Commons Sitting of 17 November 1813

NON-RESIDENT CLERGY.
Mr. Bathurst, in rising, pursuant to notice, to call the attention of the House to a subject with the merits of which many of those who heard him were well acquainted, expressed his conviction that when the details were known to the House at large, they would not hesitate to apply a remedy to that which appeared to him to be a great evil. About ten years ago an Act was brought into that House by a right hon. and learned gentleman, a doctor of civil law, to remedy the inconveniencies which were felt in many parishes in consequence of the non-residence of the clergy. That Act was certainly calculated to insure a sufficient residence, at the same time that it mentioned a variety of cases exempt from its operation, and left to the bishops the power, under certain circumstances, of increasing by licence the number of those cases. The Act to which he alluded had two principal objects in view, and for the attainment of those objects heavy penalties were attached to the non-observance of its provision. The first of these objects, that indeed which was evidently the main scope of the legislature, was, he repeated, to insure a sufficient residence of the clergy, providing exemptions which branched out into various heads, such as unhealthiness of the situation, impracticability of obtaining a house, &c. &c. but enacting for non-residence, without such exemption, or without licence from the

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diocesan, a penalty proportioned to the length of absence. But in addition to this chief object of the Act there was a clause which went to regulate the returns of those who availed themselves of the exemptions provided, in order that the bishops should be enabled annually to lay before the privy council a list of such claimants to exemption, which list might be subsequently submitted to parliament. The House would observe, that this last-mentioned clause was of a nature very different from that which he had first described; and that although undoubtedly it was highly advantageous, as giving notoriety to the cases to which it referred, and enabling the legislature to judge of the real state of residence in the respective dioceses, yet that it was a subordinate part of the Act—a matter of regulation merely. It had however happened (as the same penalties were attached to the violation of both clauses of the Act) that this latter clause had served as an excuse for that which he must call an extraordinary and extensive system of persecution. He was sorry to be obliged to state, that an individual (for the affair had originated in a single individual, and a person acting under him) had instituted prosecutions to such an extent, that the penalties, if levied, would amount to no less a sum than 80,000 l. By much the largest proportion of these prosecutions were founded on the mere omission of the returns. He should proceed to state the circumstances under which the individual to whom he had alluded had been enabled to obtain the information on which he proceeded. That individual had been the registrar in the bishopricks of London, Norwich, and Ely. He had thus not only acquired the means of knowing what had been done, and what had been omitted to be done, by the clergy of those dioceses; but he had possessed the power of preventing, if he chose it, the appearance of those documents which might be a defence against the prosecutions that he had since instituted:—for, in the ordinary course of episcopal business, the particular notifications of the clergy were entrusted to this very individual himself!—The transactions of every diocese were so extensive, that it was impossible for the bishop personally to go through them; and it was not at all improbable that many of the letters of notification, for the non-delivery of which the actions had been brought, had been put into the hands of this identical
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registrar or secretary, and might by him be supplied or not, at pleasure. In fact, he (Mr. Bathurst) had to state, that he had received many letters from highly respectable individuals, in which they assured him that they had applied first by licence and then by word of mouth, to this person, and that they had been assured their licences would be made out in consequence. In some cases, he had been out of the way, and no satisfactory answer could be obtained; until at length, for some reason into which he would not then enter, this person was removed from his situation on the accession to the see of London of the present bishop. He had subsequently been removed from his office in the other episcopacies, and had since openly avowed (as he Mr. B. understood,) that having done with the bishops he would attack the clergy.—With respect to one large class of clergymen, against whom this person had commenced actions for omitting to send in their notifications, he (Mr. B.) was told (for it was a matter in which he was unable himself to form an opinion) great doubts existed whether or not, under the Act, the prosecutor could recover. It was doubted, whether persons who, being allowed to hold two livings, did in fact reside in one, were called upon to make any return of their non-residence at the other. This, however, was not certain. Such persons might be liable, and it was certainly desirable to defend them from any vexatious proceedings. There was another class of persons who were precisely in the same situation as that in which they were when the bishop's licence for non-residence was originally granted to them, but who had not formally applied for the renewal of their licences—some because they knew that the bishop was perfectly well acquainted with the impracticability of their residence (from there being no house, &c.) and some from other causes, of the incompetence of which to satisfy the Act, not being lawyers, they were perhaps not perfectly aware. He knew that with respect to this last class there might be some difficulty. Nothing could be further from his intention than to interfere with the fair, just, and wholesome exercise of the existing law. If there were persons who had violated the law wilfully and knowingly, and not merely inadvertently and negligently, unquestionably they ought to suffer the penalties attached to such violation. The House would observe that

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the penalties for the violation of this Act were extremely severe; and that there was no limit of time with respect to their operation. The Act had now been passed ten years; and it might certainly happen, if an informer could pick out a case in which an individual had not complied with its provisions for the whole period, that he could bring actions for the penalties incurred for the whole period. In the course which it was his intention to pursue on this subject, he was disposed to follow the example of a former case of a similar nature. In that case, prosecutions to a considerable extent had been instituted; and the remedy resorted to was, the introduction of a Bill to suspend those prosecutions for a time to be limited, in order to give parliament time to consider of an adequate legislative enactment. In this instance, however, he had no change to propose in the law; but he would propose to suspend the operation of the law until the heads of the church should have the opportunity, which in a few months they would have (the law providing that the returns should be made to them within six weeks of the 1st of January of every year,) of examining all the cases, judging of their nature, and ascertaining the circumstances which had prevented various parties from making their returns at an earlier period. His motion therefore would be, for a Bill to enable courts of justice, on application, to stay all proceedings on the subject until some day in April next. By that period the returns would be made to the bishops, from the bishops to the privy council, and from the privy council to parliament—by whom, if any jealousy were entertained of the conduct of the diocesans, any inquiry that might be thought fit might easily be instituted. If the result of that inquiry should prove (as he was satisfied it would prove,) that all or the majority of those who had not applied for licences would have obtained them had they so applied, parliament would probably see the justice of adopting some retrospective measure to defend those individuals from the penalties which they had innocently incurred. After a few further observations, the right hon. gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill to suspend, for a time to be limited, the proceedings in actions under the Act of the 43d of the King, &c. &c.
Leave given.

FOREIGN TREATIES.
On the motion of lord Castlereagh, the House resolved itself into a Committee on the Foreign Treaties.
Lord Castlereaghbegan by expressing his regret, that in calling on the House to make provision for the fulfilment of these treaties, he was not in a situation to lay before them all the engagements with foreign powers into which his Majesty had entered in the course of the year. But he trusted, that his not being able to do so would not be attributed to any neglect on the part of the executive government; as, whenever the treaties to which he alluded were produced, the House would observe, on a reference to the dates, that there had not been time to exchange the ratifications, a form indispensable before any document of that nature could be laid on the table. At the same time, it appeared so material, before calling on the House to make any further provision on this subject, to put them in possession of the general nature and extent of the engagements which had been entered into by his Majesty's government, that he felt it would be very unsatisfactory, and even unfair, in his Majesty's government, willing as parliament had evinced itself on the present occasion, to call upon it to make a considerable further provision, without at least giving the House some notion of the proportion which the proposed provision bore to the general expenditure on the same head. He was anxious, on another consideration also, to bring every thing connected with this subject into one point of view. The motive was obvious. It was highly desirable that foreign powers should look in a collected view at the exertions which this country had made in their behalf. Painful as was the task, his Majesty's government had felt it their duty to resist many applications for aid which they would have been most happy to grant, and an acquiescence in which, if acquiescence had been practicable, would doubtlessly have been in the highest degree beneficial to the common cause. But the limited nature of the resources of the country had compelled them in some cases to deny altogether, and in others materially to narrow, the assistance which had been required of them. It was extremely desirable, therefore, that foreign powers should have an opportunity of seeing the aggregate of the exertions which Great Britain had made for the interest and advantage of the world; and of being

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convinced, that if their wishes had not met with the fullest and most prompt concurrence of the British government, it arose from the necessarily restricted character of the British resources. With respect to that aid which had been granted, he was persuaded that no other sentiment had influenced the crown in its distribution, than an anxious wish to apportion it in the mode best calculated to promote the general interest. In the first place, he wished to draw the attention of the House to the means that were last session placed by parliament at the disposal of the executive government; to the purposes to which those means had been applied; and to the probability that they would be adequate to cover the expenditure (under the name of aid) of the present year; and then to consider what it might be necessary to do with reference to the approaching year; without, however, chaining down the discretion either of parliament or of the executive government on the subject. He had great satisfaction in stating what had been done in aid of one class of those to whom it had been judged necessary to extend the assistance of this country. Independently of the glorious services of our own army in the peninsula—independently of the direct aid that had been given to Spain and Portugal, indirect aid had been afforded to the Spanish and Portuguese armies to a considerable extent. It frequently occurred, that they were in utter want of military stores and equipments. Under those circumstances, it was impossible to allow the service to stand still; and in many instances, the necessities of those armies had been supplied from our own commissariat. The aid which had been granted to Spain during the last year, in money, stores, &c. amounted to about two millions. Parliament had not been called upon to afford this assistance formally as a subsidy; it having been thought most advantageous to give it in a liberal manner, rather than under any specific engagement. The provision which parliament had made for the service of Portugal, for the last two years, was two millions. For Sicily 400,000 l. had been voted; for Sweden one million. Added to which, parliament, at the close of the session, agreed to a vote of credit to the amount of five millions. He wag happy to state to the House, that the sum which had thus been placed at the disposal of the crown would cover the engagements entered into by his Majesty for the existing
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year. The particular distribution of it would be regularly laid on the table of the House at a later period of the session. Four millions were appropriated to the payment of the subsidies with the foreign powers (a great portion of which had already been remitted); and the remainder was reserved for the purpose of re-imbursing those departments of the state, from which military stores had been forwarded for the use of the continent. And here he would observe, that no mode of assistance was so advantageous, both to ourselves and to the countries to which it was extended, as that to which he had just alluded; and that it was but an act of duty on his part to speak in terms of high admiration of the activity with which the department of the public service principally concerned had carried into effect the object in view. In the mere article of small arms, in addition to the great expenditure and waste of our own army, we had in the course of the year sent half a million of muskets to Spain and Portugal, and 400,000 to other parts of the continent as subsidiary aid—an exertion which, he repeated, reflected the greatest credit on the head and all the members of that department of the public service by which it was effected.
Having stated the general amount of the assistance that had been given to this different continental powers in the course of the year, he would proceed to a more detailed and particular statement. And first, with respect to Sweden. The House would recollect, that by the treaty concluded with that power, and which had received the sanction of parliament, the sum of a million, to be paid to her, was to cover her exertions to October last. The treaty expressly stipulated, that on the 1st of October 1813, the contracting parties should concert any further engagements that might appear expedient. In point of fact, instructions had been given on our part, some time before the expiration of that period, to the British minister at the Swedish court, to renew our subsidiary engagements with Sweden for the ensuing year. But, from the nature of the campaign, and from the state of the weather he (lord C.) was not in possession of the proceedings under those instructions. He was, therefore, not justified in pronouncing what might or might not have been the course of the negociations; but he felt warranted in the general statement that in all likelihood our engagements with Sweden

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for the ensuing year, would not materially differ from those which we had held with that power during the present. As to the policy of renewing those engagements, he apprehended, in the present circumstances of the war, and after the experience which we had had of the conduct of Sweden in the last campaign, there would be no difference of opinion. Whatever objection, and on fair grounds, might have been made to the policy of the original contract; after all that had since occurred, he presumed no such objection could by possibility be repeated. He said this because he was sure the House could not fail to recollect the manner in which Sweden had fulfilled the treaty, by providing the full amount of the force which she had stipulated to provide; which force, brought to the North of Germany, in conjunction with the body under general Walmoden, had added not less than 50,000 men to the general exertions which had been made in the North of Europe. When the amount of this force was considered—when was also considered the energetic conduct of the Prince Royal of Sweden, who, magnanimously declining objects purely Swedish, had abstained from any separate effort, and had offered to the allies three distinct plans of general exertion for the campaign, it must be allowed that he had acquitted himself with the utmost spirit in the common cause, and laid the foundation for the glorious results which had followed. It was no small credit to that illustrious person, that, thrown at the commencement of the war into a situation of extreme difficulty, called to the command of an army composed of many nations, himself a foreigner, many of his regiments recently raised, and of a description which would not allow any military man to estimate their strength by their number, placed at the head of such a force, in opposition to the best troops of France, instead of permitting the French to capture the Prussian capital (an intention which they had openly announced), he assembled his army with unexampled rapidity in front of that capital, and with inferior means foiled all the efforts of the enemy at the very outset of the campaign, and, in conjunction with the force under that veteran, whom to name was honourably to distinguish, general Blucher, caused them a loss of at least 40,000 men. Although it certainly was impossible to contemplate without pain the situation which, at the commencement of the campaign, Hamburgh was left by the operations
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which he had just described, it was a great consolation to reflect, that from the misfortunes which Hamburgh had then sustained, would probably be derived her ultimate security. It was his firm conviction, on military principles, that if the army of the Crown Prince had been diffused instead of concentrated, not only Hamburgh would still have fallen, but Berlin would have fallen, and the fate of the whole campaign would have been uselessly sacrificed. Having said so much with respect to Sweden, he would proceed to speak of our treaties with Russia and Prussia. He was perfectly prepared to admit, that the aid pledged by this country in her conventions with those powers was greater than any she had ever before been called upon to afford. This aid was of two descriptions—direct subsidy, and the credit of Great Britain on the continent, to the amount of 5,000,000 l.; the subsidiary part of the engagement referring to the present, the assistance by credit to the ensuing year. On this latter point a difference would be found to exist between the original and the supplementary conventions. In the original convention, the House would perceive that the subsidy was contemplated; but in the supplementary convention it was deemed wise to provide that there should be no admixture of the credit of Great Britain with the credit of any foreign power; a junction which, in the first instance, it was proposed should take place.
The noble lord dwelt upon the importance of the improvement which this change of system introduced, by enabling our allies to pursue their operations with more effect, while it left this country at liberty to follow its own arrangements. As to the treaties to which this change referred, they were entered into shortly after the conclusion of the armistice; but instructions respecting their negociation were forwarded so early as April. His Majesty's ministers, indeed, had very easily formed their resolution; and the general ground upon which they proposed to act was, to assist, to the utmost extent of the means within their reach, the great powers with whom they were allied. With that view they made the advance stated to Russia and Prussia. They thought it peculiarly proper to enable these powers to call all their natural faculties into action, in order to sustain the important object for which they were confederated. They felt, that the only chance of overcoming the common

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enemy, and restoring the world to that state of public order, of which it had been so long bereaved, consisted in the establishment of a great bulwark, or rallying point, which the effective union and vigorous co-operation of those two great powers was, with certain aids, so eminently calculated to afford. Without the establishment, indeed, of this bulwark, the collection or operation of the force under Walmoden would have been found impracticable. Hence the propriety of contributing, on our part, to the establishment alluded to was obvious, and would, he had no doubt, meet the approbation of the House. As to the meritorious conduct of the powers whom we had thus aided, there could not, he felt confident, exist a doubt in that House or in the country. The progress of the exertions, the rapidly victorious strides which marked the career of the emperor of Russia, were fully notorious; but the demeanour of that monarch towards this country was peculiarly entitled to praise. The steps taken by him, in concurrence with this country, to authorise the proposition of Austria to treat with France for the restoration of peace, were peculiarly judicious. It was, indeed, unquestionably right, that Austria should make a trial of the disposition of the enemy towards peace, if it were only to satisfy its own subjects of the necessity which impelled her to take the part which that power had since so gallantly performed. Austria did, therefore, perfectly in a spirit of good faith, propose her mediation to France; but she had too much knowledge of the character of the French government not to foresee the result of her experiment, and not to make adequate preparations for the result. Austria did then make the most complete arrangements. The activity of Russia too, was, particularly signal; for, on the re-opening of the campaign, on the 17th of August, that power had actually in the field the fall complement of men which she had promised to her allies, with the addition of a large reserve, besides another army collecting on her frontiers. Thus Russia had not only expelled the enemy from her frontiers, but, having passed those frontiers with a powerful army, brought general Bennigsen, with a reserve, to aid the common cause, and replaced the latter with another army on his frontiers. Such was the magnanimous conduct of this sovereign, who, after delivering his own country, conveyed his powerful army into the dominions of
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others, in order to rescue them from oppression—to restore their liberties. With that generous view, his great generals who had in their own country evinced such distinguished capacity to execute the highest purposes of war, were in the territories of the allies appointed to act a subordinate part in the command even of Russian troops. Such a circumstance was rarely to be found—was perhaps, in every view, without a parallel. It furnished, indeed, a conclusive proof of the liberality of the councils which regulated the government of Russia, to have her generals so disposed of—the most eminent acting under prince Schwartzenberg, general Blucher, and the Crown Prince of Sweden. In fact, no Russian general whatever had a predominant command, the whole being placed under commanders of those countries for whose redemption the Russian army had so gallantly fought—the Russian government thus acting towards the other members of the confederacy in the true spirit of alliance, and honourable confidence.—The Russian government had, indeed, throughout, displayed a degree of liberality, only to be equalled by the valour of its army. The pecuniary contribution, therefore, of this country, to such a power, employed in such a cause, was, he was persuaded, not merely secure against objection, but deserving of praise. But the contribution to Prussia would, he had no doubt, be equally applauded by that House, by the country, and by Europe. The exertions of Prussia were indeed unparalleled: and it was perhaps the most extraordinary feature in the present war, that that country, which was most depressed by the enemy—which was most exhausted by the plunder and devastation of France, had been found to make the greatest exertion—had been found to overcome, apparently, insurmountable difficulties, by raising its army to a level with that of the greatest power in Europe connected with the confederacy. Prussia had, in fact, been able to provide an army of no less (including its garrisons,) than 200,000 men, thus equalling the amount of the Russian force. In stating this astonishing evidence of zeal and ability on the part of that regenerated country, he could not forbear from doing justice to the merit of that distinguished individual, general Scharnhorst, who so gloriously fell at the battle of Lutzen, and who most materially contributed to promote the resurrection of the military power of Prussia. But the

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merit of that gallant officer was most successfully emulated by his successor, general Eisenau; and here be had to state a fact, which proved that the period of the armistice was not wasted in indolence—that our allies were not by that transaction lulled into inactivity by any delusive hope; for, by the conclusion of the armistice, general Eisenau had succeeded in raising 70 battalions for the service of Prussia, 50 of whom were among the army which acquired such eminent distinction under general Blucher. It would not, he was persuaded, be rating the military exertions of Prussia too high to say, that in the present war it had exceeded any distinction it had ever attained under the great Frederick, whether its character was to be appreciated by the amount, the skill, the valour, or the success of its army. In fact, Prussia was never known at any former period to have possessed so large an army; and it formed a source of peculiar satisfaction and surprise, that this army so suddenly raised from among a people so long oppressed, should have been found competent to contend against, and to conquer, the bravest troops of France. Such a circumstance was indeed eminently calculated to justify confidence, or at least to encourage hope, as to the result of the war. But here he felt it proper to observe, that it would be contrary to the principle of his Majesty's ministers, to allow any immoderate hope to sway their decisions on any military results, however brilliant; or to withdraw their minds from a due consideration of that which was the only legitimate object of war, namely, the attainment of peace. To that object, indeed, they were prompted to attend, not only by their conceptions of duty, but by their views of interest. That object, however, they felt most likely to be attained by duly seconding the exertion of our allies; and under that consideration he had not the slightest doubt, that that House and the public would fully approve of what ministers conceived to be their duty; namely, to make the pecuniary grants he had described.
Now as to Austria, he hoped it would be felt, that in advancing any pecuniary aid that might be deemed necessary, to sustain the movements of that great military power, ministers should be limited only by the limits of our own resources. It was impossible for any man not highly to appreciate the assistance which Austria was capable of affording. But, greatly as
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he valued and desired that object, he felt satisfied that the co-operation of Austria was not to be obtained, but through the conviction of Austria itself that France was not willing to concur in any equitable settlement of the affairs of Europe. That conviction alone could, he was persuaded, urge Austria to embark in the war. Austria, indeed, saw that the enemy was adverse to the proposition even of an imperfect arrangement. That any thing like a pacific settlement of Europe was not to be looked for from the power which had so long disturbed its order. Austria then, slow and unwilling as she seemed to be convinced, became assured that the enemy was resolutely bent upon struggling, by arms, to hold Europe in a state of subjugation. Hence Austria was urged to take the part which she had so nobly performed; and that part was, he had no doubt, materially attributable to the moderation of the allies, who manifested a proper deference to the opinion of a power so important. They therefore paid due attention to the proposition of Austria, to mediate with France; taking care, however, not to commit themselves to any principle inconsistent with their own interests. But Austria having made a similar proposition to France, the experiment failed, and hence that power was led to engage in the war, at once by the forbearance of the allies, and the unchangeably hostile disposition of France. This the noble lord felt was not the time to discuss transactions with regard to which there was not yet any authentic information before the House; but yet he thought it necessary to make a few observations, in order to remove a false impression, which was too likely to be produced by the remark of an hon. member on a former occasion. That hon. member (Mr. Whitbread) expressed a wish that the allies should be disposed to conclude a peace upon the terms formerly proposed; which expression, no doubt, the hon. member afterwards corrected, so far as regarded terms professing only to advert to "the same basis of pacification."—Now it was not consistent with the fact, that any basis or system of pacification was ever offered to France by the allies, and of course it could not be intended to depart from any system in consequence of a change of circumstances. Yet from the hon. member's expression it might be inferred, either that the former pacific proposition, alluded to by him, was inadequate; or, if adequate, that the allies

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were likely to be led by the late military successes to abandon it, in order to press some exorbitant demands—while in point of fact no such proposition as that in the contemplation of the hon. member was ever made. It was merely attempted by Austria to mediate between the allies and France; and the conditions stated, were only those upon which that power was willing to become the mediator. But to the grounds of those conditions the allies were in no degree pledged; and it must be recollected, that those conditions did not at all touch any points affecting the particular interests of this country; that this country was in no respect a party to the transactions; that those conditions were, in fact, limited to the continent. France, however, having rejected those conditions, no hope of pacification remained, and Austria itself was in no degree pledged to them; for that power distinctly declared in its ultimatum, which had been published to the world, that if France did not agree to the conditions alluded to, she (Austria) would not hold herself bound to them, but resort to arms and seek to conquer peace. Hence it was evident, that no party whatever was pledged to the conditions referred to. Indeed, no terms of peace had ever been mentioned as the basis of any treaty to be concluded between the allies and France.
But upon the important subject of peace, he hoped the House and the country were willing to confide in his Majesty's government. Nothing had, he trusted, appeared or occurred in the conduct of government which should induce parliament or the public to withhold that confidence—nothing was, he believed, to be collected from the Speech of the Prince Regent, or from any part of the proceedings of his Majesty's ministers, which could justify a doubt of their anxiety to conclude a peace, whenever peace, in the just sense of the word, could be obtained. But while he calculated that those who were most anxious for peace had reason to rely upon the sincere desire of his Majesty's government to Obtain it, he flattered himself with the enjoyment of equal credit with those who were most solicitous for the just rights and dignity, for the permanent honour and safety of the empire. The Solicitude of government for peace had, indeed, been evinced on every legitimate occasion. Even after the battle of Leipsic, which might well be said to decide the contest on the continent, was there to be found in
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the Regent's Speech any appearance of that spirit of intoxication which such a splendid victory might be supposed to produce? Did the satisfaction inspired by triumph diminish at any time the express solicitude of government for peace? Was not the same language which appeared in the Speech used in reply to the proposition of Austria in the month of April last, after stating the grounds upon which government were precluded from accepting the mediation of that power, in consequence of its connection with France, and in consequence also of a declaration which, according to a trick of diplomacy recently very common in France, was made to the French senate, that the dynasty of Buonaparté did reign and should continue to reign in Spain.—Here the noble lord read, from the reply delivered to the Austrian minister in April, the passage he had alluded to; namely, that his Majesty's government had no disposition to interfere with the honour and just pretensions of France. From this and the other facts he had quoted, the noble lord expressed a hope that his Majesty's ministers might calculate upon the confidence of their country as to their disposition towards peace; that, indeed, they never would be suspected of forgetting that all the exertions used in war could have no other legitimate object than peace; and, that the most successful results of the one could be valuable only as they tended to the accomplishment of the other.
As a farther evidence of the desire of ministers for the attainment of peace, the noble lord referred to their conduct in the month of August last, when they communicated to Russia their readiness to accept the proffered mediation of Austria; and that, too, after intelligence had been received of the battle of Vittoria. This fact he quoted as a pretty clear proof that victory, however brilliant, could not withdraw his Majesty's government from its anxious solicitude for peace. Though they had agreed to accept the mediation of Austria in August, while a similar proposition was rejected in the preceding April, the House must be aware of the difference of circumstances which produced the change of decision on the part of his Majesty's government—Austria having been in April the ally of France, while in August she appeared in the character an armed mediator. France, too, had in the interval relaxed its pretensions with respect to Spain; leaving, that as question

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for discussion, instead of asserting an indisputable claim. No part, indeed, of the conduct of government could be fairly said to indicate any indisposition towards peace. But he hoped that it would not be deemed by the hon. member (Mr. Whitbread) inconsistent with a proper anxiety for peace, to discourage any idle, futile discussions upon the subject. His Majesty's government certainly protested against the idea of entering into a congress without any satisfactory understanding as to the ends in view, or any ground of calculation as to the extent of the discussion; because there was too much reason to apprehend, that such a meeting might serve only to chill the exertions of the confederacy, to fill the mind of Europe with false hopes, and to lead individuals into injurious speculations; while it would enable the enemy to practise delusion upon the people of France.
The noble lord recapitulated the amount of the grants to Russia and Prussia; adding, that the advance to Austria, which, consisting of bills of credit, would not form an immediate deduction from our finances, amounted to one million, together with 100,000 stand of arms, and a large quantity of military stores. The subsidiary engagement entered into with Russia and Prussia would, he observed, terminate in January, and that with Austria in March; but these engagements would, of course, be renewed should the War continue. In this case, then, he could not calculate that the expenditure of the country, on these grounds, would in the next year fall below the standard of the present. The whole of the sum necessary for our military expence on the continent he stated at 10,400,000 l. namely, four millions for the peninsula, and rather more than, six millions for Germany. But provision having been already made for a great part of this expence, while more was required to fulfil engagements which were not yet in a shape to be submitted to parliament, he meant at present to move, that three millions should be granted on account; and when the engagements alluded to should be ratified and laid before the House, he should feel it his duty to enter into a minute explanation respecting the application of the proposed grant.
The noble lord concluded with moving, that the sum of three millions be granted to his Majesty, to enable his Majesty to carry into effect certain engagements with foreign powers.
The motion being put,
Mr. Canningrose and spoke nearly in the following terms:—Having been unfortunately absent when the general assurances of support on the part of the House were given in answer to the Speech from the throne, of which the vote of this day is a partial performance, I am anxious to take this opportunity of expressing, as strongly and as warmly as I am able, both my concurrence in those assurances, and my disposition to make them good, by the way and in the proportion recommended by the noble lord. If in the present state of this country, and of the world, those who, during the course of the tremendous and protracted struggle, on various occasions called upon parliament to pause, to retard its too rapid and too rash advance, and to drawback from the task it had unwisely undertaken to perform, have manfully and honourably stepped forward to join their congratulations to the joyful acclamations of the nation, and to admit the present to be the period favourable to a mighty and decided effort; how much more grateful must it be to those, who at do time during the struggle have lifted up their voices in this place, excepting to recommend and to urge new exertions; to those who, when the prospects were most dreary and melancholy, insisted that there was but one course becoming the character and honour of Great Britain:—a persevering, an undaunted resistance to the overwhelming power of France. To an individual who, under the most discouraging circumstances, still maintained that the deliverance of Europe (often a derided term) was an object not only worthy of our arms, but possible to be achieved, it must be doubly welcome to come forward to acknowledge his transports, and to vindicate his share in the national exultation. If too, on the other hand, there have been those who, having recommended pacification when the opportunity was less favourable, are now warranted, as undoubtedly they are, in uttering the same sentiments, in the confidence that the country will sympathize with them; it is natural for those who, under other circumstances, have discouraged the expectation of peace, and have warned the nation against precipitate overtures, now to be anxious to embrace this occasion of stating their sincere conviction and their joy, as strongly felt by them as by others, that by the happy course of events during the last year, and by the wise policy we shall

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now pursue, peace may not, perhaps, be within our grasp, but is at least within our view.
The vote we are this night called upon to make is in part prospective, and in part retrospective for services actually performed. Of that portion which is prospective, the noble lord has properly deferred the discussion; but of that portion which is retrospective, we are enabled to judge; and, large as the expenditure now proposed may seem, I think no man, who compares the station we now hold with that which we occupied at any former period of the contest, can doubt that the expenditure has been wisely incurred, and that the services actually performed have fully merited the disbursement. I agree with those who are of opinion, that the time is now arrived when we may look forward to the attainment of peace; but I am far from disguising from myself, and I deem it of infinite importance that the country should not disguise from itself, the difficulties with which we may have still to struggle. We must not deceive ourselves by supposing that the game is actually won; that the problem is mathematically solved; that we have done all that is necessary to insure a lasting tranquillity. What we have accomplished is, establishing the foundation upon which the temple of peace may be erected; and imagination may now picture the completion of that structure, which, with hopes less sanguine, and hearts less high, it would have been folly to have attempted to raise. We may now confidently hope to arrive at the termination of labour, and the attainment of repose. It is impossible to look back to those periods when the enemy vaunted, and we, perhaps, feared that we should have been compelled to sue for peace, and all the ebullitions of joy, without returning thanks to that Providence, which gave us courage and heart still to bear up against accumulating calamity. Peace is safe now, because it is not dictated: peace is safe now, for it is the fruit of exertion, the child of victory: peace is safe now, because it will not be purchased at the expence of the interest and of the honour of the empire: it is not the ransom to buy off danger; but the lovely fruit of the mighty means we have employed to drive danger from our shores. I must with heartfelt delight congratulate my Country, that, groaning as she has done at former periods under the heavy pressure
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of adverse war, still "peace was despaired of; for who could think of submission?" Her strength, her endurance, have been tried and proved, by every mode of assault, that the most refined system of hostility could invent, not only by open military attacks, but by low attempts to destroy her commercial prosperity the experiment has been made; the experiment has failed; and we are now triumphantly, but not arrogantly, to consider, what measures of security should be adopted, on what terms a peace should be concluded. But, as I before remarked peace is only within our view, not within our grasp; we must still look forward to an arduous struggle with an enemy, whose energies have grown with his misfortunes, and who will leave no efforts untried to remove us from the lofty pinnacle that we have attained. We are not yet in a situation in which we have a right to discuss the terms of pacification; but so far I agree with the noble lord, that the happy changes which have taken place, must not alter the principle on which a treaty should be founded: they do not vary with circumstances; we must secure and guard our own honour and interest; but we must not expect from our enemy that to which we ourselves should not submit, that he should sacrifice to us his own honour and interest, to him equally dear. All will agree, however, that this is not precisely the time for these discussions; we must expect from him a renewed and vehement struggle; he will not tamely submit to degradation, but will continue his efforts; and if we arrive at the desired goal, it can only be by the road we are now pursuing.
With reference, however, to the vote of this night, as far as it may be considered prospective, as to the exertions we are called upon in future to make, I must observe, that even if our hopes of peace should be postponed, or even disappointed, is it nothing to reflect upon the posture we are enabled to assume, by the achievements we have already performed? Is it nothing, to look back upon the fallen, the crouching attitude of enslaved Europe, at a period not long distant, and compare it with the upright, free, undaunted posture in which she now stands?—Living memory can recal no period when she was entitled to hold her head so high, and to bid such bold defiance to her enemy. What, let me ask, is the first and brightest fruit of the late successful conflict?—

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First; that continuity of system, that instrument of not wholly ineffectual hostility against Great Britain, which, until lately was supposed to be growing in strength and perfection, has been destroyed; that complex machine directed against our trade, has received a blow which has shivered it to atoms! (Hear, hear!) The enemy is doubly defeated; his arms and his artifices have failed: burdened as it was, still there is something in the incompressible nature of commerce which rises under the weight of the most powerful tyranny: his efforts have been exhausted; his monarchy was reduced, to sink our commerce; but, rising with tenfold vigour, it has defied his puny efforts, never to be repeated. The next point that we have attained is, the destruction of his own darling system of confederation; I mean, that system by which he had formed all the states of continental Europe into satellites of the French empire, that moved only as it moved, and acted only by its influence. They are now emancipated; the yoke has been removed from their shoulders; the nations rise superior to themselves,
"Free, and to none accountable, preferring
"Hard liberty, before the easy yoke
"Of servile pomp."
But, since all the events of war are precarious, is it impossible, that, after retiring awhile, the tyrant of Europe (now no longer its tyrant) may again burst forward, and again, with desolation in his train, awhile victorious, attempt to collect the fragments of that system, and to reconstruct that mighty engine which we have shattered, but which once, guided by his hand, hurled destruction on his foes?—It is impossible. After the defeats that he has sustained, all confidence between him and his vassal states most be annihilated. Admitting that they may bet compelled again to act, can he rely upon their exertions, or can they depend upon his support? He may go forth like that fool idol, of which we heard so much in the last year, crushing his helpless victims beneath his chariot wheels; but he never again can yoke them to his car as willing instruments of destruction. Even if Austria, by base submission to the sacrifice of her honour, were to add the sacrifice of another daughter, and of another army of 30,000 men, that mutual confidence which existed at the commencement of the last campaign can never be restored.
So much for the present state of Europe:
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but has this country gained nothing by the glorious contest, even supposing peace should be far distant? Is it nothing to Great Britain, even purchased at the high price stated by the noble lord, that under all the severity of her sufferings, while her trade declined, her military character has been exalted? Is it no satisfaction, no compensation to her, to reflect that the splendid scenes displayed on the continent are owing to her efforts? that the victories of Germany are to be attributed to our victories in the peninsula? That spark, often feeble, sometimes so nearly extinguished as to excite despair in all hearts that were not above it, which we lighted in Portugal, which was fed and nourished there, has at length burst into a flame that has dazzled and illuminated Europe. Shall it then be said, that this struggle has had no effect upon the military character of Great Britain? At the commencement of this war, our empire rested upon one majestic column, our naval power. In the prosecution of the war, a here has raised another stupendous pillar of strength to support our monarchy; our military pre-eminence. It is now that we may boast, not only of superiority at sea, but on shore: the same energy and heroism exist in both the arms of Great Britain; they are rivals in strength, but inseparable in glory. If at a future period, by successes which we cannot foresee, and by aggressions which we cannot resist, war should again be threatened upon our own shores, what consolation will the reflection afford, that out of the calamities and the privations of war has arisen a principle of safety, that, superior to all attacks, shall survive through ages, to which even our posterity shall look forward. Compare the situation of England with her condition even at the beginning of the last campaign, much more with her condition at the renewal of the war. Were we not then threatened by the aggressions of an enemy even upon our own shores: were we not then trembling for the safety and sanctity even of our homes?—Now contemplate Wellington encamped on the Bidassoa!—I know that a sickly sensibility prevails abroad, which leads some to doubt whether the advance of lord Wellington was not rash and precipitate. Of the political expediency of that advance I can entertain but one opinion: I cannot enter into that refinement which induces those who affect to know much, to hesitate upon the subject: I cannot look with regret at

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a British army encamped upon the fertile plains of France: I cannot believe that any new grounds for apprehension are raised by an additional excitement being afforded to the irritability of the French people: I foresee no disadvantage resulting from entering the territories of our enemy, not as the conquered but the conquerors: I cannot believe that there are any so weak as to imagine that England wishes to maintain a position within the heart of the enemy's country, or that Spain will attempt to extend her dominion beyond that vast chain of impregnable mountains that seem to form her natural boundary. What is the fact? The Portuguese are now looking upon the walls of Bayonne, "that circles in those wolves" which would have devastated their capital; the Portuguese now behold, planted on the towers of Bayonne, that standard which their enemy would have made to float upon the walls of Lisbon. I cannot think it a matter of regret that Spaniards are now recovering, from the grasp of an enemy on his own shores, that diadem which was stripped from the brow of the Bourbons, to be pocketed by a usurper. (Hear, hear, hear!) I cannot think it a matter of regret that England, formerly threatened with invasion, is now the invader—that France, instead of England, is the scene of conflict:
—Ultro Inachias venisset ad urbes
Dardanus, et versis lugeret Græcia fatis.
I cannot think all tins matter of regret; and of those who believe that the nation or myself are blinded by our successes, I entreat, that they will leave me to my delusion, and keep their philosophy to themselves. (Hear, hear, hear!) There are other observations, growing not only out of the proceedings of the last year, but since the commencement of the war, that to my mind are highly consoling. It is a fact acknowledged by all, that our enemy, who has enslaved the press, and made it contribute so importantly to his own purposes of ambition at various periods during the hostilities, has endeavoured to impress upon all those who were likely to be our allies a notion, that Great Britain only fought to secure her own interests—that her views were completely selfish. That illusion is now destroyed, and the designs of this country are vindicated by recent events. We call on all the powers with whom we are at war to do us justice in this respect: above all, we claim it of America with which as much as any man
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I wish for reconciliation. If she were now hesitating and wavering, which of the two great contending parties she should join, would not the conduct of England now decide the doubt? I ask her to review her own and the policy of this country, and to acknowledge that we are deserving, not only of her confidence, but of the support of mankind. Now, she can behold Buornaparté in his naked deformity, stripped of the false glory which success cast around him: the spell of his invincibility is now dissolved: she can now look at him without that awe which an uninterrupted series of victories had created. Were she now to survey him as he is, what would be the result?—She would trace him by the desolation of empires and the dismemberment of states; she would see him pursuing his course over the ruins of men and of things: slavery to the people, and destruction to commerce; hostility to literature, to light and life, were the principles upon which he acted:—his object was, to extinguish patriotism, and to confound allegiance; to darken as well as to enslave; to roll back the tide of civilization; to barbarize, as well as to desolate, mankind. Then, let America turn from this disgusting picture, these scenes of bloodshed and horror, and compare with them the effect of British interference! She will see, that wherever this country has exerted herself, it has been to raise the fallen, and to support the falling; to raise, not to degrade, the national character; to rouse the sentiments of patriotism which tyranny had silenced; to enlighten, to re-animate, to liberate. Great Britain has resuscitated Spain, and re-created Portugal: Germany is now a nation as well as a name; and all these glorious effects have been produced by the efforts and by the example of our country. If to be the deliverers of Europe; if to have raised our own national character, not upon the ruins of other kingdoms; if to meet dangers without shrinking, and to possess courage rising with difficulties, be admirable, surely we may not unreasonably hope for the applause of the world. If we have founded our strength upon a rock, and possess the implicit confidence of those allies whom we have succoured when they seemed beyond relief; then, I say, that our exertions during the last year, all our efforts during the war, are cheaply purchased: if we have burdened ourselves we have relieved others; and we have the inward,

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the soul-felt, the proud satisfaction of knowing that a selfish charge is that which, with the faintest shadow of justice, cannot be brought against us.
Mr. Canning then proceeded to applaud the system of affording aid by bills of credit, which, without danger to ourselves, mixed the credit of this country with that of our allies. He also stated his concurrence in the treaty with Sweden, to which last year he had objected, in consequence of the provision regarding Norway. A majority of both Houses had determined in its favour, and he was satisfied with that vote. He also approved of the continuance of the aid to that power. He congratulated the House upon the accession of Austria to the confederacy, whose aid was so necessary to its success. Next to his joy in voting these supplies, would be the indignation he should feel, if either of the three great powers were to forsake the league, and make a separate treaty to secure its own peculiar interests. He did not believe that there was the least reason to apprehend such a defection; for he was convinced, that all were now sensible, that the fate of each depended upon the firm union of all at the present crisis, when the liberty of the world was the prize for which they were contending.—He concluded in the following words:—
It has been often said, that the language of true poetry is the language of universal nature; but I believe, that the empress of France was little conscious when she made her speech to the senate respecting her husband, that she was employing almost the very words of our great epic poet, who put them in the mouth of the first rebel and usurper on record, who is speaking of the disappointment of the followers whom he had seduced—
—"Ah me! They little know
"How dearly I abide that boast I made;
"Under what torments inwardly I groan,
"While they adore me on the throne of hell!"
Thus have I stated a few of the remarks which press upon me in the present posture of affairs. I ardently hope, that the result will be a general pacification, in which the interests of the civilized world will be duly consulted: if it should be necessary to continue hostilities, may we contend, as we have fought during the last campaign, with matchless strength, arising from the firmness of the indissoluble union of the allies, whose cause is, and whose exertions ought to be, one. May Great Britain still maintain that dignity
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of station, and support that grandeur and liberality of design, upon which she has hitherto acted: may she continue the unoppressive guardian of the liberties that she has vindicated, and the disinterested protectress of the blessings that she has bestowed!
Sir Gilbert Heathcoteobserved, that it was not to this particular treaty that he objected, but to the principle of granting foreign subsidies at a time when the annual taxes bore so heavy on the community, and when our finances by no means warranted us in such an expenditure; for the allied powers had never so effectually opposed the French as during the last two years, when almost unconnected and unsupported by pecuniary aid from England. If the people of the continent really felt the encroachments of France, they would continue to resist, without pay being afforded as a preliminary for the continuance of their hostility. He understood that the new loan was for 22 millions, with a prospect of more being required: in addition to this enormous sum, during the ensuing spring, some thought that loans might be pushed to any extent whatever; provided part of each was reserved as a sinking capital, ultimately to extinguish the debt. He conceived this to be dangerous, and every way burthensome to the present generation. The Prince Regent's Speech, from which the proposed measure originated, gave much satisfaction, on account of the moderate and liberal sentiments which it contained. Regarding the Speech as that of the ministers, he hoped that they would act up to it. They would do well to caution their agents, who write in the public prints, to abstain from violent language; as a suspicion might be entertained, that what was announced publicly in the House, was discouraged elsewhere; that when debating on subsidies caused by coalitions, it would be well to recollect the campaigns of 1799 and 1800. In the first, the allies were completely successful; but in the latter, the fatal battles of Marengo and Hohenlinden laid Austria again prostrate at the foot of France. No dependence could be placed on the small states in Germany; they were alternately with the strongest party. The system pursued, resembled too much that of a person in private life, who lived on the principal instead of the interest of his fortune, for him to think it a wise or safe course for the nation any longer to pursue. Ministers

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had much in their power, if they acted with firmness and moderation. England stood too high, to necessitate her to alter her demands on every fresh success; she should fix what were the terms on which she could make peace with security, and adhere to them as the bases of negociation. Opposition to the measure he knew was useless; but as his public conduct should not belie his private sentiments, he could not avoid stating his objections; conceiving it to be the particular duty of a member of the lower House, to look to a provident expenditure of the public money. He then alluded to the re-publication of Louis the 18th's proclamation to the people of France, at this particular time, in journals devoted to the ministry, as betraying a feeling for the re-establishment of the Bourbon family, which, however he might pity them as individuals, he thought most impolitic: it was in contradiction to the Prince Regent's sentiments in the Speech from the throne; and if entertained, the war might be considered as perpetual.
Mr. Whitbreadrose, he said, merely to notice one or two remarks which had occurred in the declamatory speech of the right hon. gentleman who had spoken last but one. He, for one, must disclaim his having entertained any idea at any period of making a dishonourable peace with France, a peace of compromise or subjugation; but he did think, that many opportunities had been lost (and more particularly under the administration of the right hon. gentleman himself,) when there was a prospect of making a fair and honourable peace with France. He never wished this country to make a peace that should compromise her interests or her honour; but he at the same time wished that France should be fairly and honourably dealt by. Sure he was, as sure as he could be of any thing that did not admit of actual demonstration, that if the councils and policy of Mr. Fox had been originally adopted, those tremendous events which we had witnessed, would not have taken place on the continent; nor should we to night have found it necessary to vote the proposed subsidy, in order to make one more effort to put an end to the war. One part of the right hon. gentleman's declamation he was quite at a loss to understand, or where be had found the material for it. He did not know where he would find any individual in that House either among the friends who sat
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near him, or those who were separated from him; among those whom be retained, or those whom he had discarded; who had ever lamented those proud events in consequence of which lord Wellington had planted his standard on the soil of France. He would vie with the right hon. and eloquent speaker in his congratulation and triumph on that subject; but he could not help saying something of the overweening self-complacency with which that gentleman talked of the share which we had had in giving a decided turn to the aspect of affairs in the North of Europe. He hoped that he would recollect, that his Majesty's ministers would recollect, and that the allies would recollect, that it was the mad ambition of Buonaparté, which, by carrying him beyond all bounds of prudence or justice, had produced that reverse of fortune. But it was the conduct of this country which had enabled him to proceed so far as he had done in his unprincipled career. Great Britain (Mr. Whitbread said) had made Buonaparté, and he had undone himself. By pushing his anti-colonial policy to the impracticable extremes which his passions and resentment against this country dictated; and by the aid of Heaven, which had almost miraculously conspired to the destruction of his army last year in Russia, he had been reduced within those limits, which he (Mr. Whitbread) sincerely hoped he would never again be able to pass. The right hon. gentleman talked of coalitions. Mr. Whitbread thought it best not to revert to that topic: but there was a marked difference, in his opinion, between the present and former coalitions. Formerly we had offered subsidies to the continental powers to coalesce against France: in the present instance, these powers had themselves coalesced against France; and we were called upon to advance subsidies to enable them to continue their efforts in the common cause, and for the attainment of peace on a permanent basis.—He had on a former night expressed a wish that the same terms of peace might be granted now, as were offered at the commencement of the armistice. He had then corrected himself by saying, that he hoped the same basis of negociation might be adopted. He would now correct himself still farther, and say, instead of the same basis, the same principle of negociation. He should indeed be most happy to learn, that some general principle of pacific arrangement

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was understood and agreed upon by the allies. He did not mean officiously to ask, what that principle was, nor would it be right at present to disclose it (Hear, hear! from lord Castlereagh;) but if there were no broad and definite outline previously laid down, and firmly adhered to, as to the demands on the part of the allies, or the concessions on the part of France, which were to form the groundwork of a general peace, he would venture to predict, that what had so often happened already, would again take place; namely, that we should before long hear that some one or other of the allies had made a separate treaty, founded on its own views or interests. Why had the coalesced powers hitherto been vanquished by France? Because the people were not with them. The allies had now triumphed over the French armies, because the people were with the governments, and urged them on to repel the unjust and intolerable encroachments of France. The great course of events held out to us a most important lesson. If we did not take warning from it, but attempted blindly to push our advantages too far, he feared that we should only rouse the same irresistible power in France, which in 1793 had repelled the combined attacks of all Europe—which had since led on the emperor of the French to conquests, and which might again turn the tide of success against us. With respect to that part of the treaty with Sweden which related to the annexation of Norway, he still retained the same sentiments of abhorrence and detestation of it that he ever did. But that was now past. In the present situation of Europe, and after the services rendered by Sweden to the allies, the proposed subsidy to Sweden would have his hearty concurrence. Agreeing as he did, in many points, with the hon. member who sat behind him (sir Gilbert Heathcote), he differed from him on this, as he felt no reluctance in voting the sum called for, in the hope that the efforts which it was intended to sustain and assist, would be directed to the attainment of that great object—a secure and lasting peace.
Mr. Baringobjected to the mode of granting the subsidy. Remitting it to the continent by bills, or in paper, was the least advantageous mode that could be. Our bills on the continent would not be worth more than 40 or 50 per cent. Mr. Baring also conceived, that the postponing the payment of part of the debt incurred
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by the new subsidies till after the return of peace, would be throwing a considerable obstacle in the way of the resumption of the Bank payments in cash, which were to recommence at that period. The hon. member then entered into a forcible and ingenious argument, to shew, that it had always been the policy of France to erect a barrier of small states along the frontier which divided her from Germany; that these states, which nominally belonged to the empire, but were without any military force, gave France that ascendancy which she had constantly maintained over Austria; and that the anxiety which he had heard expressed by ministers for the restoration of these smaller states, would probably be found fatal in the event to the establishment of that continental independence which was so much wished for.
The Chancellor of the Exchequersaid, that, under all the circumstances, it had been judged advisable to postpone the raising one million of the subsidy to, Austria to a subsequent period, rather than incur the inconveniences of the immediate increase of expence.
The Resolutions were then put and carried, and the Report ordered, to be received to-morrow.