Commons Sitting of 5 October 1831

MINUTES.
Bills. Read a third time; White Boy Offences. Committed; Arms (Ireland); Labourers' House Rent; Hospitals Registration (Ireland).
Returns ordered. On the Motion of Mr. O'CONNELL, of the quantity of Guernsey and Jersey Spirits imported into London since the 5th July, 1831:—On the Motion of Mr. HUME, the Expenses of the Bankruptcy Courts about to be formed; and of the number and particulars of Petitions presented to the House of Commons.
Petitions presented. By Mr. O'CONNELL, from Raheen, for disbanding the Yeomanry (Ireland); from the Magisirates, Burgesses, and Protestant Freemen of Galway, to extend the Franchise of that place to the residents, without distinction of Religion; from the Catholic Inhabitants of St. Mary, Youghall, for the abolition of Tithes; from the Inhabitants of Cappoquin and Castlederwent, and Jewellers of Dublin, for the Repeal of the Union; from certain Individuals, against the present system of Insurance Companies. By Mr. R. GORDON, from the Minister, Churchwardens and Inhabitants of the Parish of Cannington, for a Repeal of the Beer Act. By Sir ROBERT BATESON, from the Mayor, Magistrates, Clergy, and other Inhabitants of Coleraine (Ireland), praying the continuance of the Grant to the Kildare Street Society.

IRISH MAGISTRACY.
Mr. O'Connellpresented a Petition from four Labourers in the County of Cork, complaining of the conduct of certain Magistrates, and of the administration of Justice at the Petty Sessions (Ireland). He thought the petitioners made out so strong a case, that had it happened on this side of the Channel it would have produced more petitions than the case of the Deacles. The petitioners represented, that they were the tenants of a Mr. Macarthy, and that an information
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was laid against them for feeding cattle upon their own land; for which offence they were brought before two Magistrates, one of whom was a curate of the Established Church, and fined 5l. and costs. The petitioners declared their intention to appeal against the order, when the Magistrates made them enter into recognizances, and seized their cattle for payment of the expenses, which they afterwards recovered, on account of the illegality of the proceeding. They were then charged with an assault upon a person of the name of Collins, put forward as the prosecutor, on which charge they were acquitted. They then wished to prosecute the informer Collins for perjury, but were baffled by a variety of legal expedients, and sustained great hardship and expense. These ill-used men had travelled 600 miles in search of justice, but obtained only injustice. They complained particularly of the partiality of the Magistrates. He believed that these statements were founded in fact, and as the conduct of two Magistrates were impugned, he wished to give his hon. and learned friend, the Solicitor General for Ireland, an opportunity to inquire into the facts.
Mr. Cramptonsaid, he had seen the petition before, and had made some inquiries into the circumstances through a private channel, but without communicating with the Magistrates who were the

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parties accused, and he was inclined to think, the petitioners were themselves much in fault as well as the man Collins, with whom they were at variance on a point of disputed possession. One of the petitioners had been found guilty of an assault upon that person, and it was from a sworn information relating to this assault that the petitioners desired to indict Collins for perjury. The Judge refused to try the cause, and sent it to the Sessions, and there the Grand Jury threw out the bill. He had reason to believe Collins was exonerated on the merits of the case itself, and not from any technical difficulty. From all his inquiries he had reason to believe that no case of corruption could be made out against the Magistrates.
Sir Robert Batesonwas of opinion, that these petitions were brought in, night after night, for the particular purpose of traducing the conduct of the Irish Magistrates, and keeping up excitement. He believed on the whole, the laws were as justly administered as in this country, and he spoke as an Irish Magistrate.
Mr. Huntsaid, one good effect was caused by these discussions. They made the law officers of the Crown inquire into the cases of alleged misconduct on the part of the Irish Magistrates. He should be happy if the same course was followed in this country.
Mr. Estcourtconsidered the insinuations of the hon. member for Preston most uncalled for. He had no doubt, if any case of oppression could be made out in England, however humble were the suffering parties, that the law officers of the Crown would promptly attend to it.
Petition laid on the Table.
Mr. O'Connellmoved, that it should be printed. He thought he had some reason to complain that his statements had not been duly attended to. He had no doubt from the information of the attorney of the petitioners, that the facts could be distinctly proved. The report upon the face of it evidently shewed a neglect of duty on the part of the Magistrates.
Mr. Blackneysaid, the two statements, like those on most Irish questions, differed so completely, and were so much mixed up with partizanship, that there was great difficulty in deciding upon either of them. The great ground of complaint respecting the Irish magistracy was, that there were too many churchmen among them, he did
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not believe they were personally corrupt, but he heard with great satisfaction there was to be some change in the system.
Mr. Henry Grattansaid, so long as there were grievances to redress, he for one should make complaints; but what he wished at present to bring before the House was, the custom of giving blank summonses by many Irish Magistrates to persons who did by no means deserve such confidence. He had seen cases of great oppression growing out of this practice.
Sir Francis Burdettsaid, such a practice was evidently liable to abuse, and ought to be wholly put an end to. He fully believed, from several cases recently brought before the House, that a complete revision was required with respect, to the constitution of the Irish magistracy.
Petition to be printed.

PROSECUTIONS ON ACCOUNT OF RELIGION.
Mr. Huntpresented a Petition, numerously signed by respectable persons, Inhabitants of the Metropolis, setting forth their disapprobation of Prosecutions on Account of uttering Religious Opinions, and praying that Mr. Taylor might be relieved from the very severe punishment he was suffering, which was contrary to justice and exceeded the sentence passed upon him.
Mr. Humewould seize every opportunity to declare his detestation of the laws under which this man suffered. The House deserved some censure for permitting such laws to be enforced. He did not mean by these remarks to express any particular anxiety relating to the individual who was the subject of the petition; but he would maintain, that every man had a right, which ought to be in violable, to express his opinions upon religious questions, arid, indeed, upon all other matters which were not at war with the principles of public morals. The country could not be said to be in possession of much liberty, when a man was liable to be punished, not for acts, but for opinions.
Lord Althorpthought, that the publication of all religious sentiments ought to be unrestrained and free, provided they did not militate against the peace and decency of society, or contradict the first principles of religion. As to remarks on the characters of public men, he desired there should be no restraint whatever on the publication of opinion; but this case was somewhat different. It operated against the principle on which the foundation of

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public morals was laid. On the best consideration of Mr. Taylor's offence, he did not think it required the interference of Government.
Mr. O'Connellfully concurred with those who thought that plain and direct attacks upon the Christian religion ought to be prevented as much as possible, but the question was, whether they could be best prevented by contemptuous neglect or prosecution. He feared the latter could never put down opinion. In the case of Carlile, for instance, many persons began to look upon him as a martyr; and had not this man, Taylor, created a sort of party round himself to support and uphold him in his ribaldry? He lived on prosecution, which was a bounty on his trade, and the more he was prosecuted, the more he was encouraged. Feelings of sympathy, indulged towards a man supposed to be oppressed, operated upon people to such a degree that they became partial to his opinions, and thought them right, because they were convinced his oppressors were wrong. Nothing short, of extirpation could put opinion down. He hoped to see the time when every Christian would feel himself so strongly armed in his own convictions, as not to require prosecution to support them.
Sir Robert Peelsaid, the unaffected detestation expressed by the hon. and learned Gentleman of the doctrines and conduct of Taylor, he was sure met with the full concurrence of the House. He had heard the hon. and learned Member's remarks with great satisfaction. He also agreed with him in thinking, that very great discretion ought to be exercised in instituting such prosecutions as that under which the person in question was suffering. He had successfully tried the experiment of non-prosecution, but it was extremely difficult to withstand the representations of good and religious men. As to the question which had been propounded by the hon. member for Middlesex, he believed few would agree with him that there should be unqualified impunity, or that all laws which bore upon the questions of religion and morals should be repealed. Why, what would be the result of such a state of things, but that people whose feelings were outraged, would resort to personal violence? He acknowledged it was difficult to lay down any precise rule, but he could never admit that every person might attack the first truths of Christianity
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at their own discretion. Protection was principally required by the young and thoughtless; not that it could be harmed by the statement of facts, by calm reasoning, or by philosophical discussion, but by insult, burlesque, ridicule, and passionate appeals, such as this man Taylor was in the habit of using. He appeared in the costume of a clergyman, and did all he could to insult the feelings and principles of every man attached to the Christian religion.
Mr. Lambobserved, that the prosecution against Taylor had not been instituted by Government. Taylor was a person who had made the most horrid and disgusting attacks upon everything the people had been taught to venerate; for this he was prosecuted, and found guilty by a Jury—and this petition called upon the Government, to interpose the prerogative of the Crown to defeat the verdict of a Jury, without any evidence to show that the verdict was contrary to law or fact. No man could suppose for an instant that Taylor was punished on account of free discussion. Nobody reprobated prosecutions more than he did for mere opinion, but was it not notorious that this man at his trial exhibited himself in the garb of a Christian minister, and outraged all decency by his conduct. Such a disgusting farce deserved punishment, for it never could be allowed to go forth to the public that the most atrocious blasphemy should enjoy impunity. Nothing certainly but strong cases could justify prosecution; but he believed this was a case of that kind, and that Mr. Taylor fully deserved the visitation he had met with.
Mr. Ruthvensaid, he fully agreed in the necessity of keeping discussion within the bounds of reason and decency, so as to afford equal protection to all persons With regard to the particular case now before them, he believed it had excited a general horror throughout the country, and the only excuse that could be made for Mr. Taylor was insanity. He ought not to be allowed to go at large; neither ought he to be treated with undue severity, or confined to a particular prison, whose regulations bore very grievously upon him.
Mr. John Campbellsaid, it was utterly impossible that any Government could tolerate such a scandalous outrage as the conduct of this unhappy man presented. He had collected a multitude of people,

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and in a public theatre burlesqued the most solemn rites of our religion, and had insulted all the feelings which the community most reverenced. It was absurd to suppose such a man excited sympathy.
Petition to lie on the Table.
Mr. Hunt, in moving that it should be printed, said, he did not mean to say anything in favour of Taylor, or attempt to justify his conduct. He had never read his writings, or heard him speak; but the complaint of the petitioners was, that the punishment exceeded the offence. He concurred with other hon. Members in thinking that they had better have their present laws, with all their faults, than to be exposed to the attacks of an infuriated rabble.
Mr. Humewished to know what the noble Lord (Lord Althorp) meant by first principles of religion. He would find that the State in different parts of the empire tolerated Jews, Hindoos, Mahometans, and other sects, all of whom were as much opposed to the first principles of Christianity, as the person whose conduct was now before the House. Every person ought to be tolerated, whatever opinions he might entertain, provided he did not disturb the peace of society. It was allowed by the right hon. Baronet who had recently presided over the Home Department, that the laws on this subject ought to be enforced with great discretion, but unfortunately that was of no avail, for any individual, or self-constituted Society, might prosecute. One of two things, therefore, ought to take place; either the laws should be repealed, or some regulation should be made as to prosecuting for such offences. He never could tolerate a man being punished for publishing an honest opinion. He claimed to have that privilege himself, and he was willing to allow it to others.
Mr. Trevorbegged very seriously to ask the hon. member for Middlesex, if he believed such doctrines as Mr. Taylor was convicted of preaching, had not a tendency to interrupt the peace of society? He differed from the hon. Member, and applauded the Society which had prosecuted this man, and were ready to undertake a duty which the Government declined. From the statement which the hon. Member had made, it might be presumed this person had been prosecuted for certain doctrinal points only, instead of
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public blasphemy against the Holy Scriptures. He regretted that the hon. Member had put forth the opinions he had with the weight of his authority, and to correct them as far as he could was the motive why he had addressed the House.
Petition to be printed.

CALL OF THE HOUSE.
Lord Ebringtonwished to know from the hon. and learned member for Kerry, whether it was his intention to enforce the Call of the House on Monday next.
Mr. O'Connellsaid, he felt it a duty he ought to perform, but as he had some doubts as to the propriety of causing general inconvenience on account of the Irish Reform Bill, he should propose that the Order be discharged.
Lord Ebringtonsaid, that considering the condition of the country, he should feel it his duty to enforce the Call of the House, and he, therefore, gave notice he should do so on that day, in order that he might bring forward a motion upon the state of public affairs.

MONEY PAYMENT OF WAGES BILL.
Mr. Littleton Mr. Littleton moved that the Bill be now read a third time.
Mr. Humefelt himself bound in principle to oppose the third reading of this Bill. He never could consent to a law which would have the effect of fettering the hands of both masters and operatives, or that should prevent the one buying, and the other selling labour, on the best terms. He had hoped the day for these restrictions had gone by, and that we had grown so much wiser by experience, as to believe that no man could take such care of another's affairs as the individual himself. The main evil under which the commerce of the country had suffered, arose from the restrictions imposed by ignorant legislation, which prevented labour being bought and sold at the market price. The persons who had petitioned in favour of the Bill, he believed were unacquainted with its probable effects—he feared they would find, that instead of plenty of work and high wages, it would produce a monopoly in the hands of a few persons, who would grind the workmen down to the lowest degree of misery. The measure was injurious in policy, and mischievous to individuals; he, therefore, proposed, for the word "now" that the words "this day six months" be substituted.
Lord Granville Somersetsaid, that nothing had occurred since he had delivered his opinions on this Bill, to make him believe those opinions were erroneous. He still believed the Bill would operate injuriously to both masters and workmen, but after the discussions that had taken place, he did not expect to alter the opinions of the House; he would, therefore, content himself with recording his own.
Sir Robert Batesonsaid, he resided in the manufacturing district in the vicinity of Belfast, and he knew both masters and workmen were favourable to the principle of the Bill, and he also knew that many industrious workpeople had suffered very much by the Truck-system, in having damaged goods forced upon them. Its provisions might be obnoxious to the principles of political economy, but he was quite sure the present system required alteration.
The House divided on the Original Question: Ayes 61; Noes 4—Majority 57.
Bill read a third time and passed.

BANKRUPTCY COURT BILL— AD JOURNED DEBATE.
The Order of the Day for resuming the debate on the Second Reading of the Bankruptcy Court Bill read,
Sir Charles Wetherellcomplained, that there had been a partial distribution of some statements relating to the Bill; he had not received one, although he understood several of his learned friends had.
Mr. Humesaid, there ought to be no mystery, whether this Bill would cost, 25,000 l. or 50.000 l.; he wanted to know, whether the Commissioners were to be entitled to superannuations.
Mr. John Williamswas sure, that 9,000 l. would be saved by the plan, if there was any truth in figures.
Sir Charles Wetherellthought the honour of the Chancellor of the Exchequer concerned in this; they were about to establish a Court which was likely to cost 40,000 l. per annum, and they had no knowledge of the materials.
The Attorney Generalsaid, there was nothing of mystery in his statement; he had distinctly stated the cost of the proposed and the present Court.
Mr. John Williams Mr. John Williams rose and said, that his hon. and learned friend, the member for Borough bridge, upon the previous debate on this question, had made a very general, and therefore, in the opinion of many persons, a very successful attack
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upon this Bill. With the moderation and care which were becoming to a subject of such very great importance, he (Mr. Williams) should embrace the objects of his learned friend's attack, in the order in which he took them, and he hoped that, when they were fully stated, as clear a case for the necessity of change and amendment would be made out, as any person could conceive. He should consider the subject as one which affected the administration of justice in an enlarged and most important sense. His learned friend (the member for Borough bridge) had begun by stating, that he could not think of abolishing the whole system of these Courts, from the long continuance of it; and he reminded the House, with warmth and earnestness, that that system had very long received the patronage equally of Whig and Tory Chancellors. Such an argument would be equally good to justify the continuance of any system, however vicious or pernicious; and yet systems were not perpetual, but were often modified, or entirely changed, to meet the wants and opinions of society. But his learned friend had said, that he might be brought to consent to the modification of these Courts, though not to the abolition of them; for the system was good, his learned friend said, and by him should it be defended. Without any disrespect to any one person now concerned in the present transactions of the Courts—for he utterly disclaimed all personalities, and believed, that among the Commissioners there were many honourable and learned men—he was convinced, that the whole system was utterly bad, and that it required one entire and complete change. His learned friend had objected to the multiplication of places by the Bill, to the patronage it would give to the Lord Chancellor, to the pension to be paid to the retiring Chancellor; and, lastly, he objected to the Bill because he said, that no competent opinions had been pronounced in its favour. He (Mr. Williams) would first take one opinion of the learned Gentleman's in which they were equally agreed. His learned friend had said, that the question was one of the very highest importance, and of the greatest moment—that it was full of intricacy, and that points of legal decision were submitted to the present Commissioners of Bankrupt. Upon these points there could be no difference of opinion. He agreed with his

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learned friend in all these points as facts, but in the inferences from them they totally differed. He would maintain, that in proportion as the questions of Bankruptcy were of importance, in the same proportion was it necessary to have a Court which was presided over, by Judges of great learning, and in the same proportion was it necessary to revise, to remodel, and to make a radical change in the whole system. To use the language of the Committee of 1818, in proportion to the importance of the subject, was the necessity, that there should be a complete change in the Courts, and in their practice. These Courts of Commissioners, it was well known, were sub-divided into fourteen, and these lists had not to defend them any analogies, with respect to any other Courts whatever in this kingdom. First as to the appointments of the Commissioners. It was notorious and past all contradiction, that if the present Lord Chancellor should appoint as a Commissioner of Bankruptcies, a gentleman of only one year's standing at the Bar, no man could with justice attack that appointment; because, as his learned friend had justly said, his predecessors, both Whig and Tory, had done the same thing. Was it decent to the mercantile people of England, that any young gentleman, of ever so great promise, but as yet of no performance, should sit in judgment upon a case, or upon a class of cases which were admitted to be of the greatest, importance, both with respect to the very large sums they involved, and to the difficulties of understanding and deciding them? This alone was a state of things in contradiction to the establishment of any Court which possessed the respect of the country. Another peculiarity in these Courts was, that they were the only Courts now existing of which the Judges could at the same time be practising Barristers. There had been one example to strengthen this, but that very example had led to the destruction of the Welsh jurisdictions. He would now ask, how did the system work? Fourteen different lists of gentlemen were all acting independently of each other. In the superior Courts, by means of the conferences of the Judges in the House of Lords, by means of their being brought together in Courts of Appeal, a uniformity of decision was within the reach of every Court. Not so was it with respect to the Commissioners of Bankruptcies, for
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fourteen independent Courts of Decision were sitting at the same time. Mr. Cullen had said, in his evidence, that, at the same time, the same Commission of Bankrupts had four matters under its consideration. One was, to choose the assignees, one the proof of the debts, one the proof of trading, and one he knew not what; but all tending to confound the judgment. And how were these Commissioners to be remunerated? Why, in a most peculiar manner, which gave them an interest in damaging and prejudicing the suitor, in order to pay the Judge. The interests and duties of these Judges were in direct opposition to each other. They were paid 20 s. each, at every meeting, and therefore the greater were the number of meetings the greater was the pay of the Judge, and the greater number of meetings the greater was the delay in the division of the funds, and the greater in every respect were the injuries to the suitors. It was impossible for these gentlemen, in many cases, to entertain an opinion that was not thwarted by their interests. It was the same with respect to the solicitors and the messengers—the interest of all was, to delay the division of the funds, the early division of which was the very object of the Bankrupt-laws. The Commissioners might be all honourable men; "so are they all honourable men;" but that was no reason whatever why they should be placed in such a situation that they could not do their duty but at the expense of their own interest. It was too much that such a system should be allowed to remain in opposition to all principles, and in defiance of every analogy with other Courts. If a gentleman of great talents, industry, and acquirements, received his early appointment of Commissioner, what was the consequence? The very moment at which he arrived at any proficiency to perform his duty as a Judge, the remuneration of a Judge for it averaged only 400 l. a-year, became too contemptible for him to attend to the duties of his office, and he would be found practising in Westminster-hall, or at Lincoln's-Inn, to the desertion of his duties in Basinghall-street. This fact was within the knowledge of every man, and it was impossible to deny it. From a jurisdiction so prone to error—from a depository of errors like this—it would be conceded that, there ought to be some mode of readily correcting what it did. Was this the case? It was his duty to state, that

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the only appeal from the Commissioners of Bankruptcies was one, of all others, the most full of delays, the most overloaded with expenses, and more calculated to defeat all the ends of justice and objects of appeal, than any other known to the laws. It was a mere combination of every objection which could exist against the revision of a case. He was speaking of the appeal from the Commissioners of Bankruptcy to the Court of Chancery. First, was that appeal attended with delay? Look at the evidence given on the subject. Mr. Hamilton had said, that he had felt the inconvenience to his clients of an appeal to the Court of Chancery, most particularly when the appeal was from the Bankruptcy Court. Before the petition of appeal could be heard, the mischief to be provided against was very frequently committed, and past all remedy. Most cases of bankruptcy required a speedy decision, and yet in the Bankruptcy Court, in Basinghall-street, the business was worse conducted than in the most petty Court in the kingdom; and if the Court in Basinghall-street were absolutely abolished, and a Court like the Insolvent Court were to be established in its stead, it would be a great advantage to the public. The object, for which the Bankrupt Court was established was lost. Such had been the evidence of Mr. Hamilton, and now let the House hear what had been the evidence of the Chief Baron upon the subject of the expenses. The late Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, Sir James Alexander, had said, that there was a large expense incurred in the first instance. He had taxed a great number of bills, and the large expense arose principally from the number of affidavits, which contradicted each other as to the facts, and if there was any doubt as to the facts, the Chancellor sent the case to an issue before a Jury. One of the Commissioners of Bankruptcy, Mr. Greig, had written a pamphlet on the subject, from which he would read an extract. Mr. Greig said, that these difficulties had long been a subject of complaint. The uncertainty of such evidence, the conflicting nature of the affidavits, very often rendered a Commission of Bankruptcy a matter of great expense, and the matter generally at issue was on occasions where a Jury must decide the facts. This was a costly, a dilatory, and unsatisfactory mode of coming to a decision. Now he (Mr. Williams) would come to the subject
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of expense. Mr. Penson, Secretary of Bankrupts under Lord Eldon, had afforded a conjecture of the immeasurable, and of the almost inconceivable expenses, utterly wasted and thrown away upon those affidavits, which were filed for no purpose except that the suitor might have the satisfaction of knowing that he must have to pay 1,000 l. or 1,500 l. for no purpose upon earth. Mr. Penson further stated, that in the bankruptcy of Messrs. Howard and Gibbs, the affidavits alone amounted to 1,500 folios, and as eight folios went to one brief-sheet, there were about 190 brief-sheets, at 3s. 4d. a sheet, which, with the expenses of preparing the brief, would amount to 50 l.; and as in this case there were five counsel on each side, the solicitors would have to charge this 50 l. five times over, or 250 l. The other side would have the same, expense, so that the amount would be 500 l. This afforded one idea of the length, breadth, and delay of costs, of a Chancery appeal. In this one case 1,000 l. had been spent on the bare materials for the wordy warfare Then came the refreshers, so that infinitely more than 1,000 l. would be spent; and this was by no means an extraordinary case. Mr. Penson had said, that in several cases the expenses of the affidavits had amounted to 1,000 folios. In another cause eight counsel had been employed, and each had been heard at great length. And what did all this end in?—it ended, as the Lord Chief Baron had informed the House, in an inquiry, where, as Mr. Greig very truly said, it ought to have begun—it ended in an issue to try the facts, which rendered all the affidavits useless. He never knew a case where a man had been in the Court of Chancery with any profitable result, and the case subsequently went to a Jury, that he did not throw aside all his Chancery affidavits, and resort to the evidence of other witnesses. The Lord Chancellor, in fact, always said, that where a doubt existed, he should send the point to issue; and how, he would ask, could a case be without a doubt, in which there were 1,500 folios of affidavits? This insufficient and costly appeal, then, was the only correction that existed to the proceedings of the worst constituted Court in England. Would any man of principle undertake to say, that in a country priding itself upon its jurisprudence, such a system could be tolerated for a moment? and if his learned friend replied, that Englishmen

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had tolerated this, he should then reply that that was not enough to satisfy any honourable mind that such a nuisance ought not to be removed. His hon. and learned friend opposite (Sir C. Wetherell) who spoke against this Bill, said, that no opinion had ever been pronounced in favour of the Court now proposed to be established by the gentlemen examinee before the Chancery commission. It would be marvellous if they had pronounced such an opinion, for the Court had no existence even in embryo until the beginning of this year. If such an opinion had been pronounced, it would have been anticipatively prospectively, and prophetically—to borrow the language of his hon. and learned friend. But did his hon. and learned friend mean to say, that the necessity of something like it had not long been acknowledged? In 1718, upwards of a century ago, there had been a petition from the city of London, complaining that the operation of the Bankrupt-laws was such, that the estate of the bankrupt was consumed in litigation. In 1783, Sir James Burgess put forth a series of reasons against the existing power of the Court of Chancery; and in his learned pamphlet, Mr. Basil Montagu had printed a bill for the remedy of the abuses he complained of, in the same form as Sir James Burgess drew it. That bill contained a provision for a permanent Court, and proposed a remedy for some of the grievances which suitors at present sustained in their appeal to the Lord Chancellor. Again, in the year 1811 there were petitions from the sister kingdom, from Dublin, Waterford, Cork, Belfast, and other trading and commercial places, complaining of the administration of the Bankrupt-laws, and of the manner in which the Courts were formed. In consequence of the general complaints which were made of the existing law, a bill was introduced into Parliament in the course of the year 1811, but for some reason or other, with which he was not acquainted, it was not followed up; that bill, however, contained a provision for the establishment of a permanent Court to dispose of all legal matters in bankruptcy. Then came the Committee of 1817, before which the most eminent legal authorities, Sir Samuel Romilly, Cullen, and others, were examined, and all concurred in stating, that nothing could be more iniquitous than the existing mode of administering the Bankrupt-laws. These things
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spoke loudly against the existing system, and called imperatively for a radical change in the constitution and administration of these laws. But this was not all. The very cause of this Bill, the very ground of its being brought before Parliament, was the requisition of a numerous body of bankers and merchants of the City of London, assembled last spring, complaining of the manner in which the Bankrupt-laws were administered, and praying for a change. It was that requisition which suggested and became the immediate foundation of the Bill which his noble and learned friend introduced into the other House, which had received the sanction of that House, and which was now in the course of discussion before that House. The necessity for the introduction of some measure to amend the Bankrupt-laws, must be obvious to every one after the repeated and continued complaints which had been made against the existing laws, from the commencement of the last century down to the very day and hour that this measure was introduced. What did the hon. and learned member for Borough-bridge mean by saying to him, or to any of the supporters of this measure, that it was unnecessary—that it was uncalled for—that it had been introduced in mere wantonness of legislation? Did the hon. Member mean to say that, in the opinions of commercial men, as well as in the judgment of the most eminent of those to whom the administration of the existing Bankrupt-laws had been intrusted, that change was not required? All that he (Mr. J. Williams), could do was, to satisfy any man that, for more than a century past, the attention of the public had been continually called to the grievances of the present system. He had done that, and laboured to shew, that the present system was ill-constructed and worked ill, for this plain and obvious reason,—that in proportion as the questions of bankruptcy were of importance, in the same proportion was it necessary to have a Court which was distinguished by Judges of great learning, and in the same proportion was it necessary to revise, to remodel, and to make a radical change in the whole system. To use the language of the Committee of 1818, in proportion to the importance of the subject, was the necessity that there should be a complete change in the Courts and in their practice. The noble Marquis, the member for Buckinghamshire, said

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that he was anxious to see the details of this Bill, in order that he might form a judgment of what their probable effect would be. He wished to God the noble Marquis were present now, impartially to determine whether the Commissioners should remain as they were, or whether this plan, or something like it, should be substituted. He would allude to those points upon which the present Bill got rid of many of the great and long-lived abuses which had hitherto disgraced this branch of our law. His hon. and learned friend, however, who he was glad to see was at that moment resuming his seat, had asserted that the present Bill would beget a multiplication of appeals. In the first place, said he, there is an appeal from the decision of the one Commissioner to the Subdivision Court. Upon that point, his hon. and learned friend was mistaken—there was no such appeal. The manner in which that part of the Bill was to operate was this:—If the single Commissioner, whose duties were limited, had any doubt upon his mind upon any point, either of law or of fact, which might arise before him, instead of appealing to the Subdivision Court, he called in the aid of some of his brother Commissioners, and, with their assistance, determined the question at once. Nothing, in his opinion, could be a more judicious or convenient mode of settling preliminary difficulties. Still it was said, you have no end to appeal, because from the decision, whether of the one or of the three Commissioners of the Subdivision Court, you have an appeal to the Court of Review. It was for this that he praised this Bill, because it substituted a summary mode of proceeding, which would operate cheaply and quickly, for the long, and tedious, and ruinous system which had hitherto prevailed. By one of the provisions of the Bill, the Judges of the Court of Review were empowered to form rules for the practice of that Court and of the Subdivision Court. Now supposing one of the rules to be, that the Commissioners singly, or formed into a Subdivision Court, should have a shorthand writer to take down all these decisions, or perhaps take notes of all that passed before them, or, if it be deemed better, that the Commissioner should take notes of the evidence adduced before him, in the same manner as the Judge in the Superior Courts—what would be the consequence? Why, that within four-and-
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twenty hours after a doubt might have arisen in the minds of any of the Commissioners in the Subdivision Court, the opinion of the Judges of the Court of Review might be obtained upon it. Could any reasonable man doubt the advantages of such a system of appeal over one which, attended with ruinous expenses, also kept the parties in suspense and doubt, not only for weeks and months, but for years? The next appeal was to the Lord Chancellor; but it would be upon matter of law only; because the Court of Review, if a doubt or a difficulty arose upon a point of fact, were empowered to direct an issue, as Mr. Greig wisely said, at first instead of at last. Then his hon. and learned friend had assumed, but assumed under a mistake, that there was to be an appeal from the decision of the Lord Chancellor to the House of Lords. If the parties chose to take the appeal to the House of Lords at once, instead of to the Lord Chancellor, they would be at liberty to do so; but if they appealed to the Lord Chancellor, they would not afterwards be at liberty to appeal to the House of Lords. At present, according to the evidence given before the Chancery Commission, it appeared that the number of bankrupts' petitions carried before the Lord Chancellor, did not, on the average, amount to less than 700 a year. Thus, according to the testimony of Mr. Lee, a most competent witness, was one-third of the time of the Lord Chancellor occupied in the disposal of business which did not properly belong to the Court of Chancery. The costs attendant upon these 700 appeals to the Lord Chancellor, according to the sample which he had given, would amount to 700,000 l.; but suppose they were to take it at one fifth of that sum, and say that the costs amounted to 140,000 l., which was a moderate calculation—even then, ought they to reject any measure which had for its object the cutting away of so odious a system? If fit and proper Judges were appointed to the Court of Review, he would venture to say, that the appeals to the Lord Chancellor would hereafter be few indeed. Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Basil Montagu, who had had more practice before the Commissioners of Bankrupts than any other man now living—as well as many other authorities of the highest eminence, all concurred in stating, that a worse tribunal could not by possibility exist than a Court of Commissioners

19
of Bankrupts. The late Chief Baron, Sir William Alexander, stated in his evidence before the Commission, that a Court could be so constituted to determine matters in bankruptcy, as to render an appeal to the Lord Chancellor unnecessary. His (Mr. J. Williams's) object, however, at present was, to shew that the appeals would be few, if a proper Court were established to hear bankrupt cases in the first instance. Upon this point he would quote the evidence of a Mr. Harris, a solicitor at Bristol, a man of great respectability, and in very extensive practice, and who spoke very sensibly upon the subject. Having alluded to the establishment of a Bankrupt Court, he said—'My opinion is, that appeals from such a Court would only originate where there was a manifest error in the decision of the Judge, or in the case of extremely litigious suitors.' Mr. Harris was then asked, whether he did not think that the parties would be anxious to go to a higher Court of appeal. He said, 'Not generally, I should think, except where the suitors are litigious, or the attorney employed—as unfortunately, there are but too many—is of a low, pettifogging character. Where respectable persons are employed, I do not think that there would be many appeals.' Such was the evidence of Mr. Harris, and he perfectly concurred with him in all the opinions which he had expressed. He was satisfied that if the Court of Review were established, they should hear no more of 700 bankrupt petitions being annually carried before the Lord Chancellor. There was one other point upon which this Bill had his most sincere and hearty concurrence, knowing by a pretty long experience how much such a provision was required. He alluded to the appointment of the official assignee, whose duty it would be to secure the property of the bankrupt; and, what was more material, to render it immediately productive, by vesting it in the public funds. He was well aware that the last Bankrupt Act provided, under penalties, that the assignee should place in the hands of some banker the outstanding debts of a bankrupt, as he should collect them. It often happened, however, that the assignee, although, to all appearance, a man of substance and of property, was, in point of fact, in very doubtful and precarious circumstances. It was an old and a true adage that a drowning man would catch at a straw. It had, in many
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instances, been exemplified in the cases of assignees of bankrupts. Themselves in an insolvent state, they had been unable to resist the temptation of employing the funds, which had come into their hands from the bankrupt's estate; but eventually failing, the other creditors had lost everything. Therefore, it had been thought, that the best mode of applying sums derived from bankrupt estates, would be to compel the official assignee to vest them immediately in the public funds. Moreover, to guard against any danger of loss from the insolvency of the assignee, it was provided, that he should not be allowed to undertake the duties of the office, unless he gave security for the full amount of the sums which might be likely to pass through his hands. So that the danger which now attended the appointment of assignee was effectually provided for, as well as the immediate and beneficial application of whatever assets might be derived from the estate. He would now say a few words upon the pounds, shillings, and pence part of this Bill, about which the hon. and learned member for Boroughbridge had said so much. Was it really so extravagant and profligate a measure as he had described it to be? In the first place, there was, in the Court of Chancery, a fund of ominous name—a name, by-the-bye, which it well deserved—the Dead Fund, from which, after paying the Masters in Chancery, the Vice-Chancellor, and the other officers of the Court of Chancery, there remained a clear surplus of 27,000 l. a-year free, to be disposed of in any manner that the Lord Chancellor might think fit. The whole expense of the new establishment, according to the statement of the hon. and learned member for Borough bridge, which was somewhat exaggerated, would amount to 29,200 l. a year; to meet this expense, the Dead Fund, if it were necessary, would be applicable, and thus an expense of little more than 2,000 l. a year would be thrown upon the public. But it was proposed to raise a sum equal to the whole expenditure of the Court by a tax upon the suitors, without calling for any portion of the consolidated or other funds of the country. Upon a reasonable and very moderate calculation, the fees paid by the suitors in the new Court would amount to 34,500 l. a year—that was to say, upwards of 4,000 l. a year beyond the estimated expense of the Court itself;—so that, in point of fact,

21
this Court would cost the country nothing. But when expense was talked of, they ought to consider for a moment what was the expense of the present unsatisfactory system of administering the Bankrupt-laws,—it was 71,189 l. a-year—so that, upon the score of saving expense alone, there was a balance in favour of the Court proposed to be established by this Bill, of no less than 41,989 l. a-year. But he was defrauding the Bill of its merits when he descended to these particulars. As his hon. friend, the member for Westminster, too, had well observed, in providing for the proper administration of justice, every pound of expense was not of importance, and should, in fact, be regarded only in a secondary point of view. For this measure, however, he might with truth assert, that in all its parts, in all its operations, it might, without any additional expense, be I brought into use for the benefit of the public. But, supposing that this were not the case—supposing that it were necessary to call upon the Consolidated Fund for 10,000 l. or 20,000 l. a-year, what would that be, compared with the needless sums which, under the existing system, were annually expended in the Court of Chancery. He now came to another point, upon which his hon. and learned friend attracted much attention; he alluded to the patronage which it was contended the Lord Chancellor would gain by this Bill. The House was probably aware, that the Lord Chancellor at present was paid but 5,000 l. a-year from the Consolidated Fund—that, undoubtedly, was a public charge. Then he received from 6,000 l. to 7,000 l. a-year upon fees, and 4,000 l. a-year from the House of Lord, with which they had nothing to do. New, in the first place, upon the subject of fees. Ever since he had had a seat, in that House—ever since he had read anything upon the subject—he had always understood it to be matter of complaint that any Judge should be paid by fees arising from his own Court. At the present time, therefore, in conformity with all that had been said and written upon the subject, it was intended to abolish that part of his emolument which the Lord Chancellor derived from fees, and to substitute another fund from which, by less objectionable means, he might obtain a sum equal to that which he had hitherto derived from fees, and from the Consolidated Fund; so that, for the future, neither the suitors of the Court,
22
nor the country generally, would have to bear any part of the expense of supporting a Lord Chancellor. The manner in which this was proposed to be effected was, to take from the Dead Fund, which was no man's property, a sum of 12,000 l. annually, in lieu of the fees and of the 5,000 l. hitherto paid from the Consolidated Fund. He now came to the 2,000 l. a-year which it was proposed to add to the Lord Chancellor's retiring pension. His hon. and learned friend, the member for Boroughbridge, said that he gave no opinion upon that subject. There certainly could be no ground for objecting to it. Every man who had any acquaintance with the Court of Chancery must be aware, that many serious changes to the prejudice of the Lord Chancellor had been effected by this Bill, and other regulations made which rendered it fit and proper that the amount of his retiring pension should be reconsidered. He who supposed that the people of England were niggard in rewarding those who faithfully discharged high, and responsible, and laborious duties, was mistaken. They were at all times ready and willing that such persons should be amply paid. He wished it to be understood that he had had no communication whatever with the noble and learned Lord who now presided in the Court of Chancery, upon the subject of this Bill—but, at the same time, he must do him justice, and must be allowed to say, that, if ever man deserved well of his country, it was my Lord Brougham, who, by exertions almost superhuman, had got rid of the immense arrear of business which had hitherto been the curse of the Court of Chancery. There was one topic more, and one topic only, to which his hon. and learned friend had adverted, and upon which he would say a few words. His hon. and learned friend had contended that this Bill was framed, as it would appear, almost for the express purpose of creating patronage to the Lord Chancellor. Those gentlemen little understood the profession of the law who supposed that the greater the value of the situation to be given away, the more desirable was the patronage to the person who had the disposal of it. A very little examination must serve to convince any one that it was not in the power of the Lord Chancellor, without incurring the indignation of the public, to make anything like a jobbing, irregular, or sinister appointment to any important judicial

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situation. By constituting a regular Court, therefore, the Lord Chancellor deprived himself of the power of appointing any other than competent persons to discharge the duties of it. A Commissionership of Bankrupts, on the contrary, was just the species of appointment which might be winked at. It might be made a matter of solicitation, and granted without much consideration as to whether the party seeking for it were competent or not. Mr. Montagu said, that the very day that Lord Erskine received the Seals, he made an application to him for a Commissioner-ship; but, before he was twenty-four hours older, the noble and learned Lord shewed him a list of at least 100 names of persons who had applied to him for the like situation. Did any Gentleman suppose that, in the appointment to a Judgeship such a thing could occur, that, where the appointment was to a situation of 5,000 l. a-year, such applications would be made. They all knew that it was impossible. But the little snug thing of 400 l. a-year came completely within the reach of patronage, and the office of Commissioner of Bankrupts had been a fruitful source of patronage. But the more important the office to which the appointment was to be made, the more was the party appointing bound and fettered by public opinion, and, consequently, the less valuable was the patronage vested in him. It would be impossible for the Lord Chancellor on the solicitation of a Duke to make his younger son a Judge, although he might very easily, and without scruple, make him a Commissioner of Bankrupts. In the appointment to a Judgeship, public opinion must always operate too powerfully to prevent corrupt influence from being exercised. He was not aware that there was any other point on which he had intended to dwell. As far as was in his power, he had followed the course of his hon. and learned friend, and endeavoured to reply to the arguments which were advanced by him. In conclusion, he must express his gratitude to the noble and learned individual who, by his exertions in the Court of Chancery, had "won golden opinions from all sorts of men," for the introduction of this measure; and to declare, that of all reformers in law and equity, none that had ever come under his cognizance could be compared with-him. For this reason he would give his hearty and undivided support to the Bill.
Sir Edward Sugdensaid, he had hoped that his honourable and learned friend would have abstained from introducing the Lord Chancellor personally into this debate, particularly when the subject of it was of a general nature, and affecting Lord Chancellors generally; he thought that his hon. friend would have taken a more fitting occasion to introduce the merits of the present Lord Chancellor to the notice of the House. The few observations which he should make with reference to that noble and learned Lord were only called for by the interference of his hon. friend; and in what he did say, he meant in no manner to be understood as reflecting on the noble and learned Lord, or by any means to disparage him. No man had admired, and did admire, more than he, the learning, the talents, and the highly-gifted eloquence of the Lord Chancellor; but he must say, considering the length of time which the noble and learned Lord had sat in the Court of Chancery, and considering the many and highly important and difficult questions of law which were frequently recurring, he did not think that, sitting so long in the Court as he had, and listening so long to the arguments of Counsel, he could have given that deliberation to them which their due investigation imperatively required. He had not intended to have said a word with reference to the noble Lord, but his hon. and learned friend had forced it on him, for he had taken occasion to praise the noble and learned Lord for that which he thought required greater consideration as to whether it did more evil than good. If the noble Lord would take his advice, he should advise him not to sit so long, but to give more time to quiet deliberation, and in making himself master of the practice of that Court, with which he was necessarily unacquainted, inasmuch as he had practised in a Court altogether dissimilar. His hon. and learned friend had said, that the administration of bankruptcy could not be worse than it was at present, and he went into numerous details to make out that case. He would ask, was there any man who would deny that the present administration of bankruptcy was bad? Was there any man who could deny that it required change and correction? Some of the hon. Gentlemen who supported this Bill seemed to take all the credit of the measure to themselves; they had no right to that merit, The late

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Administration had determined upon the improvement and correction of the Court of Chancery; and one of the most important branches of that improvement was, the reforming of the administration of bankruptcy. If the late Administration had continued to exist, the administration of bankruptcy would have been reformed and rectified as bills were in preparation for that purpose. It was said that, under the present system, the Lord Chancellor might appoint a young man of one year's standing at the Bar a Commissioner of Bankrupts; but if he did so, it would be a most scandalous thing either for him or for any other Chancellor to do. An objection was raised to the present Commissioners being practising barristers at the same time; but were not Recorders generally practising Barristers? He did not think there was much, if any thing, in that objection. His learned friend objected to the appeal to the Lord Chancellor, under the present system; but surely his learned friend had not studied the Bill very attentively, for that appeal was preserved under it. With regard to filing numerous affidavits upon immaterial or collateral matters, in trying a question of bankruptcy, no man could condemn that abuse more than he did. It was true, he would admit, that there were too many Commissioners for the business they had to do; but was that a reason that this new Court was necessary? There were to be sixteen Commissioners under this new Bill; at present there were seventy. The new Commissioners would saddle the country with an expense to the extent of 14,000 l. a-year, and this, too, for the purpose of appointing another set of persons no fitter or more competent than those who at present performed the duties. In the present lists, which were composed of seventy Commissioners, there were to be found sixteen men, as competent as any men that could be brought forward, if not more so; but by the new system, the country would have to pay 14,000 l. a-year to get, by some accident, some few persons who might be capable of the duty of the office. The present Administration had come into power upon a declaration of economy: but this did not show them to be sincere in that respect. It might be requisite to reduce the present lists; but why not take from them those persons who were truly competent, and give them the new appointments? He would be bound to say, the business
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would be as well done by sixteen of them as by any other set of men whatever. He thought that some of the Commissioners ought to be practising Barristers, otherwise they would degenerate in the knowledge of their profession, as being confined to the Bankruptcy Court alone. They could not be aware of the new decisions daily occurring in their profession. There were many good things to be given away by this Bill, and he could not but draw the attention of the House to some of them. He would not go into a consideration of the Registrars, though it appeared that ten were to be appointed under the present Bill, that is, one to each Judge. He supposed that they would be a sort of inferior Commissioners, and under the control of the Judge; but although there were ten Registrars, whose office it would be to perform the duties now performed by the Secretary of Bankrupts; yet that office was also to be retained. He would observe, that the appointment of a practising solicitor to the office of Secretary of Bankrupts was most objectionable. Lord Eldon certainly made such an appointment, so had previous Chancellors; but it was an objectionable practice, and ought to be got rid of. The noble Lord, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said, that the time in which a Government of patronage could exist in this country had gone by for ever, but every possible mode had been adopted in the present Bill, of creating patronage. There were to be two Registrars and one Secretary to be appointed to perform the same duties. But whose Secretary was he to be? Was he to be the Secretary to the Lord Chancellor? And if so, was the new Court to be considered as only an appendage of the Court of Chancery? The new Secretary was to have 200 l. a-year, whilst the Registrars were to have 800 l. each, and the Judges 1,500 l. a-year. As to the official assignees, it was hardly possible to estimate their salaries. If he had retired from the profession, he should like nothing better than one of these official assigneeships; for having very little to do, he should be sure of getting a great income. The assignees would get enormous salaries, and there would be no control over them. If he did not satisfy the House, that there never was any thing so uncalled for as the proposed new Court, he should stand convicted of knowing no more about the Court of Chancery than his hon. and learned friend himself. He

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would remind the House, that there were twelve Masters in Chancery, who were fully paid, and not too fully employed; but they had a good deal to do in references made to them in bankruptcy matters, which references they were able most satisfactorily to dispose of, and they might dispose of a great deal more. There was the Vice-Chancellor, too, a Judge who was appointed for the particular purpose of assisting the Lord Chancellor in bankruptcy cases. The present Vice-Chancellor had, during his sittings, devoted thirty-five days to the hearing of bankruptcy cases, and in that period entirely disposed of the whole of them. He had left no arrears in bankruptcy, for, although there were a few cases still set down before him, they could not be called arrears, as they had not been on the paper four months, because he had devoted his holidays to the hearing of bankruptcy cases, and had got through all but those of later growth. This showed that the Vice-Chancellor was fully competent to do the business. The proposition then in support of the present Bill was this—the jurisdiction of the Vice-Chancellor, who had time and ability to do the business in bankruptcy, was to be taken away, and a new Court was to be established, and paid for out of the public money—out of the "Dead Fund," as it was called, and the Lord Chancellor was to retain the whole of his 7,000 l. a-year, without allowing out of it, as Lord Eldon used to do, 2,500 l. to the Vice-Chancellor, in part of his salary for assisting him. There happened to be no arrears of bankrupt cases in the Court of Chancery in consequence of the extraordinary exertions of the Vice-Chancellor, who had been able to get rid of all the arrears, and to keep down the number of causes. The Lord Chancellor now said, that the duty should not be performed in this way, but that he would receive the fees, and cease to pay 2,500 l. to the Vice-Chancellor for the hearing of bankrupt petitions. He did not believe that the present Lord Chancellor had devoted more than eight or nine days to bankrupt cases. The whole of the jurisdiction of bankrupt cases was undoubtedly in the Keeper of the Great Seal for the time being. At present, all the expense of this part of the administration of the law was defrayed out of the fees paid by the suitors in this Court: but it was proposed, that the expenses of the new Court should be paid by the public,
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out of what was called the Dead Fund. The income of the Lord Chancellor would be increased very considerably by this Bill. At present, the fees paid in the Court of Chancery on bankrupt cases amounted to rather more than 7,000 l. a-year, of which the Lord Chancellor received only 5,000 l. as he had to pay the Vice-Chancellor 2,500 l. a-year out of the fund arising from that source. This new Court was to hear till the appeals in bankruptcy now heard by the Vice-Chancellor, although the appeal still remained to the Lord Chancellor. He presumed, under these circumstances, the Lord Chancellor would cease to pay the 2,500 l. now received by the Vice-Chancellor out of the bankrupt fees. He had not made any personal attack upon the Lord Chancellor in the observations he had thought it necessary to make upon the manner in which the business of the Court of Chancery was performed. Nothing he could say would have the effect of lessening that distinguished individual in public estimation; for, however much they might differ in opinion, it was impossible for any one to withhold a tribute of respect to his distinguished talents. The average salary of Lord Lyndhurst during the three years that he held the Great Seal, amounted to 12,771 l., and out of this he had to pay the Vice-Chancellor 2,500 l. a-year. This left 10,271 l., which was the whole sum he received as Keeper of the Great Seal; but he also received in addition a salary of 4,000 l. as Speaker of the House of Lords: this made a total of 14,27l l. But if the present Bill should pass into a law, the Lord Chancellor would have 18,000 l. a-year, as it was not to be expected that he would continue to pay 2,500 l. a-year to the Vice-Chancellor. A Committee of that House had recommended that the salary of the Lord Chancellor should not exceed 14,000 l. a-year. The noble and learned Lord, the author of this Bill, computed the income of the Lord Chancellor at 15,000 l. a-year, but he (Sir E. Sugden) was prepared to shew that it would amount to considerably more than 18,000 l. and this great increase of salary over that received by his predecessors would be attended with a diminution of duties. He was ready to admit, that the present Lord Chancellor had devoted a larger portion of his time than his predecessors to sitting in Court, but he doubted whether the public had gained materially by it. At any rate, there was no reason to justify the increase

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of the Lord Chancellor's salary to such an enormous amount as 18,000 l., and at the same time divesting the Vice-Chancellor of 2,500 l. a-year. In addition to this, it should also be recollected, that, by this Bill, the Lord Chancellor saved the charge of the salary for the Secretary of Bankrupts. But the office of Patentee of Bankrupts was to be abolished. This office was now held by Mr. Thurlow, and Mr. Scott, a son of Lord Eldon, had a reversion in it. It had been asserted, that the Lord Chancellor made a great sacrifice by abolishing this office; but how could this be, as he would not have an appointment to this place until after the death of Mr. Thurlow and Mr. Scott, and it was not likely that a vacancy would occur while the noble and learned Lord held the Great Seal. As so much credit was claimed for the abolition of these sinecure offices, he would remind hon. and learned Gentlemen, that there were many sinecure offices attached to the Court of Chancery, which were not to be abolished. Out of some of these, certain portions of the fees were annually paid, the amount of which was not exactly known, but which would go to increase the 18,000 l. a-year. In addition to this great augmentation of salary, this Bill would confer on the Lord Chancellor an extent of patronage greater than any his predecessors ever enjoyed. However, he did not believe that the Lord Chancellor would have the official appointment to the places under the new Bill. He was convinced, from the very constitution of this Court, that it would be made a political engine. He was satisfied that a more unwise act had not been committed since the dismissal of the late Lord Chancellor of Ireland, for the purpose of appointing a noble Lord to preside in that Court, or of a more decided political bias. He could not see the shadow of a reason for cutting down the salary of the Vice-Chancellor to the extent of 2,500 l. a-year, when such a material increase was to be made to the income of Lord Chancellor Brougham. The noble Earl at the head of the Administration had said, that he was satisfied he had made a very good bargain, but the Lord Chancellor had certainly made a better bargain. But these were not the grounds which should actuate public men. The present Chancellor had already had a considerable share of patronage considering the short time that he had been in office. No less than
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six vacancies in the Commissionerships of Bankrupts had been filled up. Lord Lyndhurst told each of the Gentlemen whom he made a Commissioner of Bankrupts, that he must not expect any compensation if a change should be made in the Bankrupt Court, and the office of Commissioner abolished. Lord Brougham made no such limitation, but appointed gentlemen to these offices, without, any understanding as to their not having retiring salaries. These Commissioners were to be paid 14,000 l. a-year for retiring salaries, when there existed not the least necessity that they should retire. But, independent of the patronage of the appointment to these lucrative offices, which were more than fifty in number, was the House aware that the appointments were to be made, and the salaries to commence immediately on the passing of this Bill, although the duties of these Judges and other officers, were not to commence until some time after the beginning of the new year? The noble Lord opposite said, that the days of patronage had gone by; but could a proposition of this nature be designated in any other way than as gross patronage and jobbing? He would read the last clause of this Bill, which would render the nature of his objection obvious. 'And be it enacted, that this Act shall commence, and take effect from and after the passing thereof, as to the appointment of the Judges and other officers hereby authorised, and as to all other matters and things, from and after the 11th day of January next.' From this it appeared that these gentlemen would receive their salaries from the day of their appointment, which would take place immediately, although the Bill did not come into operation until the 11th of January. What, a large sum would the salaries of the Judges, Registrars, and other officers of this Court amount to, which must be paid by the public, until the duties of their office commenced! What an opportunity had the Lord Chancellor to give a portion of the bankruptcy business to the Masters in Chancery! for nobody would say that they were now overburthened with the duties they had to perform; but then, if this were done, the fees which would be paid under the new system would go to other persons. The Chief Justice of this new Court was to have 3,000 l. a-year, and the three Puisne Judges 2,500 l. a-year each. These Judges would have little or nothing

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to do for their large salaries. Such was the impression on the minds of others. A few nights ago his hon. and learned friend said, with some degree of exultation, that one of the most learned of the commonlaw Judges had consented to fill the office of Lord Chief Justice of this new Court. No man could entertain a higher degree of respect for this learned Judge than himself, and every man would admit his claims as a person of eminent talent, extensive legal knowledge, and great industry. It should not be forgotten, however, that this learned Judge retired from the Court of King's Bench to the comparative ease and quietness of the Exchequer, as he found the duties of the former Court too onerous for his advanced years. Since the appointment, however, of Lord Lyndhurst to the Chief Justiceship of the Court of Exchequer, and the throwing open the Court, there had been such an influx of business, that it could no longer be called the seat of ease. The learned Judge, then, to whom he had alluded, was to be appointed to the Chief Justiceship of this Court, and, if the business of this office were great or burthensome, it was not very likely that he would accept it. This salary, however, of 3,000 l. a-year, with comparatively nothing to do, could not but prove to be very agreeable. The four Judges of this Court would have to hear the bankruptcy petitions, and to try issues on points of that nature. The Vice-Chancellor heard all the bankruptcy petitions in thirty-five days, and it was not very probable that it would take these Judges a longer time than that, for there would not be more petitions to hear than the Vice-chancellor heard, as that learned Judge heard all that there were. Again, on the average of a number of years, there were not twelve issues on questions of bankruptcy tried in our common-law Courts. The Court, also, from its constitution, would become stagnant, and decline in public estimation; and, in consequence of the smallness of the business, the legal knowledge of the Judge would diminish, and might become obsolete; and the professional character of the practitioners in it would not be of the highest order. He admitted that the bankruptcy system required alteration, but he objected to the proposed new jurisdiction as inexpedient and inefficient. It was establishing an inferior jurisdiction in the place of one of high importance, and it could have no beneficial operation, but, on
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the contrary, it would dwindle into insignificance, and be productive of mischief. The great protection which a trader now had against his being unjustly made a bankrupt, consisted in his right to try, by an action at law, the validity of the commission which had been sued out against him. For the trial of such actions no tribunal was more fit, or so fit, as the superior Courts of common-law. He should be sorry to see their important functions delegated to the new Court, which would prove to be as unsatisfactory as it was unnecessary. He would not be understood to advocate the existing administration of the law in bankruptcy, because he disapproved of the mode in which it was intended, by the present Bill, to alter it. Why make a complete change in the machinery of the Court? If it was necessary, were there not Masters in Chancery to whom matters of this nature could be referred? Were there not the present Commissioners, some of whom were amongst the most able men in the profession? Had they not a Vice-Chancellor as a Judge of Appeal, instead of referring every question to the Lord Chancellor? And, also the fifteen common-law Judges for the trial of issues? Why was it necessary to constitute this new Court with such expensive and complicated machinery? No man was more pledged to the improvement of the law than he was, and, when he left office, he explained to the House, in a long speech, the alterations and amendments which it was proposed by the late Administration to make in the law, and the House would recollect that the important subject of bankruptcy was not omitted in the detail he then made. The object he intended to effect was, in the main, that which was sought by the present Bill; but he proposed to attain it in a very different manner. He never contemplated the severing the jurisdiction in bankruptcy from the Great Seal, but to reduce the number of the Commissioners, and to place the duties at present discharged by the seventy in the hands of perhaps twenty; to retain the valuable assistance of the Masters in Chancery, and to make still greater use of it, in order to relieve the Court, and decrease the number of appeals, and, above all, not to part with the privilege of trying actions in the superior Courts. The change which he contemplated might have been effected without expense, and without any such increase of patronage as

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the present Bill proposed. He never contemplated the forming a new Court, with a Chief Justice aud Puisne Judges, Commissioners and Registrars, at salaries amounting to 26,000 l. a-year. It must be universally admitted, that a more opportune moment for the passing of this Bill could not occur than the present time, for the attention of the public was so strongly directed to other topics, that hardly any regard had been paid to this Bill. It ought to have been brought in and left over until next Session, when time would have been allowed for its consideration by the country, instead of its being hurried in the way in which it had been. Again, it was most objectionable to deprive the creditors of the care of the property of the bankrupt, and to place it under the control of official assignees. The Lord Chancellor was afraid, however, that the creditors might neglect their own interests; for he said, "We must not let the unfortunate creditors place confidence in one of their own body, for there is a chance that he may deceive them; let us, therefore, take charge of the estate." Accordingly, the Government were to appoint thirty persons to perform this duty of official assignees. He had thought that everybody had agreed that it was desirable to leave the management of a man's affairs in his own hands, and the same rule should apply to the creditors in a case of bankruptcy. He was ready to admit, that great frauds and abuses were committed by persons acting as assignees; but this could have been prevented without establishing this machinery. Why not allow the Lord Chancellor or the Commissioners of Bankrupts to remove assignees in case of the non-performance of their duty; and why not modify the law, so as to render the punishment in cases of fraud more certain and expeditious? This part of the Bill would lead to the greatest abuses, and would produce much mischief. He objected to the Government interfering in any case in which the property of individuals was at stake—of course, he exempted the property of minors and lunatics—or of preventing any disposition that a man chose to make of his own. He had always regarded this as one of the chief blemishes of the French law. There was hardly any mode in which a gentleman of England could not dispose of his property. There was no mode of dividing it among his family
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which he could not avail himself of. The French law, however, on the death of a parent, directed—with the exception of one share—an equal division among the younger children, and a double portion to the eldest son. This was most objectionable, and, even if for no other reason, a father ought to have the power of protecting himself against a prodigal son. An extreme case like that of Mr. Thellusson—where a father left all his property from his family, unless at the end of a certain time a heir-male should be alive—could be no justification of such a rule as was laid down in the French law. But to return to the subject immediately before the House. He contended that it was against the very principle of the law of England, to adopt the course now laid down in this Bill, relative to the appointment of official assignees. Because the assignees appointed by the creditors sometimes violated their trust, it was proposed to take from the creditors the management of the property of their debtor, in which they must feel great interest, and give it to assignees to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Then it was obvious, that these thirty official assignees would have enormous salaries in fees, for they were to receive five per cent on the money collected out of the bankrupt's estate. This might appear a small sum, but when the estate was large, the money that would accrue would be enormous. He remembered a case of the bankruptcy of a Mr. Powell, where the debts collected amounted to 780,000 l. Now if, when this Bill comes into operation, any merchant should fail for such a large sum as that, any one of these assignees would come in for upwards of 30,000 l. He was so convinced, that the remuneration of the official assignees would be enormous, that he was inclined to request his hon. and learned friend, if his praises of the Lord Chancellor should gain for him, as they ought, the favour of his Lordship, to exercise a little of his influence in favour of him (Sir Edward Sugden), for he should like of all things to lay down his more laborious occupation, and take up for the rest of his days with the post of official assignee. One of these thirty official assignees was to be tacked to every existing commission, and the existing assignees were to pay over the money to him. This was an insult to men of character, respectability, and education, which they

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would not bear. Could it be expected that an honest assignee—a man of justice and integrity—a creditor, who had been appointed under an Act of Parliament—would relish being turned out of his office in this manner, and being obliged to hand over every single shilling he had received? But to what restrictions were these official assignees to be subject? In the first place, good security would be required. It was absurd to talk of sufficient security, for such enormous sums as these persons might receive, which, in some cases, would amount to hundreds of thousands of pounds. He did not insinuate anything against the character of these official assignees; they would be gentlemen of good and proper politics. The noble Lord said so—that was certainly something—but men who were to exercise such a control as this, ought to possess even greater merits than that. If a man were to give security for 10,000 l. and then received a very large sum—perhaps 100,000 l.—what remedy would there be if he were to take it into his head to proceed to Calais by steam, or some such quick conveyance? Would not the creditors say in such a case, that it would have been better for them if the Lord Chancellor had allowed them to take care of their own interests, and would they not have a right to say so? What would the effect of this Bill be, so far as regarded country attornies. In that respect, it was one of the most objectionable measures he had seen. As the law now stood, the Lord Chancellor had not the power of appointing country Commissioners, but by this Bill he vested that power in himself, and by that one act secured to himself the patronage of all the barristers and attornies throughout the kingdom. Now, suppose a political Lord Chancellor, such a Chancellor as had been in times long gone by, who would interest himself in political questions, was it not likely that the gentlemen, before they were appointed, would have a little bit of information given to them, to the effect that his Majesty's Government wished to advocate particular questions, and to attach themselves to specific political parties? He had stated, when the Reform Bill was before the House, that it had been calculated that the barristers who would be appointed under that Bill, would not be less in number than 300, and they would be appointed by the Lord Chancellor; if, therefore, the appointment
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of those 200 or 300 individuals were given him, as well as the influence this Bill would give, an immense degree of power, to be exercised over all the attornies and all the barristers in England, would be vested in him. This was a power which should be given to no man, and the present Lord Chancellor ought to form no exception. The Reform Bill had placed more power in the hands of the country attornies than they ever possessed, and if that Bill should pass, these dangerous powers would be still more increased by the Bill now under discussion. Under that Bill it would be necessary for the overseers to employ an attorney, in order to make out the lists; when the lists were made out, the attorney must go before the barrister to argue the case—for a barrister must not—over whom he will possess a most considerable degree of influence, and if the barristers were to go on their own circuits, it would be still more objectionable, and this influence would be increased. The attorney would possess an interest over the barrister, he would make up the lists, and if this Bill passed, the attornies would have a greater power over the elections of this country than ever was possessed by any class or body of men. Now, as this Bill gave the Lord Chancellor again great influence over these attornies, who possessed so much power, the Lord Chancellor and his Majesty's Government for the time being, would possess an influence over the elections, which was highly improper, unconstitutional, unadviseable, and inexpedient. On these grounds, it would be quite impossible to pass this Bill. He would not stop this measure at present, because he was quite willing to admit, that there must be great alterations in bankruptcy. He entirely agreed that there was a necessity of cutting down the number of the present Commissioners; but the power of deciding cases of this description must not be taken from the Judges of the land, and given to an inexperienced and inefficient Court. He would state to the House a few general observations on this question. He had frequently heard it argued by individuals, whom no man would deny were competent to form an opinion upon the subject, that the business of bankruptcy ought not to be separated from the Great Seal, and he would tell the House why. He was making these observations in the presence of many hon. and learned Gentlemen, who would,

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no doubt, correct him if he stated anything improper. This was not only an important branch of legislation, so far as the property of individuals was concerned, but there was no law in practice which it might not be necessary to consult in the administration of justice in this respect. The greater part of the solicitors who were engaged in bankruptcy cases only, were much less respectable than any other class of practitioners. There was no branch of the practice in which there was so great a tendency to perjury as bankruptcy. It was requisite, therefore, that this business should be attached to the Great Seal, not merely because the Great Seal was supposed to possess the knowledge requisite to amend and correct the erroneous decisions of the Courts below, but because the importance of that Court, and the importance of the barristers who practised in it, were such as to keep in check and to control undue practices on the part of the inferior practitioners in bankruptcy. The removal of bankruptcy from the Great Seal would, therefore, be the means of also removing this wholesome cheek, and this due administration of justice. Nothing could be more dangerous than the appointment of this Court of Review, which would transact the business now performed by the Vice-Chancellor. If it, were necessary to establish a new Court at all, which he denied—it would first be proper that the whole law of debtor and creditor, and the administration of the Insolvent-laws between them, should be taken into consideration. The Insolvent-law now stood on as bad a footing as a law could well stand, operating most harshly upon the poor debtor, without being sufficiently advantageous to the poor creditor. Everybody knew the truth of this observation, and nobody better than the noble Lord, the Chancellor of the Exchequer; because, before he came into office, he did, in a manner most creditable to himself, and highly gratifying to this House and the country at large, offer to become a most active member of a Committee which the Government then proposed to appoint, for the purpose of inquiring into the law of debtor and creditor. The noble Lord at that period could afford to devote his time to the performance of that duty; but, of course, his coining into office had incapacitated him from doing so. His Majesty's Government had not brought forward any proposition for pursuing that inquiry,
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although the leading member of it was willing to take upon himself the arduous duty to which he had referred. It was impossible to conceive a more unwise and improper course than that of constituting a new Court of Bankruptcy, while the existing laws of insolvency and of debtor and creditor remained in their present state. This Bill had two objects in view; the first was, the institution of a new Court, which was not wanted; and the other was, the making some half-dozen alterations in the law, which might well be done without having a new Court. Under the existing law, the first man in England might be put into an awkward predicament. A man behind his back might swear to a certain transaction, ex parte; and unless he had the means of shewing that he was not a bankrupt, they were bound to regard him as one, on this ex parte proceeding, and his fair fame and fortune were, perhaps, for ever destroyed. As so much hardship could be entailed upon individuals by this law, the Legislature very properly allowed an appeal to any court of justice in the country. But what did this Bill do? It allowed no such advantage, but compelled the individual to bring his case before one of the unimportant and incompetent Judges of the Tribunal which was about to be established. If this Bill were to pass, what would be the effect, supposing a man—Mr. Chambers, for instance, whose case was well known—should turn out not to be a bankrupt; a man's credit would be destroyed without any cause for so doing. It was quite a common thing, certainly, for the decision of Commissioners to be reversed, and for issues to be tried, and verdicts set aside; but under the present system there was a direct remedy; the case might be tried before any of the Courts in Westminster-hall, or before the Lord Chancellor; but in future this must be done before this new tribunal of unimportant personages. Unless his Majesty's Government could shew that the fifteen Judges of the land were so pressed that they could not hear issues on bankruptcies—the number of which was very small—there was not the slightest foundation for this change. The bankrupt and the creditor ought to have a full and fair remedy, and therefore he was willing and anxious to concur in a measure which would have that effect. There was another question, of very great importance, relating to

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the saving of which they had heard, and the fund of which the hon. and learned Gentleman spoke. The Dead Fund was the property of living men; it was composed of dividends which had not been paid over, because the owners were not to be found; and it was, therefore, as much the property of the public as any which was applied in the administration of justice. The hon. and learned Gentleman might have applied the same observations to this fund as to the unclaimed dividends at the Bank of England. There was very great expense and trouble attendant upon getting a small fund out of Court; and no doubt every facility ought to be afforded for that, purpose. These small funds were accumulated at the expense of individuals, and he, therefore, called upon the noble Lord to protect this fund. There was once a suggestion made on this side the House, which seemed not to be attended to on the other side, to borrow the Suitors' Fund and lend it, to Government. He then took the liberty, as he always should, of opposing such a system. Not a single shilling of a fund belonging to the suitors of that Court ought ever to be touched. That fund, so far as it was not wasted, belonged to the State, no doubt; but then, the law applied it in the first instance to make good the necessary charges of the administration of justice—nothing, certainly, could be more fair. It was unclaimed, and it certainly ought to be applied, in the first instance, to defraying those costs incurred in administering justice. The noble Lord, however, was now going to apply it to other purposes. He proposed to give the Lord Chancellor 5,000 l. out of it, as at present, and also 7,000 l. instead of fees and other emoluments. How could such a proceeding be reconciled with justice? What right, had the noble Lord to pay the Lord Chancellor in the way he proposed, without, in the first instance, making a full inquiry into the nature of this fund? In fact that fund had become a public trust; and when the hon. and learned Attorney General said, that he was prepared to provide for these expenses without having recourse to a public fund, this was a perfect delusion; for he proposed to throw those expenses upon a fund which belonged to certain individuals, and not one shilling of which ought to be applied to the benefit of the country. The Lord Chancellor held the bankruptcy business by a particular commission—that commission
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was always directed to him as a matter of course; and, therefore, though the law in bankruptcy cases was always administered in the Court of Chancery, where alone it could be administered, yet it did not, strictly speaking, so belong to the Court as to justify them in throwing upon the Suitors' Fund, not only the expense of the fees in bankruptcy, but the whole of the expense of this new Court. The noble Lord at the head of his Majesty's Government, and the noble and learned Lord at the head of the Court of Chancery, would entirely disappoint the expectations of the country, if they brought forward measures of this description, instead of introducing new and complete reforms in the law, and instead of reducing those enormous fees and exorbitant charges which would long ago have been abolished if the late Administration had remained in office. He had a right to say this, and he would now declare, sincerely and deliberately, that he would support any general improvement in this respect which might be brought forward on fair and proper grounds. When the noble and learned Lord who now sat on the Woolsack was defeated on the measure which he (Sir Edward Sugden) then brought forward, he again divided the House, and again declared his intention of making use of his privilege as a Member of Parliament, until, by repeated adjournments, he had destroyed the success of the measure. Therefore, the noble and learned Lord now at the head of the law, had shewn as much opposition to an alteration in the state of the law as it was possible for any individual Member of Parliament to shew in his place in that House. For the task of introducing a Reform in the administration of justice, many individuals might be more competent than himself; but, there was no one who would have set about it with a more sincere and earnest desire to effect, an improvement than he should. He had employed the time which properly belonged to himself—the vacation—to give his best consideration to the subject, and from the course then adopted by the noble Lord opposite, he had had a most sanguine hope that some most effectual improvement in the state of the law would have been introduced. This confidence he could not entertain much longer, if some comprehensive measure were not brought forward. In making any observations upon a public subject, he should always do what he conceived to be his duty,

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without regard to any, the most remote, ulterior considerations, or to whoever might happen to hold the Great Seal for the time being.
Mr. Serjeant Wildedid not know whether his hon. and learned friend had ever received any castigation in the Court of Chancery, but, certainly, if not for that, for some other sufficient reasons, he had addressed the House on the present occasion on very many, various, and dissimilar subjects. He (Mr. Serjeant Wilde) had never received any castigation from the present Lord Chancellor; and it was, therefore, to him no matter of surprise that an hon. and learned friend of his, near him, could treat, this subject with good humour. One of the evils to which his hon. and learned friend (Sir Edward Sugden) called the attention of the House was, the recent despatch of business in the Court of Chancery. As this House and the country had a tolerably long experience of the evil consequences of delay in that Court, there could be but, very few hon. Members who would sympathize with the hon. and learned Gentleman. This was undoubtedly a measure of very great importance, embracing the whole system of the present administration of the law. Though his hon. and learned friend had entered into a great variety of topics calculated to distract his own attention and that of his listeners, he had not advanced anything decidedly opposed to this proposition. He had not attempted to shew that the Court, which it was proposed to establish, would be incompetent to answer the object for which it was to be created. He was not aware from whom the noble and learned Lord who introduced this Bill in another place, procured the necessary information on which to act, or to whose experience he addressed himself, if he did not apply to the very same quarters to which the hon. and learned Gentleman had referred. With regard to the introduction of this Bill, the measure now proposed was not new to any individual who might have thought fit to direct his attention to the subject. For upwards of thirty years, the system of bankrupt jurisdiction had been a matter of universal and constant condemnation and execration. This Bill was the result of those inquiries which had from time to time been made, upon the authority of that House, or by persons professionally engaged in the administration of justice: the Bill at the same time proceeded upon
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the recommendations of Committees of that House, and upon the recommendations of individuals who had given, their best attention to the subject; and there was no part of this Bill, not even that part which was most condemned, which had not received the sanction of most respectable authorities reiterated from time to time. Considering the way in which Commissioners of Bankrupts were appointed, it would be a most extraordinary circumstance if that jurisdiction were efficient; agreeing, however, with his hon. and learned friend, that among the Commissioners there were to be found as intelligent, efficient, and respectable individuals, as filled any situations in the kingdom. He had for many years been in the constant, habit of practising before them, and had, therefore, constant opportunities of seeing them; and he would unhesitatingly state, that there were individuals in that jurisdiction before whom he should be most happy to plead; still that jurisdiction had been made more the subject of patronage than any other in the kingdom. It was well known that to Lord Chancellor after Lord Chancellor it had been the means of obliging political and other friends, and a great number of individuals had been appointed who were utterly incapable of discharging the duties belonging to their office. The hon. and learned Gentleman had spoken of this jurisdiction without knowing anything about it; he had borne testimony to the manner in which the Commissioners did their duty. He believed he never was in a room with them in his life, he was sure that his hon. and learned friend had no experience on the subject, that he possessed no personal means of information. He was quite in error when he stated to the House that much attention was usually given to parties at private meetings. He would read what had been stated by an hon. and learned friend of his, who had been engaged in eleven times as much business before these Commissioners as any other individual in existence. He said, 'Secondly, among 'the evils of the jurisdiction is the difficulty of fixing the attention of the Commissioners.' This individual was himself a Commissioner: he proceeded. 'The attention of the Commissioners is with great difficulty fixed on the subject matter in dispute. I frequently have to implore the undivided attention of the Commissioners, but at private meetings

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the newspaper is a much more able advocate than I am. In January last, on my stating to a Commissioner, who had appointed two and I believe three private meetings at the same time, that it was impossible all parties could gain his undivided attention; the answer to my observations was, "that the Lord Chancellor had ordered that only three meetings should be held at once." A more perverted or mistaken interpretation of that order could not be conceived.' When his hon. and learned friend, therefore, spoke as he had done upon this subject, his observations were applied to a point, in respect of which he possessed no information. It must be apparent that this was the case, if the statements which had been made by individuals who knew anything of the matter were referred to. It appeared from a statement of Mr. Montague—an excellent authority on this question, and who had been before referred to—that a worse constituted tribunal could not be conceived; but how could it be otherwise? Three Commissioners were appointed to attend a meeting two hours, or, if it were a private meeting, one hour, The counsel, the attornies, and the Commissioners attended, besides the parties. Punctuality was not to be expected; a portion of the two hours or hour, as the case might be, was wasted, in consequence of the non-attendance of the necessary parties. The examination was taken by question and answer, and while it was proceeding the counsel did not sit silent, and discussions frequently arose, so that it often happened that half the time of the second meeting was occupied in re-saying and re-considering what was said at the first; and so they might go on for ten, fifteen, or twenty meetings. Could it, then, be supposed that such a Court as this, and such proceedings as these were calculated to administer justice, equitably, and satisfactorily? It had been stated that the average expense of each meeting was 12 l.; it was not more than 10 l. At last the decision of the Commissioners was unsatisfactory; and what then took place? A petition was presented to the Vice-Chancellor, the depositions being taken before him by affidavit, and, consequently, not in the same way as before the Commissioners. The whole matter was gone over again; at last, at the end of some months, the matter came for hearing before the Vice-Chancellor; he decided, and in many cases the parties instantly appealed, But did he
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always decide? no; he frequently directed a further inquiry, and often he directed issues to be tried. What was the consequence? These inquiries were unsatisfactory; the case came back again to the Vice-Chancellor, and the parties then appealed to the Lord Chancellor, the whole system being one of endless litigation, procrastination, and expense. Although he, perhaps, had had considerable experience on this subject, still there were many gentlemen who had had more; but, with the permission of the House, he would state a few instances of what had occurred within his own personal experience, and the truth of which he could vouch for. It was admitted—and this fact was material—by the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite, that the nature of this jurisdiction ought to be altered. Now, some short time ago, the necessity of such an alteration was utterly denied, but it was now fully admitted, for no one could deny that great evils existed. His hon. and learned friend referred to a specific case, and as he took it first he would follow his example. In that case a Commission issued against Messrs. Howard and Gibbs; that commission was superseded: it was afterwards tried, and before another Commission; and after a very long examination—sixteen or twenty meetings were held upon it—the petition was rejected. A petition was presented to the Vice-Chancellor to reverse that decision, and praying that it should be received; long affidavits were prepared, and six or seven counsel were instructed and feed. The case came on before the then Vice-Chancellor, Sir John Leach, who, as soon as the case was opened, said—"It is useless my going through this petition. I cannot hear it, inasmuch as the question turns upon contradicted facts, and there must be an issue." An issue, therefore, was directed. That petition did not cost less than 300 l. or 400 l. and before counsel were heard—immediately, in fact, on the case being opened, and without the long affidavits being looked into further than to shew the Court that the facts were contradicted—it was thus abruptly disposed of. That petition was presented in 1816; the issue was tried in about twelve months; and a verdict was found in conformity with the decision of the Commissioners, and against the debt. A petition was presented to the Lord Chancellor, with a complaint that the Vice-Chancellor had not heard counsel, and setting forth the

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fees and expenses incurred in presenting their first petition. At the end of something like twelve months this petition was heard, and after an argument which lasted three or four days, a new trial was granted on payment of costs by the petitioners: these costs amounted to 550 l. The new trial, at the end of another twelve months, was about coming on, when it was discovered that the order was not quite right. There was a petition, therefore, to the Lord Chancellor to amend it; this was done; but when the cause was about coming on again, it was discovered that there was another error in the order, and another petition was therefore presented, and at the time of the presentation of that petition something like four years and a-half had elasped since the question had first arisen. My Lord Eldon then said, that he should have had all the facts before him three years before, when the petition was first presented. The parties begged and prayed that he would decide the case himself, without obliging them to incur the expense of preparing another issue and sending it down for trial. Four days were occupied in hearing the argument, in which no less than nine counsel were engaged. The Court then made an order confirming the original decision of the Commissioners and the decision of the Jury, and dismissed the petition with costs. The petitioners complained that they should have costs to the amount of 1,550 l. to pay the assignees, besides 550 l. they had paid before, and the petitioners' own costs could not have been less than 2,500 l. The assignees' costs were about 500 l. Thus there was a delay of five years, and the expense altogether was about 5000 l. This was the jurisdiction—the tribunal—which indeed his hon. and learned friend said, he could not defend, but which nevertheless had been defended by others, and held up as perfect and requiring no alteration! He would cite another case which also occurred within his own knowledge. In that case a creditor had proved a debt of the amount of 4,000 l. A petition was presented, in the year 1816, to expunge that debt. The petition was presented to the Vice-Chancellor, by whom the case was referred to the Commissioners, who held twenty-five meetings upon it, which occupied about three years. The Commissioners ultimately decided against the debt; and a petition was presented to the Vice-Chancellor, who directed an issue; after all
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the expense, therefore, of taking the affidavits—after all the fees to counsel—the matter was in no way advanced, and the affidavits were mere waste paper. The attorney's costs for taking instructions are 1s. for every seventy-two words; for drawing, 8d. per folio, or seventy-two words, and for copying—to be sworn. Then briefing, 3s. 4d. a sheet for every sheet delivered to counsel, of which there were sometimes six or more. An issue was prepared by one side; the other side said that the matter ought to be concluded, and that there ought to be no issue—and the result was, that a petition was presented to the Lord Chancellor; that petition, after about a year and a half had elasped, was at last argued before Lord Chancellor Eldon, and at the period when he left office, it remained waiting for judgment, it having been presented in 1816. The parties implored my Lord Eldon to give judgment notwithstanding that he had resigned the Seals, and not to put them to the expense of having the whole of the matter re-heard before the new Lord Chancellor. In January, 1831, therefore—last January—an order was pronounced on this petition, reversing the decision of the Commissioners, and pronouncing the debt to be good, and the creditors of the estate had the satisfaction of receiving a dividend on 4,000 l. of 2s. in the pound, the costs only amounting to 2.000 l. There was another case, in which a person of the name of Perkins proved a debt to the amount of 4,000 l. The case was examined by the Commissioners, and went through the same routine, an issue was directed in the same manner; the debt was established, and a dividend of 2s. in the pound, or something less, paid upon it, the costs greatly exceeding the whole amount of the debt. He might mention several similar cases but would confine himself to one more. A dispute arose, in the instance to which he alluded, whether the sum of 300 l. had been received by the assignee for the benefit of the estate or his own benefit, on which an issue was directed—the Vice-Chancellor, conceiving himself incompetent: to decide, directed the issue, and the verdict decided in favour of the creditors, and that the money was received for the use of the estate. When the case went back to the Court of Chancery, all the parties were desirous of having their costs out of the fund, but the parties received only 300 l. a sum not sufficient to pay their costs, and

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the rest they went without. He could accompany these cases with many others which had occurred within his own experience. He would venture to say—and he had been engaged in as many commissions as any man in England—that the instances were very rare where a man was not ruined by a bad commission being taken out against him, He recollected the case of a man whose estate was supposed to be worth 10,000 l. My Lord Eldon directed an issue; great delay took place; the whole estate was ruined and there was not one shilling left to divide among the creditors. Instances like these were not rare—they were in the ordinary course of the administration of justice. It might be asked, how this happened? Was the tribunal incompetent to administer the duties which were imposed upon it? One reason was, the jurisdiction of my Lord Chancellor in bankruptcy was, to a great extent, assumed, for there was no such jurisdiction given him by the law of the land. He had it and exercised it now, and of course it would be idle to attempt to dispute it. He only referred to this matter now, in order to shew why the jurisdiction was so incompetent. The Lord Chancellor had a commission directed to him to try bankruptcy cases; but it was hardly possible to imagine a tribunal less qualified to decide such questions satisfactorily. It was impossible to suppose that disputed matters of fact could be tried by affidavit. The affidavit was drawn by the attorney, and the witness spoke the language of the attorney, and not his own. My Lord Eldon—with his intimate acquaintance with, and knowledge of, human nature—knew perfectly well that it was impossible to decide satisfactorily, on contested matters of fact, without the intervention of a Jury; the Commissioners therefore formed a most imperfect tribunal. Many of them were too timid to discharge their duty efficiently. He had frequently heard commissioners say, when they had been urged to do their duty and commit a bankrupt, "No! we cannot do it, our responsibility is too great." When he was a Solicitor, he frequently refused to issue Commissions for creditors, observing that it would be useless to do so unless they were directed to a particular List. He had frequently heard it observed by solicitors, that there were only particular Lists who would do their duty; they of course, became the subject of particular
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remark, as they discharged their duty in a different manner from the others. They were accused, or laboured under the imputation, of acting with a peculiar degree of severity, which imputation had no foundation whatever; in fact, he never knew a case of any individual committed by them, who was afterwards discharged by a superior authority. It really was the practice, to say to creditors, "You will only throw your money away unless you can get the Commission directed to a particular List." At this day there were many solicitors who, though they believed that the prosecution of a Commission of bankruptcy would be beneficial to the creditors, declined to take the necessary steps, despairing of obtaining Commissioners who would fearlessly discharge their duty. Therefore, looking to the Commissioners in the first place, it appeared that they had not the confidence either of the profession or of the public; and a great part of the delay and expense which took place, arose from the circumstance of the parties appealing against the decision, merely from want of such a confidence. This was one of the evils proposed to be cured by this Bill, which proceeded upon the recommendations of individuals perfectly competent to form a judgment upon the subject. It was proposed to select many of the new Commissioners out of the existing number; and there was no doubt that out of seventy twenty efficient men might be found; and when it was considered that these twenty individuals would form a separate jurisdiction, giving their whole time to the duties of their office, not acting as counsel, and not having their attention distracted by going into different inquiries partially at one and the same meetings, it must be at once conceded that they would make most efficient Judges or Commissioners. He had heard it stated in another place most distinctly, that many of the existing Commissioners were intended to form the new jurisdiction. His hon. and learned friend assumed that this would not be the case; but he was mistaken. Very many, if not all of the new Commissioners would be selected from the existing body, and no doubt could be entertained, that when the nature of the jurisdiction was so much improved, it would be found to be most efficient. His hon. and learned friend said, that they had no right to expect the assistance of three efficient Commissioners at one and the

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same time; and he said—"If a young man were appointed, I should ask, are there other young men with him; if so, then I should say that the commission is inefficient, but if he were to act in conjunction with experienced persons, then the case would be different." But was it fit that they should take the chance of having efficient persons in this way? This was not, however, the only objection—there were others which required, to be equally considered. He had attended cases for seven years virtually, as it was called, before a Commissioner whom he (Mr. Serjeant Wilde) never saw—because he was up stairs in bed during the whole of the time: a second Commissioner was below, and his door was left open, in order that the oath might be considered as having been administered before him. Now this was a most respectable gentleman in every sense of the word, but this jurisdiction was certainly inefficient. His hon. and learned friend said, let the appeal be to the Vice-Chancellor: the cases to which he had referred did go before the Vice-Chancellor. They were not now proposing to establish a new Court, the Vice-Chancellor's being untried; they were not now dealing with imaginary evils: Government was called upon to act in a case, the evils of which were well known to commercial and professional men, and called upon by the existence of such glaring defects in the administration of justice, that they could not refuse to legislate. Therefore, it was a sufficient answer to his hon. and learned friend, that the Vice-Chancellor had been tried, and his jurisdiction in this respect, as at present constituted, had been found inefficient. When he heard it said that there were very few appeals, he referred to a return which was made to that House relative to the number of petitions which were heard before the Lord Chancellor. His hon. and learned friend said, that the average was about one in forty; but in referring to this statement, it must not he forgotten that many of the petitions which were laid before the Vice-Chancellor, were mere matters of course. The whole number of petitions heard before the Vice-Chancellor, in the year 1824, was 150; how it happened he could not tell—but, according to the return, the appeals before the Lord Chancellor in that year amounted to 163. In 1825, 304 were heard before the Vice Chancellor, and 202 before
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the Lord Chancellor. In 1826, 423 before the Vice-Chancellor, and 223 before the Lord Chancellor. In 1827, 292 be the Vice Chancellor, and 222 before the Lord Chancellor. In 1828, 353 before the Vice-Chancellor, and 148 before the Lord Chancellor. In 1829, 309 before the Vice-Chancellor, and 147 before the Lord Chancellor. There was scarcely a contested matter which was not afterwards made the subject of appeal; those appeals being productive of the greatest delay, expense, and inconvenience, and frequently ending in the total ruin of the parties. This naturally arose from the very great evils of the existing system. Nobody who heard his hon. and learned friend's statement would believe that suitors at present paid fees to the extent of 40,000 l. a-year, a very "great part of which would be abolished by this Bill. Nobody would credit that his observations could be founded on facts so simple as this: the expense of the new Court would be about 29,000 l. a-year, whereas the expense of the present, for the very same matters, was 40,000 l. a year and more; besides which a saving infinitely beyond this would accrue to the public in respect of an expense, which had been calculated by Mr. Montague at 240,000 l. a-year. The question then resolved itself into this: was the proposed Court calculated to remedy the evils which at present existed? It was; because these Commissioners would bestow their whole and undivided attention upon the matters brought before them,—they would not have their attention distracted by the investigation of several cases at the same time, and they would have the means of coming to a satisfactory decision. The consequence of this improvement would be, that there would not be one-half, or anything like one-half, of the petitions brought, forward which were now presented; that was to say, of petitions respecting the same subject-matter. The expense of each meeting at present, as he before observed, was 10 l. Under this Bill it would be 1l., for which sum suitors would have a competent and efficient tribunal, besides the saving which would be made in messages, fees, &c. Thus a great number of appeals would be abolished, and an effectual tribunal created. But would the number of commissions be abolished? There was no question that there would be a much greater number than at present, because the tribunal would be more effectual,

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and many parties would then be anxious for inquiry, who now abstained from demanding it, because they thought that the case would not be properly examined into by the present jurisdiction. Under the proposed system they would have men of intelligence and experience. If a Commissioner's decision were gainsayed, too, he would have notice that the Court would be moved, in order that he might shew cause why he should not review his decision; on which he would make a report to the Court of what had taken place. Under the present system, if the case were decided by the Chief Justice or any other judge, and a new trial was moved for, that motion was decided upon affidavit and the arguments of counsel, just as a motion would be decided in the Court of Chancery. Under the present system, in case of an appeal, affidavits must be filed at an enormous cost; but, under the proposed system, if a new trial were wished for, instead of a mass of affidavits, there would be only the report of the Judge of what took place before him. How little expensive was this course compared with the old one! He remembered that a mandamus was once moved for, and refused, in a case of bankruptcy, on the ground that the Lord Chancellor had a summary jurisdiction; but, in point of fact, the delays were often such as to ruin all parties concerned. If copies of the proceedings were wanted, parties could have them from a short-hand writer at a far less expense than the copies of the affidavits were now procured at. There was now a multiplication of fees, and all, perhaps, for nothing, as the facts might at length be sent to be tried before one of the Judges at Westminster Hall. Thus the winner was sometimes ruined; the loser always. His hon. and learned friend had reflected upon the Judges that were to be in this new Court, and had said that they would be persons of no weight or consideration. What authority had he for so saying, or how could he reconcile his statement, that this Court would have to decide on questions of the greatest complexity and difficulty, involving property to an enormous amount, with his opinion that it would be considered a trifling Court? The jurisdiction of this Court would be found so important as to carry great weight and consequence with it in the eyes of the country, and, consequently, to offer sufficient inducements
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to men of reputation to become Judges in it. Instead, then, of bankruptcy proceedings being attended with enormous expense, and lasting for years, they would, in this Court, be despatched at a cheap rate in the course of a few weeks. He agreed with the hon. and learned member for St. Mawes, that the fact of a man being ruined by a commission being taken out against him, even if that commission should turn out to be bad, was sufficient to call for an amendment of the law. The issues to try whether a man had been a bankrupt or not were frequent and expensive from various causes. That evil would be remedied by the fact being at once tried by affidavits and got rid of, and by the decision being made upon the facts before the Court, instead of the parties being at liberty to make a new case. The case of Chambers shewed, in a most glaring manner, the evils of the system in this respect. In that case, the question was brought before the Court of Chancery, and was argued four times. Three verdicts were given on one side and one decision on the other. The case then went before the Court of Exchequer, which negatived the bankruptcy: a new trial was had, which again established the commission; and now another new trial was pending to overturn that decision. This had been going on for four or five years. What, during this time, had been the situation of the customers of that banker? How many tradesmen might not have been ruined by the delay in paying the dividend? How many thousands had not been consumed in costs? His hon. and learned friend opposite complained of the expedition of the Lord Chancellor—complained that those who found fault, when on that side of the House, with the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in bankruptcy, had not been three months in office before they set themselves about remedying its evils—evils which he himself had been considering these twenty years. His hon. friend said, why not wait until a bill for the reform of the whole of the Chancery jurisdiction was brought on. But why should they wait for all before taking a part? Here a Bill was presented, proving the integrity of the intentions of the Government, and its determination to act upon the professions it made upon that side of the House. The hon. and learned member for Boroughbridge had said, that it was essential

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that the Lord Chancellor should have the superintendence of all matters in bankruptcy. This Bill proposed to preserve the superintendence of the Lord Chancellor, without troubling him with matters he could not decide. The Lord Chancellor had always found himself incompetent to decide on matters of fact; and, when questions of fact had come before him, he had sent them to a Court of law. Under this Bill, all matters of fact would be decided previously to their coming before him. The mere question of law would go before him, either in the shape of a bill of exceptions, or of a special verdict, thus saving the parties a vast expense. It had been stated by several intelligent persons, and by none more strongly than Mr. Montagu, that the present system involved a maximum of expense with a minimum of justice. At present, 43 l. was the least expense at which a man could be at before the Commissioners; for there could not be less than three meetings. Under the new system, the creditor would, at an expense of 30 l., be able to have as many public meetings as he might require, and as many private meetings as he might think fit at the cost of 1l. Gentlemen talked about the expense of this Court; but the plain fact was, that the country, instead of paying 70,000 l. a-year, would only have to pay 30,000 l. His hon. and learned friend spoke with an air of determination and positiveness that would almost persuade one he was always in the right; but he could not help suspecting, that he knew as little of the time that would be occupied in this new Court as of the proceedings of the Commissioners of Bankruptcy. Suppose there be 5000 public meetings and 2,000 private meetings, it would give the Commissioners work for six hours a day through nine or ten months in the year. But there was every reason to believe, that when the business could be done at a reasonable expense, and in a satisfactory manner, the increase of business would make the work greater. That such was likely to be the case might be judged from the fact of the Court of Exchequer having twenty times as much to do as it used to have. Another objection made to the Bill was on account of the retiring allowance given under it to the Lord Chancellor, but if it was compared with what was received by Lord Lyndhurst and Lord Eldon, and if the
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fees abolished were considered, no one ought to complain of it. The 12,000 l. was less than was received in any one year during the Chancellorships of Lord Eldon and Lord Lyndhurst on account of their bankruptcy business, except one year of Lord Lyndhurst's, when it did not exceed 10,000 l. With respect to the objection of part of the expense being defrayed out of the Dead Fund, as it was clear that all the suitors of the Court of Chancery would benefit by the arrangement, very little weight was to be attached to it. And it appeared, from an investigation ordered by the Lord Chancellor, that that fund would still be sufficiently large to answer all demands upon it. Another objection had been raised to this Bill on account of its giving the Lord Chancellor the appointment of the Judges who were to preside in this Court, but he could not see upon what foundation it rested, when, without dispute, he appointed all the Judges in Westminster Hall. Besides, he had already the appointment of these seventy Commissioners, vacancies among whom occurred every year: and it was clear that the present system, costing the public 70,000 l. a-year, instead of 30,000 l., must give a greater annual patronage than could be exercised under the new Bill. It was objected, also, with regard to the period of the appointment of these Judges, that they might be in the receipt of their salaries several months before they commenced their duties. Now it must be considered that they did not at once go into a Court and begin their operations, but that they had to forma Court; and two months was not too much time for the purpose. In short this country had long been groaning and suffering under the most imperfect and inefficient system of law, with regard to bankruptcy matters, that it was possible to imagine, and had paid dearly for perjury, delay, and uncertainty. He had not troubled the House with a statement of the evidence of various witnesses upon these points, for they were notorious and undeniable. This Bill would substitute for all these evils an efficient Administration of justice, and therefore he should support it. He had refrained from entering into various topics introduced by his hon. and learned friend because he did not think it respectful to the House to occupy its time with any matter except the actual Bill.
Mr. John Smith Mr. John Smith rose to support the Bill,

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the object of which was, to carry into effect alterations which he had urged upon the House many years ago, but without effect. It was in some measure by his humble means that the Committee which had been referred to was appointed by the House in 1818. The evidence given before that Committee convinced the House and the public, that the Bankrupt-laws as they stood were a source of villainy, fraud, and perjury, of the grossest and most odious kind. It was clearly made out in evidence that there were men plying, almost openly, a daily trade at the doors of the Court of Commissioners, and that they were ready, for small sums, to swear to any debts that might be required; that bills of exchange drawn for the purpose were put into the hands of these persons to support the proofs they made upon bankrupts' estates; and that thus the certificates of fraudulent bankrupts were obtained in spite of their real creditors. The opinions of some of the most eminent men in the city of London confirmed the opinion which he had formed, and convinced him that nothing was more injurious to the fair tradesman than the facility which the Bankrupt-laws afforded to fraud, while the delay and expense which accompanied them amounted in many cases to a total denial of justice. He knew many instances in which commercial men often were obliged to submit to great losses as a less evil than applying to the Equity Courts. He had known Lord Eldon reserve his opinion for sixteen years, to the ruin of suitors, though the point at issue was such as the new Court would settle in a few days. The evils now to be remedied, existed and were complained of thirty years ago. On one occasion a rich man refused to pay to the banking-house with which he was connected more than 4,000 l. on his bond of 4,500 l. The house had consulted its legal adviser, Mr. Kay, the solicitor of the Bank of England, who had told him, that the house could undoubtedly recover the money in a Chancery suit, "but," added Mr. Kay, "mind what I tell you, my bill will exceed the 500 l." Under such circumstances the bankinghouse to which he belonged had no other alternative than submit to the loss. Such were the Courts of Equity. It often happened that a man who stopped payment would appear, on his books being inspected by his creditors, to be able to pay 18 s. in the pound; but it was almost certain,
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that if, instead of a composition by the creditors (which, it was very difficult to effect with the consent of all the creditors) the man was driven into the Gazette his estate produced only a dividend of 2s. in the pound. The new Court, which had been denounced by the hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir E. Sugden), whose ability and confident manner were calculated to make an impression on persons not as well acquainted as he was with this subject in all its bearings, was a feature in the Bill of which he very much approved. The official assignees, too, of which the same hon. and learned Gentleman disapproved, would, he (Mr. Smith) did not doubt, be the chief means of saving the estates of bankrupts, and making them productive. He had had so much experience of the evils occasioned by assignees, themselves in bad circumstances, getting the bankrupt's estates into their hands, and absconding or failing, that he was glad to see the security of a responsible officer interposed for the protection of the creditors. He hailed the measure as a proof of the earnestness and ability of the illustrious nobleman at the head of the law in this country in purifying the judicial institutions; and he thought a better beginning could not have been made than with the Bankrupt-laws, which were the worst in Europe, and a disgrace to the nation. He gave his most cordial support to the Bill.
Bill read a second time

SELECT VESTRIES BILL.
Sir John Hobhouse Sir John Hobhouse moved that the Bill be read a third time.
Mr. Trevorsaid, that he intended to speak on the principle of the Bill. At the then late hour of the night that would be extremely inconvenient. He suggested that the question for the passing of the Bill, which certainly was of a most important nature, should be postponed.
Sir John Hobhousewas surprised at any objection being made at this stage of the Bill, which he, and he believed every one else, thought had been already fully discussed.
Mr. Protheroethought the Bill, instead of receiving any impediment, should be hastened as much as possible. The present system of vestries was one of great injustice. In numerous parishes, he was sure, taxes would not be paid if the present select vestries were continued.
Sir Robert Inglissaid, he was somewhat surprised at the language of the hon. member for Bristol: he appeared to think the House would be deterred from its duty by threats. If there was no other reason to delay this important Bill, the remark of the hon. Member, that the parishes would legislate for themselves, was sufficient to induce the House to do so, and not to pass such a Bill at that late hour.
Mr. Spring Ricesaid, the Bill had been most fully discussed, besides having been under the attention of a Committee up stairs for several months, who had recommended it to the House: it had been examined at full length before a Committee of the whole House. He could not imagine what useful purpose the hon. Member could gain by now opposing it, for there was no doubt it must ultimately pass into a law.
Mr. George Dawsonsaid, he was favourable to the principle of the Bill, and had no intention of opposing it, but for the violent language of the hon. member for Bristol, who had attempted to overawe the House by threats. He objected accordingly to the third reading at that time.
Mr. Protheroesaid, he had no intention to use the language of intimidation or to appeal to the fears of the House. He knew such an attempt would be wholly unsuccessful. His only motive for supporting the Bill was, to restore to the people the authority that of right belonged to them, but which had been lessened by select vestries at various places.
Sir John Hobhousesaid, any discussion on this Bill at so late a state of its progress could only delay it from passing for a very short time; if the hon. Member, therefore, thought proper to again argue it he would endeavour to meet him. He would only add, that in urging the passing of this Bill he was not stimulated by any thing that was passing out of doors.
Mr. Trevorsaid, he had no desire to impose any unnecessary delay, but he wished the third reading to be postponed until the next day, and he should propose an amendment to that effect.
The House divided on the Original Question. Ayes 38; Noes 8—Majority 30.
The Bill read a third time and passed.