Commons Sitting of 14 April 1823

NEGOTIATIONS RELATIVE TO SPAIN.
Mr. Secretary Canningappeared at the bar. Being called upon by the Speaker, he said he held in his hand Papers, which be was commanded by his Majesty to present to the House. The said Papers being accordingly brought up,
Mr. Secretary Canningrose. He said, that in moving that their titles be read, he should, with the permission of the House, take advantage of the opportunity afforded by that formal motion, to redeem the pledge which he had given some weeks ago, by stating succinctly the course of conduct which had been pursued by his majesty's government, and the principles by which that conduct had been guided, in the important and complicated transactions to which the documents referred. In doing so, he felt that he was discharging a duty as awfully important as could at any time devolve upon the servant of a great monarchy and the minister of a free people. He was to account to the representatives of that people, for the manner in which the honour of the Crown had been upheld, and the interests of the country consulted, in a crisis of perhaps unexampled difficulty, and of which the consequences were yet unascertained. He mentioned this last consideration, because it was impossible not to be sensible, how much it added to the arduous nature of the task imposed upon him. If, indeed, the complete issue of all that had been recently passing had been known, it would be necessary only to shape the explanation and defence to that issue so ascertained; but he felt that

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the present state of the affairs of the world was of such unexampled magnitude and difficulty, that what had been the course of conduct pursued by the British government would be judged not only in reference to any one definite issue, but in reference to ail imaginable possibilities and to all anticipated dangers. In a case so complicated, and dealing with considerations so important, there could exist but one consciousness to sustain any man in the onerous situation in which he was placed—it was that of having pursued, throughout the whole series of transactions, one intelligible object, one invariable principle. The object which the king's government had had constantly in view, was the preservation of the peace of the world: the principle by which they had been guided in the pursuit of that object, had been clearly stated on a former day by an hon. and learned friend (sir J. Mackintosh) whom he was grieved not to see upon the benches opposite. He meant, respect for the faith of treaties—respect for the independence of nations—respect for that established line of policy known by the name of "the balance of power," in Europe—and last and not least, respect for the honour and interests of this country.
Before he proceeded to the narrative of the course of these transactions, he would take the liberty shortly to recall the recollection of the House to what was the state of Europe, and of this kingdom in relation to it, in the month of September last, when those transactions originated. There was at that date pending a meeting of the sovereigns of Europe, or rather a meeting of some of the leading sovereigns of Europe, such as had occurred on two or three previous occasions, to consult generally on their affairs, and specifically on the preservation of peace. About that time he had had the honour of receiving the seals of the office he now filled. It was not with the intention of separating himself in any degree from those who preceded him in it, nor with the desire of claiming to himself any merit that belonged to them, that he now felt himself called upon to repeat what he had stated on a former day, and what had beer much misunderstood—narrowed by some and extended by others—that, applicable to the considerations on which the congress was to be employed, he had found in the records of his office (and it was also it the records of the country, and known to
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all the world) a state paper, laying down the principle of non-interference, with all the qualifications properly belonging to it. When, therefore, with whatever degree of courtesy, it had been ascribed to him, that he had applied new principles to a new case, he had thought it but just to remind the House of a fact, of which it was indeed already in possession. The principle of non-interference with the independence of foreign states was laid down in the document to which he alluded, as broadly, clearly, and definitively, as it was possible for any statesman to wish to lay it down.
Having said thus much, he should perhaps surprise the House, when he stated, that in going to the congress of Verona it was not in contemplation, that that question which turned out to be the most important topic agitated at that meeting—he meant the case of Spain—would be the immediate object of the assembly. So much so, that the House would find among the papers now submitted, that the very first number, being a dispatch from the duke of Wellington, on his arrival at Paris, showed that his grace had been under the necessity of asking for instructions respecting the case of Spain. The matter of which it was expected that the congress would take cognisance, and to which the preparation of instructions had been particularly directed was, the state of affairs in the east of Europe, and the complicated transactions between Russia and Turkey. It was only on his arrival in Paris, that the duke of Wellington found that the affairs of Spain were likely to occupy a most important place in the deliberations of the congress at Verona. He accordingly, as had been mentioned, applied to him (Mr. Canning) for specific instructions on this point; and in reference to them he would in this, and only in one other instance, refer to the papers about to be laid upon the table. The requisition of the duke of Wellington—(who left London, as far as he (Mr. C.) recollected, within about 48 hours after he had accepted the seals of the foreign office)—was dated from Paris on the 21st of Sept., and the instructions transmitted in consequence were in the following terms:—" If there be a determined project to interfere by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are his majesty's government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference, objectionable does it

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appear to them in principle, as well as utterly impracticable in execution, that when the necessity arises, or (I would rather say) when the opportunity offers, I am to instruct your grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare that, to any such interference, come what may, his majesty will not be party." With such instructions the duke of Wellington left Paris for Verona. The House would see, that the instructions did not go into much detail, nor did they admit any qualification; they were positive and peremptory; and from them the duke of Wellington for one moment had never swerved. In making this statement, he incidentally met an objection that had been put with great force as well as ingenuity by an hon. gentleman opposite on a former night; viz. that if England went to congress with a view to discuss the affairs of Spain, England ought to have taken care that Spain was a party to that congress. The hon. gentleman and the House would, however, see, that England went, in the first instance, with no expectation that a prominent part in the deliberations would belong to the affairs of Spain. From the moment it was known that they would be so brought forward, the course of instruction to the British plenipotentiary had been distinct, positive, and peremptory, not to be party to any discussions, or rather to the issue of any discussions, if that issue were hostile measures against Spain. So far was the British government from any expectation that a proposition of a nature hostile to Spain would be made by France, that there was every previous reason for believing that France would be the last quarter from which it would come. It was not among the documents to be laid on the table, nor was it of a sort that it could be laid there; but it was in the memory of every body—it was among the papers published all over Europe—and was therefore a matter publici juris, that the king of France, on the 5th June 1822, declared, in allusion to the force he had stationed on his Pyrenean frontier, that the precaution thus adopted had kept contagion from his provinces, although it had ravaged a great part of Spain; that with the same object only he meant to maintain the forces he had stationed; and that nothing but malveillance—nothing but ill-will and calumny—could find a pretext for giving this precautionary measure a different purpose. Such, un-
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doubtedly, was the distinct statement in the last document France had issued with relation to the affairs of Spain; and he mentioned it now, not with a view of inculpation, or for the sake of drawing inferences of an unfavourable nature, but to account for the fact, that the instructions of the British government were not, in the first instance, framed with a view to meet hostile propositions with respect to Spain, on the part of the French government. It was but just to state, that when the congress of Verona met, and when the propositions of the French government regarding Spain were brought forward, they were not directed to a hostile object—they were in their nature purely defensive, conditional, and hypothetical. They did not then call for the assistance of the allies to bring half Europe into the field against Spain: the French plenipotentiary contented himself with asking merely, what would be the conduct of the allies in given cases, which cases all presupposed some active offence, in the first instance, on the part of Spain. To these propositions, or, more correctly speaking, to these inquiries, answers were given on the part of three of the continental powers, professing their readiness to countenance, and if necessary to support, France in the so specified cases, contingent and precautionary, but not in their nature offensive. But to these pro positions, however limited, the British plenipotentiary gave no such answer: in the replies of the three other states, however cautious and conditional, he did not concur. He said that he was precluded from entering into any hypothetical engagement, which might commit his country, in cases unforeseen, and to an extent not to be calculated. He demanded, before he was called upon to give even a hypothetical concurrence to a hypothetical promise in a hypothetical case, that he should be informed, distinctly and practically, what offence Spain had actually given to France, and what were the grounds of future offence anticipated by France. He absolutely refused to give the smallest countenance to the imagination of a case, on which, should it occur, he might be called upon to pledge his government to eventual co-operation and concert. The congress of Verona, during the weeks of its sitting, discussed the question in all its bearings; but the language of the duke of Wellington had been the same on the last day of meeting

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as on the first—a positive refusal to concur in any such measure—a positive refusal to give any answer to the inquiries of France—a positive refusal to have any thing to do with interference, by force or menace, in the internal affairs of Spain. When, at the conclusion of the congress, the three great continental powers had agreed with France to transmit, to their ministers at Madrid several dispatches, remonstrating with Spain on the state of her institutions, and calling for changes in there as the price of their continued friendship and forbearance, the British plenipotentiary declined any participation in that proceeding, and declared, on the part of his sovereign, that all he could do would be to continue his minister at Madrid when the others were withdrawn, in the hope of abating the irritation such a hostile measure must occasion, and of preventing the evil by friendly counsel and assistance.
So broke up the congress at Verona. The plenipotentiary of France left it to return to Paris, to consider what step his government would take more in advance than the rest of the continental allies: the plenipotentiaries of the continental allies, to prepare their dispatches for Madrid, which would not form a part of the papers upon the table, because they were not at all within the jurisdiction of this country, although they were well known, having been printed in all the gazettes of Europe: the British plenipotentiary, to renew at Paris the remonstrances he had ineffectually made at Verona, and, in the last resort, to report to his government his disappointment, if disappointment it should be, in order that to the minister at Madrid instructions might be sent to disavow, on the part of this country, any participation in these proceedings; but at the same time to advise, and strenuously implore, that the slightest excess might be studiously avoided, which could retrospectively justify, or prospectively encourage, the war threatened by France. The duke of Wellington returned to Paris about the beginning of December. The French government, far from being found in a more warlike disposition, were, on the contrary, whether on reconsideration or from what other motive did not belong to him to speculate, inclined to maintain peace. The British plenipotentiary found the French ministry disposed to send back to Verona, at least to the
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sovereigns who had not then actually quitted that city, the dispatches prepared for Madrid, and to entreat them to reconsider the contents of those dispatches, and the impropriety of the time for sending them. Such was the first report received from the duke of Wellington. Up to this period, no communication whatever had taken place between this country and Spain, on the subject of what was passing at Verona; and he would shortly explain to the House why no such intercourse had occurred. Hon. gentlemen might remember, that towards the end of the last session of parliament the clamour, the just clamour, and complaint in this country had been raised, respecting the state of our commercial navigation in the West Indies. Pirate-vessels, some bearing the flag of the independent but unacknowledged colonies of Spain, and others of Spain herself, had committed the most grievous depredations on British trade, to an enormous amount, and attended with circumstances of such violence and cruelty, as to call for national interposition. He (Mr. C.) recollected these matters well; because it had been his duty, as the representative of a great commercial town, to bring forward the case in that House, and to remonstrate against what was considered the supineness, or at least the forbearance, with which the strength of this country had been withheld from the assertion of its own rights and interests; those rights having been shamefully abused, and those interests seriously injured. Not long, therefore, after parliament rose, it had been thought necessary by the British government to send orders, and therewith an armament, to the West Indies, to take into our own hands that redress which had been in vain sought by representation and remonstrance at Madrid. Orders were given to the commander, in the event of the owners of pirate vessels continuing to find refuge on the shores of Cuba, that, after first communicating with the Spanish governor of the island, and asking his assistance—if assistance he could give—then conjointly, or, upon his refusal, separately, to effect a landing in Cuba, to root out the nest of marauders that infested those seas and impeded our commerce and navigation. In giving these orders, and in taking this step, he hoped it was unnecessary to say, that the British government had thought it right to communicate the course it had pursued

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to the cabinet at Madrid. But this was not at all. About the same time, pretensions were revived by commanders on the Spanish main, pretensions utterly obsolete, waved and forgotten for many years, to declare constructive blockades of the whole coast of what was Spanish America, and to capture all trading vessels that should presume to violate these blockades. Many instances, recent and flagrant, had occurred, in which the laws of these blockades had been rigorously carried into execution, and outrages of the same sort had been continued, more or less, for many preceding years. Almost from the year 1815, there had been a series of unanswered representations of unredressed grievance preferred to the court of Madrid, which it was at length thought expedient, avoiding if possible angry discussion, to bring directly to a point. That justice was on the side of the British complaints might be inferred from the circumstance, that after negotiation redress was finally accorded; and that the amount of the grievance was not small, might be gathered from the sum the Spanish government itself appropriated to the liquidation of the claim, being about half a million sterling. This did not amount to the whole of the demand; but it showed, at least, the estimate of Spain, as to what might turn out to be just. The business on which sir W. A'Court, our minister at Madrid, was first employed there was in the making these remonstrances, and in urging—successfully urging—the redress it was necessary to afford. He was to communicate to the Spanish government; first, the instructions with regard to Cuba; and secondly, the further fact, that the armament had been sent to the West Indies, with orders to make reprisals if our maritime rights should not be observed. Redress was promised on the part of Spain, and instructions were accordingly sent out to sir John Owen. Remonstrance having been once made, redress once claimed, and satisfaction accorded, no hostile feeling could possibly remain on the part of this country. But the House would see, that it was not in the midst of negotiations like these, that it would have been either delicate or proper towards Spain to have entered into discussions, or rather to have made declarations, of the part Great Britain was taking on behalf of European Spain. This country had pursued two courses of
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action: on the one hand, it had claimed of Spain redress for injuries inflicted by her South American colonies; and on the other, she had defended Spain against an invasion by European powers. The British government well knew, that a time must come when a disclosure of the latter course might be made to the ministry at Madrid; and by a coincidence in point of time, it was at the close of the congress at Verona, that our negotiations for redress had been brought to a favourable conclusion.
He would now take the liberty of drawing the attention of the House to one particular circumstance. He had seen in various quarters, and had heard from different persons, that some offence had been given to Spain by sending sir W. A'Court to represent his majesty at Madrid. It happened, whimsically enough, that about the time when sir W. A'Court's name was thus brought forward with obloquy in this country—not about the time he set off for Madrid, for he had proceeded thither long before his (Mr. C.'s) appointment, and he had nothing more than the slightest personal acquaintance with him,—about the time when sir W. A'Court's appointment to Spain was represented as the greatest grievance to that country, the ministers of the three allied powers called upon him (Mr. Canning) in Downing-street, to make representations against sending him out, as giving countenance to Spain. It was somewhat difficult to steer between these two difficulties: but the answer to the ministers was very short and simple—that sir W. A'Court was gone—that there he was, and there he must remain. Undoubtedly, he could well believe, that the course of negotiation in which sir W. A'Court was first employed—that of an obdurate and pressing creditor, calling up obsolete demands, and enforcing a speedy settlement—could not tend to make him very popular with the Spanish government, which was every day suffering under his applications; while that government was not yet aware of the course Great Britain had pursued in the European negotiations. It might be very readily imagined, that sir W. A'Court might have made an impression in the Spanish capital, unfavourable to his official, but not to his personal character. As soon as the general understanding, that no interference in the affairs of Spain should take place was abandoned—as

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soon, in short, as it was clear, that the issue of the negotiations at Verona must become publicly known—so soon, communication was made to Madrid of the line this country had pursued in those negotiations. It was then unequivocally shown, that while sir W. A'Court had been employed in this obdurate and unpopular character, the British government, through their plenipotentiary at Verona, had been anxiously engaged in securing the national independence of Spain. From that time, the feeling with respect to sir W. A'Court at Madrid was completely changed. Before this disclosure of the discussions at Verona was made to Spain—while she was yet uncertain what steps had been taken at congress—an application was made on the part of the Spanish government; first, to ascertain what the precise course of negotiations had been; and next, to interest this country to employ her good offices for the maintenance of peace. In making this application, which, being in writing, formed part of the papers on the table, pains were distinctly taken to make it appear, that the good offices she asked were not inconsistent with the most strictly-conceived system of neutrality. She asked counsel and mediation—that Great Britain should offer her advice to one friend, on behalf of another. Spain required no proceeding that could trench upon our neutrality; but rather, such a course as would entitle the power intervening, to the thanks of France, as well as to the gratitude of Spain. Upon receiving this application, his majesty's government hesitated not a moment to write to the duke of Wellington, then expected at Paris, and to direct his grace to offer to the French government the mediation of Great Britain for the amicable settlement of the disputes with Spain. The French government, after some negotiation, declined the offer thus made; stating as the reason, that the grounds of difference between France and Spain were not grounds of that distinct and definite kind, that admitted of exact specification and practical adjustment; that they grew out of the state of things in which the two kingdoms found themselves; and out of the influence which what was passing in Spain had upon the internal tranquillity of his most Christian majesty's dominions: that the two nations had, in fact, got into such a condition towards each other of reciprocal jealousy and irritation
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that rather than submit to all the inconveniences of such a situation, war would be the preferable alternative, as affording at least some ultimate solution. It seemed to the British government, that the position of affairs admitted of a reciprocation of good offices; and both at Madrid and Paris, a course of interposition would have been pursued which might have rendered war unnecessary. He (Mr. C.) admitted, that here was a case in which it might have been quite usual to say to both parties, that without something more specific on either side, some sensible and tangible cause of complaint—some exact claim of redress on the part of the country supposed to be aggrieved—it would be better for Great Britain not to interfere; that she had done all that she thought she could do with each party; and that, as her efforts had been attended hitherto with no success, she begged leave to withdraw from further interposition. Such a course was quite open to the British government; but, as every thing that was stated on both sides was accompanied with the most solemn assurance of a pacific disposition; and as the British ministry did entertain—what from that moment to the present it had never ceased to feel—an alarm beyond any former occasion of the danger of war, not only to Spain but to France, and through France to Europe, it became a question very material to be debated, whether, while there remained the slightest chance of success, it was not our duty to make a further effort, being the only power through whom it was possible that the effort should be made.
It was, therefore, determined to ascertain what might yet be done; and there was this advantage in the present situation of affairs, as compared with the state of Europe at the opening of the congress of Verona—that questions were now reduced to the differences between France and Spain. The dispatcher from the three continental powers had been sent; and their ministers had been withdrawn the cases foreseen at Verona, in which alone the powers were bound to interpose on behalf of France, had none of them occurred. It was a matter, therefore, merely between France and Spain; and it was for this country to decide, whether it would or would not take a step which might prevent the occurrence of war; but which could not widen the breach and increase the danger. Under these cir-

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cumstances, his majesty's ministers determined to interpose their good offices on behalf of Spain; and their anxiety, in so interposing, was to distinguish their conduct, not only from that which the continental powers in their several dispatches had displayed towards Spain—not only from that which France, in the speech of her minister, had likewise declared her determination to pursue; but to distinguish it also, by the channel through which it was made, from every species of interference that was not made upon the most friendly terms. The channel through which it was made was the duke of Wellington. That illustrious individual—if ever man did earn it from a foreign state—had earned from Spain the right to be considered as her friend. For years he had sustained her liberties in the field, and ultimately had rendered them triumphant over every difficulty. In his diplomatic character, too, he had recently asserted the same principles in her behalf, which he had formerly had occasion to vindicate for her in the field; and that independence, which he had once conquered for her by his sword, he had latterly endeavoured to preserve to her by his negotiations. If ever there was an individual that was entitled to deliver his opinions to a foreign nation, without any suspicion being entertained of the purity of his motives, it was the individual who had performed such services, and who, in consequence, had been incorporated as well by gratitude as adoption, among the benefactors of the Spanish nation. The opinions which that distinguished character offered to the consideration of the Spaniards, were opinions Which his private friends were aware that he had long entertained; and they were offered to them in a way that took from them every appearance of arrogance and insult. It was through the medium of a confidential friend, who had formerly been his companion in arms in the Peninsula, and afterwards his assistant in the deliberations at Verona, that the opinions of the duke of Wellington were stated in Madrid in terms which, though they were not put together with all the finesse of diplomacy, still expressed his meaning in the most frank and explicit manner. It was after pain had asked for the interference of the British government, and had obtained; it on the express stipulation that its interposition was not to be considered as inconsistent with the most strict neutrality,
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—it was after France had stated, that vas through the good offices of the British government that she looked for any thing like an accommodation of her differences with Spain—it was whilst the British government entertained a sincere belief that is interference would lead to a pacific and lot to a hostile issue—it was under such circumstances, that the duke of Wellington, not declaring either this or that mode of conciliation to be the price at which the friendship of England was to be purchased, but echoing, as he supposed, the opinions of a great majority of the Spanish nation, addressed himself, through the medium of lord Fitzroy Somerset, his confidential friend, to those who swayed the destinies of Spain, and left them to accept or reject his advice as they in their wisdom should think proper to determine. Looking at this transaction three months after its occurrence, and with a knowledge of every thing which had since occurred, he did not know exactly how he should decide, supposing the question were now put to him whether he should try this chance again, or throw it away as undeserving of attention; but this be did know, that, supposing he had decided not to avail himself of this chance, and war had then ensued, he should hare found a difficulty in justifying himself to the world for not trying one means of averting it, which, if used, might have perhaps rescued Europe from the calamities in which it was now going to be plunged, and of which no man could foresee the extent, or limit the duration.
Having made these observations, he would now proceed with his details. Lord Fitzroy Somerset quitted this country, as the bearer of a confidential communication to the Spanish government from the duke of Wellington, about the first week in January. Before he proceeded farther, he wished to remind the House that the application which was made from Spain for the interference of the British government was made early in the month of November; that the offer of our mediation, which was made to France in the month of September, was not finally rejected till some time in the ensuing November; and that a correspondence of some length took place upon the subject; into the particulars of which he should not then enter, for this plain reason—that the whole of them were to be found in the papers which he was directed by his majesty to lay upon the table of the

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House. He must now proceed to state, that not many weeks after lord Fitzroy Somerset had set out for Spain, an event occurred, which, he must confess, shook very strongly his hopes of bringing about any accommodation between the governments of France and of Spain—he alluded to the extraordinary speech with which the French ministers thought proper to open the chambers. Of the construction to which the words of that speech were liable, and which indeed they most naturally bore, there was not a man in the House who thought with more disgust and abhorrence than he did. If that speech were to be understood as the plain meaning of the words in which it was couched naturally suggested; namely, that the Spanish people were to be called upon to consent to certain modifications in their constitution—not because it was faulty in itself—not because it contained particulars which rendered it dangerous to neighbouring states, and unsafe even to the prince who ruled by it—but because it was not an emanation from the Crown—it was clear, on the one hand, that no Spaniard, who had the slightest regard to the independence of his country, could consent either to modify, or to hear a modification proposed of that constitution; and, on the other, that no British statesman, who valued his character as a member of a free state, could either think, or hear of his country being made a party to negotiations for the purpose of discussing such monstrous proposals. Not a week, no, not even a day, was lost in conveying to France the expression of these sentiments on the part of the British government; and in telling her, that if such was the meaning of the speech in question, there was an end to all further negotiations, at least through a British channel—that British intervention must be considered as closed—that the principle avowed, was one which a British statesman could not acknowledge—that it struck directly at the root of the British constitution—and that as it could not be accepted as part of the British code of law, it could not be recommended by a British statesman to the acceptance of any other. The ministers of France were likewise told, as Great Britain did not put forward her own political institutions as the model on which those of other states were to be framed, or as the only system from which national freedom and happiness could flow; so neither could she
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allow France to make her own example a rule for other nations, much less to force that example upon Spain, in virtue of the consanguinity of the reigning dynasties of the two Countries. It was however added, that if this construction were disavowed, the negotiations might still continue. The French government, it was only right to state, did subsequently disavow this obnoxious construction, and adopted another, which, he was free to confess, the words were not altogether qualified to bear. The negotiations in consequence proceeded; and it was at this period that ministers, when interrogated on the subject in parliament, had felt themselves bound to declare, that they had considerable hopes of bringing them to a successful termination: for, however extraordinary it might appear, it was nevertheless strictly true, that when the speech of the king of France was communicated to him (Mr. C.) by the French Chargé d'Affaires in this country, it was accompanied by a more profuse communication of the desires of the French government for accommodation, and by a more profuse declaration of their wishes for the good services of the British government, in producing that accommodation, than had ever been made at any previous stage of the transactions. It was not surprising that the effect which the French government had anticipated had been produced upon the British government by the communications which they then made to it; but it was surprising, that the French government, by some strange and unaccountable delusion, and in spite of all the remonstrances which his majesty's ministers had made to them on the subject, should have ever thought, and indeed should still continue to think, that in publishing the document which they had done, they had hit a chord which could not fail to vibrate at Madrid, and that they had put forward a specific which could not fail to cure all the evils which prevailed within its meridian. The thing itself was so strange and singular, that the House would be inclined to think it either a fable or an invention of his own, if the proofs of it were not to be found in the papers which he was now ordered to submit to the House.
He must now state to the house, that while these communications were passing between Paris and Madrid, a new application was received from the Spanish government (which the House would find

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in the papers), calling for a more active employment of the good services of this country, in producing an accommodation with France. If his majesty's ministers had previously entertained any doubt of the line of conduct which they ought to pursue, that application would have decided them: for, under such circumstances, had they declined to continue their interposition, they would have appeared to be setting their own private feelings in opposition to the judgment of those who still thought their interposition worth having. The interposition was therefore continued; but from that time forth the British government took no active part in the transactions. No second instructions were sent out to lord Fitzroy Somerset, who, in consequence, left Madrid. Sir W. A'Court being three days nearer to Paris, and the duplication of three days in the conveyance and return of the correspondence causing the delay of a week, was left to conduct the intercourse of the two parties; and all that remained for him to do was to state to each party the proposals and answers of the other. The result of these communications, though it was not more than might be calculated upon from the premises he had stated, was a total failure; and he took an opportunity of frankly stating that fact to the House. Nothing then remained for the British government to do, but to state fairly to each party the line of conduct which Great Britain was determined to pursue, in a state of things so deplorable for the tranquillity of Europe, and to explain to them the course of policy which she thought most consistent with her own welfare, as well as with that of both the contending nations. He begged the House to be assured, that there never had been a moment, from the beginning of our interference on behalf of Spain at the congress of Verona, down to the time at which he was then speaking, during which the Spanish government had been led to believe, that the course of policy which Great Britain would pursue, in case a war should unfortunately break out between France and Spain, would be any other than that of strict neutrality. No hope was ever held out to it, from which an inference to the contrary could be possibly deduced. Nothing was ever said on which a doubt of the intentions of England could be suffered to hang. From the beginning to the end of these transactions, it was re-
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gularly stated to the Spanish government, that we would do all that we could, in any way, and by any means, to avert a war; but that, if war should unfortunately ensue, it was not to be supposed that our anxiety to avert it, was to be considered as the measure of our determination to take part in it, when commenced. To France, such a declaration had not been made, and hon. members, on reading the papers, would see that it was not necessary; for, though the documents which passed between the two governments were indications that measures of hostility were contemplated by the one against the other, still, when it became necessary to speak out on the points which those documents suggested, it could not well be done without making a declaration of neutrality, if not in express words, at least in substance.
That consideration brought him to the only part of the papers which it was his intention to read to the House. It was part of a despatch which had been sent to our ambassador at Paris, after all hopes of an amicable arrangement had ceased, to be by him communicated to M. Chateaubriand. That despatch contained an account of the negotiations from their commencement to their close; and he was the more anxious that the French government should see it, as he did not wish to make any unfair statement regarding its conduct. After giving a history of the negotiations it concluded in the following manner:—
"It remains only to describe the conduct which it is his majesty's desire and intention to observe, in a conflict between two nations, to each of whom his majesty is bound by the ties of amity and alliance. The repeated disavowal, by his most Christian majesty's government, of all views of ambition and aggrandizement, forbids the suspicion of any design on the part of France to establish a permanent military occupation of Spain; or to force his Catholic majesty into any measures, derogatory to the independence of his crown, or to existing relations with other powers. The repeated assurances which his majesty has received, of the determination of France to respect the dominions of his most faithful majesty, relieve his majesty from any apprehension of being called upon to fulfil the obligations of that intimate defensive connexion which has so long subsisted between the crowns of Great Britain and Portugal

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With respect to the provinces in America which have thrown off their allegiance to the crown of Spain, time and the course of events appear to have substantially decided their separation from the mother country; although the formal recognition of those provinces, as independent states, by his majesty, may be hastened or retarded by various external circumstances, as well as by the more or less satisfactory progress, in each state, towards a regular and settled form of government. Spain has long been apprized of his majesty's opinions upon this subject. Disclaiming in the most solemn manner any intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, his majesty is satisfied that no attempt will be made by France, to bring under her dominion any of those possessions, either by conquest, or by cession, from Spain. This frank explanation upon the points on which perhaps alone the possibility of any collision of France with Great Britain can be apprehended in a war between France and Spain, your excellency will represent to M. de Chateaubriand as dictated by an earnest desire to be enabled to preserve, in that war, a strict and undeviating neutrality—a neutrality not liable to alterations towards either party, so long as the honour and just interests of Great Britain are equally respected by both."
These were the only points on which it appeared to him that any danger could be apprehended for Great Britain; and on these points he had endeavoured to guard her interest as carefully and specifically as he could. He would now beg leave, to say a few words with respect to the treaties which existed between this country and Portugal: and here be would take the opportunity of stating, that there never had been a single moment in which the ministers of France had not been aware, that any attack wantonly made by them on Portugal would bring Great Britain into the field with all her force to support the independence of her antient and her faithful ally. He was compelled, however, to remark, that much misconception prevailed in the country upon this point: for it was not only asserted, that our connexions with Portugal imposed upon us the necessity (as they certainly did) of flying to her assistance if she were attacked; but it was also asserted, that they left the question, whether Great Britain should go to war or remain at
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peace, entirely in the keeping of Portugal. He desired to be understood as admitting our pledge of defence to Portugal on the ground of a defensive, and not of an offensive, treaty; and if there was one point more clear in the law of nations than another, it was this—that a defensive alliance between two states did not commit one of them to war, when that was voluntarily commenced by the other. He was happy to state, that there never had been a moment in which the French government had not declared to Portugal that it was not its intention to meddle at all with her, either in word or deed, unless Portugal attacked the armies of France. He could also inform the House, that up to this moment Portugal was not bound by any engagement to enter into the war [Hear! from the Opposition benches]. He was not stating what her policy was—he was only stating her obligations; and he again repeated, that Portugal was not bound by any treaty to enter into the war which had now broken out between France and Spain. He, therefore, said, that if Portugal joined Spain in her endeavours to repel France from the Peninsula, there was no ground for Great Britain to put forward a single soldier in support of Portugal. He was not stating what our policy might be; but what was required of us by the faith of treaties. England was bound to protect Portugal, if Portugal were attacked; but not if Portugal attacked others. He thought it right to make this statement, because England had never yet made any arrangement, or entered into any treaty, which she had not, when called upon, fulfilled to the very letter; however arduous was the struggle into which she entered, and however great the sacrifice which she was compelled to make to procure its fulfilment; and it was on account of that rare scrupulousness in fulfilling her engagements, that it became the more necessary for her to understand precisely what the nature of those engagements was.
With regard to the independence of the Spanish colonies in America, be also wished to say a few words by way of explanation. Undoubtedly it would have been much more agreeable to him not to be called upon to give any explanation upon an event which might only be contingent. Unfortunately, however, no choice was left him at the present moment. As long as peace prevailed on the

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continent, and Spain had no enemy in Europe to contend with, so long it was a matter of discretion with the British government, whether it would or would not call the attention of Spain to the undeniable fact, that she had lost all her influence in her American provinces—that all her efforts to regain it have been, and still were, useless and ineffectual; and that her wisest policy was to enter, as soon as possible, into an accommodation with them—an accommodation founded, indeed, upon the basis of recognizing their independence, but qualified with any advantages which the mother country might think proper to stipulate, and the colonies, in return, to grant. Indeed, advice to that effect had already been given to her by this country. We had told her that we should ask of her colonies no commercial advantages, as we conceived the superiority should be reserved to her as the mother country; and all that we were inclined to demand was, that we should be placed in the same situation with other favoured nations. More than once it had been hinted to us, that our good offices between Spain and her colonies would be favourably received by the mother country. The answer which had been invariably returned to such applications was, that we were willing to interfere with our good offices, if our recognition of the independence of the colonies were not to be made determinable on the issue of the negotiations. At present, however, the case was entirely changed. As Spain had now an active and powerful European enemy, it became necessary for England to declare in what light she looked upon the struggling provinces of South America: for as Spain still retained the dominion de jure over them, though she had lost the dominion de facto; as France might send forth her fleets and armies to seize and conquer them: and as, at the conclusion of the war, arrangements might be made between the two nations regarding the conquest or the cession of them, the British government had felt itself called upon to state, that it considered the separation of the colonies from Spain to have been effected to such a degree, that it would not tolerate for an instant any cession which Spain might make of colonies, over which she did not exercise a direct and positive influence. To such a declaration the British government had at last been forced. Without staying to examine
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whether it had been made prematurely or not, he would once more repeat, that to such a declaration we had at length, by necessity, been driven, and that the justice and propriety of it had not yet been disputed by either party.
He was aware, that to whatever determination the House might come regarding the conduct of his majesty's ministers in the late negotiations, strong difference of opinion had existed, and would still continue to exist, with regard to the propriety of our observing a strict neutrality in the impending contest between France and Spain. He knew that many individuals in this country thought that the invasion of Spain by a French force ought to be considered by England as a declaration of war against herself. That opinion, he knew, was held by many persons of the first rank and the utmost respectability in the state; but of that opinion he would state, that it could not receive any support from either justice or the policy of the state. When he said, that it could not receive any support from justice, he did not mean to say that such a war would be absolutely unjust on our part, but that there would be no adequate ground on which we could be called to interfere in it. War, in the responsibility of those who had to make it, ought to be well and duly weighed before it was resolved on; the cause of it should not merely be sufficient, but urgent; and not merely urgent, but absolutely consistent with the interest and welfare of the country which first declared it. In making these observations, did he cast any blame upon those who, seeing a strong and powerful nation eager to crush and overwhelm with its vengeance a less numerous but not less gallant people, were anxious to join the weaker against the stronger party? Certainly not. The feeling was highly honourable to those who entertained it. The bosoms in which it existed in full bloom and vigour, unchastened and unalloyed by any other feeling, were much more happy, than those in which that feeling was chastened, tempered, and mitigated by the considerations of prudence, interest, and expediency. He not only knew, but he absolutely envied the feelings of those who called for war, for the issue of which they were in no wise likely to be responsible; for he would confess, that the reasoning by which the war against Spain was justified, appeared to him to be much more

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calculated than the war itself to excite a strong feeling against those who had projected it; and he must likewise add, with all due respect to those who defended it, that he could not understand by what process of reasoning, or by what confusion of ideas, they contrived to persuade themselves that they had made out any thing which approached even to a shadow of a case. They had been foolish enough to institute a comparison between the conduct of France at this moment, and the conduct of Great Britain in 1793. But what, he would ask, had Spain ever done that was at all analogous to the celebrated decree of the 19th of November, made by the French republicans? What country had Spain ever attempted to seize or to revolutionize? What independent state had she invaded in any manner that could be compared with the invasion of Geneva, of Savoy, and of Avignon by France—states that had been ravaged and plundered by their invaders, before any notice of their intention was given, and before their inhabitants had even time to draw a sword in their own defence? If the whole of Europe had formerly combined against France, it was not because she had refused to amend her political institutions on the demand of foreigners, but because she had declared her resolution, in the first instance, to propagate as widely as possible her pestiferous doctrines, and had provided means, in the second, to carry them all over Europe by the terror of her armies and the power of her sword. There was no analogy between the case of Spain and that of the French republic; and of all the powers which ought to think of reading such a lesson to Spain, even if the analogy existed, France was the very last. France, Whose oppression and tyranny had created that very constitution in Spain, which it was now the foremost in condemning and reprobating! That France should be the first to complain of that constitution, which was the consequence of her own unjust aggression, was the event which of all others he should have least expected! He was not therefore surprised to find that many individuals were for deterring France from her present invasion of Spain by something stronger than state papers and remonstrances.
He had heard that there were some persons who thought that, though it might not be prudent to make war, it might still
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be prudent to menace war against France upon this account. These individuals, he conceived to be guilty of an error in principle, as the country which menaced war ought always to be ready to carry those menaces into execution. There were other individuals who were guilty of an error of a different kind—he meant an error of opinion. They thought this country should immediately send forth a maritime armament to watch the events that might occur on the shores of the Peninsula. Such a course, in his humble opinion, would be unworthy a great and independent nation like our own, and would degrade it from a first to a secondary power. He did hope, that whenever it determined upon war, it would determine to wage it, not as an auxiliary, but as a principle. Such had hitherto been its policy; and on all former occasions, when it had resorted to war, it had exerted every nerve to bring it to a safe, a speedy, and an honourable conclusion. "Toto certatum est corpore regni." This, he contended, was the only sound view in which war could be contemplated, and he differed entirely from those who considered the subject in any other manner. If war were the issue, it should be a war worthy of this great country; and there was no war in which the country could be engaged at the present moment, and under the existing circumstances of Europe, that would not call forth all her power, all her strength, and all her energies. This was the alternative which they had to weigh—whether honour commanded, or interest prescribed; or, if interest were left wholly out of the question, whether a sense of justice between the two hostile parties was not sufficient to induce the British government to interpose its good offices and to state what its views of policy were; and, finally, having undertaken that, as it turned out, thankless and unpleasant office with respect to both sides, there was sufficient cause to justify them in joining the injured party. These points admitted of much argument, and were mixed up with a great portion of feeling. But, whatever decision they came to, that decision ought to be a calm, a sound, and a just one; and, so far as a pretty large and a most anxious expression of public feeling had gone, it did appear that the course which had been pursued was in unison with the general sense of the country. The determination of the government was for neu-

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trality. And for what sort of neutrality? The House would give him leave to say, for an honest and real neutrality. Any other would be unworthy of the nation. The choice was between neutrality and war. If they meant war, let them openly choose it; but, if they called for neutrality, let it not be neutrality under the mask of non-interference with one party, whilst a covert support was given to the other. If they asked him what were the lines, rules, and limits, of a just neutrality, he would tell them in one word. There was a golden maxim, which applied as well to politics as it did to morals—"Do unto others as you would that others should do unto you." But to England, he would say, "Do unto others what you have made others do unto you." For a quarter of a century, this country had laid down the law of nations to the whole world; she had laid down, most clearly, the code by which neutrals were to be guided. From the learning, the acuteness, and the talents, which had been employed in its formation, and from the recognized justice and purity of its principle, it stood, he believed, unquestioned throughout the world; and, if they did not question it themselves, would, he was convinced, go down to posterity as one of the greatest monuments of wisdom and integrity, that had ever appeared in any age. He alluded to the code which had been compiled from the decisions of sir William Scott.
There were two points on which his majesty's ministers might be questioned; first, whether it was proper that a system of neutrality should be acted on; and next, whether, at the congress of Verona, they ought not to have accepted from both parties, that undefined offer, short of mediation, and without a distinct definition of the principle on which their good offices would be received, which had then been made? The complaint of France against Spain, whether well-founded or not, was, that the disquieted state of her internal institution placed the tranquillity of France in jeopardy; and the counter-statement of Spain was, that the Army of Observation which France had marched to her frontier disquieted the Spanish people. It was between these two points that they had to strike the balance, without considering whether France sinned more against Spain in calling for preliminary conciliation, or Spain sinned more against France in desiring her to withdraw her army. Under such
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circumstances it was impossible to negociate. This was a case of a very novel nature, differing entirely from those in which a portion of territory having been captured, or a number of ships having been seized, there were tangible points for discussion, which could easily be adjudged. What was wanting in this instance to preserve peace was, that Spain should make some change in her constitution (a constitution which she had unquestionably a right to form), and that France should withdraw her Army of Observation. Without touching on any question involving the conduct of either party, it became a matter of inquiry, whether the British government had not done right in exerting their power to the utmost, and endeavouring as much as they possibly could, to prevent the breaking out of hostilities. This only, he should say, that though on this point he must anticipate some difference of opinion (and that difference he did not mean to censure), still, if the question were to be discussed again, be would undoubtedly pursue the same course, and he would not incur the reproach of stimulating Spain to resistance, by promises of support which could not be realized. The promise of actual and efficient support to Spain, this country was not prepared to give and the case ministers had to consider was this—whether they should with, draw from the question altogether, and treat it with perfect indifference? Indifference they could never feel towards the affairs of Spain; and he earnestly hoped and trusted that she would come triumphantly out of this struggle. But he should not speak truly, if he did not say, that he was perfectly convinced, the first result of her success and pacification must be, the adoption of those alterations in her system which they had recommended. But, whether Spain or France were successful, he must ever feel a perfect conviction, in considering the extent of misery which might be occasioned by the contest, that if Spain had given way in a slight degree on the one part, and the Army of Observation had been withdrawn on the other, any unpleasant feeling would have been swallowed up and lost sight of in the immensity of the benefit which would have been produced. They would not then have had to deplore that state of warfare, the risk of which was incalculably great, and the issue of which it was impossible to foresee.
Mr. Broughamsaid, he rose on this occasion not so much for the purpose of entering into the discussion of the many momentous topics which the right hon. gentleman had introduced in the course of his speech, as to vindicate himself and the gentlemen near him in the eyes of the country, for not now proceeding with the discussion, animated as they were by many of the sentiments which had fallen from the right hon. gentleman—sentiments which reflected the highest honour on his character. There were, no doubt, very many persons who did not thoroughly understand, why so great an abstinence had been exhibited, and for so long a period, on his side of the House. That circumstance he would explain. He was one of those who, when he heard in a distant part of the country, where he was professionally engaged, the course of proceeding which the right hon. gentleman intended to follow, could not see the expediency of adopting that course. The right hon. gentleman did not produce the papers in the first instance, that gentlemen might read them; he reversed the practice, by defending his conduct first, and afterwards producing the papers on which that defence was founded. Now, he must say, that the unfavourable impression which that mode of proceeding had originally communicated to his mind, was not altogether removed by the right hon. gentleman's statement: for it did so happen, that, having attended to his speech with the greatest possible care, he found himself left in the dark, up to the present moment, as to the precise and specific line of conduct which his majesty's government had pursued. The right hon. gentleman said, that strict neutrality was what the government had intended: he said, that they would give no assistance to Spain, or to the invaders of Spain; but, as to what extent they had laboured to avert it, and as to what representations they had made at Verona or at Paris upon these points, he was left wholly in the dark. Nay, there were some parts of the right hon. gentleman's narrative, which, from the curious omissions observable, led him to a conclusion directly the reverse of that which other parts of the statement would induce him to form. The right hon. gentleman having passed over, with a lightness at which he greatly marvelled, whatsoever had been done at Verona—having given no account of what had been said by the duke of Wel-
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lington—having stated nothing relative to the proceedings which afterwards took place at Paris—stated, to his great astonishment, in a subsequent part of his speech, that the duke of Wellington had exerted himself to secure the tranquillity of Spain. But how? That did not appear. Here there was a great chasm—an immense hiatus valde deflendus—in the narrative. The most important part was omitted. Hamlet, the most striking and the most necessary object in the play, was left out. But, having made these omissions, the right hon. gentleman went on to say, that the duke of Wellington had first restored the freedom of Spain by his military prowess, and had next defended her liberty and independence by his conduct at Verona. Now, if he took this as a real statement of what had occurred at Verona, he should be led to indulge in the pleasing expectation, that he should find, in the papers on the table, no vague generalities, no idle wishes, but representations drawn up in the firm language of remonstrance. He would not say menace; because that point appeared to have been blown on towards the latter part of the right hon. gentleman's speech. He, however, did not know that there were any persons, either in that House or out of it, who could be so extremely absurd as to wish ministers to use menaces which they could not follow up. He would say, that they ought to have used the strong and firm language of remonstrance, not of menace. It was of no use to say, "Don't think we are so mad as the Bourbon government—don't think we are so wicked as that handful of imbeciles who have forgotten nothing and learned nothing; who have not profitted by those precious lessons of adversity which were never thrown away on any except themselves—don't suppose that we will assist in bringing back those pernicious principles which are the shame of France, and which, if restored, must be the curse of the Spanish people, and reduce to misery all the rest of Europe." What benefit could result from their declaring at Verona—"that we are not so base, so wicked, so drivelling, or so profligate as those by whom the invasion of Spain has been commanded?" What gratitude did he owe to ministers if they had done no more than this? What was the use of such statements, if nothing effectual were done to check that system of policy, which he thought had died with the late

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marquis of Londonderry—that system which was supported by, their shallow rhetorician, by their flimsy orator, Chateaubriand, who had been transformed from a writer of bad books to a writer of worse manifestos? What use was it to tell the people, and the parliament, "We do, not mean to do that," which ministers knew for their lives, they could not, they dared not to do? Where was the mighty fortitude, where the exalted courage, in their saying "We will not, to support your false principles, plunge this country into a war with all Europe?" No minister, not even Mr. Pitt, in the plenitude of his power, would dare to make such an experiment. Where, then, was the merit of a government such as the present—no two members of which seemed to agree upon any important point—in declaring, that they would not do an act, which it was not in their power to effect? He observed, that when the minister for foreign affairs, rose and uttered sentiments which, as an Englishman, a statesman, and an orator, did him the highest honour—sentiments which would surprise and delight the country, and which would crown him with the ardent applause of that country—he observed, while those expressions were heard with delight by all who sat on the Opposition side of the House—while the loudest expressions of gratification were heard—while even the benches below him [those occupied by Mr. Bankes, Mr. Wilberforce, &c.], resounded with acclamations—that a "deathlike silence" was preserved by the gentlemen opposite—that the faculties of those who administered the government, and their various adherents and supporters, appeared to sink into a "dread repose," astounded, he supposed, at the liberality of the principles which they had so unexpectedly heard. God grant, that the negotiation, when we came to read the papers, might not be found to have been carried on rather in the spirit of those silent gentlemen, than in the spirit which filled the breast of the right hon. secretary, the expression of which was re-echoed from almost every part of that House, and would be joy fully responded from every part of the empire. Finding many contradictions in the statement which they had just now heard—finding also a great many blanks in it—and knowing that, the contradictions could only be reconciled, and the blanks filled up, by a careful perusal of the papers—what,
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under such circumstances, could be more necessary than to defer the detailed discussion of the question? He was ignorant of even the dates of the different papers; and therefore he could not tell how long the right hon. secretary had been the dupe of the French government. That he had been duped was quite clear. That was his case. The right hon. gentleman denied being an accomplice; and he disproved the accusation by showing that he was the dupe. Until he knew how long the right hon. gentleman had been hood-winked by those gracious personages, he could not decide in what degree the French government altogether was or was not the most finished specimen of perfidy that could be conceived. He believed from all he had seen, that the conduct of the French government had been most perfidious. However gentlemen opposite might stare, he repeated, that its conduct had been most perfidious. The right hon. gentleman himself had admitted the fact—he had stated it in a manner almost less measured than that which he (Mr. B.) had adopted. In speaking of the objects of his vituperation, the right hon. gentleman had, in effect, declared, that more cunning, more imposing, more wheedling men—men of worse faith, more abandoned in their notions of honour—men whose words were less to be relied on—existed not in any cabinet in the world, than those men who now composed the French government. These were the figures which constantly occurred to them in the picture which the right hon. gentleman had that night sketched. By reading one of the papers, it would be found, that up to the very eve of the day when the French king declared war in his speech to the chambers, the government of this country was abused with sanguine hopes of pacification. He wondered how it could possibly enter into the mind of so acute a person as the right hon. gentleman, who had recently studied in the French school of policy, to write the dispatch which he had read that night. The concluding passage was one of the most wonderful things in this extraordinary chapter of marvels. That he could have written it when M. Chateaubriand was not at his elbow to wheedle him; that he could have written it in the fulness of his senses; appeared almost incredible. That a paper which was go to the French government—a paper which was to be laid before that House—

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accompanied as it was by proofs of the most unexampled perfidy, should contain such a flattering expression of sentiments was really astonishing. It was there stated, that no one could doubt the purity of the motives which influenced the French government. It appeared according to this, that the little article of the French making war on the Spaniards was nothing; that no man could be so foolish as to suppose that France had any object of aggrandizement in view, when she strove to overrun Spain. As to the line of conduct they were about to be called on to sanction, either by their forbearance, or by adopting some proposition from the other side of the House, until he had an opportunity of reading and examining the papers themselves, he would abstain from giving any opinion whatever. But it would be en abandonment of every honourable principle, in any event, to sanction so absurd, he would not call it so unprincipled, a plan, because its want of principle was lost in its pure folly, and utter want of sense, as that of holding out a threat which they could not fellow up. If they decided fur neutrality, it was, observed the right hon. gentleman, to be a real, not a mock one. On this part of the business, he begged to make a few remarks. Now one of his reasons for preparing for war instead of neutrality, was, because he looked upon it to be the only way of preserving peace, and of averting those calamities by which Europe was threatened. They might be obliged ultimately to go to war, and in what situation would the country then be, if no previous preparation had been made? It was not a question, whether they should continue at peace, or go to war, merely as a matter of voluntary adoption. Other nations might choose to decide for themselves; and then the question would be, whether their going to war might not compel us also to adopt hostile measures? Then, supposing war to be inevitable, what would be the consequence if this country were dragged into it unprepared, and at a time when the enemy had effected the greater part of his object? From this followed the great question, whether an earlier preparation, and the tone befitting that state of preparation, might, not, and would not, if proper steps had been taken, have saved the country from a State of warfare? If they were only to have the pleasure and satisfaction of a
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state of neutrality, which, for a quarter of a century, the people of this country only knew by its effects on other states then the commercial interest of this country, the merchants, and the crews who manned their ships, would be placed in a very novel situation. Other countries would, of course, act on the principles; with respect to neutrals, which England had laid down; and then the people of England would, perhaps, have to bear the novel sight of British ports blockaded by a French force, and they would also witness the efforts of British vessels to break that blockade, not for the mere purpose of traffic, but for a higher and nobler purpose, in the prosecution of which they would have the prayers and good wishes of every Englishman. The vessels, however, so loaded and so manned, for the assistance of the oppressed, would, under the neutral code, be liable to the visitation of every French boat with five men and a gun in her—they would be exposed to that visiting system which England had exercised towards other nations for a quarter of a century. Perhaps they would not find the system quite so agreeable when it was turned against themselves. To make the medicine a little more palatable, the right hon. gentleman had spoken of it as clothed in the elegant language of sir W. Scott, who had bestowed on it that ornamental dress, that dazzling garb, which had bewitched all but the neutrals. It had bewitched the right hon. gentleman who had a congenial classic taste, almost as much as it had tormented the unfortunate neutrals who suffered by that celebrated code. God forbid that war should last long, if that code were to be actively employed against the merchants of this country. The operation of the code would be found a very painful process. The merchants would scarcely bear it. Eruptions would break out in the system; and it would end at last by amputation in the shape of actual war. [Laugh.]—The learned gentleman then proceeded to observe, that he never knew a minister cut a worse figure than the right hon. secretary had done that night. The fault was not, however, attributable to him, but to the badness of his cause. He and his hon. friends agreed perfectly with the right hon. secretary in the liberal sentiments he had expressed, He wished those sentiments were common to him and to all his colleagues and their supporters. Those

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sentiments would be echoed through this country with delight; and most heartily did he and all his friends pray for the success of the Spanish people in this war. He denied that it was the war of the French nation, and he believed that the French army did, in their hearts, detest the, work of plunder, guilt, and hypocrisy which they were sent about. It was the effort of three or four French emigrants, who had gotten into power. They were determined to make a desperate attempt to get back their confiscated estates by a counter-revolution, and the priests chimed in with them to recover their well-lost tithes. It was on account of these classes that the Spaniards were to be punished because they wished to be free. He hoped in God, however, that they would succeed against their enemies. He had with delight heard the right hon. gentleman say that this war was not only unprincipled, but desperate, on the part of France. He believed it was both; and he trusted the defence by the Spaniards would prove it to be the latter. But though the Spaniards might yield a little—though the French might succeed at first—though a great foreign orator had predicted their success as certain—though the renowned and veteran general Angoulême had clapped his hand upon his sword and vowed to conquer, still he would not despair of the ultimate success of the Spanish people. For our part, our duty was to go on, so as to deserve the respect of a people who to a man were animated with the strongest feelings for the success of liberty and independence. Should the war end (as he sincerely hoped it would) in the discomfiture of the Bourbons—should they be again conquered—they would owe it to themselves alone, and they would perish amidst the delight of every man in Europe; except, perhaps, a few, whose breasts never warmed with any feelings for liberty, except when the preservation of their places or their own personal interest rendered it expedient; but, with these few exceptions, they would perish unregretted by the world. None would raise a hand in their behalf; none would wish for their restoration. When the papers now produced should be fully before the House, it would be their business to decide whether the conduct of government had been such as either to give rise to bitter disappointment of hopes strongly excited, or sore humiliation at the degradation of our national honour.
Mr. Canning, in explanation, observed that the hon. and learned gentleman had quite misunderstood him in attributing to him the assertion, that the war was a desperate enterprise on the part of France. He had not said a word as to the possible result of the war on one side or the other. He looked forward with satisfaction, to any opportunity which might be afforded him of answering any objections which might be made to the course which had been pursued by his majesty's government, and with a perfect confidence, that if that conduct were tried by any of those tests to which the policy of governments in their foreign relations could be fairly subjected, they would be found to have been uniformly actuated by a respect for the independence of nations, the faith of treaties, and the honour and interest of the nation.
The papers were laid upon the table.

PAPERS CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATIONS RELATIVE TO SPAIN.
The following are copies of the Papers relative to Spain, which were laid, by his majesty's command, before both Houses of Parliament:
PAPERS RELATIVE TO SPAIN.

  CLASS A.—VERONA AND PARIS.
  No. 1.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received September 24th.
  (Extract.) Paris, Sept. 21, 1822.
  I had a long discussion with M. de Villèle yesterday, on the relations of this government with Spain. It appears, that for a considerable time past, I believe since the alarm of infectious fever in Spain, the French government have been collecting the troops in the southern departments of France. They have not, however, on the immediate frontier, a larger body of men than are sufficient for the performance of the duties of the "Cordon Sanitaire," so long as that precaution is necessary, in consequence of the prevalence of the fever in the neighbouring provinces of Spain; or than can fairly be deemed necessary for the purposes of observation of a country which is the seat of a civil war, and for the protection of the French frontier from insult, by the different parties in operation immediately on the borders.
  M. de Villèle said, that the assembly of the Congress at the present moment, was not matter of indifference, in relation to the situation of affairs in Spain, or to that in which the two countries stood towards each other. There was no doubt that expectations were formed respecting the result of the deliberations of the Congress on the affairs of Spain, as well in Spain as elsewhere; and that if the

  905
  Congress were to separate, and come to no decision on those affairs it was probable that the existing evils would be greatly aggravated, and that the two countries might be forced into a war.
  M. de Villèle wished that the Congress should take into consideration the actual position of the French government in relation to Spain; and the hypothesis under which they might, be forced into a war; and that the four other powers of the alliance should declare what line they would each take, in case of the occurrence of any of the events which they conceived would force them to war. I told M. de Villèle that it would be quite impossible for us to declare beforehand what would be our conduct upon any hypothetical case.
  I should wish to receive his majesty's instructions what line I shall take, and what arguments I shall use, in case the French government should make the proposition at the Congress, which M. de Villèle has made to me, respecting a declaration by the allies.
  No. 2.—Mr. Secretary Canning to the Duke of Wellington.
  (Extract.) Foreign Office, Sept. 27,1822.
  If there be a determined project to interfere by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are his majesty's government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference—so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, as well as utterly impracticable in execution, that when the necessity arises, or (I would rather say) when the opportunity offers, I am to instruct your grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come what may, his majesty will not be a party.
  No. 3.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.
  (Extract.) Verona, Oct. 22, 1822.
  We had a conference on Sunday night, at which the French minister, M. de Montmorency read a paper of which I inclose a copy. I imagine that each of the ministers will answer this paper. In my answer, I shall review our line of conduct since April 1820; and shall decline to engage ourselves to adopt any measure beforehand, or till we shall have a full knowledge of all the circumstances which have occurred between the two countries. I propose, besides, to point out, that, considering the relative position of France and Spain, it is not probable that Spain will declare against them; if they explain, as they ought, the meaning and object of their corps of observation, and make some allowance for the state of effervescence of men's minds in Spain in a state of revolution and civil war.
  (Translation of Enclosure in No. 3.)—Questions addressed by the French Plenipotentiary to the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain.
  Verona, October 20th, 1822.
  1. In case France should find herself under
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  the necessity of recalling her minister from Madrid, and of breaking off all diplomatic relations with Spain, will the high courts be disposed to adopt the like measures, and to recall their respective missions?
  2. Should war break out between France and Spain, under what form and by what acts would the high powers afford to France, that moral support which would give to her measures the weight and authority of the alliance, and inspire a salutary dread into the revolutionists of all countries?
  3. What, in short, is the intention of the high powers as to the extent and the form of the effective assistance, ("secours matériels,") which they would be disposed to give to France, in case active interference should, on her demand, become necessary.
  No. 4.—The Duke of Wellington to; Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received November 14th.
  (Extract.) Verona, Nov. 5th, 1822.
  Prince Metternich called together a conference of the five cabinet ministers of Wednesday evening, at which were delivered in answers to the demands of the French minister on the 20th ultimo, from the Russian, Austrian and Prussian ministers; and that from myself, a copy of which I inclose.
  (Inclosure in No. 4.) Memorandum.—Answer of the Duke of Wellington to the Questions of the French Plenipotentiary.
  Verona, October 30, 1822.
  Since the month of April 1820, the British government have availed themselves of every opportunity of recommending to his majesty's allies to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Spain.
  Without adverting to those principles which his majesty's government must always consider the rule of their conduct, in relation to the internal affairs of other countries, they considered that to whatever degree either the origin of the Spanish revolution, the system then established, or the conduct of those who have since had the management of the internal affairs of Spain might be disapproved of, any amelioration which might be desired in the Spanish system, for the sake of Spain herself, ought to be sought for in measures to be adopted in Spain, rather than abroad; and particularly in the confidence which the people should be taught to feel in the character and measures of the king.
  They considered that an interference, with a view to assist the monarch on the throne, to overturn that which had been settled, and which he had guaranteed, or to promote the establishment of any other form of government or constitution, particularly by force, would, only place that monarch in a false position, and prevent him from looking to the internal means of amelioration which might be within his reach.
  Such an interference always appeared to the British government an unnecessary assumption

  907
  of responsibility; which, considering all the circumstances, must expose the king of Spain to danger, and the power or powers which should interfere, to obloquy, certain risks, and possible disasters; to enormous expenses, and final disappointment in producing any result.
  Upon these principles his majesty has advised his allies, and has acted himself, from the month of April 1820, to the present day.
  The protocols and other acts of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, which established the union at present existing between the five powers, so happily for the world, require the most unlimited confidence and communication on the part of each; and accordingly, his majesty has never failed to communicate to his allies, and Particularly to France, every instruction which he has sent to his minister at Madrid; and all the communications made by his majesty's commands to the minister of Spain residing in London:—all in the same spirit of good-will towards, the king of Spain and the Spanish Nation.
  It is impossible to look at the existing relations between France and Spain, adverting to what has passed from the commencement of the year 1820, to the present moment, without being sensible of the unfortunately false position in which the king of Spain is placed; and that the spirit of party in both countries, having aggravated the national antipathy which antecedent circumstances had occasioned, is in a great measure the cause of the unfortunate irritation in Spain against France, to which his excellency the minister of France has adverted. The great object of his majesty's foreign policy is, to preserve peace among nations; he feels the most anxious interest for the happiness of his Catholic majesty, and the honour of his government; and it would be his sincere desire to allay that irritation.
  But the British government cannot but feel, that to make any declaration on any of the three points referred to by his excellency, without a previous accurate knowledge of all the circumstances which have occurred between the two countries, would be not only premature and unjust, but would probably be unavailing; and would, in fact, deprive his majesty of the power of discussing and deciding upon the measures of his own government in this affair hereafter, when he should be better informed. His majesty must either place himself in this painful position, or he must do, what would be equally painful to his feelings, require from his august friend and ally the king of France, that he should submit his conduct to the advice and control of his majesty.
  His majesty's government cannot think either alternative to be necessary; but are of opinion that a review of the obvious circumstances of the situation of France, as well as Spain, will show, that whatever may be the tone assumed towards France by the ruling powers in Spain, they are not in a state to carry into execution any plan of real hostility.
  Considering that a civil was exists in the
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  whole extent of the frontier which separates the two kingdoms; that hostile armies are in movement and in operation in every part of it; and that there is not a town or village on the French frontier which is not liable to insult and injury—there is no person who must not approve of the precaution which his most Christian majesty has taken in forming a corps of observation for the protection of his frontier, and for the preservation of the tranquility of his people.
  His Britannic majesty sincerely wishes that this measure may be effectual in attaining the objects for which it is calculated; and that the wisdom of the French government will have induced them to explain it at Madrid, in such terms as will satisfy the government of his Catholic majesty of its necessity.
  Such an explanation will, it is hoped, tend to allay in some degree the irritation against France; and, on the other hand, it may be hoped that some allowance will he made in France for the state of effervescence of men's minds in Spain, in the very crisis of a revolution and civil war.
  A moment's reflection upon the relative power of the two states will show, that the real evil to which his most Christian majesty is exposed, is that resulting from the operations of the civil war on the neighbouring frontier of Spain; against which the measure which his government have adopted is best calculated to preserve him.
  Even revolutionary madness could not calculate upon the success of a serious attack by Spain upon France, under any circumstances, which it is possible to suppose to exist at present in the latter kingdom.—But the attention of the Spanish government is now occupied by a civil war, the operations of which certainly justify the formation of a corps of observation in France; and it is not very probable that they would, at this moment, desire to break with France.
  Neither is it to be believed that, in their present situation, they would not desire still to enjoy the advantage of that countenance to their system, which the presence of the French ambassador at the seat of government must afford them.
  His majesty therefore considers any rupture by Spain, or any measure on her part which may render necessary the immediate discontinuance of diplomatic relations by France, very improbable: and as his majesty is quite unacquainted with what has passed between France and Spain since the month of April, 1820; and his government cannot know upon what grounds his most Christian majesty's government may think proper to discontinue the diplomatic relations of France with Spain; or upon what grounds was may break out between the two countries; it is impossible for them now to pronounce what advice they should consider it their duty to give to his majesty, in case either or both of those events should occur.
  His majesty most anxiously wishes that such extremities may be avoided; and he feels convinced that the government of his most Christian majesty will find means of avoiding them.
  No. 5.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received Nov. 21.
  (Extract.) Verona, November 12, 1822.
  I have little to report as having occurred on the Spanish question, since I wrote to you on the 5th inst. But I inclose to you a memorandum on what is passing here, which I send to sir Charles Stuart by this occasion.
  (Inclosure in No. 5.)—Memorandum.
  (Extract.) Verona, November 12, 1822.
  On the 20th of October, the French minister gave in a paper, requiring from the ministers of the allies to know, whether, if France should be under the necessity of withdrawing her minister from Spain, the other allied powers would do the same? In case France should be involved in war with Spain, what countenance the allies would give the former? And in case France should require it, what assistance?
  To these questions the three continental allies answered on the 30th of October, that they would act as France should, in respect to their ministers in Spain, and would give to France every countenance and assistance she should require—the cause for such assistance, and the period and the mode of giving it, being reserved to be specified in a treaty.
  The minister of Great Britain answered, that having no knowledge of the cause of dispute, and not being able to form a judgment upon an hypothetical case, he could give no answer to any of the questions.
  The mode of communicating with Spain was considered on the 31st, with a view to prevent a rupture between France and Spain. It was agreed that the minister of each of the four continental courts at Madrid should present a separate note of the same tenor, and drawn upon the same principles; and on the 1st of November it was settled, that the four courts should draw up their notes and communicate them to the British minister; who should, upon seeing these notes, make known the line which his court would take.
  Since that meeting, it is understood that the plan of proceeding proposed and agreed to, has been altered. Instead of official notes to be presented by the several ministers at Madrid to the Spanish government, it is now intended that dispatches shall be written to those ministers respectively, in which the several courts will express their wishes and intentions: this mode of proceeding is adopted, as affording greater latitude for discussion and explanation than that by official notes.
  Accordingly M. de Montmorency has prepared the draft of his dispatch; and it is understood that the ministers of the continental powers are preparing theirs. These are the facts which have occurred at the existing Con-
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  gress. In the course of the discussions which have taken place upon this occasion, a marked difference of opinion as to the mode of action has appeared between the continental courts on the one hand, and England on the other. The minister of the latter power has recommended that France, and the powers which should interfere in this case, should confine themselves to what may properly be called the external quarrel between France and Spain; should not menace; and above all should not approach Spain in the form of enemies, bound in a treaty of defensive alliance against her.
  No. 6.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received, Dec. 6.
  (Extract.) Verona, November 22, 1822.
  I inclose the minute of the answer which I returned to the ministers of the allies on the 20th inst. when they communicated to me the dispatches which they proposed to write to the ministers of their several courts at Madrid.
  Minute.—(Inclosure in No. 6.)
  Verona, November 20, 1822.
  When the ministers of the five courts last assembled on the 1st instant, the object of their common solicitude was, to allay the irritation existing in Spain against France, and to prevent a possible rupture between the two powers.
  Although his majesty's government did not consider themselves sufficiently informed, either of what had already taken place between France and Spain, or of what might occasion a rupture, to be able to answer in the affirmative, the questions submitted to the conference by his excellency the minister of France; yet, knowing the anxiety of the king, my master, for the honour of his most Christian majesty, and for the preservation of the peace of the world, I was willing to cuter into the consideration of the measures proposed, with, a view to attain our common object.
  It was settled, that the notes to be prepared according to the proposition of his highness the Austrian minister, and to be presented to the Spanish government on this occasion, should be communicated to me, in order that I might see, whether, consistently With the view which the king had invariably taken of the affairs of Spain, and with the principles which had governed his majesty's conduct in relation to the internal concerns of other countries, his majesty's government could take any part which might forward the common purpose of preserving the general tranquillity.
  The ministers of the allied courts have thought proper to make known to Spain the sentiments of their respective sovereigns, by dispatches addressed to the ministers of their several courts, residing at Madrid, instead of by official notes—as a mode of communication less formal, and affording, greater facility of discussion.
  These dispatches, it appears, are to be communicated in extenso to the Spanish government.
  The origin, circumstances, and consequences of the Spanish revolution,—the existing state of affairs in Spain,—and the conduct of those who have been at the head of the Spanish government may have endangered the safety of other countries, and may have excited the uneasiness of the governments, whose ministers I am now addressing; and those governments may think it necessary to address the Spanish government upon the topics referred to in these dispatches.
  There sentiments and opinions have certainly been entertained by the three cabinets of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, for a considerable period of time; and the British government duly appreciates the forbearance and deference for the opinions of other cabinets, which have dictated the delay to make these communications, to the present moment. But having been delayed till now, I would request those ministers to consider, whether this is the moment at which such remonstrances ought to be made; whether they are calculated to allay the irritation against France, and to prevent a possible rupture; and whether they might not with advantage be delayed to a later period.
  They are certainly calculated to irritate the government of Spain; to afford ground for a belief that advantage has been taken of the irritation existing between that government and France, to call down upon Spain the power of the alliance; and thus to embarrass still more the difficult position of the French government.
  The result of these communications will probably be, that the diplomatic relations between the three allied courts and Spain will be discontinued—whatever may be the state of the questions between France and Spain: this occurrence cannot assist the cause of France; as those questions will stand upon their own ground, and the government of France must decide them upon their own merits.
  But these communications are not only calculated to embarrass the French government, but likewise that of the king, my master. His majesty feels sincerely for the king and the people of Spain; he is anxious to see a termination of the evils and misfortunes by which that country is afflicted; and that it should be prosperous and happy. His majesty likewise earnestly desires, that the usual relations of amity and good neighbourhood may be reestablished between France and Spain; and his majesty's government would have been anxious to co-operate with those of his allies, in allaying the existing irritation, and in preventing a possible rupture.
  But his majesty's government are of opinion, that to animadvert upon the internal transactions of an independent state, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of his majesty's subjects, is inconsistent with those principles on which his majesty has invariably acted on all questions relating to the internal concerns of other countries; that such animadversions, if made, must involve his ma-
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  jesty in serious responsibility, if they should produce any effect; and must irritate, if they should not: and if addressed, as proposed, to the Spanish government, are likely to be injurious to the best interests of Spain, and to produce the worst consequences upon the probable discussions between that country and France.
  The king's government must, therefore, decline to advise his majesty to hold a common language with his allies upon this occasion: and it is so necessary for his majesty, not to be supposed to participate in a measure of this description, and calculated to produce such consequences, that his government must equally refrain from advising his majesty to direct that any communication should be made to the Spanish government, on the subject of its relations with France.
  His majesty, therefore, must limit his exertions and good offices, to the endeavours of his minister at Madrid to allay the ferment which these communications must occasion, and to do all the good in his power.
  No. 7.—Mr. Secretary Canning to the duke of Wellington.
  (Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 6, 1822.
  The latest date of your grace's dispatches from Verona is the 19th ultimo. The French mail due yesterday, has, from some unaccountable accident failed to arrive; and we are left in an uncertainty, as to every thing that has passed at Verona for more than a fortnight. In this state of things, however difficult it may be to shape instructions to a case not ascertained, it has nevertheless been felt by his majesty's advisers, that we should be wanting to our duty, if we did not submit to his majesty the course which it would be expedient to pursue, in that which is understood to be the present situation of the question of peace or war between France and Spain.
  M. de Villèle has taken several opportunities of expressing to sir Charles Stuart his own earnest desire for the preservation of peace; and his wish to receive, not only the support but the advice of the British government, in his endeavours to preserve it.
  I have the king's commands to signify to your grace his majesty's pleasure, that your grace should seek a conversation with M. de Villèle; and, after referring to his excellency's communications through sir Charles Stuart, should offer to that minister the mediation of his majesty, between their most Christian and Catholic majesties.
  It will not escape your grace's observation, that in order to afford a prospect of success in our mediation, if France should be willing to employ it, there should be some reasonable hope of a similar acceptance on the part of Spain.
  I inclose to your grace an extract of a despatch from the Spanish government its Chargé d'Affaires in London, which was read and delivered to me by Mr. de Colomb in a conference the day before yesterday.
  The remaining part of the despatch to M. de Colomb (with which I do not trouble your grace on this occasion) relates to the questions pending between the two governments, respecting commercial grievances, and the piracies in the West Indian seas.
  (Inclosure in No. 7.)—Translation.—Extract of a despatch addressed by M. San Miguel, minister for foreign affairs at Madrid, to M. de Colomb, dated November 15, 1822.
  The government of his majesty has received with gratitude, but without surprise, the verbal communication, purporting that the cabinet of Ins Britannic majesty, respecting the independence and the political institutions adopted by the [Spanish] nation, is determined not to interfere in our domestic affairs.
  Nothing else could be expected from the government of a nation which like the British, knows its rights and the primordial principles of public law; and it is only to be wondered at, that it should not think it expedient to give to a declaration of such obvious justice the solemnity which it deserves.
  The ties of intimate regard, the principles of mutual convenience and the analogy of the respective institutions which exist in Spain and in England—do they not positively entitle the former, overwhelmed with difficulties, to expect from the latter, whose political influence is of the greatest weight, something more than simple and abstract justice, something more than a passive respect for universal laws, than a cold and insensible neutrality? And if some tender interest, such as befits two nations in similar circumstances, exists in the court of London, how is it that it does not manifest itself in visible acts of friendly interposition to save its ally from evils, in which humanity, wisdom, and even cautious and provident state policy will sympathize? Or how is it that (if these benevolent acts exist) they are not communicated to the cabinet of his Catholic majesty?
  The acts to which I allude, would in no wise compromise the most strictly conceived system of neutrality. Good offices, counsels, the reflections of one friend in favour of another, do not place a nation in concert of attack or defence with another, do not expose it to the enmity of the opposite party, even if they do not deserve its gratitude—they are not (in a word) effective aid, troops, arms, subsidies, which augment the force of one of the contending parties. It is of reason only that we are speaking, and it is with the pen of conciliation that a power, situated like Great Britain, might support Spain, without exposing herself to take part in a war, which she may perhaps prevent with general utility.
  England might act, in this manner; being able, ought she so to act? and if she has she acted so? In the wise, just, and generous views of the government St. James, no other answer can exist than the affirmative. Why then does she not notify to Spain what
  914
  has been done, and what it is proposed to do in that mediatory sense (en aquel sentido mediator)? Are there weighty inconveniences which enjoin discretion, which show the necessity of secresy? They do not appear to an ordinary penetration.
  Nevertheless, in such uncertainty of what she has to thank the British ministry for, the government of his Catholic majesty thinks itself bound to manifest, in the face of the world, in order that it may regard its profession of faith, that whilst it respects the rights of others, it will never admit the least intervention in its internal concerns, nor execute an act which may compromise in the least the free exercise of national sovereignty.
  When once you shall have communicated these frank declarations to the right hon. George Canning, his excellency cannot do less than find them worthy of his flattering concurrence, as well in substance as in form, and must correspond cordially with the spirit which has dictated them; and it will be sufficient that you should terminate your discourse, by reminding his excellency that Spain has been almost always, in her political relations, the victim of her probity and good faith; that her friendship has been, and is useful to other nations, and sincere under every trial; that the government of his majesty is desirous to preserve the friendly ties which exist between Spain and England, but without the diminution, without the degradation of its dignity, and that, if it has to struggle with the embarrassments that result from its immense progressive losses, the Spanish people always possesses sublimity of sentiment to conduct itself with honour, strength of character to support its calamities, and constancy of resolution to maintain itself in spite of the last sacrifices, in the post which belongs to her in Europe.
  No. 8.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received December 11.
  (Extract.) Paris, December 9, 1822.
  I arrived here this afternoon, and received your despatch of the 6th inst. I have since had an interview with M. de Villéle and I have the pleasure to inform you, that he has sent a messenger to Verona with orders to the French ministers at that place, to express the desire of the French government, that the transmission of the despatches to Madrid should be suspended.
  No. 9. — Mr. Secretary Canning to the Duke of Wellington.
  (Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 13, 1822.
  Your grace's despatches of Tuesday have been received and laid before the king. The step taken by M. de Villéle, in referring back to Verona the consideration of the despatches proposed to be sent by the three continental courts to their several ministers at Madrid, with a view of inducing the three courts to

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  suspend the transmission of those despatches, undoubtedly constituted a case (wholly unforeseen when the last instructions of your government were framed) which made it expedient to suspend, on your grace's part, the offer to the French government, of his majesty's mediation with Spain.—Upon a full review, however, of the situation in which we stand towards both those powers, and towards the other members of the alliance, and upon an anxious consideration of the several issues to which the question of peace or war may come—all those of his majesty's servants, whom I have been able to consult, are of opinion, that it is highly material, for the clear and perfect discharge of the duty of the British government, in a question so deeply affecting the interests, not only of the powers immediately concerned, but of the world, that your grace should not leave Paris, without having placed in the hands of the French government the eventual offer of his majesty's mediation.
  No. 10.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received December 22.
  (Extract.) Paris, December 17, 1822.
  I waited upon M. de Montmorency this day, and presented to him the note of which I inclose a copy.
  (Inclosure in No. 10.) The Duke of Wellington to M. de Montmorency.
  Paris, December 17, 1822.
  The undersigned, his Britannic majesty's plenipotentiary, has explained and recorded, in the conferences of Verona, the sentiments of his government upon the present critical state of affairs between France and Spain; and the earnest solicitude of the king his master, to avert a war of which no human foresight can calculate the consequences.
  Upon his arrival at Paris, the undersigned found instructions from his government, to offer to his most Christian majesty the mediation of the king his master, before the decisive step should have been taken, of transmitting to Madrid the despatches written at Verona.
  The undersigned rejoiced at the delay which had been interposed to the transmission of those despatches to Madrid, by the reference to Verona; and his government have learnt, with the liveliest satisfaction, the determination of the French government to reconsider a measure which the undersigned had so anxiously deprecated.
  It is the sincere hope of his majesty, that this salutary reconsideration may prevent recourse to arms. But, as the issue of the reference to Verona may still be doubtful, the undersigned is instructed to declare, that, if the answer to that reference should not be such as to preclude all danger of hostilities, his majesty will be ready to accept the office of mediator between the French and Spanish governments; and to employ his most strenuous endeavours for the adjustment of their
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  differences, and for the preservation of the peace of the world. The undersigned, &c.
  (Signed) WELLINGTON.
  No. 11.—(Translation.) Note from the Duke of Montmorency to the Duke of Wellington, dated Paris the 26th Dec. 1822.
  The undersigned minister for foreign affairs has received and laid before the king, the note which his excellency the duke of Wellington did him the honour to address to him on the 17th of this month.
  His majesty has appreciated the sentiments which have induced the king of England to offer his mediation to his majesty, in order to prevent a rupture between him and the Spanish government. But his majesty could not but feel that the situation of France with regard to Spain, was not of a nature to call for a mediation between the two courts. In fact, there exists no difference between them, no specific point of discussion, by the arrangement of which their relations might be placed on the footing on which they ought to stand. Spain, by the nature of her revolution, and by the circumstances with which it has been attended has excited the apprehensions of several great powers. England participated in these apprehensions; for even in the year 1820, she foresaw cases, in which it would be impossible to preserve with Spain, relations of peace and good understanding.
  France is more interested than any other power in the events which may result from the actual situation of that monarchy. But it is not her own interests alone which are compromised, and which she must keep in view in the present circumstances:—the repose of Europe, and the maintenance of those principles by which it is guaranteed, are involved.
  The duke of Wellington knows that these are the sentiments which dictated the conduct of France at Verona; and that the courts which agreed in them regarded the consequences of the revolution, and of the actual state of Spain as being common to them all; that they never entertained the idea that it was between France and Spain alone that the existing difficulties needed to be arranged; that they considered the question to be "wholly European;" and that it is in consequence of this opinion, that the measures which had for their object the bringing about, if possible, an amelioration in the state of a country so highly interesting to Europe, were conceived and proposed—measures, the success of which would have been completely secured, if England had thought she could concur in them.
  His most Christian majesty, who was bound to weigh these considerations maturely, has therefore thought that he could not accept the mediation that his Britannic majesty has been pleased to propose to him. He sees, however, with pleasure in this proposition, a new pledge of the conciliatory disposition of the English government; and he thinks that with such feel-

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  ings, that government may render essential service to Europe, by offering in the like manner to the government of Spain, advice, which by leading them to entertain more calm views, might produce a happy influence on the internal situation of that country.
  His majesty would learn, with the liveliest satisfaction, the success of such efforts. He would see in it a firm ground to hope for the preservation of a peace, of the great value of which, the governments and the people of Europe cannot but be deeply sensible. The undersigned eagerly embraces the opportunity of renewing to his excellency the duke of Wellington the assurances of his high consideration. The undersigned, &c.
  (Signed) MONTMORENCY.
  No. 12.—Mr. Secretary Canning to the Vicomte de Marcellus.
  Foreign Office, January 10, 1823.
  The undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has received from the duke of Wellington, late his majesty's plenipotentiary at the Congress of Verona, and has laid before the king his master, the answer of the minister for foreign affairs of his most Christian majesty, to the official note in which the duke of Wellington, on his return from Verona, tendered to the French government the mediation of the king, for the adjustment of differences between France and Spain.
  The undersigned is commanded to address to M. de Marcellus, chargé d'affaires of his most Christian majesty, the following observations on the note of his excellency the duke de Montmorency, to be transmitted by M. de Marcellus to his court.
  The king has seen with pleasure, that his most Christian majesty does justice to the sentiments which dictated the offer of his majesty's mediation: and although the view which is taken in M. de Montmorency's note, of the nature of the differences between the French and Spanish governments, has induced his most Christian majesty to decline that mediation, the king will not the less anxiously employ, in every way that is yet open to him, those "conciliatory dispositions" for which his most Christian majesty gives him credit, to bring about a state of things less menacing to the peace of Europe, than that which is exhibited in the present position of those two governments towards each other.
  The British cabinet had not to learn how fearfully the tranquillity of all Europe must be affected by the hostile collision of France and Spain. Accordingly, in the duke of Wellington's official note, the "adjustment" of the supposed "differences between the French and Spanish governments," was stated as auxiliary to "the preservation of the peace of the world." But the British cabinet certainly did not understand the questions brought forward at Verona, by the plenipotentiary of his most Christian majesty, with respect to the
  918
  actual situation and possible conduct of Spain, to be questions in which the concern of France was so little distinguishable from that of other powers, as the duke de Montmorency's note, represents it.
  The plenipotentiary of the king of France Solicited from his most Christian majesty's allies a declaration:
  1st. Whether, if France should find herself obliged to recall her minister from Madrid, and to break off all diplomatic relations with Spain, they would be disposed to take the like measure, and to recall their several legations?
  2nd. If war should break out between France and Spain, in what form, and by what acts, would they afford to France that moral support, which would give to her proceedings the whole force of the alliance, and would inspire a salutary fear into the revolutionists of all countries?
  3rd. What were the intentions of the several powers, both as to the substance and the form of the direct assistance which they would be disposed to give to France, in a casein which, upon her demand, their active intervention should become necessary?
  France, therefore, originated the discussions upon Spanish affairs at Verona; and the answers of the three continental members of the alliance were addressed to the cases supposed, and to the support demanded, by France.
  In common with the three continental powers, the plenipotentiary of his majesty considered the question of peace or war with Spain, as a question peculiarly French, In his answer (given in simultaneously with those of the three continental powers) to the queries of the French plenipotentiary, and in all the discussions which followed thereupon, the duke of Wellington uniformly alleged, as one of his reasons for not assenting to the propositions of M. de Montmorency, the ignorance of the British government as to the antecedent Transactions and communications (during the last-two years) between the governments of France and Spain.
  No objection was stated by the duke of Wellington, on the part of the king his master, to the precautionary measures of France, within her own frontier; measures which the right of self-defence plainly authorized, not only against the danger of contagious disease (in which they professedly originated, and to which, till the month of September, they were exclusively ascribed), but against those inconveniences which might possibly arise to France from civil contest in a country separated from France only by a conventional line of demarcation; against the moral infection of political intrigue, and against the violation of French territory by occasional military incursions. But it appeared to his majesty's plenipotentiary at Verona to be necessary and just, that, before he was called upon to promise eventually the support of his government to measures on the part of France which were likely

  919
  to lead to war with Spain, opportunity should have been allowed to his government to examine the grounds of those measures—that the Cause of offence given by Spain to France should have been specifically defined.
  It was therefore impossible for his majesty's plenipotentiary to "concur" in the decisions of Verona.
  It remains for the undersigned to advert to that part of the French official note, which appears to insinuate a reproach against this country, as if she had abandoned at Verona, opinions which she had formerly declared with respect to the affairs of Spain.
  "England," it is said, "partook in 1820, of the inquietude which the revolution in Spain occasioned to many great powers; she foresaw cases in which it might be impossible to preserve with Spain the relations of good intelligence and peace."
  The undersigned must be permitted to say, that though questions were indeed propounded to England in the year 1820, as to possible future contingencies in the affairs of Spain, so far from "foreseeing cases," and deciding upon the conduct which would be applicable to them, in the manner here described, the British government positively declined to bind itself, by a contingent opinion, to any conditional Course of action.
  But there was no indisposition or hesitation to avow the principles upon which the opinion of England would be formed, and her course of action regulated. It was not only declared that the British government disclaimed any general right of interference in the internal concerns of independent nations; but it was specifically stated, that there was perhaps no country of equal magnitude with Spain whose internal disturbances would be so little likely to menace other states with that direct and imminent danger, which could alone, in exception to the general rule, justify foreign interference.
  The application of these principles to the cases brought forward by France at Verona, was as direct as it was consistent with the former professions of the British cabinet.—That application was further enforced by other considerations, which, though they had not perhaps been distinctly anticipated in a prospective and hypothetical argument bore nevertheless with undeniable force upon the question to be decided at Verona.
  Dangers not necessarily arising from the existence of the internal agitations of Spain, might nevertheless be created by an uncalled for and injudicious interposition in them. The spirit of revolution, which, shut up within the Pyrennees, might exhaust itself in struggles, trying indeed to Spain, but harmless to her neighbours, it called forth from within those precincts by the provocation of foreign attack, might find perhaps in other countries fresh aliment for its fury; and might renew throughout Europe, the miseries of the five and twenty years which preceded the peace of 1815.
  For these and abundant other reasons, the voice of his majesty's plenipotentiary at Verona was for peace. The preservation of general peace is the earnest wish and object of his majesty; and the undersigned is commanded to repeat, that no means will be left unexhausted by his majesty's government, which the impartial employment of good offices can afford, to soothe the irritation at present unhappily subsisting between the governments of France and Spain, and to prevent, if possible, the commencement of hostilities, the consequences of which no human foresight can calculate. The undersigned, &c.
  (Signed) GEORGE CANNING.
  No. 13.—(Translation).—The Viscount de Chateaubriand to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received, Jan. 27th.
  Paris, Jan. 23, 1823.
  The undersigned minister for foreign affairs, of his most Christian majesty, has laid before the king, the note, dated the 10th of this month which his excellency, the principal secretary of state for foreign affairs of his Britannic majesty, has addressed to viscount Marcellus. He has been commanded to make the following communication to his excellency:
  The cabinet of his Britannic majesty would fall into a serious error, if it imagined that France had represented to the congress of Verona, the question of Spain, as having for her an interest entirely separate from that of the allied powers; that, consequently she is inconsistent when, in her answer to the proposition of mediation made by England, she maintains that that question is "wholly European."
  France, since the transactions of Aix-la-Chapelle, is closely united with the courts, who, by their efforts, have re-established peace upon the continent. Deeply impressed with the sacred obligation of treaties, she will fulfil the duties which they impose upon her:—one of the duties thus required of France was, to make known to her allies, the motives which had compelled her to establish an army of observation on one of her frontiers, and to explain her uneasiness on approaching events, of which it was easy to calculate the chances. In the position in which the agitations in Spain had placed her, common prudence required that she should make herself acquainted with the part which the allied powers would take, in the event of war becoming inevitable.
  This line of conduct, which good sense and reason pointed cut, the duke de Montmorency was bound to follow at Verona. The sovereigns were of opinion (in which the French government concluded,) that there was imminent danger to society, in that military anarchy in Spain, in which those principles were put forth anew, which, during thirty years, had occasioned the misfortunes of Europe. From these general conferences, particular questions naturally arose; and cases which were originally involved in the general interests, became the subject of specific discussion.
  The result of these frank communications was, that France found herself placed in a position to act separately in a cause which was, as it were, appropriated to her, without, however, separating her policy from that of her allies; so that, according to the impression which the case conveyed, it might be said, without fear of contradiction, that the question respecting Spain was at once "wholly French, and wholly European."
  The undersigned, flattering himself that he has given a satisfactory answer to the first objection of his Britannic majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, proceeds to the consideration of another point.
  The cabinet of the Tuilleries have not forgotten, that the principal motive alleged by his grace the duke of Wellington at Verona, for not explaining himself upon the casus fœderis, was, the ignorance of his government of the transactions which had taken place between France and Spain, from 1820 to 1822. That objection was removed at the congress, as it will be here, by the single observation, that the grievances of which France might have to complain, on the subject of the Spanish revolution, were unfortunately of public notoriety; and this is what the undersigned will have occasion to develope in the course of this note.
  The minister for foreign affairs of his Britannic majesty, in reply to an observation contained in the note of M. le Due de Montmorency, dated the 24th December, states that the cabinet of St. James's has never admitted that there was a case to justify intervention in the affairs of Spain; and that therefore it might refuse to bind itself for the future by expressing an opinion upon contingent and uncertain events. The undersigned thinks, however, that he has reasons for not doubting that in a Mémoire drawn up by the cabinet of London, in answer to a despatch of the court of Russia, and communicated on the 17th Nay, 1820, by sir Charles Stuart to the French minister for foreign affairs, an opinion is pronounced that an interference in the affairs of Spain would be justifiable; 1st, if the violence of the persons in power led them to an attack against any other states: 2nd, if Spain attempted to possess herself of Portugal, or to effect a re-union of the two states.—This opinion of the British cabinet appeared at the time as conformable with the general interests of Europe, as with particular interests, to the care of which every government has an acknowledged right to attend.
  The undersigned regrets that he cannot coincide in opinion with his Britannic majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, as to the little danger to which the Spanish revolution exposes the other powers of Europe. The state of modern civilization brings one nation into communication with all others, however completely it may be insulated by geographical position. France, especially, the only country whose frontier touches that of Spain, suffers considerably from the troubles
  922
  which agitate the kingdom of Ferdinand—A revolution which seems to have taken for its model, that of which the traces are not yet, effaced, awakens and agitates in the bosom of France a host of passions and recollections.—Innumerable proofs exist that the revolutionists of Spain and France are in close connexion; and in all the military conspiracies tried by the French tribunals, the name and the hope of the Cortes have invariably appeared. Offenders escaped from justice have found an asylum in the Peninsula, where they menace and' insult with impunity, the monarchy and the throne of the Bourbons.—Libels written in French and printed in Spain, are scattered abroad amongst the Army of Observation, for the purpose of corrupting it. And even in the English papers the British government has seen that our soldiers were excited to revolt in the name of Spain. These facts were admitted by implication by his grace the duke of Wellington, when, in his diplomatic notes he extended his approbation to the establishment of the Army of Observation. The very note to which the undersigned has now the honour to reply, confirms all that he here advances, in citing the following expressions of the noble duke.—"The duke of Wellington made no objection in the name of the king, his master, to the, precautionary measures taken by France on her own frontiers, whilst these measures were evidently authorized by the right of defending herself, not only against the dangers of infectious disease, but also against the moral contagion of political intrigue; and finally, against the violation of the French territory by casual military incursions."—This admission is remarkable, and besides, did not Piedmont and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies rise in the name of the Cortes; and is any other proof required, that the Spanish revolution may pass the limits of the Pyrennees? France then has the right to defend herself against moral contagion. It is equally necessary for her to secure herself against dangers of another sort, since the French territory has been thrice violated by the constitutional troops of Spain.
  That France, disquieted in her interior, and armed on her frontiers for her defence, should be under an imperious necessity to escape from a position so painful to her, is what it is impossible not to acknowledge. Like the British government, she sincerely desires peace. She would not have hesitated in concert with her allies, to accept the mediation of England, if the discussion of specific interest were in question; but it is impossible to establish a basis of negotiation upon political theories, and of arbitration upon principles.
  For the same reason France could not accede to the proposal which M. de San Miguel made on the 12th of this month, to the minister of Great Britain at the court of Madrid, in order to engage that power to interfere in the affairs of the French and Spanish governments—an intervention useless, at the least, since it appears

  923
  that it would have no other object than measures relative to the Army of Observation.
  If the cabinet of Madrid is sincere in its communications, does it need an intermediate channel to transmit them to the cabinet of the Tuilleries? The latter does not fear to explain itself. Even recently it has made known the reasonable conditions, by means of which a speedy reconciliation might be effected.
  The Comte de la Garde has received orders to communicate confidentially to sir William A'Court the king's benevolent intentions. His most Christian majesty demands, that his Catholic majesty, should, of himself, and by his own authority, apply the necessary modifications to the institutions which have been imposed on the crown of Spain by the revolt of a few soldiers.
  To this free concession by king Ferdinand, of the corrected institutions, the king of France thinks that it would be proper to add, a full and complete amnesty, for all political acts committed from 1822, up to the day of promulgating the royal concession.—Thus would disappear from the Spanish constitution, the defects, in substance, and in form, which endanger all legitimate monarchies. The undersigned feels persuaded, that propositions so just and so moderate will obtain the concurrence of all the cabinets of Europe.
  The French government having made every sort of sacrifice to the desire of avoiding war; having struggled, perhaps too long, against public opinion, roused by the provocations of Spain—has at length reached that last limit of concession which no power, that respects itself, can with impunity over-step. Injured in her essential interests France, without ceasing to offer the most ardent prayers for peace, can no longer shut her eyes to the dangers which threaten her. She has already taken, and she will continue to take, the measures best calculated for putting an end to a state of uncertainty, which compromises alike her safety, her honour, and her dignity. Whatever may be the event, France will always have pleasure in relying on the good offices of which the English government has again been pleased to renew to her the proposal. She will herself use her utmost endeavour to draw closer the ties which so happily unite the two monarchies and the two people.
  (Signed) CHATEAUBRIAND.
  No. 14.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir Charles Stuart.
  Foreign Office, January 28, 1823.
  Sir;—Shortly after I had despatched the messenger yesterday, M. de Marcellus delivered to me the official answer of M. de Chateaubriand to the note addressed by me to M. de Marcellus on the 10th instant.
  As it appears from your excellency's despatch of the 24th, which also reached me yesterday that M. de Chateaubriand, though he stated to your excellency the substance of this note, had not furnished you with a copy of
  924
  it, I think it right to inclose a copy for your information.
  Upon a first consideration I am by no means sure that it will be necessary to reply officially to this note of M. de Chateaubriand; since it in effect admits all the material propositions of the note to which it is an answer.
  The questions brought forward by France at Verona are acknowledged to have been French questions, in the sense in which they are in my note described to have been such; that is to say, the interest of France is stated in those questions not as distinct from the interest of Europe, but as more immediate:—and it is not denied, that the refusal of his majesty's plenipotentiary to concur in the decisions of Verona, was founded on the omission by France to substantiate any specific ground of complaint against the Spanish government.
  In the subsequent part of M. de Chateaubriand's note, while the assertion of my note of the 10th instant, that Great Britain had in 1820 declined anticipating hypothetical cases in which it might be impossible to remain at peace with Spain, is disputed; the only two cases which are cited in exception to that assertion, are cases wholly independent of the principle of interference in the internal concerns of other nations.
  It is averred, that we admitted the necessity of war against Spain; first, if Spain herself should be guilty of aggression against other states, and secondly and specifically, if she should attempt to possess herself of Portugal.
  Unquestionably, with respect to either of those cases, Great Britain would admit, not only prospectively and hypothetically, and as to Spain, but positively and directly as to any power whatever, that aggression against any of its neighbours would justify war; and that aggression against Portugal would impose upon Great Britain the duty of protecting her ally.
  But these admissions leave the question as to the right of interference in the affairs of Spain, where it was.
  With respect to that part of M. de Chateaubriand's note which describes the nature of the demands intended to be made by France upon Spain, and takes credit for the moderation of them; your excellency will not fail to observe, that our difference with France and the allies throughout, is not as to the arrangements which it might be desirable to obtain from Spain, but as to the principle upon which France and the allies propose to require them.
  We disclaim for ourselves, and deny for other powers, the right of requiring any changes in the internal institutions of independent states, with the menace of hostile attack in case of refusal. The moderation of such demands in no degree justifies in our eyes such a mode of enforcing them; and this distinction it is the more important to keep steadily in view, and to impress upon the French government, at a moment when, for their sake, and at their desire, we are suggesting to Spain, in

  925
  a tone of friendly counsel, alterations similar to those which France is proposing as the alternative of hostilities.
  Your excellency will speak in this sense to M. de Chateaubriand, when you acknowledge on my part the receipt of his official note; from the general tone of which, and from the friendliness of its expressions towards this country, you will inform M. de Chateaubriand, that his majesty's government derives the liveliest satisfaction; at the same time that it views with deep regret the tendency of that part of the note which appears to indicate an expectation of hostilities with Spain. I am, &c.
  (Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

CLASS B.—PARIS AND MADRID.
No. 1.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office Dec. 3, 1822.
In order that you may be fully informed of the manner in which the question of interference in the affairs of Spain has been treated at the conferences at Verona, I have directed copies of the principal communications received from the duke of 'Wellington on that question, to be prepared for you; and I herewith transmit them to you for your information.
No. 2.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 9, 1822.
On the day after I had despatched my last messenger to you, M. de Colomb, the Spanish chargé d'affaires, requested a conference; at which he first read, and then delivered to me, the extract of a despatch from his court, of which I inclose a copy.*
No. 3 —Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 9, 1822.
I have received this morning, the duke of Wellington's final despatches from Verona. No argument will be left unemployed on the part of his majesty, which may tend to allay a warlike disposition in his most Christian majesty's councils. His majesty's mediation between France and Spain, if solicited by Spain and accepted by France, would be gladly given and earnestly exerted, to settle the disputes between those powers, and to preserve the peace of the world.
If Spain be disposed to solicit that mediation, she will entitle herself to it, first, by redressing our grievances—and secondly, by a confidential and spontaneous assurance, that his Catholic majesty and his family are altogether safe from violence.
Upon this latter point, it is not intended that you should make any direct demand to the Spanish government. It could not pro-
* See the inclosure in No. 7, of Verona and Paris papers.
926
perly find its place in a diplomatic communication to the minister of his Catholic majesty. But M. San Miguel may be easily led to understand, how important an aid would be afforded to any interposition of ours in behalf of Spain, if we could accompany it with the declaration of our entire conviction, that on this point Europe has nothing to fear.
No. 4.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 17, 1822.
I transmit to you an extract* of a despatch which has been received from the duke of Wellington at Paris. You may confidently assure the Spanish minister, that no effort has been, or will be left untried, on the part of his majesty, to prevent a war against Spain.
No. 5.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 28, 1822.
I re-despatch your messenger with the inclosed copy of an official note† presented to the French government by the duke of Wellington the day before his departure from Paris. You will communicate it to M. de San Miguel; and if desired, will furnish him with a copy of it.
No. G.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 29, 1822.
Sir Charles Stuart has transmitted the answer of the French government to the official note presented by the duke of Wellington, at Paris. In that answer (of which I inclose a copy‡), the French government, while it declines accepting the proffered mediation of his majesty, on the ground that there is no specific point of difference, to the removal or explanation of which mediation can be distinctly applied, expresses nevertheless the pleasure with which it views the "conciliatory dispositions" of the British government, and the hope which it derives from those dispositions, of the continuance of peace in Europe.
Sir C. Stuart at the same time, reports to me, the instructions which have been transmitted by the French government to their ministers at Madrid.§ M. de Marcellus has been with me this morning for the purpose of making, by order of his government, a similar communication.
As the object at Verona was to induce us to make common cause with all; so the object of France, since she has to a certain degree reconsidered for herself the measures framed at Verona, appears to be to induce us to concur in her separate and mitigated measure.
* See No. 8, Verona and Paris papers.
† See inclosure No. 10, Verona and Paris papers.
‡ See No. 12, in Verona and Paris papers.
§ Despatch from M. de Villèle to M. Lagarde, dated Paris, December 25, 1822.
The truth is, as you are aware, that our objection to joining in the measures settled at Verona was an objection of principle not of degree; an objection not capable therefore of being overcome by a were modification of the execution of them.
It would have been idle to offer our mediation to France, if we had been prepared to unite with her in the conditional menace contained in the despatch which she has now addressed to her minister at Madrid—a menace softened perhaps in it's terms, and less precise as to the conditions on which it depends than those of the other continental powers, but still vicious in principle, as at once demanding of Spain something to be done in the arrangement of her internal concerns, and denouncing (in however comparatively distant and obscure a manner) war as the consequence of refusal.
In speaking to M. de San Miguel upon the subject of those instructions, you will disclaim or your government any participation in this proceeding of the French government. But you will avow the deep interest which the king, our master, feels in the agitations now prevailing in Spain; his majesty's anxious hope that the Spanish government and nation may avoid any access, either in action or in language; and his majesty's unabated desire, to employ his good offices, in whatever way may be most useful to Spain, for averting the dangers with which she is threatened, and for reconciling her to France and to all Europe.
No. 7—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 29, 1822.
It may be of so much use to you, in the present critical state of things, to have with you some person, in the duke of Wellington's entire confidence, and capable of communicating in his grace's name with individuals whom he has personally known, and who are now in the Spanish government or councils, that lord Fitzroy Somerset has agreed to undertake a journey to Madrid, for the purpose of affording, you such assistance. He will set off in the course of next week, and will remain at Madrid as long as you think he can be useful to you.
No. 8.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received January 2, 1823.
(Extract.) Madrid, Dec. 24, 1822.
Mr. Jackson is arrived, and has delivered to me your despatches of the 9th ultimo. I am now really inclined to believe that we shall come to an amicable and satisfactory termination of our discussions with the Spanish government.
My conversation with M. San Miguel this morning began by his pulling from his pocket a large roll of papers, with which, he said, he was going down immediately to the Cortes, with the view of requesting authority from that body, to settle every question at issue between England and Spain.
"We are sure of England," he said, "and satisfied with her position; and, we hope that the Cortes will enable us to make her satisfied with Spain. We cannot expect her to range herself on our side, nor to send troops or fleets to assist us; but we are persuaded that she will never assist our enemies, nor furnish them with the means of invading us. It is moreover so much her interest to prevent war breaking out between us and France, that it is quite unnecessary to ask for her mediation—There is certainly nothing to induce us to ask for such a mediation at present; but we are at sea, surrounded by dangers, and menaced by storms, and it is impossible to say that we may not yet require a friendly hand. But we see nothing yet to make it necessary for us to ask any mediation, nor have we at present any intention to solicit one."
I have thought it adviseable, sir, to repeat to you this conversation, that you may be able to draw from it your own conclusion as to the probability of our mediation being solicited. I am myself of opinion that such a step will never be resorted to, till every other hope has failed: and certainly there is nothing in the despatches from Paris, nor in the conversations or conduct of general Lagarde, to make this government despair of avoiding a war without our mediation.
No. 9.— Mr. Secretary Canning to Lord Fitzroy Somerset.
Foreign Office, January 6, 1823
My Lord;—in returning to your lordship the memorandum which the duke of Wellington has put into your hands, of the points upon which it may he advantageous to the king's service, that your lordship should communicate verbally his grace's sentiments to such of the persons now taking a leading part in the affairs of Spain, as may be likely to be influenced by a communication of this confidential nature, I have very little to add to the contents of the memorandum; and that little relates rather to the mode of your acting upon it, than to the substance of the paper itself.
Important as the aid which your lordship will bring to sir William A'Court must be, you will, I am sure, be aware of the absolute necessity of not appearing to be invested with any separate mission, which might detract in the eyes of the Spanish ministers from that gentleman's official or personal authority.
Your lordship will be so good as to consult sir William A'Court's wishes and opinions as to the occasions on which, and as to the persons with whom, you should enter upon the topics entrusted to your discretion; and you will report to him your several conversation not disguising from the individuals with whom those conversations are held, that you are to do so.
At the same bane, however, that you will be thus careful to mark your relation to his majesty's established minister, it will be essential to avoid creating the impression, that the sug-

929
gestions which your lordship has to offer on the part of the duke of Wellington, as the friend and well-wisher of Spain, are only in another shape demands on the part of your government. A voluntary adoption of the suggestions of the duke of Wellington would enable us to mediate for Spain with France, with an effect infinitely more powerful. But we do not, like France, demand any thing of this sort, as the price of our forbearance to break with Spain.
What is necessary to enable us to mediate for Spain with honour, is the redress of the grievances which we have against her. But that matter is in sir William A'Court's hands; and is, I hope in a train of settlement.
With regard to the length of your stay at Madrid, I have only to refer you to your own and sir William A'Court's joint discretion.
I shall hope to hear from your lordship soon after your arrival, and as often as there is a safe opportunity of writing. I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.
(Inclosure in No. 9.)—Memorandum by the Duke of Wellington for Lord Fitzroy Somerset.
London, January 6, 1823.
It is important to make the Spaniards feel, that a king being necessary for the government of their country, and a part of their system, as established by themselves—it follows, as a matter of equal necessity, that the powers and prerogatives assigned to the king in the system, should be such as to enable him to perform his duties, and such as, in reason, a king ought to be satisfied with.
If the situation of the king is not what it ought to be—if he has not the power to protect himself, and those employed under him, in the performance of their duty in the service of the public: and if the king has not reason to be satisfied, that the power allotted to him by the law is sufficient—the country will never be in a state of tranquillity, be the system of government what it may.
There will be perpetual, successive, royalist insurrections in one part of the country or the other; and the king and his government will be objects of never-ceasing jealousy and distrust.
The family connection between his Catholic majesty and the king of France—and the interest which the latter naturally feels for the welfare of the former—will occasion a perpetual irritation between the two countries, so long as the situation of the king in Spain is not what it ought to be: which it may be expected will, sooner or later, occasion war, and the invasion of the weaker country.
Thus then, those Spaniards who really desire the peace and welfare of their country, must look to an alteration of their constitution, which shall have for its object, to give the king the power of executing his office. I confess that I do not see any objection to this alteration,
930
either in the antecedent conduct of the king, or in the apprehension that his Catholic majesty will abuse the power thus confided to him. The king will feel the advantages of the position in which he shall find himself, and will have no motive for wishing to overthrow the system established, particularly if the alteration is made in concert with him: and, moreover, the spirit of the people, and the exertions of those individuals who have prevented the existing system from being overthrown, will preserve that to be established, even though the king should be desirous of overthrowing it, by the abuse of the power entrusted to him.
This will be the case particularly, if the proposed alterations of the system are concerted with the king. Indeed, no other Mode of making those alterations can have the desired effect as, if they are not made in concert with the king, his Catholic majesty will not cordially carry into execution the system proposed; and, both king and people being dissatisfied, there will still be the same causes for internal disturbance and for external war as exist at present. The concert with the king on the alterations must be a real one and the king must be satisfied, that the consitution, as altered, will secure the foundations of his power over the executive government, and will give him the means of protecting himself, his family, and his servants.
Neither do I see any reason for deferring to make these alterations in the recent transactions of foreign powers. Those transactions are all professedly defensive. France professes, by her Army of Observation, to be defensive; and declares that she will not pass the frontier, excepting on the occurrence of certain cases. The alterations of the constitution, on the principles proposed, would render those cases so improbable, as that the continuance of the Army of Observation would be an useless expense; and there is no doubt that it would be immediately withdrawn.
Then, another advantage which would result from this alteration in aid of internal tranquillity is, that France would most probably immediately adopt some efficient measure to prevent the assembly of the royalists within the French frontier. All Spaniards who pass the frontier, might be ordered to reside at such a distance from the frontier, as to render their intrigues or their operations within the Spanish frontier nearly impossible; and thus the asylum given in France to persons of this description, would not be inconsistent with the peace and tranquillity of Spain.
But this is not all. The Spaniards must see that all the sources of the prosperity of their country are nearly destroyed; and that the very foundations of social order and government are in a state of risk. There is no trade, no private or public revenue: the national property cannot be sold: the interest of the national debt cannot be paid; nor can the army, or any of the public servants or establishments; and no money can be borrowed.
I happen to know that the principal monied people in Europe, will not lend their money to Spain, till they shall see a system prevail in that country, which shall afford some hope of the re-establishment and permanence of peace and good order.
If all this be true—if it be true, besides, that the best chance that Spain has of coming to some arrangement with her colonies, is to be found in some settlement of her internal dissensions and distractions, it is impossible that any reasonable Spaniard can doubt that the time is come, to effect those alterations, which the common sense of mankind points out to be necessary.
No. 10.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir W. A'Court.
Foreign Office, January 6,1823.
Sir;—This dispatch will be delivered to you by lord Fitzroy Somerset, who has the goodness to undertake a journey to Madrid (without any official character), in the hope of being useful to you in the very difficult and complicated state of your present negotiations, through his acquaintance with some of the prominent characters, among military and other public men, in Spain; and through the knowledge which he possesses, and is known to possess, of the views and opinions of the duke of Wellington.
There may be those among the leaders of the Cortes, or in offices of the executive government, who would listen to friendly counsels, coming from a man to whom Spain is so deeply indebted as the duke of Wellington, and to whom her welfare is naturally so Wellington, from the very services which he has had the glory of rendering to her, though they might turn a deaf ear to any other suggestions.
The object of England is, to preserve the peace, of which her exertions have prevented the immediate interruption. But it is much to be feared that peace cannot be preserved, if things remain in their present state, both at Madrid and on the frontier of Spain.
France can hardly be expected to withdraw her Army of Observation, without some assurances from Spain, which she may plead as satisfactory. We ask no such assurances for ourselves, and we annex no penalty to the refusing or withholding them: but it would enable us to do much, that such assurances should voluntarily be given to us; and perhaps they may be given less reluctantly through the confidential friend of the duke of Wellington, than directly to yourself, even if you were authorized officially to receive them. The interval is precious, and it is hoped that it may not be thrown away.
I inclose to you a copy of a letter* which I address to lord Fitzroy Somerset, and of a memorandum with which he is furnished by the duke of Wellington.
You will see that he is to consult your judg-
* No. 8, and Inclosure therein.
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ment as to the occasions on which; and the individuals with whom, it may be expedient that he should enter into communication; that he will repeat to you whatever passes in such conferences; and that the length of his stay and the time of his departure are to be determined with your advice. I am, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.
No. 11.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, Jan. 9, 1823.
Inclosed is a copy of an official note* which I have received the king's commands to address to the French chargé d' affaires in London, in reply to the duke de Montmorency's answer to the note of the duke of Wellington of the 17th ult. which tendered to the French government the mediation of his majesty for the adjustment of its differences with Spain—You will communicate my note to the Spanish minister.
Our position between France and Spain is strictly mediatorial, even though neither of the two states should (for different reasons) think fit to avail itself of our formal mediation: and though we are not invested with the office, we must endeavour practically to perform the duties of it.
I have received the king's commands to signify to you his majesty's gracious approbation of the ability, zeal, and perseverance with which you have executed the instructions heretofore confided to you, with respect to the commercial and maritime claims of his majesty's subjects—the settlement of which after so long a course of complaint and remonstrance, will be mainly to be attributed to your exertions.
The difficulty of the task imposed upon you by the tenor of those instructions, contrasted as they are with the more acceptable communications which you have subsequently had to make to the Spanish government, is fully acknowledged; and your success in reconciling two apparently opposite courses of conduct, and producing (as it is hoped you may do) a favourable result in both, will be proportionably appreciated by your government.
If any thing of personal indisposition towards yourself, shall appear to have been excited in the mind of those with whom you have had to negociate, from the pertinacity with which you have been directed to press the unpleasant topics of your late conferences, you will not scruple to set yourself right, by throwing the whole responsibility upon your instructions.
It would have been very desirable if indeed, if it had been proper, to qualify the unpleasantness of those instructions, by accompanying them with some distinct intimation of the part which the plenipotentiary of his majesty was taking in Spanish affairs at Verona: but such an intimation of our separate opinion could not be given, in fairness to the allies, while
* See No. 13, in Verona and Paris Papers.

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their deliberations yet continued, and while the result of those deliberations was undetermined or unknown.
Now that the whole of our conduct is before the Spanish government, you will assuredly find no difficulty in convincing them of the correctness of both parts of it; in showing them that a determination to vindicate our rights against Spain was not incompatible with a respect for her national independence; and in availing yourself of the removal of that dissatisfaction, which must always have tinged our intercourse with the Spanish government, while our just grievances remained unredressed, to impress upon M. de San Miguel our desire to prove, by our good offices in Europe, how little any feeling of hostility entered into the measures to which we were compelled to resort for the defence of our honour and our interests in America.
(Extract.) No. 12.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received Jan. 9, 1823.
Madrid, December 26, 1822.
I saw M. de San Miguel again this morning, who continued to speak in the same friendly tone as during our last conference, and repeated his assurances that every thing respecting our claims should be arranged to our entire satisfaction, provided the Cortes granted him the faculties he demanded.—This I trust will be done.
In the course of this conference M. de San Miguel said, that he fully understood our position, and our friendly intentions towards Spain; which arose indeed from a conviction of our own interests. It never could tally with English policy that France should be in military occupation of Spain.
He then added, that, from every report which had lately reached him, he did not believe that any war was likely to take place. The Congress was over, and the great continental sovereigns had retired to their respective states, leaving every thing to France: and he had reason to believe that France was by no means in those decidedly hostile intentions, which there had once been reason to apprehend.
With respect to the possibility of any future solicitation of British mediation, he gave me to understand that it was a question of so delicate a nature, and necessarily so dependent upon contingencies, that he wished, at present, to say nothing upon the subject. If ever such a solicitation took place, it would bed one in the most open, frank, and unreserved manner, by an official written document, which should leave no doubt upon the mind of one party, as to the intentions of the other.
I shall draw no inferences from this conversation, nor argue upon the probability or non-probability of our mediation being solicited; as you, sir, will be much better able to judge correctly of this matter, from the communications you receive of what is passing in the
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cabinet of the Tuilleries. This despatch will be forwarded by a Spanish messenger, who leaves Madrid for London, either this evening-or to-morrow morning.
No. 13.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, Jan. 11, 1823.
I was about to send this messenger to you the day before yesterday, with my despatch of that date, when yours by the Spanish messenger arrived.
Its contents, though not conclusive, are highly interesting; and if the hopes which you hold out, with respect to the settlement of our claims, are realised, you will have rendered a great service to your country.
You have judged quite correctly in not pressing the mediation of his majesty. The refusal of the French government puts any formal exercise of it now out of the question. But, substantially, our, good offices may do all that the most regularly accepted mediation could have done.
The position in which the Spanish and French governments stand towards each other cannot last. Every day brings with it the hazard of an accidental infraction of peace on the frontiers; and the smallest such infraction might confound all our hopes and endeavours. Till France shall withdraw her Army of Observation, there is no security against such hazards. France cannot withdraw her army (it is fair to admit) without some cause to assign for doing so. The only cause to be assigned must be some satisfactory assurances received from Spain. Spain may be reluctant to give such assurances to France, under the apparent influence of a menace. But she may confide them to us, who neither require them, nor threaten any consequence of withholding them. If Spain has griefs against France, she may, in like manner, confide to us the statement of them, as an inducement to France to be satisfied with less concession.
Such is the summary of the present state of things, on which depends the fearful alternative of peace or war. We earnestly desire the former; not only for our own interest, as M. San Miguel suggests, but for the larger interests of Europe (those of Spain herself included), in which ultimately, if not immediately, our own no doubt may be involved.
We wish for peace, therefore, in Europe: but peace for ourselves we are determined, at all events, to preserve; and should our efforts to maintain it between France and Spain prove abortive, we shall have the consolation to have discharged the duty towards both, of a faithful and disinterested ally; and shall retire thenceforth within the limits of a strict neutrality.
This last topic you cannot state too clearly, nor press too strongly upon M. San Miguel; as there are not wanting those who may wish to inspire him with the notion that the anxiety which we manifest to rescue Spain from the war, is an earnest of a determination to join

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her in the war, if it should come upon her. I have discouraged in the most decisive manner some obscure indications of a wish and hope of this kind, in the Spanish mission in this country.
No. 14—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received Jan. 20
Madrid, Jan. 7, 1823.
Sir;—Long before this despatch can reach you, the final determination of the cabinets of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as well as that of the cabinet of the Tuilleries, will have left little doubt on your mind as to the probable issue of the negotiations (if negotiations they may be called) undertaken with the government here.
It is therefore unnecessary for me to do more than give a succinct statement of events in this capital, from the period of their arrival to the moment of writing this despatch.
The French minister, as might have been foreseen, had the start of his colleagues, having received his letters two or three days earlier than they received theirs. He made use of this time to give that favourable impression of the intentions of his government, to which his attention appears to have been directed by his instructions; and he had already prepared the Spanish government thoroughly to understand the position in which France had placed herself, long before any intimation could be given, by the representatives of the other continental powers, of the intentions of their respective courts.
The Spanish government, thus set comparatively at ease with respect to France, and sure of the neutrality of England, could not be expected to pay any very great attention to the vague suggestions of three distant powers, couched in language very far from conciliatory. Instead then of any intimidation being exhibited, or any point being yielded, the tone adopted by the Spanish government has been that of conscious security. No written answer to the several communications has indeed been given; but it has been promised: and there is every reason to suppose that, when it arrives, it will be found to be in the sense which this feeling would naturally dictate; and that the departure of the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian representatives must necessarily follow. The French minister will remain.
I must do the Spanish government the justice to say, that, so far as I can perceive, it has not assumed any improper manner, or exhibited any extraordinary presumption upon the present occasion. M. de San Miguel, indeed, in his conversations with me, since the arrival of the despatches above-mentioned, has spoken in a tone of much greater moderation, and has held out much greater hopes for the future, than he ever ventured to express before:—he more than insinuated, that modifications might be effected, whenever the country should be relieved from the danger of foreign interference.
The contents of the communications made have not yet been sufficiently digested by the public, to allow me to speak with any certainty of the general feeling. Upon the whole, how, ever, I do not observe any very great effervescence; nor do I, as yet, see any reason to fear that any personal insults will be offered to the representatives of the allied sovereigns. The town remains perfectly tranquil I have done, and shall continue to do, every thing in my power to allay the irritation which may exist, and to prevent the adoption of violent measures. The friendly and cordial footing upon which M. San Miguel and I now stand, makes me hope that my endeavours will not be entirely useless. I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM A'COURT.
No. 15.—Sir A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning—Receoved Jan. 20.
Madrid, Jan. 10, 1823.
Sir;—The despatches received and communicated to this government, by the representatives of the three continental powers, were yesterday presented and read to the Cortes, by M. de San Miguel, in a public sitting. He at the same time read the answer addressed to the Spanish minister at Paris, but previously communicated to M. Lagarde; and the despatches addressed to the Spanish representatives at the courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, in answer to the communications made by the respective chargés d'affaires of those powers residing here.
The answer to the French despatch contains nothing that can be deemed offensive. The answers to the others will probably be considered in that light. I inclose a gazette containing all those documents, which the immediate departure of the courier will prevent me from getting translated.
The Cortes exhibited a great degree of temper and moderation. M. M. Arguelles and Galiano immediately moved that no discussion should be entered into for the moment, but the whole he referred to the foreign committee; alleging, that a certain time should be given for passion to subside—it being highly desirable that the members should come to the discussion of so grave a subject, with the temper and decorum becoming the Spanish character and nation. The papers were consequently referred to the committee for foreign affairs, to report upon the same; and the committee was also instructed to prepare an address, to be presented by the Cortes to the king, pledging the nation to reject all compromise with foreign powers, unbecoming the dignity of their country; and expressing their determination to die, if necessary, in defence of the constitutional throne. The committee was ordered to report in forty-eight hours.
As it was not very generally known that these documents were to be publicly read, the House was by no means full. The galleries were disposed to be a little riotous, venting their constitutional ardor in repeated cheers, and a

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few ill-supported cries of "Death to all Tyrants, &c. &c" Upon the whole, however, the sitting may be said to have passed over with order and tranquility.
I cannot help, thinking, that some of the moderation exhibited may be due to the language which I have uniformly held, as Well to M. de San Miguel, as to others who have considerable influence. I certainly prevailed in preventing passports from being sent, unasked, to the three chargès d'affaires, as was at first intended. This is perhaps not gaining much, as they will be immediately applied for by them; but still it prevents what might hereafter be construed into, a fresh ground of offence, on the part of this government.
Not to leave any measures untried for the preservation of peace, I have also opened myself in the most unreserved manner to the French minister, offering to co-operate with him by every means in my power for that first of objects. Till within these few days, he appeared to be as anxious as myself to prevent things from coming to extremities; but since the arrival of the last courier from Paris, I have observed a difference in his tone, which I cannot but attribute to fresh instructions. He informed me yesterday that it would be impossible for him after the departure of his three colleagues, to allow the slightest offence or insolence to pass without immediately demanding his passports. The persuasion upon his mind now seems to be that a war is inevitable.
If the French government be determined on war, it will certainly be impossible for us to prevent it from taking place: yet I have very strong reason to believe, that I shall receive from the Spanish government, within forty-eight hours, an application for our good offices (though I fear not for our mediation); and I cannot but hope, that if this be the case, it will give a fresh aspect to affairs. If such an application reach me, I shall request Mr. Jackson to set off with it immediately for London: but I cannot assure you positively that it will be made, till I hold the application in my hands. I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM A'COURT.
16.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received Jan. 21.
Madrid, Jan. 12, 1823.
Sir;—In my despatch of the 10th instant, I stated to you that I had reason to believe that a note would shortly be addressed to me, requesting the good offices of England, with the view to prevent the breaking out of a war between this country and France.
This note has reached me, and I have the honour to inclose a copy of it herewith. I have requested Mr. Jackson to proceed with it directly to England; and have selected him the rather, from the persuasion that no one is better qualified to give you verbally those further explanations, which, under the present circumstances; I can hardly venture to write.
If France be pacifically inclined, something may yet grow out of this overture to prevent that recurrence to arms, the consequences of which it is impossible to foresee. France may state what she wants to Great Britain; who may thus become the medium of her communications with this government, in the event of the departure of her minister. This appears to me, at all events, to be the last hope that remains for the preservation of peace; and therefore, faint as it is, it should not be rejected. I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM A'COURT.
(Translation of Inclosure in No. 16.)—Mr. de San Miguel to Sir William A'Court.
Madrid, January 12, 1823.
Sir;—Under date of the 9th inst. an official copy of the late communications which the representatives of France, Austria, Prussia and Russia at this court, have made to the Spanish government, by order of their respective courts, together with the answers given to them, was forwarded to Mr. Jabat, his majesty's minister plenipotentiary in London. At the same time orders were given to the aforesaid minister, to read the whole of this correspondence to his Britannic majesty's secretary of state for foreign affairs, and to declare to him, that the principles and resolutions of the Spanish government would never differ from those consigned in these documents.
His Catholic majesty's government will, consequently, have but little to add in the note which I have now the honour to address to you, by royal order, together with the inclosed gazette; which contains an official and authentic copy of the communications in question, which are not forwarded to you for want of time.
You, sir, who have been an eye-witness of the events which have occurred in this capital during the last three months, and of the scene which it has presented during the last three days, can inform your government better than any one else, of the firm determination of all Spain to defend her national independence at all hazards, and never to acknowledge a right of intervention on the part of any foreign power. The justice of the cause of the nation is so obvious, and its right to be independent so sacred and imprescriptible, that his, majesty's government would think it an affront to your judgment, sir, to dwell any longer upon this point.
Any defect which the present constitution of Spain may have, ought to be discovered and remedied, freely and spontaneously, by the nation itself. The contrary would ten to establish a right of the most terrible, and insupportable oppression. The Spaniards are, at present, identified with the constitution promulgated in 1812.—They,all behold in their present monarch Don Fernando the 7th, the sacred and inviolable person of their constitutional king; and it cannot be concealed from you, sir, that this respect professed to king,

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is extended to all the members of his royal family.
Spain, unvarying in her principles, awaits calmly, the result of the answers which have been given to the communications of the four great continental powers; but she flatters herself, however, that blood will not be shed in Europe, for questions so evident in themselves; and that France will lay aside her system of precaution, as she calls it (su llamado sistema de precaucion), which, without being of the slightest utility to her, is the source of so many evils to Spain.
To England, who has taken in the conferences at Verona so moderate and pacific a line, it now belongs to crown the work; and to prevent an effusion of blood, which can be productive of no possible advantage to the interest of any nation. To England too belongs the task of making the French government perceive the error which it is committing, in taking measures and precautions, which only produce contrary results to those, which it states itself to have in view.
The existence of its Army of Observation on the Pyrennees, and the protection afforded to the insurgents, are entirely incompatible with that tranquillity, which the French government says it wishes Spain to enjoy.
His Catholic majesty's government hopes that this fatal contradiction will at length disappear:—and, in attaining this object, it feels that it can no where look for more effectual assistance, than from the cabinet of Great Britain, the exercise of whose influence to this effect, will not, it trusts, be denied.
I beg, sir, that you will be pleased to lay before your government, the communication which I have now the honour of making to you, and I embrace this opportunity of renewing to you the assurances, &c. &c.
(Signed) EVARISTO SAN MIGUEL.
No. 17.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir Charles Stuart.
Foreign Office, January 24, 1823.
Sir;—I enclose to your excellency a copy of a note* which M. de San Miguel, the Spanish secretary of state, addressed to sir William A'Court on the 12th instant, and requested him to transmit to his government.
The object of this note is, as your excellency sees, to obtain the good offices of his majesty's government with France, for the purpose of averting hostilities.
It is needless to repeat to your excellency, how anxiously the king our master deprecates a war between two powers, whose collision must so deeply affect the general tranquillity of Europe; or how confidently his majesty infers from the desire for peace, so repeatedly expressed by his most Christian majesty's government, a disposition on their part to avail themselves of every opening for adjustment and explanation with Spain.
* See Inclosure in No. 15.
I have therefore received his majesty's commands to direct you to request an audience of M. de Chateaubriand, so soon as this despatch shall reach you; to read to him M. de San Miguel's note; and to inform him, that Mr. Jackson (who was the bearer of sir William A'Court's last despatches, and by whom this despatch will be delivered to you), will wait at Paris, for the result of the deliberations of his most Christian majesty's cabinet upon M. de San Miguel's note, in order to convey to sir William A'Court your excellency's report of that result.
In your conversation with M. de Chateaubriand, your excellency is not to over-rate the value of the concessions, implied, rather than distinctly expressed, in the note of M. de San Miguel; nor to represent it as completely satisfactory, and as leaving nothing to be desired:—but it is just and reasonable, at the same time, to consider the circumstances under which it was written.
Assuredly the more enlightened part of the government, or of the Cortes, of Spain, does not believe the Spanish constitution of 1812 to be, in all its parts, usefully and permanently practicable. But if there exist imperfections in the frame of the government of France, or of England respectively, should we consent to reform those imperfections, on the demand of a foreign power, and under the menace of a foreign war as the penalty of our refusal?
Even by the mode in which the demand was made by France, that part of the Spanish government or nation, which might be willing to undertake those ameliorations of the present constitution of Spain without which it is alleged to be unsafe to her neighbours, has been placed in a situation of great difficulty. Is it not plain, that the same proposition completely changes its nature, according to the manner in which it is brought forward?—that one, which, if submitted through the regular channels of diplomacy, might he matter of wholesome advice or amicable remonstrance; when addressed to a nation aloud, and in the presence, as it were, of all the world, becomes a taunt and a defiance? The publication of the despatch to M. Lagarde, while it was yet on its road to Madrid, is, I know, defended by the alleged necessity of tranquillizing the public mind at Paris. But if the public mind at Paris required to be tranquillized, was not the public mind at Madrid liable to be inflamed?
Your excellency will not understand these observations to be made with any view of inculpating the proceedings of the French government, with which, abstractedly, we have no concern.
I would recall M. de Chateaubriand's attention to the situation in which the French government has placed itself towards Spain, by the manner in which her first alternative for war has been propounded—only for the purpose of impressing upon the French government the necessity of not omitting any

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fresh opportunity, however little promising they may deem it, for again stating to Spain the grounds of their dissatisfaction and the nature of their demands.
The French government desires to assure itself of the safety of the royal family of Spain, and of a disposition in the leading members of the Cortes, as well as of the government, to turn to advantage any occasion that may occur, or that can be created by a prudent and gradual course of measures, for the remedy of the defects in the Spanish constitution:—a channel is now opened to the French government for endeavouring to arrive at those assurances. A precipitate removal of the royal family from Madrid—would be the instant and infallible consequence of the march of a French army across the frontier. If the amendments in the Spanish constitution are absolutely necessary, and it is hopeless to bring about those amendments otherwise than by arms—has the French government chalked out to itself the course by which a successful invasion is to be made to lead to the desired result? The occupancy of Madrid, as repeated experience shows, is not the dominion of Spain. The king, and the Cortes, will be established elsewhere, and what is then to follow but a continuance of civil and foreign war, spreading misery and devastation over the whole kingdom?
These considerations your excellency will suggest to M. de Chateaubriand, in a tone of perfect amity and good-will; and with the assurance of the most entire persuasion, on the part of his majesty's government, that the prosperity and tranquillity of France are objects in which Great Britain has, herself, the deepest concern. It is seen and acknowledged here, and acknowledged with no feelings but those of congratulation and satisfaction, that every year's continuance of peace to France, must consolidate more and more her political institutions, and promote those improvements in her interior condition and resources, which assure to her the high rank that she holds among European nations. But in proportion as we feel this sentiment sincerely, we deprecate the fearful experiment of a war, in which there is so little to gain by success; and at a hazard which appears to us as imminent as unnecessary.
The immediate object, however, of your interview with M. de Chateaubriand, is to bring before him the overture from M. de San Miguel; to offer his majesty's minister at Madrid as a channel of communication with the Spanish government; and to assure the French government of the anxious desire of his majesty, to promote, in that or in any other way, the attainment of such a settlement with Spain, as France may deem consistent not only with her safety but her honour.
This despatch will be delivered to your excellency, I hope, on Sunday; so that you will have an opportunity of communicating to M. de Chateaubriand the Spanish note, the day before the meeting of the Chambers.
I trust the new opening which it affords for discussion and possible accommodation, may be felt as some relief to the French government, under the difficulties of their present position. I am, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.
No. 18.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received January 26.
(Extract.) Madrid, January 15th, 1823.
Nothing of any material importance has occurred since Mr. Jackson left Madrid. There is a party labouring hard at the present moment to bring about the publication of a general amnesty. I shall do every thing in my power to forward the adoption of this measure, by representing the favourable impression it will not fail to produce throughout Europe.
No. 19.—Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received, January 26.
(Extract.) Paris, January 23, 1823.
I saw M. de Chateaubriand yesterday. He told me that the duke of San Lorenzo had communicated to him the instructions which had been laid before the Cortes—that he must admit the moderation with which M. de San Lorenzo had spoken, respecting the situation of the two governments; but that a conciliatory tone is assumed by the agents of Spain, which does not prevent the adoption of principles the most incompatible with the tranquillity of Europe, by the government and by the legislature of that country—that at the moment they admit all the defects of their constitution, their readiness to concur in measures to produce a change, and their wish for the publication of a general amnesty, their societies are the most active in their endeavours to organize revolt in France:—in short, that the enormity of the evils resulting from war is not to be compared with the consequences which must result from the success of intrigues which the French ministers have no means of preventing during the continuance of peace. Without questioning the sincerity of the efforts of his majesty's government to maintain peace, he is convinced that it is impossible seriously to press the subject on the Spanish government in sufficient time to lead to the result we desire. The language of the French ministers shows that they would be glad to avail themselves of the publication of an amnesty, accompanied by any change, however trifling, if brought about by the authority of the king of Spain, which might enable them to avoid a declaration of war.
No. 20.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
Foreign Office January 26, 1823.
Sir;—Mr. Jackson arrived here on Tuesday night with your despatches to the 12th of this month, and on Friday that gentleman was re-despatched to Paris with instructions to sir Charles Stuart, founded on M. San Miguel's note of the 12th instant, requesting the good offices of his

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majesty for the prevention of war with France. A copy of these instructions his excellency is directed to transmit to you by Mr. Jackson, and to apprize you of the result of his execution of them.
Since Mr. Jackson's departure for Paris, I have received your despatch of the 15th instant, and therewith despatches from sir Charles Stuart, which appear somewhat more favourable to the preservation of peace, than any of the late reports from Paris.
As you will receive by Mr. Jackson, intelligence from Paris of five or six days later date, and so much the more important as the meeting of the French chambers will have taken place in the interval, it is useless for me now to speculate on events, which will be to you, when this despatch reaches you, matter of positive information.
I shall therefore at once proceed to state the course which you are to follow in either of the two possible alternatives,—1st, of the government of France having decided for war,—or 2dly. of its having consented to avail itself of the opening presented by M. San Miguel's note; and to make known through you to the Spanish government, the conditions on which it may be prepared to withdraw its Army of Observation.
In the former case, you have nothing to do, but to profess anew his majesty's fixed determination, to maintain during the war a strict and impartial neutrality: always ready at the same time to listen to any call for the renewed interposition of his good offices; if balanced success, or a reviving sense of common danger and mutual interests, shall better incline the contending parties to accommodation.
In the other case, you will probably receive from sir Charles Stuart a statement of the terms which the French government deem indispensable, either for their honour or for their safety, in breaking up that system of precaution, the continuance of which operates as a bar to pacification: and the time will then be arrived at which you can, without the suspicion of a dictatorial or an un-called for interference, press earnestly upon M. San Miguel a frank and friendly opinion, in support of such of those terms as appear to you to be not unreasonable. The amnesty which, if issued in the king's name, would, as it appears from sir Charles Stuart's despatch of the 23rd, be satisfactory to the French government, it is unnecessary for me to instruct you to urge; since you have informed me of your intention to urge it to the utmost of your power. Neither you nor the French government have over-rated the-effect which such an act would be likely to produce throughout Europe.
To liberate the person and family of the Icing not only from danger, but from the appearance of restraint,—to give something like force and free-will to the actions of the executive power—to rescue the deliberations of the Cortes from the overawing influence of the Clubs—are, next after the amnesty (which
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should perhaps precede them all) the alternations the most desirable, and those which would give the greatest confidence to foreign nations.
These and any other objects of the same sort and with the same tendency, we are now, after the clear and practical proofs which we have given of our indisposition to claim any thing as of right, or to enforce any thing by menace, for the amendment of the Spanish constitution, warranted to recommend, with all the earnestness which is prompted by our tried friendship for the Spanish nation; by our experience of the practice of free government; and by our conviction of the sufferings and the perils which must be derived to Spain, and to Europe from war.
So long as our voice might have been confounded with those of other powers, who took a different measure of their right of interference—or with that of France, whose exhortation was accompanied with denunciations of hostility, we abstain from advising, rather than incur the imputation of attempting to control. But now, that the possibility of such misrepresentations is at an end, we cannot see the obvious dangers into which the present course of Spanish affairs is leading a brave and gallant people, and be silent; without abandoning the duty which is prescribed, no less by the obligations which international law imposes upon friendly states, than by the peculiar ties which connect Great Britain with Spain.
You will keep sir Charles Stuart constantly informed of the course of your discussions with the Spanish ministers. I am, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.
No. 21.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
Foreign Office, January 28, 1823.
Sir;—I inclose to you a copy of the official answer* from his most Christian majesty's secretary of state, to my note of the 10th instant, a copy of which I inclosed to you in my despatch of the same date. This note was delivered to me yesterday by M. de Marcellus. I cannot better explain to you the opinions of his majesty's government upon it, than by in-closing to you a copy of a despatch which I this day address to sir Charles Stuart. I am &c.
(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.
No. 22.—Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received January 30.
(Extract.) Paris, January 28, 1823.
I received your despatches of the 24th instant on Sunday evening. I immediately called upon M. de Chateaubriand, for the purpose of communicating to his excellency the note from M. de San Miguel, under date the 12th instant; and on the following morning I went over the reasoning contained in your letter, with a view of pointing out to the French minister, the
* No. 14, and, 15 of the Verona and Paris Papers.

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necessity of not closing the door against an overture: which offers the only remaining chance of maintaining the tranquillity of Europe.
The French minister told me, that the substance of M. de San Miguel's paper had already been transmitted to him from Madrid; but that it had not been communicated to him sufficiently at length to show that M. de San Miguel merely demands the dissolution of the Army of Observation, without holding out any hope whatever of a concession upon points which menace the vital tranquillity of this country; though he must be well aware that, in the present situation of affairs, no French minister would be bold enough to propose such a measure, unless it should be justified by a corresponding concession on the part of Spain.
He added, that, under these circumstances, the king is compelled to assume a decisive tone in his discourse to the legislative bodies; and that in announcing the cessations of the diplomatic relations between the two governments, it is necessary to show that they cannot be re-established until the origin of the mischief, with which the Spanish revolution menaces neighbouring countries, has been removed; by assimilating their institutions to those of other limited monarchies, under an act on the part of the king of Spain declaring the constitution to emanate from the crown.
He hoped the anxiety of my government to maintain peace, would induce you to instruct sir William A'Court to convey these sentiments to the knowledge of the Spanish government; and to impress upon the ministers the expediency of not refusing to admit the only measure of which it is possible, in the present situation, to take advantage, with a view to the attainment of that object.
No. 23.—Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received January 30th.
Paris, January 28, 1823.
Sir;—I inclose a printed copy of the Speech which his, majesty the king of France pronounced from the throne upon the assembly of the legislative bodies this morning. I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES STUART.
No. 24.—Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received February 2nd.
(Extract.) Paris, January, 30, 1823.
Having sent off a messenger on Tuesday, at the moment a printed copy of the Speech from the throne was put into my hands, I was unable to make any observations upon that subject in any despatch of the same day.
M. de Villèle, whom I accidentally met on Tuesday evening, appeared surprised to find that I did not consider, the language of the speech perfectly in unison with the tenour of his excellency's former assurances. He said that, the violent alternative, to which the king refers, is mentioned in a conditional sense.
I could not avoid expressing my regret; that this public manifestation of demands for such changes in the Spanish, constitution, as the leaders in that country would hardly be persuaded to attempt, should not leave his most Christian majesty the means of receding from the position in which he has been placed.
Notwithstanding the strong evidence of Preparations for hostilities, I find both this minister, and his colleague, M. de Chateaubriand, continue to answer the representation of the consequences which must result from a rupture, by assurances that they do not participate in my uneasiness upon the subject, because they yet continue to entertain hopes that war will not take place.
No. 25.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir Charles Stuart.
Foreign Office, February 3, 1823.
Sir;—On the same day on which your excellency's despatches of the 28th, one of them inclosing the speech of the king of France at the opening of the Chambers, arrived here, M. de Marcellus called upon me for the purpose of communicating a copy of that document.
In making this communication, M. de Marcellus took occasion to declare the unabated desire of his government for the preservation of peace; to renew in a more precise and formal manner their request of his majesty's good offices for that object; and to express their hopes, that our intervention at Madrid might yet avert an extremity, which (it must be confessed) the language of the French speech, unaccompanied by such a commentary, might have been understood to announce as unavoidable.
Such an intimation from the French ministry, at the moment when the decision of the king of France for war is the subject of general regret and alarm, places his majesty's government in a situation of great embarrassment; an embarrassment which is the more sensibly felt by them, on account of the necessity of making some disclosure of opinion in the speech to be delivered from the throne, at the opening of the session of parliament. On the one hand, his majesty's government would not willingly either risk the misfortune, or incur the responsibility, of closing, by any act of theirs, the door which the French government declare to be still open. On the other hand, the sense of the suspensive and conditional particle in the speech of the king of France, on which the possibilities of peace are supposed to bang, is so much obscured by the ambiguous character of the condition with which it is connected, that it is very difficult to estimate its real value.
It has become necessary on occasion, to reconsider maturely the position in which his majesty's; government stands towards that of France.
The answer which has uniformly been given by the British government to the questions put by France, as to the course which his ma-

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jesty would pursue in a war between France and Spain, has been, that no opinion could be formed on that point, in the ignorance in which his majesty's government were as to the causes of complaint which France might have against Spain. Nothing has even yet been precisely stated to them on that subject. General danger from the nature of the present political institutions of Spain—danger to the king and royal family of Spain—attempts on the part of the Spanish government to corrupt the minds of the French people, and to seduce the soldiers of the Army of Observation:—these, coupled with the undeniable facts of three or four occasional violations of the French territory, constituted the sum of grievances which have been alleged, at different times, against Spain by the French government, up to the publication of the speech of the king of France.
In charges such as these, especially when urged (as some of these were at Verona) only as the grounds of a system of defensive preparation, his majesty's government saw nothing which rendered an accommodation hopeless. Spain on her side has, or professes to have, grievances to plead against France, of similar intermeddling with her people and her army. She alleges that France has encouraged dissension and disaffection at Madrid; and that she even by money and other means, fomented and stimulated the tumult of the 7th of July.
Such mutual recriminations appeared to the British government to furnish the elements of a discussion, in which something would be to be explained on either side; and in which reconciliation might at last result from mutual compromise and concession.
In this state of things the mediation of Great Britain was offered; and, under these impressions, her good offices have been employed. The question so far turned, principally, if not exclusively, upon facts; there was no declaration of principle absolutely precluding negotiation. But as the nature of the present political institutions of Spain was put forward, as being of itself a source of danger to France, and, at the same time, as susceptible of modifications by the voluntary act of Spain herself, which would remove the apprehension of that danger, and consequently open the way to amicable discussion on other points; the British government endeavoured to learn from France, what were the modifications in the Spanish constitution, which would give to France an assurance of safety and tranquillity; and they have not hesitated to advise, at Madrid, an attempt to bring about some such modifications; or at least the declaration of a disposition to consider of them when the time should be more propitious for a change.
There is no conclusive reason to apprehend, that, if the influence of British counsel had been left to its own operation (considering the weight of the authority under which it was offered) it would have been offered in vain. Even after the communication to the Spanish government of the despatches of the continen-
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tal powers, the Spanish minister expressed distinctly and formally the wish of his government, for the good offices of Great Britain with France; and we were not without hope of a favourable answer to the suggestions proposed through lord Fitzroy Somerset, when we received the speech of the king of France.
The principle put forward in that speech, as the basis of the French demands upon Spain, is liable to a double construction. If, as we are desirous of believing, the sentiment intended to be conveyed is no other, than that, in order to give stability to any modification of the present system in Spain, and to afford sufficient assurance to France to justify her in discontinuing her warlike preparations, the king of Spain must be party and freely consenting to any such modifications; and if your excellency shall obtain from the French minister an avowal that such is the intention of the speech; the British government will be most happy to continue at Madrid their amicable and earnest endeavours, to ascertain the means, and to recommend the policy of accommodation.
But it would not be right to conceal from the French minister, that a different construction is generally put upon the paragraph to which I refer. It is construed as implying, that the free institutions of the Spanish people can only be legitimately held from the spontaneous gift of the sovereign, first restored to his absolute power, and then divesting himself of such portion of that power as he may think proper to part with.
The Spanish nation could not be expected to subscribe to this principle; nor could any British statesman uphold or defend it.
We can conscientiously recommend to Spain to modify her constitution of 1812. The law of nations warrants the suggestion from one friendly power to another, of counsels for the melioration of internal institutions, provided that suggestion be made in good faith, and not in a spirit of dictation; and provided it be not attempted to be supported by force. But the British government could not advise any people, in adopting changes however beneficial, to admit the principle on which (according to this latter construction) the speech of the king of France would be understood to prescribe them. It is indeed a principle which strike, at the root of the British constitution.
The British government does not presume to hold out its own political institutions, as the only practical system of national happiness and freedom. It does not presume to question the freedom and happiness which France enjoys under institutions emanating from the will of the sovereign, and described as octroyées from the throne. But it could not countenance a pretension on the part of France to make her example a rule for other nations; and still less could it admit a peculiar right in France, to force that example specifically upon Spain, in virtue of the consanguinity of the reigning dynasties of those two king-

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doms. This latter reason would, on the contrary, suggest recollections and considerations, which must obviously make it impossible for Great Britain to be the advocate of pretensions founded upon it. I am, &c. &c.
(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.
Memorandum—A copy of this despatch was transmitted to sir William A'Court on the 4th of February.
26.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received Feb. 6th.
(Extract.) Madrid, January 21, 1823.
Lord Fitzroy Somerset arrived last night. It has given me the greatest pleasure that a person so much versed in affairs, and so intimately acquainted with every thing and every body in this country, should see with his own eyes and report directly to his majesty's government, the real state of things here his arrival has been a very great relief to me.
No. 27.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir William A'Court.
(Extract.) Foreign Office, Feb. 9, 1823.
You will have learnt, by the ordinary modes of intelligence, the opening of parliament, and the reception, in both Houses, of that part of the king's speech which relates to the present position of France and Spain.
What impression may be made on the French government by this unequivocal disclosure of public opinion in England, I cannot pretend to foresee; but it can hardly be other than such, as,—if it were met at the same time with any reasonable facility on the part of Spain, which would afford to France a retreat without dishonour—might lead to a reconsideration of their plans, and yet arrest the fatal blow which is to commence hostilities.
I trust, however, that the report which the Spanish government may receive of these proceedings, will not lead them into a false security, by inducing them to place their hopes of extrication from their difficulties in a war between this country and France.
Neither the determination nor the means will be wanting, to vindicate, in any case, that might arise, either our honour, or our interests. But this consideration does not affect the immediately impending conflict between France and Spain. It is to the prevention of the commencement of the war, that the anxiety of the British government is, at this moment, exclusively directed; and that it is desirous of, directing the deliberations of the Spanish government; and the way to defer the present execution of the project of invasion of Spain is, that Spain should furnish us with some proposition, such as we could submit to the French government, with an earnest appeal to its policy, as well as to its justice.
No. 28.—Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received February 10th.
(Extract.) Madrid 3, January 25, 1823.
With the approbation of sir William A'Court I communicated to—on the 22nd instant, the nature of the commission with which I was entrusted; expressing to him my hope that in a matter so materially affecting the welfare of his country, I should have the benefit of his assistance and co-operation.
I informed him that his majesty's government continued to adhere to the determination on which they had hitherto acted, of not interfering in the internal concerns of Spain; but that, deeply alive to the difficulties of her present situation, and most anxious to prevent her rupture with France, they had thought proper to try the effect of a confidential communication, which should make known to the leading characters in this country the sentiments of the duke of Wellington, who, as the friend and well-wisher of Spain, had consented to state his opinions, on the necessity of some alteration in the existing constitution.
I, at the same time, begged him to bear in mind, and to impress on those with whom I trusted he would communicate, that England demanded nothing of Spain; that she suggested nothing officially, and that her sole object in touching in any way upon so important a question, was the hope that it might lead to the adoption of a system, which should put an end to civil dissensions, and lessen the probability of a war with France.
I afterwards read to him the duke of Wellington's memorandum.
—was evidently a good deal startled at my communication, for which he professed himself to be quite unprepared; and he at once declared his conviction, that he could not be instrumental in the attainment of the objects to which I had called his attention.
He gave the British government full credit for the conduct they had pursued during the congress at Verona. He was deeply sensible of the value of the duke of Wellington's exertions on that occasion, and of his constant solicitude to promote the happiness and secure the independence of Spain; but, in the present situation of the country, he could not disguise from me the difficulty of prevailing upon any party to act upon the suggestions which were thrown out for their consideration in the duke's memorandum.
He acknowledged the defects of the constitution, and admitted the propriety of taking into consideration the expediency of modifying it hereafter, when such a proceeding should not be illegal.—He felt equally with myself the imminence of the danger to which the country was exposed, and that war was the inevitable consequence of a refusal to modify the constitution. Such a measure being, however, out of the question, the government had, in his opinion, nothing to do, but to await the evil which they could not avert.
Seeing that my reasoning made no impression upon—and that his reluctance to become a party in proposing any alteration

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in the present order of things was not to be overcome, I refrained from pressing him further on the subject; having first, however, prevailed upon him, as an act of kindness to me, and of duty to his country, to mention to some of the gentlemen of the Cortes, in whom he could confide, the nature of the commission with which' was charged; and the reasons which induced the duke of Wellington to think, that the time was arrived when Spain should make an effort to effect such an alteration in her present system of government, as might tend to put an end to the disturbances of which she is the theatre, and to satisfy her sovereign and his allies.
I have found several of my old acquaintances who are neither in the Cortes, nor in any situation of responsibility very ready to enter into conversation with me on the difficulties by which Spain is now surrounded, and on the necessity of some modification of the constitution. Some, indeed, are clamorous for such an amendment, and for the interference of Great Britain; but when asked how the first can be effected, or the latter made available to the exigencies of the moment, they are unable to furnish any satisfactory reply.
No. 29.—Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received February 13.
(Extract.) Paris, February 10, 1823.
After receiving your despatch of the 3rd instant, I called upon M. de Chateaubriand, and held a long conversation with that minister upon the subject to which it refers. Without under-rating the effect of his majesty's good offices to preserve peace, I found M. de Chateaubriand still extremely prepossessed with the notion, that the tone assumed in the speech of the king of France, is well calculated to induce the Spaniards to give way; and resolved, in spite of all I could say, to ground hopes of preventing war upon the result of that speech.
When I questioned his excellency respecting the interpretation of which his most Christian majesty's speech to the chambers is susceptible, be admitted that your account of the different constructions which are put upon that discourse, clearly exposes the doubts which have prevailed in the public mind upon that important question. He said, that whatever may be the interpretation which is attached to his majesty's expressions, by those who are determined to consider all the measures recommended by this court, to be proofs of their desire to reestablish an absolute government in Spain—his excellency never can believe that the communications which have taken place with the British cabinet, have been misunderstood to a degree which can authorize such suppositions. He does not hesitate to admit that, "in order to give stability to any modification of the present system in Spain, and to afford sufficient assurance to France to justify her discontinuing her warlike preparations, the king of Spain Must be a party, and consent to such modifi-
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cation." Upon this principle, a change which shall result from a thorough understanding between his Catholic majesty and the Cortes; will be considered to afford some prospect of the modifications which are indispensable to the security of neighbouring states. The French government will not only be satisfied with the opening which any act (such as the establishment, of a second chamber) may offer, to complete, through the intervention of Great Britain, the system which is necessary for the constitutional government of Spain; but, without waiting for any further proofs of the sincerity of the Spanish government, they will consider any such act as affording reasonable grounds for suspending their armaments, and replacing the relations between the two countries upon the footing usual in time of peace;—though, since he cannot suppose that we consider mere fair assurances to be sufficient; we must not be surprised if preparations for war are, in the mean time, carried on without intermission.
M. de Chateaubriand did not enter into any detail respecting the nature of the acts to which he alluded; but I understood him to refer to the project of allowing the king the nomination of councillors of state, and giving them a deliberative power, upon a similar principle with that of the American senate; to which might be added, a regulation fixing the amount of the qualification required, to render a candidate eligible to the second, or representative chamber.
With a view to avoid the possibility of any misrepresentation, I have read to M. de Chateaubriand that part of this despatch, which states the expectations entertained by the French government, and have ascertained that his ideas are correctly reported. The communication of the same extract to*—enables me to say, that it contains notions which, in the opinion of that gentleman, will be considered admissible in Spain; and which may afford sufficient grounds for further communications on the part of sir William A'Court to the Spanish government.
No. 30.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received February 13.
Madrid, 27th January, 1823.
Sir;—the French minister received two despatches from M. de Chateaubriand by the last courier; the one to be communicated to M. de San Miguel at the same time that he demanded his passports; the other to be read to him, as well as to the king, previous to his departure.
The first, which has already been communicated, contains little more than expressions of regret, that the answer of the Spanish government should have been so very unsatisfactory, leaving no other alternative to the French government than of recalling its legation.
*A Spanish gentleman at Paris.
The second goes more into detail. It states that, after the fruitless efforts made by the representatives of the continental powers, as well as by sir William A'Court and lord Fitzroy Somerset (the last of whom, it must be observed, had not left Paris seven days, and was not even arrived at Madrid when the French despatch was written) to engage the Spanish government to listen to the suggestions of reason, and to adopt a line of greater moderation, no other course remains to the government of his most Christian majesty than that of recalling its minister from Madrid:—that this is the only step left for the maintenance of peace:—that the duke of Angoulême is upon the point of placing, himself at the head of 100,000 men upon the frontier:—and that if the king of Spain, released from his present thraldom, and placed at the head of his army, shall be allowed to advance to the banks of the Bidassoa, in order to treat with him, a firm and durable peace may be established between the two countries—the antient intimate connexion between France and Spain restored; and the fleets, armies and resources of France be placed from that moment entirely at the disposal of his Catholic majesty:—That France does not pretend to dictate to Spain the precise modifications she ought to adopt in her constitution; but in order not to expose herself to the charge of having intentionally left her wishes unexplained, she declares that she will not renew her relations of amity with this country, until a system he established, with the consent of, and in concert with, the king, assuring alike the liberties of the nation and the just privileges of the monarch; and until a general act of amnesty be passed in favour of every individual persecuted for political offences from the promulgation of the constitution in 1812, down to the present period.
I write this from recollection; but I am perfectly certain that, though I may not have given in every instance the precise words used, I have in no way varied from the meaning. This paper has already been read by general Lagarde to the king; and he will probably communicate its contents to M. San Miguel in the course of the morning. I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM A'COURT.
No. 31.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received February 17.
(Extract.) Madrid, February 4, 1823.
Mr. Jackson arrived this morning, bringing me several despatches from sir Charles Stuart, and amongst others, a copy of his despatch to you, sir, of the 28th ultimo, detailing his conversation with M. de Chateaubriand, after the communication of M. de San Miguel's note to me of the 12th January.
I immediately proceeded to make known the contents of this despatch to M. de San Miguel; being extremely anxious to prevent the adoption of any violent measures, in consequence
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of the arrival of the king of France's speech to the chambers, which reached, Madrid last night.
After I had read the whole to M. de San Miguel (and some parts of it, by his own desire, a second time), he broke out into exclamations against the general conduct of French government; expressing his conviction that a war was inevitable:—He said, that Spain would never admit that the constitution emanated from the king nor recognize any other sovereignty than that of the people that a manifesto was preparing, in which his majesty would speak his sentiments to Europe, and that these sentiments would be found in unison with the answer which he had lately delivered to the Cortes:—that Spain was prepared to repel force by force; and that France would find, that the war would be a much more serious undertaking than she seemed at present to imagine it would be.
He requested me to leave him for an hour the copy of sir Charles Stuart's despatch. I did not hesitate in complying with this request, upon the condition that it was to be considered as a strictly confidential communication.
No. 32.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received February 22.
(Extract.) Madrid, February 7, 1823.
Sir Charles Stuart has forwarded to me your despatch to him, inclosing M. de San Miguel's note, and a copy of his despatch to you of the 30th ultimo.
I must await your further instructions, after the receipt of sir Charles Stuart's despatch, announcing the manner in which this overture has been received by France, before I can venture to advance any further. By sir Charles Stuart's account, it appears that France has neither quite accepted, nor quite declined, our interference; and M. de Chateaubriand's statement of the conditions necessary to the establishment of amicable relations between the two countries, is so extremely vague, that I should really be at a loss to inform this government, if called upon to do so, what are the precise concessions which would ensure the maintenance of peace.
I shall, however, not lose sight of the amnesty, but press it by every argument in my power. I have some reason to believe that, such a measure will not be opposed by any party. One object is already gained, viz. that, of the shutting up of the Landaburian society. If this be followed up by a general amnesty, I shall not yet despair of arriving at that first of objects, the prevention of a continental war.
I had written thus far when I was interrupted by the arrival of M. San Miguel.
M. San Miguel observed, that with respect to modifications, there was neither a man nor-a party in Spain (were the ministry to be changed a hundred times) who would venture to propose their adoption, till the time pointed out by the constitution; and that, had any hopes been held out to me of an opposite na-

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ture, I might depend upon it they never would be realized. M. San Miguel's conversation was nevertheless less war-like than I found it a day or two ago. He would not, he said, consider all hope of negotiation at an end, but still rely for a successful issue from the present difficulties, upon the friendship and good offices of England. He was convinced that she might, and that she would prevent a war.
I told him that England had done, and would continue to do, every thing in her power to prevent matters from coming to such extremities; but my Own opinion was, that war was inevitable, if Spain were really determined to admit no modification in her present constitutional system. This would not prevent our endeavouring to avert such a misfortune by every means within our reach, short of involving ourselves in the quarrel; but that I could not flatter him with any hope that our efforts would be successful, unless we were enabled to hold out to France, the prospect of some concession on the part of this country.
A long and desultory conversation followed, which it will be unnecessary to repeat; in the course of which, M. San Miguel put very prominently forward, the evident acknowledgement of the intention to establish a permanent French interest in (Spain, contained in certain passages of the king of France's speech to the chambers.
No. 33.—Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received February 23.
(Extract.) Paris, February 21, 1823.
M. de Chateaubriand said, that he had turned over the subject in his own mind, with a view to decide upon what terms it might be possible to meet the proposals they might receive—and though he could not state the result of his reflections to be the expression of the sentiments of the French government,—yet be thought the subject might be taken into consideration, if the Spanish negotiators should engage at a future period, to modify their constitution; and, in the mean while, prove their good faith, by restoring the king to his physical liberty, and allowing him to frequent the sitios, and to go to watering places; by a general amnesty; by the establishment of laws to regulate the press—and by a change of ministry; but that the military preparations of the French government must continue without intermission; and that their armies will be ready to take the field, if a change in the aspect of affairs does not contribute to remove the pressure and irritation which prevails on both sides, before the season for active operations shall arrive.
No. 34.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received March 3.
(Extract.) Madrid, February 16, 1823.
The debate upon the subject of the removal of the seat of government, passed off without any thing being elicited from either party, which could give an opening for the discussion
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of the possibility of an arrangement through the good offices of England. The extraordinary Cortes will close on the 19th instant, and the ordinary Cortes will assemble on the first day of March. The question of an amnesty for all those who shall lay down their arms before the entry of a foreign force, was subsequently brought forward, and referred to a committee. An extension of this limited amnesty, I am assured, will be proposed by the committee, and it will be recommended that it should be made general. If this be done, and the proposal be adopted, it, will be a very great point gained. There is, however, but little hope that any of those further concessions will be made, which would ensure an amicable arrangement of the differences that exist between this country and France. Besides which, the putting forward by France of so extravagant a proposition, as that the king, restored to his full and absolute power, shall himself grant a charter to the nation, has singularly increased the difficulties of the question. The principle upon which this proposition is founded, is one to which it is evident the British government can never agree; and consequently if such be the sina quá non of France, our intervention falls to the ground.
No. 35.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received March 3rd.
(Extract.) Madrid, Feb. 18, 1823.
My hopes have been grievously disappointed with respect to the amnesty; which, I was confidently assured, would embrace every political offender. But neither by the committee, nor in the Cortes, has the slightest allusion been made to so general a measure, notwithstanding the hopes that were held out. The amnesty voted, is nothing more than an act of pardon for any "factious," who may lay down their arms before the 1st of April; without any retrospective operation in favour of those already in prison, or any allusion to those confined merely for political opinions. It is a mere act of policy, and by no means an act of grace; nor can it be expected to produce that favourable effect in France, which might have been insured by a more general measure.—A report was circulated a few days since, that the king, with the concurrence of the council of state, had determined upon a change of ministers:—from the variety of quarters from whence this report reached me, I was inclined to believe that it was not without some foundation, and that his majesty's intention was to have requested the council of state to choose a new ministry for him, selected from their own body. Alarmed by the reports in circulation, the ministers obtained from the Cortes this morning, the repeal of the decree authorizing the employment of councillors of state with the exception of these already employed.—The repeal of this decree, though it may not prevent a change of ministers, effectually puts an end to the administration which it was proposed to form.
No. 36—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received March 3.
(Extract) Madrid, Feb. 19, 1823.
Sir Charles Stuart's secretary arrived last night, bringing me your despatch of the 9th instant. He also brought me an extract of sir Charles Stuart's despatch to you of the 10th instant, by which I learn, for first time, the exact concessions which will satisfy France and engage her to put an end to her armaments. What use I shall be able to make of these communications, I cannot yet foresee. The Cortes were closed this morning in the usual form, after which the ministers tendered their resignations.
P. S. The resignations are all accepted, except that of the minister of finance. The heads of the several departments are to act as ministers till a new administration be formed.
No. 37.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received March 3.
(Extract.) Madrid, Feb. 20, 1823.
His Catholic majesty has been pleased to re-appoint the same ministers ad interim. I shall endeavour to see M. de San Miguel tomorrow, in order to communicate to him your despatch of the 9th instant; and the propositions contained in sir Charles Stuart's letter of the 10th of February; but I am perfectly persuaded that all my efforts will be vain.
No. 38.—Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received March 9.
(Extract.) Paris, March 6, 1823.
I cannot help thinking that there is in the language of the ministers a more pacific colour, than I had observed within the last three weeks; for both to myself, and to all those with whom they converse, Monsieur de Villèle and Monsieur de Chateaubriand express their hopes of averting a war, with a degree of confidence which induced me to observe to the latter minister, that the insisting upon a direct negotiation between the duke d'Angoulème and a Spanish prince, may be a great obstacle to success. His excellency answered, that although this mode of settling the question had been strongly urged, he could assure me the objects of the negotiation are too important, not to be sought for by the concession, if necessary, of this, or of any other mere point of form; and that if the Spanish government will empower any negotiator to treat, after a change of ministers at Madrid, he shall be able to look forward with confidence to the continuation of peace. I cannot, however, participate in the hopes, which the French cabinet found upon the intelligence they expect to receive from Madrid: I consider late events to be the prelude to war.
No. 39.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received March 13.
(Extract.) Madrid, Feb. 23, 1823.
M. San Miguel called on me this morning,
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for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the articles respecting the slave trade. Having gone through that ceremony, I informed him that I had communications of some importance to make to him, which the troubled state of the capital for several days past, and my own continued indisposition, had prevented me from submitting to his consideration at an earlier period.
Having thus drawn his attention to what I was about to say, I produced your despatch of the 9th February, and an extract from sir Charles Stuart's despatch to you, of the 10th February; and proceeded to read to him those parts of each, which I thought the most calculated to produce a favourable effect, accompanying my reading with such remarks as the nature of the communication required.
M. de San Miguel listened with the greatest attention; but as soon as I had concluded, observed, that the British government was labouring under a delusion, in supposing any sort of modification possible. It would be a much easier thing to overturn the whole constitutional system, and to re-establish absolute despotism, than to concede even the most insignificant of the points which had been pointed out as the most likely to conciliate.
He was fully aware that England asked no modifications on her own account. He knew that we wished to preserve to Spain her constitutional system; that our only object in trying to engage her to yield upon certain points, was the conviction that if a war did break out, we must be, sooner or later, involved in it ourselves. He knew very well that we should not declare in favour of Spain at first; but nobody could be so blind as not to see, that, if the war was protracted, and other powers took part in it, England alone could not remain a passive spectator of what might be its results.
No. 40.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received March 16.
(Extract.) Madrid, March 5, 1823.
A Spanish gentleman at Paris has written from Paris to—,that the French government has declared that it will suspend hostilities if a general amnesty be granted, a verbal promise of modifications hereafter be given, a change of ministers take place, and the king be permitted to go to the waters of Sacedon. That the negotiation must be carried on at Paris through the mediation of the British ambassador;—quotes sir Charles Stuart as his authority, and refers his friends to me for further information. Now I have heard nothing from sir Charles Stuart since the 20th ult. when he still referred me to his despatch to you of the 10th of February, as containing the final determination of the French government. That determination is very widely different from the arrangement alluded to by—
No. 41.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secre-

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tary Canning.—Received March 18th at night.
(Extract.) Madrid, March 9, 1823.
I saw M. de San Miguel this morning, and to my great astonishment, he asked me what were the precise conditions required by France, in case any questions should be asked him in Cortes. I repeated to him the conditions stated in sir Charles Stuart's despatch of the 10th February, and those (hardly to be considered official) contained in the same ambassador's despatch of the 21st February;* and, according to his request I sent him, upon my return home, an extract from the despatch of the 10th February. What is in agitation I know not.—He told me he should say nothing upon the subject, unless called upon by the Cortes; and that if any negotiations were entered into, he would not be the person to negotiate. I should only mislead you if I were to attempt to give any explanation of this singular conversation.
No. 42.—Sir William A'Court to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received March 25.
(Extract.) Madrid, March 11, 1823.
In a few hurried lines, written as the last courier was setting off, I communicated to you a singular conversation which had passed between M. de San Miguel and myself. I forbore to express any opinion upon this conversation; but whatever hopes some of his expressions were calculated to excite, are now entirely at an end.
No. 43.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir Charles Stuart.
Foreign Office, March 31, 1823.
Sir;—The hopes of an accommodation between France and Spain, which his majesty has so long been encouraged to cherish, in despite of all unfavourable appearances, being now unhappily extinguished; I am commanded by his majesty to address to your excellency, for the purpose of being communicated to the French minister, the following explanation of the sentiments of your government upon the present posture of affairs between those two kingdoms.
The king has exhausted his endeavours to preserve the peace of Europe.
The question of an interference in the internal concerns of Spain, on account of the troubles and distractions which have for some time prevailed in that kingdom, was not one on which his majesty could, for himself, entertain a moment's hesitation. If his majesty's plenipotentiary at Verona did not decline taking part in the deliberations of the allied cabinets upon that question, it was because his majesty owed to his allies, upon that, as upon every other subject, a sincere declaration of his opinions; and because he hoped that a friendly
* See No. 33, a copy of which was received by sir William A'Court, subsequently to his letter of the 5th March.
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and unreserved communication might tend to the preservation of general peace.
The nature of the apprehensions which had induced the king of France to assemble an army, within his own frontier, upon the borders of Spain, had been indicated, in the first instance, by the designation of the "Cordon Sanitaire." The change of that designation to that of an "Army of Observation" (which took place in the month of September last) did not appear to his majesty to imply more, than that the defensive system originally opposed to the contagion of physical disease, would be continued against the possible inconveniences, moral or political, which might arise to France, from a civil contest raging in a country separated from the French territory only by a conventional line of demarcation. The dangers naturally incident to an unrestrained intercourse between two countries so situated towards each other; the dangers of political intrigue, or of occasional violation of territory, might sufficiently justify preparations of military defence.
Such was the state of things between France and Spain at the opening of the congress at Verona. The propositions brought forward by the French plenipotentiary in the conferences of the allied cabinets, were founded on this state of things. Those propositions did not relate to any project of carrying attack into the heart of the Spanish monarchy, but were in the nature of inquiries: 1st, What countenance France might expect to receive from the allies, if she should find herself under the necessity of breaking off diplomatic intercourse with the court of Madrid? and, 2ndly, what assistance, in supposed cases of outrage to be committed, or of violence to be menaced, by Spain? These cases were all contingent and precautionary. The answers of the three continental powers were of a correspondent character.
The result of the discussions at Verona, was a determination of his majesty's allies, the emperors of Austria and Russia and the king of Prussia:—1st. To make known to the cabinet of Madrid, through their respective ministers at that court, their sentiments upon the necessity of a change in the present system of the Spanish government; and, in the event of an unsatisfactory answer to that communication, to recall their respective ministers; and to break off all diplomatic intercourse with Spain. 2ndly, To make common cause with France against Spain, in certain specified cases; cases, as has been already observed, altogether contingent and precautionary.
His majesty's plenipotentiary declined concurring in these measures; not only because he was unauthorized to pledge the faith of his government to any hypothetical engagement, but because, his government had, from the month of April 1820, uniformly recommended to the powers of the alliance, to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Spain; and because, having been from the same period, entirely unacquainted with whatever

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transactions might have taken place between France and Spain, his government could not judge, on what grounds the cabinet of the Tuilleries meditated a possible discontinuance of diplomatic relations with the court of Madrid; or on what grounds they apprehended an occurrence, apparently so improbable, as a commencement of hostilities against France by Spain.
No proof was produced to his majesty's plenipotentiary of the existence of any design on the part of the Spanish government, to invade the territory of France; of any attempt to introduce disaffection among her soldiery; or of any project to undermine her political institutions: and so long as the struggles and disturbances of Spain should be confined within the circle of her own territory, they could not be admitted by the British government to afford any plea for foreign interference. If the end of the last and the beginning, of the present century saw all Europe confined against France, it was not on account of the internal changes which France thought necessary for her own political and civil reformation; but because she attempted to propagate, first her principles, and afterwards her propagate, by the sword.
Impossible as it was for his majesty to be party to the measures concerted at Verona with respect to Spain, his majesty's plenipotentiary declared, that the British government could only endeavour through his majesty's minister at the court of the Catholic king, "to allay the ferment which those measures might occasion at Madrid, and to do all the good in his power."
Up to this period no communication had taken place between his majesty and the court of Madrid, as to the discussions at Verona. But about the time of the arrival of his majesty's plenipotentiary, on his return from Verona, at Paris, Spain expressed a desire for the "friendly interposition" of his majesty, to avert the calamities of war. Spain distinctly limited this desire to the employment of such "good offices," on the part of Great Britain, as would not be inconsistent with "the most strictly-conceived system of neutrality." Nor has any period occurred, throughout the whole of the intercourse of the British government with Spain, at which the Spanish government has been for one moment led, by that of Great Britain, to believe that the policy of his majesty, in a contest between France and Spain, would be other than neutral.
In pursuance of this request, and of his previous declaration at Verona, his majesty's plenipotentiary received instructions at Paris, to make to the French government the offer of his majesty's mediation. In making this offer, the British government deprecated, from motives of expediency as well as from considerations of justice the employment towards Spain of a language of reproach or of intimidation. They represented as matter of no light moment, the first breach, by whatever power, of
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that general pacific settlement which had been so recently established, and at the cost of so many sufferings and sacrifices to all nations. Nor did they disguise from the French government, the anxiety with they looked forward to all the possible issues of a new war in Europe, if once begun.
In addition to suggestions such as these, the British government endeavoured to learn front the cabinet of the Tuilleries, the nature and amount of the specific grievances, of which his most Christian majesty complained against Spain; and of such specific measures of redress or conciliation on the part of Spain, as would arrest the progress of his most Christian majesty's warlike preparations.
The French government declined the formal mediation of his majesty; alleging, in substance, that the necessity of its warlike preparations was founded, not so much upon any direct cause of complaint against Spain, which might be susceptible of accurate specification and of practical adjustment, as upon the general position in which the two kingdoms found themselves placed towards each other; upon the effect which all that was passing and had been for some time passing in Spain, produced upon the peace and tranquillity of his most Christian majesty's dominions; upon the burthensomeness of that defensive armament which France had thought herself obliged to establish on her frontier towards Spain, and which it was alike inconvenient to her to maintain, or, without some change of circumstances which would justify such change of counsel, to withdraw; upon a state of things, in short, which it was easier to understand than to define; but which, taken altogether, was so intolerable to France, that open hostility would be far preferable to it. War would at least have a tendency to some conclusion; whereas the existing state of the relations between France and Spain might continue for an indefinite time; increasing every day the difficulties of Spain, and propagating disquietude and alarm throughout the French army and nation.
But although his most Christian majesty's government declined, on these grounds, a formal mediation, they professed an earnest desire for peace, and accepted his majesty's "good offices" with Spain for that object.
Contemplating all the mischiefs which war might inflict upon France, and through France ultimately perhaps upon all Europe; and which it must inflict, more immediately and inevitably upon Spain, whose internal animosities and agitations a foreign war could not but exasperate and prolong—the British government was deeply impressed with the necessity of peace for both kingdoms; and resolved, therefore, whether invested or and with the formal character of mediator, to make every effort, anal to avail itself of every chance, for the prevention of hostilities. The question was now become question simply and entirely between Spain and France; and the practical point of

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inquiry was not so much how the relations of those two governments had been brought into their present awkward complication; as how that complication could be solved, without recourse to arms, and an amicable adjustment produced, through mutual explanation and concession.
Nothing could have induced his majesty to suggest to the Spanish nation a revision of its political institutions, as the price of his majesty's friendship. But Spaniards, of all parties and descriptions, admitted some modifications of the constitution of 1812, to be indispensably necessary: and if in such a crisis as that in which Spain now found herself—distracted at once by the miseries of civil war, and by the apprehension of foreign invasion—the adoption of modifications, so admitted to be desirable in themselves, might afford a prospect of composing her internal dissensions, and might at the same time furnish to the French government a motive for withdrawing from the menacing position which it had assumed towards Spain, the British government felt that no scruple of delicacy, or fear of misconstruction, ought to restrain them from avowing an earnest wish, that the Spaniards could prevail upon themselves to consider of such modifications, or, at least, to declare their disposition to consider of them hereafter.
It is useless now to discuss what might have been the result of his majesty's anxious endeavours to bring about an accommodation between France and Spain, if nothing had occurred to interrupt their progress. Whatever might be the indisposition of the Spanish government to take the first step towards such an accommodation, it cannot be disguised that the principles avowed and the pretensions put forward by the French government, in the speech from the throne at the opening of the chambers at Paris, created new obstacles to the success of friendly intervention. The communication of that speech to the British government was accompanied, indeed, with renewed assurances of the pacific disposition of France; and the French ministers adopted a construction of the passage most likely to create an unfavourable impression in Spain, which stripped it of a part of its objectionable character. But all the attempts of the British government to give effect at Madrid to such assurances and explanations, proved unavailing. The hopes of success became gradually fainter: and have now vanished altogether.
It remains only to describe the conduct which it is his majesty's desire and intention to observe, in a conflict between two nations, to each of whom his majesty is bound by the ties of amity and alliance.
The repeated disavowal, by his most Christian majesty's government, of all views of ambition and aggrandizement, forbids the suspicion of any design on the part of France, to establish a permanent military occupation of Spain; or to force his Catholic majesty into
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any measures, derogatory to the independence of his crown, or to his existing relations with other powers.
The repeated assurances which his majesty has received, of the determination of France to respect the dominions of his most faithful majesty, relieve his majesty from any apprehension of being called upon to fulfil the obligations of that intimate defensive connexion, which has so long subsisted between the crowns of Great Britain and Portugal.
With respect to the provinces in America, which have thrown off their allegiance to the crown of Spain, time and the course of events appear to have substantially decided their separation from the mother country; although the formal recognition of those provinces, as independent states, by his majesty, may be hastened or retarded by various external circumstances, as well as by the more or less satisfactory progress, in each state, towards a regular and settled form of government. Spain has long been apprised of his majesty's opinions upon this subject. Disclaiming in the most solemn manner any intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America. His majesty is satisfied that no attempt will be made by France, to bring under her dominion any of those possessions, either by conquest or by cession, from Spain.
This frank explanation upon the points on which perhaps alone the possibility of any collision of France with Great Britain can be apprehended in a war between France and Spain, your excellency will represent to M. de Chateaubriand, as dictated by an earnest desire to be enabled to preserve, in that war, a strict and undeviating neutrality; a neutrality not liable to alteration towards either party, so long as the honour and just interests of Great Britain are equally respected by both.
I am commanded, in conclusion, to direct your excellency to declare to the French minister, that his majesty will be at all times ready to renew the interposition of his good offices, for the purpose of terminating those hostilities, which his majesty has so anxiously, although ineffectually, endeavoured to avert. I am, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.