Commons Sitting of 2 July 1860

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Indemnity.
2° Poor Law Board Continuance; Militia; Game Certificates, &c; European Forces (India).
3° Railway Cheap Trains, &c; Labourers' Cottages (Scotland).

TAX BILL.—THE PAPER DUTY.

  PETITION.
  MR. BRIGHT presented a Petition from a numerous meeting held at Congleton. The petitioners declared that they had always understood that it was the undoubted privilege of that House to settle the taxation of the country, that any departure from the practice would be very prejudicial to the operations of trade, and they prayed the House to resist the recent aggression on the established usage of the constitution.
  MR. STEUARTrose to order, and said that since the discussion which had taken place some days before in reference to a Petition of a similar character, he had consulted the work of Mr. May on The Law and Practice of Parliament, and found it distinctly laid down, that any language reflecting on the other estates of the Realm was a ground for refusing the Petition in which it was contained. As the words just read by the hon. Member were, he conceived, disrespectful to the House of Lords, he begged to ask Mr. Speaker whether the Petition ought to be received?
  MR. SPEAKER: Will the hon. Member be good enough to specify the words?
  MR. BRIGHT: I will read the words to the House.
  MR. SPEAKER: The Member for Birmingham may state the substance of the Petition, but if it is to be read at length it must be read by the Clerk.
  MR. STEUARTinquired, Whether the words "aggression on the established usage of the Constitution" and "Invasion of the privileges of the House of Commons," as applied to the other branch of the Legislature, were not objectionable.
  MR. SPEAKER: There can be no objection to receive the Petition. There is nothing in it which would render it informal.

EUROPEAN FORCE IN INDIA.

  QUESTION.
  MR. TORRENSsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for India, Whether, if there be any evidence from intercepted Letters that a well-drilled and well-armed European Force made communications inviting the Sikhs to join them in driving the Queen's Army out of India, Her Majesty's Government will cause Copies of those Letters to be laid upon the Table of the House; whether the authenticity of those Letters was formally inquired into, and, if so, whether it was ascertained who were the writers, and by whom and to what place the Letters were forwarded to the Sikhs; and whether, if their authorship has been brought home to any men of the European Force, punishment, and, if any, of what nature, has been awarded to the writers of them?
  SIR CHARLES WOODsaid, he was in possession of no information on the subject.

  ANNEXATION OF SAVOY.—QUESTION.
  SIR ROBERT PEELsaid, he wished to ask the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Whether, as a solution of the question which has arisen between Switzerland and France respecting the annexation to France of the neutralized provinces of Savoy, Her Majesty's Government have replied, in answer to the Despatch of M. Thouvenel on the subject, that they are prepared to accept the proposition contained in that Despatch for the assembling in conference of the great Powers of Europe?
  LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, it was true that Her Majesty's Government had, in reply to the despatch of M. Thouvenel, agreed to the proposal to hold a Conference of the Powers of Europe with respect to Savoy. He might also add that the Russian Government had assented to the proposal.
  SIR ROBERT PEEL: When is the conference to assemble?
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL: That is a point not yet settled.

EUROPEAN FORCES (INDIA) BILL.
  SECOND READING.—ADJOURNED DEBATE.

    SECOND NIGHT.
    Order read for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [28th June],
    "That the Bill be now read a second time;' and which Amendment was to leave out the word 'now,' and at the end of the Question to add the words 'upon this day three months."
    Question again proposed, 'That the word 'now' stand part of the Question.
    Debate resumed.
    MR. RICHsaid, that in the short discussion that took place on Friday evening, the expediency of adjourning the original debate was fully admitted. He was glad to find from both sides of the House that this was in no degree to be a party question. The friends of the Government were thereby more free to express their opinions and to record their votes on this most important question. On the previous evening the hon. Gentlemen who addressed the House had taken "Indian views," views derived from men of great ability and large Indian experience; but they had heard comparatively little of the bearing of the question on this country, whether considered in a financial, a political, or a military point of view. He wished to address a few words to the House on those bearings of the question. The point at issue, as he understood it, was this: should we continue that organization of the army in India, which had existed almost from the period of our possessing substantial power there, or should we, on the most abrupt notice, cashier that army, and replace it by another, of whose fitness to control India we had no experience whatever. It was proposed now to put an end to the local European force, and the whole of the Sepoy regular regiments—amounting to 180,000, out of an army of about 230,000 men—and to substitute in their place 80,000 of Her Majesty's troops. A radical change like this, one would think, must be called for cither by a great and overwhelming pressure of public necessity, or it must have been long and earnestly desired by those who were best acquainted with the condition of India. But was that the case? Diametrically the reverse. All the highest Indian authorities were against it, and its few ministerial supporters had till very recently been its opponents. The Governor General of India and his Supreme Council were unanimous in their opposition to the pre-
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    sent proposition. Next to the Governor General came the Secretary of State for India. Now, Lord Ellenborough, who held the Indian office when the change in its Government took place, was against the change. He was succeeded by the noble Lord, the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley), and he, too, was against the change. The next Secretary of State was his right hon. Friend, who at present held the office; and six months ago, to judge by the tendency of the measure he then introduced, he also was opposed to the change. But that was not all. When the Government of India was transferred to the Crown, Parliament was justly jealous of entrusting autocratic power in the hands of the Indian Minister, and they surrounded him with an able and influential Council of Fifteen, every one of whom had either spent many years in India, or had been conversant all his life with Indian affairs. The whole weight of opinion of those constituted authorities, was against the proposed measure. We were told on high authority that the late Cabinet, who had studied the Report of the Commission on the organization of the Indian army, had unanimously made up their minds against amalgamation; though the gallant Officer, who was then Secretary for War, now tells us he has changed his opinion. So, also, the right hon. Baronet, the present Secretary of State for India, when in August last he proposed that the European local corps should be raised to 30,000 men, was then against amalgamation. He gave all due credit to these right hon. Gentlemen for sincerity in their change of views; but then, in proportion to this credit for sincerity must be the detraction from the weight of their authority. Thus, then, the whole weight of available authority was in favour of the present system of organization. Common sense and prudence therefore pointed to delay and further examination, to amending that which was amiss in the military organization by which we had won and maintained India instead of rashly and recklessly forcing on a radical change. How, too, would the plan work in a financial point of view? The right hon. Baronet said the change would cost the country only an extra £100,000 to £200,000 a year. The Secretary to the India Board, whose speech he had hoard with great pleasure, as it reminded him of the ability and amiability of one of their best Chancellors of the Exchequer,

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    though he wished that the mantle of that Minister's economy had also fallen upon him, placed the extra charge much higher. The right hon. Secretary for War placed it higher still; and as the debate went on, it became clear that it would exceed half a million a year. Such a sum passed glibly enough from the tongue; but it must be remembered that it was to be taken from the Indian revenue, which was already staggering under the weight of its taxation. Let us remember also that it is an additional burden cast by us on those who have no representative, nor defenders here. But let them consider how the question would bear on this country. The substitute for the present military organization of India proposed by this Bill was a force of 80,000 of Her Majesty's troops, to be constantly maintained there. The present limit was 30,000. This, therefore, was an addition of 50,000 men to our regular army: and he wanted to know how this great addition to our standing army would he viewed in quieter days. It might pass current now, but not very long ago a large standing army was looked upon with great jealousy, and he both believed and hoped that feeling might easily be revived. But more than this. If 50,000 additional men were to be supported in India, large depôts would be required in this country for the purpose of feeding them with recruits and reliefs. It had been mentioned in the course of the debate that the regiments serving in India were to be relieved every twelve years; and if that were so, then from three to five months in every year 6,000 men would be either at sea or just arrived, so that instead of 50,000 nearer 70,000 or 80,000 would have to be added by this Bill to the permanent establishment of the British Army. Now, against this wanton and enormous addition, he for one would raise his voice and record his vote. There was another strong objection in the fact that by this plan three-fourths, also, of our whole army—excepting the Household Troops, who never left home save in the case of an European war—would be nailed to foreign stations. The effect of this would be to consign every officer of the regular army to Colonial service for eighteen years out of twenty-four—in fact to colonialize our army, to impair its efficiency in the field, and to weaken its connection with England. The system would press with still greater severity on the private soldiers, not one in ten of whom would return to their families and country.
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    He did not see how the Ten Years' Enlistment Act was to work under such circumstances. And, further, a long service as an army of occupation and control over an inferior and alien race would not tend to make our officers and soldiers good citizens. The Commander-in-Chief already complained of the difficulty he had in keeping up a high state of discipline in those regiments that had been long in India; and this would be still further enhanced by the details proposed. The difficulty of providing officers for the special requirements of the Indian service was admitted on all hands; but the Secretary of State for India proposed to remedy this difficulty by the creation of a Staff corps from the élite of the regiments. The young men who by intellectual and military studies should qualify for this Staff corps, would be drafted off to various appointments; hence the Imperial army would lose its young and best officers, while those who had interest and fortune, finding that there was more promotion to be obtained by a campaign at the Horse Guards than by remaining in India, would exchange and return home. The less enterprising and the older officers would not learn the native languages and the Staff corps duties, and would soon become a complaining residuum left at the listless head-quarters of each regiment. He put it to the House whether this was not the very same exhausting system which had been so much complained of, and by no one more than the present Government, by which the Indian regiments were deprived of their best officers. The effect of it would be that in less than ten years the efficiency and discipline of our European army in India would be to a great extent deteriorated. He, therefore, contended that under such a system it was in vain that they could hope to maintain so large a force as 80,000 of the Queen's army in India in so efficient a state as Her Majesty's troops ought to be maintained. The Duke of Wellington's opinion was that a Colonial corps had not the ésprit de corps—that elan—which her Majesty's troops had:—he said that you could not colonialize regiments without deteriorating them. But that was precisely what the right hon. Gentleman proposed to do. He proposed to colonialize 80,000 of Her Majesty's troops;—in India alone—and yet he asked the House to believe that they would, under those circumstances, maintain the discipline and all the high qualities for which they were now

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    so distinguished. The principal excuse for making this change was that the Indian army was in a state of indiscipline. No doubt it was; but there were able Commanders-in-Chief in India, who, if supported and aided by the authorities at home, could restore order and reinvigorate the system. It was also said that the existence of two separate bodies of European troops in that country was an anomaly. It might be so, but it was one which had been attended with great advantages. Independently of the benefits of emulation we must remember that but for the presence of the Queen's troops the local armies would, upon a recent occasion, have been masters of the situation; and it was possible that there might be occasions on which the presence of local troops might operate as a wholesome check on the Queen's forces; one single army far from home restraint had in all times been a difficult and dangerous machine. We had been told that we could have nothing to do with these men who had mutinied, and that the best course to pursue was to get rid of them at once. Yet how was it that many of those who left their standards and came home had been eagerly sought for and enlisted into the Queen's army; but these were the very men who had deserted their standards when their services were most wanted. These surely were the worst offenders, and not those who were loyally serving in India and in China. Would you then press your enlistment bounties on the worst, and brand only those who were less guilty, and had, indeed, remained faithful to the last? The Minister for India passed a Bill at the end of last Session for increasing the local army. If he had believed that the troops were so tainted with disloyalty and disaffection that it would be dangerous to continue them in the service of the State he assuredly would not have added to their numbers. But the right hon. Gentleman said that something had since occurred to alter his opinion. Why, in a despatch written by himself not many days after the passing of that Bill, he stated that the result of the inquiries held at the different stations of the army clearly established the prevalence of a conviction among the soldiers that they had a right to an option in regard to the transfer of their services from the Company to the Crown, and that he thought this conviction not ill-founded, for the defective character of the duplicate attestation given to
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    the men, and the opinion entertained by their own officers, and by high authorities at home, were calculated to confirm it. With that statement from the pen of the Secretary of State he had no hesitation in saying it was a mere subterfuge to tell the Houses that the feeling of disaffection in the Indian army could only be eradicated by cashiering the whole force. It was asked, however, how we were to recruit the local army. Sir James Outram gave a satisfactory answer to that question in one of his admirable despatches, where he showed how, by a different course of treatment and enlistment, by instituting schools and a system of examination, and by advancing good men to certain minor Indian offices, we might raise the tone of the local army, and induce men of good education to enter it. The hon. Gentleman concluded by stating that he hoped the debate would not be closed until all the papers relating to the subject had been placed before the House, and until the scheme which the Government had in hand had been, not shadowed forth in a vague speech, but laid on the table in the tangible form of a Bill.
    MR. TORRENSsaid, that the present scheme was one which was intended to effect a great and, he thought, a very doubtful change. A local European force had existed almost from the time we set our foot in India, and they had well and devotedly performed their duties to this country; and he was, therefore, averse to the change proposed by the right hon. Gentleman. He thought, too, that those who were the best authorities on the subject were in favour of retaining a local force. The Report which had been lately printed at the desire of the Secretary of State for India bore out the opinion that a local force was the most efficient for the Indian service, both as respected the sanitary condition of the troops, their efficiency, and the cost of their maintenance. The right hon. Gentleman, the other day, quoted the opinion of Sir Ronald Martin, on the sanitary part of the question; but as far as he (Mr. Torrens) could see all that that Report proved was, that ensigns were more healthy than lieutenants, and lieutenants than captains; or, in other words, that the laws of nature operated in India as they did everywhere else, and that old men died where young men lived. The right hon. Gentleman had stated his opinion that officers and men, after a residence of ten or fifteen years in India, were not so active and energetic as

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    those more recently arrived from Europe. But, he thought, they had instances enough before them of men who had served with distinction in India to show that the most valuable services might he expected from Europeans, however long resident in that country; and he would refer to the eminent services of such men as Sir Archdale Wilson, General Chamberlaine, General Nicholson, Major Hodgson, Major Probyn, Major Charles Gough, and Major Hugh Gough, the three latter having received the Victoria Cross, to show that the opinion held by the right hon. Gentleman was erroneous. Then as to the insubordination shown by a portion of the European force in India. It had been stated by the Secretary of State for War that some of the local European force had acted so disgracefully as to have written to the Sikhs, asking them to join them in driving the Queen's troops out of India. He had put a question to the Secretary of State for India on this subject, and judging from the very curt answer he received, as well as from the evidence published on the subject, he concluded that the statement made was completely inaccurate. But, referring to the so-called mutiny of the European force in India, what, he would ask, was the conduct of the authorities at home, with regard to these misnamed mutineers. No sooner did the ships which conveyed them to England heave in sight than the recruiting sergeant went on Board, or awaited their landing, to induce them to join regiments of the Line, so that these mutineers would thus be draughted into battalions serving in our Colonies, in Canada, or New South Wales, for instance, where much more danger would arise from a mutinous spirit among the men, than there would in isolated stations in India. He did not suppose that there would be much difficulty in reorganizing an efficient local force. He believed the amount of the local force at present was 15,000 men. If these were dispersed among the new regiments which he should propose to raise, there might very soon be in India regiments in a tolerable state of discipline and amounting in number to about 40,000 men. If to that force were added a Royal army of 30,000 men, there would then be strength enough in India to maintain the peace of the country, provided the Native army was sufficiently reduced. He regarded the present moment as not the proper time for carrying out this great change; and thought it would have been much better if the Government had
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    confined itself to the preparation of measures for relieving that country from financial embarrassment, and had allowed the question of military organization to stand over till a more favourable time arrived for its consideration and settlement.
    SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, he must complain of the course that had been taken on this question by the Secretary of State for India, who, he thought, had not treated the House with the consideration it had a right to expect; and he was not sure that the House would have had any documents relating to the subject under discussion until the question had been disposed of, if it had not been for the clamour raised about them. The right hon. Gentleman declined to have any discussion with the Council of India, who might have been able to furnish him with important information and good advice, until their advice was no longer of any use; and the right hon. Gentleman seemed to propose that the House should legislate upon the subject without their having decisive information before them, and without his having formed any well-digested plan in his own mind. The question before the House was a most grave one, involving the interests of many thousand officers and closely affecting the honour of the country. When the Secretary for India brought forward the measure of last August, he (Sir De Lacy Evans) gave him every possible assistance; but, since then, the right hon. Gentleman had turned completely round, though he (Sir De Lacy Evans) was unable to follow him, but continued to hold the same opinions which he then professed. Such a proposition as that which had been intimated by the Government ought to be distinctly placed before the House. It was a mistake to suppose that the question was purely military. It was partly military, and partly a question of State. In the Cabinet which brought the present scheme forward, there was not one soldier nor one Member who had been in India. He was himself a soldier, and had served in the three Presidencies. He, therefore, thought that on military questions he was quite as competent to form an opinion as the Members of the Cabinet. The House had been led to believe that the principal military officers in India were greatly alarmed with regard to this local force; but great injustice had been done at least to three of them—Lord Clyde and Sir William Mansfield, and Sir Hope Grant; and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India

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    he thought had occasion to blush for some of the harsh observations which had been made in ignorance of the real state of the case, as disclosed by these papers. A portion of them had now been received, and Heaven knew when they would obtain the rest; the right hon. Gentleman declared that he was not responsible as they were in the printer's hands; whereas it now turned out that he had the documents in his own office nil the time. He did not know, until he read those documents, how completely Lord Clyde and Sir William Mansfield stood exonerated from any blame on the subject; and if their sound and rational advice had been taken in the early stage of the matter, they might have escaped the difficulty in which they found themselves. The gravity of the question had been monstrously exaggerated. The right hon. Gentleman stated that he was almost in darkness till after the 10th of August last; but it appeared that at a very early stage the heads of the army in India gave advice which, if adopted, might have prevented the necessity for the present measure. In a despatch from the Governor General to Lord Stanley, dated the 18th of November, 1858, Lord Canning thus expressed himself:—
    "I beg your Lordship to believe that I do not underrate the grave responsibility which attaches to the choice in this matter of a course different from that which has recommended itself to the judgment of Lord Clyde, and which is emphatically urged by His Excellency, who is so pre-eminently well qualified to guide the Government in any question in which the feelings and treatment of British soldiers are concerned. But after very careful consideration, I have, to my regret, found myself unable, in this instance, to adopt the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, and I feel it to be my duty to require that the law shall be asserted and maintained."
    What was the advice given by Lord Clyde, and who was to be held responsible for the movement? The noble Lord at the head of the Government had been repeatedly charged with having caused the expectations which gave rise to it, and had not shown his usual candour in dealing with that accusation. Sir William Mansfield, in a letter dated November, 1858, explained to the Governor General the views of Lord Clyde:—
    "Lord Clyde would beg leave to call to the recollection of the Governor General, with the greatest deference to His Excellency, a fact unknown except to military men—namely, that in the old regiments of the Crown a man cannot be transferred from one to another without his free consent, he having enlisted to serve in a particu-
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    lar regiment. Thus it happens that, although the conditions of servitude are precisely the same in the various regiments of Her Majesty's service, whenever necessity requires that the complement of one regiment should be filled up at the expense of others, 'volunteers' are called for the purpose, who receive a bounty in consideration. Whatever may be the exigencies of the State, the rule has always been followed in the army, that the free consent of the individual must be obtained before he can be transferred from one part of the service to another. Perhaps there is no rule which the soldiers more clearly understand, or to the principle of which they cling with greater tenacity; it is understood before they enter the army, in consequence of the education in this respect which they receive from the recruiting sergeant, and in the Militia regiments. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, Lord Clyde would request the closest attention to the practical circumstances of a soldier's enlistment, and of the manner in which the soldier would view any attempt to deprive him of what he considers a right. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to make him understand any legal argument by which the very principle of his military existence might, in his opinion, be set aside. Lord Clyde would earnestly suggest that, in treating this very important matter, it should be so managed as not to alarm the men with regard to the point to which allusion has now been made. He would propose to the Governor General that it may be worthy of consideration whether the re-enlistment of the Company's European forces should not be proceeded with immediately, in order to prevent the possibility of a feeling of irritation arising in the army of a very inconvenient, and, perhaps, dangerous tendency."
    Why, from the course they had adopted, it would appear that the authorities in England and Calcutta were bent on irritating the men. Such were the views of Lord Clyde and Sir William Mansfield. The officer next in point of distinction was Sir Hope Grant, who wrote similarly, and declared it to be "of the highest importance that this question should be speedily set at rest, otherwise most vexatious circumstances might ensue." At the very time these men were respectfully pressing their claims either to a discharge or a fresh bounty, other soldiers, who merely volunteered from one regiment to another, were obtaining bounties. Colonel M'Kenzie was sent to Burhampore, which was supposed to be the focus of this terrible revolutionary movement, and, the men having been paraded he found only thirty-nine who absolutely insisted on their demands being complied with. He made a statement to them, and, in a Report which he subsequently despatched, discipline was described as becoming gradually restored, and of the thirty-nine all except one evinced a disposition to return to the ranks. By the advice of Lord Clyde a Court of Inquiry

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    was established, and all the men had been invited to present themselves before it, and to state their grievances. Among others who had so presented themselves was Private Campbell, who stated that he had been attested at Dundee in 1857; Private Casey, a native of Belfast, and Private Costello, who had been attested the same year—all, be it remembered, men of only one year's standing, and these men, in reply to the questions which had been put, said they had enlisted to serve the East India Company, and that the authority of the Company having been put an end to they thought they had a right to be re-attested, or to obtain their discharge. Now, it was possible that when the whole of the papers had been delivered some much more flagrant cases of insubordination than those might be discovered; but, if there were no such cases, then he apprehended no sufficient reason for the proposed amalgamation, founded upon the mutinous spirit evinced by the local army, could be advanced. On these men being asked which they would prefer, their answers generally were that they preferred being again attested, and that they had not wished to give up the soldiering life. Indeed one of them, of the name of Costello, from Dublin, added that he did not like to go home, but that if any recompense were given he should like to get his share of it. Well, those were the atrocious conspirators against the Indian Empire, as characterized by the right hon. Baronet (Sir Charles Wood). Now, when that right hon. Gentleman brought on his India Bill, in the course of last Session, the opinions he expressed were totally at variance with what they were at present. The right hon. Gentleman in the former Session warmly defended the local army from the imputation of mutiny, and said that it would be grossly unjust to them and discreditable to the Government if those men, who had behaved so nobly during times of great peril and difficulty, were treated with any want of regard or consideration. The Secretary for War, a few nights before, in dealing with that part of the subject, made some remarks to which he had listened with the utmost pain and regret. The right hon. Gentleman upon that occasion endeavoured to impress upon hon. Members the necessity of assenting to the Government measure, inasmuch as if they did not do so an expense of £220,000 for pensions, of £300,000 for gratuities, and of £70,000 for something else would have to be incurred. He then went on to
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    say—thus, proving by what enormous faith in the credulity of the House he must he animated—that for his part he thought it would be very improper to render ourselves liable to such an expense in order to reconstruct a force which in the moment of our direst need had proved faithless and disloyal to their Sovereign. He for one deprecated the use of such language, and he would entreat the right hon. Gentleman, when he had to deal with the honour and feelings of a large body of men such as those under the control of the Department over which he presided, to give expression to his sentiments in words somewhat more gentle and considerate. The language which the right hon. Gentleman employed in speaking of the local army in India was, he (Sir Do Lacy Evans) contended, in the highest degree unjust. Was it not a fact that in the moment of our direst need the troops of that army had performed their duty to their Sovereign in a manner the most faithful and heroic? No part of the Royal army had proved more faithful or had stood more heroically to their colours than the local troops. He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman had ever read an account of the achievements by which that fidelity and that heroism were evinced. If not, he would inform him that two regiments of Bengal Fusileers were engaged at the memorable siege of Delhi, and that two other regiments of the same force served at Lucknow. The two principal regiments engaged at the siege of Delhi were the 1st and 2nd Bengal European Fusileers. Those men displayed the most heroic courage and determination in that memorable siege, lasting upwards of four months. Despatches had been received on frequent occasions referring to their gallant conduct during that perilous struggle. The troops before Lucknow had displayed equal bravery, and were likewise honoured by frequent references in the Government despatches. Were all those glorious deeds now to go for nothing? Was a miserable squabble arising out of a claim of £3 or £4 a man, eighteen months afterwards, sufficient to erase the merits of those troops from the records of Indian history, and to degrade them from the rank of British soldiers? For making this claim the local army had been taunted with language of a bitter and most painful character. And what was the nature of this claim? Why the Governor General, in reference to it, stated that the claim was one evidently made by honest men feeling that

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    they were right. Lord Clyde said the soldiers were certainly impressed with the conviction that the justice of the case was on their side. And what were the results? Thirty-nine men only were declared guilty of an offence, and sentenced to one night's imprisonment. With the exception of one man. Lance-sergeant Best, they all submitted subsequently, and were restored to their companies. Now, the plea on which the House of Commons was asked to as-Bent to the proposal of the Government was the uniformly had behaviour of the troops in question; but if such had really been their behaviour it was desirable that the allegations against them should be founded on some better proof than any which had hitherto been furnished. How, he should like to know, if their acts had been such as they had been represented to be, had it come to pass that what they had originally asked for had been granted to them without any resort upon their part to force? The Civil Government had published a Proclamation, setting forth that all the men who pleased might take their discharge; but why, while thus far acknowledging the justice of their claim, bad it resorted to the petty punishment of refusing to re-enlist them? It was only remarkable that of the whole 22,000 who might have accepted a free passage to England, and there re-enlisted, only 10,000 took the discharge, the others remaining in the country, and passing from the Company's service to that of the Queen, but without receiving any bounty. Rather ungenerous treatment, he thought, it was to give them no bounty. Now, they were told the whole force had destroyed itself, and this was, therefore, a most desirable opportunity for carrying out amalgamation, for why should they reconstruct the local force? Now, the fact was, that in consequence of 3,000 re-enlistments, and about 2,000 men who had joined from depots, the force now numbered 17,000, or very nearly as many as existed previously. In his opinion, it was most injudicious to raise so large a body of men as had been proposed. He supported the proposition of the Secretary for India last year that it should be increased to 30,000; but the Commission, it appeared, had decided that we should have a European force in India of 80,000. That extraordinary Commission had not yet been described in its true colours. How was it formed? There were six officers of the Queen's army on the Commission, and four Company's officers,
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    and Lord Stanley, a Member of the Government. It was as clear as the light that the six officers in the Royal army would vote according to the wishes of the Horse Guards and the Government. Were these six officers properly chosen? He thought not. Two of these officers, great chiefs of the Commission, never were in India, and had no experience of Indian affairs. One was the then Secretary of State for War (General Peel), and the Commander-in-Chief. It was quite impossible that either could know much of this matter. Yet their opinions being strongly expressed must have exercised great influence on all the others. Then there was the Adjutant General, besides the Commander-in-Chief. Whoever knew of an Adjutant General giving an opinion different from that of the Commander-in-Chief? There was no such thing in military affairs. Three, then, out of the six officers really knew little or nothing of India. On the other hand, there were on the Commission four local officers, and only one statesman unconnected with military affairs, namely, Lord Stanley, whoso vote was decided for the continuance of the local force. The Report was a very curious one. He knew no precedent for such a state of things. All the names of the Members of the Commission except one were appended to the Report. The exception was that of General Hancock, who happened to know a great deal more of the matter than any other of the six, and he resolved to make a separate Report. This required a great deal of firmness, looking to the manner in which he had been treated. General Hancock's name was not appended to the Report; but the names of all the others, although they disagreed, were attached to it. How did they manage that? Most ingeniously. Undoubtedly, there was a good deal of difficulty about it; but, to induce all the Members to put their names to it, the earlier part of the Report professed to represent the opinion of the majority, and the latter part that of the minority. The majority recommended that there should be 80,000 European troops maintained in India—a most preposterous proposition, in his opinion—which would amount to very nearly 100,000 men; for a very large part of the force would be continually lost to the Indian army and that at home by being at sea. He must say those who made such a proposition had little considered the finances of India,

    1269
    or what had taken place during the great Sepoy rebellion. Although Lord Clyde had completely succeeded in suppressing the rebellion and disarming the people, we still continued to send out troops to India. The continual pouring forth of British troops upon India after the mutiny had been completely subdued seemed as if it were intended to make the people of England believe that that country could not be held without a vast European army. A very moderate augmentation of our force would have been amply sufficient. He regretted to hear that the accounts from China were of so doubtful a character—that it was uncertain whether peace or war was to be the result—because it necessitated the keeping a larger force in India than would otherwise be requisite; and from the general uncertainty it was premature at present to judge of what amount of force would be required for service in China. The Secretary for War had rather overlooked the contingencies involved in the war with that empire. We were mixed up with our warlike neighbours—the French—in that part of the globe, and he could not venture to predict what the results might be. It was quite probable, however, that we should require to have a considerable European force in readiness for another year or two to see how the contest with China would terminate. Heaven knew, indeed, whether success in China might not lead to the same results as it had done in India, and whether our rulers in the East might not commence a career of conquest in China, as they had done in India. Statements had been made that the idea of acclimatizing troops was altogether nonsense, and that there was no advantage in having soldiers accustomed to a particular country. The Duke of Wellington certainly entertained a different opinion, for in many of the despatches which his Grace wrote home from the Peninsula he declared that a soldier who had got through one campaign was of more value than two or three who had just arrived from England. If that principle held good in regard to services in Spain and Portugal, it applied with still greater force to service in a country like India. His own experience in the Crimea, where several of the regiments composing the division he had the honour to command were for several years before on Mediterranean stations, was to the same effect as that of the high authority he had just quoted. It
    1270
    certainly required a long residence in the various Presidencies to enable both officers and soldiers to become acquainted with the habits and customs of the Natives; but when this was acquired, many difficulties were removed. Many persons seemed to consider our position in India very similar to that in our Colonies; but this was a mistaken notion. In many of our Colonies the Native population was either barbarous or scanty in numbers, and in some cases they had been almost wholly annihilated. India, on the other hand, had its 180,000,000 of inhabitants, whose extermination was impossible, and who could not be supplanted by a European race. It was consequently necessary to establish not only a military but a moral supremacy, and that could only be done by obtaining a thorough knowledge of the habits and institutions of the people. A letter from the Calcutta correspondent of The Times, published on the 6th of June, described "the consternation and dismay" produced among the officers of the local army by the news of the supposed intentions of the Home Government. The writer said:—
    "Bound by every association, by a service extending over the best years of their lives to India, the majority of the officers feel that in being handed over to the Horse Guards, or even in being amalgamated with the Royal army, they will be virtually sacrificed. Eminently fitted for Indian warfare, the elder officers especially would feel themselves in a new and strange position in other parts of the world. There is a strong feeling of alarm also lest all the privileges guaranteed to them in 1858 should not be preserved intact after their amalgamation with a service which stands on a different footing. The feeling of apprehension is aggravated by the conviction pervading almost the entire Indian service, that amalgamation is utterly opposed to true policy. …. It is impossible to deny that in general the Natives have an intense dread of newly-arrived regiments. In the local force the tendency of young officers to deride or exasperate our Native fellow-subjects is strongly repressed by the senior officers. On both grounds, therefore, public and private, the Indian officers look forward with anxiety on this subject."
    The Times was a great authority in this matter, and the letter which he had quoted had appeared in its columns, although its tendency was in direct opposition to the views now advocated in other portions of that newspaper. Another part of this subject was its constitutional bearings and its relation to the Horse Guards. In Sir John Malcolm's Life of Lord Clive there occurred this passage:—
    "The reasons of expediency that led Clive to recommend that high public officers, civil and mi-

    1271
    litary, should be remunerated by shares of the profits of the salt trade are stated in numerous letters. He thought that open, direct, pecuniary allowances (adequate in amount) would not willingly be sanctioned by the Company out of any of the revenues that flowed into their Treasury, and still less from the profits of their trade; and that, besides, such large avowed allowances would invite an attack from the Crown upon their patronage; and that the grasping character of the administration in England would lead to a ruinous interference in the nomination of men to India who had no recommendation but their high birth and great interest."
    No doubt there existed a general impression that the extraordinary changes which had come over the mind of Her Majesty's Government on this question might be attributed to a disposition on the part of the Ministry and the Crown to get hold of a large portion of the patronage of India. The Indian Council had been directly charged with endeavouring to keep the patronage arising from these appointments; but those who made that charge seemed quite unconscious that a similar accusation might be brought against the Government. The prophecy of Lord Clive appeared to be in course of fulfilment. What was the patronage connected with the army at present possessed by the Government? During the year 1858 about 800 first commissions were disposed of, 300 or 400 of which were without purchase. Their value was little short of £300,000. Returns also showed that within the last six or six-and-a-half years commissions had been given away to the value of a million and a quarter sterling. There was really no check or control over this patronage. It was frequently said that the Secretary of State for War was supreme; but, in point of fact, the disposition of this patronage rested entirely in the breast of the Commander-in-Chief. It was not desirable that so vast a patronage should rest without control in a single individual; yet by this measure it was proposed to add to it the appointments to the commissions of 5,000 officers. The patronage, which under this Bill would be possessed by the Commander-in-Chief, was without parallel. It would far exceed that enjoyed by the Ministers of War of either France or Russia. Had the right hon. Baronet given the House all the papers referring to this subject he should not have trespassed upon its attention. As he had not done so, he should move the adjournment of the debate, and in doing so he would repeat the question whether, before the Bill passed another stage, the right hon. Baronet would lay
    1272
    upon the table papers in continuation of those which they had received that morning, the protests and Minutes of the Council, and copies of certain letters which were said to have passed between the right hon. Gentleman and a distinguished member of the Council within the lest twenty-four hours.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, That the "Debate be now adjourned."
    MR. MONCKTON MILNES,in seconding the Amendment, said that he was induced to do so mainly because he deeply regretted the mode in which his right hon. Friend had brought this question before the House. There were two modes of proceeding which he might have adopted with fairness to all parties, but, unfortunately, he had pursued a course different from either. He might have taken upon himself the whole responsibility of settling the question, when it would have been his duty to incorporate in a Bill, in a regular manner, what it was that the Government intended to abolish, and what to substitute, laying before the House all the requisite documents and information; or if he shirked that responsibility, and wished to ascertain the opinion of the House before the Government came to an absolute decision upon the subject, he might have moved the appointment of a Select Committee before which all the documents should have been laid, and which should have examined the distinguished gentlemen who composed the Indian Council. Upon the Report of that Committee the House would have been fully able to discuss and to legislate upon. In either case the House would have been placed in a position to understand what it was about; but at present it was unable to come to a decision even upon this very short Bill. The appointment of the Indian Council, and the provision that the opinions of its members should be recorded, implied that that record should be used for the information of the House; and, therefore, until those opinions were placed before them, he thought they should take no further proceedings in the matter. But the way in which his right hon. Friend and the Government were now dealing with the Minutes and protests of the Council amounted to an insinuation that they were not fit to be laid on the Table of the House, and naturally gave rise to an impression—which was perhaps erroneous—that they were anxious to degrade the Council and diminish its value, in order that they might obtain the support of public opinion to ul-

    1273
    terior measures—such as the abolition of the Council itself—which they were not yet quite ready to carry into effect. The question which the House now had to decide was not whether we should have a certain local force in India, but whether 30,000 or 40,000 men should be added to the Queen's army to be employed in protecting her Indian dominions, in addition to the forces now engaged in that service. The circumstances of India were so peculiar that it was probably impossible entirely to do without a local force. This force in his opinion stood in a position somewhat analogous to that of the Canadian militia, and was dependent upon considerations totally distinct from those affecting the regular army. He trusted that, if peace continued, we should be able to maintain the security of our Indian Empire, by means less expensive and less violent than had hitherto been the case. If we were to renew the struggle of the Sutlej or of Rangoon, or if a second mutiny were to break out among the people, then, of course, we must fall back upon a large Imperial force; but, as he hoped neither of those contingencies would occur, he believed the security of India might be maintained mainly by means of a local army. The question before the House had been made to depend too much upon the accidental revolt of a small body of European troops. It was impossible to read the blue-book published that morning without seeing that the history of the revolt in question exhibited an amount of incapacity and a recklessness of public duty which were almost incomprehensible. Sure he was, however, that wherever the fault might lie, the great weight of it could not with justice be made to fall upon the local force. He was not prepared to go the length of saying that their conduct was justifiable, but he thought that a large part of the mischief was caused by the Central Government at Calcutta, who overrode the calm and statesmanlike judgment of Lord Clyde himself. At all events, he protested against founding upon an event so accidental and peculiar as the refusal of some European soldiers to continue their services in India an argument for discharging altogether the local army of that country. The question must rest upon far wider grounds. It must rest chiefly upon the consideration whether it was absolutely necessary largely to increase the Imperial army for the purpose of maintaining the security of our Indian possessions. He be-
    1274
    lieved such a measure was not necessary. All that was required could be fully accomplished by means of a well-organized local force. No one could read the admirable despatches of General Outram without feeling that there were in the higher orders of that force officers with sufficient grasp of mind to remedy any proved defect, and to place the local force, when reorganized, in as high a position as any portion of the British army. A very short experience in India had convinced Mr. Wilson that it would be dangerous to substitute for the local army a mere hostile garrison of strangers; and those who knew what weight should be attached to the opinion of Mr. Frere would not be inclined to disregard his assertion that but for the localized character of our Indian army it would have been impossible to maintain our footing there. The policy of the Romans with regard to Britain was, to leave here some of their best legions to become localized, and by their means to govern their distant dependency, and such he thought should be our policy with regard to India. He would implore the House not to be led away by that lust of centralization which seemed to have occupied the minds of English statesmen on Indian subjects for the last few years.
    COLONEL DUNNEsaid, that the questions of the amalgamation of the Indian with the Royal army, and of the amount of force to be maintained in India, were by no means to be decided by the present Bill, and the reasons for introducing it were so unfair towards the men who had often conducted themselves in an heroic manner that the House ought to hesitate before adopting it. Last year, when the so-called mutiny in the local force took place, he called the attention of the House to the subject, arid mentioned almost every point stated in Lord Clyde's letter. Referring to the attestations, he maintained that no Act of Parliament could transfer the services of the men from the Company to the Crown. The service might be transferred, but the attempt to transfer the services of individuals was an act of tyranny. The men who objected to be transferred were not mutineers, and could not be punished as mutineers. In fact, the Government had not dared to punish them. If any man had been punished he could have recovered damages in England, and if death had in any case been inflicted the person who ordered the punishment would have been guilty of murder. A contract had

    1275
    been entered into, and what the men required was that the contract should be carried out. Nothing could have been more impolitic or more imbecile than the course which the Government had pursued—they simply granted from weakness that which they had refused to any sense of justice. Nothing was more clear than the law, though, unfortunately, Lord Canning and the authorities at home took a different view of the question. If the Secretary of India meant to propose the amalgamation of the Indian and Royal armies, he should clearly state upon what his proposition was founded. Would the right hon. Gentleman say what amount of force was to remain in India, how the Indian officers were to stand in the Queen's army, as regards rank, and what was to be done with the Clive fund? He trusted that, before further proceeding with the measure, details on these points would be supplied to the House. He certainly felt great difficulty in deciding whether the force in India should be local or Royal when he found so much difference of opinion prevailing among great authorities; but, at all events, this point could not be decided upon a Bill which really did not determine the matter.
    MR. AYRTONthought that the Secretary for India had hardly been treated with fairness, for last year the right hon. Gentleman did not commit himself by any formal expression of opinion as to what ultimately should be the position of the European force in India, but merely in an incidental manner stated what was at that time the impression on his mind. He then ventured to differ from the right hon. Gentleman, observing that the right hon. Gentleman had not had time to look into all the papers on the subject, and that when he had he would ultimately be driven to that conclusion at which he had now arrived. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman had very frankly admitted that the impression existing in his mind last year arose from a hasty view of the papers before him, and not upon the deliberate investigation of the more important documents. The right hon. Gentleman was charged with submitting this Bill to the House without having consulted the Members of the Indian Council. Having taken some part in the discussions respecting the formation of that Council, he thought it was understood, when the Council was instituted, that everything was not to be debated in a kind of little Parliament in Leadenhall Street, but that the Secretary of State was to divide the Council into
    1276
    committees, and to submit questions like the present to the investigation of an appropriate Committee; and having become acquainted with the opinions of the Committee of Council, it was then the duty of the Secretary for India and the Government to take their own decision on their own responsibility, and to propose to Parliament such measures as they had resolved to adopt. The papers which had been laid on the table showed that the Secretary of State had given the Council sufficient opportunity of placing on record their views on this subject, in order to enable him to form a judgment of his own. The right hon. Gentleman was, undoubtedly, bound to act on his own responsibility, and would not have been permitted to avoid that responsibility by interposing the Council between himself and Parliament. The Minute of the Committee which had been laid on the table, and which was based on a voluminous blue-book containing the opinions of the most experienced officers not only in the late Company's army but also in the service of the Crown, put the subject in the most concise and explicit form. With such a mass of information already before them, he saw no necessity for prolonging the investigation. The Secretary of State had been found fault with because he had not submitted to the House a scheme for the re-organization and management of the Indian army in all its details. But the fact was that the Indian army had been constructed entirely by the authority of the executive Government step by step, according to the circumstances of the times, and Parliament had had little or nothing to do with the matter. The right hon. Gentleman had pursued the proper course in asking Parliament to undo only what it had already done—namely, to repeal an Act which was passed last Session, and which was no longer applicable to the circumstances of the case. The right hon. Gentleman had displayed great prudence in not attempting a complete and detailed reconstruction of the Indian army, but in leaving the changes which might be required to be worked out gradually by the executive Government. The Secretary for India was going to reconstruct the Indian army in the same manner as it was constructed before—namely, by the action of the Executive Government extended over a long term of years. In accomplishing this there was no reason to believe that Her Majesty's Government would not pay

    1277
    the same respect to the vested interests of officers as the Court of Directors of the East India Company would have done. Much of the argument against the measure was based on the presumption that the Crown was bent on doing injustice to the Officers of the Indian army; but all the changes proposed might, and no doubt would, be effected without injury to the position of those officers. It was, however, a mistake to suppose that there was any guarantee given for maintaining things us they were by the Act of Parliament which put an end to the power of the Company, because the Court of Directors themselves always retained in their hands the power of making any orders respecting the officers of the army in India as well as the disposition of that army, and the Secretary of State in Council was invested with the same power. Without stating all the details of the proposed changes he thought it was sufficient that the Government gave a general pledge not to put an end to the rights and privileges of the officers. Those who chose to remain in India would have the option of doing so, and would have the same benefits as if the old system had continued in force. It was much to be regretted that foreign topics had been intruded into the debate. No one wanted to exalt the Imperial army, or to decry either the Native or the local European army in India. It was only when one force was said to be the perfection of military organization that the question was obliged to be asked: How conies it that one part of a force so excellent has exploded in a most terrible mutiny, and another part has dissolved in what he must term a most mutinous disaffection? If any one studied the papers they would find that, instead of the men putting forth their claims temperately, they proceeded in such a manner that the Government was led to the conclusion that the men had formed their opinion, and that it had resolved to take their own course though they were shown to be in the wrong. The soldiers of the European force, by the negligence of the officers of the Indian Government, were not given a copy of the oath which they had taken, and which would have made them aware that they owed equal allegiance to the Crown as they did to the East India Company.
    Notice taken, that Forty Members were not present. House counted, and Forty Members being present—
    MR. AYRTONresumed:—When the local troops, on the transfer of the Government from the Company to the Queen, looked to the papers supplied to them, they could not find the solemn oath they had taken to serve the Queen, and they set up a claim that, in consequence of the change of Government, they were entitled to their discharge, and to receive a bounty upon re-enlistment. There was, however, a well known distinction in military law, that if a man enlisted to serve in a particular regiment or place, the condition of that service could not be changed without re-enlistment: but in the present case, whether the East India Company administered the affairs of India as trustees for the Crown, or whether the Crown itself administered the affairs of India in its own name, could not give the men a claim to re-enlistment after the oath they had taken, their conditions of service remaining unchanged. No one had desired to charge the local European army with discipline; but when exaggerated pretensions were set up, and its discipline was said to be equal, if not superior, to that of the Queen's army, it became necessary to state that the discipline of the Company's European force was not of the highest character. He held in his hand, for example, a report by one of the Company's officers upon the punishment and treatment of offenders in one of the local regiments. A private was charged with being asleep on duty. He was forgiven. Another man was charged with being three times drunk on duty within four months. Upon each occasion he was forgiven. These were serious military offences, and the punishment exhibited a lax state of discipline, which, when the local army was crossed and thwarted, manifested itself in acts of sedition, if not in absolute mutiny against the Government of India. The argument of the under Secretary of State with regard to the qualifications of officers of the Queen's army appeared to him to be greatly mistaken. It was an answer to the only argument of any weight against the change proposed, and was therefore deserving of attention. When they were removed at their own request from the Queen's army, they would be allowed to continue as local officers, and to discharge local duties as long as they remained on the Staff of the Indian army, The same conditions that now existed would therefore be in force, and would provide a body of British officers devoted

    1279
    to local objects. What reason could there be for maintaining that British officers would be more willing to quit posts of adequate remuneration under the new system than under the old? The only difference would be that the Government would have a larger area of selection, and the probability therefore was that they would have a better body of officers at their command. It would be safe to assume that the change would operate without injury to the public service in India, since there would be just as great an opportunity for officers to undertake a local duty, and obtain the same amount of remuneration and distinction as the Company's officers at present enjoyed. It was also said that there would be an insuperable desire on the part of officers of the Queen's army to return to this country, and this argument, which was to some extent adopted by Lord Canning, was, if well-founded, no doubt adverse to the change. The short answer to that was, that officers would remain or come back just as expectations were held out of advantage to themselves. When an officer had obtained for himself the reputation of having a knowledge of local affairs his own interest would keep him where he could gain distinction instead of coming to England to begin life again with new competitors. The Governor General said he had conversed with officers lately on this subject, and found among them a great indisposition to remain in India. But he had not sufficiently considered that the officers with whom he conversed were hurried out to India under the old system, to suppress the mutiny, and had no intention of remaining there. They were, no doubt, men much devoted to the Queen's service, and had no desire to change their condition by accepting permanent employment in India. But this state of mind was quite inapplicable to officers who had fitted themselves for civil employment in India. The noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley) said, the local officers of the Native army who quitted the army and remained attached to the Staff as civil officers would not be respected unless they were identified with a large body of local European officers; but if they were respected because of their connection with the local European officers, would they not be still more respected if they were connected with the still more numerous and more important body of officers who commanded
    1280
    the army of the Queen? In point of fact—setting aside the interest of senior officers and individuals—the proposed change would greatly conduce to raise the character and position of the officers who obtained local employment, while it would add to the respect in which they were held; and it was very much on that ground that he desired to see the present measure passed. Nothing would so much tend to divest the Secretary of State for India of all prejudices with regard to the class of officers appointed to serve in India, as the fact that all belonged to one grand army. He believed that the only opponents of this measure in India were those who had got a certain position under the present system; but he did not hesitate to say that if the question of comparative merit were raised, many of them would be found not entitled personally to the positions which they held. ["No, no!"] Perhaps the Gentlemen who cried "No, no!" thought that all the officers in India were selected according to merit; but he could tell them that there had been just as many influences at work in the administration of affairs in India as in this country. There were connections and classes who considered India as their freehold in regard to appointments, and persons were not always placed in positions of importance on account of merit alone. By a system of seniority on the one hand, officers were placed in command of regiments without reference to merit, and by a system of selection on the other, persons were placed in positions for which they were not qualified. The observations he had made with reference to officers generally applied equally to the remark that they would have no staff officers in India if this change were made. They would still have the same principle of selection, there would be not merely the same but a larger area from which to select, and, therefore, it might be presumed that the same or a better result would be arrived at. It had been said that the proposed change would give rise to collisions between the military and civil Governments in India; but how could collisions be incurred by placing the whole of the army under the control of the Governor General and the local Government? Under the new system the Commander-in-Chief would have no more power to interfere with the local army than at present, and the danger of collisions would be lessened by the circumstance that they would get quit of the present double staff, and

    1281
    have only one responsible staff. If the existing system would work well with regard to the Queen's troops in India, why should it work worse when twelve or fourteen regiments were added to the Royal army? The Horse Guards was always set up as a bugbear to frighten them on this subject; but he did not believe in the power of the Horse Guards to do all the mischief that had been asscribed to it. They knew that in this country the Horse Guards was very much under the command of the Secretary for War. The Horse Guards could not increase the expenses of the army one shilling without his previous assent. And, with regard to India, the power of the Horse Guards would rather be lessened than enhanced by the proposed change, because the Secretary of State for India would be cognizant of all that took place in India with regard to the European troops, and thus the Commander-in-Chief would be placed under a double supervision, that of the Secretary for War and that also of the Secretary of State for India. Then, as to the transfer of patronage from the Indian Council to the Horse Guards, he maintained that such transfer was not the necessary result of passing this measure. That point might be determined by proper orders being given by the military authorities, and if any question should arise it would necessarily come under the consideration of that House, which could then express its opinion on the course to be adopted. Those were the main objections to the Bill; but the able speech of the noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley) did not convince him that those objections could not be removed by adopting proper precautions. If that were so, the House must consider what would be the practical advantages of the change. Some hon. Members appeared to regard this as purely an Indian question; but that, he conceived, was an imperfect and unsatisfactory view to take. They must regard the measure as it would affect England. The pretence that India was a self-sustaining Government had long since vanished. It was not the local force that had defended our Indian empire from the attacks of other Powers; it was the British navy which protected the coasts of India, whilst our internal Power had to be sustained by the military resources of this country. He contended, then, that England should be entitled in the event of any emergency at home to withdraw troops from India for the protection of England. That was the main object
    1282
    of the amalgamation which was now proposed. What would be thought of France if she were to raise an army to serve in Algeria, and never to be recalled to France, whatever the danger at home might be? The case was the same with India, although it was further from the mother country. It had been suggested that we might safely rely upon the loyalty of the local force, who would not hesitate to volunteer for service at home if any great danger should threaten us; but he would ask whether it would be wise to enact that those men should serve only in India, and then rely upon the chance of their being willing to break through that arrangement in case they wore required at home? Then, again, it was said that to bring home troops would be unjust towards India; but he could not see why it would be so. We might require trained veteran troops at home to cope with European armies, but younger and less experienced men would be fit for India; and again, it was not intended to take away troops from India in such a manner as to weaken our hold upon that country. If they assumed that the Government would act with common sense, as upon other matters, there was no force in that objection. He had suggested that the difficulty, if any existed, would be met by keeping a home battalion for each regiment serving in India, and for a time transferring the younger soldiers to India and bringing home the older and more experienced men. There was one last consideration that ought not to be overlooked in dealing with this question. He believed the maintenance of a local force did not conduce to the cultivation of a spirit of loyalty to the Imperial Government and the Crown. It created local feelings, prejudices, and views, which might become paramount. He thought it was necessary that every man in India should feel that he was a soldier in the service of the Queen of England. Although this change might cause some expense, yet that expense would only be commensurate with the advantages it would confer on the soldier by affording him greater facilities for exchanging the unhealthy climate of India for that of their native country. All the objections that bad been raised seemed to him to be of a slight and untenable character, and therefore he hoped there would be no further obstruction to the passing of this measure, which would both increase the efficiency of the army in India and the military resources of the empire.
    MR. DANBY SEYMOURsaid, he was glad that the Bill had found a supporter, and one who had stated the case with great ability. For the first time in the history of this nation disloyalty had been imputed to our countrymen, at whatever distance they were from England, and it had been declared that they were not to be trusted in India. The authority of the Duke of Wellington had been most erroneously quoted as having anticipated disaffection in India, and the Secretary for War seemed to think that he contemplated such a danger as was now spoken of. But the fact was that, though in the extract read the Duke of Wellington believed it possible that officers living far away from their country might, under circumstances, be led away from their duty, he expressly declared his opinion that the British soldier, whether belonging to the Company's service or in the Queen's army, would remain firm. It was by the trust that we thus reposed in our countrymen, of whatever rank and in whatever part of the world they might be, that the Emperor Napoleon was so much astonished, and he was the only person who had ever yet imagined that it was possible that England might, by the arms of her own children, be deprived of her Eastern empire. What proofs were there that the local troops had ever indicated the slightest desire to league with the Sikhs to drive the Queen's troops from India? He challenged the right hon. Gentleman to show that the slightest ground existed for the suspicion that Englishmen serving the Indian Government would prove disloyal. As to the proposed measure, the onus probandi lay upon those who proposed the change, and not upon those who supported the existing local army. The fact was that our Indian army was an exceptional army, because India was an exceptional empire. The two things had grown up together, and, if one were abolished, who could say how long the other would remain? In truth, as we had given up localizing the Government of India our tenure of that country had become more and more precarious. The Secretary for India had no right to ask the House now to come to a vote on this question. In the first place, he could not refute the charge of producing garbled extracts from the papers. That had been done in Colonel Durand's case; a paper was printed and a letter of Colonel Durand, who found that two paragraphs had been extracted from it, and he was informed
    1284
    that that officer had sent to The Times the whole of his correspondence with the right hon. Gentleman on the subject. How could they tell the other papers had not been mutilated in the same way? Then, again, was it the practice for Colonel Baker, the Military Secretary, to keep papers in his office for two months when they were forwarded to him for examination? Of all the Indian papers presented this year none had been kept back so long. Another point for consideration was the mode in which the Indian Council had been treated. He understood that the right hon. Gentleman announced one day to the Council that the Cabinet had come to the detertermination of abolishing the local army, promising that the week afterwards the subject should be brought before the Council in the shape of an order to stop the enlisting of troops for the Company's service; but the right hon. Gentleman up to that time had never brought the subject before the Council; and so he now told the House that he could not produce the minutes of the Council upon the subject, becouse the Council bad never discussed it. He contended that it was contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Act of 1858 that the question had never been submitted to the Council. It was intended by the Act of 1858 that the Council should transact the general business of India, and the Act even provided that in the case of a difference between the Secretary of State and the Council, if the Secretary of State did not defer to the opinion of the majority he should record his reasons for differing from them; and that the Council, on the other hand, should record their protests against his decision. It was never contemplated in 1858 that great questions of policy should be disposed of by the Secretary for India alone, and that fifteen gentlemen with salaries of £1,200 a year each should be kept to deal with ordinary business which might be transacted by a staff of clerks. The clear object, then, in view was that these gentlemen, being of great experience in Indian affairs, should be consulted by the Secretary of State on matters of importance, and that their opinions should have due weight with him. The members of the Council were prevented by the Act from sitting in Parliament, or otherwise many would be there. The House of Commons had not the advantage of their presence. They had been taken away expressly to assist the right hon. Gentleman, who now, however, would not

    1285
    be assisted by them. Instead of sending for them one or two at a time into his room, the Secretary of State should have had the whole thing openly discussed in the Council Chamber, where all the arguments pro and con. might have been heard and met, and why had he done this? Because he knew that every one of them was against his scheme. As it was he thought the Bill ought to be adjourned until a full investigation had taken place. The right hon. Gentleman said that in 1858 a person must have possessed a supernatural foresight who could anticipate that the differences which had arisen with the men would result seriously. But the letters which the Government had received from Lord Clyde and others had apprized them of the difficulties to be encountered, and should have warned them not to treat the matter so lightly. General Mansfield also had written to the same effect. As regarded the cause of the complaints, the officers had done not a little to encourage them, by representing that the demands of the troops would certainly be complied with by the Home Government; and the speech of the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) was in itself sufficient to mislead uneducated men. When the opinion of the law officers was first taken on the subject, he believed they declared that the attestation of the East India Company's troops did not render them liable to the service of the Queen. The men, therefore, felt themselves oppressed, and mutiny was the result. What had taken place with regard to the Chinese troops, was not a parallel case. Their claim was referred home and was acceded to, and no thought of mutiny entered their minds; but did anybody believe that if the reply had been unfavourable, they would have gone contentedly to China? This Bill, by which the military government of India was transferred from Calcutta to the Horse Guards, was diametrically opposed to the maxims of the greatest authorities, who always held that India should be governed as much as possible in the country itself. Lord Dalhousie, Lord Ellen borough, and Lord Canning, all men eminently qualified to judge of Indian matters, were all opposed to its principle. That the object of the Horse Guards was to get additional power, was shown by the course of the examination before the Commission. At present the Commander-in-Chief in India had no communication whatever with the Commander-in-Chief in England; but under the terms of this Bill he would correspond
    1286
    officially with the Horse Guards, not alone in relation to British troops, but to the whole Native army, which was to be commanded by British officers. It became important to know on what subjects he was to correspond, and how it would be possible for the Commander-in-Chief in England to regulate the internal economy of 300,009 men abroad, and at the same time not to receive any accession of influence. The effect, he believed, would be—though perhaps contrary to the intentions of the right hon. Gentleman—to transfer the control of the whole Native army from Calcutta to London. Whether or not this was the intention of the right hon. Gentleman this would be the result, since the Native army would be officered by British officers belonging to the army under the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards. Still less was he able to understand the reasoning of the Government with respect to the Staff corps. An officer appointed to the Staff was struck off the strength of his regiment; but one of the advantages of his new position was that he was able to serve in any part of the world. In the case of a war in Europe a man would naturally long to be on the spot where fighting was going on, and though he were well acquainted with the habits and language of the people, and might be on the way to become an Outram or a Lawrence, there would be nothing to localize his services, and these, in all probability, would be lost to India; he would, as the Duke of Wellington once did, insist upon joining his brethren in arms in the field. Again, if the war happened to be with Russia, and intrigues were taking place in the East, there would often be struggles between the home and the Indian Governments for an officer of remarkable ability, who was peculiarly fitted to cope with Asiatic duplicity. There would be a divided allegiance between Calcutta and the Horse Guards, and who could doubt which would prove the strongest? At home, again, the power would be severed into two departments, that of the Commander-in-Chief and that of the Secretary of State for War. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir Charles Wood) had stated that the present Bill would not trench upon the power of the Governor General in India; but it had been well said that in Eastern nations the power of the sword was immense, and those who had filled the office of Governor General seemed to be of opinion that by the Bill that means of upholding authority

    1287
    would be destroyed. It was also contended that under the existing system the discipline of the local army was at a low level; but, if the test of discipline was to be supplied by the conduct of troops in the field, he could not understand how that argument could with justice be urged in favour of effecting a military revolution in India. What constituted discipline? The conduct of the men in face of the enemy; and the army which was now said to be so undisciplined that its individuality must be destroyed was the same that had been victorious at Delhi and Luck now. Three years ago the discipline of the local army was sufficient to save an empire, but it nevertheless did not appear to have reached a standard which could satisfy the Horse Guards. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for India endeavoured to justify the change which he proposed on the ground of the discontent which had prevailed in that army; but the letters which he had received in the May and June of last year were quite as strong on that subject as any which seemed to have reached him since he had declared himself in favour of the maintenance of the local army in the following August. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman had not at all condescended to tell the House what the circumstances really were which had led him within the space of ten months to be the advocate of two lines of policy in themselves perfectly inconsistent. As to the question of expense, it was at present left quite in the dark, whether the army in India when amalgamated with the Royal army would be dearer or cheaper than the local army; but there was one point of importance on which they had the means of forming an opinion—all the evidence proved that the standard of health in the local army was higher than that of the Queen's troops serving in India and the rate of mortality lower. He considered Lord Ellenborough's maxim a wise one, "to disturb as little as possible." India was not like England and could not with safety be constantly subjected to great changes. If, indeed, the right hon. Gentleman were to turn his attention to internal reforms in the affairs of India, and to seek to improve the administration of justice there, much good might be effected in that direction. But, instead of doing that, the most complete stagnation appeared to prevail in his Department until he had been roused into his present condition of unfortunate activity. He should, however, remind the House that, if they as-
    1288
    sented to the right hon. Gentleman's proposal, on them the responsibility of the mode in which it would operate would ultimately rest. We had guaranteed the rights of 6,000 officers, and one of the reasons he understood why Sir Patrick Grant acceded to the Government scheme, as stated in a suppressed despatch, was that he despaired of having justice dealt out to a local army from head-quarters. Be that as might, however, it was surely but fair that the House of Commons should endeavour to reconcile the proposed change with the fulfilment of the guarantee to which he alluded. Besides, they gave away to the Queen's army the posts which were the subject of guarantee given to those officers. If the right hon. Gentleman persevered with his Bill, of course he would be successful in the division; but he was bound to explain how far the authority of the Governor General was to extend as to the interior discipline and management of the army in India. If that was satisfactorily explained it would take away in part the objectionable character of this plan. There was another point on which the Duke of Wellington had laid great stress—how were they to keep the armies of the three Presidencies separate if they officered them all from one army? They could not long keep up the difference between these local armies after they had obliterated it in the officers in command. It was said this question should be looked at not for India, but for England. He looked at it in an Indian point of view, simply because he wished to see the course taken which would redound most to the benefit of both countries. In a case of emergency it would not be practicable to transport the troops from India to this country so as to be speedily available, for there was no analogy between the instances of England and India and France and Algeria. Algeria was only forty-eight hours sail from France. In a British point of view, he thought it better to have a local army in India. If a reserve was wanted, it should be kept in England. For these reasons he was against the Bill of the right hon. Gentleman. It had not been proved that it would be more economical. It had not been proved that the health of the European troops would be better than that of the local army in India. It had not been proved that this scheme would not injuriously affect the power of the Governor General, and he very much feared it would be found to introduce the principle of

    1289
    governing India in London instead of Calcutta.
    MR. GREGSONsaid, that as the most eminent military authorities were divided on this subject, he took the liberty, as a civilian, of offering a few remarks upon it. He had lived in India, where he acquired the highest estimate of the bravery and skill of the officers of the local army. If we were now about to take the first step towards dispensing with the Native army and the local European force, he should hesitate very much; but the work was done for us—the Native army had melted away with the mutiny, and the European force had virtually ceased to exist; and it seemed to him that the time had therefore come when we should cease to have a Royal army and a local army in India. There should be but one united army in that country. He was glad to hear that the Horse Guards was not to interfere with the authority of the Governor General. Under the proposed amalgamation of the two forces he trusted that every encouragement would be given to officers to reside in India, and acquire the Native languages. The greatest mischief had resulted from the want of a cordial understanding between the European officers and the Sepoys, from the inability of the former to speak the Native dialects. High prizes ought, therefore, to be held out to spirited young officers to learn to converse with the people of India in their own tongue. This might be done by continuing the allowances formerly granted, and by offering Staff appointments to those who qualified themselves to receive them. He believed that Sir John Lawrence and other Indian officers had given honest opinions on this subject; but they were necessarily prejudiced. No doubt the officers of the Queen's service were not wholly free from bias on this question, but he thought the preponderance of prejudice rested on the side of the local Indian officers. We had abolished what was called "the double Government," and it was equally desirable to get rid of the double army. They would thereby put an end to the jealousies which now existed between the two services. We must retain a certain proportion of Native troops, but experience had proved the inexpediency of enlisting the high caste Natives. The army in India at present was out of all proportion to the necessities of the case. He believed that a force composed of half the number of men would be quite sufficient, and that by such a reduction
    1290
    £10,000,000 a year might be saved to the Indian finances.
    SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, that he would not have troubled the House but for the reflection made upon the discipline of the Indian army by the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets. He trusted that the additional papers that were now asked for would be produced as early as possible, for there might be in them matters which would induce hon. Members to modify or change their opinions. The change proposed by his right hon. Friend the Secretary for India was put forward on three grounds:—First, a saving of expense; secondly, increased efficiency; thirdly, better discipline. He believed with Sir Bartle Frere that financial considerations were the most important with which we had to deal in respect of India at the present moment; but he very much doubted that the plan of his right hon. Friend (Sir Charles Wood) would conduce to economy; the evidence, indeed, was quite the other way; the force we had now in India was quite beyond the requirements of the case; and, on the whole, he thought it clear that economy would be best secured by keeping things as they now were. Then as to efficiency, what had we to complain of on that head? The efficiency of an army consisted in its being well drilled, and its being able to turn out the greatest number of men per 100 into the field at any moment. Now, in this latter respect it was quite evident from the returns on the table of the House that the local European army stood better than the Line. With regard to discipline, the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets had said that the Indian army was in a state of complete indiscipline. He did not think the hon. Member was well informed on the matter. They could not have better judges on such a subject than Sir William Mansfield and Sir Hugh Rose, both of whom had repeatedly eulogized the Indian force in their orders of the day. It had been said by his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War that the school in which the officers of the local European force were trained was a bad one. His right hon. Friend assumed that those officers were always in the first instance placed over Native troops; and then he argued that, because those troops were docile soldiers, the officers were not, on their appointment to local European regiments, able to acquire command over men who, to use his (Mr. S. Herbert's) words, "were not so easily led, and whom it was more difficult to drive."

    1291
    But the officers who exercised authority in the local European force were not taken from commands in the Native force. Cadets on their arrival in India reported themselves to the Adjutant General of the Presidency, and were then appointed either to the one force or the other; and in that force they passed the rest of their lives unless selected for Staff or Civil employments. He should be glad to know in what respect there was a want of discipline. But if it did exist, who were the cause of that state of things? Not the officers, not the men; but the Government, who persevered in that vicious system by which the best officers were taken from the regimental force and sent to Civil appointments or were placed on the Staff. That system had been strongly condemned by many able men, and, amongst others, by General Cotton. He (Sir Frederic Smith) gathered from his right hon. Friend the Secretary for India that under the new Bill officers would be taken from the Queen's service in the same manner. There could not be a greater evil or any course more likely to destroy the efficiency of the army than to give occasion for the feeling that the regimental duty could be escaped. If the system now proposed is to be carried out, he hoped that the most important point of all would never be neglected—namely, the efficiency of the regiments. In reference to the strength of the army in India, it did not appear to him that under a proper arrangement of the troops they would require 80,000 men with 200,000 Native police. The Sepoy mutiny in India was put down by only 42,000 European soldiers, though there was a large army arrayed against them. If steps were taken to produce a Native army, having a greater attachment to this country, he thought that the right hon. Gentleman would find a much smaller number than that which was proposed sufficient for all purposes in India. In his opinion, if the troops were skilfully disposed, and great care taken to have head-quarters at a suitable point, much less than 80,000 men would suffice. It should be recollected that India had a deficit of £7,000,000, and was, therefore, not in a condition to maintain a larger army than was absolutely necessary. He should wish to see the right hon. Gentleman place a map before the House, showing how he proposed to arrange these forces. If they were well arranged there was no doubt but that a smaller number of men would suffice. With regard to the jea-
    1292
    lousy of the two armies towards each other, he did not believe that such a feeling existed to any such extent as to prove injurious to the public service. He believed that the feeling existing was one rather of great mutual respect towards each other. He was anxious to know how the Native troops were to be officered, whether they were to be officered by the selection of the Crown or by the Secretary for India. He asked whether the officers to be appointed to the Native corps were to be continued with them throughout their term of service, or to be transferred at any time to the Line. He was afraid that if officers were to be permanently placed over the Native soldiers they would lose caste. He did not think that the right hon. Gentleman would obtain so many officers from the Line to fill Staff situations as he expected. He (Sir Frederic Smith) had seen officers belonging to the depôts of Chatham, Portsmouth, and other places, go out with great reluctance to India, except during the time of war. Being naturally anxious that the interests of the country should be well considered, he respectfully had made these observations; and he earnestly trusted that whatever course the right hon. Gentleman adopted it would he successful.
    COLONEL SYKESsaid, the opponents to this Bill had been charged with something very like factious conduct for endeavouring to delay its progress until full information was laid before the House, when, in fact, if anybody could be charged with factious conduct, it was the 200 Members who rushed in at the second division and voted without ever having heard a word of the debate. During the debate on that occasion the House varied from 23 to 38 Members, and to-night, when the attempt to count out was made, it had sunk as low as 17 Members; but at the sound of the bell a host of Members, who had not heard one word of the arguments on either side, rushed in and supported the Government. That was the tyranny of numbers, and the faction of the ignorant against the informed. The arguments he had heard urged in favour of the Government Bill might be arranged under the following heads:—first, the mutiny of the European troops; second, the indiscipline of the army of India; third, the deterioration of the local army by climate; fourth, the anomaly of two armies in India; fifth, the present narrow field for the selection of officers for Government employment; sixth, the Staff not taking the field, proving the want of mili-

    1293
    tary order and discipline in the local army; seventh, the jealousy existing between the two armies; eighth, the inability to raise the necessary number of European regiments in case this Bill should not pass, and finally the array of eminent men in favour of the proposition of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir Charles Wood) stated that he had lost all confidence in the local army, and that their trustworthiness was gone: and that was the reason for his change of opinions: but what were the facts. The so-called mutiny occurred three months before the right hon. Gentleman passed his Bill for increasing the local European troops in India from 20,000 to 30,000, and he was aware of what had occurred. He could not then have thought the troops untrustworthy, or he would not have passed his Bill; why therefore the present change? Another argument was that the Government passed that Bill because the preceding Government had raised the number of European troops beyond the legal number authorized by Parliament; but he found from a Return presented to the House that in August last there were 3,156 cavalry, which had been sent out to replace the ten Native regiments disbanded. Those were mere boys, and it was the indiscipline of some of them that caused alarm. There were likewise 7,102 artillery and 9,846 infantry, making a total of 20,104 men. At the same time there were 2,000 men at the depôts; consequently, there were less by nearly 2,000 men than the Act of Parliament authorized. Therefore that argument of the right hon. Gentleman that the Bill was passed to legalize an Act of the preceding Government was not supported by the fact. Then as to the next head of objection, the indiscipline of the army. All he could say in regard to that charge was, that in every action they took part in, they had sufficient discipline to beat the enemy. Sir Henry Somerset, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army. Sir George Pollock, and many other eminent men in India, testified warmly to their merits. The testimony of the celebrated Havelock, with reference to the discipline and valour of these European regiments, was conclusive. Speaking of the Madras Fusiliers, or "the blue caps," as they were called, which regiment had been 100 years in India, and which some people thought might have become deteriorated equally in courage and physique, he said—"I owe the blue caps thanks—they owe me nothing. If I may select and praise any
    1294
    regiments without being invidious, I should say that they and the Highlanders are the most gallant troops in my little force." But indiscipline, it would seem, was not confined to local regiments, for recent accounts from India went to show that courts-martial were proceeding in some regiments of the Line at a great rate, and that in one regiment alone there were 53 in one year. It was asserted that the physique as well as the morale of the regiments that had been long in India was deteriorated. The Secretary for War, however, had testified from Official Returns that the health of the local troops was superior to that of the regiments which had only been a short time in India. To show the frightful mortality which was experienced by European troops before they were acclimatized, he would give the House one single example. Out of 99 recruits received by an artillery regiment at Dum Dum, in Bengal, 21 died within three months after their arrival; 33 within the next three months; 7 within the next three months; 6 within the next three months; and in all 67 out of the 99 within the first twelve months. That was the consequence of pouring fresh European blood into India, instead o£ keeping on the men who had been acclimatized and had adapted themselves to the country. The usual loss was from 7 to 10 per cent the first year; about 7 per cent for the next three or four years; and then about 5 per cent for the succeeding six years. The House might, therefore, think what would be the consequence of relieving 8,000 men every year as was proposed. But that was not all. One of the great advantages arising out of the system that now existed, in connection with permanent residence, would be entirely done away with by the plan proposed—of having new regiments annually sent to India and exposed to all the dangers of climate. When they first landed in India, everything was new to these troops—the country, the black faces, the heat, and the habits of the people, and, following a European to-be-deprecated practice, they called the Natives "niggers," and treated them as such; but consequent upon permanent residence, their prejudices gradually wore away; they looked upon the Natives as comrades, and a fraternization sprang up between them. Here was the advantage of what he had alluded to. We could not keep India except through the goodwill of the people, and that was only to be won by kindness on the part of Euro-

    1295
    peans. The number of the Europeans was a mere handful to the millions of India, and would always he insufficient to maintain our authority with permanent hostility between the races. We could not safely legislate upon a class system, and it was because he thought this measure would be most disastrous in its ultimate results, and to our future security in India, that he opposed the Bill. The fourth anomaly alluded to was the having at one and the same time an army of the Queen and a local army in India. It was an anomaly, however, that had existed for three-quarters of a century, and without inconvenience. At first the local troops had always predominated, but gradually the troops of the Line increased, and of late years the proportions were about two-fifths of the local to three-fifths of the Line, and if the system has been found successful, why alter or disturb it? Did not the same anomaly exist in the army in England, where there was the Line and the Marines? The next argument was, that the local army offered a very narrow field for the selection of officers for staff and other employments in the public service; but the change now proposed could not make any alteration in that respect for officers of the Line at present were equally eligible for staff or other employment if qualified with those of the local army. The field of selection therefore would remain the same as before. Another argument in favour of the present Bill was founded upon the statement that the officers of the Indian army shirked their duty in the field, preferring to remain on staff appointments. This was a most unjustifiable assertion, and contrary to all experience. The fact was that the Government had laid down the rule that certain appointments could not be filled by acting officers, and therefore, if those who held them did not accompany their regiments into the field, the fault was to be attributed to those who framed the regulation in question. In his own regiment the officers brought an officer to trial because there was a semblance only of his shirking his duty in the field. Sir George Pollock had expressed his indignation at the accusation which had been made against the military ardour and soldierly zeal of the officers of the Indian army, and had stated that when he commanded in Afghanistan there were only two officers on the Staff absent out of his entire force. Sir Hugh Rose mentioned the case of an officer on the Staff who did
    1296
    not accompany his regiment, but it was found upon inquiry that it was owing to an interdict of the Government; he was a divisional paymaster, and not permitted to go; but there was no doubt that if the Commander-in-Chief had addressed the Government on the subject the Government would not have refused. There were certain rules laid down by the authorities for officers on detached employ taking the field with their regiments, and if they were not enforced it was the fault of the Commander-in-Chief. Again, it was said that jealousies existed between the two services in India. Such might have been the case formerly, when local officers had no rank westward of the Cape of Good Hope; but the Queen's Order of 1855, obtained at the instance of the present Lord Lyveden by giving Indian officers rank with the Royal officers all over the world, removed all ground for jealousy, and it did not now exist. He did not agree with the Secretary for War in thinking that the continuance of a local army would injure the Queen's army by absorbing recruits. Why should it do so for the future more than it hitherto had done? He would undertake to supply a complement of 30,000 men without drawing from the Royal army. He considered 30,000 men a sufficient force of local European troops; indeed, 20,000 would suffice. It was said that the local troops were not trustworthy, because they had mutinied. How was it, then, when a portion of these troops came back to England, the men-who were described as not being trustworthy, were actually enlisted by recruiting sergeants into the Queen's army. They conceived they had rights which they were justified in asserting, and the Government by the course they had taken had admitted the justice of their claims. With respect to the effect of amalgamation on the interests of the officers of the local force notwithstanding the guarantees, it must be prejudicial; an Act of Parliament guaranteed to the officers of the Indian army certain rights and privileges; it guaranteed their pay and pensions, seniority promotion, and the orphans' and widows' funds. Supposing the armies to be amalgamated, and vacancies to occur in the Indian regiments, the officers who went in would not be entitled to the same privileges as the other officers, as they would be on the footing of the Line, and thus in the same regiment there would be different rights and privileges. Amalgamation, under these circumstances, seemed

    1297
    impracticable. He was amazed when he heard the Secretary for War state that all officers of the Indian army below the rank of captain were for amalgamation. He had had some experience of the Indian army, and he would venture to say that scarcely one officer in one hundred had expressed that desire which the right hon. Gentlemen described as being the desire of all under the rank of captain. He had received letters stating that the writers had read the observation with surprise, and one of them suggested that the assertion must have been founded on the expressions of boys who had gone out within the last few years, and who desired to get home again to their friends. Under the proposed arrangement he believed that a conflict of authority between the home and local Governments would be apt to arise—that is, between the Secretary for India and the Governor General on the one side, and the Secretary for War and the Home Commander-in-Chief on the other. There was no guarantee that former abuses in appointments to the Staff would not be multiplied, and the filling up the vacancies in the body of 4,982 officers of the local army, would throw a serious amount of patronage into the hands of the Horse Guards authorities. The only way in which that evil could be prevented would be to confer certain powers of appointment on the Governor General, and to define very clearly in the Bill the limits of the authority of the Secretary for War and the Horse Guards. The gallant General who sat on the Commission had remarked that, as a rule, all the officers of the Line were for, and all the officers of the Indian army against this Bill. That told very strongly against the measure. All who had experience of Indian service, who understood the European character in India and the habits and prejudices of the Natives, were averse to the amalgamation of the two forces, while the advocates of the change consisted of those who had been in India for but a very short time, or not at all. It was knowledge on the one hand against ignorance on the other. He would vote against the Bill, and hoped his right hon. Friend in the interests of India would not persevere with it.
    MAJOR WINDSOR PARKERsaid, that he must be pardoned for saying that the right hon. Gentleman had fallen into great errors in his statements with regard to the Indian army. The right hon. Gentleman had urged it as an argument in favour of
    1298
    amalgamation that it would render the Indian forces more available than they had hitherto been for service in different parts of our dominions. Was it necessary for him to tell the right hon. Gentleman that from the earliest period of history the armies of India had rendered most important services to the Sovereign in other parts of the world besides India? Had the right hon. Gentleman never heard of its services in Java, or the Mauritius, or of the expedition up the Red Sea to Egypt to assist the expedition under General Abercrombie? He knew of no occasion when the Indian army did not display the utmost zeal and alacrity in coming forward in defence of British interests, no matter in what quarter of the world. The hon. Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes) had spoken of himself as the only Sepoy officer in the House; but he begged to say that he himself had served for sixteen or seventeen years in the Native army of India. He had acted as adjutant and as interpreter; he was well acquainted with the feelings of the people of India, and he thought that the amount of troops necessary for that country had been much exaggerated. He believed that by mixing the various castes of Natives together in single regiments, together with a greater degree of care and vigilance on the part of the European officers, a Native force might be kept in such a state of discipline and efficiency as would render necessary a comparatively small number of European troops. The European force should not be dispersed and broken up in numerous and unhealthy positions; but should be kept massed together in well-chosen and salubrious localities. He wished further to say in support of the union of the two armies, that he had had the pleasure of meeting many distinguished Queen's officers. He might mention Colonel Gardner, who commanded a troop of local horse in Bengal; Colonel Fisher, who did the same, and unfortunately lost his life in the massacre of European officers. There was also M'Cann, of the Lancers, who was an excellent linguist. He had risen to offer these few remarks to the House, principally actuated by a desire to disclaim the statement made by the hon. Chairman of the late Board of Directors to the effect that there was not a Sepoy officer iu the House but himself.
    COLONEL NORTHwished to know how the statements which had been made as to the high discipline of the European portion of the Indian army could be reconciled with

    1299
    the remarks contained in the despatch of Lord Canning which had recently been laid on the table. The noble Lord wrote as follows:—
    "I would, if necessary, sacrifice something even of perfection of discipline. The European troops of the East India Company's army were much below those of the Line in this respect, and probably it would not have been possible to keep them up to the mark of their brother soldiers trained in England; but neither officers nor men had fair play. It appears that these troops, forming as they did a very small fraction of the Indian army, had been until lately almost overlooked by their successive Commanders-in-chief. Upon no other supposition can I account for the fact that there did not exist for the Bengal European regiments any code of instructions or regulations teaching the officers the first elements of their duty."
    The noble Lord went on to say,—
    "I know of no mode of effectually or speedily training the local European troops to the required degree of efficiency which is more likely to be successful than that of obtaining for a time from the Line regiments, whether serving in India or elsewhere, the assistance of officers of experience. No doubt this measure will be, to a certain extent, distasteful to the officers of Her Majesty's Indian forces, and not without some unpleasantness to the officers of the Line selected for the purpose."
    Anything more degrading than such a course would be considered by officers of the Royal army, if applied to them, he could not conceive, and he could not understand how the officers of the Indian force could submit to such a degradation. Lord Canning added,—
    "I am aware that it is the opinion of many high authorities that the maintenance of perfect discipline will be difficult if two distinct English armies are preserved in India, and that the complete order and economy of regiments is greatly promoted by their return, from time to time, to home service. I do not contend that, if judged mainly with reference to soldierly efficiency, the question would be decided more satisfactorily by substituting one army for two."
    Surely, however, soldierly efficiency was the great thing to be looked to in the constitution of an army. Suppose that in some garrison town there were stationed a local European force and a force of Queen's troops, and that something like mutiny had broken out. Would it be pretended that the Queen's soldier must be punished, but that the offence of the Company's soldier was not to be looked upon in the same light? He admitted that the conduct of these local troops came as near mutiny as was possible; but there had also been the greatest mismanagement. The mere fact that when the case was sent home for the opinion of the Home Government a lawyer's opinion was sent back was quite suf-
    1300
    ficient to cause a mutiny. He had no doubt that if the matter had been explained to the men on parade, as would have been done in the Queen's service, the mutiny would not have happened. The most painful thing in the matter was that there was not a single non-commissioned officer, from the serjeant-major to the lance-corporal, who acquainted his officer with the mutiny that was going on. There could be no doubt of the gallantry of the Indian army, but there was a great difference between gallantry and discipline. Not numbers or drill, but discipline, marked the soldier. The efficient soldier was the disciplined soldier on whom a thorough dependence could be placed.
    SIR CHARLES WOOD: Sir, I presume that, although the adjournment of the debate has been moved, yet as every speaker has treated the question as if it were a continuation of the debate on the second reading, I may also be justified in so treating it, and that under these circumstances I hope I may be permitted to bring the debate to a termination. Sir, my hon. Friend the Member for Poole has said that there is one sufficient reason for not proceeding with the second reading of the Bill, and that is, that I have kept back some papers which a week ago I was accused of suppressing. [Mr. HORSMAN: Hear!] Whether these papers were printed as soon as they should have been is another matter; and whether the delay occurred through the fault of the printer, or that of the Military Secretary to the Indian Department, is an affair with which I have nothing to do. Very high testimony has been borne to the character of that officer, which I can entirely and strongly confirm. I certainly heard that duplicates of these papers had been lying in the India office, and in the hands of some members of the Council, but I had not seen them, nor was I aware that the printing of them was not being proceeded with as fast as possible. Although, however, these papers have afforded some occasion for discussion, I do not think they would have advanced the case of those who have opposed this Bill; on the contrary, I think they would have confirmed the statements I made, in the speech I made on introducing this Bill to the House. The hon. and gallant Member for Westminster has taunted me with having given a military opinion. Sir, I never gave a military opinion. I quoted the opinions of Lord Clyde and Sir William Mansfield, who were as well entitled to

    1301
    form a military opinion upon what was passing under their eyes as the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster. What do these papers prove? They prove exactly what I stated—namely, that Lord Clyde took a very different view of the mutiny of the European troops in the summer and autumn of last year from what he had originally entertained, and that he thought it a much graver question. These papers prove that in November he did not think very much of the matter, but that when later in the spring on the final announcement of the intention of the Home Government of India, the mutiny took place, and still more so as the proceedings went on he considered it decisive against the maintenance of a local army. It is clear also from the dates of many of the letters that much of the information upon which the Government came to their conclusion did not reach us until October, November, and December, An hon. Member, who says that the change in my opinions simply arose from the mutiny, misunderstood what I said. I stated several reasons why I had come to a different conclusion from that which I held in the summer of last year. One of those reasons did not occur until late—namely, the melting away of the local army. Mr. Hammack's Report was not made till November. I said, that in the first instance, I was unwilling to depart from the decision of the late Government. The hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets has charged me with having bound myself to that decision without sufficient consideration. If I am guilty of any charge, it is that to which I should be most disposed to plead guilty. Sir William Mansfield and Sir Patrick Grant are military officers of high character, and who were on the spot, and their opinions were changed by what occurred in the spring and summer, and the same change has been made in other men's minds too by this occurrence. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War stated the other night for himself that which I can state for myself, that it was only after great doubt and hesitation that I slowly and gradually came to think that the course which I now propose is the right and safe course to adopt. I never complained of the variety of opinions expressed by hon. Members who oppose this Bill. When I have hesitated so long myself, I have certainly no right to complain of those who have been still longer in coming to the same decision; I have, however, not heard
    1302
    anything during this debate to shake the opinion I have formed. I will very shortly recapitulate the circumstances that have occurred. The decision of the late Government was to maintain two-fifths of the minimum European force in India. This, however, did not satisfy the advocates for the maintenance of the local army. Lord Canning recommends 80,000 as the present force of India. The Political and Military Committee of the Council of India recommend 78,000 or 79,000. Several requisitions have been made by the different Presidencies during the last few months, the maximum being 95,000, and the minimum 79,000. The hon. Gentleman is not, therefore, entitled, I think, to throw discredit upon the calculation that 80,000 is about the number which, as recommended by the Commissioners on the Organization of the Indian Army, ought in future to be maintained in India. I join in the hope expressed by my hon. Friend, that this number may hereafter be reduced; but we have at present the high authority of the Governor General, the Military Committee of the Indian Council, and the Commander-in-Chief at every Presidency, that not less than 79,000 European troops ought to be maintained in India. The Bill I introduced last summer for covering what had been done during the late Government in increasing the local army beyond its legal limits has been quoted as a proof that I then intended to increase the Indian army. But in introducing that Bill I stated the reasons why I moved it, and I said that I was not thereby to be considered as pledged in respect to the reorganization of the Indian army. I stated distinctly that that Bill was not to be considered as in any way prejudging the question of the re-organization of the Indian army. I have a very few words to say with reference to the alleged garbling of papers. A number of letters were received in the autumn bearing on this question. I felt myself justified in having them printed confidentially, for the use of the Cabinet and the Indian Council, and memoranda founded on them were drawn up by three of the members of the Military Committee of the Council, also for the use of the Cabinet and the Council, Up to the time when the hon. Member for Aberdeen moved for the production of these papers I was not aware that they were known to any but those to whom I had directed them to be sent, and I still regarded them as confidential papers. I told

    1303
    my hon. Friend that they were so, and could not be produced to the House; but in conversation with some of my colleagues at the India House I found that there was a wish on their part for the production of the memoranda. It was obviously impossible to produce the memoranda without the documents, to which they were an answer, I wrote therefore to Lord Elphinstone, and letters were addressed to Lord Clyde and Sir William Mansfield to obtain their authority to give publicity to extracts from their letters, and as soon as I received an answer by telegraph, authorizing me to do so, I announced to my hon. Friend my intention to produce all the papers. The House will see that before this I had no authority to publish the letters on which the memoranda were grounded. I had then to look over the papers for publication. Amongst the letters printed confidentially for the use of the Cabinet and the Council of India (as the memoranda originally were), were some that I had no authority to publish, and I therefore omitted them from the papers given to Parliament. In Colonel Durand's memorandum there were two paragraphs, which were mainly in reference to one of these confidential letters, and contained an extract from it. I thought them also calculated to give offence, which I was anxious to avoid. I pointed out these two objections to Colonel Durand, and stated my opinion that the two paragraphs should be omitted. He expressed his unwillingness to withdraw anything which he had written, but added that the responsibility rested with me. I certainly understood him to state no other objection on his part; but I certainly could not place on the table a paragraph, containing a quotation from a letter which I had no authority to publish. I should have been guilty of most improper conduct if I had published either the letters or paragraphs with an extract from them, without the authority of the writer. This, Sir, is the garbling of which I have been accused. These papers came late in the autumn, and they were carefully considered by the Cabinet, and led us gradually to the conclusion at which we have arrived. Considerable stress has been laid on the circumstance that I did not consult the Council, and that I have not produced the document in which they protested against this measure. It is true that I did not consult my Council collectively on the subject, but I communicated fully and freely with the members of it individually, and gladly heard the opinions they had to express.
    1304
    An hon. Gentleman had said that, according to the Act, I was bound to consult the Council, and that, when consulted, they had a right to enter a protest if they did not agree with me. I think, however, that on a close inspection of the Act it will be seen that there is no ground for this interpretation. This is an important point, on which Gentlemen may very fairly have very different opinions, for in practice there is nothing to guide us. The House must remember that the creation of a Secretary of State with a Council is a novelty in this country. The Secretary of State for India is put over a Council many of whom were members of the old Court of Directors, so that, with the best intentions on both sides, it might be expected that occasionally a difference of views would exist. The Secretary of State, however, is the supreme authority, and must decide for himself in all such cases. The matter was fairly and frankly discussed among us. I apprehend the state of the case is this, that what a Secretary of State for the Colonies may do by himself, the Secretary of State for India must do with the Council. No executive act can I do except after communication with the Council. I may overrule them, but I must consult them. This, however, I think only applies to duties of the Secretary of State as an executive or departmental officer. If the majority of the Council decide upon any point, the minority may dissent and record their dissent. The Secretary of State may overrule the whole of the Council, and the same power of recording dissent, or opinions would arise, but to enable them to record their dissent there must be a question proposed and decided by the Council. The 23rd Clause runs thus—
    "In case of any difference of opinion on any question decided at any meeting, the Secretary of State may require that his opinion and the reasons for the same be entered in the Minutes of the proceedings, and any member of the Council who may have been present at the meeting may require that his opinions and any reasons for the same that he may have stated at the meeting be entered in like manner."
    That is, I say that there must be a meeting of the Council, at which a question is proposed and decided, to enable the Secretary of State or any member to record their opinion. In this case the question had been decided by the Cabinet that we should introduce a Bill for the reorganization of the Indian army. It was not a question to be decided by the Council, nor was it one in which the Secretary of State could act

    1305
    by himself. The late Government did come to an opinion upon this question of the Indian army, and announced that they had done so. My noble Friend did not consult his Council, and I think he was right. In like manner I did not consult the Council in an official way, so as to enable them to record their dissent to the plan. They were not entitled to be consulted, for no question could be brought before the Council for their decision until the Government had determined what should be done. I felt, however, anxious to afford them the earliest opportunity of recording their opinions, and the Cabinet having decided on the 16th of May that a Bill should be introduced for the purpose of putting an end to the Indian army, I on the 17th of May stated the fact to the Council, and said, "Many of you may wish to record your opinions upon this question, and, therefore, I propose to write a letter to the Horse Guards to stop recruiting, some of you may dissent, and although I may overrule your opinion, it will enable any member of the Council who likes it to record his dissent." That brought the case within the 23rd Clause of the Act, and would give them the first legitimate opportunity of recording their opinions. They did not avail themselves of any offer, and so matters remained till the last Council day, when some papers were placed on the table. The heading of one of them was reasons against the determination of Her Majesty's Government, &c. I did not conceive that the Council could record its opinion against a decision of the Queen's Government, and I did not formally receive the papers. When I was asked this evening to produce these protests I postponed my answer in order that I might have this opportunity of explanation. The members of the Council did not avail themselves of my offer on the 17th of May, many saying it was too late, and that they should have been consulted before; but, as they did not avail themselves of the opportunity I offered them, I did not think it necessary to force it upon them. About a week afterwards I heard that there was a desire that the same opportunity should be given, and I said I was willing to do so, but I have heard no more of it since then. On Thursday several papers were put into my hands—protests, resolutions, and memoranda, some referring to the scheme of the army, some against their not having been consulted. I said, "I cannot say what I shall do with them, but I will take the opinion of my col-
    1306
    leagues." I laid them before the Cabinet, and we all agreed, upon what we believed to be the construction of the Act, that these documents could not be received in their present shape; but if put into proper shape they may be received as protests against any act of mine as Secretary of State. I will give the Council the same opportunity as I before offered. These points have been urged so strongly, that in justice to myself I have felt bound to state fully the reasons why I do not think it would be right to produce these documents. The late Government did not consult the Council, neither have we. I have followed the course which the noble Lord who so ably preceded me in office pursued. Let it not be said, then, that there has been any attempt to suppress or conceal those papers. There is one other point I must notice. I have been taunted with bringing on a short Bill, but I am surprised at that charge. The commissions of Indian officers, and all questions of pay, purchase, and promotion, are settled not by an Act of Parliament but by the Indian Government, and all the details of any arrangements are not, and could not, be introduced into the Bill. But I thought it right and necessary to take the opinion of the House of Commons upon the subject—before taking any step whatever—to make them share the responsibility of this measure and become parties to the proceedings of the Government—and therefore I introduced this Bill. The same result, however, might, if the majority of my council had agreed with me, have been attained without coming to Parliament, and under those circumstances, the only object being to obtain the concurrence of Parliament, I thought the shorter the Bill to which that assent was obtained the better. It would have been impossible to introduce all the details of promotion and exchange into an Act of Parliament. The general principle of the alteration proposed by the Government is a simple one—namely, that there should be no local European army; that the European force in India should be part of the Queen's general army; that a Staff corps should be formed partly from the present Indian officers and partly from the Line officers, and that ultimately all the Native regiments should be officered from the Staff corps. That general scheme is the one to which we ask the assent of the House, and I think the bare statement of the plan answers the objection that under the new system there would be any differ-

    1307
    ence of grades, and that one officer will be looked down upon by others. How that can be, when all the officers are taken from the same source, I do not know, and so far from there being any such difference, it seems to me that now for the first time there will be perfect equality of feeling between all classes of officers. With regard to the question of expense, what I stated was put in the shortest possible form. Assuming 80,000 for the number of European troops, Mr. Hammock states the additional expense of troops of the Line. Now, if for two-fifths of that force you substitute local troops, the saving will be two-fifths of that additional expense, in round numbers, £184,000. I stated, therefore, that the increased cost of substituting Queen's troops for a local force, to the extent of the two-fifths as proposed by the late Government, would be under £200,000, though I do not at all believe that any such cost will be incurred, I said that if the measure be a right one, and if the efficiency of the army will be greatly promoted by the change, a matter of £200,000 ought not to be allowed to stand in the way of such a change. With regard to the supply of officers, I believe there will be an adequate number from the Line, but there will be ample time and opportunity of trying the question. For some time the officers of the local Indian army must of necessity fill the greater part of the Staff appointments. So far there are more candidates from the Line than there are vacancies to be filled. But at present there are not in Bengal officers enough for the Staff appointments and the regular regiments. That deficiency may be supplied to some extent by the cadets, of whom there are upwards of 200 to go out; but the ultimate result of the system as to whether the Line officers come in or not can only be tested by experience. If those officers do not come in, of course other means must be taken. The hon. Member (Mr. H. Seymour) stated that the Duke of Wellington did not entertain the opinion attributed to him on this question; I will not again trouble the House by reading the words of the Duke of Wellington, but the extract which was read from his despatches, corroborated by the extract read by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Herbert), showed the Duke to be completely of opinion that the army in India should be a portion of the Queen's army. Lord Cornwallis, also, five years after he first went out to India, and with that full ex-
    1308
    perience of India, prepared a detailed plan for the amalgamation of the two forces; but owing to the rejection of the scheme, I believe, in the Court of Proprietors, it was never carried into execution. None of the arguments which I have heard in the course of this debate have shaken my opinion on the merits of this question. I think it especially desirable that we should have no delay, at all events beyond that which is absolutely necessary for the fair discussion of the subject. All the Indian authorities have urged that it is imperative to lose as little time as possible in the settlement of the question, If the measure be carried by an overwhelming majority in this House, the effect will be good and satisfactory in India; but, at any rate, do not lose time in coming to some conclusion or other; do not hesitate to legislate merely for the sake of delay.
    MR. A. MILLS(who rose amid loud cries for a division) said, his object in the opposition he had given to the Bill was not to delay legislation, or to imperil our Indian Empire. The right hon. Gentleman had now promised that the protest of the Indian Council should be laid on the table: and, as his only object in the conflict of opinion which existed on this subject had been that the House should have the advantage of possessing the views taken by those Gentlemen, he could not give his support to a Motion which merely sought delay.
    SIR CHARLES WOOD: What I said was, that I would give the Council the opportunity which I offered them on the 17th of May of recording their dissent, and they choose to avail themselves of it, then I shall not have the slightest objection to the production of the documents. My hon. Friend says I promised to produce the papers; that is quite another matter, for I cannot say whether they will avail themselves of the opportunity. Do not let mo be again accused of a breach of faith. I cannot produce the papers unless they put me in a position to do so.
    MR. A. MILLSsaid, his object in the opposition he had given to the Bill was not to delay legislation, or to imperil our Indian Empire. His opinion of the Bill remained unchanged; but as the right hon. Gentleman had now promised that the protest of the Indian Council should be laid on the table; and, as his only object in the conflict of opinion which existed on this subject had been that the House should have the advantage of possessing the views

    1309
    taken by those Gentlemen, he could not give his support to a Motion which merely sought delay. He would therefore join in the suggestion that the Motion for the adjournment of the debate should be withdrawn.
    SIR CHARLES WOOD: What I said was that I would give the Council the opportunity which I gave them on the 17th of February of recording their dissent, and if they chose to avail themselves of it then I had not the slightest objection to the production of the documents. My hon. Friend says I promised to produce the papers; that is quite another matter, for I cannot say whether they will avail themselves of the opportunity. Do not let me be again accused of a breach of faith. I cannot produce the papers unless they put me in a position to do so.
    MR. HORSMANhoped that his hon. Friend, after the explanation which had just been afforded, would not press his Motion for the Adjournment. He assumed, of course, that in case the Council availed themselves of the opportunity afforded them, and recorded their dissent, the right hon. Gentleman in laying that expression of opinion on the table of the House would allow time for it to be considered before proceeding with the next stage of the Bill. [Cries of "Withdraw."]
    MR. SPEAKER: Unless the hon. Member for Westminster is present the Motion for Adjournment cannot be withdrawn.
    Question put, and negatived.
    Question put, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."
    The House divided:—Ayes 282; Noes 53; Majority 229.
    Main Question put, and agreed to.
    Bill read 2°, and committed for Thursday, 12th July.

  SUPPLY.—REPORT.
  Resolutions reported.
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYcalled attention to the fact that the Estimates for the Revenue Departments, the Customs and Inland Revenue especially, were always placed higher than was necessary. For example, for some years past the House had been called upon to vote £220,000 a year more than was expended, showing that the Estimates were very loosely framed. He asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the discrepancy could be explained, and whether care would be taken in future to prevent it?
  THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHE- QUER,said, there were two questions involved in this subject;—one of a general character and the other of a character peculiar to the present year. The changes contemplated in the Revenue Departments under the financial measures of the Government at the commencement of the Session, were of a nature to bring about, in the course of the year, a considerable contraction of expense; but it was impossible to make any allowance for that in the Estimates, because they did not consist of a lump sum, but were made up of detailed and minute provisions for all the different officers of the establishments; and it was impossible to say with any security, beforehand, the precise nature of each reduction. Therefore, as far as those reductions were concerned, it was not possible to make any allowance for them. With regard to the general question, namely, the expenditure of the Revenue Departments, so far as he was informed, he believed the case to be this: The principal difference was not in the Customs or Inland Revenue Department, but in the Post-Office Department. This was of a nature that rendered it impossible to make a close estimate. In the first place, constant changes in arrangements in detail were made with regard to the minor offices, and in the next there were also changes with regard to the railway companies, the contracts for the carriage of mails, and the uncertainty of the rates they might have to pay made it impossible to give a very close estimate. Where it was not possible to give a close and accurate estimate, it was the duty of the Revenue Department to give such a one as would cover the outside expenditure. At the same time he admitted this was a question in which the House was entitled to insist upon a searching inquiry; and he would afford every facility to the hon. Baronet for that purpose.
  Resolutions agreed to.

POOR LAW BOARD CONTINUANCE BILL.

  SECOND READING.
  Order for Second Reading read.
  MR. C. P. VILLIERS MR. C. P. VILLIERS moved the second reading of this Bill, on the understanding that an opportunity for discussing it should be afforded on the Motion for going into Committee.
  MR. HADFIELDhoped that full time would be given for the discussion. There were many things connected with this Board which it was generally believed it would be as well to change.
  MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHhoped the right hon. Gentleman would be satisfied that the powers of the Board should be renewed until next Session—when the House might have a full opportunity for discussion. One of the Secretary ships, in his opinion, might be well dispensed with.
  LORD FERMOYalso begged to add his voice to that of the hon. Member who had last spoken, that the powers of the Board should be continued only for one year. If the right hon. Gentleman would not consent to that, would he give an assurance that the Committee on the Bill would be brought on, when there might be an opportunity for full and fair discussion?
  MR. SOTHERON ESTCOURTsaid, that the Bill consisted solely of one clause, which proposed the extension of the powers of the Board for five years, and he did not see why that need prejudice the question whether those powers should be restricted or not. It had often been suggested to take powers only for one year, in order that there might be an opportunity of discussion; but any one who had any experience of office must be aware how very much the action of a Department is paralysed when its powers are limited to one year. He should be disposed to vote for this Bill, and he thought five years better than one; but if any hon. Gentleman were to raise that question, he would suggest that it be done on going into Committee.
  MR. DARBY GRIFFITHsaid, that the extension of the powers of the Board for five years was a question of principle, and as the Bill consisted only of one clause, the discussion would be more properly taken on the second reading.
  MR. MONSELLsaid, that the Secretary to the Poor Law Board had repeatedly stated that it was his intention to introduce a Bill this Session in order to get rid of the admitted hardship and cruelty which prevailed with regard to the removal of Irish paupers. He should not oppose the second reading of this Bill, provided his right hon. Friend would say that he was about to introduce another Bill this Session. Otherwise he should be disposed to oppose the Bill.
  MR. E. P. BOUVERIEthought it was a rather Irish mode of dealing with the grievance. How the opposing this measure could compel the bringing forward such a Bill as the hon. Gentleman desired he could not conceive. If the Poor-law Board had the strongest intention of dealing with the grievance (which he admitted was
  1312
  a great grievance), there would not be the slightest possibility of having a Bill introduced with a chance of passing in the present Session. He would urge his right hon. Friend not to be led away by the blandishments of hon. Members to limit the continuance of the Bill to one year.
  Mr. BEACH and Colonel DICKSON Mr. BEACH and Colonel DICKSON advocated the limitation of the Bill to one year.
  SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYhoped that Gentlemen who were opposed to the construction of the Poor-law Board would not hesitate to express that opposition, whether in Committee or on the second reading. There was a strong feeling in the country that this Board was not required; and when the Board was first established by Lord Althorp a distinct pledge was given that as soon as the system was regularly organized throughout the country its powers should cease. It might be necessary to give the Board time to wind up its affairs; but there was nothing in the working of the Board which an under-secretary might not perform, and that without the expensive machinery which they had at present.
  MR. EDWIN JAMESsaid, if the right hon. Gentleman would not give a pledge that there would be an opportunity for discussing the Bill, he would move that the Bill be read a second time that day three months.
  COLONEL GILPINwas of opinion that the Board was too large, and with the facilities of electric telegraphs the expense of Commissioners might be dispensed with.
  SIR GEORGE LEWISsaid, it would be impossible to fix an early day, but the House should have an ample opportunity for discussing the provisions of the Bill on going into Committee.
  Bill read 2°, and committed for Friday.
  House adjourned at a Quarter after Two o'clock.