Commons Sitting of 3 March 1864

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Railway Companies Powers nominated. (See p. 300.)
SUPPLY—considered in Committee—ARMY ESTIMATES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Metropolitan Subways* [Bill 42].
Second Reading—Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (Ireland)* [Bill 38].
Committee—(on re-comm.)—Vestry Cess Abolition (Ireland)* [Bill 16], re-comm., considered, reported, and considered as amended.
Third Reading— Sir John Lawrenoe's Salary* [Bill 10], and passed; Vestry Cess Abolition (Ireland)* [Bill 15], and passed.

INDIA—A GOLD CURRENCY.

  QUESTION.
  COLONEL SYKES: I beg, Sir, to ask the Secretary of State for India, Whether, considering the rapidly increasing difficulties of adjusting the large annual balance of trade in favour of India by means of silver, it is his intention to facilitate commercial operations by the introduction into India of pure or alloyed Gold Tokens of the value of five or ten Rupees?
  MR. VANSITTART: Sir, I would also beg to ask, whether, in lieu of the Gold Tokens of the value of five or ten Rupees, as suggested by the Member for Aberdeen, it would not be desirable to re-introduce that portable and popular Gold Piece among the natives known as the Gold Mohur, which is worth thirty-two shillings, and which resembles the Prussian Double Fredericksdor?
  SIR CHARLES WOOD: Sir, I do not think it would be convenient to coin either the Gold Mohurs or the Tokens, as suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes). What I should be very glad to see would be the introduction of the English sovereign, which would then form a common currency for this country, Australia, and India. That would be a very great advantage, but the adoption of either of the other proposals would be a great impediment to the ultimate circulation of the sovereign. On that account I am not prepared to adopt either the one or the other of them. At the same time, I may be permitted to state that the temporary inconvenience felt in India with respect to the currency seems very much to have passed away; and the fact that the coinage of silver during the last two years has amounted to £12,000,000 sterling

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  shows that the mints have made the greatest exertions to meet the demand for coin, which has been increased to such an extraordinary extent by the rise in price of all articles of produce.
  COLONEL SYKES: The answer of my right hon. Friend not being satisfactory, I beg to give notice that after Easter I shall call attention to the subject, and move a Resolution.

  UNITED STATES—CAPTURE OF THE "SAXON."—QUESTION.
  LORD ROBERT MONTAGUsaid, he wished to ask Mr. Attorney General, Whether it be true that the Saxon was captured on the ground that her cargo was supposed to be the property of the Confederate States; and whether it be according to the Law of Nations to take possession of enemies' goods under a neutral flag, or to make prize of the neutral vessel containing those goods; or whether, on the other hand, the Saxon was captured on the ground that her cargo was Federal property, which had been seized by a Confederate man-of-war, and had been transhipped on board the neutral vessel; and, if so, whether such an act be in accordance with any principle of International Law?
  THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, in reply, that he was not able to inform the noble Lord on what ground the Saxon was captured. Her Majesty's Government had caused a representation to be made to the Government of the United States on the subject, but they had not received any answer to that representation. Under these circumstances, it seemed to him that it was by no means expedient to enter into a hypothetical discussion on the ground on which the capture had been made until the information sought for had been received.

GENERAL POST OFFICE—TRANSMISSION OF LETTERS ON SUNDAY.

  QUESTION.
  MR. HOPWOOD: I beg, Sir, to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If there will be any objection to allow Letters posted at the General Post Office on Sunday to be dispatched on that day, on account of the great privilege it would afford to the public, and the small amount of labour it would entail?
  MR. PEEL: I think there would be great objection to the adoption of such a proposal.
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  The Post Office estimates the number of letters that would be delivered at the General Post Office on a Sunday at about 20,000, and that a force of 220 men would be required to dispatch these letters to the country; and although the hon. Member proposes to limit the arrangement to the General Post Office, it would be impossible so to limit it, and applications would be at once made to them for an extension of the measure to the District Offices.

ASSAULTS WITH KNIVES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. HORSFALL: Sir, I would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether Her Majesty's Government are prepared to take any steps to prevent the wearing of sheath or dagger knives, from the use of which so many murders have been committed?
  SIR GEORGE GREY: I have received, Sir, a communication from the magistrates of Liverpool, transmitting to me an Address from the Mercantile Marine Association, with reference to a practice common among seamen, and especially foreign seamen, of carrying about with them knives of a very formidable character. The magistrates appear to have taken every precaution to cheek the practice, and wherever an attack is proved to have been made by any man with one of these knives, severe punishment is inflicted. I cannot myself see that any other remedy can be applied, as we could hardly prohibit seamen from carrying knives. However, I told the magistrates that I am ready to entertain any practical remedy that they may suggest.

CONTRACTS FOR GUNBOATS.

  QUESTION.
  MR. FERRANDsaid, he rose to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, If contracts, without competition, for two iron-plated gunboats have been given, or are intended to be given, to two shipbuilding firms.
  LORD CLARENCE PAGET, in reply, said, it was true that the Admiralty had departed from their usual system of inviting tenders for the construction by competition of ships of war. The Messrs. Dudgeon had been very successful in building vessels on the twin-screw plan. They had lately built a small vessel for the Admiralty, and the Admiralty had invited them to tender for one of the gun-boats which

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  were about to be built, supposing the House agreed to the Vote he should have to propose next week. With respect to the second gunboat, Mr. Langley had a patent for building ships with iron frames and wooden planking, and of all the plans of that nature that had been laid before the Admiralty they preferred his. They had, therefore, invited Mr. Langley to send in a tender for building a gunboat on his patent. If those two tenders were reasonable, they would be accepted by the Admiralty; but if not, they would be thrown open to competition by other parties.

NEW ZEALAND—CORRESPONDENCE.

  QUESTION.
  MR. ARTHUR MILLSsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, When the New Zealand Correspondence moved for last Session will be laid upon the table; and whether any intelligence has recently been received as to the proposed transfer of the seat of Government from Auckland to some other locality in New Zealand?
  MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUEsaid, in reply, that the Government were aware that the question of changing the capital and the seat of Government in New Zealand had been much debated, but he believed the Legislature had come to no conclusion. At all events, the Governor had not informed the Colonial Office on the subject. The papers to which the hon. Gentleman had alluded would be laid on the table that evening and distributed tomorrow morning. The other papers, bringing down the history of the war to a very recent date, would, he hoped, be distributed on Saturday morning. He, therefore, trusted that the hon. Gentleman would defer the discussion on the subject until the papers were before the House.

  COURT MARTIAL ON COLONEL CRAWLEY.—QUESTION.
  MR. DUDLEY FORTESCUEsaid, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, When the Proceedings of the Court Martial on Colonel Crawley will be laid upon the table of the House?
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, in reply, that the papers would be laid on the table that evening, and would be ready for distribution on Saturday morning.
  MR. DUDLEY FORTESCUEtrusted that, under these circumstances, the noble
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  Lord the Member for the East Riding (Lord Hotham) would postpone the discussion of which he had given notice until the papers were in the hands of Members.
  LORD HOTHAMsaid, he had not the slightest wish to interfere with the Motion of which the hon. Member for Andover had given notice for the 15th instant, but he considered that the Vote for the administration of Martial Law was the legitimate and proper opportunity for the observations which he proposed to make on the course adopted in the case of Colonel Crawley, and its effect on the discipline and good order of the army. Looking to the manner in which the Government were dealing with the Navy Estimates, and the notice given by the noble Lord in regard to the Army Estimates, which he must regard as somewhat unusual, he had come to the conclusion that the object of the Government was to get the two great Votes for the army with reference to the Mutiny Act, and the Financial statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the same manner. Seeing, therefore, that there was little probability of getting the remainder of the Navy Estimates and the whole of the Army Estimates before the holydays, he was ready, if the hon. Member for Andover could arrange with those around him to postpone the Vote for the administration of Martial Law until after the hon. Member's Motion, to defer to the hon. Gentleman's wish. He, however, could not forego the legitimate and proper opportunity afforded by the Vote for the administration of Martial Law to submit the observations which he wished to make on the court-martial.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he did not think the Government could promise to defer Vote No. 6 until after the Motion respecting Colonel Crawley's Court Martial, but he would promise that the discussion on Vote No, 6 would not be taken until the proceedings of the court-martial were in the hands of hon. Members.
  COLONEL NORTHsaid, he wished to know whether there would be any objection to give the House an opportunity of inspecting the models of the bungalows, &c., without which it would be difficult, if not impossible, for hon. Members to understand the evidence given before the court-martial.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, there would be an objection to removing the models which were produced

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  before the court-martial from the custody of the Judge Advocate General, inasmuch as they were the record of the proceedings of the Court. Accurate plans and drawings had, however, been made from these models, and the House after seeing them would be as well able to form an opinion as if they had the models.

GOVERNMENT ANNUITIES BILL.

  QUESTION.
  MR. CRAWFORDsaid, he wished to know, Whether the Government intend to proceed to-morrow with the Government Annuities Bill?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, that the proceedings of the Government would depend upon the progress made that evening. Until his noble Friend the Under Secretary for War obtained his Vote for the number of men, the Government could not do anything but ask for Committee of Supply. Presuming that Vote was obtained this evening, if there was sufficient time to-morrow evening they should propose to take the Annuities Bill immediately after the Motion for Supply was disposed of. He did not, however, propose to invite the House to-morrow evening to discuss the question with regard to life assurances, but merely to dispose of the clauses relating to annuities to which there was no objection, and then to fix the next Government evening for the discussion of the clause on the subject of assurances. He might add that his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary would place the Penal Servitude Bill immediately after the Annuities Bill.
  SIR MINTO FARQUHARsaid, he would beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman, whether he was not aware that the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. H. Bt. Sheridan) has given notice of a Motion, that he would move the postponement of the further consideration of the Annuities Bill for a month?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, it would be quite competent for the hon. Member for Dudley to move to postpone the Bill if he chose, but the proper plan would be to take the clauses to which he had referred, and then, when they came to the clause on life assurances, to move to report Progress, and to postpone the discussion upon that clause for a month.

  DEBATE ON KAGOSIMA —ADMIRAL LAMBERT.—EXPLANATION.
  MR. BUXTONsaid, he wished to refer to a statement which he had made on a former occasion, to the effect that Admiral Lambert had bombarded Rangoon. He stated then that Admiral Lambert had acted under orders of his superior officer; but he had since received information from officers who were present, that the greater part of the town was burnt down by the natives themselves, and that the rest was burnt accidentally by our men. He wished, therefore, to withdraw the whole of the statement which he had made on the occasion to which he referred.

  SUPPLY.
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

REDUCTION OF THE ARMY.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Perhaps the hon. Member opposite (Mr. H. Baillie) will allow me to appeal to him to postpone the statement of his views upon the reduction of our military establishments. Would it not be more convenient to the House, and equally conducive to the object he has in view, if he were to reserve his remarks and arguments until my noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington) has moved the first Resolution, with regard to the number of men. I do not say there is any irregularity in the course which the hon. Member proposes, but I think the other course the more convenient.
  MR. H. BAILLIE: I regret that I cannot accept the proposal of the noble Lord, because it would confine the discussion within very narrow limits. I feel it necessary to proceed before going into Committee. I regret to find that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Ministers to make a reduction in the army. It is true that the proposed reduction is not on a large scale; but such as it is I object to it under existing circumstances, on two grounds—first of all, because I believe I shall be able to show the House that the army of this country at the present time is not sufficiently large to provide adequately for the duty that is required, and because I

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  think it is both cruel and unjust to sacrifice the health and the lives of British soldiers in order to save the money of the State; and secondly, I object to this reduction of the military force of the country because, under existing circumstances, and in the present state of the foreign relations of the country, I believe the reduction to be ill-timed. As to the first proposition, the House is probably aware that more than two-thirds of the army of this country is at the present time serving in India and in the colonies— in climates for the most part tropical, injurious to health, and fatal to European life. It was under these circumstances that, some years ago, very strong remonstrances were made to Her Majesty's Government, from the highest military authorities in the country, against the practice which at that time prevailed of leaving Her Majesty's regiments for indefinite periods in India. It was stated, that the practice was not only injurious to health and destructive to human life, but fatal to the discipline of the army. At that time, it was the common practice to leave regiments in India for twenty-five years, and hon. Members will easily understand that the officers of those regiments must have become unfit for any other service. It was under these circumstances that Her Majesty's Government took the whole of the circumstances into consideration. I think Mr. Sidney Herbert was Secretary at War at that time, and after full deliberation it was decided that Her Majesty's regiments for the future should not be compelled to serve for a longer period than ten years consecutively either in India or the colonies. Now I think it will be admitted by the House, that ten years consecutive service in a tropical climate is quite long enough, more especially when I state to the House what is the ordinary result of that service. There are few hon. Members in the House who would suppose, or who would be prepared to realize the fact, that when one of Her Majesty's regiments is ordered to India, practically speaking, so far as the private soldiers are concerned, it is a doomed regiment. Now let me explain, Let us suppose that a battalion of 1,000 men is ordered to India; they will be all young men, selected for the purpose, and in perfect health. What would be the condition of that battalion at the expiration of their ten years' service in India? We have lately had presented to us a most valuable Report—the Report of a Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the
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  sanitary state of the army in India. That Commission instituted an inquiry extending from the beginning of the present century down to the present time, and from the Report of that Commission we are enabled to ascertain what is the average rate of mortality of European troops serving in India. It is stated in that Report that the deaths in the European troops of the East India Company for the series of years commencing with the present century and coming down to the year 1857, amounted to 69 per 1,000 per annum, or a fraction less than 7 per cent. Now let us apply that calculation to the battalion to which I have referred, and see what is the result. At the expiration of ten years' service that battalion will have lost, by deaths, 690 men. There will then remain 310 to be accounted for. But a great proportion of these have been invalided and sent home; so that, practically speaking, a battalion would be annihilated in ten years. But the Commissioners give us another calculation, which is, I think, still more unfavourable to the soldier. They tell us that an annuity upon the life of a soldier in India at the age of twenty—and that is the most favourable age for them—is worth twelve years' purchase, or ten years' less than an average annuity on that age at home; so that, according to that calculation, the whole battalion would be extinct in twelve years. The House will of course understand that there are stations in India where the mortality is not so great; but there are others where it is still greater. At Peshawur, for example, where we have a very large garrison, and which I believe to be a regular pest-house, the mortality is far greater. The calculation to which I have referred takes the average—the only way in which such a calculation can be fairly made. Now, under these circumstances, I think the House will admit, that the regulation proposed by the Government, confining the period of service of British soldiers to ten years in those tropical climates, was wise, just, and humane, and ought to be maintained and enforced by Parliament. Well now, Sir, having made that preliminary statement, I will go to the facts of the case. I am prepared to show and to prove beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the army which we have in this country at the present time is not sufficiently large to furnish the ordinary relief to the troops that are serving abroad that is to say, if the period of service is to be confined to ten years, allowing the troops

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  that return home five years to remain at home. That is the shortest period which could be allowed them. Now, this is a proposition very easily proved. We have only to ascertain what is the number of battalions serving abroad with the number serving at home, and the calculation is very easily made. First, then, let us see what is the number of battalions that are serving abroad at the present time. In this calculation I do not mean to include either the cavalry or artillery; for, although the same rule applies to all services, the calculation is more easily made by battalions. Of course, I do not mean to include local battalions, such as the four West India regiments, the Canadian Rifles, the Ceylon Rifles, and the Cape Rifles. Excluding all these, I find that there are serving abroad at the present time—that is, on the 1st of January last— 107 battalions. Now, the question is, what is the amount of force requisite to be maintained at home in order to give relief to those 107 battalions once in ten years, allowing the regiments that come home five years to remain at home. The number required for that purpose would be fifty-three battalions. That is the smallest number with which relief could be regularly made. And now let me tell the House what is the actual amount of force we have in the country in order to perform that duty. It amounts to thirty-three battalions:—so that we have actually twenty battalions less than the force absolutely required in order to carry out the ordinary relief of the service. Now that is a very serious matter, because it involves the lives of the men and the discipline of the army; and I say that it is a very discreditable state of things for the House of Commons. If the House of Commons thinks proper not to vote so great a number of men, if they think that the force we have in India is too great, let that force be reduced. If they think the number of battalions we have in our Colonies too great, let some of them be recalled. If they are of the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley), that the Colonies should defend themselves, well and good — recall those troops from the Colonies that are capable of self-defence. This may be good or bad policy, wise or unwise; at all events, it would be logical. But what I complain of is, that the House of Commons should deliberately permit any Government to sacrifice the health and the lives of British soldiers for the purpose of gaining a little
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  temporary popularity in this House by reducing the army below that standard which the requirements and interest of the public service absolutely demands. This is a very important question, and I trust we shall have a clear explanation of the subject from the Government.
  Now I have stated my first objection to a reduction in the army, and the House will observe that I have based it solely on what I believe to be the interest of the British soldier. I will now proceed to advert to what I believe to be the interest of the public. I think, Sir, the House cannot have failed to perceive—indeed, I am sure many hon. Members are painfully conscious—that the influence and control of this country over the affairs of the world have of late years sensibly diminished. It is true that England still occupies a position as one of the five great Powers of Europe; but the voice of England no longer exercises that power and that control over events which she formerly exercised. To what is this to be attributed? I regret to say that a very general opinion, a very general feeling prevails in every country in Europe, and also in America, that the people of this country, having by their trade and commerce acquired great wealth, are now much more anxious and careful to preserve their money than to maintain the honour of their country. This is an opinion which prevails in every country in Europe. We are spoken of in the most degrading terms even in those countries which are naturally the most friendly to us. Austria is, perhaps, one of those countries most friendly to England, and is the natural ally of England, and this is the opinion we find expressed in the public papers there on the policy and conduct of England. These papers say the foreign policy of England is ambiguous, faithless, pitiful, abominable, and unspeakably cowardly. Now we shall not find the French papers more complaisant; but the Americans are, of course, the worst of all. Now I will not stop to inquire whether these opinions are well or ill-founded. All I maintain is that they exist; and it is to this cause that we must attribute the humiliation of our Foreign Minister—his failure in all his diplomatic negotiations with foreign Powers. we have seen Earl Russell humiliated by being compelled to withdraw a despatch which he had addressed to a great Power, and which he had communicated to all the other Powers of Europe, because he was told by

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  the Prussian Minister that it would lead to war. We have seen Lord Russell fail in his negotiations with Russia on behalf of the Poles, because he declared that under no circumstances would England go to war. We have seen Lord Russell fail in his negotiations with the German Powers on behalf of Denmark—and it was only natural that he should fail, because at the very time Lord Russell was using high language and reminding the German Powers that England was bound to maintain the integrity of Denmark, those Powers knew very well that the Ministry had decided that under no circumstances would they go to war. Now this is a mode of diplomacy which must inevitably fail. I do not say that England ought to go to war, but I say that if England interferes she ought to be prepared for that event. I believe Her Majesty's Government call this "exercising the moral influence of England." Why, the moral influence of England is a myth. I should call it attempting to trade on the past reputation of the country; but forgetting that from their hands that reputation had passed. Now, Sir, we see a different mode of diplomacy prevailing on the other side of the Atlantic. There we find that when Mr. Seward has an important demand to make on our Foreign Office he invariably backs that demand with the intimation that the people of America have grown warlike —that they are ready and willing, and even anxious to go to war with England—that he has a great difficulty in restraining them; and it is wonderful to see the "moral influence" that diplomacy produces at our Foreign Office, and the humility with which it is received. Now, Sir, such being the state of our foreign relations, men are naturally curious to know why the Government should have seized this opportunity to make reductions in the army. I am aware that by the forms of this House we are enabled to reduce, but that we cannot increase the Estimates submitted by Ministers. We are therefore, to a certain extent, at the mercy of the Government, and we must submit to any humiliation which their policy may entail. But we are not altogether without light upon the motive power which influences the Government, because by the revelations, or rather, I should say, that ingenuous confession made by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade to his constituents, we learn that there is scarcely one great public question upon which the present
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  Cabinet are united in opinion. It is then, with such a Cabinet, and backed by a bare majority of this House, that the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown has to deal. We cannot be surprised, under these circumstances, that he should be compelled to yield—to make concessions even to the smallest sections of his political supporters. That is, I believe, the real solution both of the foreign policy of the Government and of this reduction in the military force of the country. It is, no doubt, a great misfortune, which I sincerely trust the noble and confiding people of England may not hereafter have just reason to complain of. Sir, I felt it my duty to make these observations, in order to raise my protest against the Estimates that are about to be submitted to the House.

THE YEOMANRY CAVALRY.

  RESOLUTION.
  COLONEL EDWARDSrose to move—
  "That the discontinuance in the present year of the assembling of the yeomanry cavalry for the accustomed period of six days' training on permanent duty would be detrimental to the efficiency of the force, and contrary to the recommendation of the Committee appointed by Lord Herbert in the year 1861, and is inexpedient,"
  and said—Sir, I rise to bring forward the Motion of which I have given notice, and must say that I do so with some little feeling of delicacy, considering that there are on both sides of the House officers senior to myself, who would have dealt with the question much more efficiently than I am able to do; but, as far as I can see, the whole subject lies in a nut-shell, and I expect there will be very little difficulty in explaining to the House the view I entertain of the question. In the first place, I wish to express in the strongest terms my indignant protest against this pitiful economy on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and in passing simply say this—that it is not my opinion only, but the opinion of a large majority of hon. Members, that the manned in which he is about to deal with the yeomanry cavalry is of his own seeking; and the rest of the Government, or, at all events, a majority of her Majesty's Ministers, are opposed to it. That is my own surmise. Still, I venture to say it is the impression of nearly the whole of the House of Commons. Sir, I wish to express my indignation at the Chancellor of the Exchequer this year declining to call

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  out the yeomanry for its annual period of eight days' training, and this, too, in the face of a contemplated large surplus. And what is the result of that reduction in the Estimates? "Why, it amounts to the trumpery sum of six-and-forty thousand pounds, or, to give the exact figures, to £46,276—a mere drop in the ocean, beneath the consideration of the House of Commons under all the circumstances. Sir, it may be said by Members of the House that I am an interested party. Well, Sir, I will not deny that I am interested as an Englishman and a Member of the House of Commons. I am also interested as the commandant of a regiment that has done some good service to the country, having received the thanks of the Government, at all events, on one memorable occasion; and I consider that I am also interested in the manner in which the yeomanry force of England is in future to be maintained. The colonels of the yeomanry regiments have a responsibility which can scarcely be overrated. I have seen letters, within the last few days, from a great number of field officers, and especially colonels of regiments, disapproving of the step of the Government. I trust I may have credit for sincerity in reiterating my conviction, that it will be contrary to the wishes and welfare of the whole of the corps. Sir, I feel the deepest interest in the force admitted by our best general officers to be an efficient auxiliary to the regular army. It has been admitted over and over again by a distinguished officer, the late Secretary for War, who I am always proud to see in his place on this side of the House, and also by Major General Sir James Chatter-ton, who himself has inspected sixty-nine regiments, that the yeomanry cavalry, as a body, performed the duties required of them in a most satisfactory manner. Then, Sir, it seems that some credit is due to that force of which I am such a humble member. It is a question whether the yeomanry cavalry is of any use or no use at all. If it is of no use, disband it at once; but if it is of any value as an institution of this country, as a domestic force of our own, in aid of the civil power and for other important duties, for heaven's sake do not attempt to disable and discourage it, and impair its efficiency in the way you now propose, but give it a fair chance of keeping up the credit it has always maintained in England and out of England. If it is of use, why select this time to discourage it, when every
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  power in Europe is engaged in military preparations on a gigantic scale, and trembling at the threatened earthquake of war; we see almost every nation on the face of the globe bristling with arms; when we see France and Russia, and Prussia, Austria, and Italy, in fact every country in the world, prepared at any moment should a blunder occur, which is very probable, on the part of our Foreign Secretary—for he has not made very few mistakes in the short period he has been in office— when a slight mistake of our Foreign Secretary might plunge the whole of Europe in war, and create such a flame as would take half a century to extinguish. Why, it was only the other day our little army of regulars was reported to have been under orders for Denmark. In such an event, I ask, what strength have you left to rely upon at home for the preservation of order. This is the position in which we are placed now, when we talk about reducing our army and navy and domestic forces—one of our domestic forces at any rate. This, I repeat, I attribute entirely to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who seems to delight in neglecting and disparaging the yeomanry. Not long ago, to effect a miserable saving of expense, it was considered necessary that the officers of the yeomanry should be mulcted of their wretched pay, and this was actually done for one year; but it produced such an impression of disgust amongst the officers of the force, that a meeting was held at a nobleman's house in London, and a committee appointed as a deputation, of which I was one, to represent the case to the War Office. We had a long interview with Lord Herbert, but produced no impression. Not satisfied, we made an appeal to the Law Officers of the Crown; they gave an opinion in our favour, and we compelled the Chancellor of the Exchequer to disgorge every shilling that he had so misappropriated. That is the secret of the punishment which we are about to suffer at his hands. But there is another reason. The money needlessly wasted on the Crawley trial by having the court-martial held in England will cost the country something. Probably the Chancellor of the Exchequer may have had that payment in his eye when he made up his mind to snub the yeomanry. If report speaks true, the saving will about cover the cost of that trial. But I complain bitterly of this feeling on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which he

  1379
  has shown on so many previous occasions, when he has an opportunity of giving the yeomanry a kick. Now, I yield to no man in the country in appreciation of that magnificent force, the Rifle Volunteers, who have become, I trust, a permanent institution of the country. In my own district, I may venture to say that no man has exerted himself more in co-operating with others to establish regiments than I have, and I am happy to say that we have succeeded, and I feel a great pride in witnessing and bearing testimony to their zeal and efficiency. The Rifle Volunteers, or I may now call them the national guard of the country, have in their ranks 150,000 men, the nucleus of a large army for the defence of this country — such an army as we had in 1803 and 1804—when I believe the Volunteers numbered 400,000. Well; it is in times like these that we ought to have such an army to depend upon; and my own impression is, that if they had not been in existence, if that magnificent institution had not been formed, we should not have been on terms of peace, at this moment at all events, with one of our nearest neighbours and allies. Whilst I thus bear testimony to the national value of the Rifle Volunteers, I do not see why the yeomanry cavalry of this country, the older institution of the two, should be met with kicks from the Government at every corner. Is it right, considering that they have always done their duty when called upon, that they should receive such treatment at their hands, when they are prepared at all times to act for the purpose of keeping order in the country? The Rifle Volunteers, as at present constituted, are for the defence of the country from invasion; but it seems our gallant yeomanry force of 14,000 men must be treated like Denmark, and driven out of the field, in order to cull a little popularity in the manufacturing districts. Sir, I was speaking not long ago on the responsibilities of colonels of regiments throughout the country, but more particularly in the manufacturing districts, where we all know that tumults arise occasionally and that we have not always had a sufficient force to protect property and keep order. I would instance the memorable riots in the North of England in 1842. Upon the yeomanry cavalry you may always rely; and if you attempt to get rid of this force, which appears to be the wish of one or two Gentlemen on
  1380
  the Treasury bench, I think the country may have reason to regret it. I would repel such an attempt with indignation, as being unwise and impolitic. The ungracious and gratuitous attempt made by Colonel M'Murdo, who has ever shown a hostile and jealous feeling towards the yeomanry, to substitute mounted volunteers for the old constitutional domestic force, utterly failed as to numbers; and up to this moment they do not amount to one tenth of the latter, the proportion being, I believe, as 1,200 to 14,000 men and upwards—besides the fact of this new subsidiary force being utterly unavailable, except in the event of invasion. I rest my case on the Report of the Committee appointed in the year 1861, by the late Lord Herbert, to inquire into the present organization and establishment of the yeomanry. That Report is a document of great importance, and I will now proceed to read to the House one or two of its paragraphs. I find in it the following statement on the subject of the comparative position and relation of the mounted Volunteer corps to the yeomanry:—
  "We find that a yeoman is at all times liable to be called out in aid of the civil power, and, further, to perform escort duty at the shortest notice. A mounted volunteer is exempt from these services, and is not liable to be taken away from his home, even for a day. A yeoman, on the other hand, is not only liable to hold himself and horse in constant readiness for service throughout the entire year, but in addition to attending drill in his own vicinity (as the mounted volunteer does), he is bound to leave his home and avocations for eight consecutive days in every year for the purpose of being instructed in regimental movements, when, as already stated, he receives only sufficient pay to cover his necessary outlay."
  It contains another important paragraph in reference to the question of permanent duty. That paragraph is as follows:—
  "As regards the present system of training for six consecutive days (exclusive of marching days), as compared with fewer day's permanent duty and a larger amount of troop drills, the evidence we have taken shows that any diminution of the period of permanent duty would be detrimental to the efficiency of the force. We do not, therefore, recommend any reduction of the number of days usually devoted to this duty. We consider the assembly of regiments upon permanent duty so essential to the efficiency of the force, that we recommend that they should invariably be called out for this duty, in preference to assembling them for exercise under the Act of 44 Geo. III., c. 64."
  I will now read the concluding paragraph, which is, in my opinion, deserving of special consideration; and as the appointment of the Committee was a measure

  1381
  adopted by the War Office, and as Lord: Herbert himself nominated its Members, it ought to have special weight with hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House. In their concluding paragraph the Committee state:—
  "We cannot conclude our Report without adverting to the circumstance of the yeomanry force having from year to year maintained its numbers. we are confident that the country may rely upon a continuance of the loyalty and zeal of the members of this force to keep the ranks effective with horses as well as men; and we are satisfied that they will not only, as heretofore, prove equal to the duties required of them in times of disturbance, but also be found a valuable auxiliary to Her Majesty's regular forces for national defence."
  After such a testimony to the value of the yeomanry, I believe that if Lord Herbert were now alive he, at all events, would never sanction this attempt to disparage that corps on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I now make one last appeal to hon. Members on both sides of the House. You must recollect that the whole of this Vote does not amount to more than £46,000; and, in justice to the yeomanry of England, in justice to the field officers placed in command of that force, whose responsibility is so serious, and in justice to the Committee which inquired into the subject, I ask you not to run the risk of impairing the efficiency of such a valuable element in our means of national defence by withholding that amount. I was very much astonished the other day at receiving a copy of a circular addressed by the War Office to the Lord Lieutenant of the county with which I am connected, as well as to the other Lord Lieutenants of counties throughout the country generally. That circular is as follows:—
  "My Lord,—I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the corps of yeomanry in the Riding under your Lordship's charge will not be called out, either for permanent duty or for training and exercise, during the year 1864–5, Her Majesty's Government being of opinion that, as the force generally is in a high state of efficiency, such services may be dispensed with for the period in question.—I have the honour to be, my Lord, your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,
  "DEGREY AND RIPON."
  That is to say, in other words, that because we have accomplished a most desirable object, we must abandon the means by which it has been attained. That is adding insult to injury. I again implore the House to do justice to a corps which so well deserves justice at their hands. The hon. and gallant Member concluded by submitting his Motion to the House.
  SIR MATTHEW RIDLEYseconded the Motion. He believed it had become too much the habit of the Government and of Parliament to treat the Yeomanry as a force maintained for the sole purpose of assisting the civil power in maintaining the peace. But it really occupied another and most important position—it was a portion of the constitutional defence of the country, and was entitled to rank with the militia and Volunteers as a subsidiary to the regular army. The Volunteers Act of George III., under which it was originally constituted, assigned to it that position, and directed the assembling and marshal ling, not only of the Volunteers, but of the militia and all other subsidiary forces, and it gave power to the Lords Lieutenant of counties, on any apprehended invasion, or even on the approach of a hostile fleet towards our shores, to call out such forces — "all or any of them." Such was, like wise, the object and intent of the Volunteer Act of Her present Majesty. The fifth section of that Act made provision for regulating the command of the Volunteer, Yeomanry, and militia forces when called out for actual military service. It was clear, therefore, that Parliament had hitherto contemplated one common course of action to be observed by the subsidiary forces of the kingdom, including the Yeomanry. Last year an additional sum was voted, in the most unhesitating and most generous spirit, for the Volunteer Rifle Corps and the Volunteer Artillery, and the only condition attached to the grant was, that the money should be distributed ac cording to the efficiency of the corps as reported by the inspecting officers. He trusted, then, that Parliament would not this year withhold from the Yeomanry their customary allowance. The War Office might say, as they had said in the circular read by his hon. and gallant Friend, that the reports of the inspecting officers, as to the efficiency of the Yeomanry, had for many years past been so very satisfactory that it would be quite unnecessary to call them out for service in the present year. It appeared to him that weaker ground could not be taken; for, if the Yeomanry had been made efficient, by all means let them be kept so, and do not allow them to go back. As an old Yeomanry officer, he could bear his testimony to the great importance of keeping the force together. He believed, indeed, that the non-assembling of them, even for one year, was highly prejudicial, inas-

  1383
  much as it led to the loss of some of the most valuable men and of the most practised horses, induced many of the men to return their clothes and accoutrements, and perhaps leave their regiments, from a feeling that they were not treated fairly by the Government, and created dissatisfaction and discontent among the whole body. It should be recollected, moreover, that in the opinion of all military authorities it was much more difficult to train cavalry than infantry. It would be a heavy discouragement to many Yeomanry officers younger than himself if the Government persevered in the intention it had announced. Unwearied attention had been displayed by many commanding officers, great expense had been incurred for riding schools, accommodation for the staff, and the storing of accoutrements—matters in respect to which the Yeomanry were in many cases not surpassed, and scarcely equalled, by any regiment of regular cavalry. He said, then, that the move contemplated by the Government was most ungracious. No very friendly feeling appeared to be entertained towards this force in official quarters. The hon. and gallant Member for Beverley (Colonel Edwards) had imputed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer a rather discourteous proceeding towards it. Perhaps the hon. and gallant Member went too far in his description of the right hon. Gentleman's treatment of the Yeomanry officers, when he said they had received a kick from him; but he would still ask the right hon. Gentleman, in the spirit of the old play—
  "It is true that you did not dissemble your love,
  But why did you kick us down stairs?"
  He earnestly hoped that the House and the Government would pause before they finally determined on withholding the usual annual grant from one of the most valuable elements in our national defences.
  Amendment proposed,
  To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the discontinuance in the present year of the assembling of the Yeomanry Cavalry for the accustomed period of six days' training on permanent duty, would be detrimental to the efficiency of the Force, and contrary to the recommendation of the Committee appointed by Lord Herbert in the year 1861, and is inexpedient,"— (Colonel Edwards,)
  —instead thereof.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that he did not rise for the purpose of following the hon. Member for Inver-
  1384
  ness (Mr. H. Baillie) in the observations he had addressed to the House on the proposed reduction of the army. Although the hon. Member did not think proper to accede to the request of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, that he should postpone his remarks till they had gone into Supply, still he trusted it would not be thought that he was treating either the hon. Gentleman or the House with disrespect, if he said he felt that it would be more convenient if he were permitted to defer any observations which he had to offer on the reductions about to be proposed, and, among others, on the reduction of the number of men for the regular army, until he made his statement in Committee of Supply. But as he understood that the hon. and gallant Member for Beverley (Colonel Edwards) intended to press his Motion to a division, he thought it necessary then to say a few words, in order to explain the grounds on which the Government had acted in resolving not to call out the Yeomanry for permanent duty this year. At the same time, perhaps, he might be excused if he did not enter at that moment into any lengthened observations as to the necessity under which the Government had felt themselves placed to frame the Estimates of this year with some regard to economy. As hon. Members were no doubt aware, considerable charge had been brought upon the Estimates by exceptional circumstances, and especially by the war in New Zealand. At the same time, the Government had not thought that they would be justified in calling on the House or the country to make any extraordinary exertions to increase the large contributions which had, for so many years past, been made towards the expenses of the army. It became necessary, therefore, to frame the Estimates with the strictest regard to economy. In doing so, it was perfectly inevitable that they should be obliged to neglect or postpone certain services, and not to spend all the money they might wish to do in various directions; and among other items in regard to which they thought a saving could be effected without materially diminishing the efficiency of our force, the Government came to the conclusion that it would be advisable not to call out the Yeomanry for permanent duty this year. They, however, utterly disclaimed any intention to disparage in the slightest degree the services of that corps by this step. On the contrary,

  1385
  he and his Colleagues entertained the highest respect for the Yeomanry force, and had the greatest confidence in its efficiency and utility; in fact, if required to give a description of that distinguished volunteer force, and especially of the officers who had the honour of commanding it, he thought he could do so in a more flattering manner than the hon. and gallant Member for Beverley had done when he spoke of those officers as meeting together to protest against the reforms that a Committee which the hon. and gallant Gentleman himself had most emphatically praised and recommended to the Government. The hon. and gallant Member had represented the Yeomanry officers as placing such a pressure upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to compel him "to disgorge" the two half-crowns which he had earned by cutting down their pay to 7s. The hon. and gallant Member, however, did not tell the House that that reduction of pay was made by the recommendation of the Committee which he had so much lauded. The hon. and gallant Gentleman and the hon. Member who followed him had made a very ingenious use of the Report which they had quoted. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had dwelt on the concluding paragraphs —praising, and justly, the efficiency of the Yeomanry corps; but he omitted to cite the passage in which an opinion was expressed, that the sum of £1 10 s. a year was enough to support the force in an efficient state. The officers, however, protested against that, and by bringing pressure to bear upon the Government, got the sum increased to £2. Then the hon. and gallant Member read the paragraph in which the Committee state that they did not think the period of permanent drill could be diminished with advantage. But the Committee were appointed to consider certain definite questions, and among those questions was the present system of training for six consecutive days, exclusive of market day, as compared with fewer days of permanent duty and a larger amount of troop drill. The Committee considered that subject, and arrived very properly at the conclusion that permanent duty was more beneficial to the force than an increased number of days of exercise. But they were never asked to give an opinion whether it would ever be advisable, under any circumstances, not to call out the Yeomanry for permanent duty at all. Of course, he did not say that it would add to its efficiency not to call it out. Officers interested
  1386
  in the efficiency of their regiments would naturally prefer that they should be called out. But he would remind the House that this was not the first time that that measure had been taken. On two former occasions, the Yeomanry had not been called out, and he was bound to say that, from the Reports of the Inspectors in the subsequent years, it was impossible to find that the regiments had suffered in any material degree in their efficiency. Therefore, the passage which had been read to the House from the circular that had been referred to was not conceived in any ironical spirit. The efficiency of the Yeomanry regiments was admitted; and although it might to some extent be impaired by their not being called out this year, yet experience showed that it would not sustain any serious detriment. He was unwilling to follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman into the observations he had made, from which it might almost be inferred that an invidious distinction was intended to be drawn between the treatment of the Volunteers and Yeomanry. He thought it would be unfortunate if such invidious comparisons were made in that House. The organization of the two forces was quite different. Even this year, when no sum was taken for calling out the Yeomanry, they were spending per man a considerably larger sum of money on the Yeomanry force than on the Volunteers. He could not, therefore, think that any useful object could be served by raising invidious comparisons between them. He was quite certain none was intended to he made by the Government; and he could only repeat that they were fully persuaded of the efficiency of the body, and had no intention to discredit them in any way whatever. The reduction that would be proposed had been dictated solely by motives of economy. They were obliged to cut down where they were unwilling to reduce, and they hoped the sum proposed would be saved without materially diminishing the efficiency of the force.
  GENERAL PEEL: The noble Marquess has borne ample and willing testimony to the efficiency of the Yeomanry force, that he has cut from under his feet the ground of his own argument. Of all pitiful, penny-wise-and-pound-foolish economy, this proposal is the most extraordinary. If you have made up your mind that the Yeomanry are of no use, why not say so? But you call upon us to vote £41,000 for the permanent staff of the Yeomanry, and yet refuse the trifling sum requisite for the six days' training on permanent duty. Is it

  1387
  possible that the noble Marquess, with the Report of the Committee appointed by Lord Herbert for the purpose of inquiring what is essential to keep the Yeomanry effective, can be so unmindful of its directions? I hope the noble Marquess will at once agree to what is so perfectly evident, and what nobody can deny—namely, that the discontinuance even for one year of the six days' training on permanent duty would be detrimental to the efficiency of the force; that it is contrary to the recommendations of the Committee; and, thirdly, that it would he an inexpedient thing to do. I am perfectly certain if the noble Marquess will look through the Estimates he will be quite able to effect other reductions sufficient to make up the amount.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I hope the House will not be led away by the very enthusiastic speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just sat down. We are, as my noble Friend stated, fully sensible of the great value of the Yeomanry force and of their efficiency, and what we now propose does not either imply any want of appreciation of their merits, or, on the other hand, entail any sensible diminution of their efficiency. It is not the first time that the motive of economy with regard to the service of a particular year has prevailed, and the calling out of the Yeomanry has been omitted. There have been many years in which the Yeomanry have not been permanently embodied. I think it is a great disparagement of the Yeomanry not to believe that the efficiency of the force will remain unaffected, although for the space of one year six days' training on permanent duty may be discontinued. They have not been called out for two successive years; but it has often happened that for one year they have not been called out. The unfortunate war in New Zealand has entailed very large expenses incidental to the year, and which, we hope, will not occur in any future year. Looking over the various heads of charge connected with our military arrangements, we have thought the reduction proposed might fairly be made without any diminution of the efficiency of this valuable part of our domestic force. I hope, therefore, the House will not agree to the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member, and diminish by the amount of £46,000 that saving which we think the House may, with every regard for the safety of the country, wisely agree to.
  SIR WILLIAM MILESsaid, he should not have been surprised if the noble Lord
  1388
  had given a silent Vote on this occasion; but he certainly was surprised at what he now said. When the noble Lord presided at the Home Office, and a deputation of Yeomanry Officers waited upon him, including the Marquess of Ailesbury and Lord Eversley, he (Sir William Miles) was also present. The noble Lord received them most courteously, and after hearing the whole of their case, in which they set forth the necessity of the Yeomanry being called out for a longer period, the noble Lord, as it seemed to him (Sir William Miles), was so convinced by the arguments the deputation addressed to him, that he was disposed to extend the period, not only to eight, but to ten days; and if his right hon. Friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had not come to the rescue—for the order had been given and disseminated from the Home Office—the alteration would probably have been made.
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUERsaid, he had nothing at all to do with it.
  SIR WILLIAM MILESsaid, he had thought it probable that the right hon. Gentleman had a hand in it. After this opinion of the noble Lord while at the Home Office, he (Sir William Miles) was surprised to hear the noble Lord say that the efficiency of the Yeomanry could be as well kept up if their calling out were intermitted for a year. His regiment was not called out in 1860, and the result was, that when they were inspected in the following year, every fifth man was found to be a recruit. He could not conceive why this change should be called for. If they did not want the Yeomanry, let them dismiss them, but let them not be dealt with on such a penny-wise-pound-foolish principle. Let the Government tell them, "We want you," or "We do not want you;" but let not the position of the commanding officer be rendered so embarrassing, and let not the proffer of services so valuable be treated in such a manner.
  Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
  The House divided:—Ayes 158; Noes 157: Majority 1.

REPORT OF THE INSPECTORS OF CON STABULARY—POLICE SPY SYSTEM.

  OBSERVATIONS. QUESTION.
  MR. ROEBUCK: Sir, I wish to call the attention of the House to a Report which

  1389
  has been made to the Home Secretary, and I wish to ask a question of the right hon. Gentleman respecting that Report. It will be in the recollection of every one that, within the last few days, a remarkable trial has taken place in France, which furnished us with a notion of what the police system is there; and, thereupon, the most influential journal of England, and probably of the world, published a strong article upon the effect of the spy system in France. At that trial it was seen that the spy system was employed to track men who were denounced as conspiring to commit a great crime, and the spy system was put into operation to prevent that crime and to bring those who contemplated it to justice. The article in The Times newspaper spoke of that system in terms of reprobation, and it stated that certainly the people of England would not bear such a system among them. I am very much afraid that the people of England not only may, but actually do bear the existence of a spy system of which they have but little idea. I take it that if a spy system were established in the country, in places where the population is comparatively thinly scattered, all hopes of privacy would be at an end, and the pleasures of private life would be poisoned, embittered, and almost destroyed. It happens that we have established police all over England, and in London there are, as I learn from the Inspectors' Report, societies organized for the purpose of supplying information to inquisitive persons. The pretence is that of defending credit and preventing crime; but the result is, that the habit of inquisitiveness is propagated, and a desire for tittle-tattle is very much fostered. Everybody wishes to know everything about everybody else, and what "Mrs. Grundy" may say is an important question in every family. But, as we know that in France the steps of men were dogged from hour to hour, by night and by day—that men could not go out or return home, could not dine or go to bed, without the police knowing it—so in the present circumstances of England private life in the same way may be watched, and we shall be unable to stir without somebody following to report our actions. In order to make the House understand what I mean I will read a few lines from the Reports of the Inspectors of Constabulary in England, ordered to be printed on February 9th last. In his report, General Cartwright, the Inspector of Police in the Eastern Counties, Midland,
  1390
  and North Wales district, makes this statement—
  "During my inspection in the county of Lincoln, Captain Bicknell, the Chief Constable for that large and important county, brought under my notice a system which he had discovered of private communication between individuals or societies and members of the force, which I cannot better explain than by entering the letter addressed from Captain Bicknell to the county paper upon the subject—
  "'To the Editor of the Mercury,
  "'Chief Constable's Office, Lincoln,
  August 12th, 1863.
  '"Sir,—The police of this county are constantly receiving letters from private inquiry offices, seeking information as to the character, respectability, and money value of persons residing in the towns and villages, generally of small traders, but sometimes of clergy and professional men. Companies are formed for the professed object of conducting these inquiries, and the practice is becoming very prevalent. I think most persons are little aware of the system of spying that is going on, and that "strictly confidential" communications may be passing concerning them which may be of serious injury to their prospects, and that their names may be inscribed at the offices in the "register of persons deemed unworthy of credit." The police of the counties and boroughs are largely applied to by these offices, and it is within my knowledge that, in some instances, the information sought has been furnished, and remuneration received. Such matters, unless on criminal information, are, I conceive, beyond the province of the police; and it is to make known that I have prohibited any replies to such inquiries on the part of the constabulary of this county, and also to draw the attention of the police authorities generally to the subject, that I request the insertion of this letter in your widely circulated paper. I enclose you a specimen letter of inquiry, but not for publication. I am, &c.,
  "'PHILIP BICKNELL,
  Chief Constable of Lincolnshire."'
  Upon this General Cartwright makes some observations, which I will read to the House—
  "Considering this is a most important communication, I have made a point of inquiring whether this system has been generally in force, and I have to report, that in many counties and boroughs I find it to be of common practice. Feeling deeply how injurious such a system must be to the wellbeing of the force, I cannot too strongly impress upon you my firm belief that, unless it is at once suppressed, the support the force receives from the public will be greatly damaged, if not entirely withdrawn. According to the title of the Act, under which the force is established, it is stated to be for the more effectual prevention and detection of crime, suppression of vagrancy, and maintenance of good order. The duties here are so well defined that it must be clear to every one that any strictly confidential inquiries into private means and character between individuals or societies and police officers, is one of the most dangerous transgressions of duty that can be imagined. The efficiency of the force depends upon its popularity, which, if removed, is fatal to its

  1391
  main support; as, according to its efficiency, it becomes popular, so according to its popularity it becomes efficient. In my circuit of inspection, wherever I have mentioned this subject to any of those in command of forces it has met with their immediate reprobation. This course of action may check the system referred to, but I consider it of such vital importance to the force, that I have thought it my duty to bring it under your immediate consideration."
  The chief consideration which presents itself to General Cartwright is very properly the efficiency of the police force; but it is right that this House should consider the welfare of the community. What I wish, therefore, to ask the right hon. Gentleman is, Whether his attention has been called to this very important communication; whether he has come to any resolution respecting the course pursued by the police in these cases; and whether he has issued any orders thereupon?
  SIR GEORGE GREY: No doubt the practice to which General Cartwright has called the attention of the Secretary of State, is a most objectionable one, and the employment of the police in certain parts of the country, not under the authority of their officers, but by private communications with private parties, in making these inquiries, is altogether foreign to the object for which the police force was established. As soon as my attention was called to this passage in General Cartwright's Report, I directed a circular to be addressed to the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions in counties, and to the Chairmen of Watch Committees in boroughs possessing a separate police force, and to the police authorities in Scotland. This is the form addressed to the Chairmen of Watch Committees—
  "Whitehall, Feb. 3.
  "Sir,—I am directed by Secretary Sir George Grey to request that you will call the attention of the Watch Committee to the inclosed extract from the last Report of Lieutenant General Cart-wright, one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary, respecting a system of private communication which appears to be in operation between individuals or societies and members of the constabulary force; and I am to request that inquiries may be made upon this subject with reference to the police of your borough, and that special instructions may be given to prevent a practice which is open to very serious objection. I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
  "H. A. BRUCE,
  "The Chairman of the Watch Committee."
  I have received a great many letters in answer to this circular, and, although some replies are still wanting, I am happy to say that the general result shows that the practice does not exist except in only
  1392
  a very few instances; and, attention having been called to the subject, I hope the notice taken of it by General Cartwright, and the steps adopted in consequence, will effectually prevent the continuance of the practice.

THE CONTROLLER OF THE NAVY AND THE DEVONPORT ELECTION.

  QUESTION.
  MR. FERRAND,pursuant to notice, rose to put Questions to the Secretary to the Admiralty, on the present Controller of the Navy having appeared in the uniform of his rank when Captain of the Steam Reserve at the Devonport Election in 1859, and taking an active part in its proceedings. Ten days ago the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) brought under the notice of the House the Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed in the year 1861, to inquire into the Dockyards. On that occasion I took the liberty of calling attention to what I described as Whig tyranny and political interference in Devonport on the part of the Admiralty by the late and present Controller of the Navy. The charges I made were clear and distinct—there could be no mistake about them — and I made them in the presence of the Secretary and junior Lord of the Admiralty. Neither of those honourable officials thought it their duty to contradict any statement I made on that occasion. They both held their peace, and from that time to this day the charges that I made have never been contradicted. I was astonished at the silence of the Secretary of the Admiralty and of the junior Lord; and, for the purpose of obtaining from them some distinct confirmation or denial of the statement which I made, I placed on the paper of the House a notice intimating my intention to put some Questions to the Secretary of the Admiralty. After I had placed that notice on the paper, I was told by an hon. and gallant Friend of mine (Sir John Hay) that he intended to read a denial to the House of some of the statements which I had made. That being the case, instead of putting the Questions I at first intended, I thought it necessary to alter my notice, and to intimate my intention, upon the Question of going into Supply, of asking the indulgence of the House whilst submitting certain questions, and of making a further statement in reference to that intended to be made by my hon. and gallant Friend. Since I received that information

  1393
  from my hon. and gallant Friend, I have looked into the proceedings which have taken place in what I may call the persecution of my late respected friend Mr. Augustus Stafford, and I am greatly surprized to find that the men who were the chief persecutors of that noble hearted Englishman — who had brought distinct charges against him of using his office for the purpose of bringing his political influence to bear upon the dockyard boroughs —have themselves actually, and to a far more guilty extent than Mr. Augustus Stafford, exercised their political influence in those boroughs. On the 21st of April, 1852, Sir Baldwin Walker—who was then Surveyor of the Navy, and I may say the chief persecutor of my late hon. Friend Mr. Stafford—addressed a letter to the then Secretary of the Admiralty, for the purpose of forwarding his resignation to the Board of Admiralty. I will read an extract from that letter, which was dated the 21st of April, 1852—
  "I must beg to tender to their Lordships my resignation, for I can no longer continue to hold the appointment of Surveyor of the Navy with such an imputation on my character, as that of allowing political motives to influence my admission to the Board."
  Nothing further was heard in regard to Sir Baldwin Walker's resignation either inside or outside of this House. I believe that in consequence of some communications which had taken place between the Lords of the Admiralty, Mr. Augustus Stafford, and Sir Baldwin Walker, the latter gentleman was induced to withdraw his resignation. But on the 19th of April, 1853, Sir Benjamin Hall brought forward some distinct charges against Mr. Augustus Stafford, to support which Sir Baldwin Walker was the chief witness. On the 22nd of the same month a Committee was appointed to inquire into dockyard appointments and promotions. This Committee consisted of five Members of this House, and Lord Seymour, now the Duke of Somerset, was the Chairman. I hold in my hand some short extracts from the Report of that Committee. The Committee report that—
  "In 1849, Sir Francis Baring, being then First Lord of the Admiralty, introduced an additional precaution for the exclusion of political influence from the administration of the dockyards, by writing himself to the superintendents and principal officers whom he appointed, asking them as officers and gentlemen to give him an assurance that they would not interfere in the politics of the place. An important system of advancement must be productive of industry, and therefore of economy; such a system your Committee believe may be
  1394
  enforced, if the Board of Admiralty honestly persevere in its maintenance; and if, having appointed fit persons as superintendents, they direct them vigilantly to watch those whose fair co-operation can insure justice to candidates for promotion."
  The Report says in another place—
  "For the purpose of securing a proper system of promotions in the dockyards, it may, perhaps, be fairly required that, if the system under which these promotions are now again regulated should be hereafter altered or modified, the information shall be laid before Parliament, as soon as an opportunity may be afforded for such communication."
  The Report strongly censured Mr. Stafford for interfering with the duties of Sir Baldwin Walker, in whose hands the promotions in the yards then rested, on the recommendation of the superintendents. In this Report the present Duke of Somerset declares distinctly that no Government officer was to interfere in the elections, and that the Board of Admiralty should not interfere between the superintendents and the Secretary of the Navy. In 1855 the right hon. Baronet the present Secretary of the India Board (Sir CharlesWood) became First Lord of the Admiralty; and to prevent the slightest mistake taking place afterwards on this important question, he issued an order or regulation, which ought to be as binding on officers of the navy as are the Rules of this House upon its Members. When, on a former occasion, the right hon. Gentleman was explaining to the House what he had done in reference to the patronage in the dockyards, he said—
  "When I was First Lord the patronage was given over to the superintendents, and since then the Board of Admiralty have had nothing to do with promotion in the employment of the yards."
  The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty heard that statement, and he did not contradict it. He would now show the House what the facts really were. In 1858 the Government of Lord Derby came into office, and the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) became First Lord of the Admiralty. It is an extraordinary fact, that in a short time after the right hon. Baronet came into office, promotions were stopped in the borough of Devonport by Sir Baldwin Walker; and none of the vacancies that then occurred in that borough were laid before the Board of Admiralty. I have already told the House how often I had demanded that these vacancies should be laid before the Board of Admiralty. I was told that there were no vacancies, and therefore no appointments could be made

  1395
  in the borough of Devonport. On the last day of the Derby Government I again went to the Admiralty, and insisted upon the production of the list of vacancies; at last it was produced. I then saw the Secretary to the Admiralty, who took me to the First Lord (Sir J. Pakington) and placed the list in his hands, but that he could not interfere because he had just resigned office. I have before told the House how those vacancies were filled up immediately by Sir Baldwin Walker when the Duke of Somerset became First Lord of the Admiralty. Now, I here assert that the Duke of Somerset and Sir Baldwin Walker on that occasion did precisely that for doing which they had both censured so severely and cruelly Mr. Augustus Stafford. The other night, when I made a charge against Sir Baldwin Walker for having in 1859 issued an address to the electors of Devonport, for the purpose of preventing them voting for me, accusing me of having told falsehoods, I then stated I regretted that I was not able to produce a copy of the placard containing that address to the House. I have, however, since had it searched for, and I have it now in my possession. This is the placard I hold in my hand, and it was issued by Mr. R. M. Watson, the Chairman of Sir Arthur Buller's Committee, now my hon. Colleague, with Sir Baldwin Walker's name at the bottom of it. Now, let hon. Members observe that the man who sent in his resignation some years ago, because he alleged that Mr. Augustus Stafford had interfered with his duties, thought it becoming in 1859, when the Whigs were so anxious to keep me out of Parliament, to violate the pledge he then gave by issuing an address to the electors of Devonport conveying the most offensive charges against me. Sir Baldwin Walker's placard is headed "Refutation of Slander." The attention of the electors of Devonport is herein seriously called to the statement of Sir Baldwin Walker, Controller of the Navy, &c., &c. Now, the charges which I had made against Sir Baldwin Walker were these:—That during the time the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) was First Lord of the Admiralty he had kept back from him all knowledge of the vacancies that occurred in the borough of Devonport, so that no promotions could take place during that time. I stated how the case stood when the Government of Lord Derby had resigned, and how the appointments were made when the Duke of Somerset
  1396
  came into office as First Lord of the Admiralty. Now, the truth of that statement was confirmed by the evidence of Sir Baldwin Walker himself, before the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the control and management of the Dockyards appointed in 1860. In a letter from Sir Baldwin Walker to Mr. Watson, he says—
  "Dear Sir,—I have to thank you for your kind communication, and to express a hope that the enclosed statement will be sufficient to prove that Mr. Ferrand's charges, as regards me, are false."
  Now Sir, before Sir Baldwin Walker attempted to make out my statements false, he should take care that his own statements are true. A statement was made by him to the electors of the borough of Devonport to which I am ready to take exception. I have proved that the late Board of Admiralty had never heard of any of the vacancies that took place in Devonport during their tenure of office, consequently they could not have issued any express order with regard to them. I avail myself of the present opportunity of apologising to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for what I said in respect to the contents of the placard, as it was only from memory I then spoke of it. It appears I was wrong in saying that Sir Baldwin Walker had stated that the vacancies were not filled up on account of the right hon. Gentleman having made some mistake in his financial calculations. Sir Baldwin Walker denied that there were any vacancies kept back from the knowledge of the Board of Admiralty; that from the pressure of business, and the fact of an insufficient money Vote, certain vacancies were delayed, and he asserted that the appointments were duly made to temporary offices, and that the parties nominated were paid from the dates of the vacancies occurring. The Controller of the Navy went on to say, "From this statement it will be apparent that political motives had nothing whatever to do in the matter, that the statement of Mr. Ferrand had no foundation in fact, and that the charges which he had made against me are false." Now we will see whether Sir Baldwin Walker speaks the truth on this occasion. He first says that the vacancies had not been filled up on account of the deficient Vote of this House, and that if they had been filled up there would have been no money to pay the officers. He then goes on to say that there had been no needless severity exercised, that neither the service nor individuals suffered, as temporary appointments were

  1397
  made in the first instance, which, with few exceptions—Conservatives were the exceptions—and those for sufficient reasons— their Conservatism of course—were subsequently confirmed, and in all such cases these temporary officers were paid the same as if they had been confirmed at the several dates of their acting appointments. Again, he said, "the excess was met by the express orders of the late Board (Sir John Pakington's), by the vacancies not being filled up instead of by discharging the men." The House would observe that the passages which I have just quoted are contradictory of each other. In the first it is stated that the vacancies were not filled up because there was no money; but in the second it is alleged that the persons who were appointed temporarily were paid. How were they paid if there was no money to pay them? How could these temporary officers have been paid from the occurrence of the vacancies if there had been no money voted for the purpose? And then, thirdly, they were told that these vacancies had not been filled up at all. There is evidently a contradiction here in the statements made by Sir Baldwin Walker in the placards which he had caused to be posted in Devonport with the view of depriving me of the honour of representing that borough. It is notorious that I was deprived of my seat in this House by the intervention of Sir Baldwin Walker—that I was deprived of the honour which I now enjoy by the scandalous and disgraceful conduct of Sir Baldwin Walker. In his evidence before the Royal Commission he stated, that in consequence of a pressure of business, there had occurred a little delay in the forwarding of the names of the officers to the Board of Admiralty. But that delay extended over ten months. As I said before, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich never heard of those vacancies in the borough of Devonport during the whole tenure of his office as First Lord of the Admiralty. I have now done with Sir Baldwin Walker. He kept me out of this House for a considerable time; but our positions are now changed. Sir Baldwin Walker has had to cross the seas, and I now stand here as representative of the borough of Devonport. I now turn to Admiral Robinson. The other night I brought a distinct charge against Admiral Robinson, now Controller of the Navy. This gentleman was in 1859 the captain of the steam reserve at Devonport. As my gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) will read a
  1398
  letter to the House denying the charges I made on a former occasion against Admiral Robinson, I beg to repeat them, and to assure the House that I stand to them as correct, and that I make them upon my word of honour, and as a Member of this House. On the day of the nomination for the borough of Devonport, which took place in the Town Hall, a large building capable of containing upwards of 3,000 persons, I and my friends found on arriving there that my hon. Colleague opposite (Sir Arthur Buller) and his friends had arrived before us, and we had great difficulty in fighting our way into the hall, for there were as many outside eager to get in as had already assembled within the building. I forced my way as well as I could to the front of the platform, and I then observed that a barricade went down the centre of the hall to divide the two hostile parties. My party consisted of about two-thirds of those present; and scarcely had I and my immediate friends taken our places before I saw an officer in uniform stride over the benches and stand against the wall on the Whig side. He was dressed in the uniform of his rank, he had a quantity of gold lace on his clothes, and gold buttons, and he stood up while those around him were seated. There was the usual amount of confusion and cheering which attends a contested election, and when some one in the crowd called for "Three cheers for Sir Arthur Buller," I saw this gallant officer wave his handkerchief, and join in the call. He gave the cheers, waved his handkerchief, and caused great excitement; and, in fact, he acted as fugleman to his party on several occasions during the proceedings. At last he aroused a strong feeling of hostility against him, and his conduct was met with cries of "Shame, shame;" "Be off, you have no business here;" "You are transgressing the rules of the service," and so on; and I distinctly heard it said by several who were present, "That he had come there in the hope of getting a good place from the Duke of Somerset." There was so much excitement in the hall, caused by this gentleman's conduct, that I expected a row, and I appealed to the Mayor of Devonport, calling his attention to it, and requesting that he would desire the gentleman, who had violated the rules of the Admiralty by his being present, to leave the hall. The Mayor looked up and the Mayor looked down, but nothing more, and the gentleman remained till the end of the proceed-

  1399
  ings. It has been hinted to me that the Mayor of Devonport has written a letter to the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, in which he says non mi ricordo. Now, as the Mayor is an extreme Whig, an earnest party man in the borough, and a strong influential supporter of my hon. Colleague, having made himself most active in his election, his denial of my statement must be received with that hesitation which a party man's declaration always will be when he says, "I don't remember." I do remember what occurred, and I have stated on my word and honour what I saw and what I will stand by. I understand my hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) is going to read a letter he has received from Admiral Robinson; but, before he does so, I must call my hon. and gallant Friend's attention to the fact that Admiral Robinson has made two statements with respect to this charge. When I was addressing the House on a former occasion, Admiral Robinson was sitting under the gallery, and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wakefield went to him, and he afterwards informed me that Admiral Robinson said there was not one word of truth in what I had said of his conduct at Devonport, and that all he did there was to call for a lady on his way home—[Sir JOHN HAY: NO, no!] —that he called at the Town Hall for some person or other to take home as he returned from his official duties. Now, he has written a letter, which my hon. and gallant Friend has shown to me and other hon. Members, which he is to read to the House, in which Admiral Robinson says he was there in uniform, and that he had a right to be there, notwithstanding Sir Francis Baring's circular prohibiting all officers from interfering at elections. A right to be there! why, he was not even a voter! [Sir ARTHUR BULLER: Yes, he was.] If he was he had no right to interfere. He, however, did so, and towards the conclusion of his letter he says he was leaving the Town Hall when a gentleman came up to him and said he would report his conduct to the Board of Admiralty, for what lie had done that day, and his reply was, "You are quite welcome; send me the letter, and I will forward it myself." Can you imagine anything more improper than that Admiral Robinson, having violated the rules of the service, should have made such a reply to a person who complained to him of his conduct? But it shows to me, and I think it must appear clear to
  1400
  the House, that he knew no fault would be found with him by the Admiralty; and to show that no fault was found with him, in the following year—1860—he was, I stated the other night, appointed "our trusty and well-beloved Commissioner" to go down to the borough of Devonport and inquire into the control and management of the dockyard, and in the following year he was appointed Controller of the Navy. As to the hon. and gallant Member for Wake-field, and the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty, who will probably read a letter each to the House, perhaps the House will be so indulgent as to allow me to read a statement which I have received from Devonport confirmatory of my statement. It was from the gentleman who proposed me on the second occasion, and who is a gentleman of great influence and standing in the borough. The letter says—
  "Admiral Robinson may say what he pleases about his not being at the hustings and taking part in the election proceedings you mention. You might get fifty people at least to swear to the fact, if necessary. His appearance there in the uniform of his rank excited my own attention, and I condemned the proceedings as improper to our friends, both at the hustings and after. You will understand that Admiral Robinson was not a voter at the election you mention."
  I have another letter from a leading supporter of his at Devonport, who says —
  "The fact is that Admiral Robinson wore the uniform of a captain in the navy, which rank he then held, and it is a quibble to say he was not in full uniform. Admiral Robinson cheered, waved his pocket-handkerchief, and was as excited as the most extreme and violent partisan in the room. Why, he was the observed among observers. I heard men near me cry 'Shame.' On hearing that cry I inquired who the captain in uniform was. I have heard admirals and captains in Her Majesty's navy speak in the strongest terms of his conduct on that day. You may make what use you like of this; and if my statement is not enough to justify yours, why there are hundreds of Whigs who will back you out."
  [A laugh.] And I have this morning received a statement from several most respectable persons at Devonport to the following effect:—
  "Devonport, March 2, 1864." We, the undersigned, beg to state, that at the nomination of Sir Arthur Buller in August, 1859, Captain Robinson, who was then Captain of the Steam Reserve at this port, was in the Town Hall, in the uniform of his rank, taking a very prominent part in the proceedings by standing up in a most conspicuous place, cheering and waving his white pocket-handkerchief. The Town Hall was crammed, consequently Captain Robinson must have been there before the proceedings commenced and remained until the close, as it was utterly impossible for him to have got to the place where he stood (upon the high benches), unless he had

  1401
  been admitted to the hall before the public were let in. We saw him when we entered the hall, and his being there in uniform was generally remarked upon and considered as highly indecorous and improper. Five hundred persons will corroborate this statement.

  "FRED. ROW, M.D.

  GEORGE H. E. RUNDLE.

  "JOHN C. THIERENS.

  WILLIAM OLIVER.

  "JOSIAH G. UNCROP.

  W. P. SWAIN.

  "THOMAS H. HAWKER.

  JOHN GREENWOOD."

  My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wakefield says Admiral Robinson was not there in full uniform. What I meant was, that he wore an officer's dress with buttons and lace upon it. I do not mean to say he had a cocked hat and a sword on, because it was not likely he would have worn them. After the letters I have read I hope the House will say that I have not made my statement on light grounds, and that I have only done my duty in bringing it forward. I wish with all my heart poor Augustus Stafford had been spared to be sitting on these benches. Yes, he was a persecuted, and, politically speaking, a murdered man, and his bitterest enemies were the Duke of Somerset and Sir Baldwin Walker—men who I have proved have violated that law ten times more than he did. It is true that the man who preferred the charges against him (Sir Benjamin Hall) went up to the House of Lords, and poor Augustus Stafford went down into the grave—a broken-hearted man—cruelly persecuted to death by two Whigs, who I have proved have violated the law; and Sir, the Duke of Somerset, who is made such a parade of in the Report I have quoted, has rewarded Admiral Robinson for outraging public decency in Devonport, by appointing him Controller of the Navy in the room of Sir Baldwin Walker, who, at the Duke of Somerset's instigation, has fled across the seas to prevent his being examined before a Committee of this House. I now beg to ask the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty the Questions of which I have given notice— Whether Admiral Robinson, the present Controller of the Navy, attended the nomination of candidates at the Devonport election in 1859 in the uniform of his rank as Captain of the Steam Reserve, and took an active part in the proceedings; and whether, in doing so, he acted in defiance of the rules laid down by the Admiralty for the control and management of the naval service?
  SIR JOHN HAYsaid, that as he had been alluded to he thought it right to explain before the noble Lord the Secretary
  1402
  of the Admiralty replied to the questions of the hon. Member for Devonport, the part which he had taken in this matter, and how it was that he had anything to do with it that evening. He might say—since there is sometimes (and very naturally so) a forgetfulness as to details of subjects brought under discussion—he might say, that on a former occasion he went to the hon. Member for Devonport, and asked him whether he meant that Admiral Robinson was present with a cocked hat, sword, and epaulettes, which appeared to him a very absurd thing; and he certainly understood the hon. Member to reply that Admiral Robinson was in full dress, which to a naval man meant a cocked hat, sword, and epaulettes. ["Oh!"]
  MR. FERRAND: I beg to say I never alluded to cocked hat, sword, and epaulettes.
  SIR JOHN HAYsaid, that of course the hon. Member was right in his recollection, but the impression made on him was that the hon. Member affirmed that Admiral Robinson was in full dress. Perhaps his hon. Friend did not know the exact difference in naval uniforms. But he mentioned to the hon. Member the cocked hat, sword, and epaulettes, because it struck him as too absurd to suppose a naval officer would stand up like a parish beadle at an election, and he asked the question to make sure whether he had understood him rightly or not, It frequently happened that persons connected with the Admiralty attended the House, and as it was the first night of the Naval Estimates, Admiral Robinson happened to be in the gallery when the hon. Member made the statement which they were now discussing. He (Sir John Hay) went to Admiral Robinson and said, "What on earth is this you have been doing? Can you explain it at all?" Admiral Robinson had not made two statements to him. The expression used was that there was not a word of truth—he did not mean it at all disparagingly to the hon. Member in reference to his being there in full dress. Further than that, Admiral Robinson had written a letter containing a full account of the whole proceeding, and he had shown it to the hon. Member, because there was one quotation which, as it would not be strictly in order, the hon. Member would not object to his omitting it. The letter was as follows:—
  "As you have asked me about the Devonport election of 1859, let me state in a few words what

  1403
  I know about it. The only circumstance which made any impression upon me is this:—As I was leaving the Town Hall after the election, with my wife, who had gone there with a friend to hear the speeches, a stranger came up to me and said he should write to the Admiralty to say that he had seen me in the hall in uniform. I very civilly offered to forward his letter, and to certify to the fact that I had been there, as I had a perfect right to be. I never, of course, heard a word more upon the subject, or ever gave it a thought. I was dressed in a frock coat and cap, a dress I always wore on all occasions, according to rule, when within the limits of the port. You and every naval officer know that it was impossible I could have worn a cocked hat, sword, and epaulettes, except at a court-martial and in full dress. Epaulettes were worn only with an evening coat or in full dress. The story is too absurd, and it is not true. I assert that on whatever occasion I was in the Town Hall I was dressed as I have described; that I had a perfect right to be there— the same right that I had to be present, as a listener, at any public meeting lawfully assembled. I took no part whatever in the proceedings, any more than I do when I am under the gallery of the House of Commons. The Mayor of Devonport, at that time, does not even recollect that I was in the hall at all, much less does he remember being applied to by Mr. Ferrand on account of my interrupting him. The whole subject has so completely passed from my mind that I cannot recall the place where I stood. I know it was in the gallery, and that there was a great crowd, with the usual laughing and shouting accompanying election speeches. It is preposterous to suppose that the Duke of Somerset knew that I had any political opinions whatever. I may add that, as Captain of the Reserve, I had no charge, power, authority, or influence whatever in the dockyards. It is different, as you know, now, but in 1859 it was as I say. I really thought the whole story too absurd to ask any one to contradict it in the House, but these are the facts, and you may make what use of them you please."
  That was the note in question. It was a note written to him, unasked for, in consequence of the conversation which he had with Admiral Robinson, as he had before stated. It appeared to him to be almost a private note; but as the hon. Gentleman had requested him to read it, and as Admiral Robinson gave him permission to make what use of it he pleased, he thought it desirable to read it to the House. He should like to say a few words on the case. It must be remarked that Admiral Robinson was at that time Captain Robinson, of the Steam Reserve; that as Captain of the Steam Reserve he had no power in the dockyard; lie was merely the captain of a ship lying in Hamoaze. He polled at eight o'clock before he went down to his duty, and he believed he polled for the hon. Baronet the Member for Devonport (Sir Arthur Buller.) He was not sure whether it was on the same occasion; but, on the occasion in question, Admiral Robinson
  1404
  came to the meeting to join a party of friends and to see the fun which was going on, and he did not take any special part in the proceedings. Such was the Admiral's statement to him, and he must say he believed what the Admiral told him. A great deal had been said against Sir Baldwin Walker. He believed Sir Baldwin Walker to be a very able and a very zealous officer. He did not intend to go into the question which had been often mooted as to his conduct, but he was quite sure that Sir Baldwin Walker was one of the most honourable men in the profession, and that he was one of the most capable admirals whom we had afloat. He thought his noble Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty owed Sir Baldwin Walker a word in defence, because he rather thought that any slackness in the Controller's department in reference to filling up vacancies, was owing to a charge made by the noble Lord, about five millions of money, which the clerks in the office were endeavouring to discover. If there was any neglect in filling up the appointments, it was partly owing to the attention paid to the noble Lord, who was then sitting on the Opposition side of the House, and was a very ardent naval reformer. Whatever might be said of the conduct of various Cabinet Ministers in reference to elections at Totness or Tamworth, he thought the Duke of Somerset, in making naval appointments, was not unduly influenced by political motives, and he was happy to bear testimony to the noble Duke's conduct in that respect.
  LORD CLARENCE PAGET: I thank the hon. and gallant Member for Wake-field for his noble and kind defence, both of Admiral Robinson and Sir Baldwin Walker. It does him infinite credit, because it shows that he puts aside party feelings, and wishes to do justice when anything like slanderous attacks are made upon honourable men. I need add but a few words. I wish to subscribe to what the hon. and gallant Officer has said in reference to the delay in the promotions. I believe, if any one was to blame, it was myself. In the spring of 1859, Sir Baldwin Walker was very much occupied in making the necessary preparations for the armour-plated ships which were then about to be constructed under the direction of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich, and was likewise extremely troubled about the accounts. When in that year I made the Motion relative to the cost of the

  1405
  construction of our ships, it was construed I in a manner which I never intended. It was construed into a suspicion that the money had been squandered, or, even worse, had been misapplied. But that was not my meaning or my intention, nor did I ever entertain such a suspicion. That suspicion was, however, fostered by more than one hon. Member, and Sir Baldwin Walker naturally felt anxious about the matter, and he put the strength of his department on the work of getting out the accounts, which caused the delay in the promotions. I was only then able to form my opinion of the cost of the construction of our ships from the imperfect information that we possessed at that time, and I explained that what I desired were accounts on the table showing what our ships cost. In the absence of any accounts, I had gone carefully into the matter for the last few years, and made such accounts as I could; but I asked the Admiralty to explain them in detail, asserting that I could not make out how the money was expended. I may have been right or wrong, but I state this now in order to account for the fact of delay in those promotions. After all the assertions, however, as to the delay in those promotions, when we came to sift the thing to the bottom, I find that the delay was very inconsiderable. It is quite true that there were a great many promotions just after the present Government came into office. Those promotions arose in this way:— First, proposals for the dockyards in March contained recommendations for seventy-three acting appointments. The persons proposed were authorized on the 11th of March, by an Admiralty order, to be provisionally employed pending the results of examination to be held. The result of the examination was sent up in May. It was referred to Devonport for explanation, and was returned to the Controller's Office on the 18th of June, and submitted to the Board on the 2nd of July. Therefore, out of all these promotions, the only delay was from the 18th of June to the 2nd of July; and, as every one knows that in the dockyards very careful investigation is necessary to insure a proper choice of persons for promotion, I do not think that delay was of any great consequence. I endeavoured to ascertain whether there could be any foundation for the statement that promotions had been kept back, as stated by the hon. Member for Devonport, with a view to their being made by the
  1406
  Duke of Somerset, in lieu of my right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington). Now here, I think, is a proof that the allegation is utterly without foundation. On inquiry, I found that in the first six months of 1859, while my right hon. Friend was at the head of the Admiralty, 106 promotions were made; in the last six months of that year 151 were promoted. That fact I mention, to show that Sir Baldwin Walker had no political object in keeping back the promotions. I admit the delay, and also that I am partly to blame for it; but it is likewise chargeable in part, I think, to the fact that the right hon. Gentleman (Sir John Pakington) occupied Sir Baldwin Walker very much in the preparation of plans for armour-plated ships. I will not go back to the unfounded and slanderous attacks on that gallant Officer, which have been alluded to by the hon. Gentleman opposite. I would rather take Sir Baldwin Walker's word than that Gentleman's oath. [Loud cries of "Oh! oh!"] Lord Clarence Paget having resumed his seat—
  SIR WILLIAM FRASER: I beg to move that the words just used be taken down.
  LORD CLARENCE PAGET: If I have said a ything unparliamentary ["Oh! oh!"], I have only done so in defence— [Cries of "Move" and "take down the words."]
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: I rise to order. I hope the necessity for taking down the words will be averted by the noble Lord recalling the hasty expression which, I am sure, he could only have used in the heat of debate.
  LORD CLARENCE PAGET: Well, Sir, in deference to the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman and to the House I shall be glad to retract that expression. But, at the same time, I wish in the strongest possible Parliamentary language that I can use to express my abhorrence of the attack made upon one of our bravest officers, who is serving the country now at the other end of the world, and who has served it for a long course of years with honour and dignity. I am positive that the assertion as to his having politically murdered a lamented friend of mine is utterly without foundation. Sir, with regard to Admiral Robinson having attended the election at Devonport, my hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) has stated the circumstances of the case. I can only say, that from all I can learn—and I have the evidence of several impartial people—

  1407
  that Admiral Robinson only appeared in uniform at what is called the declaration of the poll, when the election is virtually over. The question is—was he there in contravention of any orders of the Admiralty? Sir, I know of no order forbidding an officer in the navy to go and see the fun that is going on, provided he does not take part in the election. It was well known that the election in which the hon. Member was to take part would produce great excitement, that strong assertions would be made; great curiosity was felt, especially on the part of the ladies, and a strong desire to be present. My gallant friend, Admiral Robinson, went as a spectator, and not in any other capacity. I believe his word; and I do not think he took any part in the election beyond recording his vote. I, therefore, attach no weight to statements affecting so distinguished and gallant an officer of the navy who is not here to defend himself. In answer to the Question put to me by the hon. Member, I have to say that Admiral Robinson, the present Controller of the Navy, when captain of the Steam Reserve at Devonport, did appear at the election in the uniform of his rank, but did not take an active part in the proceedings.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: Sir, I have been so much referred to, both by my hon. Friend behind me and by the noble Lord opposite, that perhaps I ought to say a few words on this question. With regard to the statement that a great number of appointments in Devonport dockyard were kept back in 1859, as my hon. Friend says, for political reasons—at this distance of time, and not being aware that my hon. Friend meant to appeal to me, I cannot pretend to speak with accuracy as to what occurred. As far as I can trust my memory, I believe that when I left office in 1859, a very considerable number of appointments had been kept back by the Controller of the Navy — Sir Baldwin Walker. But the House will recollect that those appointments passed through the hands of my right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry) as Secretary to the Admiralty, and that as First Lord I had nothing to do with them. What the motives of Sir Baldwin Walker may have been, of course, I do not know, and cannot presume to say. I have not sufficient information to justify me in giving an opinion. But I am bound to say this—that I believe it was constantly the habit of my right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone—who is, unfortunately,
  1408
  prevented from attending to-night by domestic circumstances—to make these appointments on the recommendation of Sir Baldwin Walker, and to take his recommendation as conclusive, reserving only to himself the right of investigation in any case where he might see reasons for prosecuting inquiries. It is only due to Sir Baldwin Walker to say, that if this was the constant habit of my right hon. Friend, it is difficult to see what political motives could have influenced that gallant officer to keep back the appointments. In the position which I held, I naturally had very constant communications with Sir Baldwin Walker, and whatever his conduct on former occasions may have been, or whatever his motives in this particular instance—of which, of course, I can know nothing—I feel bound to say that not once merely, but more than once, he gave me the most distinct assurances, as a gentleman and as a man of honour, that he was not in any way influenced in what he did by political motives. The other portion of my hon. Friend's question refers to the conduct of Admiral Robinson. I think the question raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wakefield is, if he will allow me to say so, one of very minor importance. The question is, not whether Admiral Robinson had on a cocked hat or one of a different kind—the real question is, whether he appeared publicly on the scene of a contested election at Devonport in his uniform as captain of the Steam Reserve? My noble and gallant Friend opposite says it is true Admiral Robinson went there, but that he went merely as a spectator. I am well aware of the high professional reputation of Admiral Robinson; he is a very distinguished and able man; but I must say, and I think the feeling of the House will endorse the assertion, that Admiral Robinson would have acted with much sounder discretion had he abstained from presenting himself in uniform on that occasion. The complaint as to party and political influences in our dockyards is an old and very distressing one. Reference has been made to the order issued by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir Francis Baring). I have always thought that order did great credit to the right hon. Gentleman. It is quite clear he found the evil existing, or he would never have issued it. We have had reason to believe to-night that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Sir Charles Wood) found similar grounds of

  1409
  complaint. During the short time that I was First Lord of the Admiralty, I received constant complaints of the extent to which party influence and party injustice, and, I must say, party oppression was carried in the dockyards. So urgent were those representations that they induced me to issue a circular, drawn up in the strongest terms I could use, to forbid interference by any officers concerned for the Government in these yards. The matter is a difficult one to restrain; but it is the duty of every Minister, and of every individual having authority in these dockyards, to repress the influences which have so long been the subject of complaint. I therefore think the precedent was peculiarly unfortunate which was established by an officer so distinguished as Admiral Robinson, when, led away for the moment, as I am willing to believe, by political feeling, and with no intention of committing any impropriety, he presented himself at a place and on an occasion where much greater discretion would have been shown had he felt that his uniform ought not to be seen.
  SIR ARTHUR BULLERsaid, he was present and played a considerable part in the proceedings in question, and knew the exact circumstances under which Admiral Robinson appeared on the occasion in question. The hon. Member for Devonport charged Admiral Robinson with having been present at the nomination and interfering, he then being in high authority in the dockyard. Now I beg the hon. Member will recollect, that at that time Captain Robinson held no position higher than that of simple captain of a ship, and had no authority whatever in the dockyard.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: The hon. Gentleman, I am sure, does not wish to state anything in the least degree incorrect. But an officer at the head of the Steam Reserve of a port cannot, I think, be spoken of accurately as "merely captain of a ship."
  SIR ARTHUR BULLER: The commander of the Steam Reserve at the time had no power in the dockyard, although new functions had since been added to the office. At all events, he had no electioneering power. He had no authority, direct or indirect, over any class of voters in the dockyard. Admiral Robinson, no doubt, went to the election and I apprehend that as an elector he had a perfect right to do so, provided he had leave of absence from his ship. That
  1410
  leave he had taken the precaution to obtain from his superior officer, and so was present at the nomination. He went simply to hear the fun of which there was reason to expect an ample store. He was not disappointed in that expectation; but it was a little unfair of the very person who provoked the merriment to complain of its expression. There were many hon. Gentlemen present, he believed, who had had occasion to smile at the exhibitions of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ferrand) in that House, but I can assure them that these are miserable and tame proceedings in comparison with his poluphloisboious performances on the hustings. Admiral Robinson is free to admit that he did laugh on that occasion; that he laughed heartily; but he kept within the legitimate bounds of honest laughter; and he declared upon his honour that he did nothing whatever to disturb, as it was called, the proceedings. He (Sir Arthur Buller) declared, upon his honour, that he was present at the time, that he did not see Admiral Robinson do anything of the kind, and he declared further, that if he had done any such thing he must inevitably have seen it. The hon. Gentleman complained of the mayor as being a Whig, and, like all other Whigs, refusing to do his duty. The mayor had a distinct recollection that no reference whatever was made to him as to the conduct of Admiral Robinson, and that it was impossible for the Admiral to have interfered in the proceedings without his knowledge. Admiral Robinson certainly did not interrupt the proceedings, and it was in the highest degree improbable that he should have done so, because at the close of the proceedings on the very day in question, his hon. Colleague (Mr. Ferrand) proposed, and he (Sir Arthur Buller) seconded, a vote of thanks to the mayor for his impartial conduct. Two days afterwards, at the declaration of the poll, he (Sir Arthur Buller) proposed, and his hon. Colleague seconded a similar vote.! At the nomination of Sir Michael Seymour a week before, his hon. Colleague, in proposing a vote of thanks to the same mayor, declared that, although he was opposed to him (Mr. Ferrand) in politics, he had behaved in a most honourable and gentlemanly manner, and that his character and conduct gave them reason to be proud of having such a person to preside over them. He (Sir Arthur Buller) was confirmed in his statement by several of the most respectable persons in Devonport, including

  1411
  the mayor and town clerk, that Admiral Robinson did not take part in the proceedings in any offensive way, or in the way described by the hon. Gentleman. The statement of his hon. Colleague was also flatly contradicted by Admiral Robinson himself.
  LORD JOHN MANNERS: The hon. Baronet who has just sat down has contented himself by proving a negative. He says, he never saw Captain Robinson act in the way described. [Sir ARTHUR BULLER: I said, I must have seen him if he had done so.] The hon. Gentleman forgets that, in contested elections, many things could have happened without the hon. Baronet seeing them; and I think the House will not be satisfied because Captain Robinson, after the lapse of four or five years, says he does not remember acting in the way the hon. Gentleman states he saw him act. I think that the documents read by the hon. Member for Devonport, especially the one signed by eight or nine gentlemen of Devonport, were clear and distinct upon the subject; and, supported by the clear and distinct statement of my hon. Friend himself, there can be no reasonable doubt in any man's mind, that Captain Robinson was led away by the fervour of his political feelings, and carried into a manifestation of those feelings in the way adverted to by my hon. Friend. But the practical point is this:—We are likely before very long to have a general Election, and we have been favoured by the noble Lord opposite with his view of the duties of Government officials in dockyard boroughs at elections. The Secretary of the Admiralty does not think it is contrary to the instructions of the Admiralty that an officer holding any public appointment should attend an election in uniform if he do not take any part in it. He says, that Captain Robinson attended this election, but took no active part in it, and that he did not therefore violate the instructions of the Admiralty. But I understood the noble Lord to admit that, if Captain Robinson had taken an active part in an election, he would, to that extent, have failed in his duty to the Admiralty. I want to know how far a naval officer, who manifests his anxiety that one candidate should be elected and the other defeated—I ask how far, under such circumstances, he may take part in a contested election? I hold that to be a practical question; and I am afraid that if a general election were to take place after this discussion, we should find in the
  1412
  dockyards of this country more naval gentlemen holding situations under Her Majesty's Government who would think themselves perfectly justified in taking what ordinary mortals would consider an active part, though, not in the estimation of the noble Lord, an offensive part, in the contests. I therefore think the question is one of practical importance. With respect to the language in which the noble Lord has indulged, I must say for myself that I think my hon. Friend has done well in bringing the subject before the House. I know perfectly well what would have been said if Admiral Robinson had appeared on the other side of the hustings; and, distasteful as it is to me personally to enter into these topics, I am grateful to any one who stands up in this House and shows that the party who sit on this side do not intend to allow gentlemen on the other side of the House a monopoly of electioneering purity, and enjoy entire and permanent immunity for such conduct as has been brought under our notice to-night. I admire the pluck and courage which my hon. Friend (Mr. Ferrand) has displayed, and I hope he will not be deterred from showing up proceedings of this kind whenever they may occur.
  MR. BERNAL OSBORNE: Sir, Parliament is so singularly dull, so singularly devoid of any object of public interest, that I am not surprised that the hon. Gentleman on the other side should have thought to enliven our debates by introducing an electioneering brawl in the borough of Devonport—for this is nothing more nor less than a brawl brought before the consideration of Parliament. I have nothing whatever to say to the question on the paper with regard to the conduct of Admiral Robinson, except that I believe him to be a most distinguished officer, and in every way deserving the credence of the House. But when the noble Lord on the other side (Lord John Manners) rises in his place, and congratulates the hon. Member for Devonport and the House for the pluck and courage—for these were his words—which have been displayed by his hon. Friend the Member for Devonport, I must say that I cannot congratulate the House on the "pluck" that abuses and maligns absent men, or the "courage" that never withdraws an imputation or makes an apology when he is proved to be wrong. Such is not my notion either of pluck or courage; and I would remind the House, and the noble Lord who has this idea of the British

  1413
  pluck and courage of his hon. Friend, that this is not the only occasion on which he has maligned and misrepresented men as honest and as honourable as himself. Sir, with regard to Sir Baldwin Walker, whose acquaintance I am proud of possessing, when I heard the hon. Gentleman impugning the conduct of this honest officer and honourable gentleman, although regretting the fire displayed by my noble Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty, I could not be surprised at it. If ever there was a man who deserved well of his country for the real pluck and courage, and the ability he has shown as a public servant, it is Admiral Walker. And when the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ferrand) has the face to say that he ran away from his charges, I venture to doubt whether, with all his pluck and courage, the hon. Gentleman would have dared to make that charge before Sir Baldwin Walker's face. When, too, I heard that miserable and lukewarm apology from the right hon. Gentleman late the First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir John Pakington), I felt utterly ashamed that he should have got up and, in that "lean and slippered pantaloon" way, have made an apology for Sir Baldwin Walker which the gallant officer would have been the first to reprehend. The right hon. Gentleman ought to have known that it was impossible for any man connected with the Admiralty, at any time or place, to know what Admiral Walker's polities were. He was a good public servant, but, as I know, he never interfered in any way with politics or the unjust disposition of patronage. Sir, if our public servants are to be treated in this way, and if all the brawls incidental to an election are to be thus brought forward— why, I might as well go into the old story of the right hon. Gentleman's conduct to me at Dover. I have forgiven him that conduct, and why should not the hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport be equally forgiving, instead of making his seat in this House a tool for aspersing the character of public men? I did not intend to say a single word in this discussion, had it not been for the attack made by the hon. Member for Devonport; but I should feel myself unworthy of a seat in this House if I were to remain silent when I see the character of an officer of the highest standing impugned, and I might say his personal honour insulted, as it has been by the hon. Gentleman.

  ARMY-INSTRUCTION OF SOLDIERS IN TRADES-RESOLUTION,
  SIR HARRY VERNEY,in rising, pursuant to notice, to move—
  "That it is expedient that the recommendations contained in the Report of the Committee on the proper means for the Instruction and Employment of Soldiers and their Children in Trades, and of the Under Secretary of State in a letter to the Quartermaster General, Horse Guards, dated 23rd May, 1862, be carried into effect,"
  said, that the matter was one of great importance to the efficiency of the army. In 1861 the late Sir George Lewis appointed a Committee for the purpose of investigating the subject, and the Committee addressed questions to officers of all ranks, with the view of obtaining a perfectly impartial statement of opinion. It should be observed that the Instructions which were drawn up by Sir George Lewis were of the most liberal and impartial kind, and that his desire was not so much to have his own preconceived opinions confirmed as to have such a result produced as would contribute to the general efficiency of the army. Replies were sent by a great number of officers, and many of those replies were of great length and went very much into detail. There was but one distinguished officer who replied in the negative to the inquiries addressed to him, and that was Sir George Brown. With that exception, all the replies were favourable to the increased employment of soldiers in trades. Sir George Wetherall, Sir John Burgoyne, General Hutchinson, Sir Percy Douglas, and Colonel Simmons, of Aldershot, were all favourable to the project. The only objection of any weight to the employment of soldiers in trades was that soldiers who could earn money by trades would be likely to quit the army the sooner; but Sir Percy Douglas grappled with that objection, and contended that, though the loss of good soldiers was a thing to be regretted, yet the benefit of attracting good men into the army, by holding out to them a prospect of being able to provide for themselves whenever they might leave, was so great as to outweigh any disadvantage on the other side. It was well known what the French soldiers could do in the various trades. When he was last in a French camp an officer took him round, and, showing him an eagle, said, "Everything in the camp, except that eagle, was made by the soldiers." He would direct the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington),

  1415
  to this point; what n great saving of expense might be effected in employing soldiers to make their uniforms and to execute the various repairs in barracks. He should like to see the noble Lord signalize the commencement of his career, which he trusted would be one honourable to himself and beneficial to the country, by a reform of that kind. It had been remarked over and over again, that the morality of the soldier would be greatly increased by giving him increased employment, and there was nothing the House had more at heart than the moral improvement of the soldier. They had reason to suppose that some measures calculated to improve the moral condition of both services would be introduced by the War Office and the Admiralty, and nothing would contribute more to the morality of the soldier than to provide him with employment. To prove what might be done by soldiers, Sir John Burgoyne had instanced the great works of defence at Antwerp, which had been executed by soldiers. The Report of the Committee concluded with the opinion of Sir Hugh Rose, who had introduced the system largely into India, and with the utmost success. Sir Hugh said he found the men very desirous of being employed in their trades, and, though those who were so employed were able to earn considerably more than others not so employed, not one case of drunkenness among them had ever been brought to his notice. The workmanship, too, was superior to that of native mechanics, and several articles of furniture which could not be produced by the Natives were turned out by men of the regiment. In the early part of the evening the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. H. Baillie) had referred to the condition of the soldiers in India, and he should like to read an extract upon that subject. The commanding officer of the 91st Highlanders in India, by taking measures for the amusement, employment, and occupation of his men, reduced the number of district court-martials among between 900 and 1,000 men from 50 to 13, and the regimental court-martials from 105 to 48, and never had a case of flogging during six years. What he desired was, that the House of Commons should express their opinion that more employment should be introduced among the soldiers, because, if they did that, the Horse Guards would, no doubt, be induced to push the matter further than they had hitherto done. The hon. Member was then about to make his Motion, when—
  MR. SPEAKERsaid, the hon. Member would not be in order in moving.
  Main Question put, and agreed to.

  SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES.
  SUPPLY considered in Committee.
  (In the Committee.)
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that before he asked the Committee to agree to the Resolution with which he should conclude by moving, it was fair that he should state, that he should that evening have to lay upon the table a supplementary Estimate for the year 1863–4, which in a few days he should ask the House to vote. The gross amount of that Estimate would be about £400,000; but he must explain to the Committee that a very large part of that sum, £119,000, was merely a matter of account with the Indian Government. Payments to that amount had to be made to the Indian Government; but, on the other hand, re-payments would during the year be received from them to the amount of £300,000, which would be paid into the Exchequer. The remainder of the supplementary Estimate would consist chiefly of unforeseen expenses, chiefly connected with the war which was now going on in New Zealand. Of course, there was no intention to ask the Committee to vote that Estimate tonight; but, as he had not been able to lay it on the table, he thought that it was fair, before asking the House to vote money for the ensuing year, to inform them of the Votes they were to be asked to agree to for the year now expiring.
  The Estimate which he had now to introduce to the Committee amounted to£14,844,888. Comparing it with the Estimate for the current year 1863–4, which amounted to£15,060,237, there was a reduction of£215,349. If they still further compared the Estimate for the present year with the Estimate for 1862–3, which amounted to £15,672,730, the reduction in this year's Estimate would amount to £827,842. He would also, with the permission of the Committee, make one more comparison between the Estimate of this and former years. He would compare this year's Estimate with that for 1861–2, which was the year, during time of peace, in which our army expenditure reached its highest level. The Estimate for that year amounted to £15,883,000; therefore there was this year a reduction, compared with 1861–2, of £1,038,112. The comparison

  1417
  was still more favourable in an economical point of view if he deducted, as he was entitled to do, from the gross sum he was about to ask the Committee to vote for the present year, the sums which it was calculated would be repaid into the Exchequer, and which might be taken in aid of the Estimate of the year. Making those allowances, the amount of the Estimate which he was about to move would be £13,520,446. The actual expenditure (not the Estimate, but the expenditure) for 1861–2 amounted to £15,883,160; so that upon the present Estimate there was a reduction of no less than £2,362,714. From what had been said that evening by the hon. Member for Inverness and other hon. Members, it appeared that Government were likely this year, contrary to the usual course in Committee of Supply, to be found fault with for going too far in the direction of reduction. He fully admitted that the Estimates which he was going to move were peace Estimates. The Government had not based their Estimates upon the supposition that the country was likely soon to be involved in war. If hon. Gentlemen opposite entertained a contrary expectation, it seemed to him that they ought to say so at once. They ought to condemn the policy of the Government, which had been announced as a peace policy, and not the Estimates, which, being those of a Government which had announced a peace policy, were essentially peace Estimates. Although we had arrived at a reduction of something like £2,300,000 since the year of highest military expenditure, the Committee would not require to be reminded that there had been a large increase in our military expenditure comparing it with its rate previous to the Crimean war. The excess of our Estimates this year over those of 1853–4, the year before the Crimean war, was about £4,500,000. The Committee ought to consider what were the causes which had produced this large increase of expenditure. During the Crimean war it was found that the organization of our army was in many respects extremely defective. In fact, it would hardly be going too far to say that many branches of our military organization entirely broke down. The House and the country immediately determined that those defects should be remedied, no matter at what cost. Very great alterations and improvements had since been effected, and those alterations and improvements had, necessarily, led to a
  1418
  largely increased expenditure. But he did not believe that the House and the country ever contemplated that the Estimates were permanently and in future years to range at so high an amount as they did immediately following the Crimean war. It was thought that it was time the country should reap some of the benefits of the large expenditure which had been incurring for so many years, and that the high level which that expenditure had reached should be gradually reduced. He, therefore, thought that he might claim the support of the Committee if the Government had attempted, in the Estimates he was about to submit to them, not to break through the course of gradual reduction, which it had been the object of the Government to accomplish in each successive year, and if they had, therefore, been obliged to exercise a somewhat strict economy and saving this year. He thought that, though a comparison had been made in several ways and on different occasions, it might not he uninteresting to the Committee to hear an explanation of the excess of the present Votes over the Estimates of 1853–4. As he had stated, the sum which had to be accounted for was £4,684,000. There was first to be deducted from that sum the repayment from the Indian Government, amounting to £970,000, in the shape of a capitation grant for services formerly performed by the Indian Government. This deduction reduced the sum to be accounted for to £3,714,000. Since 1853–4 the number of the Militia force and the expenditure on it had nearly doubled, and the Volunteer force was completely new. Those items together caused an increase in the expenditure of £650,000. That reduced the sum to be accounted for to £3,064,000. In accounting for that sum he would first take £1,000,000, the additional expenditure of this year over that of ten years ago under the head of warlike stores, occasioned by the improved arms introduced into every branch of the service. Since that time the Enfield rifle had been placed in the hands of the whole army, instead of comparatively a small portion, and it had, therefore, been found possible, in the present year and in the last two or three years, to reduce the Votes for stores, because the reserves had been raised up to their proper complement. Still, it was evident that the annual expense to keep the army supplied with the Enfield rifle must be very much more than that which

  1419
  was occasioned by the supply of the old musket. The introduction of arms of precision had led to increased expenditure for ammunition and practice. Not only was there an enormous amount of ammunition consumed by the regular army in practice, but the Volunteers and Militia, amounting to a force, added to the regular army, of 400,000 men, used a very large quantity of ammunition, which occasioned an increased expenditure. Moreover, since the time to which he had been referring, the Armstrong gun had been introduced. A great number of batteries were completely armed with them, and a large number of the guns was besides in the hands of the troops. The same necessity for practice as was felt in the case of the Enfield rifle was experienced in respect to the Armstrong gun; and the consequence was that a very much greater quantity of ammunition, and that, too, of an expensive character, was fired away in the course of the year than formerly, in the days of the old field-pieces. In addition to these circumstances, it must be borne in mind that the numerical strength of the army had been very largely increased; and he did not think, considering the expensive nature of the alterations made in the equipment of the army, that the increase of a million for warlike stores was very much to be wondered at. The next item he had to deduct was one peculiar to the present year. He took the sum of £500,000 as about the amount which New Zealand would cost this country more than in 1854. These deductions reduced the sum he had to account for to £1,564,000. The remainder would be accounted for by the strength of the army having been numerically increased. That increase since 1853 had been between 25,000 and 30,000 men. He did not take into account the number falling on Indian depôts. Exclusive of the Indian depôts the increase had been 17,000 men and 4,000 horses, at a charge of £600,000; leaving the sum to be accounted for this year, compared with expenditure of 1853, £964,000. He would not weary the Committee by stating the exact amounts of the items composing this sum of £964,000. The items consisted of good conduct pay, additional expenses for recruiting, and for experimental services. An improved quality in a number of articles of clothing supplied to the troops cost £124,000, and improvements in the Commissariat cost £120,000. Since 1853 the stoppage for rations had been made uniform all over the
  1420
  world at 4½d., while formerly it was not a fixed sum. Perhaps he might mention, that that expenditure represented a great and substantial benefit to the soldiers. There had also been established a Commissariat staff corps, which discharged the functions formerly performed by contractors, and through this means the quality of the meat supplied to the troops was very much improved. Among the items was one of£150,000 for increased rations, for fuel and light. The item for lodging, partly for officers, and the increased lodging allowance to married soldiers amounted to£70,000. The increase in the item of the medical department was£150,000, and in the educational and religious Vote£125,000. There was an increase, he was sorry to say, in the Vote for the military prison discipline of£25,000. The new items for schools of gunnery and musketry practice, and for the movement of troops for the formation of camps of instruction, amounted to£60,000. Such were the various items which accounted for the increase of the Vote in the present year over the Vote in1853–54; but hon. Members would see that the money had been expended on the improvement of the efficiency of the troops, by giving them better arms and better instruction, or by improving the condition of the soldiers. He believed that it was absolutely necessary that some additional advantages should be offered to the soldiers. The condition of the labourer throughout the whole country was rapidly rising, and unless additional advantages were offered to the soldiers there would have been a difficulty, not perhaps now, but certainly in time of war, in obtaining men for the army. He believed that all changes of this kind were looked on favourably by the country.
  He came now to the Vote which he should move that evening, fixing the number of men for the army. The number of men it was proposed to take this year was 145,654, being a decrease of 1,464 on the number taken last year. As he had stated before, the present Estimate was, and professed to be, a peace Estimate. It was not framed with any immediate prospect that the country was about to enter on a war; and the Government in framing it had deemed itself at liberty to inquire in what direction our military force could be reduced, without to any material extent diminishing its efficiency, while at the same time retaining the power of rapidly increasing

  1421
  its numbers if to do so should be found to be necessary. He did not, he might add, think that the speech of the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. H. Baillie) on the subject, interesting though it was, required from him any very lengthened reply. The first objection which had been taken by the hon. Member to the proposed reduction in the number of troops, was the insufficiency of the force at home to meet the requirements of the service for reliefs in India and the colonies. If, however, the hon. Gentleman would look at the Estimates for this and compare them with those for last year, looking at the explanation by which they were accompanied, he would find that the mode in which the proposed reduction had been arrived at was not by diminishing the number of battalions of infantry, or, in fact, diminishing the infantry at all; on the contrary, the infantry was increased over a thousand men. The hon. Gentleman had correctly stated that the proportion in which it was desirable we should keep up our establishment would be to keep one-third of the number of men at home, so that a regiment might enjoy five years at home in return for ten years foreign service. He had not, however, correctly stated the actual number of battalions of infantry at home and abroad, inasmuch as he put those in India and the colonies down at 107. Now, in making that calculation, the hon. Gentleman would, he thought, find that he had included the West India regiments. [Mr. H. BAILLIE: I stated distinctly that I did not.] Well, he had, at all events, arrived at too great a number of battalions; for the number which was estimated by the War Department taking pay was 41 at home, 45 in the Colonies, and 55 in India. There were, he might add, actually at home at the present moment only 34, but there were four expected in a month or so from the Ionian Islands, while there were three on their way home from India. When these battalions returned there would be at home 41, and in the Colonies and India 45 and 55 respectively. [Mr. H. BAILLIE: I spoke of the number on the 1st of January.] Yes, but during the greater part of the ensuing financial year there would be 41 battalions at home and 100 abroad. It was, however, contended that we ought, under those circumstances, to have 50 battalions at home. But the Committee must bear in mind that four battalions were excep-
  1422
  tionally employed in New Zealand, and that the force at present in Canada was much larger than was generally maintained in that part of the Empire. Still, the argument of the hon. Member for Inverness would go to prove, not exactly anything against the reduction which was proposed, but rather that the number of battalions of infantry ought very considerably to be augmented; and he did not know whether after the Vote of that evening, which showed that the Committee was not in an extremely economic frame of mind, they would not be disposed to agree to a large increase in our army. The Government, however, did not think it would be justified in proposing any such increase. And what, he might ask, was the principle on which it proposed a diminution in our military force? The late Lord Herbert, when proposing in 1860 an increase of 20,000 men in the army—an increase which was called for by the fact of a large number of troops being located in India, and by the determination to disembody the Militia—while he added two brigades of artillery, accomplished the whole of the rest of the increase, not by raising additional battalions, or by augmenting the number of units in the force, but by augmenting the strength of each unit. The reason given by Lord Herbert for that mode of proceeding was, that it was one which made the army most easily susceptible of reduction, if reduction should be required, and that if he were to raise fresh battalions he would be compelled, when he sought to bring about such a reduction, to disband a certain number of battalions—a thing which was always expensive and disagreeble to do—while his power of again raising the army in case of necessity to a war establishment would be greatly impaired. We, in this country, had not, it must be admitted, the same facility in increasing the number of our troops as was possessed by foreign nations, which, having a conscription, carried out the principle to which he was adverting to a very great extent—they kept up the cadres of their regiments—knowing that they could lay their hands at any moment on those conscripts, by whose absence the number of their troops was reduced. Not relying on conscription, we could not, of course, reduce our army so much in proportion to its war strength as other States were able to do. But he still saw no reason why we should not, as far as lay in our power, imitate in that respect their

  1423
  example. Though we could not compel men to enter our military service, yet it had always been found in time of war that, by sufficiently increasing the bounty, we could get any number of men we might require. He had, therefore, no fear that be long as we maintained the number of units in our army, we should have in the event of war an insufficient number of men; and the Government had, under the circumstances, deemed it right to reduce the number for this year, acting on the principle to which he referred. Last year, or the year before, when the number of infantry was reduced, the reduction, for the reasons which he had stated, was not made by battalions, because any such reduction would interfere with the reliefs for service abroad. That reduction was, however— except as to the regiments in New Zealand and China—carried to the lowest point at which it was deemed the efficiency of each battalion could be maintained, it being thought that any further diminution of the numbers would render it a mere skeleton of a battalion. It was, therefore, deemed desirable that the infantry should not, beyond that point, be reduced. But when hon. Members came to consider the numbers in other branches of the service, they must look to the way in which they had increased; and they would find, taking the garrison artillery—the first branch which it was proposed to reduce—that those numbers had been going on continually increasing, without any break, for the last twenty years. In 1843, for instance, we had at home and in the colonies a total of 4,885 garrison artillerymen; the total in 1853 was 9,303, which number had gradually increased, until last year it amounted to 17,629. That number it was proposed this year to reduce to 14,606, which would still leave an increase of 5,000, as compared with the numbers of that arm of the service ten years ago. The increase had been so steady and continuous, that the number they proposed to take for this year was in excess of the number on the establishment in every year except 1863—in excess, if measured, not by the numbers voted, but by the numbers actually borne. There did not appear to be any sound reason why the garrison artillery should be maintained at so high a standard, while other branches of the service were being reduced. In time of war, a field battery consisted of 234 men; but during peace it was fixed at about 130 or 140 men. A field battery would, there-
  1424
  fore, have to recruit its strength very considerably before going into actual service. For some reason or other, of which he was not aware, the batteries of garrison artillery had always been kept during peace on a war footing. They proposed to reduce them only fifteen men per battery, distributing the reduction over ten brigades—or 1,300 men in all. That would still leave the garrison artillery at a much higher proportionate strength than the field batteries, and they would have exactly the same facilities for recruiting up to the war strength should necessity require it. With regard to the cavalry, the increase of late years had not been less rapid than in the garrison artillery. In 1843, our cavalry force at home was 7,949, with one regiment of 386 in the colonies. In 1853, our force at home was 8,690, and that in the colonies 442. In 1863, we had 12,143 cavalry, and the reduction proposed would bring the numbers down to 11,331 next year. This increase had been partly caused by our raising two new regiments; but the main increase had been caused by the addition of a squadron to the establishment of each regiment. That addition of a squadron was called for owing to its being found, during the Crimean war, that the cavalry melted away very fast, and that the three-squadron formation was not suitable for service in the field, and that, to be quite efficient, a regiment must consist of four squadrons. The four squadron organization was therefore adopted, and with that they did not intend to interfere. Finding, however, that we had a force of cavalry very large in comparison to our other arms—and also looking to the fact that there was no question in reference to the reliefs of cavalry, because the cavalry regiments in India were eleven, whilst at home they were seventeen—there was, independent of relief, a force of cavalry at home quite sufficient to furnish the required proportion to any expedition which might be sent out—it seemed to the War Office that as long as the organization of the regiments was retained, the efficiency of the service would not be impaired by a reduction of twelve men per squadron in each regiment; and this reduction they proposed to make. The hon. Member for Inverness having based his reasons against any reduction on the score of reliefs, he (the Marquess of Hartington) must submit that the reduction the Government proposed to make in the cavalry force had nothing to do with the matter. The hon.

  1425
  Member for Inverness then adverted to what he alleged to be the fact, that the influence of England had decreased during the last few years. Without entering on a discussion of that question, which certainly did not at present arise, he would only say that, if that decrease of our influence existed at all, it certainly had not fallen off in consequence of a decrease in our military strength. The force on the establishment had been increased by very nearly 30,000 men; we had also got the Militia and the Volunteers, which hon. Gentlemen opposite might not, perhaps, reckon as very reliable, but which at least added to our sense of security at home, and would set free a great number of regular troops, who would thus be available for any enterprize. For his own part, however, he believed that the influence of England had increased rather than diminished. At any rate, he thought hon. Gentlemen opposite would do well, instead of indulging in vague declamation, to point out any quarrel in which we ought to have taken part, but from which we had improperly held aloof, and to show that our action had been in any way hindered by an insufficiency of military establishments. It was on these grounds that the reduction in the army was proposed. It was a reduction very small in amount, which would not interfere with the organization of the forces, which would not deprive us in the least of the power of recovering the strength with which we were now dispensing, and which would not impair the efficiency of the service. There was one point which, indeed, had not been brought forward in the House, but to which allusion had frequently been made in the newspapers and in conversation—it was said to be most unwise to disband our trained soldiers. It ought to be known, however, that it was not the intention of the Government to disband a single man. The reduction proposed would be accomplished within two or three months, simply by the cessation of recruiting during that period. The only men who would be dismissed were men whom it was desirable to get rid of. Thus not one able, well-drilled man would be dismissed in order to carry out the measure.
  While upon this Resolution, he would explain what had excited some observation —the unusual form in which the Resolution had been presented to the House. Hon. Members were aware that a very considerable change in the form of the
  1426
  Estimates was made last year; and he believed there was a general agreement in the House that the change was for the better, and that it was much easier to understand what money was voted, now that the statement of accounts had been simplified. While the alteration in the arrangement of the Estimates was being effected, the late Secretary of State for War carefully considered whether it would be more expedient to take the number of men, as formerly, in the shape of a Vote, or whether he would adopt the course which he afterwards did adopt, of moving a Resolution as to the number of men, and taking Votes only in respect of money. In choosing the latter course, it never was intended by Sir George Lewis to take away from the House the power of voting the number of men. It was well known that when once the number of men had been agreed upon, a large proportion of the expenses incurred in the Army Estimates would thereafter be passed as a matter of course, and he therefore thought it more simple and more logical to make all the Votes in Committee Votes of money, instead of having a Vote for the men. The Resolution on the present occasion was exactly similar to the one moved last year by Sir George Lewis, and in order to make it strictly regular, notice had been given of it. Now that the officials of the Department all over the Empire had become habituated to the new system, it would, of course, be inconvenient to alter it; but if there was any strong feeling against it in the House, the War Office were not at all wedded to it, and would have no objection to return next year to the original practice. He believed that the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel), would call attention to the number of native Indian troops which it was proposed to pay this year for service in China. Last year these troops were not introduced into the Resolution, nor were they included in the Resolution now before the Committee. The reason was, that the Mutiny Act was founded upon the number of men voted by the House, and it was not intended that those native troops should be under the provisions of the English Mutiny Act. However, if the hon. and gallant Member wished that they should be absolutely voted by the Committee, he believed that Lord de Grey would have no objection to that course being taken.
  The increase which hon. Members would observe in the number of infantry was en-

  1427
  tirely attributable to the New Zealand war. There were ten battalions of infantry serving in New Zealand, and these ten battalions had been raised to the full complement of 1,000 men each, thus causing an increase over the other battalions of 200 per regiment, or 2,000 altogether.
  Having fully explained the amount of the Estimates which he was about to submit, and the number of men he asked for, he would now refer very briefly to some of the minor Votes in the Estimates. There was nothing peculiar or exceptional about the Commissariat Vote; but he might state that the increase which would be noticed in it was to be attributed to the expense of the war in New Zealand. This Vote was explained by the statement which had been circulated with the Estimates—and he would therefore say that the cause of the increase was the high price of provisions, the fact that it was necessary to provide stores at a very great expense in New Zealand, and also to provide a very large increase in the means of transport. The Vote for clothing had been slightly reduced. New arrangements had been made in the establishment, the cost of providing new works and buildings had almost ceased, and the improved superintendence of the clothing department had been attended by a saving. In Vote 4, for Barrack Establishments, there was a decrease, owing to a more economical administration of barrack stores; and here he might remark that the new arrangement of the Estimates had been productive, not only of convenience to hon. Members, but of actual economy in the service. The principle which had been adopted was to make the head of each department of the War Office responsible for the expenditure of the sum voted for it by Parliament. Of course, the chiefs took a greater interest than before in the economical administration of their respective departments, and the result was a reduction in Vote 4, with a well founded belief that when the improved system was applied to the other Votes the same result would follow. An experiment was about to be tried which it was hoped would be productive of good to the troops in the matter of canteens. Formerly, the canteens were let to tenants who, in addition to a fixed rent, paid so much per head of the troops in garrison. It was the interest of these canteen-keepers to make as much money as possible, and for that purpose to supply the troops with inferior liquors at high prices. In 1855 a
  1428
  change was introduced, at a sacrifice of £25,000 per annum to the revenue. From that year tenants were appointed at yearly rents—he was not sure, indeed, whether they paid any rent at all—but under the superintendence of the officers of the regiment. That, of course, was a great improvement, because the officers could exercise some control over the canteen-keepers, and see that they did not sell bad liquors to the troops. But the new system had not been found altogether satisfactory, and an experiment was now proposed which had been tried with good results in India and in one or two colonial stations. It was intended to take away the canteens from tenants altogether and to place each of them under a committee of officers, the object being to supply the troops with the best articles at very small expense, applying the profits, if any, to the benefit of the soldiers themselves. The only expenses charged against the canteen fund would be those necessary for keeping the place and utensils in a proper state of repair, and the surplus would be spent by the committee of officers in purchasing books and periodicals, and otherwise providing for the comfort of the troops. It was not thought desirable to enter upon such an experiment upon a large scale. Next year it would be tried at six or seven stations in the United Kingdom, and if it answered, as there was every reason to believe it would, it would be gradually introduced everywhere. The Committee would observe that a small Vote was taken for gymnasia. Some time ago a Select Committee was appointed to investigate this subject, and it recommended that gymnasia should gradually be introduced into all the principal stations, so that the troops might go through a regular course of gymnastics as part of their drill. It was believed that the experiment now proposed would not only be an amusement to the men, but would materially improve their health and increase their power of enduring fatigue. Many improvements had lately been made in the matter of cooking for the troops. Improved apparatus had been introduced, and instructors had also been appointed to cook for the men and teach others. The consequence had been a considerable saving in the article of fuel, and with a view of encouraging this economy, a measure had been adopted which had been productive of excellent results—namely, to allow the troops the benefit of half the fuel which they

  1429
  might be able to save from the regulation allowance. It was hoped that this would be productive of still further saving. An additional sum of £150,000 was now being spent on medical administration, and we had a right to expect some benefit from so large an expenditure. He believed the increase had arisen chiefly from the fact, that in the Crimean war the medical administration of the army almost entirely broke down. That administration, indeed, was at that time scarcely sufficient for the wants of the service at home. Besides, the hospital administration was not good, the barracks in which the men were lodged were confined and ill-ventilated, and the general result was, that at the time of the Crimean war the average mortality at home amounted to 17½ per 1,000 annually. There was no means of arriving at an accurate knowledge of what had been the effect of the improved medical and hospital administration and the improved arrangements for lodging the troops, because the army consisted now of a much larger number of young men than it did. in 1853, which would of itself very materially diminish the rate of mortality; and moreover, even within the last few years, when there had not been so great a disproportion in the ages of the men, the health of the troops had been found improving yearly. By the last Returns, instead of being 17½ per 1,000, the rate of mortality was only 8 per 1,000. That was a result which showed that the increased expenditure on barracks, hospitals, and medical establishments, had been well laid out. The next Votes which he needed to mention were those for the manufacturing department and for stores. It was desirable in discussing the Estimates that those two Votes should be taken together. The object of both was to supply military and warlike stores for the use of the army. If the Vote, for stores was greatly diminished it followed almost as a matter of course that the Vote for the manufacturing department must be increased. It was only a question whether they should obtain their warlike stores by contract, or should manufacture them at their own establishments. Well, on these two Votes the Government had been able to make a very considerable reduction. There was an increase of £16,666 in the Vote for the manufacturing department, and a decrease of £265,850 in the Vote for stores. That decrease arose from the termination of the contract at Elswick, and also from the contract for
  1430
  small arms having almost entirely come to an end. The exertions which the country had been making for a considerable number of years to gain a sufficient supply of small arms had now brought their reserves up to, or very nearly up to, the amount which was deemed necessary. There were about 400,000 Enfield rifles distributed among the regular and auxiliary forces of the country, and it was thought desirable that there should be an equal number in store, and they had nearly that quantity in their various stores. The increase in the Vote for the manufacturing department would have been considerably greater except for the transfer of a sum of about £30,000 from that Vote to the experimental Vote for services under the Ordnance Committee. He had stated that their stores in respect to small arms were everything that they could desire; but when they came to the article of artillery he was not able to give the House so consolatory an assurance. The Report of the Ordnance Select Committee which sat last year, showed very accurately how the Ordnance question stood at that time. As the result of their expenditure on Sir William Armstrong's guns, they had the whole of their field batteries armed with the Armstrong gun. Those guns, he might safely say, were now almost universally approved and liked by the troops who possessed them. In New Zealand they were being supplied, and certainly they heard no complaints; the guns, as far as they knew, giving satisfaction. It was quite true, that at one time in 1863 there was some doubt, some dislike felt, in regard to them among the Artillery, on account of some failure, or rather symptoms of failure, in those guns; but it turned out that this applied only to some of the very earliest that had been produced, when the manufacture had not reached the perfection subsequently attained, and not even among those guns, he believed, was there ever any accident involving loss of life or personal disablement. Further experience had convinced the Artillery, he believed, that they were in possession of an arm which could be trusted to for rough, actual service, and which, when they had learnt, as they were now learning to use it, was one of most extraordinary accuracy and power. Besides the guns belonging to the field batteries they had a large number in store, with a considerable number in depôt at Woolwich, ready to be sent out at any moment if required. There were also a

  1431
  number of these guns in possession of the navy. Besides the 12-pounders in possession of the troops and in store, they had a large number of twenty and 40-pounders, and of those guns, and especially of the 40-pounders, it was he thought impossible to speak too highly. He believed that the troops, wherever they had them, said they were a most excellent gun, and very far superior to those they had supplanted. For new works, such as those of the land defences at Portsmouth, and also to accompany an army into the field, or to be used as guns of position, they were very valuable. Coming next to the 110-pounders—it was perfectly true they were not so popular or so greatly approved as the guns he had previously enumerated. The Report of the Ordnance Committee had informed hon. Members of what was supposed to be the overwhelming political necessities of the time which required those guns to be adopted and manufactured in large quantities without any very mature consideration or very extended system of experiment. It was believed that foreign nations had obtained rifle guns of great power, and that it was necessary, above all things, that we should have powerful rifle guns to compete with them. Therefore, the only gun of that kind which we knew of was adopted, perhaps, with too much haste. But, although there were many objections to those guns, he believed that those objections were being gradually overcome. The question of the vent-pieces —one of the most difficult questions of all —was being gradually settled. The improvements in the manufacture of steel had enabled the gun factory at Elswick to produce a vent-piece of superior durability. Although the 110-pounder, as far as they had yet tried it with cast iron shot, was not of any material use against armour-plated vessels, still there were a great many positions in which it would be a most useful weapon. He thought that almost all the naval witnesses examined before the Select Committee, although they deprecated the use of the 110-pounder of Sir William Armstrong as a broadside gun, had nevertheless, almost every one of them, stated that he would like to have some guns of that description in his ship for purposes of distant bombardment. For many works of land fortification also these guns would be extremely valuable; there were many positions requiring defence where it was not necessary to have a gun that was capable of piercing an iron-clad
  1432
  ship; and, therefore, although those guns would not accomplish all that could be wished from them—although they had defects, yet their defects were being gradually overcome, and the gun was useful. As to the gun which they were going to make, it was true they had not yet in the service a gun capable of doing effective work against armour-plated ships; but the experience they had had in regard to the 110-pounder ought to caution them against going too fast in that matter. There certainly was no immediate pressure to make them adopt a new gun for that purpose without the fullest consideration. If they had not got a gun capable of making effectual practice on iron-plated ships, they had reason to believe—nay, they felt perfectly certain—from all the information they could obtain, that no other nation had in its service such an arm. Therefore, there was no overwhelming necessity for hurrying on in that direction. But if affairs should look more threatening than they did—if there should be any immediate occasion for ironclads being called into action, it might be consolatory for the House to know, that as the result of their experiments, they had a system of construction which would give them a strong heavy gun, and a mode of rifling, which, although it might not be the best that might hereafter be discovered, would yet enable them to make guns fulfilling all the conditions they required in a rifle gun, and strong enough to pierce any target yet constructed. They knew now that the principle of making a muzzle-loading gun, the barrel of which was composed of cast steel, strengthened by wrought-iron coils, was capable of producing a strong gun, and that the inventions of Sir William Armstrong combined almost perfectly all the requisites of a system of rifling. Though, therefore, it might appear to the Government and the House not to be desirable that we should proceed hastily in manufacturing heavy guns for our naval armament, yet they would know that we had means to meet any probable emergency. However, as scientific and military men were very much divided into the followers of Sir William Armstrong and Mr. Whitworth, it was considered desirable, as he stated to the House the other evening, that, before proceeding any further with the great question of artillery construction, the merits of these two great artillerists should be tested by an impartial Committee specially chosen for that purpose; and, at the same time,

  1433
  the Ordnance Committee were engaged in a series of experiments as to the other best known systems of riflingand construction. He explained the other reason why so long a delay had occurred before the commencement of these experiments. They wore now fixed for the 1st of April, They would have to be most carefully conducted, and would probably extend over a considerable period of time. It would be some months—perhaps near the conclusion of the year — before the Armstrong and Whitworth Select Committee concluded their investigations with reference to the competing guns; but, in order that we should not lose more time than was necessary, orders had been given to the Royal gun factory that a considerable quantity of material should be prepared for the system on which the Committee should decide. The Committee, no doubt, were aware of the performances of the 600-pounder or 13-inch gun, as it would now be called, and which had been extremely satisfactory in a limited number of experiments. Further experiments would take place in a few days; but, although the results were very satisfactory, it would be quite premature to enter largely into the manufacture of so expensive an arm until the fullest tests had been applied to its capability of endurance. If it should continue to exhibit all the excellences it was supposed to possess, two, three, or four more experimental 600-pounders would be ordered, that the Government might feel quite certain that its excellences were not confined to one gun, but that they could be produced on a considerable scale and degree of perfection. If that gun could be reproduced, and answered all the expectations raised by the trials hitherto made, then, he thought, we might feel certain we could produce a gun capable of fairly blowing any ship ever created out of the water. The gun tried at Shoeburyness had almost destroyed the Warrior target. It was quite certain, that with steel projectiles, there was no ship floating on the water could resist at 1,000 yards the shot fired by that 13-inch gun. He believed that in future warfare conducted against iron-plated ships, the quality of projectiles would exercise quite as important, if not more important, influence than the gun itself. It had been found by experience that no gun, however powerful, could produce much effect on iron plates with only cast-iron shot. However heavy the blow struck, the shot itself was shattered into pieces without much injury to the plates. He believed that hon.
  1434
  Members who were far better qualified than himself to give an opinion on the subject would bear him out in saying that there was no manufacture in the country which had progressed with such rapid strides of late years as that of cast steel. He believed improvements of the very greatest importance had been made within the last twelve and even within the last six months. The Ordnance Select Committee had been associated with the Iron-plate Committee for the purpose of instituting and carrying out experiments with different kinds of steel, formed into different projectiles, and fired from different kinds of guns. They found that with steel projectiles fired from guns of very much inferior power to the 13-inch gun, such as the Duke of Somerset's gun, the smooth-bore 100-pounder, very satisfactory results had been obtained against iron-plated ships. He had stated at the commencement that he could not give a perfectly satisfactory account of our position as regarded guns; but he had endeavoured to show that, if we were not in possession of a more perfect gun—more perfect as against iron plates—the fault was not that of the Government, or the advisers of the Government. They had prosecuted with the utmost diligence a series of experiments, and they were still going on with them. The fault—if fault there was—arose from the fact that both the manufacture of guns and the manufacture of plates had been continuously in a state of progress, and that the result of one year was constantly upset by that of the year which followed. There must be a limit to the thickness of iron plates, and he thought they had proved that there was scarcely any limit to human science and improvement.
  He believed he had now gone through all the items in these Estimates to which it was necessary in this stage of the proceedings, to call the attention of the Committee. He would conclude with admitting, as he began, that this Estimate was a peace Estimate; but, although a peace Estimate, it was a very large Estimate compared to those they had been in the habit of voting a few years ago. Still, he could assure the Committee, that the very greatest care and pains had been taken in framing these Estimates, not only to effect a saving, but real economy. The right hon. and gallant General the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel)had stated at an earlier period of the evening, when supporting an additional expenditure of £40,000, which the Government wished to reduce,

  1435
  that a careful inspection of these Estimates would enable them to find items on which they could effect savings sufficient to cover that amount. He could only say if the right hon. and gallant Officer, looking over the Estimates, could point out an item which could be reduced without much greater loss of efficiency to the army than that involved in the discontinuance of the six days' training of the Yeomanry, the Government would thank him and adopt his suggestions. He did not deny that we had been incurring a large expenditure since 1857. He did not deny that the re-organization in almost every branch of the army might have been in some instances extravagant, and that some of our establishments were not conducted in the most economical manner; but he could assure the right hon. and gallant Officer that his noble Friend at the head of the War Department had every disposition to enforce real economy. Investigations were going on, having for their object the reduction of expense. He could only appeal to the Committee and to every Member of it to point out where they thought a real reduction might be made without a diminution of efficiency, and to support him if he were called on to resist, as no doubt he should be, solicitations for increased expenditure. He had endeavoured, very imperfectly, to lay before the Committee the condition of our army and the manner in which the Votes had been framed, and he had now only to place in the hands of the Chairman the Resolution of which he had given notice—
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  "That a Number of Land Forces, not exceeding 146,766 (including 9,347 of all ranks, to be employed with the Depôts in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of Regiments serving in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, but exclusive of the numbers actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions) be maintained during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1865."—(The Marquess of Hartington.)
  GENERAL PEELsaid, that he wished in the first place to congratulate the noble Lord upon the able statement which he had made to the Committee. He also wished to congratulate the Committee upon the improved manner in which the Estimates were presented to them. He, however, hoped that as the noble Lord who moved the Navy Estimates had shown how the recommendations of the Committee upon Public Accounts would be observed, those recommendations would be borne in
  1436
  mind in the future preparations of the Army Estimates. The consequence had been that the Navy Estimates had become much more intelligible than they were formerly; but in the shape in which the Army Estimates were now presented he would defy anybody to compare the Estimate of one year with the audited accounts of the expenditure of the year with any satisfactory result. The audited accounts only professed to show the expenditure of the absolute sum granted by Parliament, and if the expenditure happened to exceed that amount the excess could not be traced. He had endeavoured to compare the estimated expenditure for the present year with the actual expenditure for the year 1858–9, for which he was responsible. Upon one item—for pay and allowances—the audited accounts showed an expenditure of £3,200,000, although he knew that the actual expenditure was £3,700,000; and, therefore, £500,000 had been expended beyond the amount which appeared in the audited accounts. Of course, there was no concealment of the fact that £500,000 had been advanced by the Treasury, for it was clearly shown in the detailed accounts, but still the fact could not be discovered in the accounts themselves. Another item was the expenditure which had been going on since 1858, and of which he could find no account whatever—the expenditure for Indian troops employed in China, and paid for by the Imperial Government. With reference to that item, however, he was glad to find an improvement in the present Estimates. Last year, when the Indian troops were first noticed in the Army Estimates, and a sum of money was taken for their payment, no number was given, and there were no means of ascertaining their number. In consequence of the forms of the House, he had been compelled to change the form of his objection, and moved that the Vote be reduced; and the result of what took place then was, that this year not only the amount of cost, but also the number of men was given. Certainly, if the control of the House was necessary in any case, it must be in the case of the Indian Native troops. [Colonel SYKES: Serving out of India.] If any part of the Indian Native army could be employed without a Vote of that House, those troops were altogether removed from Parliamentary control. In the case of ordinary troops there were two checks—the Mutiny Act and the money voted by Parliament

  1437
  for the pay of the troops. But neither of these checks applied to Indian troops. Native Indian troops were not liable to the Mutiny Act, being expressly excluded from the operations of that measure, and were ruled by Articles of War expressly framed for India; and the House had no control over Native troops through its privilege as to money Votes, because those troops were paid, in the first instance, by the Indian Government, and the expenditure never came under the notice of the British Parliament till long after it had been incurred. Some little hint of a supplemental Estimate had been put forth, in which the accounts between the Indian Government and the Imperial Exchequer would have to be balanced; but all that the House would learn of that matter would be when a lump sum in settlement was proposed for its sanction. Looking at the Estimates before the Committee, he found that if he added to the 146,766 men there taken credit for the 1,532 Native troops now serving in China and elsewhere, the total number of troops provided for in the Estimates would be 148,219—and thus a most extraordinary proof of the rough Estimate he had made, that the army cost£100 per man was afforded, for the total amount of the Estimates was £14,800,000. But he found that the reduction proposed this year in the number of men was not borne out by the reduction in the Estimate for pay and allowances. Although the number of men was reduced by 1,476, the total reduction in the Vote for pay and allowances was only £750, and the aggregate of the seven Votes immediately connected with that Vote showedjan absolute increase of £74,294. He was anxious that there should be a permanent reduction in the army expenditure; but could not avoid an expression of regret that it should be proposed to reduce the artillery by 1,300 men. As recently as the year 1860 his lamented Friend, Lord Herbert, added a brigade of field artillery and a brigade of the very artillery which it was now proposed to reduce. Lord Herbert did so on the express ground of the want of strength in that branch of the service; yet reduction was to take place, notwithstanding the fortification scheme so warmly and so properly supported by the noble Lord at the head of the Government, for which Parliament had since Voted such large sums of money; but it was quite evident that fortifications without guns and men—as had recently been seen in Denmark — were not only useless, but worse than useless.
  1438
  There was another reason which induced him to look with great alarm on the loss of a single trained soldier, and that was the effect of the Limited Enlistment Act. He knew that the subject was one which excited the greatest alarm among military authorities. He had moved for Returns to show the operation of that Act during the last four years, but they were not yet completed. The Adjutant General, however, had shown him the effect of the Limited Enlistment Act for the past year. Men enlisted in the artillery and cavalry for twelve years, and for the Line and Guards for ten years. The result was found to be, that men who had served twelve years, and had only to serve nine years more to become entitled to a pension, re-enlisted more readily; while in the Guards and the Line the proportion of re-enlistments was much less. About ten years since, twenty-six new battalions of infantry were created, whose period of service would expire soon and simultaneously. It therefore became a grave question, whether the subject of Limited Enlistment should not be re-considered, and whether stronger inducements to re-enlistment should not be held out. He was glad to find that an improvement had been made in the Estimates, by which they not only had the Estimate of the present year to compare with that of the last, but they had also the absolute expenditure of the preceding year — that of 1862 and 1863. The noble Lord had pointed out that the Estimate for the present year, as compared with that of the last, showed a decrease on the net expenditure of £373,026, and on the two years together of £619,215. The noble Lord, however, had not been quite happy in explaining the grounds of the proposed reduction. The increased expenditure of 1859–60 was under Lord Derby's Government, and the number of men voted was 122,000 odd, while the total estimated cost was £12,200,000. This included £661,000 for military stores, which sum covered the first introduction of the Armstrong gun into the service, to the limited extent to which it was adopted by Lord Derby's Government — that is to say, merely for field guns. He would answer that for the first quarter of the financial year, for which he was responsible, neither the number of men nor the Estimates were exceeded. But at the conclusion of the financial year, after Lord Derby's Government quitted office, the war broke out, and there was a total expenditure over the Estimates of very nearly

  1439
  £2,000,000. The item of warlike stores afterwards mounted up from £661,000 to to £2,000,000. Then came a reduction of £600,000 in the item; and this year the saving of £215,000 which had taken place upon the whole Estimates was wholly accounted for, and was even exceeded, by the decrease in the charge for warlike stores. Now, if this decrease were the legitimate result of the operations of the Department, if we had succeeded in reconstructing our armaments, and now only had to allow for ordinary wear and tear, such a result would be a gratifying one. But he feared that this was not the case. The Secretary to the Admiralty had stated the other evening, no doubt with perfect truth, that the navy had not been happy in their guns; and probably he would not have said too much if he had added that three years hence not one single gun now employed in the navy would remain in the service. Another reason for doubting the permanency of this reduction was, that while the Vote for stores was much smaller than before, there was a great increase in the charge for experiments. This seemed to show pretty conclusively that we had not yet hit upon the right gun; and he feared that, as in 1858, so now, large demands upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer were looming in the distance for new armaments, and that the great expenditure upon their reconstruction had not yet ceased. One great advantage to be obtained by having the Estimates in a proper form was that the House then saw not only the number of men voted, but the number actually borne, as well as the expenditure in respect of them. Again, the House had an opportunity then of testing the value of the objections which had been taken on particular points. The House might recollect that he had always objected to attempts to show a decrease of expenditure which would not be borne out by the result. On a former occasion a large number of men were said to be wanting to the complete establishment. He felt sure that this was not so; but a sum of £60,000 was, nevertheless, deducted from the Vote for pay and allowances. He protested against this at the time, and he now found that the excess upon that Vote was £56,400, showing that the reduction had been purely nominal. The fact had been accounted for by the statement that the men were all in prison; and in Vote 6 of the present Estimates there was certainly
  1440
  a deduction of £41,000 on account of unissued pay to soldiers under confinement. However, he contended that his criticism had been perfectly justified. On three or four occasions he had endeavoured, in vain, to obtain some further information with respect to capitation. Capitation was an allowance of £10 per man paid upon forces absolutely serving in India in order to cover expenses formerly paid by the Indian Government, but now transferred to the Imperial Government. That sum was no doubt fixed after careful consideration by the Committee which was appointed and which represented the interests of the Home and the Indian Governments. [Colonel SYKES: After a considerable wrangle.] Upon one item alone, that of the pay of officers upon furlough from India, which two years ago was estimated at £45,000, there was an increase in the year following to £130,000, and this year it had risen to £137,000. He would suggest to the Government whether, out of the great excess of expenditure upon this one item, they might not find the means of saving the cost which they grudged to the Yeomanry. After the division which had taken place that evening, he had certainly hoped that the noble Lord at the head of the Government would have got up, and said that the Government would take into consideration the strong opinion of the House; and he still trusted that, before the Estimates were disposed of, the noble Lord would give an assurance that a Vote so essential to the efficiency of the Yoemanry would yet be proposed. However this might be decided, he felt certain that if there was a Committee upon Public Accounts, and these Estimates were referred to them, the question of the capitation Vote would be found worth their serious consideration. In all his observations upon the Army Estimates he had but two objects in view—first to secure the efficiency of the army, and next to secure the due control of this House over the expenditure. He was not one of those who had the least fear of the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. Williams), or of the strictest economist, feeling persuaded that if you could show them that any sum of money was really required for the defence of the country, it would be at once and cheerfully given.
  MR. BENTINCKsaid, the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) had given no answer to his hon. Friend the Member for Inverness-shire (Mr. H. Baillie). He had, however, broached some very remark-

  1441
  able and some very dangerous doctrines. His noble Friend had told them that the policy of the Government was a peace policy. That was a great announcement to make at any time, but was it very remarkable at the present time? Although the policy of the Government might be a policy of peace, it did not follow that that would always justify proposing peace Estimates. Did the present state of Europe justify peace Estimates? He might also advert to the state of things across the Atlantic. Was any man in this country prepared to take upon himself the responsibility of saying, that within a limited period we should not be engaged in hostilities with the United States? He thought there was not; and, if not, the Government ought not to have brought forward such Estimates as those proposed by the noble Lord that evening. His noble Friend had told them—and told them truly—that the improved condition of our armaments was clue to the large expenditure which had been incurred in consequence of the deficiencies that were discovered during the Crimean war, and he said that now the country desired to reap the benefit of that expenditure. That appeared to him (Mr. Bentinck) a most untenable proposition— because it amounted to this, that after expending a large sum of money they proposed to return to that mistaken economy, the result of which must be disastrous and costly upon any emergency arising. The question which had been raised by his hon. Friend the Member for Invernesshire was a very large one, for it embraced two points —a question of policy, and a question of humanity. As far as policy was concerned, the noble Lord had said nothing to justify peace Estimates, and he had made no answer to his hon. Friend. His hon. Friend had stated, in reference to the question of humanity, that a regiment in India was entirely expended by the climate in the course of twelve years. That in itself was a fearful consideration, and it was quite obvious that it was the duty of any Government to reduce as much as possible such an expenditure of life. His hon. Friend had told them that in order to supply sufficient reliefs we were now twenty battalions short. The noble Lord had not in any way answered that statement. His hon. Friend had talked of the decreasing influence of England in the counsels of Europe. He (Mr. Bentinck) believed that that was so, and that it was to be attributed to the policy of succeeding Govern-
  1442
  ments for many years past of endeavouring to frame Budgets to meet the clamour— or he had better, perhaps, say "claim," and not for the benefit of the nation. It was impossible for any country in the position of Great Britain, with her colonies and commerce, to retain her influence, unless her armaments were in such a position as to enable her to defend herself from aggression in every part of the world. His noble Friend spoke of having 12,000 more troops than we had at some former period. [The Marquess of HARTINGTON: I said we have 30,000 more than were on the establishment in 1854.] That did not make the matter much better. An increase of 20,000 or 30,000 would not place England in a position to take her part in a great European struggle, whilst the other great European powers had armies of from 300,000 to 600,000 men. With reference to the peace policy announced by the noble Lord, he could understand it, for this country was not in a state to go to war at present; it was not prepared; and the country would not again consent to rush into a war, as it did in 1853, when they were quite unprepared, thus causing an immense loss of blood and money, and it would be impossible to prepare this country for a great war in less than three or four years. So long as the Government were prepared to bring forward Estimates such as these, they must be prepared to tell Europe and the world that we were not prepared to go to war. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had told them that fortifications were the best means of defence for our coasts. He should like to know how the noble Lord reconciled the immense outlay for fortifications with the reduction by 1,300 of the only men who could work them—the artillerymen—who took longer than any other class of soldiers to train and render efficient. As to what had fallen from the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel), he would appeal to the Government on the subject of the Yeomanry, and suggest to them, that, after the very close division that had taken place, they should do that which would be the right and graceful thing, and accede to the proposition that the Yeomanry should be called out. There was a very strong feeling in the country on this matter. The Yeomanry did not belong to a very favoured class—namely, the agriculturists; but the Government was now doing all that it could to encourage the new class of Volunteers

  1443
  —he would not say a word of disparagement of that force, which was an example to, as it was the admiration of, Europe; but because they encouraged this valuable class of men that was no reason why they should do away with an older class of Volunteers, against whom there was no complaint, and who not only gave their services but kept horses for the purpose of rendering the force efficient. Moreover, it was easier to organize a body of infantry than a cavalry force. It was always a very unwise thing for Government to do to discourage any ebullition of loyal feeling, and he ventured to say that there could not be found throughout the length and breadth of the land a more loyal, devoted, and energetic body of volunteers than the Yeomanry.
  MR. H. BAILLIEsaid, the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) had admitted they had 34 battalions of infantry, that was 26,000 men, on the home establishment, so that if they had now 26,000 infantry in the country, he did not know how they could have 30,000 more than they had a few years ago. The noble Lord was quite right in saying that if his (Mr. Baillie's) statement meant anything, it meant that Government ought to increase the number of battalions so that relief might be sent more regularly to regiments serving abroad. He regretted to find that the Government did not intend to carry out any such plan, as the result must be that that relief could not be afforded, and they could have regiments abroad, in the Colonies and India, remaining twenty-five years, thus causing great loss of life and discipline. The right hon. Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) adverted to the limited service, and the loss the Government sustained by the number of men whose period of service expired every year; the loss was not only numerically great, and deprived them of their most efficient men, but as the Government had to bring these men home and send new recruits out to fill their places, the expense was very great, and he thought it would be more economical, and secure the continuance of the men in the army, if, at the end of ten years, their pay were raised 3d. a day for five years. He understood that there were no less than 15,000 men whose term of service expired this year, and the number would be greater hereafter, when the time of the new battalions had expired. The subject ought, therefore, to engage the immediate attention of the Government.
  MR.W.WILLIAMSreminded the House that, in the regular service, Yeomanry, Militia, and Volunteers, the country had 450,000 armed men at home; and, adding to these the army in India and the native troops, they had altogether 650,000 men for the defence of Great Britain and her colonies. What more could we want? No other country had so many men under arms. He could well understand the Government maintaining our present military force, because it gave them an enormous amount of patronage. But he thought it quite unnecessary, and if any hon. Member would move a reduction in the number of men, he would support the proposition.
  COLONEL SYKESsaid, he was glad to see a marked improvement in the Estimates with respect to additional information, but a great deal more might yet be done. In their present form there were no means of ascertaining what a piece of ordnance or a rifle cost, how many were turned out, or how many were required in the year; nor could they tell how many of the 146,766 men had to be clothed, or what was the cost of each soldier's clothing in the different grades. In the French Budget details were given which enabled anyone to calculate those particulars for himself. There was a reduction of 1,476 men, but a reduction of only £750 out of £5,708,983, so that there must be an increased charge in allowances. He regretted the proposed reduction in the artillery; he would rather see a reduction in any other portion of our military force. He thought it unfair to the Army Budget that £1,324,442, which was the amount paid back to the Government for the troops in India, and on other accounts, was not deducted, and the total amount reduced to £13,520,446, the real sum required, instead of standing, as it did, at £14,844,888. The army, too, supplied the navy with ordnance and gunpowder to a very large amount, and the cost ought in fairness to be deducted from the Army and carried to the Navy Estimates. The first and second Votes were also somewhat mystified, by the total amount of pay being charged, and the total amount of rations, without deducting the money stopped for rations from the men's pay. It had been often stated in the House, that the annual cost of an English soldier was £100 per man but this was fallacious as far as it related to the effective strength, for this sum of £100 included the charges for auxiliary forces, and the very large amount exceeding two millions for the non-effec-

  1445
  tive services. The average cost per head of effectives, including these charges for 1863–4, was £101 11 s. 10 d.; but deducting £1,222,977, the charge for the auxiliary forces, the numbers of which were not given, the cost per head of effectives was reduced to £93 6s. 10 d; but still further deducting the charge of £2,127,836 for non-effectives, the most per head of fighting men and officers was £78 18 s. 5d., and from this amount a deduction also should be made for the supply of warlike stores to the navy. In the French army the cost of effectives and non-effectives was £43 11 s. 10 d., as against our £101 4s. 11 d. per man, and of effectives £37 2s. 6d., as against £78 18 s. 5d. per man. The cost of our men was nearly double that of the French, and the same proportion ran through all the charges in our army when compared with the French army.
  COLONEL NORTHsaid, he could not congratulate the Government on this occasion, for if ever there was a moment when the army or navy ought not to be reduced by a single man the present was the time. When he considered the number of soldiers whose period of service would expire in the next year and a half, about 15,000, it became a subject most alarming to the country. Several years ago, when the new system was introduced, the late Lord Herbert asked him how he thought it would work. His reply was that the system would either be most advantageous or most destructive. He hoped he should not prove a true prophet. He believed that no sum would be too large to insure to the service a good soldier of ten years' service. Some persons seemed to suppose that it was only necessary to put a red coat upon a man's back to make him a soldier; but the real value of an efficient soldier consisted not in his acquaintance with drill, but in his disciplined mind, enabling his officers to place reliance upon him under all circumstances of danger and difficulty. Owing to the demand for trained men in the rural police and upon railways, soldiers now at twenty-eight years of age could take off their caps to their commanding officer, and obtain pay that was enormous compared with what they received in the ranks. Under these circumstances, instead of discharging men, every possible inducement should be offered to experienced soldiers to remain. Assuming that the ten years' service men quitted the army in any great proportion, most of our regiments must re-
  1446
  main in a very inefficient state for months, perhaps for years; whereas in the Continental armies the conscription replaced on Tuesday the vacancies caused by lapse of time upon Monday. The noble Lord said, if we happened to be at war there would be no lack of men; but surely the experience of the Crimean war ought not to be lost. Towards the close of that contest our regiments consisted of wretched boys, without strength or constitutions, who, as soon as they were exposed to hardship or fatigue, had to be discharged in bad health, with from 6d. to 9d. a day for two years, at the end of which time they had to go about the country begging. The country had no right to destroy the health of young men by such a system, and then turn them adrift with a miserable pittance. The reduction contemplated was accounted for by the relinquishment of the Ionian Islands; but in the garrisons of those Islands he found that there had been only 372 artillerymen, whereas no less than 1,313 were suddenly to be got rid of; 313 sappers and 813 cavalry were likewise to be struck off. Now, he had never heard of a single cavalry soldier being quartered in the Ionian Islands. It required three years to make a good artilleryman, two years to train a cavalry soldier, and what time to educate a sapper he really did not know; but the proposal of the Government was to weaken these three most important branches of the service. Such a proposal was, in effect, saying to the rest of Europe, "You may kick us as much as you please, but you will not kick us into a fight." If such really were to be our system for the future, it would be well if we abstained from internally interfering and offering an opinion as to the affairs of every other country. He felt pleased that England had not been forced into war, but it was impossible to shut one's eyes to the opinion universally prevalent, that we had behaved in a most disgraceful and un-English manner to a nation as gallant as our own. The Danes were few in number, he granted, but the more credit to them for the gallant way in which they were defending their country. To dispel an illusion was always unpleasant, but he must assure the noble Lord who thought the influence of England had not declined, that a very different opinion was entertained outside the House. Many persons were recalling the old fable about the jackass with the lion's skin. Once the roar of the lion made half Europe quail, but now the bray of the jackass

  1447
  made all Europe laugh. According to the new heraldry, the lion should be no longer rampant; the lion with his tail between his legs would better illustrate the real position of the country. Our Government had meddled with the affairs of every country of Europe, until it was laughed at by everybody. If there was a division, he should protest against the reduction of the army by a single man.
  MR. CHILDERShoped the House would not be drawn away from financial considerations into a discussion of the Danish policy of the Government. Such a debate would he premature in the first place, but he ventured to think that whenever it was entered upon the country would show at least as much confidence in the policy of the Government in reference to Denmark as it had in the late Government at the time Lord Malmesbury was at the head of the Foreign Office, and the war broke out between France and Austria. He gave sincere thanks to the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) for the perfectly clear mode in which the Estimates had been drawn up; this improvement with the intelligible statement with which the noble Lord had introduced them, would enable the Committee to see at once what was the cost of each branch of the service. As to the French Budgets he warned hon. Members against assuming that the cost of the new arms could yet be conclusively arrived at. No doubt we should aim at a clear estimate of the cost of every article made, without which no one could tell whether the manufacturing departments were properly worked; but the attempt at present to fix the cost of, say the Armstrong gun, would infallibly be delusive. On the whole, considering the present state of Europe, he did not think it would have been wise for the Government to have reduced the Estimates any further; but he was sorry that the promises made last year, of a reduction in the military expenditure of the colonies, had not been kept. For instance, the revenues of Ceylon and the Mauritius were well able to bear an additional proportion of this charge. He could also endorse the opinion of many hon. Members, that the reduction in the numbers of the artillery was injudicious. Many of the colonies would rather have 150 or 200 artillerymen than the present force of 400, 500, or 600 infantry of the line. There were still signs of an inefficient control over the buildings in the military department. At the proper time he would be
  1448
  obliged to remark upon the carelessness with which the Estimates appear, in the first place, to be drawn in the case of almost every barrack and hospital. He was glad that the War Office were about to improve the canteen arrangements in six or seven home stations. He would suggest that the experiment should also be tried at Gibraltar. He was at that place about four months ago, and regretted to observe that every temptation to drink was held out to the soldiers. He found that half the civil revenue of the place was derived from licences, rents, and payments in connection with public-houses. The reason appeared to be that Gibraltar was located as a Colony, and that it was necessary to create a Colonial revenue to defray its civil charges. But Gibraltar ought to be regarded not as a colony supporting its own civil establishment, but as a large garrison.
  COLONEL DUNNEcould not admit that the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington) was correct in calling the present a peace Estimate when it was within a quarter of a million of £15,000,000. He should like to know how many men we could send into the field on a sudden for this fourteen millions and three-quarters? He did not believe that 25,000 men would be available for foreign service even if the militia were called out. The fact was, the men were locked up in the depôt battalions. For £15,000,000 the Government got a great deal of patronage, and the country very little efficiency in the army. He considered that the reduction of 1,300 men in the artillery, and the despatch of seven batteries of horse artillery to India, were both unwise measures. The officers now in this country did not wish to go to India, and those who would come home would be a long time before they were as efficient as the others under circumstances so widely different. The Government would do well, without delay, to alter the system of recruiting. The plan of enlisting for an infantry soldier for ten years was absurd. It would be much better to raise the period from ten to twelve years, as was done in the cavalry and artillery.
  THE MAUQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, several hon. Members on the other side had referred to the operation of the Limited Enlistment Act. It was quite true that that Act was now, for the first time, coming into operation; but so far as results had hitherto gone they had been by no means unsatisfactory. If they lost this

  1449
  year no more in proportion of the limited service men than in former years; their losses would not exceed 4,000; and that, added to the ordinary casualties, would not bring the number of recruits that would be required above 13,000—a number that had been frequently raised in former years. It would be impossible to say, until the Act had been still longer in operation, what would be the general results, and what measures it might be necessary to take in consequence. It was quite possible that it might be necessary to hold out further inducements for re-enlistment; but it would be premature to press for alteration until they had had some few years' experience of the working of the Act. At present, he saw no cause for alarm. As he had said earlier in the evening, the losses in the army were very much smaller than usual, owing to improved sanitary arrangements and the younger age of the men entering the service; but, at all events, there would be no use in asking a larger sum of money than would be required for the number of men likely to enlist. As to the state of our reliefs, there would be borne on the books of the establishment at home forty-one battalions, in India twenty-five, and in the colonies forty-five. That number was not equal to what it ought to be. The proportion at home ought to be fifty battalions, but the rule in that respect was never intended to hold good in exceptional circumstances, such as were created by the war in New Zealand and the large body of troops in Canada. If we got three or four regiments from New Zealand and a few from Canada, we should have a sufficient number of battalions at home to keep up the necessary reliefs. There had been some misunderstanding as to what had been said by the noble Lord at the head of the Government about the reduction owing to the evacuation of the Ionian Islands. If they reduced their army by the exact number of men that was gained by the evacuation of the Ionian Islands, they should make a much more considerable reduction than they did—they should reduce it by 4,000 instead of 1,100 men. As to the reduction of 380 artillerymen, it was well known that if the Ionian Islands were in our hands in case of war they would take not less than 1,000 artillerymen; and, therefore, having given up those Islands, we should, in case of war, have that additional number of artillerymen to depend upon. The Government certainly were of opinion that the country was entitled to
  1450
  some relief from the surrender of those Islands, and if no reduction had been made the country would not have been at all better off for having given them up, and they had carefully considered in what manner reduction could be best made having regard to the efficiency of the army, and the result was the proposition he had now made.
  It had been said that it takes some time to make an artillery soldier, but it was not absolutely necessary that all the men who had to work guns should be highly trained. Within the last two years they had made such arrangements that they now retained a nucleus by means of which a very large force of garrison artillery might be called together should occasion arise, and, under the superintendence of trained officers and men, no doubt they could be very effectively employed. With the good system of artillery officers and non-commissioned officers which they had established, they could afford to spare a few men. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) had mentioned the subject of the Indian capitation rate. The total cost of the depôt battalions for the regiments in India, calculated for whatever number of years, was divided by the number of men in India, and that was the way the capitation rate was arrived at. Several hon. Members had referred to the fact that, although the numbers of men had been diminished by 14,000, Vote I had only been reduced about £700; but the explanation of that circumstance would be found in the statement which had been circulated with the Estimates. As it was necessary that the Mutiny Bill should be passed before Easter, he hoped that the Committee would agree to this Vote to-night.
  COLONEL NORTHsaid, that 5,000 men would complete their service in the course of next year, and much anxiety was felt among military men lest the army should not be properly recruited.
  SIR WILLIAM FRASERasked whether it was intended to make any alteration in the uniforms of the army. Facings, colours, or badges, a star or a cross might not appear to civilians matters of much importance, but great value was attached to them by soldiers; and no less an authority than the Duke of Wellington was of opinion, that a difference of facings was of great use in enabling the General of a division or a brigade to distinguish different regiments rapidly and easily.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that although there might be advantages in having only one button and one set of badges, there was no immediate intention of making any alteration in the uniforms of the army.
  MR. BENTINCKsaid, he could not refrain from noticing one extraordinary argument which had been used by the Under Secretary for War. The noble Marquess admitted that we had not sufficient troops at home to provide for our colonial reliefs, but he said that the deficiency was caused by the war in New Zealand, and the military occupation of Canada. That meant that there was a war going on in one country, and a probability or possibility of war in another. Yet it was under these circumstances that the Government proposed a reduction of the army. A more singular or more illogical argument he never heard.
  THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that his argument only went to this—that the Indian reliefs could not be carried on with the same regularity with a war in New Zealand and an occupation of Canada as in ordinary years. No one supposed that during a war the colonial reliefs would go on with their accustomed regularity. The proportion of ten years to five was intendad to be maintained in the time of peace and not in time of war.
  Resolution agreed to.
  "146,766 Land Forces (including 9,947, all ranks, to be employed with the Depôts in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of Regiments serving in Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, but exclusive of the numbers actually serving within Her Majesty's Indian Possessions)."
  House resumed
  Resolution to be reported To-morrow.
  Committee to sit again To-morrow.
  House adjourned at half after Twelve o'clock.