Commons Sitting of 13 February 1860

MINUTES.
NEW WRITS ISSUED.—For Ennis, The Right hon. John David FitzGerald, one of the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland; for Cork County, Rickard Deasy, esquire, Attorney General for Ireland.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Conveyance of Voters, &c.
2° Law of Property.
3° Probate and Administration (India).

RETIREMENT OF MR. JUSTICE PERRIN.

  QUESTION.
  MR. LONGsaid, he wished to ask the reason of the retirement of Mr. Justice Perrin?
  MR. CARDWELLsaid, he was sure the hon. Gentleman would be extremely sorry to know that the cause was ill-health. The learned Judge, being prevented by the state of his health from discharging the duties which he had so honorably discharged for twenty-five years, and being unable to go the approaching circuit, had thought proper to resign.

LIEUTENANTS OF THE ROYAL NAVY.

  QUESTION.
  LORD JOHN BROWNEsaid, he rose to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether any reply has been given to the Memorial of the Lieutenants of the Royal Navy, presented in December last; whether it is the intention of the Board of Admiralty to increase the pay and half pay of those Officers, so as to place them more nearly on a position of equality with the Masters and the non-executive Officers of the Royal Navy of the same rank; and whether it is intended to allow their service in the Coast-guard to count as sea time?
  LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, the Memorial was received and taken into consideration by the Admiralty, although no official acknowledgment was sent. It was not intended to increase the full pay of those Officers, but when the Vote for half-pay was before the House in Committee of Supply he would explain the intentions of the Government with regard to the half-pay of Lieutenants.

THE NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERIES.

  QUESTION.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTONsaid, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the English and French Commissioners sent to Newfoundland last year to investigate the questions so long at issue between the two Governments with respect to the Fisheries, have made recommendations which are likely to be accepted by both Governments, and to lead to a final and satisfactory arrangement?
  LORD JOHN RUSSELLsaid, that the French and English Commissioners made separate Reports to their respective Go-
  918
  vernments. He approved generally of the recommendations of the English Commissioners; but he was not in a situation to know whether the French Government would agree to a measure founded upon those recommendations. The Commissioners generally had agreed upon all the points except some of no great importance; but it was proposed to send Captain Dunlop to Paris to have some personal communication with the French Government on the subject.

FRENCH CUSTOMS TARIFF.

  QUESTION.
  SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEsaid, he understood it would be inconvenient to give a Return of the French Tariff of Customs Duties now in force; but he should be glad to know whether the Government could not supply the information in some other shape?
  LORD JOHN MANNERSsaid, that by the 3rd Article of the Treaty of Commerce certain differential duties in favour of French shipping were recognized; he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade whether he proposes to make any statement as to what these differential duties are?
  MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he wished to remind the right hon. Gentleman that the other evening he (Mr. Nowdegate) had asked when the changes in the tariffs of foreign countries, which are in preparation in his office, will be laid upon the table; also when the changes in the colonial tariffs will be before them?
  MR. MILNER GIBSON, in reply, said that he had already stated that the changes in the rate of duty on foreign tariffs were in preparation, and he could give no further information at present. He understood that the colonial tariffs were under preparation also. The reason why the delay had taken place in the production of the papers relating to the change in the duties of foreign tariffs was, because they were made up to the close of last year instead of to August: with regard to the question of the hon. Baronet (Sir S. Northcote), the whole French tariff would be so voluminous that it would not be desirable to lay it on the Table of the House, but the Government had in preparation a paper containing the rates of duty on all articles of British produce and manufacture, which would shortly be laid on the Table, specifying also what

  919
  would be the maximum duties, supposing the Treaty to be adopted by Parliament. With regard to the question of the noble Lord (Lord J. Manners) as to the differential duties mentioned in the third article of the Treaty, his answer was that the differential duties might be considered part of the French navigation laws. So far as the direct trade between England and France was concerned, which would grow up under the Treaty, there were no differential duties, and English ships going to France and carrying British manufactures, or from any British possession in Europe, were placed precisely in the same position as a French vessel. The Treaty, however, was merely a treaty of commerce, and not of navigation and commerce. He should be happy to lay on the Table any paper wished for; but should be glad to know the precise point any hon. Gentleman might have in view, in order to give him exact information upon it.

NATIONAL DEFENCES.

  QUESTION.
  MR. HORSMANsaid, he would beg to inquire, Whether the Government intend to take any steps in order to carry out the recommendations of the Committee on National Defences appointed last year.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that the Report of the Committee was not in such a state of maturity as to enable the Ministry to communicate their intentions with respect to its details to Parliament. There was no item in the Estimates now presented which applied to that Report.
  On Motion that the House do go into Committee of Supply.

RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  MR. BAILLIE COCHRANErose to call the attention of the House to our relations with China. It appeared to him that at the commencement of another contest with that country it was most desirable that the House should express its opinion as to the instructions to be given to the Ministers and officers out there, and also as to the authority under which those instructions were to be carried out. He should not think it necessary to refer to the former lorcha war, though he had no doubt he should only be expressing the
  920
  opinion of the majority of Members, in saying that that war was the cause of the present; nor would be refer to the opinion expressed by the noble Lord, the Foreign Secretary, and other Members of the present Government in 1857, when they were opposed to the noble Viscount now at the head of the Government, nor to the blue-book, except so far as it might be necessary to enable him to explain the present position of affairs. He would regard the question as subsequent to the Treaty of Tien-tsin. Early in 1857 Lord Elgin was appointed special envoy to China; but, owing to the disturbances in India, he did not place himself in communication with the Chinese officials until the close of that year. The original demands made by Lord Elgin in December 1857 were two, one the complete execution of treaty engagements, the other, compensation to British subjects for losses incurred in 1857. But, most unfortunately, on the 11th of February, 1858, the noble Lord took a step further, and reserved to himself the power of demanding other conditions from the Chinese Government, and, more unfortunately still, the first of those demands was that the Chinese Government should concede the right of having a British Minister resident at Pekin. This demand was in fact the cause of all our present difficulties. Every hon. Member who had read the blue-book would do full justice to the ability, energy, and frankness of Lord Elgin. His energy he had displayed with an extremity of vigour against the Chinese Government, at one moment demanding from them all the observances of a high civilization, and at another treating them as most ignorant barbarians. His frankness he had displayed in the unfavourable opinion which he invariably expressed with regard to this demand for a resident envoy at Pekin. On the 12th of July, 1858, he wrote to Lord Malmesbury:—
  "The concessions obtained in it from the Chinese Government are not in themselves extravagant; nor, with the exception of the important principle of exterritoriality, in excess of those which commercial nations are wont freely to grant to each other; but in the eyes of the Chinese Government they amount to a revolution, and involve the surrender of some of the most cherished principles of the traditional policy of the Empire. They have been extorted, therefore, from its fears."—P. 345.
  And on November 5, 1858, he wrote thus:—
  "In order that your Lordship may correctly apprehend the drift of this correspondence, it is neces-

  921
  sary that I should state at the outset that the Chinese authorities contemplate the permanent residence of foreign Ministers at the capital with more aversion and apprehension than any of the other innovations introduced by the treaty of Tien-tsin. 'If we were quite sure,' say they, that you would always send to us men thoroughly wise, discreet, and considerate, it might be different; but if, for instance, so-and-so were appointed to represent a foreign Government at Pekin (and the right, if exercised by you, would, of course, be claimed by all other Governments), a month would not elapse before something would occur which would place our highest officers in the dilemma of having either to risk a quarrel or submit to some indignity which would lower the Chinese Government in the eyes of its own subjects.' No doubt such apprehensions are to some extent chimerical; but I am bound to admit that I do not consider them to he altogether so. The doctrine that every Chinaman is a knave and manageable only by bullying and bravado, like the kindred doctrine that every trading junk carries guns and is piratical, is, I venture with all deference to think, sometimes pushed a little too far in our dealings with this people. Be this, however, as it may, I advert to the point now only because I wish your Lordship to understand that I believe that the objections to the permanent residence of foreign Ministers at Pekin, which the Chinese authorities urge on this head, are sincerely entertained by them, and not entirely groundless."—P. 406.
  As to the feeling of the Chinese on the point, there was no manner of doubt. Here was an extract from a most touching despatch from the Chinese Commissioners in reference to it: —
  "The established reputation of your Excellency for justice and straightforwardness, for kind intentions and friendly feeling, make us place the fullest confidence in your assurance that when you exacted the condition referred to you were actuated by no desire whatever to do injury to China. The permanent residence of Foreign Ministers at the capital would, notwithstanding, be an injury to China in many more ways than we can find words to express. In sum, in the present critical and troublous state of our country, this incident would generate, we fear, a loss of respect for their Government in the eyes of her people, and that this would indeed be no slight evil it will not be necessary, we assume, to explain to your Excellency with greater detail. It is for this reason that we specially address you a second letter on this subject, and we trust that your Excellency will represent for us to Her Majesty your Sovereign the great inconvenience you feel (the exercise of the right would be) to our country, and beseech her not to decide in favour of the permanent residence at Pekin. When we bethink us of the lustre shed by the well-doing and justice of Her Majesty, we feel assured that she would not wish, by being peremptory in a matter so hurtful to our country, to involve it in embarrassment: and our country will not fail to be impressed with gratitude."—P. 411.
  In spite of this the demand was insisted on. What happened? The treaty was signed on the 26th June, 1858. After the treaty
  922
  was signed Lord Elgin went to Japan. He returned to Shanghai at the end of January, 1859, and at the commencement of February he sent a letter to the Commissioners, requesting them most strongly not to leave Shanghai until he returned from Canton, whither he intended going, to suppress some disturbances. Unfortunately, Lord Elgin did not return to Shanghai, but came home to England, and was replaced by Mr. Bruce, in May, 1858. Lord Malmesbury's instructions to Mr. Bruce were that on his arrival in China he should repair without the loss of one moment's time to Shanghai, on his way to the mouth of the Peiho, to complete the ratification of the treaty signed in the previous year. Lord Malmesbury then went on to say, and he begged the particular attention of the House to this,—
  "You will probably find it advisable, before your departure from Shanghai, to send an intimation to Pekin of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements may he made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Pekin. The Admiral in command of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in China has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient Naval Force, and unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship-of-war."
  The object, no doubt, was that the vessel of war should serve as an escort, and as a matter of dignity to the mission. There was not a single word in this despatch, or any other written by Lord Malmesbury, which in any way could be twisted into a justification of Mr. Bruce's proceeding up the Peiho with a fleet. From the first moment he got out, Mr. Bruce appeared to have been panic-struck. He saw danger everywhere, he saw Russians everywhere, and he was ready to receive information from any one about the supposed evil intentions of the Chinese Government. One authority quoted by him in his despatches was a Cantonese money-lender, who told him that the Russians had offered to send 10,000 muskets to the Chinese, which the Emperor of China judiciously declined, lest, as he said, they should be carried by 10,000 Russians. In his first despatch he complained that the Chinese Commissioners were waiting at Shanghai—the very place where Lord Elgin desired them to wait; and he went on thus —
  "In my previous despatches I have informed your Lordship that we can ascertain nothing as to

  923
  the intentions of this Government, with respect to the visit of Foreign Envoys to Pekin; but the Imperial Commissioners, on hearing of my arrival in China, have proceeded from Soo-chow to Shanghai—a fact of some significance, and which gives colour to the opinion that they hope to raise questions or begin negotiations at that point; otherwise they would have returned ere this to Pekin, for the purpose of making preparations for our reception."
  The House would bear in mind that this was a mission of peace, sent to ratify a treaty which was known to be most unpalatable to the Chinese nation. Mr. Bruce went on to say: —
  "I hope in this way to compel the Chinese Government to declare itself upon those points which we know are the most unpalatable to it; and if there exists on its part a disposition to evade its obligations, to thrust us back, as before, on the seaboard, and refuse the reception which I cannot waive without lowering our national dignity, I trust we shall be in possession of their views when we arrive at the mouth of the Pciho, and not be left to discover them gradually at Pekin. If, as is most probable, the Court of Pekin is wavering, anxious to evade, but unwilling to risk a rupture, I trust that identity of views among the Foreign representatives, firm language, and an imposing demonstration of force, will secure the observance by it of the recent treaties, and incline it to listen to moderate and pacific advisers."
  Then followed three despatches from the Chinese Commissioners to Mr. Bruce, in which they said: —
  "The Commissioners, having the fullest confidence in his predecessor (Lord Elgin) when he engaged them to remain at Shanghai to consider all matters not disposed of, were unable to return to Pek in; and if Mr. Bruce now proceed direct to Tien-tsin, the Commissioners having to travel by land, cannot reckon upon arriving there so soon. Indeed, taking into consideration the hindrance to be expected from the weather on their land journey, this will certainly occupy two months and more, as Mr. Bruce, they imagine, must be well aware."
  Mr. Bruce again wrote to the Commissioners, proposing to place steamers at their disposal for the purpose of reaching the mouth of the Peiho; but they replied that they had no authority to go by sea, and again urged Mr. Bruce as strongly as possible to grant an extension of the time. Mr. Bruce, however, would not listen to any delay; and, though he himself had remained for an entire month at Hong Kong, in order to meet the French Minister, M. dc Bourboulon, notwithstanding the directions of Lord Elgin to lose no time in proceeding to Shanghai, he refused to extend any leniency to the Commissioners who had remained at Shanghai, in consequence of instructions from their own
  924
  Government, confirmed by the authority of Lord Elgin. And now came the most interesting feature of what he might call this extraordinary narrative. On the 16th of June, Admiral Hope arrived at the mouth of the Peiho, which was reached on the 20th by Mr. Bruce and the other Commissioners. In the interval Admiral Hope had discovered that the forts were fortified, that barriers had been placed across the river, and that, in fact, it was not intended to allow the mission to proceed by the Peiho to Tien-tsin. And those preparations were not made without justice, because Lord Elgin in a despatch said:—"We have no right to navigate the Peiho until after the ratification of the treaty." But Mr. Bruce, on arriving and discovering the state of affairs, took what appeared to him to have been the most unwarrantable step of ordering Admiral Hope to clear the passage. That order was given on the 21st of June. But Admiral Hope judiciously delayed his proceedings; and he firmly believed that had it not been for the attacks which had been made on another gallant Admiral—a high-minded and gallant officer, now a Member of the House (Sir Michael Seymour)—on the ground of over-caution in a former engagement at the Peiho, Admiral Hope would have had the good sense not to obey those instructions. He now came to a point which he could not touch on without bitter regret—a regret that was mingled with astonishment, in which he thought the House must sympathize. The attack was to have been made on the 21st; but would it be believed that at nine o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the 26th being the day on which the treaty was to have been ratified, Mr. Bruce received a despatch from one of the highest officers of the Crown in China, stating that he had arrived at Peh-tang-ho, another mouth of the Peiho, ten miles to the northward, to sec Mr. Bruce and to conduct him with all possible dignity to the Court of Pekin? The statement was so important and almost incredible that he would suffer Mr. Bruce to tell the story in his own words:—
  "About nine a.m. on the 25th a junk came alongside Her Majesty's ship Magicienne, anchored about nine miles from the forts, and a petty mandarin came on board with a letter addressed to me by the Governor General of Pechelee, a translation of which I herewith inclose. It announced that the Governor General had been ordered to proceed to Peh-tang-ho, an inlet or small mouth of the river, about ten miles to the northward of this anchorage, and thence to offer his services to

  925
  Her Majesty's Minister; that Kweiliang and Hwashana had been summoned back to Pekin, as the persons authorized to exchange ratifications and to convey the Minister to the capital. I was requested, therefore, to await their arrival, and to allow time for the withdrawal of the troops quartered at Peh-tang-ho, after which the Governor General would come in a vessel to convey me to the landing place, whence I should proceed to Pekin by land. This letter was dated the 23rd, and only reached me on the 25th—a delay which is inexplicable if it had been intended to reach me in time. As, in the body of the letter, the name of Her Majesty was not put on the same level with that of the Emperor of China, thereby violating the principle of equality established by the treaty, it was returned by Mr. Wade for correction, with an intimation that I was about to proceed to Tien-tsin. As the attempt to pass up the river was to be made at ten a.m., it would have been difficult for me, at that late hour, to have communicated with the Admiral, who was at a distance of nine miles, and already engaged in his operations."
  Could it believed that Mr. Bruce, being in receipt of a communication at nine o'clock in the morning, stating that it was intended to receive him properly, and when a misunderstanding might possibly exist as to the place at which he was to land, gave as an excuse for not sending nine miles to stay the effusion of blood that "Admiral Hope had already commenced operations"? And what would be thought by the House when he added that operations did not actually commence till two o'clock, and that Mr. Bruce, in the meantime, although he knew that the Chinese Government was then in the right, having done all that was expected at its hands, made no effort whatever to prevent the slaughter of our troops? A force of 1,100 went into action, of whom 434 were killed and wounded, and the sorrow for their loss could scarcely be alleviated by the gallantry displayed by both officers and men when the signal to "engage the enemy" was hung out by Admiral Hope, and below it that noble command, "as closely as possible." The very first night of the Session they had heard how the gallant Admiral, struck down and shattered, had shifted his flag from ship to ship, and, although himself desperately wounded, had yet been able to observe and sympathize with the gallantry of the officers under his command. They had heard of Vansittart and Shadwell, of Lemon, of Commerell, of Heath, Fisher, and Parke, rivals in glory and companions in fight. All this strife went on from two o'clock till night fell like a curtain on the scene; and Mr. Bruce, at nine miles' distance, and knowing that the Chinese Government had fulfilled its obligations, made no effort what-
  926
  ever to stop the carnage. He sympathized deeply with any Minister at such a distance from home, whoso position of necessity entailed great responsibility; but he could not help expressing his painful conviction that Mr. Bruce had made an undue use of the authority with which he was intrusted. What was the excuse afterwards made by Mr. Bruce? He said there was treachery on the part of the Chinese, that the batteries were masked, and that the gunboats were lured into the river, and were then fired upon without due notice. But what was the fact? Why, Lord Elgin himself, in one of his despatches written before he left the country, stated distinctly that the Chinese were fortifying the Peiho, and that they were justified in doing so. There had been a very remarkable letter written by an "Eye-Witness," and what did the author, Captain Longley, state? He very frankly remarked that it was on our part that the declaration of war was made; and he added, "I need not tell you that there was no treachery in the case at all. We saw the masks on the embrasures, and we know by these that there were guns there. The Chinese fired one shot to warn us off, and waited to see if we would draw away our forces. Had they opened all their fire upon us at that time, I do not think a single gunboat would have escaped. So I hope we shall hear no more about treachery. The writer went on to tell a story about a crusty old gentleman who liked to follow his own crotchets and live within his own house, and expressed himself unable to see why the Chinese should not act on that principle if they thought proper. "I don't say," he added, "that we are to give up our trade if we can help it, but I don't think we are right in forcing our civilization upon China." Nothing could be stronger than the expressions of Lord Elgin: —
  "We know from the Pekin Gazette that the Emperor has issued orders for the reconstruction of the forts which we knocked down at the mouth of the Peiho, and for the erection of other works to protect Pekin. It would hardly, I think, be reasonable on our part to require that the Emperor of China should leave his capital undefended for the express purpose of enabling us, whenever we see fit so to do, to attack him there."
  Another mode in which Mr. Bruce had been defended was by stating that Mr. Ward, the American Minister, who very wisely did not co-operate at all in these proceedings, was received with insult and contumely when he subsequently went up the river. He had seen this stated even

  927
  in The Times, and he was greatly surprised that a journal of such high character and ability should have published a statement altogether incorrect; but that surprise was removed when he subsequently found that the journal had been misled by Mr. Bruce's own despatch. Would it be believed that all this was totally imaginary? The fact was, Mr. Ward was received with great consideration. In the American account of the mission it was stated that,—
  "The despatch of Hanguh, the Governor General, was couched in the most courteous terms, expressing his great desire to carry His Majesty's orders into effect, and to facilitate the journey of the American Envoy and his suite to Pekin,…The distance to Pehtang is about twelve miles, but it could not be seen from the ship. They were met by three junks, handsomely fitted up, in one of which they proceeded two miles to the landing-place, which was ornamented with coloured silk festoons. A guard of honour lined the streets up to the House, and the foreigners rode to it in carriages; and though the equipage of these vehicles and the discipline and uniform of the soldiers were not what they would have been in Paris or Vienna, they exhibited as much courtesy as could be desired."
  In addition to this description he found that President Buchanan said, in his last Message, "It is but justice to the Chinese authorities to observe that throughout these transactions they have acted with good faith, and in a friendly spirit to the United States." The reception "was after their own peculiar fashion; but they ought to regard with a lenient eye the ancient customs of the empire." Mr. Buchanan added, "The conduct of our Minister on this occasion has my entire approval." Thus the opinion expressed by Mr. Bruce, that Mr. Ward's mission was received with indignity, entirely fell to the ground. And taking the whole case into consideration, even with every indulgence, he thought Mr. Bruce had acted precipitately, and not in the spirit of a Minister charged with the ratification of a treaty of peace. He declared war on his own authority, and did not bear in mind the advice of the Duke of Wellington on a somewhat similar occasion. In 1835 the Duke of Wellington in a despatch to Lord Napier, said, "It is not by force and violence His Majesty intends to establish a commercial intercourse with China, but by the other conciliatory measures so strongly inculcated in all the instructions you have received." It was in this spirit Mr. Bruce should have acted. It might be interesting to the House to know what was the opinion on
  928
  this subject of men perfectly competent to give one, of many official gentlemen in China, and even of Lord Elgin himself. Mr. Consul Alcock and Mr. Consul Robertson had both stated that the Chinese officials had shown every disposition to act in a friendly spirit. In his despatch of April 9, 1858, Lord Elgin said:—
  "I must, however, begin by observing that the evils which I am about to signalize do not arise from any indisposition on the part of the natives to live peaceably with foreigners. On the contrary, they have their origin rather in the exaggeration of this desire than in its defect. The state of Ningpo in this respect furnishes their favourite and, perhaps, most plausible argument to that class of persons who advocate what is styled a vigorous policy in China; in other words, a policy which consists in resorting to the most violent measures of coercion and repression on the slenderest provocations."
  He believed his first despatch, of September 20, expressed only a very qualified approval of Mr. Bruce's proceedings; and in his last despatch the noble Lord distinctly stated how he thought the necessity for taking these violent measures might have been prevented. The noble Lord said, that although the denial of the passage to the capital for our ambassador might be considered evidence of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the Chinese, yet it was a matter in which Mr. Bruce might have remonstrated without having recourse to force to clear the passage. In the noble Lord's despatch of October, which did him the highest honour, he expressed a strong hope that peaceful relations might, be restored to China without the effusion of more blood. That was in accordance with the passage relating to China in Her Majesty's most gracious Speech from the Throne. He hoped when the noble Lord expressed himself so admirably he really meant what he said, and that he did not mean it in the spirit of the old Inquisitors, who, when they ordered a criminal for execution, directed that he should be treated tenderly. But, somehow or other, all this cordiality of feeling did not express itself in action. Mr. Oliphant, in his new work, stated his belief that the Chinese perfectly understood the position of the English Home Government. The Chinese did not blame the Home Government, but the officials carrying out its instructions in China. In a conversation with the Emperor, recorded in the blue-book, the Minister is represented as saying—
  "Bonham has been directed by the Sovereign of the State to trade with China in a friendly

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  spirit, and not to be troublesome. Bonhara has been presented by the Sovereign of the State with the O-ta-pa (the Order of the Bath), a thing somewhat of the same sort as the ancient red-gold-fish purse. Bonham is very pleased with this. He parades it with pride. It will prevent him making any difficulties."
  Mr. Bruce insisted much on Russian guns and upon Russian influence employed against England in China. If they would take the trouble to read the despatches of Count Poutiatine, they would find they were written with the best possible feeling. The Russian Minister gave Lord Elgin very good advice, and offered to lend "his moral support to all demands of common interest which may be made by the Plenipotentiaries of other Powers to the Court of Pekin." But he stated that what China wanted in her present position was repose, and that harsh measures would only lead to increased difficulties and to bloodshed. He (Mr. Cochrane) thought that was statesmanlike advice; and he believed that a palace had been prepared for the reception of our Ambassador at Pekin. It was absurd to raise the bugbear of Russian influence; and if the Russians had such influence, they must have gained it by conducting their diplomacy in China in a very different manner from that of England. He would now make a few remarks upon the despatches of the noble Lord the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The earlier despatches of the noble Lord were written in a spirit of conciliation; he hoped they were not written in the spirit of the Inquisition, that gave up prisoners to execution, recommending them to be used as tenderly as possible. The noble Lord, in a speech made in 1857, said: —
  "In dealing with nations less civilized than ourselves, it is by lofty thought and forbearing humanity that the genius of commerce contrasts with the ambition of conquerors. You may indeed, force a road for your merchants over the ruin of cities and the corpses of your customers, but I warn you that your trade will flee. The place for commerce recoils from bloodshed."
  Those were noble sentiments, but not more noble or truer than those to which the noble Lord had given expression when he said—
  "We have heard much of late—a great deal too much, I think—of the prestige of England. We used to hear of the character, of the reputation, of the honour of England. I trust, Sir, that the character, the reputation, and the honour of this country are dear to us all; but if the prestige of England is to be separate from these qualities— if it is to be separate from the character, from the reputation, and from the honour of this country— then I, for one, have no wish to maintain it. To
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  those who argue, as I have heard some argue, It is true we have a bad case—it is true we were in the wrong—it is true we have committed injustice, but we must persevere in that wrong, we must continue to act unjustly, or the Chinese will think that we are afraid'—I say, as has been said before, 'Be just and fear not.' Whatever we lose in prestige, of which I do not presume to be a judge, I am convinced that the honour and character of this country will be raised higher by such a policy. Never will England stand higher in the world's estimation than when it can be said that, though troublesome and meddlesome officials prostitute her arms and induce a brave Admiral to commence hostilities which ought never to have been begun, yet the House of Commons, representing her people, have indignantly declared that they will be no party to such injustice, and that neither for commercial advantages nor for political advantages, nor for any other immediate advantages to their country, will they consent to stain that honour which, after all, has been, and must be, the sure foundation of her greatness."— [3 Hansard, cxliv., 1474].
  These were sentiments in which he felt assured every hon. Member in that House must concur; and he should appeal to the noble Lord, now that he was in power, to carry out the views to which, when in Opposition, he had given expression. But while he made that appeal to the noble Lord, he was fully prepared to admit that, after the reverse which we had recently experienced in China, it was necessary that some great demonstration should be made with the view of retrieving our position in that country. He should, however, like to see that demonstration great, not only in point of magnitude, but by force of its moderation. We boasted ourselves at public meetings to be the pioneers of civilization, as the Spaniards of former days were wont to boast that they had spread Christianity throughout the West, and we were called upon to justify by our acts the professions which we made. It was, then, not with the view of tying up the hands of the Executive by pledging it to any specific Resolution, but in the hope that the expression of opinion on the part of the House of Commons might tend to the prosecution of our claims against China with justice and moderation, that he had ventured that evening to trespass upon their attention. The Government might do all that they deemed expedient to retrieve our position in that country; but he should ask the noble Lord not to insist upon a demand—that of having a resident representative of England at Pekin—which was opposed to all the feelings and habits of the Chinese people. He should also ask the noble Lord to inform the House fully and clearly what were the limits which he

  931
  had prescribed to the action of the authorities who were in command of the expedition against China, and by whom those instructions were to be carried into effect.
  SIR MICHAEL SEYMOURsaid, that as his name had been mentioned in connection with the subject under discussion, he hoped to obtain the permission of the House to make some observations with respect to it; although he regretted to say that in doing so he had not the advantage which he should have possessed had certain documents been laid on the table of the House which would have enahled him to render his statement more complete. The question which had been raised by the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken was a very large one; its details were spread over a very considerable portion of time, and were marked by the occurrence of many extraordinary events. When, in 1857, the subject first came under the notice of the House, he was not unmindful that many hon. Members had been kind enough to take a favourable view of the course with respect to it which he had deemed it to be his duty to adopt; and he now begged to assure those hon. Gentlemen that he had derived no ordinary encouragement in the performance of that duty from the support which they had been so good as to accord; while to those who had taken a different course, and who had used hard words in speaking of his conduct, he could only say that he forgave them, and that he was willing to believe they had clone no more than that which they deemed to be right. But to proceed to the discussion of the subject immediately at issue. He might state that soon after he took the command in China he went to the north, and having ascertained that the Russian war was at end, had assisted in facilitating the return to their own country of about 100 Russian prisoners. He returned to Hong Kong at the end of the year. On his coming back he found that the dispute about the lorcha Arrow had arisen, and, being then a stranger to China, he referred to the merchants, and other persons of experience resident there, for information upon the point. Acting upon that information, after a delay of ten or eleven days, he ordered his second in command, with two or three vessels, to make such a demonstration, and to demand from the Chinese authorities an explanation with regard to their conduct; but without any favourable result. Having, however, ascertained that Canton was by treaty stipulations placed in a similar posi-
  932
  tion with two or three other mercantile cities in China, and that we possessed a right of entry there, and of communicating with the Government officials, he sought to secure that object, in the hope that one half-hour or ten minutes' conversation would put an end to all further proceedings. The entry to the city was, however, denied, and there were consequently no possible means of personal communication with the Chinese officials. But to revert for a moment to the proceedings which had taken place in that House in reference to the subject, he must say he had been rather surprised to read that some hon. Members had disputed the right of the lorcha to carry the British flag, seeing that the ordinance under which the right was claimed had been sent to this country and had received the Royal assent, and had, when it had gone out to Hong Kong, met with the concurrence of all the parties interested in these transactions. It was not intended to meet the requirements of the Chinese alone, but of others. The lorcha was one of a vast number of other British vessels, carrying an immense amount of British property. It was also said that the vessel had no protection—that her papers had expired. But that was not the fact. She had the right to carry the British flag, and the ordinance gave the power to the British consul to overhaul her papers and to renew the protection from year to year. If she had protection she was tegular, and if she was not regular she became forfeited to the British Crown. As it happened, however, her papers were examined and found to be correct. That being so, and the lorcha being entitled to protection, he had deemed it his duty to take some steps for the purpose of exacting from the Chinese officials some acknowledgment of the error they had committed in the case of the vessel in question, and thence had followed the further operations to which he had been obliged to resort. He could say with the most perfect truth, however, that the duty which had thus been cast upon him was one which was of a most distasteful character to his feelings, knowing as he did that he was commencing warlike proceedings against an unwarlike people. But he proceeded up the river to Canton, and as he neared the city and was surrounded by hundreds of thousands of the population, the first question which presented itself to his mind was, how he could best deal, with such a population according to the dictates of humanity, and

  933
  with as little as possible of slaughter. He directed the attack in such a manner as he thought best calculated to attain these purposes, He told the Commissioners of Canton that he had power to breach the wall, and with 300 men he did so and passed into the city. It had been said in the discussion in that House that the city of Canton was then in his power, as, indeed, it frequently was; and if he had thought fit he might, as there were not wanting some who said he should, have gone the length of firing the city and burning it down; but he said it was no part of the duty of a Christian officer to take that course, and he would not do it. He continued, however, to hold the Canton river, which was a matter of some difficulty. Owing to the number of war-junks, and the extreme ingenuity of the Chinese with their fire bombs, the position could not be maintained without considerable risk to the ships. He did not regret the course he had pursued, his desire being to make it as little oppressive as possible to the inhabitants on the hanks of the river, who, with the small officials, became friends, and in many instances supplied the force with refreshments, and gave them notice of firerafts. Operations had gone on satisfactorily for the objects in the view, but unfortunately, owing to the smallness of his force, he was obliged to restrain for many weary weeks and months the ardour of his gallant officers and men, who were eager for action. He did restrain their ardour, however, and waiting until the proper hour for action should arrive. When the noble Earl, the British Ambassador to China, arrived, the question came to he whether they should continue where they were at Canton or despatch the force to the north. The unfortunate mutiny in India then broke out, and it became his duty to do all he could to despatch reinforcements to support and sustain Her Majesty's authority in that country. The Shannon, the Pearl, the Sanspareil, were detached to Calcutta, and the Fury to Sir Henry Ward, the able and energetic Governor of Ceylon, who rendered every assistance in his power by despatching all the troops he could possibly spare. During the absence of Her Majesty's Ambassador in India the operations in China were suspended. During that absence, however, he had found it his duty to establish a blockade of Canton for this reason—he found that the Chinese High Commissioner and the other authorities had collected Chinese produce, and that they were en-
  934
  deavouring to open the trade with other foreign nations to the exclusion of the British. It was impossible to allow that; and the holding of the river was also considered essential to the arrangements which were to be made for the future; for in the report he had sent borne he stated that he should hold the Canton river until Government had decided what steps should be taken. He had already referred to the absence of certain papers, which would prevent him from speaking on one point on which it was most desirable that he should have had the opportunity of addressing the House; and he would proceed to state that in the early part of 1858 he was called on to accompany the noble Lord (the Earl of Elgin), the British Ambassador, in conjunction with His Excellency the Ambassador, the Admiral, and forces of France, to the north of China, after the final capture of Canton. The blockade was raised on the 10th of February, and arrangements were made for proceeding to the north. He confessed he had always hoped that when this period arrived no hostilities would really be necessary in the north. It was supposed that what had occurred at Canton would induce the Emperor of China to see the advisability of yielding. Moreover, happily for our prospects, the representatives of Russia, America, and France had united with us on the common ground of a revision of treaties, and he hoped that nothing hostile would ensue. With these views he had even asked from the authorities at home a discretionary power to reduce the naval forces in China. Well, it was thought necessary to make a demonstration in the north of China and to proceed to the entrance of the Peiho. The arrangement was, that all should rendezvous at Shanghai. They arrived off the Peiho on the 24th of April; on the 25th the French arrived. On the 26th they proceeded to reconnoitre the entrance of the Peiho river; on the 27th they moved over the bar two of the despatch-boats; on the 30th he was informed by Her Majesty's Ambassador that a letter had been received rendering it advisable to postpone hostile action, and that he should be informed when a different state of affairs presented itself. A conference was held without result on the 1st of May. On the 12th his Excellency the Russian Ambassador was good enough to allow him to question one of the Russian gentlemen who had come from Pekin as to what was going on there and the nature of the road thither.

  935
  Advantage was also taken of delivering a letter from Her Majesty's Ambassador to the officials in the port to reconnoitre and find out the nature of the landing, the states of the tide, and the consistency of the ground over which their force might have to travel. The final decision was taken on the 19th. On the 20th of May they proceeded to the entrance of the Peiho, when the operations against the forts were attended with the most successful result. The loss in killed and wounded was 103 men, more than half of it being unhappily occasioned by the explosion of a Chinese magazine. After the capture of the forts not the slightest molestation of any kind was offered by the Chinese until Tien-tsin was reached on the 30th. Here he would gladly sit down; but the House would not, he hoped, think him out of order if he made some reference to the manner in which he had performed his duties in reference to the noble Earl, Her Majesty's Ambassador to China. He hoped he might be allowed to say, in regard to his own part in these transactions, that from the moment the noble Earl entered upon his duties, he had never deviated from an anxious desire to forward his Excellency's wishes, or to uphold the interests of this country and obey the orders of the Queen and Her Majesty's Government. He would not have made this reference, and hoped the House would not say he was out of order (for he had refrained from noticing, on various occasions, remarks in certain public journals), if his conduct as a naval officer had not been in some measure assailed. He believed he took the right course as a naval officer and commander in chief in a distant part of the world—that course being strictly to adhere to his duty —strictly to adhere to the instructions of the Admiralty, which he served. If he had exercised forbearance in not asking for official documents relating to certain operations in which he took part, it was only because he did not think an officer should be too sensitive, even if the public thought fit to deal with his character. Were he to justify himself, his course, as it seemed to him, was this—to ask the Admiralty whether, in consequence of his character having been assailed, they would permit him to use certain documents in order to make his conduct plain before the world. If they objected to that course, he must bow to their decision. In his case he had received the fullest approbation of the Government and the Admiralty, and therefore had not thought it necessary.
  936
  But when he told the House that an hon. Gentleman—an able and very agreeable writer, who held a position of confidence, who held an official position by the side of the noble Lord, the Ambassador in China —when he gave to the world his work, which bore the impress of something like authority, in which he reflected upon his character—when that writer said that he (Sir M. Seymour) was slow, and wanting in energy, and of having thwarted the policy of the noble Lord, he thought he might fairly ask why did not this gentleman give the whole story to the world? He could have done it, but he did not; but he wished to poison the public mind in regard to the conduct of one who had endeavoured to do his duty. The House must understand that the instructions were very clear. The House would see by the blue-book that the negotiations were entrusted entirely to the Ambassador. He was told that it would be for him to determine, and for him alone, how long the negotiations should be continued, when, if unsuccessful, to be broken off; and when he judged that further negotiations were useless, and the employment of force necessary to compel the Chinese to comply with his demands, his duty then would be to announce that fact to the Admiral, with whom it would then rest to decide how he would employ the force at his disposal. He begged to tell the House that he never was called upon to act until the time he was called upon to attack the forts. Had he been called upon to act he would have respectfully told Her Majesty's Ambassador that he thought it would be better to delay, as in his opinion it was important—in acting against the Chinese it was always important—to act with effect. He had experienced the advantageous moral effect of such a course in dealing with this people. He knew the difficulty of getting the Chinese to show a front of resistance. After the successful capture of the Peiho forts the Chinese never troubled them again. In the case of affairs in the north he had given notice for the production of papers, and he believed the Government had no objection to their production. The author of the work to which he had referred seemed to forget that he (Sir M. Seymour) had not acted alone—he acted with Admiral de Genouilly, a man of honour, open, candid, and of the highest professional attainments, so much so that it was impossible for him to express the satisfaction he always felt in carrying out joint operations

  937
  with that gallant Officer. Therefore, when they singled him out he did not understand it. Those gentlemen were very fast men for fighting. Fight whom? Blame him for not fighting? Whom? Chinamen? He did not mean to say that Chinamen could not he got to resist. They did so get together at the Peiho forts, and became almost impudent, and the result was therefore useful, as they were prepared to meet them. If they had gone in a hurry up the river, no doubt the forts would have been taken; but what then? they should have commenced fighting at the opening of the river, and been slaughtering Chinamen all the way to Tien-tsin. Allusion had been made in the work in question to the enemy having retired unscathed. Why, they fled like sheep. His own vessel, a steamer, could not make the turning, and he was compelled to put her stem on to the opposite mud, to back her short, and then go on. All hands on board were not sufficient to turn her round, and who came to help them? Why, hundreds of the Chinese came down to lend a hand in getting her off, and to assist her down the river. They also came swimming off on both sides of his vessel, with fruits, vegetables, flowers, birds, and all sorts of things for the English. Yet some of those bellicose gentlemen, for the sake of a flourish of their pen and a little fine writing, did not scruple to talk the nonsense he had referred to. He regretted very much having to enter upon these subjects. He wished to act with the greatest forbearance in regard to anything that was written about him; but there were occasions when an officer was bound to answer imputations upon his conduct, and he hoped the House would giant him their indulgence. As to the commercial aspect of the question, he held that our interest in China must be purely commercial; and if we attempted to gain any other end, we should be acting unjustly and unfairly towards China. This country was very powerful for war—China was very weak. It was impossible that we could carry our arms into China without very serious consequences to that Empire. He believed that China had never recovered from the effects of the first war; and he further believed that if we carried the hostilities now impending beyond what the necessities of the case required, there would be great reason to deplore it. He had no hesitation in expressing his opinion as to the future. If it proved necessary to adopt hostile measures, with the large
  938
  allied forces now going out to China, success there would be inevitable. It could not be supposed that any Chinese or Tartar force could resist the arms of two such powerful nations as the Allies, when mustered so strongly as in the expedition now on its way out. It was much to he desired that the Emperor of China would listen to the advice which was offered him, and avert hostilities while it was yet in his power. He feared, however, that such would not be the case, and he had read with regret the news of the gathering of large Tartar forces in the vicinity of Pekin. The Chinese people did not like taking advice, and the persuasion even of their best friends was of no avail. In the event of their not yielding to our demands, we must of necessity proceed to retake the forts before which our gallant forces had been defeated, and then advance upon Tien-tsin. He felt satisfied that, once in force at Tien-tsin, the Court of Pekin would open their eyes to the propriety and necessity of yielding; but in any case he should deprecate the consequences of success, if not exercised with justice and moderation towards the Chinese. As he said before, China was really not a country to go to war with. They had nothing to oppose to our strength, and we could not carry war into China with any real satisfaction to ourselves, although we might bring ruin and desolation upon the empire. If they pushed on to Pekin, they would run the risk of making it like what Canton was at this moment; and very possibly the Court would leave the city, and then they would find themselves in Pekin without the means of getting any officials to negotiate with. There was a probability, too, that a defeat might induce the Chinese not only to lay down their arms, but to remain in what he might call a condition of passive resistance, and what could be done then? What could our forces do before an enemy that offered no opposition? He supposed they would just have to come away. After having endeavoured in vain by peaceful means to procure the ratification of the treaty, which he had no hesitation in saying he thought ought to he carried, he did not see how we could avoid proceeding to hostilities; but, having attained the success which must accompany the allied forces, the utmost forbearance and consideration should be extended to a nation so utterly indefensible as China. The fabric of Chinese power was of so flimsy a character, so merely ornamental, and so

  939
  unstable, that he had no doubt the consequence of any rude shock from the Allies would be to break up the empire. The risk we ran of bringing about such a result ought, he thought, to make us cautious how far we carried our operations.
  LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I suppose there is no one in this House who can question the professional opinion of the gallant Admiral who has just sat down, or who will be disposed to doubt his zeal and devotion in the service of the Crown and the country. The gallant Admiral has received the approbation of the Board of Admiralty, his immediate superiors, and therefore I think it is quite unnecessary— indeed impossible—for me to go into the questions he has adverted to with regard to his conduct and the differences with the noble Lord who was Her Majesty's Ambassador in China. I doubt whether this is an occasion when we can conveniently and usefully discuss the whole question with regard to China; but at the same time, the hon. Gentleman (Mr. B. Cochrane) who brought forward this subject made so many charges against Mr. Bruce, and went so much into detail that I cannot altogether avoid questioning some parts of the narrative in which he introduced them. The House will recollect that Mr. Bruce was sent to China entirely for the purpose of obtaining the ratifications of the treaty of Tien-tsin, and of acting at Pekin as Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary, Before he went he laid a paper before the Earl of Malmesbury, asking for instructions, and pointing out that, as there were parts of the treaty which he had reason to fear were very unpalatable to the Chinese, some difficulties might arise, not then perceived, in carrying the treaty into effect. I must say that Mr. Bruce did not suggest that the entrance to the Peiho would be resisted; but he asked the question whether he should insist on going up to Pokin. The Earl of Malmesbury then directed him to go to Pekin, and gave him the following instructions as to the mode of proceeding there:—
  "You will probably find it advisable, before your departure from Shanghai, to send an intimation to Pekin of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements may be made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho, and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Pekin. The admiral in command of Her Majesty's naval forces in China has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force, and unless any unforeseen
  940
  circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you reach Tien-tsin in a British ship of war."
  The case which actually occurred was not foreseen. Mr. Bruce was directed to proceed to the mouth of the Peiho with a suitable naval force. Admiral Hope says, Mr. Bruce said with an "imposing" naval force. But I take it for granted that such a naval force was intended as would inspire so much respect or awe to the Chinese that there would then be no difficulty in proceeding up the Peiho and arriving at Pekin. Many petitions have been addressed to me on the assumption that Mr. Bruce, immediately on his arrival, attempted to reach Pekin by force; that he intended to force his way. Mr. Bruce, I submit, acted exactly according to his instructions. He wrote immediately on his arrival at Shanghai, on the 10th of May, to ask that suitable preparations should be made for his reception. He said he should proceed to Tien-tsin, and when he arrived there he hoped suitable preparations would be made according to his character as Plenipotentiary for his conveyance to Pekin. He states it in these words:—
  "The undersigned takes this opportunity of informing his Excellency Kweiliang that, in compliance with the above instructions of his sovereign, he is about to proceed without delay, by ship, to Tien-tsin. He trusts that the necessary orders will be given for the conveyance of himself and his suite from thence to Pekin, and for the provision of suitable accommodation for him during his residence in the capital itself, in a manner befitting the dignity of the nation he represents."
  It is obvious that there is no contemplation of the use of force in that request, but that it is a simple request that the Ministers of the Emperor of China will make due preparation for his journey and reception. The hon. Gentleman says that there were persons waiting at Shanghai to negotiate with him, and that they were told by Lord Elgin to stay there for that purpose. But it is rather remarkable that the hon. Gentleman, who professes a wish to show every indulgence to Mr. Bruce, did not, in this respect, do him bare justice, because the fact is that in the beginning of March Lord Elgin wrote to the Ministers of the Emperor of China that he should not return to Shanghai, that he was about to proceed to England, and that another person would go from England with the view of exchanging ratifications at Pekin, and

  941
  residing there as Her Majesty's representative. These Chinese Ministers, after the receipt of that letter, remained from the 30th of March until the middle of June, but no one can say that they were justified in expecting either Lord Elgin or Mr. Bruce to negotiate at Shanghai, when they had received an intimation that another and more natural course had been decided upon. Mr. Bruce accordingly, in further compliance with his instructions, called on Admiral Hope to furnish him with an adequate force. According to directions received from Lord Elgin, that force was furnished, and he proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho. Up to this time he had had no intimation whatever from the Chinese Ministers that his entrance to the Peiho and proceeding to Tien-tsin would be opposed, or even objected to. These Chinese Ministers proposed to re-negotiate, or, in fact, re-open certain points, and to alter some parts of the treaty. Mr. Bruce very properly declared that that was no part of his duty; that it was his duty to exchange ratifications, and not re-open questions already settled by the treaty, and that he intended to proceed to the Peiho. If any one will look at the correspondence with these Ministers, he will find that, although they attempted to re-open questions, yet after a time they apparently coincided with Mr. Bruce. At all events, they declared themselves ready to do what he desired. They made some objections to the length of the journey and the time it would take, but they never, nor do I believe it was in their minds or knowledge to do so—they never suggested to Mr. Bruce that the Emperor of China objected to that mode, or that any resistance would be made to his proceeding to Pekin. Indeed, I cannot conceive what objections there could be, supposing the Emperor of China intended to admit him to Pekin and ratify the treaty. If that were the Emperor's intention, there could be no objection to Mr. Bruce proceeding by the usual and shortest route, nor to giving him those advantages in his short journey of forty miles from Tien-tsin to the capital which would enable him to reach it in a manner he had been led to expect, as becoming the representative of a friendly Power. But another party seems to have had a predominant influence with the Emperor of China. They do not manage matters in that country as they do here. In England when one party is in power the other is out. The one pursues a policy, the other criticizes it. But in China there are two
  942
  parties in power at the same time, one being for peace, and the other for war, and therefore the treatment shown to the mission was of a character totally different from that which was expected. Mr. Bruce desired that the Admiral should proceed to the mouth of the Peiho, and when there endeavour to ascertain what arrangements had been made for his reception. He always proposed that he should be allowed to go up with one or perhaps two ships, just sufficient for himself and retinue. It was not proposed to take up the whole squadron. The Admiral could not find out what orders had been given to the forts. It did not appear whether there was to be resistance or not, A number of country people appeared, whom Mr. Bruce calls a rabble, and they said there was no person of authority among them, that they were mere country people, that they had put stakes in the river to defend themselves against pirates (which is not a very unlikely event), and that they knew nothing of what the Government would do. So matters remained until the last moment. It was not that Mr. Bruce insisted on refusing the proposition of the Emperor of China that he should go some other route, but up to nine o'clock on the day the attack was made he was induced to think that the Government of China was not disposed to resist his proceeding up the Peiho. And let me say that my belief is, that if Admiral Hope had been as successful as the gallant Admiral (Admiral Seymour) was the year before in passing the forts and destroying them, we should have heard that Mr. Bruce had arrived at Pekin; and as the gallant Admiral has said, if his boat had got into the mud, there would have been hundreds of Chinese to assist him; and that the Emperor of China would have said the resistance was made against his orders, and that he was quite ready to disavow any such resistance, and to receive Mr. Bruce as became the representative of a friendly Power. But events, I must own, turned out otherwise. I do not attempt to say precisely what course was that which might have saved Mr. Bruce from difficulty. It appears to me that the evils which he had to consider were very great on every side. He was placed without instructions in a position he did not expect. He had with him a large force. He had with him, mind you, a large force —a large British force, with a British Admiral in command. He desired the Admiral to clear the river. When the morn-

  943
  ing came on which that was to be done, he received intimation that if he would go to another place, ten miles off, he would be received by a high officer, and means provided by which he might reach Pekin. Let any one who really feels that indulgence which the hon. Gentleman professed consider the difficult position to which Mr. Bruce was placed. He was ordered by the Government of his country to go to Pekin to obtain the ratification of the treaty, and not to ratify the treaty anywhere else. He was told at the mouth of the river that militia and rabble had put stakes, in order to defend themselves against pirates. There were some persons at Shanghai who told him that the Emperor of China meant to resist the advance of the British Minister. Other persons told him that preparations were made for his reception, and everything would pass in tranquillity. He had to decide this difficult question, whether he should attempt to pass by force, or without orders desire the British Admiral to retire from forts which were taken with case by a British force the year before, and thus give the appearance to the whole of China—I may say to the whole of England and the whole of Europe—of shrinking before forts which were easily overcome a short time before. Let us suppose he had taken the latter course. Let us consider what opinion would then have been passed upon him in this country. Let us suppose that at nine o'clock in the morning he had said, "I will not attempt to pass these forts, but submit to any proposal which the Chinese Government may make." For my own part, I am inclined to think that after the successful resistance made to the British and French advance the Chinese were more disposed to he civil and apparently conciliatory to the Americans than they would have been under other circumstances. It was their obvious policy. Let us suppose that Mr. Bruce had met with the same treatment as the American Minister, and that he had been conveyed to the capital in what is said to be not the most honourable mode of conveyance. I will suppose him to have arrived at the capital, and to have been told, as Mr. Ward was, that if he expected an audience he must perform the kotoo— strike his head to the ground and offer himself as the representative of a tributary nation. I will suppose him to have displayed the same spirit as Mr. Ward—and I am sure he would have displayed it— that he had replied that he would perform
  944
  no ceremony which was not performed at the Courts of the Western Powers, or which would be considered as degrading, or as placing his Sovereign in an inferior position to the Emperor of China. The Chinese would have said to him, as they said to Mr. Ward, "What was the use of your coming here, then? You can't ratify your treaty here; we will conduct you to the coast, and there it will be ratified." Suppose Mr. Bruce had done all this, what would have been said of his conduct here? Would not people have said to him, "You had instructions to go to Pekin to get your treaty ratified; you have not obeyed them; you have suffered humiliation, and you have not carried out your object, your only excuse being that you had reason to apprehend some resistance, though you were aware, and, indeed, had seen it with your own eyes, that a similar resistance had been previously overcome with the greatest case? Don't you know the character always given of the Chinese, that they are an unwarlike nation? Don't you know that the resistance from which you ran away might have been overcome in half an hour, if you had gone boldly forward?" Can anybody doubt that this would have been the judgment passed on Mr. Bruce here? On the other hand, there was the danger that, the Chinese having got ready their forts, blocked up the river, and altogether made more extensive preparations than Mr. Bruce was aware of, Her Majesty's troops might suffer a reverse in spite of their gallantry and bravery. These were the alternatives presented to Mr. Bruce, and never was a civil officer placed in a situation of more difficulty. Without attempting to decide—and I will not attempt to decide myself whether his course was the best—I say there were infinite difficulties on both sides, and the Government were justified—and not only justified, but they would have been neglecting their duty in doing otherwise—in telling Mr. Bruce that their confidence in him was not diminished by the course he had taken. I have said thus much because it was necessary, after the numerous complaints which have been made against Mr. Bruce, and after what has been said to-night by the hon. Member, to place before the House the difficulties in which he was placed. When this news reached Her Majesty's Government, we came to the immediate and unanimous conclusion that, whatever might be the terms proposed to the Chinese Government, or the course hereafter pur-

  945
  sued towards them, it was necessary to support them by such a force in the Chinese waters as should make it manifest that our moderation was the result of willingness, not of weakness. With regard to the particular terms we have offered, the gallant Admiral said, most truly, that we could not have asked for less than the treaty of Tien-tsin, which had been signed and had received the special approval of the Emperor of China. Nothing but the ratification remained to be given, and it would have been impossible for us, because Her Majesty's forces had suffered a loss, because 400 or 500 men had been killed or wounded, to give up a treaty solemnly agreed to, or to retreat from conditions to which the Emperor of China bad given his consent. It was also necessary to ask for an apology for what has occurred, to which I think we are entitled; for, whatever may be the case of the Emperor of China with regard to his right of forbidding a passage up his rivers, or defending their entrance, he was clearly not justified in barring the passage without giving notice, or in entrapping the British Minister into an ambuscade. For such a proceeding the dignity of the Crown and the nation requires an ample satisfaction and apology. With regard to the general question I quite agree with the gallant Admiral and the sentiments that have been expressed by the hon. Gentleman that we should treat the Chinese with every justice. It is not because England and France are far stronger in war than China that therefore we ought to give them an inch less than the justice to which they are entitled. I agree with the gallant Admiral, too, in those motives of policy to which he referred. I know very well that in pressing too severely upon the Emperor of China we may entirely dislocate the whole fabric of the Empire and the state of society already too much weakened and impaired, and that that which is our only business there, commerce, might be seriously injured by standing out for complete, instead of resting satisfied with insufficient, terms of peace. But, at the same time, everybody I have seen possessing any acquaintance with China is of opinion that unless we place ourselves in a position to show that we are able to enforce all our demands, the lives not only of British subjects, but of all Europeans in China, would be endangered. We must be strong enough to vindicate our honour and treat with them on equal terms. At first it was necessary to make
  946
  preparations by which to show our strength, and this we did in communication with the Emperor of the French. There was a chance that the Emperor of China might offer terms himself; that Mr. Bruce's readiness to receive those terms might be known, and that the whole matter might have been settled in a way to satisfy our honour, and at the same time obtain for us the terms of the treaty. That hope has to some extent been disappointed. It may be that it would be wiser to send out a person of more authority than Mr. Bruce, who has not been engaged in this conflict, who might obtain from the Emperor the concession of terms of peace which he would not otherwise assent to. That is a matter to which the attention of the Government has been seriously directed, and I shall take an early opportunity, as soon as the next mail comes in—and we expect it very soon—to state to the House the course which the Government intend to pursue. In the mean time, not fearing the decision of this House, not unwilling to give it every information, I venture to say that I do not think that they are in a position at this moment, without all the circumstances of the case before them, to come to a decision. I think it would be well for the House to wait before it pronounces any absolutely decisive opinion either on the conduct of Mr. Bruce or the course which the Government propose to pursue. I agree with the gallant Admiral that our business in China is commerce. A Minister residing there would not have the same duties to perform as a Minister residing at any European Court. His chief business would be to treat of matters of commerce, to protect his own countrymen residing in the country, and to obtain reparation for them if any of them chanced to sustain injury; and it is a serious question to consider whether this could best be done by a Minister residing at Pekin, or at one of the outports, and going to Pekin occasionally. These are matters which require grave consideration. I am not saying now that we ought to ask for more than we have already obtained, the option which is given by the Treaty of Tien-tsin. Every honour has been rendered, and justly rendered, to the brave men who fought so gallantly yet unsuccessfully. But the character of the naval service has not suffered by that misfortune. I need only add that I shall feel happy indeed if the measures which have been adopted should lead by successful negotiation to the establishment

  947
  of permanent relations of peace with that country.
  SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: I very much agree with what fell from the noble Lord at the commencement of his speech, that for several reasons the present is not a desirable moment for entering into a general discussion of the question of our relations with China. That opinion acquires even greater force from what was stated at the conclusion of the noble Lord's speech, and by the arrangements which the Government have made for bringing the Naval Estimates forward to-night. The questions arising out of the late unfortunate collision with China, involving not only transactions which have occurred, but matter affecting our future relations with that great Empire, must necessarily be of importance, and in many respects also of extreme difficulty. The hon. Member for Honiton (Mr. B. Cochrane) availing himself of the right which he undoubtedly possessed, has placed before the House the opinions which he entertains on some parts of the subject. He has stated them with great clearness and ability; and I am bound to say, as far as we are now in possession of information, that there were many parts of his observations in which I am much disposed to concur. The noble Lord, in answering my hon. Friend, passed in review several of the transactions which have taken place, but he has not gone into the whole of them; and if I now abstain from entering more fully into the subject, I wish it to be understood that I am not assenting to all that fell from the noble Lord. The conduct of Mr. Bruce in particular is a point on which I should be sorry to express any premature opinion. I am simply anxious not to appear as altogether concurring in the intimation that has fallen from the noble Lord. My belief is, that the conduct of Mr. Bruce must he divided into two periods — namely, that which elapsed prior to his leaving Shanghai, and the subsequent period after his arrival at the mouth of the Peiho. And I would remind the noble Lord that in his observations he has altogether omitted, or, at least, he has touched very lightly on the despatch which bears more than any read by him upon the question at issue—I mean that sent by Mr. Bruce to Shanghai on the 12th or 13th of November. On this matter I wish to be understood as altogether reserving my opinion. But I have felt a very great desire to hear what are the intentions of the Government on so important
  948
  and delicate a matter. I hope I may infer from the little the noble Lord has said today, that the course which they will pursue will be one of moderation. Further than that I will not inquire, especially after the declaration, which I heard with great satisfaction, and as to which I hope no misunderstanding exists—that as soon as the next despatch is received, which the Government expect will be on a very early day, we may anticipate a full explanation from the noble Lord of the policy which they are prepared to adopt with regard to China. [Lord J. RUSSELL signified his assent.] With that understanding, I think the offer made by the noble Lord affords an additional reason for abstaining at this moment from any further discussion; particularly as we are all anxious to hear the statement of my noble Friend opposite (Lord C. Paget). But although I thus wish to exercise some reserve in entering into the general question of our policy in China, there is one part of the subject on which I wish to maintain no reserve at all, and that is as to the appeal which I understood was in some sense made to me by the hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for Devon-port (Admiral Seymour) with regard to the opinion expressed by the late Board of Admiralty regarding his conduct while in command on the Chinese station. I confess I. entertain some regret that the hon. and gallant officer felt obliged—as I presume he did in justice to himself—to allude to the unfortunate difference which occurred between him and the noble Lord our Ambassador in China. I am inclined to believe that the fact of that difference was very little known in this country, and I am still more strongly disposed to believe that no one was inclined to attach blame to the gallant Admiral. I am sorry that the matter has been brought before the House of Commons, but as he has felt it due to himself to advert to the subject, I think I am bound in justice to confirm what has fallen from him, and to say that the Board of Admiralty unanimously approved of his conduct. After the case was brought under their notice, they sent out to the gallant Admiral for an explanation of the facts, and a full and clear explanation was returned by the gallant officer. After it had been carefully considered it was my pleasing duty to assure him, on the part of the Board of Admiralty, that we approved of the course which he had adopted; and I think I am bound further to express the opinion of the Board that there had been

  949
  nothing in the conduct of the gallant Admiral which was not perfectly consistent with the high and honourable character which he has at all times borne.
  SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, as he had placed a notice of Motion on this subject upon the Paper, he might be permitted to say a few words, which the hon. Member who had introduced the discussion had spared him the necessity of prolonging to any great extent. The policy to be pursued towards China by Her Majesty's Government he hoped would be maturely considered; but with regard to this question the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs appeared in a new character. The House would remember the eloquence and grace with which he had delivered his opinions on the same subject on a former occasion; but he could not as truthfully congratulate the noble Lord on the extenuatory speech of that evening, and he did not think he had satisfactorily replied to the arguments of the hon. Member for Honiton. The noble Lord had stated that every indulgence was to be extended to Mr. Bruce; but the important question still remained, whether in making war on another country, he was justified by his instructions, or whether his acts had been subsequently approved of by the Government. In a speech made by the Earl of Derby on the 24th of January, he said—
  MR. SPEAKER: The gallant General must not read a speech which was made in the House of Lords.
  SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, he would simply refer to the speech as being made in "another place." The noble Earl was reported to have said,—
  MR. SPEAKER: The gallant General is equally out of order in repeating what took place during the present Session of Parliament in the House of Lords.
  SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, he would not allude to the House of Lords. He would merely state that a noble Lord who had been Prime Minister at no very distant period, had declared that Mr. Bruce was not sanctioned by any instructions from his Government in the course which he had pursued. There were some other passages of importance in the speech of the noble Earl, but, under penalty of the displeasure of the Speaker, he would not refer to them; the despatch of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, however, might be legitimately remarked on. That noble Lord who now extended an absolute approbation
  950
  to the conduct of Mr. Bruce, stated in the last document which he had submitted to the House,
  "Now, although the denial of a passage to the capital by the usual and most convenient route would have been evidence of an unfriendly disposition, yet it was a matter upon which you might have remonstrated and negotiated without having recourse to force to clear the passage."
  Now, they were told by the noble Lord, that it would have been unbecoming to the English character and reputation if he had remonstrated or proceeded according to any other course than that which he had adopted. [Lord J. RUSSELL:—No.] Surely, there was some inconsistency in such a declaration, He understood the noble Lord to deny that such was his meaning. If, however, the effect of the discussion which had taken place were to induce Her Majesty's Government to nominate some high personage to conduct the negotiations in China, who did not labour under the disadvantage of having been mixed up in the previous controversy, he believed that a beneficial result would have been attained. The noble Lord had also stated that when the next despatches had arrived they (the Government) would be prepared to come to a decision and to state their policy. Under these circumstances it would ill become him to press the Motion of which he had given notice. But the noble Lord, in alluding to this matter, had not attached sufficient importance to the war they were then engaged in. It was a war which would employ an army of 30,000 men. The noble Lord had stated satisfactorily, as far as it went, but rather vaguely, that the demands Her Majesty's Government would make on China were very moderate. The demands might he of that character, but if they were to be backed by 30,000 men, the results of such demands might be by no means moderate. It was a subject for the most serious consideration by the House. He would postpone his Motion till the period alluded to by the noble Lord, but there ought to be no delay on the part of the Government in making their intentions known.
  VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I think, Sir, it seems to be the general opinion of the House that it will be more expedient and desirable to postpone the discussion of this question till my noble Friend shall be enabled by the arrival of further accounts from China to explain to the House fully what course Her Majesty's Government intend to pursue. We have another im-

  951
  portant subject immediately coming on, and I should hope the House will forbear the discussion of this question at present, in order to go at once into the Navy Estimates. I will only observe that the hon. and gallant General appears to have misunderstood something that fell from my noble Friend, and consequently sees some inconsistency between it and what he has written on a former occasion. But there really is none; the gallant General supposes my noble Friend to have told Mr. Bruce, in the despatch referred to, that if he had been informed beforehand that he could not be allowed to go up the Peiho, he might have remonstrated, and some arrangement might have been made as to the manner in which he should have proceeded to Pekin. Now what my noble Friend said was, that no such intimation having been given by the Chinese authorities, and the expedition having been already detained for some time at the mouth of the Peiho without receiving any intelligence as to its route, it was not advisable, under such circumstances, to retire without attempting to ascend the river. It must also be recollected that Mr. Bruce's decision was probably influenced by his instructions from the Earl of Malmesbury, who told him he was to be accompanied by a sufficient force. Mr. Bruce might, not very unnaturally, think that this force was to be "sufficient" for some purpose or other. As the immediate purpose was to go up in a ship of war to ratify the treaty of Tien-tsin, he might also be allowed to consider that the sufficiency of the accompanying force was to be measured by its power of overcoming any obstacle in the way. But I will not set the example of continuing the discussion I am asking the House to postpone. I wish now to state that the hon. and learned Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Kinglake) has a Motion standing on the notice paper for tomorrow evening. In the present state of things it will be very inconvenient to press on a discussion upon that Motion; and I would ask the hon. and learned Member to have the kindness to postpone it till a time when the House will be better able to consider it.
  SIR CHARLES NAPIERsaid, he thought a great deal had been said in justification of Mr. Bruce, but very little of Admiral Hope. He was sure the House would like to hear more of the courage he had shown in the action in the Peiho than they would see in the despatches. He wished then, before the conversation on the
  952
  China question closed, to read a letter from an officer who was near the Admiral during the action, who bore witness to the extraordinary courage his commanding officer displayed. It said: —
  "I am going to try and give you an account of our most disastrous affair, as my time will allow, and I know you will make allowances for me. I suppose the Admiral's despatch will be published, but I doubt if you will get all there; at any rate, you cannot hear from that source how nobly he behaved. We went into action at 2·30, the Admiral standing on the top of the cook-house, myself and the French captain on the harness casks in front of him. By three o'clock he was badly wounded by a round shot taking away the fleshy part of the thigh, the lieutenant commanding and eight men killed, and twenty-two badly wounded. The Plover then dropped down for more men, and the Admiral left her to hoist his flag in the Opossum all this time his wound had been unattended to, except what my little surgical knowledge pointed out. When we left the Plover there were only nine of us with a whole skin left out of her crew; she was literally like a butcher's slaughterhouse. We had not been long in the Opossum before the Admiral was again wounded. We had managed to get him on the top of the cook-house again, and, being weak from his wound, he was supporting himself by the mainstay, when a round shot took that away and threw him down on the deck, injuring him on the head and fracturing his ribs,—still he would not give in, and was placed on the gunwale, till, at last, being quite done up, he fainted. I then got him into a boat (French), and was taking him away, but he came to, and asked me which was the ship furthest in. I said,'Cormorant' Then take me there.' So we went to the Cormorant, where, finding him perfectly unable to stand, I had the signal made for Captain Shadwell, the senior captain, who came on board and took charge."
  In all the records of our naval history there was no instance of an officer showing greater pluck and gallantry, particularly as every one who had been wounded must know the depressing effects such severe wounds had on the system. He would not go into the question whether Admiral Hope was right or wrong in the attack he made; but he thought Her Majesty's Government would only show a good feeling if it sent him out the Victoria Cross. It was not a decoration intended only for successful actions; it was the reward of great valour, and no officer had ever displayed more than Admiral Hope. He trusted the Government would see the necessity and propriety of giving him the Cross.

SAVOY AND NICE.—POSTPONEMENT OF MOTION.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, he wished to appeal to his hon. Friend behind

953
him (Mr. Kinglake) who had a Motion on the Paper for to-morrow on a question of great interest, and as it would be most inconvenient in the present state of things to discuss the subject in Parliament, to ask him if he would be kind enough to postpone his Motion to some future period.
MR. A. W. KINGLAKEsaid, with respect to the appeal of the noble Viscount (Viscount Palmerston), he had, on the previous day, received a note from the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, containing an intimation similar to that just expressed. The application was based on the fact that bringing on the Motion the next day would be injurious to the public service and affect the negotiations still going on on the subject. On receiving the note, he felt it his duty to ask the noble Lord to make the application publicly in the House; and he had also communicated the facts and the course he intended to take to the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli). He could not but express his regret for the decision the Government had arrived at in determining to intercept the voice of the House of Commons on this question. He believed that a calm and temperate expression of the opinion of the House of Commons would not have weakened the efforts of Her Majesty's Government, but materially have strengthened their hands. He might also be permitted, in an humble way, to express his own opinion that Her Majesty's Ministers, in the course of that discussion, would possibly have obtained a knowledge of matters of dry fact, which, as far as he could judge, they did not then possess. He ventured to say this because, if he rightly understood some of the statements made by Earl Granville in "another place," Her Majesty's Government appeared to have acted under a singular mistake, a mistake for the existence of which he could easily account, but still a mistake which might be fraught with the most momentous consequences. Since this appeal, however, had been made to him by the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as a loyal subject of the Queen, it was needless to say that he must assent to the delay. On the other hand, he should have the right to expect that his Motion should be allowed to come on at such a time that it would not come on in vain. According to information which reached him not many days ago, the 20th of this month was the day fixed for the—, he wished to avoid the use of any intemperate expression, but he would say, that, according to information which he had
954
received, the 20th of this month was the day fixed for the completion of the Act in question. The day on which the noble Lord proposed he should bring on his Motion was the 28th. This was naturally unsatisfactory to him, as it was just eight days after the date when it was reported the Act was to be complete. He should, however be prepared to accept the assurance of the noble Lord at the head of the Government that the 28th instant would not be too late a day to secure the object which he had in view in entering upon the discussion of an important question. He need hardly add that he should expect, should any circumstances in the meantime occur rendering it desirable, that a day earlier than the 28th would be selected for that discussion—for he had no doubt the House were of opinion it ought to take place before the event against which it was meant to provide had come to pass—the noble Lord would feel it to be his duty to make such communication either to him or the House as would lead to the result which both had in view.
SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONEsaid, it would be very satisfactory if the Government would name a day for renewing the discussion on China. February was wearing away fast; a large expedition had to be got together; and it ought to be in motion in April or May. He trusted the Government would consider well before attempting to take possession of Pekin, and would also bear in mind the dangers which would be3et the expedition if it were detained in the waters of Pekin so late as November, when the monsoon changed from the north, and rendered the winter almost Siberian in its character. The Guif of Pecheli was so acted upon by the winds that in winter it was impossible for vessels to approach the land within eight or nine miles. The expedition, under these circumstances, would be liable to have its supplies cut off, and, having to deal with a hostile and ingenious enemy, a second Cabul disaster might he the result.
SIR ROBERT PEELsaid, that reverting to the subject of the cession of Savoy to France, he wished to state that his hon. Friend (Mr. Kinglake) was of course bound to yield, as he had done, to the wish of the noble Lord at the head of the Government with respect to the postponement of his Motion. It was, however, of the utmost importance that the question to which that Motion related should be discussed without delay. It was one with

955
respect to which he, as well as his hon. Friend, had received private information of the utmost importance; and he could not help thinking, with all due deference to his noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) that it would be for the public advantage that the House of Commons should be afforded an opportunity of giving expression to their opinions upon the subject. He must add that the noble Lord the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Lord John Russell) seemed to him to be very shy and coy in furnishing the House with information on matters connected with Foreign Affairs, and not to be disposed to act with that liberality on the point which was desirable. The Government, of course, he was aware, occupied a position as well in the case of foreign as of domestic policy which required that no ordinary amount of consideration should be extended to them; but it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that discussions in that House, and the calm determination at which it might arrive on any particular question, were calculated to produce an effect abroad, and that being so, he should appeal to his noble Friend at the head of the Government to fix a day when the Motion of the hon. Member for Bridgwater might be proceeded with. The question of the cession of Savoy to France was one, he might add, which affected very much the future of Switzerland, and beheld in his possession letters assuring him that the treaty by which that cession was accomplished had already been signed. He had, moreover, been asked to plead the cause of Switzerland in that House, and to state on her behalf that if Savoy were made over to France the neutrality of Switzerland would be at an end—a neutrality guaranteed by the treaties of 1815, which the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, called the charters by which the European Powers now held the territories which they possessed. If, then, the cession in question were to take place, a most scandalous and iniquitous proceeding, and one which would affect the future position of the European nations perhaps to European convulsion, would have been resorted to. He would, therefore, again entreat his noble Friend to name a day when the discussion upon the subject might be entered upon.
ADMIRAL WALCOTT: Sir, as other opportunity will offer to enter upon this discussion, and as the House is very naturally desirous to proceed with the Naval Estimates, I will restrict myself to the expres-
956
sion of my concurrence in the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Admiral (Sir C. Napier) that the Victoria Cross should be conferred on Admiral Hope. It has, I admit, been almost always the practice of the Government of this country not to grant rewards for deeds of heroism which were not followed by success; but then I should remind the House that Admiral Hope had acted in the case of the encounter at the mouth of the Peiho not upon his own responsibility, but upon the authority and at the request of the British Minister, Mr. Bruce, so that he did not come within the scope of the rule by which honour was refused to unsuccessful bravery, because of the stimulus which a contrary course was supposed to afford to the undertaking of rash and disastrous enterprises. I trust, however, that in honouring Admiral Hope, the Government will not be unmindful of the almost superhuman gallantry which had been displayed by the officers and men who had served under his command. I trust, Sir, that I may be permitted again to avow that I believe the circumstances of the action of the Peiho justified the Admiral in commencing the endeavour to force the passage to enable Mr. Bruce to proceed to Pekin, and redound, on calm consideration of the fact, most signally to his honour.
LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, he must express his regret that the gallant Officer who had just spoken, as well as some other distinguished members of the naval profession, should seem to think that the Government had not done justice to that most heroic officer, Admiral Hope, for his conduct at the mouth of the Peiho. He could, however, state with the utmost sincerity that the Admiralty highly appreciated that conduct, as well as the bravery of the gallant band who were under Admiral Hope's command, and the loss of many of whom the country had reason to deplore. The Admiralty, he might add, had not confined their appreciation to mere words. Admiral Hope had had several promotions placed at his disposal, in consequence of the encounter of the Peiho, and three officers had already been promoted on his recommendation. Besides those, through death vacancies, there had been four or five promotions; and the Admiral had been further informed that he was at liberty to recommend for advancement a gunner, a boatswain, three engineers, and other meritorious petty officers, to the number of six. The Admiralty

957
also took that occasion of expressing their high sense of the gallantry of himself and the officers under him. Whether that declaration was to be made again it was for the Government to consider. The House, however, must bear in mind that there must always be some discrimination between that which was a victory and that which was not so, for the reasons alleged by the gallant Officer who had last addressed them. Undoubtedly the Government would be most glad to extend to Admiral Hope any proof of their approbation of his gallantry: but if rewards were to be bestowed on officers who, however gallant their conduct, and however well conducted their operations, did not attain success, it would lead hereafter to very great inconvenience. Imprudent officers might be led to undertake expeditions at great loss of life, with the hope of receiving those rewards. Therefore it was certainly the bounden duty of the Government to exercise the utmost discrimination in this respect; but with regard to Admiral Hope and the gallant officers under him, they had had the full approval of the Admiralty.

COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH FRANCE.— COAL.—QUESTION.
MR. HORSMANsaid, he rose to put a Question to the Government with respect to the Commercial Treaty with Franco. The House would bear in mind that when it had been first rumoured that that Treaty was about to be entered into, there existed in this country a feeling rather opposed to it, but that when it had been announced by the noble Lord at the head of the Government that no provision of the Treaty would be carried into effect until it had been submitted to, and received the sanction of Parliament, public confidence had, to some extent, been restored. The 20th Article of the proposed Treaty ran thus: —
"The present Treaty not to be valid, unless Her Britannic Majesty be authorized by the consent of Her Parliament to execute the engagements contracted by Her in the several Articles of the Treaty."
The question he wanted to ask was—in what manner Government intended to proceed to obtain the assent of Parliament to the Articles of the Treaty? His question had especial reference to the 11th Article, The other Articles would come before them in Committee of Supply, the duties being remitted by Resolution to that effect in the ordinary way. But the 11th Article was to this effect—
958
"The two high contracting Powers engage not to prohibit the exportation of coal, and to levy no duty upon such exportation."
This Article was distinguished from all the rest, as it would not be brought under the consideration of the House in Committee of Supply, where they voted to take off duties. By this Article they only pledged themselves not to put a duty on, and therefore in Committee of Supply this Article of the Treaty would not be submitted to them, and their assent to it could not be obtained. He attached the more importance to this, because the Article was the most remarkable in the whole Treaty. The House would remember that the article of coal was the one first to be admitted into France, very much prior to the date at which the general admission of English articles was to be allowed. It was also to be admitted at a very much lower duty; not only so, but at a duty of an entirely different character; because, while all other articles were admitted under a protective duty, and a high protective duty, the article of coal was to be admitted at a low revenue duty, the only revenue duty in the whole Treaty. It was also remarkable that while we bound ourselves in all time coming not to make Coal an article of revenue to ourselves, we allowed France to make it an article of revenue to her. It was also remarkable in a constitutional point of view. By this Article Her Majesty bound her Ministers in the first place, in all time coming, not to propose an export duty on coal. She also bound herself, if any individual Member passed a Resolution through Parliament recommending the imposition of such a duty, to interpose her veto. No Chancellor of the Exchequer, whatever the exigencies of the country, whatever hostilities we might be involved in, and however other sources of taxation might be strained to the utmost, could, according to the terms of the Treaty, propose to derive a revenue from coal. But it was to be observed that this stipulation did not apply to France only; it must apply to all the other nations of the world. Whatever might be our relations with any other State of the world, a Minister could not, during peace, put an export duty on coal going to France, or any country with which we were not at war. He did not wish to say a word in favour of an export duty. Everybody know that export duties were vicious in principle, and, indeed, indefensible; but the principle which applied to other duties as objectionable, did not apply to coal. Wine

959
or cotton might be used and re-produced, but coal was an exhaustible commodity. Scientific men had been at one time much alarmed at the progress of the consumption of coal in this country. It was well known that the late Dr. Buckland, who was the intimate friend of the late Sir R. Peel, very much urged him to put an export duty on coal. And though he did not connect the two circumstances as cause and effect, it was known that Sir R. Peel did, in 1842, violate his principle of Political Economy, and did put an export duty on coal, and on coal alone. He (Mr. Horsman) also attached the greater importance to this from the language of Lord J. Russell, in his letter of instructions to our Plenipotentiaries at the time the Treaty was about to be signed. His Lordship, after alluding to the vast market for coal, added—"Indeed there still remains more or less of the disposition, which formerly was strong, to view the export of coal with jealousy, or even to subject it to restriction." It had been formerly the opinion of the best scientific men that, even at the then rate of consumption, the coal-fields of England then worked could not last 300 years. Three hundred years, they said, was a very long time compared to the life of a man, but a very short time in the life of a nation. The greatness of England depended upon her coal. And if 300 years hence their coal should be exhausted, what, they asked, would become of the country, for which they were bound to legislate for the future as well as the present. But it was not now the question whether they should put an export duty on coal; they were absolutely going to the other extreme, and giving a bonus for its exportation. He had intended some time ago to move for the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the statistics affecting the new and larger coal-fields in Wales, and how long, at the present rate of consumption, they were likely to last. Since he had seen this Article in the Treaty that notion had been revived; and he certainly thought it would be a very wise act on the part of Ministers to issue a Royal Commission to inquire what was the extent of coal to be had in the United Kingdom, and how long it was likely to last. This Article of the Treaty, the only one to be withdrawn from the notice and sanction of Parliament, was in his opinion so important, that he had rather all the rest had been withdrawn than it. He wished to know whether or not it was the intention of the Government, by any other
960
mode, to take the opinion of the House as to its approval of that Article?
MR. AUGUSTUS SMITHsaid, the Treaty was very one-sided. With reference to the statement of the right hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) it was important to observe that while the article obliged us not to put any duty on the export of coal, there was no reciprocal obligation on France not to put export duties on articles sent to this country. Nay, more, on wine, brandy, and almost all other articles of French produce, an export duty was put. If this clause of the Treaty were allowed to remain as it was, it should be made to apply to export duties put on by France on articles of her produce.
MR. GREGSONremarked, that some very competent authorities considered that the coal of the United Kingdom would afford a supply, at the present rate of consumption, for 2,000 years.
COLONEL HERBERTsaid, he could not help observing that very important consequences were involved in this Article of the Treaty, which certainly required further explanation from the Government. As he read the Article, in the event of any angry discussion with France tending to war, and making war imminent, nothing short of an absolute declaration of war on our part would enable us to prohibit the exportation of coal. There was another point,—in the event of war with any other Power, even during the continuance of that war, nothing could enable us to prohibit the exportation of coal to France, thus making France a general coal depot, with a power of selling it to the other nation with which we might be at war. In the event of war between France and any other Power we equally engaged not to prohibit the exportation of coal. It might so occur that France, being engaged in war with some other nation, we might be prepared, not to take part in it, but to take the line, perfectly right in a neutral Power, to prevent the exportation of coal to France for the purpose of carrying on the war. Coal was not yet decided to be contraband of war; but it was in the power of our Courts so to declare it. Whether so declared or not, however, it was obviously as much an article of warlike stores as gunpowder, or any other material which had always been so regarded. Such being the case he hoped to receive from the Government some explanation on this Article of the tariff.
MR. AYRTONsaid, he wished to express a hope that the second reading of

961
the Corporation (City of London) Bill would be so fixed that its coming on would not be left in uncertainty from the number of notices which preceded it.
MR. J. L. RICARDOsaid, the object of our commercial legislation should be to exchange that which we could produce with the greatest facility for that which we most required. It was to be expected that many captious objections should be taken to the fiscal arrangements recently announced; but the very last objection to have been anticipated certainly was the one now urged against the exchange of that commodity which of all others we could produce cheapest and with the greatest advantage to ourselves. He could not agree with the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Horsman) in his estimate of the policy of an export duty. Most writers on political economy held that there was very little difference between an export and an import duty; and unless we put an export duty on coal, how were we to prevent that article from being exported? This was a question not for us, but for other countries to decide. There was nothing new in the exportation of coal from England. Now, however, the French Government were willing to admit our coal duty free, or at least at a reduced duty. Where was the great misfortune in that? As far as warlike objects were concerned, there was no reason why the French Government should not have admitted our coal and iron at any previous time, except that it had hitherto thought fit to levy an import duty upon them for State purposes. The present was not, however, a proper occasion for discussing the great question of the Commercial Treaty.
SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBYsaid, he was willing to admit that it was not the proper time to discuss the general subject, but the object of the right hon. Member for Stroud was a simple one. He wished to obtain from the Government some explanation as to the manner in which a particular article in the Treaty was to be dealt with by the House. That question was one of great importance.
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, that having already spoken he did not intend to trespass on the indulgence of the House by asking permission to enter into details with reference to that portion of the Treaty, he would simply assure them that full information would be given on that as well as on other points on Monday next. It was inconvenient to anticipate now what
962
would be duly explained on the proper occasion. He had risen solely to answer the question that had been put to him relative to the Bill for the reform of the Corporation of London. That measure was fixed for Thursday. Other matters, however, stood for Thursday; and if that Bill could not then come on at a proper hour for its fair discussion, it would be fixed for some other day, when it could be considered at a proper hour of the evening.

NAVY ESTIMATES.—OBSERVATIONS.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, that before the right hon. Gentleman left the Chair he wished to called attention to the enormous increase in the Navy Estimates for the present year. These Estimates, the grand total of which exceeded £12,800,000, were larger in amount by more than a£1,000,000 than any that had ever been presented to that House in time of peace. Such an augmentation in our armaments was naturally supposed by the country to indicate that the Government were under an apprehension that war would occur at no distant period. It was desirable that the House should know from the Government whether there was any foundation for that impression. If there was not, the Government were not justified in submitting such extravagant Estimates to Parliament. The number of men required for the navy this year of peace was 85,500, being 6,000 more than they required when they were actually at war with Russia. The cost of the navy was £13,900,000, being £8,050,000 more than was required in 1851. The army and navy this year cost £14,626,000 more than was required in 1851. The expenditure under these heads was increasing at a fearful ratio, and must continue to do so unless the House took the matter seriously into its own hands. The greater the expenditure the greater the patronage at the command of the Ministry of the day. He took notice, with regard to shipbuilding, that the shipwrights' wages per ton were 50 per cent higher at Woolwich than at Chatham, and he thought the difference most extraordinary. He also wished to inquire whether it was the intention of the Government to go on creating a vast accumulation of Admirals. There were no fewer than 336 Admirals in the present Estimates, and that was an Admiral for almost every ship and gun-boat in the navy. With regard to Generals of Marines, there were no less than 38 in the present Estimates, though he believed that during

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the last war no such officer was known. He believed the appointment to be a sinecure. A vast amount of money was spent as bounties and gratuities, and he therefore hoped that the noble Secretary to the Admiralty would be able to give a better account than he had given last year of the success of the new scheme in procuring able seamen; and he likewise trusted that the noble Lord at the head of the Government would state whether it was on account of the apprehension of war with any great Power that he required so much money for naval and military purposes.
COLONEL SYKESsaid, he concurred with the hon. Member for Lambeth in his observations upon the alarming increase of the Naval and Military Estimates. If they went on increasing us they had done of late years, vast as was the increase of the capital of the country, it would be unqual to meet the enormous growth of expenditure. He could see nothing either in the external relations of the country or in its internal to account for the increase in the naval and military expenditure, which was progressing absolutely systematically and determinedly. The increase of £1,000,000 in the Naval Estimates of the year would have enabled the Chancellor of the Exchequer to remove the war duties on tea and sugar. It would be better for the country to be actually at war, because then they might hope to see some end of the expense, but there seemed to be no prospect of a cessation of the expenditure, which was occasioned by the state of suspicion in which they now were. When the noble Lord the Secretary for the Admiralty was on the Opposition Benches, he gave the House reason to suppose that he was in favour of economy. Since the noble Lord had come into office he had somewhat disappointed those expectations. In the name of common sense why could not a proposition be made for a mutual disarmament in France and this country.
MR. LINDSAYsaid, that though he deeply regretted the great increase in the Estimates, and did not think there was that necessity for it which others imagined, he acquitted the noble Secretary to the Admiralty from all responsibility on account of the increase. The noble Lord, simply as an executive officer, carried out the wishes of the House, and the only question was, whether they were getting the best value for the money spent.
MR. BENTINCKsaid, he had only two remarks to make in reference to what
964
had fallen from the gallant Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes) on the subject of mutual disarmament. He merely wished to say, what he believed was the opinion of every rational man, that the term was in itself an absurdity. There could be no mutual disarmament between this country and France. What was disarmament in England was not disarmament in France. He trusted that they would not again hear such a proposition brought forward. All he wished to say in reference to his noble Friend the Secretary of the Admiralty was, that he quite concurred in the opinion expressed by the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) that the increase in the Navy Estimates this year was not owing to any fault of the noble Lord, who was unable to carry out in office the economical views he had expressed when in Opposition. His noble and gallant Friend when in Opposition did his best to arrest the attention of the House and the Board of Admiralty to certain abuses which were alleged to exist. The noble Lord at that time fully established his case. He (Mr. Bentinck) could state from his own knowledge, that since the noble Lord had taken office, no man could have worked harder or have done more to carry out in practice the pledges he had given when in Opposition. It was mere justice to the noble Lord to say so much. So far from the results of the expenditure of the Admiralty for the present year being over and above what they ought to be, our armaments, great as they were, must, so far as the present defences of the country were concerned, be considered as hardly adequate for the maintenance of our position in case of hostilities such as might occur at any time on a very short notice, and as might involve an enormous stake if this country was not defended by a large maritime force.
CAPTAIN JERVISsaid, he attributed the large demands which were now made upon the country for purposes of defence to the House of Commons having been so long "led by the nose" by the late Mr. Hume. In addition to the £70,000,000 of which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had spoken on Friday night, no less a sum than £10,000,000 would be required for national defences. If the House of Commons had done its duty from 1825 downwards we should not now be called upon to pay for what ought to have been done long ago.
Motion agreed to.

SUPPLY—COMMITTEE.—NAVY ESTIMATES.
House in Committee of Supply. Mr. MASSEY in the Chair.
(In the Committee.)
LORD CLARENCE PAGET: Sir, it needed not the observations of the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) nor those of the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes) to convince me of the great responsibility which rests upon my shoulders in presenting this year to the House Estimates for the navy larger than those which were voted last year by upwards of a million, and within one million and a half of the highest Estimates during the late war with Russia; therefore in asking, on the part of the Government, the Committee to vote so vast a sum of money, it behoves me to show the necessity for keeping up our largo armaments, and continuing, certainly (luring the present year, our great system of construction of ships. I believe it will be conceded by all that, apart from the consideration of the navies of other nations, it is absolutely necessary that England, with her numerous Colonies and her enormous commerce, should maintain upon the seas a considerable number of vessels. Even supposing, therefore, that every other European Power were suddenly to disarm, and to lay up its vessels in its ports, we should still be obliged, for the police of the seas, to maintain a largo force afloat. So that, no matter what may take place in the way of disarmaments, such as those which have been alluded to by other Powers, nothing of the kind would justify us in adopting a like course. Such, then, is one consideration to which importance ought to be attached when we discuss the Navy Estimates year by year. It is not my intention upon the present occasion to enter upon the history of the past. I shall confine my observations to the present, and as far possible to professional subjects, avoiding all matters of high national policy. Over and above the question of the maintenance of squadrons for the protection of our Colonies and the police of the seas, we must, of course, consider what is the condition of other countries with respect to their navies; for, be it remembered, the steam navy is a new creation. It is the product of the last decade. All nations have recently started fair. A few years ago we had a vast number of line-of-battle ships and frigates, and by turning out a certain number of new vessels every year, and
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patching up old ones, we managed to maintain our superiority at sea. But a change took place, and suddenly we found ourselves upon an equality with the rest of the world. It behoves us then, immediately to set to work to regain that superiority, of which the introduction of steam has temporarily deprived us. Let me, in the first place, as an important point for our consideration, give the Committee some idea of what other nations really possess. There is, happily, no longer any mystery in these matters. I rejoiced when the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Pakington) gave us last year the fullest information about our own and foreign navies, and shall follow his example. I may also state that foreign nations have no sort of hesitation in showing us their dockyards. An idea at one time prevailed that the French did not like us to state publicly in Parliament the extent and composition of their navy. Only two years ago, in anticipation of a discussion in this House, and knowing there was some little difference of opinion as to the amount of the French force, I wrote to the French Minister of Marine, asking whether he would have any objection to give me a list of the French Navy. He sent me, in reply, the name and force of every ship in the navy. What I am about to state, therefore, need excite no apprehension, as being likely to give the least offence to other nations. I begin with France. The French Navy is really becoming very powerful. At the present time the French have 32 ships of the line afloat and 5 building; 34 frigates afloat and 13 building; 5 iron-cased ships— of which class of vessels I shall have occasion to speak presently—building; 17 corvettes afloat and 2 building; 39 gun-boats afloat and 29 building; 5 floating batteries afloat and 4 building; 31 transports; 86 avisos afloat and 3 building. All these are steam vessels; and they make an aggregate of 244 afloat and 61 building. We have reason to believe from the best information we have received that most of those which are building might be launched within a few months, but I confine the force at the immediate disposal of the French to 244 ships. It is true that if any gentleman were to inquire at the French Admiralty he would be told that they had only 9 ships of the line at sea, the rest being in reserve; but we should never lose sight of the fact that every one of those 244 vessels could be manned and sent to sea in a very few weeks. "Ships

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in reserve" is a very good term for the French, and I do not quarrel with it, but according to our view those ships are perfectly ready. The result is, therefore, that the French have 244 steam vessels which, if hostilities were to break out, which God forbid!—and we have indeed, every reason to believe that no such eventuality will occur—could be manned and sent to sea within a very few weeks, some of them within a few days. But there is another Power which is making great struggles to create a steam navy—I mean Russia, and really in our consideration of this subject, I do not think this fact has been brought before the House with sufficient prominence. We are informed, upon very good authority, that the Russians have 9 ships of the line afloat—steam ships like those of France—and 9 building; 18 frigates afloat, and 3 building; 10 corvettes afloat, and 11 building; 30 small vessels, of which we do not exactly know the force, afloat; 112 gun-boats afloat, and 25 building; 8 transports. The total is 187 steam vessels afloat, and 48 building. That is a very formidable navy, and should be taken into consideration when we are discussing what amount of force we ought to maintain at sea. England, as is well known, has of late years been endeavouring to form reserves at a vast expense. First of all, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham) established the continuous service; then we had Coast Volunteers; and now we have what are called the Royal Naval Volunteers. Up to the present time the last-mentioned scheme has not been very successful. I mention this subject now, instead of waiting until I refer to our own force, in order to show the distinction between ourselves, who really have, so to speak, no reserves, and the French and Russians, who have vast bodies of men at their immediate disposal. I am obliged to say that before stating the force which we have in commission, and which, according to my calculation, is that which may fairly be compared with what the French have afloat. The distinction between the fleets of the two countries is this—that while all the French ships which are afloat can be manned at very short notice, it is only those which we have in commission which are in a similar position. Some little novelties are introduced year by year into the Estimates, and at page 13, this year, hon. Members will find the exact number of ships in commission on the 1st December last. On the 1st of
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December last we had in commission the following steam ships—I exclude sailing vessels altogether—line-of-battle ships, 27; frigates, 43; sloops, small vessels, and gun-boats, 94; total, 164, being an increase of 46 vessels as compared with the number of steam-ships in commission on the 1st of December, 1858. In addition, we had the 10 coastguard-ships, the coastguard tenders and cruisers, all steam vessels, making a total of 244 steam ships in commission. Since that date we have commissioned 1 line-of-battle ship and 2 frigates. This, then, is the force you must compare with the French and Russian Navy, and I do not think that can be called anything like an undue or improper amount of naval power for this country. Of this force we have for the defence of our own shores, including with the permission of my gallant Friend the Member for Southward (Sir C. Napier) the Mediterranean squadron, the following:—27 line-of-battle ships, 14 frigates and corvettes, and 29 sloops and gun-boats; total, 70, which is a very respectable force. Of the 27 line-of-battle ships 14 are now at home, and 13 in the Mediterranean. In addition to this force we, have the 10 coastguard-ships, which are very useful for the defence of our harbours, and 17 or 18, or sometimes 20, tenders, gun-boats, and cruisers attached to them. In China, we have at this moment 14 frigates and corvettes, and 41 sloops and gun-boats; total, 55 vessels. We have, upon other stations, some at Vancouver's Island, some on the North American station, and some at other places, 3 line-of-battle ships, 19 frigates and corvettes, and 32 sloops and gun-boats; total, 54. This is the force which we have to oppose—God forbid that I should use that word as though any opposition was likely to occur—this is the force which we maintain at sea in comparison with the forces of France and Russia. I now will give the list of our entire Steam Navy. We have of line-of-battle ships 48 afloat, and 11 building, (and we expect within the next month to launch two of the latter which will make 50 afloat by the end of the financial year), besides 12 sailing line-of-battle ships fit for conversion. Of frigates we have 34 afloat and 9 building or converting; and likewise 6 sailing frigates fit for converting; steam block-ships, 9 afloat; iron-cased vessels, 4 building; corvettes 16 afloat, and 5 building; sloops, 45 screw and 35 paddle, total 80 afloat and 15 building; small vessels, 27 afloat; gun-boats,

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169 afloat and 23 building; floating batteries, 8 afloat; transports, troopships, tenders, yachts, &c, screw 18, paddle 43, total 61; screw mortar-ships, 4 afloat; total afloat 456, building 67. Supposing the Committee is pleased to consent to these Estimates, we hope to add to the navy, before the end of the next financial year, 8 line-of-battle ships, 12 frigates, 4 iron-cased ships, 4 corvettes, 15 sloops, and 23 gun-vessels and gun-boats. That includes the conversion of 4 line-of-battle ships and 4 frigates. With regard to the Estimates generally, before I turn to the particular Votes, I wish only to state to the Committee that they will find that the great increase arises upon three Votes, those referring to the number of men, the building of ships, and the transport of troops. This expenditure under the latter head is very large, but I hope it is of a temporary and special nature, consequent upon the hostilities with China. I do not enter into the question as to the policy of those hostilities, but I think that, under the circumstances, it is right for the Admiralty to present an Estimate which will be adequate to the performance of the services that may be required. I will now ask the Committee to turn to Vote No. 1 upon which there is an increase of no less than £410,000 over the Vote of last year, in order to give us the power of augmenting our numbers by 11,700 men and boys, of which number we propose to add to the fleet 8,000 seamen, 1,000 marines, and 2,000 boys (this last addition being in accordance with the recommendation of the Royal Commission as to the establishment of training ships), 100 additional Coastguards-men afloat, and 600 ashore. The Coastguards-men on shore are to replace the old Custom House civilians, who are being superannuated. The Board of Admiralty have given to the question of the number of men required the most serious consideration, and that which has been asked for is only enough to man the ships in Commission, and to carry out another recommendation of the Royal Commission, that we should maintain a reserve of seamen in our own ports. We hope we shall be enabled to keep up a force at sea according to the numbers I have mentioned, perhaps with some little increase here and there, as well as a reserve of seamen in our home ports; and in addition we hope to be able to maintain a body of marines not less than 6,000 as a home force.
SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: What would you state as the average number of the home force?
LORD CLARENCE PAGET: We hope to have a reserve of 10,000 men over and above what are employed on active service. Of course it is impossible to say exactly what will be the force available, but it is the desire of the Admiralty to carry out the recommendation of the Royal Commission, that there should be a considerable reserve of seamen in the home ports, and available for an emergency. In connection with Vote No. 1, we propose to increase the pay of the masters, engineers paymasters, and chaplains of the Royal Navy. Last year, my right hon. Friend opposite (Sir J. Pakington) proposed what has given very general satisfaction in the navy, an increase in the pay of the surgeons of the navy. It was a great misfortune, however, that he overlooked the claims of officers of equal social position. There are three other classes of officers who labour under the same disadvantages as the surgeons—that is to say, to whom the higher ranks of the service are practically, if not absolutely closed. Masters may rise, but not engineers or paymasters. A very strong reason why we should improve the position of the assistant and second masters is to be found in the scarcity of these officers which the Navy List exhibits. They are men of great respectability and high education, and they naturally prefer the merchant service to the navy. If the pay in the latter service be inferior, the same remark holds good of the engineers, who do not care to give up the higher pay which they get in the merchant service to come into the navy. As to paymasters, there is no difficulty in procuring them, but they are in the same social position, and it is impossible to leave them out of view in framing the scheme. The proposal of the Government is that there should be a small increase of pay to each of those classes. The change will consist chiefly in putting them in a higher position, with their present pay,— which is calculated on length of service— that is to say, they will be allowed to count the time they have been second masters, and so on with the paymasters and engineers. It is also proposed they should have the advantage of counting the time during which they have acted before we have confirmed their present rank, and also part of the time they have been assistants, which will be a great boon to these officers. If

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Her Majesty should sanction the arrangement, I will lay it on the table. The cost of this increase will be only some £25,000. I do not know that the scheme will give unbounded satisfaction. Some of the parties concerned may think it a rather niggardly advance, but it is all the Government think it right to propose. The item for good-conduct pay to petty officers is very much the same as last year. There is one large item not in the present estimate which was very considerable in that of last year; I mean the half bounty. The charge for seamen's clothing, tobacco, and soap, £380,502, is very large this year, even though £274,594 it is assumed will be repaid by seamen in the course of the year; and I had some doubt whether it ought to fall entirely on the present Estimate, or be in part provided for in that of last year. The enormous addition to the fleet, and the gratuitous issue of clothing exceeded the calculations of the comptroller; and our store being exhausted, this large item required to be taken. It makes a large increase in the Estimate, but will not be a permanent charge. The Vote for victualling depends, of course, on the number of men, and needs no further explanation. In the third Vote, that for the Admiralty, there is an increase to the amount of £14,323. I have received from the Accountant-General of the Navy a very curious statement as to the amount of the cost of the management and superintendence of the Admiralty since 1821 to the present time, year by year, which shows very clearly that we are much harder worked now than our predecessors used to be. In 1821 the Navy Estimates amounted to £6,382,785; yet the superintendents of the Admiralty and Navy Boards, which were then separate, consisted of not less than thirty-four people—seven Lords, eighteen Commissioners, and nine Secretaries. The Estimates for the present year amount to £12,802,000, or more than double those of 1821; and the superintendents of the Admiralty consist of only thirteen persons, namely, six Lords, two Secretaries, and five principal officers. On referring to the accounts of 1821, I find that the establishment of clerks was then about as numerous as now. The cost of the establishment of the Lords, the Secretaries, the principal Officers and the Clerks of the Admiralty was £123,986 in 1821, against £97,308 at the present time; so that while we have a navy of double the amount, the comparative cost is as I have stated; but there are
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several items of expenditure over and above what I have stated in Vote 3; for instance the Judicial Department, and other miscellaneous items; one item of increase in this Vote is in consequence of the Board Order which was made at the time when the right hon. Baronet was at the head of the Admiralty. It provides that the Director of the Works Department shall no longer be charged with Vote 11, but that the expenditure shall be shown under the heads of each establishment; and I believe it is a very good arrangement. Another, is the employment of a considerable number of temporary clerks. I should also mention, that as there is such a vast amount of business in the Surveyor's, or as he is now called, the Comptroller's, Department, it is absolutely necessary to give him some assistance, and I believe it will be a positive matter of economy. The fact is, that this officer who superintends the dockyard expenditure, and who really ought to be constantly going into the dockyards, overlooking the construction of ships, and alterations taking place, is kept a prisoner in his office by the vast amount of business which he has to do. The matter has been much considered, and my noble Friend the Duke of Somerset has gone into the Report of the Committee on Dockyard Economy; and his Minute, which will be shortly in the hands of Members, alludes to this subject, and presents many suggestions and remarks, which will be found to be very valuable. Having given some attention to the question of the payment of the men in the dockyards, I must admit that it is fraught with difficulties. Whether to pay the men by day labour, whether by task or job; whether their earnings are to be unlimited, and whether they are to work extra time, are all matters of vital importance. The question involves the expenditure of millions of the public money, and therefore it has been considered very carefully by the Admiralty. But I am bound to say that, when the hon. Member who has given notice of such a Motion proposes an inquiry, he will not find any great opposition on the part of the Admiralty. In the meantime it will be our business to reform wherever we can. We shall not wait for the Report of that Committee to carry out improvements which we think are to the advantage of the service, but we shall really look forward to that inquiry with a considerable amount of interest. It is not that we consider the Dockyard Committee has not done its duty. They have made

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many most valuable suggestions, and some of them we have already carried out. With regard, for instance, to the entry of apprentices, we have taken steps to improve that system, and various other details upon which I will not dilate. We still think, however, that there is a feeling on the part of the country that we do not get the value for our money. With that feeling existing it is wisdom, both on the part of Government and of Parliament, to forward by every means an inquiry which may be thought necessary. If, on the one hand, it shall be found that the present system works well, no man will rejoice more than I shall, or more than, I am sure, will the right hon. Baronet. But if any method can be found of constructing men-of-war—always bearing in mind that they must be built with reference to the proper seasoning of timber and the other various requirements peculiar to themselves at a less expense—I boldly and honestly say, it will be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to give every possible assistance in making that discovery. There is no material increase in Vote 4, for the Coastguard. We take, it will be observed, the same amount for the annual retainers, conduct-money, &c, for the Naval Reserve, as we did last year. This new force, to which the country looks with so much anxiety, has certainly up to the present time not fulfilled the expectations which were raised. I always felt, from the first, that it was an experiment. I know what seamen are. They are fine, noble, hearty creatures, but men of remarkably suspicious character, and if there are any people they are suspicious of, it is the Admiralty. We are really much indebted to the Board of Trade for the exertions which they have made in drawing up the regulations and giving us their assistance to carry out the measure. I wish I could state to the House that the men were entering freely; but they are not. They are labouring under some delusion. Captain Brown reports from the different merchant ports that the men say, "We think the inducement very fair. We think it very handsome; but they only want to kidnap us. The moment we put our names down they will send us off to China." It is very curious to see men labouring under that delusion. I have been asked over and over again by directors of the great shipping companies, and by men of importance in the commercial ports, for some assurance on the part of the Government
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that the men will not be called out until war is declared. I told them I could not give that assurance, but I also told them that it was perfectly certain there was no intention to call them out, except in the event of a critical emergency. Such a case as ought to make Englishmen Sock to their colours; that the threat of immediate hostilities, or of something which would oblige us to make the greatest exertions for the protection of our shores, were the only circumstances under which the Government would call for their services. If I can reassure them by what I say tonight, I really believe little more is wanting to induce them to flock to the force. It is so far satisfactory that they are beginning to get over this extraordinary idea. I wish to declare to them that Her Majesty's Government have no sort of intention to kidnap them into the navy. And perhaps I had better add a more practical assurance—that if we wished we could not enter them in the navy, because the number is complete, and except for casualties we have no means of entering any considerable number of men over and above what we have at present. I think that is a very satisfactory state of things, and that the House will be glad to hear there is no difficulty in getting men. This vast force of ships, only the creation of the last few months, is wholly manned. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: How much has the bounty been reduced?] The bounty has been reduced to £4 for able, and £2 for ordinary seamen. I will not enter into the question of the propriety of the bounty. The bounty has been given, and all the men are enjoying it. They are now in that respect on the same footing as the army, and we can raise the bounty to-morrow without committing any injustice to the men already in the service. Her Majesty's Government have not come to any decision upon the subject generally. It is a small sum—only £20,000 out of the millions we vote for the navy. It is a gift on entering the service which enables the men to purchase clothes and other articles, and it is a question whether it is not advisable to continue it. At present it is only in force until the 31st of March next. Upon Vote 5, for the scientific branch, there is a small increase, in which I think the House will be disposed to agree. The charge is for the purchase of chronometers. The House will scarcely credit that up to this time officers in command of ships have been obliged to buy their own chronometers,

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and it really is a scandal to the service that we should have cast this burden upon officers, many of them gentlemen of but slender means, who have enough to do to pay their way. Line-of-battle ships, frigates, and troop-ships will have three, sloops two, and gun-boats one. Vote 6 is for Her Majesty's establishment at home; and on this Vote I am going to ask the House to agree to an inconsiderable increase to permit the employment of two assistant superintendents at the great yards of Portsmouth and Plymouth. What I have said about the Comptroller of the Navy is doubly true with regard to the Superintendents of these two great yards. One of the great reasons, I have always thought, why we hear of idling in the dockyards, and of there not being as much activity there as there ought to be, arises from the constant confinement of the Superintendents to their offices, instead of being about the dockyards detecting idleness and punishing misconduct. Their principal business is to write letters—and I put it to the House whether that is a proper occupation for such officials. If you want economy you must not stint your Superintendents. You must enable them to go about the dockyards and see that the men are not idling. The appointment of these two Assistant Superintendents may save thousands of pounds by keeping the men at work. The Admiralty have also thought it their duty to look into the whole question of the correspondence of the Superintendents and the clerical departments of the dockyards. I am afraid to tell the House the number of returns we asked for. Our table at the Admiralty is literally swamped with the dockyard papers, but we are endeavouring to go into this matter of returns with a view of suppressing such as are no longer necessary, and I trust that we may produce a great lessening of labour. It will be observed by the House that in all these yards additional temporary clerks are employed. We are quite aware of the growing evil of these temporary clerks. It has become a public inconvenience in these great establishments; but the House must remember that if you have additional workmen and additional ships in commission the work of the clerks is also increased in the same ratio. We propose to take into consideration whether some improvements may not be made in the establishment of the clerks with a view to lessening labour. No. 7 is the Vote for foreign yards, in which there is a small increase for increased business, principally at
976
Malta and the Mediterranean yards. On Vote No. 8, for artificers, my right hon. Friend opposite will, perhaps, find fault with me because we have reduced it somewhat. When the present Board of Admiralty came into office, we asked the House to agree to an addition of £100,000 on this Vote, over and above what the right hon. Gentleman had proposed. We did so because on reference to the Surveyor of the Navy he told us that if that £100,000 were not added to the Estimate, it would be impossible for him to complete the programme which the right hon. Gentleman had laid before the House. We asked the House, therefore, to agree to that £100,000; but we have now made such progress that the Government think it possible to revert to the same number of men as were employed when the right hon. Gentleman was at the head of the Board of Admiralty. This, therefore, is, in fact, not a decrease, but only knocking off the £100,000 which we took over and above the right hon. Gentleman's Estimate of last year. Vote 9 is the same as last year, with the exception of a small sum for the artificers of the fleet, who are allowed extra pay when they are employed in the dockyards ashore. Vote 10, for the repair and building of ships, I have always thought ought to bear the motto—
"Diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis."
There is, I confess, to my mind too much pulling to pieces, building up again, altering in every shape, in converting sailing ships into steamers. Looking narrowly into these alterations, I may differ somewhat from some of my colleagues as to the extent to which the conversion of ships ought to be carried. Because I am in office I am not going to retreat from the opinion which I expressed out of office. I greatly dislike these alterations. My opinion is that these old ships are not worth the time and money expended on them. In my humble opinion, it is like putting "new wine into old bottles." The two woods do not agree; they decay, and speedily become not worth the money you have laid out on them. If you cut a hole into one of these old ships and put an engine into it, it may be made very valuable for the defence of the country as a superior kind of block-ship, but I cannot agree in the propriety of lengthening them at the bows, cutting them in two, and so on. This Vote is composed of several items, but I cannot say that it gives any great detailed information. The items are large and the in-

977
formation small. The Board of Admiralty have anxiously considered this Vote, and they are most desirous of giving every possible information with regard to it. I should have liked to lay this Vote on the table very much in the same form as Vote 11, for Public Works, but the Admiralty laboured under very great difficulties with regard to it. I am very unwilling to impute blame to any one, but if I were to venture to impute blame to any one, it would be to the House of Commons, who have never really asked for any detailed information with regard to this great Vote No. 10. I am naturally told when I ask for information, "How can we give an estimate for a future year, when we really do not know what proportion of money we have expended during the past year on building, or on repairing, or on what particular ships it has been expended." The Board of Admiralty called on the Accountant General to give a return which, in consequence of its novelty, I will not vouch for, but which I believe will be pretty correct, and which I very much wish was now on the table of the House—of the cost of ships during the past year. That return, which is of a very interesting character, gives the name and the cost of every ship in the Royal Navy, during the past Financial year, under six different heads—namely, ships building, converting from sail to screw, maintenance of ships in commission, of the steam reserve, of old sailing ships in ordinary, and maintenance of the dockyard craft. The other items expended under this Vote are also shown. I do not say that the return is perfect, because it is a novelty; it has hitherto existed in the dockyards, but it has never yet been practically turned to account, and the items consequently have not been properly checked; in fact, it may be said that its present value is nil as compared with what it will be in future years. As the name of the dockyard is attached to each ship, building or converting, with the particulars of the amount of material consumed, the cost of labour and the outlay on her engines, the Admiralty will be at once enabled to refer to the cost of each vessel, and to compare it with the cost of similar vessels in the other yards. In all matters of account there is nothing like publicity, and I am persuaded that one great and immediate effect of this comparative view of the cost of ships, will be a direct tendency to economy in the several establishments. Take the case of a vessel
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in commission—very few persons who have not turned their attention to that subject can form any idea of the cost to which the country is put by each additional line-of-battle ship. The public say, "Give us ten line-of-battle ships additional;" this return will give them an idea of the magnitude of the request. Within the last few days a gallant officer in command of one of Her Majesty's vessels, and an intimate friend of mine, called at the Admiralty, and in the course of conversation I showed him what his ship had cost during the past year, and he was absolutely thunderstruck. [Sir C. NAPIER: Such a return existed once before.] What has been done shows what is capable of being done, and I trust that if my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Pakington) succeeds to office, he will continue to require the same information. When two or three years have elapsed, we shall be able to place this Vote upon a much more intelligible and satisfactory footing by striking an average of the cost which this return will exhibit, and frame our estimate with proper details. I have shown the House what we possess in ships built; it will now be interested, probably, in knowing what we have constructed in tonnage, and what we propose to build during the present year. This is the best test, after all, of the exertions of the dockyards. It may possibly be remembered that, in proposing the Estimates last year, we announced our intention, of course subject to contingencies, of building 46,000 tons of shipping in the dockyards. [Sir J. PAKINGTON: Exclusive of conversions?] We said we would convert four line-of-battle ships and five frigates, in addition. What we have actually built amounts to 19,730 tons in ships of the line, 13,654 in frigates, 5,436 in corvettes, and 5,224 in sloops and gun vessels. We have not fulfilled our promise as to frigates, in which class I stated that we would build 16,000 tons, the reason being that there was an insufficiency of timber for the purpose; but we have made up for this deficiency in another way, for we have gone beyond our undertaking in the conversion of sailing, into steam frigates and screw ships. What we propose doing in the present, or, as my right hon. Friend reminds me, the ensuing financial year, is to build 13,216 tons of ships of the line, 13,500 tons of frigates, 4,871 tons of corvettes, 8,045 tons of sloops and gun vessels, and 302 tons of gun-boats, making a total of 39,934 tons. In addition we pro-

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pose to convert four more line-of-battle ships and four frigates. It is necessary that I should afford some idea of the expenditure of timber that is required. Our ordinary establishments in the dockyards, which is regarded as two years' stock, consists of 60,000 loads of timber for shipbuilding purposes; but during the present financial year, instead of consuming the ordinary rate of 30,000 loads, we have used 64,000 loads of timber, the result of which has been that we have been literally unable to import timber with the same rapidity with which we were working it up. Of copper, also, it has been found exceedingly difficult to procure an adequate supply, for this last year we have consumed nearly 1,000 tons. Some discrepancy will be observed between Votes 8 and 10, which should bear a strict proportion to each other; but, having thus lessened our stock of timber, we this year require a larger sum by £81,000 on that account, and we do not increase the number of men in an equal ratio. It may not be uninteresting to the House to know what the French are doing in this respect. It is true that they have greater facilities for procuring timber than we have, but they have in stock 160,000 loads, or sufficient to build fifteen line-of-battle ships, fifteen frigates, and fifteen corvettes, which is a stock far above anything we have ever had in this country. The next item, for coals, also exhibits an increase, not only because we have a more numerous fleet, but because we were obliged to send a large stock to China. I pass to the next item, for the purchase of steam machinery, as to which the House would, doubtless, desire some information. We are building engines for line-of-battle ships to the extent of 5,700-horso power; for frigates, 7,100-borse power; other vessels and corvettes, 1,200-horse power; sloops, 3,000-horse power; gun-vessels, 1,200-horse power; gun-boats, 600-horse power—that is to say, a power in all equal to that of 18,800 horses. These cost £55 15 s. each horse power. This is a very high price for machinery, no doubt. But if the Committee look carefully to the items that compose a steam engine for a man-of-war, they will agree with the Committee on Steam Machinery, who report that, regard being had to the difference between them, the Navy steam engines do not cost more than those of merchant vessels. They must have much spare gear, their engines must work in a small space, and they are in other respects very much more expen-
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sive than those of the merchant service. I will now turn to the iron-cased ships which are building, and which have excited so much curiosity and interest. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir J. Pakington), hearing that they were building in France several of these vessels, thought it right to take a supplementary or special Vote—I think a supplementary Vote—for building two iron-cased frigates, one of which was ordered before the late Government quitted office. The right hon. Gentleman asked me, soon after the present Government came into office, whether the Admiralty were going on with the second frigate. I replied that the Board of Admiralty were carrying out certain experiments, and that if they were satisfactory the Admiralty would go on with the second frigate. Shortly afterwards the Admiralty ordered a second frigate to be built of the same dimensions as the first. These vessels are of enormous scantling and very large tonnage. The Warrior and the Black Prince are of 6,039 tons each, and 1,200-horse power. They will be entirely cased with iron, and I am one of those who believe that they will be vessels of a most formidable nature. And there will also be two of a smaller tonnage, 3,668 tons, which the Board of Admiralty have likewise contracted for, They will be iron-cased, and will have the same power of resisting shots, and the same capability of defence. The late Board ordered six sloops of 200-horse power and 12 gun vessels of 18-horse power. The present Board have ordered 10 gun-boats of 60-horse power, making the total cost during the present and future financial year that we are building by contract of £1,355,807. This sum, I ought to add, includes the machinery. It is an enormous sum, over and above what we are building in our dockyards. These are the principal items of Vote 10. We are very anxious to give every information on this Vote. We are duly sensible of the necessity of economy in building our ships, and we trust that the inquiry which is to be moved for by my hon. Friend on the labour in our dockyards will give us great assistance herein. At present the country is in the position of a very wealthy gentleman who has lived very generously, and has not called for his bills; who has been, in short, what is called a "fast man." If he determined to live economically for the future the first thing he would do would be to collect his accounts. That is the first pro-

981
cess for economizing these great dockyard Votes. We want to know the amount of cost and the value of stock, and then we shall look about us and see if we cannot reform. I now turn with pleasure to Vote 11 (new works, improvements, and repairs in the yards), for this is the only Vote for the effective service that shows a real reduction. I believe that we have taken every sum that is requisite for keeping our dockyards in really good repair, while at the same time we have avoided any now works except in a few cases, the Vote being mostly expended in completing the work of our predecessors. I used formerly to be of opinion that many of our now works were on too grand a scale, and I confess that my visits to the dockyards have confirmed my views. I accompanied my noble Friend (the Duke of Somerset) to Woolwich the other day, and we looked at a magnificent building, overtopping the Thames, and looking like some great palace. This was the new Marine Infirmary. We walked over it and paced its stately colonnades, and I am afraid we were both sordid enough to say that its architectural magnificence cost too much money. At Keyham the same remark had occurred to me. No doubt, there are great public buildings in our dockyards, all of them very necessary, but too much attention has, I think, in many cases been given to architectural design, and too much scope to the taste of our engineers. Now, the present Board of Admiralty disapprove greatly of any unnecessary expenditure of this kind, and when the architects and engineers of our yards have brought us remarkably tasteful designs for our approbation we have rejected them, and asked them to give us something more simple. I take some pride in having kept this Vote down, and I do not believe that any substantial work really required has been omitted. For instance, we are going on with a dock at Portsmouth, which was commenced some years ago, and we have taken a small Vote for that. The next Vote for Medicines and Medical Stores, shows a small increase, but not beyond what is necessary for the increase of the fleet. Vote 13, for the Miscellaneous Services shows an increase of £18,529, the reasons for which are shown in the Votes; and I now turn to Vote 14—the Half-pay Vote—to which I would ask the attention of my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay.) He is under the idea that the non- effective charge for the
982
navy is growing year by year, and is becoming so great a burden as to require looking into. But so far from that, the Half pay Vote fur the future year shows a decrease of £27,049, in spite of an increase which I am about to ask for in favour of certain classes of officers. This is, in fact, a yearly decreasing Vote, and in a few years, as the older officers give way to nature—[Admiral WALCOTT: Hear, hear!]—the Committee will remember my hon. and gallant Friend's eloquence on that subject—the burden will greatly diminish, I must now allude to the item of £12,000 as an additional charge for improving and altering the system of retirement of officers of the Royal Navy, with a view to the increased efficiency and reduction in the numbers of officers on the active list. The Admiralty has had under its serious consideration the rate of promotion among the junior ranks of the navy. It is not only an act of justice to the officers, but necessary to the efficiency of the fleet, that some measure should be taken which will enable the Board of Admiralty to promote officers in due time and prevent them, as it were, from rotting all their lives in one list. If a certain rate of promotion is not kept up, officers become indifferent and slack in their duty, and can no longer be depended on to exert themselves with zeal for the service. I believe there will be no difficulty in persuading the House to agree to this small sum. When we come to the consideration of the Vote itself I shall be prepared to state to the House the particulars of the plan, which will affect the ranks of lieutenants and commanders, and in some degree the captains. This is the only charge I need mention under this head, with one exception. We have at last succeeded in establishing pensions for the widows of warrant officers. I am convinced that no grant will be more appreciated by the navy; at present it is limited to £500, and that sum I may say, we have screwed out of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. All preceding Chancellors of the Exchequer have resisted the grant; but my right hon. Friend has conceded it, on the ground that it is just and right.
The last Vote to which I shall call the attention of the House is that for transport. It does not properly belong to the expenses of the navy; but the Admiralty has to provide all the means of ocean transport for the army. We have thought it right, in reference principally to the China expedition, to take for the pre-

983
sent year the large sum of £120,000 for the freight of ships on monthly pay, or for the purchase of them, besides the Vote for the conveyance of stores and troops. I may now close this lengthened statement. In doing so, I should belie my own feelings if I did not add that it is with extreme pain that I find myself compelled to be the instrument of proposing to take from the profitable industry of the country this vast sum of money for the Navy. But I am convinced that it is the wish of the people of this nation that their navy should be well and efficiently maintained; that the country should be under no alarm; that, whatever may happen, the people may be able to say, "We are safe under the protection of our navy." In a discussion on the defences of the country last year, some very valuable advice was given to the House by my hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden). He thought that much of our naval force might with advantage be abolished; but there was one passage of his speech so marked by patriotism, and containing such sound and reasonable views, that I cannot help reading it to the House. I believe it cannot do better than follow the advice conveyed. The hon. Member for Rochdale said, "He did not wish to reduce our navy to the same force as that of France; but he should like to see the two Governments agree on some relative proportion of force; thus, the French navy might be two-thirds that of England; where the French had two ships, England might have three." If you examine the state of the French navy, you will find we have not surpassed what the hon. Member for Rochdale considered the necessary superiority of our navy over that of France. And, taking into consideration the strength of the Russian navy, I say we are bound to continue our exertions till we place our navy on a really sound and efficient footing. But I must also say, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that though they have agreed to these very large Estimates, they do not consider themselves bound to expend them, should circumstances render a less amount sufficient. We thought it better to ask the House at once to grant a sufficient amount of money, and number of men, than to apply to it again with additional Votes and supplementary Estimates. But if the dispute with China should end peacefully, if the political horizon of the Continent, and throughout the world generally, should
984
appear favourable, the Government will not feel bound to spend the full amount of the Vote, because the House has generously granted it. I thank the House for the indulgence it has extended to the statement I have made; and I shall be glad to answer any question in reference to it.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
"That 85,500 Men and Boys be employed for the Sea and Coastguard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1861, including 18,000 Royal Marines."
SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: When I took up the Navy Estimates for this year I certainly felt some curiosity to see how far the opinions the noble Lord expressed last year, as to the new form in which certain Votes, especially Vote 10, ought to appear on the Estimates, had been carried out. But I found Vote 10 on the paper wearing very much its old shape. Still, it is only just to the noble Lord to say that his statement has not only been very clear, but made with that openness and candour which I trust henceforward will always distinguish these addresses, and which indeed are nothing more than the House of Commons has a right to expect from the Government of the day. I rise principally for the purpose of asking explanations concerning some portions of the speech of my noble Friend. The Government has, I admit, asked the House for unusually large Estimates; but I do not think they are larger than circumstances require; and they prove a determination on the part of Her Majesty's Government to act in the same spirit as the late Ministry. It is the first duty of the Government of the day, as I believe it is the anxious desire of the country, to maintain the navy in a perfectly efficient condition. There is, no doubt, a great increase in the Estimates, as compared with former years: but I am willing to believe, on the authority of the noble Lord, that they are not larger than the necessity of the case requires. The great expenditure is of course caused by the large amount of men called for, and by the efforts made to increase the number of our ships. I am extremely glad to see by the return which was this morning put into our hands by the Admiralty, that the programme which I submitted to the House a year ago, on the part of the late Government, has been essentially carried out by out successors in office. It will be in the recollection of the Committee that in the programme of last year I announced the intention of the then

985
Government to add fifteen to the number of our line-of-battle ships, partly by building and partly by conversion, thereby increasing the number of effective screw line-of-battle ships from thirty-three to forty-eight. I see by the Return before me that that programme has been exactly carried out during the year. My noble Friend has stated that a considerable number more are to be added during the ensuing year; that we are to have at least eleven additional line-of-battle ships, which will raise the number from forty-eight to fifty nine. This leads me to an inquiry of some importance, and that is whether the present Board of Admiralty has arrived at any decision as to the number of line-of-battle ships they propose ultimately to have. This is a point to which I know the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty has devoted much attention. He has repeatedly expressed the opinion in this House that we should give up the building of line-of-battle ships, that line-of-battle ships are comparatively useless, and that we should devote our attention to the building of other classes of ships. I could not concur with the noble Lord in the views he thus expressed. I never would be a party to any change of that kind till we had fully established the proper superiority of England in line-of-battle ships to all the other nations of Europe. But I may state that, so far as the late Board of Admiralty had considered this subject, we had—I will not say definitely arrived at the conclusion—but had entertained the opinion that if this country possessed sixty efficient screw line-of-battle ships, it would be so far satisfactory as to enable us to pause and deal with this great question. My noble Friend and all who are conversant with the subject will admit that there is strong reason to suppose we are approaching a time when it will become a question how far these line-of-battle ships are the most effective ships of the navy. Why, we have heard this day from my noble Friend, as a part of the plans of the late Government, carried out by the present Government, of the building of such ships as the Mersey and the Orlando on a system which introduces a new element into this question—ships of the same tonnage as the largest in the navy, and carrying not a great number of guns, but guns of the greatest power and calibre, and forming very formidable armaments. Then we have the changes going on in the manufacture of ordnance, and the construction of Armstrong guns, all which
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fairly raise the question as to the limits within which we should confine the building of line-of-battle ships. I hope, however, that I shall not be misunderstood. Do not let us pause till we have fully established the superiority of this country in that description of ships. At the same time bearing in mind the great expense of building these ships, let us consider what will be the probable effect of the changes to which I have adverted. I should like to know, therefore, how far the Government are now laying down new ships of that class, and whether they have adopted any limit at which they may pause, and wait to see what the effects of the changes going on really are. Last year I promised, it will be recollected, nine screw frigates—five new, and four conversions in addition to the seventeen we then possessed, so that the total number of new frigates should amount to twenty-six. But I find that the present Board of Admiralty have hardly fulfilled that engagement, as the number of frigates in the present Return amounts to only twenty-five, which gives one less than we had promised. [Lord C. PAGET: There has been another frigate launched since the Return had been made up. I did not mean to allude to the subject in a tone of censure. The difference would in any case have been very trifling. I am glad to find that the programme of the late Government has been so nearly fulfilled, and I trust that by the close of the next financial year the navy of this country will be in a satisfactory position. Having made these remarks on the building of ships, allow me to say a few words on that heavy item which was the principal cause of the excess of outlay last year—the addition of men. I stated last year that we proposed an addition of 3,000 men; and subsequently we brought down supplementary Estimates for 10,000 men and marines. This was a large addition; but the noble Lord has announced a still further addition, and I am hound to assume that the proposal is made by the Government in consequence of the strong opinion they entertain of its necessity. I am, therefore, not disposed to make any complaint on the score of that addition. I am glad to find that the Admiralty have not lost sight of the recommendation of the Commissioners to keep up a reserve of a certain number of men in our ports; though I own I could wish that reserve amounted to more than 1200 men. My noble Friend brought something like a charge against

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me with regard to the masters of the navy. He alluded to what I had done with regard to certain officers, but said I had overlooked the masters and other classes. That is not the case, for the late Government had it in contemplation to deal with the masters and those other classes to which he referred; and were only prevented carrying out their intentions, by circumstances which they could not control. I am therefore glad to find that the Government have taken up their case. My noble Friend also adverted to the Commission on Dockyard Labourers, and I trust he will take an early opportunity of stating what are' the intentions of Government with respect to the Report of that Commission. I did not clearly understand what fell from my noble Friend as to the office of the Controller of the Navy. Is there to be any change in the arrangements of that office? [Lord C. PAGET: Instructions are to be given of a more direct character for its regulation.] I am happy to hear that the attention of the noble Lord has been directed to this subject, as when in office I contemplated considerable changes in this department; but, whatever the alterations now proposed may be, I should like to have more definite information regarding them. I hope, concurrently with this change of title, there will be some ready adjustment of the duties of the office. I was also glad to hear what the noble Lord said with regard to apprentices in our dockyards. I trust that what he proposes will have the effect of improving this class of workmen, and checking that tendency to political jobbery, that has been under all Governments a source of great complaint and annoyance, and which I did all in my power to suppress. The evil complained of is a very serious one; and I hope the regulations in regard to apprentices will go a great way to check it. I will not enter into the question of "conversions;" but I cannot concur with the noble Lord in the views he has expressed. Take the case of frigates; many of them are very fine ships, and capable of rendering service in every respect but one —that they have no engines; if we can lengthen them, and put engines in, I think we shall render a great service to the country. I hope the noble Lord stands alone in his objections, and I am glad he has not had sufficient influence with the Board of Admiralty to induce them to adopt his views. My noble Friend expressed great pleasure in the reduction made in Vote 11, but I believe it is quite indispensable that this country should, within a very short period, em-
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bark in a large expenditure for the improvement of our dockyards. I am convinced that you will be unable to keep up the navy, with due regard to economy and to the interests of the country, unless your dockyards are made more efficient than they are at present. For instance, take Chatham—[Lord C. PAGET.—We are taking 10.000L. with that view for Chatham.]—My noble Friend surely does not mean to say that £10,000 will be anything like sufficient for the purpose at Chatham. He only takes that sum to continue and carry out a previous arrangement, on which a considerable amount has already been expended, and to complete which a very much larger sum is required. If you intend to make Chatham a dockyard such as it ought to be, you must make up your minds to a much larger outlay. It only remains for me to allude to the two last subjects to which my noble Friend adverted—namely, the pensions for the widows of warrant officers, and the retirement of senior officers in the navy. With regard to warrant officers' widows, I always thought it most desirable to grant such pensions, but I was not so successful in carrying out my views in that respect as my noble Friend has been; and I congratulate him on achieving a success which I was unable to attain. With respect to the retirement of officers, that is a subject to which I am glad to hear the present Board of Admiralty have directed attention. There was no subject on which I felt more strongly when I left the Board, than the absolute necessity of adopting some improved mode of retirement, so as to remove that check to promotion, which has always been a matter of just complaint. I am glad that the present Board have directed their attention to the subject, and I shall wait with some anxiety to bear an explanation of their plan. I will only add, that in following my noble Friend, it affords me much satisfaction to be able to speak in the tone in which I have done.
SIR CHARLES NAPIERwas glad to hear the noble Lord (Lord C. Paget) follow the example of his predecessor, and speak the plain and honest truth by giving an exact statement not only of our own navy, but also of those of France and Russia. He had shown that France had 244 vessels of every description ready for sea; Russia, 235; and England, 244. He had also told the Committee that France could man the whole of her ships with her reserves whenever she thought proper; and he (Sir Charles Napier) had seen it stated in a

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Paris newspaper that France had not less than 90,000 men on whom she could at any time lay hands. Russia had always her fleet manned; England alone could not man her fleet—a state of things that was not very creditable to a great nation like England. He had worked for twenty years in and out of that House, in order to see the navy placed on a proper footing. He had been called an alarmist, and laughed at for many years on that account; but the country had at length adopted his views, and forced the present Government, as it did the last, to put the navy in a proper condition. With respect to the practice of conversion, he agreed with the late First Lord that ships could be converted with advantage. The Neptune, the Nelson, and others, which had been converted, had turned out remarkably well. He could not, however, agree in the propriety of cutting a hole in the stern of a ship without lengthening her. That course had been found by experience not to answer in the Edinburgh and Ajax. The Navy Estimates were certainly very large, but he believed the country would get the value of their money. The navy, as far as ships were concerned, was never in a better position than it was at present. But still the country must lay its account with building a new navy in the event of iron ships succeeding. Our great Ally was determined to have a large naval force, and was driving us on to build. He wondered the Government had not come to some understanding with him as to where all this was to stop. Between France and us it had become a matter of the longest purse, and he (Sir Charles Napier) was afraid that France was getting as great as ourselves. We had got ships, but what use were they so long as we had not men? It was melancholy to think that in this great maritime nation we could not raise an adequate reserve of seamen for the navy. There was quite a mania for rifle corps, but not 500 men could he got as a reserve. There must be some reason why the navy was so unpopular, and Parliament must try to get at the root of its being so. We ought always to have 10 line-of-battle ships afloat in the Channel; each of these, if first-rates, would have, as a full complement, 900 blue-jackets and 200 marines. Now, as they wanted soldiers, he would ask why they should not employ 100 of the marines of each vessel in that capacity, which would give them 1,000 men on shore,
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doing military duty; but who would be ready at any time for transference on shipboard should their services be required. He would take away 100 marines in peace, and fill the ship up with 1,000 bluejackets. That would give 500 men on each watch; and in case of an emergency he would turn one watch over to another ship, and fill up with marines, whose places, as garrisoning the sea-ports, would be taken by that constitutional force, the militia. But more than that. What was to hinder them from separating the coast districts from the inland counties, and requiring them to furnish sailors as the inland districts did the militia? A reserve for the navy must be found somewhere or other, and as there was an enormous number of fishermen and of men whose occupation was looking out for wrecks along our shores, he should advocate the expediency of having recourse to a system of Ballot in our maritime towns, which should include the inhabitants of those districts. On the first appearance of war, the crews of these 10 ships of the line would man 20 of the same class, the difference being filled up with marines, landsmen, and the usual number of idlers, as they were called, such as cooks, stewards, and so on. But that was not all. There were the district-ships— not those abominable block ships—he hated the very name of them; but good ships, such as the Majestic and Colossus, that he was glad to hear were now fitting out to take the place of the block-ships. There were 10 of these ships that, in case of emergency, could be filled up with the Coastguard and the Coast Volunteers. This would give the country 30 sail of the line, and he did not believe that any country would attack us if they knew that we could send 30 sail of the line to sea in the course of forty-eight hours. But, then, it scented they did not know whether the Coast Volunteers would serve or not. He was told that the Coastguard men of Hastings went down by railway the other day to Sheerness, and that the men mustered very well. But why did not they send the Coast Volunteers at the same time? If they had done that, he supposed their wives and children would all have been up in arms against the Admiralty. The question, however, after all, was one of money. If £1 would not do it, they must try £2, or even £3, for a reserve would be cheaper than the present system of keeping up such a large fleet, He had now done with that subject, and he would come to the question of reserve.

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He knew from the first that the system would never answer. The noble Lord complained that the men were suspicious, and he did not wonder; for the Admiralty were constantly breaking faith with the men. It was but the other day that the pensioners were promised, when they went on board ship, that those of them who had been petty officers should have the same rating now; and yet he had found that some of these old petty officers were now doing duty as able-bodied seamen. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: The gallant Officer is quite mistaken. All the old petty officers have that rating when they go on board. Yes; but where there are no vacancies for petty officers, they are made to serve as common seamen. But he objected to the present plan of reserve altogether. They were giving £6 a year to men who had never done a stroke of work for the Queen. Besides, the terms were not sufficiently stringent. A reserve that was allowed to be absent for six months was no reserve at all. The course which he should pursue would be to leave to every seaman when his ship was paid off the option of being placed in the reserve or not, as he might think proper, allowing him to count two years towards his pension for every three years' service. At present the Admiralty had no means of knowing what men entitled to pensions had refused to take them. The Admiralty ought to know the number, and if it could once be made known that 4,000 men had entered the reserve, the intelligence would spread throughout the merchant service, and the reserve would soon be filled up. If the force could not be filled up with £6, then a calculation must be made whether it would not be cheaper to pay higher than to maintain a large force at sea. Another point which he must mention related to the Channel fleet, which the Admiralty did not seem to know how to manage when they got it. Some time since there was mutiny, or something like it. On board the Liffey there was a disturbance, shot rolled about, mess-traps broken, and other disorders. In that case the Admiralty did not take proper steps, but simply gave way, and the men gained their point. Something of the same sort happened on board the Hero on a question of leave. The complaint was, he thought, a just one. When ships were fitting out in harbour there was plenty of leave; but whenever a ship was out of harbour, she was sent to Portland where
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the drills went on—a period most irksome to the men—and when the utmost indulgence should be granted. In that way the disturbance arose on board the Hero, and the Admiralty, instead of sending the squadron to sea, and sending her to the West Indies, allowed the men to remain the victors. In the Mediterranean, on board the flag-ship Marlborough, there was also a disturbance, and that was passed over. Then came the Princess Royal, the worst case of all. She came home from the Mediterranean, and, according to a very proper arrangement, another ship was ready, to which the crew was to be transferred; but there were three classes of men on board—the bounty men and the continuous-service men, upon whom the Admiralty had a claim, and those who had entered generally, upon whom they had no claim. When the captain left the ship the men cried out, "Pay off," and then the Admiralty ought to have sent a member of the Board down to inquire into the matter, but, instead of doing so, they gave way. The continuous-service men and the bounty men should have been sent on board the Queen, and the others should have been required to return the stores, which would have occupied them for three weeks, and then they should have been told that their services were no longer required. Then, when there was a ship launch, and the Queen came down, the men ought to have had leave from Saturday to Monday, but instead of that one-half had leave and the rest had not. That, of course, created dissatisfaction, and a cry of "All or none." The Admiral very properly said "None," but unluckily the liberty men had been landed and were taken back from the dockyard gates. It was an error to order those men back, although he would not say whose error it was. He must say, to the credit of the seamen, that it was not true that they had deserted in great numbers after taking the bounty, for he had seen a return showing that since bounty was given desertions had been fewer than before. Every one knew how easy it was for sailors to desert, but he did not think the Admiralty took proper means to punish desertion. He would punish every man, even with transportation, who took the bounty not intending to remain in the service. There was another evil in the service in respect to leave. When he was in Lisbon, he found that no leave was ever given there, but he granted leave to the men to go on shore. They got drunk as usual, and made rows,

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and complaints were made to him, and he got the police of Lisbon to take up every drunken English sailor and put him into prison, the consequence of which was, that all complaints soon ceased, If the same thing were done at home for a short time, it would soon put an end to such misconduct. It might be said this could not be done in England, but they could station a guard-ship close to where the men landed, warn them, and if they broke their leave or behaved ill, place them on board as prisoners. There need be no difficulty in giving men leave, and getting rid of those irregularities which were subversive of all discipline. The men would thus also be made much more comfortable and happy than they were at present. There was another point to which he wished to advert. If a ship were paid off with the crew, it was attended with great expense; but if they were transferred to another ship directly, and the ship turned over to the superintendent of the dockyard to return her stores, the whole might be effected with more regularity and economy. He trusted the Admiralty would take steps to remedy all the evils he had pointed out; especially let them see that the men had leave at all times in moderation, and that they were punished if they behaved improperly—imprisoned if they got drunk ashore and behaved in a disorderly manner. A great deal had lately been done for seamen in giving them mess traps, allotments, and paying them once a month, and those now guilty of breaches of discipline ought to be severely punished. In the Baltic a disturbance broke out on board one of the ships of the fleet. He desired an inquiry to be made to see if there were any grievances, and, if so, that they should be redressed. Grievances were found to exist; they were redressed, and the evil did not extend, as it might have done, to other ships in the fleet. He had laboured long to have the navy put on a proper footing, and he would never rest satisfied till it was properly manned, and till the men got redress of every evil they had any reason to complain of. They could not now be treated as they formerly were. The men were more enlightened, and they expected more indulgence. [Mr. WILLIAMS: Hear!] The hon. Member for Lambeth might cry "Hear," as if he wanted popularity; but he would not put an end to flogging for all that. He would flog, but he would flog in a proper manner. If a man behaved ill, he would try him by court-martial and punish him. He was not
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afraid to say so. The men themselves would not live in a ship if there was no discipline. A ship would be a hell upon earth without discipline, and if the hon. Member for Lambeth succeeded in abolishing corporal punishments in the navy tomorrow he would not get the thanks of the men.
SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONEsaid, he wished to thank the noble Lord for his clear and business-like statement, which he had heard with peculiar pleasure. With regard to the pensions to warrant officers' widows, however, he should wish to know whether the arrangement was to be retrospective as recommended by the Naval Commission. If not, he should never suspend his agitation till that grievance was redressed. The present allowance as outfit for a petty officer when raised to a warrant officer was £30, but was quite inadequate, and there was often found great difficulty in getting proper men to come forward for the warrant, because pensions were taken away from their widows. With regard to boys, the Commission recommended that school-ships should be established at all the principal commercial ports. Provision was to be made for 2,400 boys, besides those who came forward voluntarily to be afterwards absorbed into the Mercantile and Royal Marine. He found no vote taken for school-ships, and he wanted to know what was the intention of the Government in that respect. He had heard from various ports, such as Hull, Greenock, Aberdeen, and Dundee, that these school-ships were looked for with great interest, and there was considerable disappointment that the recommendation of the Commission had not been carried into effect. When the boys went on board ship, a number of them were employed as officers' servants. He objected to that, as being a most prejudicial employment for boys; under such a system they became neither good seamen nor good servants. He next wished to draw the noble Lord's attention to the subject of the sergeants in the Marine Artillery. The Marine Artillery was established in 1804, and at first made part of the Royal Artillery. The separation was made about the year 1839. Up to that time the pay of the non-commissioned officers in the Marine Artillery went on increasing pari passu with that of the Royal Artillery; but since the separation this had not been so, and he thought the case of these men deserved the attention of the Government. The pay of sergeants in

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the Marine Artillery was now less by 2¾d. a day than that of sergeants in the Royal Artillery. The pay should be equalized. With regard to the pay of other officers which had been passed in this Vote, it was the fact that the pay of captains of men-of-war was entirely inadequate to the duties they had to perform. The pay of captains was only £600 a year, and they were quite unable to maintain their position in society without trenching upon their private means. Besides this, the Admiralty had taken to cheat the captains. They appointed captains of a lower grade to the command of 90-gun ships, and cut down the pay to £450 a year. The number of midshipmen was also entirely insufficient; and it was important that young men should be encouraged to study and become candidates for warrants, and that after passing competitive examinations they should receive increased pay, and should be entered as the first men for promotion to warrants as they became vacant, and in the mean time be employed in many of the duties formerly fulfilled by midshipmen. The next point was that of naval instructors. Young gentlemen entering the navy were now called upon, he thought with great advantage, to pass examinations; but the Admiralty were now making bricks without straw, for there was a large number of ships, no less than fifteen, four of them flag-ships, to which no naval instructors at all were attached. Then, as to the reserve. Having been of those who first recommended this measure, he was sorry to find it did not work well. Various causes had contributed to this result. The bounty had operated greatly against the reserve, as had also the disturbance in the Princess Royal. Again, the Admiralty had not taken the proper steps for making the advantages of service in the reserve sufficiently known. The fact was, there was no one in the navy to discharge the duties of the recruiting sergeant. Men were furnished with a long printed list of regulations, which they had great difficulty in understanding, and which often led them to form wrong conclusions. The Admiralty might take a leaf out of the Horse Guards book with advantage in this respect, and employ active petty officers at the different ports, in the same way as recruiting sergeants were now employed on behalf of the army. In a town like Portsmouth it might be expected that a regular office for the enlistment of seamen would be open; yet
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hon. Gentlemen would be surprised to hear that the only place where anything of the kind was conducted was the house of Mrs. Louisa Wafer, a woman who exercised an extraordinary influence over seamen, corresponded with them in the most distant parts of the kingdom, and did more to man the fleet than could be well understood without being a witness to the fact. Another evil was the total absence of police on board ships in harbour, so that when the men went on shore there was no one who knew where to find them again. Besides all this there was a great want of proper dockyard accommodation; and he thought, if the Princess Royal, instead of stripping in the stream, had gone into a basin, and had her crew discharged there, such a disturbance as had taken place could not have occurred.
MR. WHITBREADsaid, he hoped the House would bear in mind that, however accurately the naval programmes might be arranged beforehand, they were always liable to be deranged by disturbing causes; and the more ships there were in commission, the more troop-ships moving, the greater was the probability that repairs and other incidental circumstances would thus operate. The non-completion of the two frigates was owing to the fact that timber of the required dimensions was not in store at the time. More timber, however, was expected, and might arrive in time to ensure their completion before the close of the financial year. The right hon. Baronet opposite had inquired whether an opinion had been arrived at with regard to what should be the standard force of line-of-battle ships to be kept up. It was, however, impossible to fix upon any standard for our force, and say that that was the proper amount of naval strength for this country to keep up. That force must always depend upon what was done by other countries; and it was only by watching the growth of foreign navies—whether in line-of-battle ships, frigates, or iron ships—that we could arrive at any just estimate of our own requirements. With regard to the duties of the Comptroller of the Navy, changes were now in progress in his office, and when those changes were completed there would be no hesitation in furnishing the information which the right hon. Baronet desired. With regard to Vote 11, the dockyards would be kept in a proper state of repair with the sum taken in the present Estimates, and he believed that

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no great work had been postponed that was really necessary to be entered on this year. They had postponed, however, large works in the different dockyards which would have to be undertaken at some time or other, such as accommodation for longer ships; but looking at the large Estimates before the House which the Admiralty were obliged to frame, they thought there should be some saving in that Vote. The right hon. Baronet would be glad to learn that the Government had faced the somewhat difficult question connected with Chatham. It was in contemplation to extend that yard, and the Board, having considered the deficiency of accommodation in the great eastern arsenals, had come to the conclusion—looking to the natural disadvantages of Sheerness, and to the objections, in a military point of view, to the Isle of Grain — that St. Mary's Island was the only direction in which the dockyard accommodation should be enlarged, and they were in communication on the subject with a large number of persons interested in the property. As to the occurrences on board the Princess Royal, prior to the outbreak the account received by the Admiralty differed somewhat from that narrated to the House to-night. According to that account the petty officers represented, in the most respectful manner to the Admiral on his inspection, that they did not wish to be turned over to the Queen; and that request having been forwarded to the Admiralty was complied with. A great deal of that unhappy feeling arose from the fact, that the officers were in the habit of obtaining leave when the ship was paid off, while the men were restricted. The officers had now been placed on the same footing as the men in this respect, and not a murmur had been heard in the case of any of the ships that had since then been paid off. He concurred fully in the opinions of the hon. Baronet (Sir J. D. Elphinstone) as to the value of a reserve force, and he hoped that by the establishment of the training ships for boys by carefully studying the feelings and the interests of the men much would in time be done to make the service popular and respected.
SIR JOHN PAKINGTON, in explanation, said, he did not intend to suggest that there should be or could be anything like a permanent standard of line-of-battle ships. But he thought there was a point at which, our navy having attained to a position of
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sufficient superiority, it would be well to pause in regard to laying down new line-of-battle ships until the Admiralty had ascertained the effect of the great changes effected lately in naval science.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he would move, "That the Chairman do now report progress."
VISCOUNT PALMERSTONsaid, he hoped that his hon. Friend would not press his Motion, the universal wish of the Committee apparently being that some Votes should be taken.
MR. W. WILLIAMSobserved, that he would withdraw his Motion on the understanding that no more speeches were to be made.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Question again proposed.
ADMIRAL WALCOTT: My thanks are due to the noble Lord (Lord C. Paget) for the perspicuity and honesty of purpose which so eminently characterize the statement which he has submitted to the House; and my satisfaction is not unpardonably redoubled by recognizing in him a brother officer and an ornament to his profession. The measures which have been adopted to maintain the navy in a state of complete strength and efficiency recommend themselves to my judgment as the dictates of prudence. The attitude of armed and conscious power deters the opponent from his intention of invading an existing peace; and the display of vigour at the onset of actual hostilities accelerates an honourable termination to a war, whilst, on the other hand, a policy of hesitation and timidity enervates the spirit of a nation, and encourages aggression and pretensions on the part of its opponent, which, if they be tamely submitted to, threaten its security and endanger its reputation. Last year I strongly urged upon the noble Lord how desirable and important it appeared to mo, that the Surveyor of the Navy should be elevated to a more commanding position in the service, by being constituted an honorary member of the Board of Admiralty. Without throwing any additional expense upon the country, the change would enable that officer to deliver his opinions with greater freedom and weight, which, under the present system, is denied to him. At the same time there are occasions when the service would derive much benefit by the existence of a Board, composed of the most eminent persons in the various branches of naval architecture and all matters connected with

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naval warfare, which should meet from time to time to review the suggestions made by competent authorities in reference to subjects of such vast importance. In dealing with the officers and men, it is only common justice to assure of certain reward the officer who displays zeal and perfects himself in the knowledge of his profession, and to observe strictly and fulfil the promises that have been held out to the seamen, I hope I am to understand that 2,000 boys will be introduced into the service every year; let me then add that two ships will not be sufficient for their proper instruction; the allotment should not exceed the number of 500 boys to a single vessel. If my earnest expostulations on this subject — the employment and training of boys from fourteen to eighteen years of age—had been heard some years since, the service would not be now suffering from a paucity of sailors. The relative strength of the fleets of Russia and France, the enormous extent of the British commerce, the remoteness of many of our most valuable dependencies, the insecurity of political relations, and the uncertainty of a continuous peace are so many undeniable arguments imperatively demanding that our navy should be preserved in the highest state of efficiency, as upon its supremacy hangs the welfare or downfall of England. The disastrous circumstances, to which allusion has been made by the gallant Admiral (Sir Charles Napier), that occurred on board H.M.S. Princess Royal require a passing observation. Any disposition to mutiny, any contumacious disturbance, as detrimental to discipline, and, under particular circumstances, still more perilous, must be promptly quelled, and vigorously suppressed. The first spark of fire must be trodden out—it must not be allowed to spread. Admiral Bowles was not informed that the men were actually standing at the gate; the knowledge would have carried importance and influenced his decision, for there is no man whose heart is more open to kindly feeling, no man of greater experience or sounder judgment, no man who has contributed more largely, than that gallant officer, his time or his money, to every institution and project that could benefit the naval service of this country.
MR. BENTINCKexpressed his concurrence in the well-merited tribute which had been paid to the able statement of the noble Secretary to the Admiralty, and he
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was very glad to find the Estimates such as to afford the hope that the navy was about to be placed on the footing it ought to be. His noble Friend said that there was an impression that the country did not get the full value for the money expended. He believed that impression to be correct; and he was of opinion that the circumstance was owing to the system on which the Board of Admiralty was constructed. Until that Board ceased to be a political one and until professional men were chosen to fill the various departments and see that the ships were properly constructed, he believed they would have always to complain of the naval expenditure. He (Mr. Bentinck) could not join with the noble Lord in holding out any expectation of a speedy reduction in the amount that would be required for the Naval Estimates; on the contrary, looking to the state of affairs in Europe he thought it more likely that it would be found necessary to spend a yet larger sum. They ought to look the question fairly in the face; and they should at all events remember that an injudicious economy in past years had in the end led to a far greater waste of public money than could possibly have been brought about by any amount of dockyard extravagance. He also wished to know what steps had been taken to supply the deficiency of naval instructors on board line-of-battle ships in commission.
MR. LINDSAYsaid, he should move that the House report progress, for the whole question of the national armaments required a much more deliberate discussion than could be given it at half past twelve. We had a large naval expenditure and a large armament, and he wished to know against whom we were arming? Was it against the Emperor of the French? Had we not just concluded a treaty of commerce and consequently of peace with him? He wanted the Government to state distinctly against whom we were arming. Why were they taxing the people? Where was the fearful expenditure to end? They ought to report progress that that Question might be fully discussed.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do now report progress."
GENERAL UPTONsaid, he would suggest that there should be an entry of boys in the interior as well as at the ports.
COLONEL DICKSONinquired whether there were no means by which the ships of

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the Royal Navy might he made serviceable for the conveyance of troops.
LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, the question of how to supply naval instructors in those ships of the line in which they were still wanting was receiving the best attention of the Admiralty; and a plan had been suggested of combining the office with that of chaplain. The ships of the navy were occasionally used for the transport of troops; but at present the crews were a little raw, and required to be trained.
MR. SIDNEY HERBERThoped the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lindsay) would not press his Motion for reporting progress. He hoped to propose the first Vote for the Army Estimates on Friday next; and if they did not take the number of men both for the army and navy this week, they would not be able to do so for some time, because the discussion on the Budget would intervene.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Original Question put, and agreed to. Also,
(2.) £3,476,757, Wages.
(3.) £1,458,087, Victuals.
House resumed.
Resolutions to be reported this day (Tuesday). Committee to set again on Wednesday.
House adjourned at half past Twelve o'clock.