, but all of them condemned the Board. The Committee which sat on Military Organization in 1860, composed of eminent men on both sides of the House, expressed in reference to Earl Grey's recommendation that the War Office should be managed by a Board, that they had great doubts of the propriety of what they considered a retrograde measure, and they therefore condemned the notion. Therefore the weight of authority, as well as common sense, told them that they ought not to

1059
go back to a Board. Something had been said about naval superintendence, and from the information he had received, he distinctly stated that the captain superintendent and the master attendant in Her Majesty's dockyards had very little or next to nothing to do with the masting, arming, and fitting of Her Majesty's ships. [Lord HENRY LENNOX: Name!] He was supported in that view by the opinion of a person well acquainted with the subject, whom he consulted last Friday, but whose name he declined to give. That person informed him that the rigging of ships was settled in warrants or orders from the Admiralty, the master attendant directing the fixing of it; and the Admiralty also settled what guns a ship should carry, the master shipwright consulting a gunner attached to the Steam Reserve as to the placing of them when necessary. It was said that the master attendant ought to be a naval man, as he had to direct the moving of ships in the basins and harbours; and on that point he (Mr. Seely) might mention that in accordance with official routine no ship could be taken from one side of a basin to the other without 24 hours' notice being given to the master attendant. He would say no more on that subject, for he thought he had sufficiently indicated his dissatisfaction with the present system, and his disinclination, to return to the old system.
MR. SHAW LEFEVREsaid, he could not allow the statement of the right hon. Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry), that Mr. Childers wished to avoid the responsibilty of the loss of the Captain, to pass uncontradicted. Probably the matter could be better discussed at another time; but meanwhile, he demurred to that assertion, and also to the statement that under a Board constituted like the old Board of Admiralty neither the loss of the Captain nor the Megæra would have taken place. Those hon. Members who had listened to the statement of his right hon. Friend (Mr. Goschen) earlier in the evening, would remember that he had stated that, with reference to the Megræa, eminent naval men, including Sir Sydney Dacres and Lord John Hay, had been consulted. [Sir JOHN HAY asked, whether it was a fact that the First Lord consulted Lord John Hay?] Lord John Hay was Superintending Lord of the Transport
1060
department, and he had no doubt he was consulted. He was surprised to hear it stated that the old Board of Admiralty was consultative only, because all the information he had been able to obtain, and some of the evidence which had been quoted, showed that the Board had been executive. When considering whether such a Board could give satisfaction they must remember the frequent debates on the question which had taken place in that House, and also speeches delivered outside the House. The right hon. Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington), when First Lord, had said in this House—
"From the constitution of the Board there is an absence of that direct responsibility which ought to exist in a great Department, and I cannot say I think the constitution and working of that machine are satisfactory or well adapted to the discharge of the important duties devolving upon it."
The right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), while establishing direct responsibility announced his intention to consult the Members of the Board freely; and he believed those consultations had been as frequent under Mr. Childer's Administration as before. But formerly important matters were discussed as much in the First Lord's room as at the Board, even if they were not absolutely decided before they came before the Board. It was the intention of his right hon. Friend (Mr. Goschen) to make the Board a consultative one, but not to restore its old function as an executive body.
LORD HENRY LENNOXsaid, that if he were to judge either by the remarks of the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. Seely) or the opinions of the public Press, he failed to see that the system initiated by the right hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) had given more satisfaction than the old Board. He was very glad to hear that the present First Lord was about to make some change in the existing state of things. The hon. Member for Lincoln had attacked the old Board with some warmth for the large prices which they gave for anchors, chains, and cables; but last year, when it came to the knowledge of the House that some of those first-class anchors, which had cost £35 or £40, had been sold during the economical craze of the right hon. Member for Pontefract for something like £6, he looked in vain to the hon. Member for Lincoln or those sitting on the same bench for a word in condemnation. As to whether the right

1061
hon. Member for Pontefract did or did not try to shift from his own shoulders the responsibility of sending the Captain to sea, it was too late to discuss it at 1 o'clock in the morning, and in a desultory conversation like the present.
Question put, and agreed to.
Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.
SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
(In the Committee.)
(1.) £68,334 Victualling Yards at Home and Abroad.
MR. GRAVESsaid, he objected to proceeding with Supply at that hour (1 o'clock), as he understood it was intended to proceed with the Merchant Shipping Bill, which would take at least two hours.
MR. GOSCHENsaid, he only meant to take such Votes as would not be opposed.
Vote agreed to.
(2.) £57,906 Medical Establishments at Home and Abroad.
Resolutions to be reported To-morrow, at Two of the clock;
Committee to sit again To-morrow, at Two of the clock.

MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS AMENDMENT (re-committed) BILL— [BILL 276.]
(Mr. Chichester Fortescue, Mr. Arthur Peel.)
MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS AMENDMENT (re-committed) BILL— [BILL 276.]

  COMMITTEE.
  Bill considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  Clauses 1 to 4, inclusive, agreed to.
  Clause 5 (Ship's draught of water to be recorded).
  Amendment proposed,
  In page 2, line 29, after the word "record," to insert the words "provided that at the time of such record being made a copy thereof had been handed to the master or chief officer of such ship."—(Mr. Graves.)
  Question put, "That those words be there inserted."
  The Committee divided: — Ayes 52; Noes 54: Majority 2.
  Clause agreed to.
  Clause 6 agreed to.
  Clause 7 (Survey of ships alleged by seamen to be unseaworthy).
  MR. NORWOODsaid, he objected to a deserting seaman or apprentice being able to raise the issue whether a vessel was unseaworthy, and accordingly would move in page 3, line 37, to leave out "in justification," and insert "by a majority of the seamen and apprentices belonging to such ship," in order that the majority, at least, should have the power of deciding.
  MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUEsaid, he thought the precautions against abuse sufficient, particularly as the deserter must make his complaint before leaving the ship, and would refer to the case of the Balaclava, mentioned earlier in the evening, some of whose seamen, sentenced to a month's imprisonment for desertion, had been liberated by the Government, as a justification for the insertion of the clause.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, they had dealt with a stronger case that evening, that of the Megæra, which was improperly sent to sea, although in her case there was an absence of economical motive.
  MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUEsaid, he would consider, before the Report was brought, how many men should to required to support the evidence of the deserter.
  MR. NORWOODsaid, he was willing to accept a substantial proportion of the crew, such as one-third, or so. His design was, that the objection to the vessel should not be factious in its character.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, he must continue to urge the adoption of the clause in the interests of the seamen.
  MR. NORWOODsaid, he thought the right hon. Gentleman (Sir John Pakington) had unduly reflected upon the class of shipowners, and he begged to say that he represented more men before the mast in his constituency than the total number of electors in Droitwich.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, he must disclaim any intention of attacking a class of traders; but he could not forget the case of the Sea Queen, and another vessel laden with iron, which foundered before they were out of sight of land.
  MR. GRAVESsaid, he had an objection to the whole framework of the clause, which he feared would be a fruitful cause of desertion in the mer-

  1063
  chant service, and would suggest that it should be re-considered by the Government.
  MR. HENLEYsaid, he would suggest that it should be the complaint of three or four sailors, at least, or of a fourth part of the crew, in certain cases.
  MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUEsaid, he would accept the Amendment if the proportion were limited to one-fourth of the seamen belonging to the ship, or if the number of such seamen exceeded 20, then by not fewer than five of such seamen.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause amended accordingly, and agreed to.
  Clauses 8 to 10 inclusive, agreed to.
  Clause 11 (Sending unseaworthy ship to sea, a misdemeanour).
  MR. GRAVESmoved in page 6, line 16, to leave out "a ship," and insert "any ship, including ships belonging to Her Majesty." He thought it was a great mistake to call this a Merchant Shipping Bill; it was a Life Protection Bill; and within the last 12 months merely there having been four striking cases of mischief to Her Majesty's vessels—namely, the Psyche, the Captain, the Agincourt, and the Megæra. He thought the crews of Her Majesty's Navy were quite as much entitled to protection as the merchant navy.
  Amendment proposed, in page 6, line 16, to leave out the words "a ship," and insert the words "any ship, including ships belonging to Her Majesty."—(Mr. Graves.)
  MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUEsaid, there was a wide distinction between the mercantile and the naval services. In one case there was need of a safeguard; but in the case of the Navy, the vigilant attention of Parliament, which had been well illustrated that evening, was the true safeguard.
  MR. LIDDELLobserved that the vigilance of Parliament had not prevented the Megæra from being sent to sea.
  Question put, "That the words 'a ship' stand part of the Clause."
  The Committee divided: — Ayes 57; Noes 27: Majority 30.
  Remaining clauses agreed to.
  Bill reported; as amended, to be considered To-morrow, at Two of the clock.
  The Clerk at the Table informed the House, That Mr. Speaker was unable to resume the Chair during the present sitting of the House.
  Whereupon Mr. Dodson, the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, took the Chair as Deputy Speaker, pursuant to the Standing Order.

  STREET ACCIDENTS BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. H. B. SHERIDAN, Bill for the better prevention of Street Accidents in the Metropolis, ordered to be brought in by Mr. H. B. SHERIDAN and Mr. RYLANDS.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 288.]

  EXPIRING LAWS CONTINUANCE BILL.
  On Motion of Mr. WILLIAM HENRY GLADSTONE, Bill to continue various Expiring Laws, ordered, to be brought in by Mr. WILLIAM HENRY GLADSTONE and Mr. BAXTER.
  Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 289.]
  House adjourned at a quarter after Three o'clock in the morning.