Commons Sitting of 15 February 1813

PETITIONS AGAIVST THE CLAIMS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLICS—FROM THE CLEKGY OF GLOUCESTER—FROM BRISTOL—PENRYN—ANTRIM—AND CHICHESTER.
A Petition of the clergy of the diocese of Gloucester, was presented; setting forth,
"That the petitioners, ministers of the established Church of England and Ireland united, whose principles have been ever favourable to the toleration of all persons who conscientiously dissent from them, can no longer with-hold from the House their expression of concern, that claims should have been repeatedly made on the liberality of parliament for an unqualified repeal of statutes, which prevent the admission of Roman Catholics to an equal, but, in the humble apprehension of the petitioners, a dangerous participation with their Protestant fellow-subjects in situations of legislative power and offices of high constitutional trust; and that the petitioners most respectfully suggest to the consideration of the House, that the antient and regular practice of all states has been, to entrust the important offices of government to those only who are sincerely attached to its fundamental laws, in full persuasion, no doubt, that those subjects who, from a conscientious principle, decline to unite in communion with the members of the established religion, will act inconsistently with that principle if they do not, when invested with power, attempt to substitute in its stead what appears to them to be the true religion, and the most acceptable mode of worship; and that the exclusive religious principle of those who profess the faith of the Church of Rome, together with that unchanged controul which a foreign power is known to maintain over their consciences, are so much at variance with the true principles of our established government, as to render Roman Catholics unfit to be entrusted with the administration of power, either legislative or executive; and that, impressed with a high veneration for those tried and approved securities of the religious and political interests of our country, the Rill of Rights and the Act of Settlement, the petitioners place the firmest reliance on the wisdom of parliament, that in its solemn deliberations on the very important question of Catholic Claims, it will not separate those interests from each other, or finally resolve to repeal those statutes which our ancestors, after a long and arduous struggle with the dangers of Popery, thought fit to enact, which have been repeatedly sanctioned by the highest authority in these
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kingdoms, and which, by confining the crown itself to the communion of the Church of England, hath for more than a century, under the favour of Divine Providence, secured to every Briton the peace able enjoyment of his civil and religious' privileges; but should the legislature, urged by considerations which are not obvious to the petitioners, think it expedient to make any alteration in those statutes, which have been most justly stilled the great barriers of our constitution in Church arid State, the petitioners then humbly but earnestly entreat, that such alterations may most sacredly be guarded by every provision which to the united wisdom of parliament may appear to be best adapted for securing to us, and to our latest posterity, the blessings of a Protestant establishment, and of a Protestant succession to the crown of these kingdoms."
A Petition of the Protestant inhabitants of the city of Bristol, whose names are thereunto subscribed, was also presented; setting forth,
"That the petitioners are firm friends to religious toleration, being fully persuaded that no power on earth has any right to interfere with the dictates of conscience with respect either to doctrine or worship, except only in cases which affect the plain obligations of morality, or the peace and safety of society; and that the petitioners however cannot but consider the concessions already made to the Roman Catholics as entirely exempting them from all restriction whatever in the profession of their religious tenets, and the performance of their religious rites; that they already enjoy therefore the most perfect toleration, and that what they demand further is access to higher degrees of civil power and authority, their possession of which could scarcely fail to endanger the civil and religions rights of their fellow-subjects in this Protestant realm; and that the petitioners, with humble deference to the wisdom of parliament, consider the high privileges of the British constitution as held conditionally by those who enjoy them (the right of their enjoyment depending on conditions to be by them performed); and that, as their Roman Catholic fellow-subjects refuse, from religious scruples, to comply with those conditions, their claim to be admitted to offices of trust and influence is on the basis of equity inadmissible; and that the petitioners likewise recollect that a large

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majority of their own number have lately taken, previously to the exercise of their elective franchise, the Oath of Supremacy, by which they solemnly declared, in the presence of the Almighty, "that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state, or potentate, hath or ought to have any power, jurisdiction, superiority, preeminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm;" and that this oath was introduced after the Reformation with a special reference to the Papal authority; and the petitioners therefore feel it to be their duty to advert to so solemn a declaration thus recently made on a subject most intimately connected with the Roman Catholic Claims, not by themselves only, but by a very large portion of the population of the country; and that they cannot on the present occasion avoid looking back with horror to the effects which the intolerant spirit of the Roman Catholic religion produced in their native land during the æra of its dominancy therein; and, though the petitioners are fully aware of an assertion which has often been hazarded, that this religion has now totally changed its nature, yet they have not seen any solid and satisfactory ground for such an assertion, but, on the contrary, they fear its intolerant and persecuting character to be still unchanged, and in this they are confirmed by repeated declarations of the highest Roman Catholic authority in England, and that on these grounds, with which it would be tedious and unbecoming to trouble the House, the petitioners humbly pray, that the bulwarks of our Protestant constitution may still be preserved inviolate, and that, firmly adhering to those securities which our Protestant forefathers deemed necessary (in lieu of which no other adequate securities have yet been proposed, nor, as the petitioners do verily believe, can be proposed), the House will effectually guard against even a remote danger of infringement on our civil and religious liberties."
A Petition of the mayor, aldermen, and other inhabitants, of the borough of Penryn, in the county of Cornwall, was also presented and read; setting forth,
"That the petitioners, impressed with a deep sense of the blessings they have so long experienced under a Protestant establishment, and firmly believing such to be necessary to the enjoyment of their civil and religious liberties, earnestly hope, that the parliament of the United Kingdom
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will not consent to an unconditional repeal of those statutes, which at present tend only to limit, the political power of their Roman Catholic fellow subjects; and that the petitioners, with a wish to see Christians of every denomination enjoy the free and unlimited exercise of their peculiar modes of worship, cannot but perceive, in the admission of Papists to the highest offices of the Slate, an abrogation of the fundamental laws of the empire and the destruction of the British constitution."
A Petition of the noblemen, and the humble Petition of the gentlemen freeholders and Protestant inhabitants of the county of Antrim, was also read; setting forth,
"That the petitioners have learned that numerous Petitions have been presented to the legislature from the Roman Catholics of Ireland, praying, as a matter of right, for an unconditional repeal of all those statutes which impose on them disabilities of any kind; and they have also learned that similar Petitions have been presented by certain Protestants of Ireland, and it has even been alleged that such is the universal sentiment of the Protestant body; and that the petitioners therefore feel it their duty to come forward lest their silence should be misconstrued, and to state respectfully to the House their deliberate opinion on this important subject, and to deny that any classes of his Majesty's subjects are entitled to demand, as a matter of right, an alteration in this vital part of the constitution; and that they entertain the strongest sentiments of personal kindness and regard for their Roman Catholic brethren, as subjects of the same government, as inhabitants of the same country, and as connected with many of them by the intimate ties of friendship and blood; but they can never lose sight of those higher considerations by which they are bound, as the Protestant subjects of a Protestant state, to preserve, unimpaired, their civil and religious institutions, and they regard with equal reverence and approbation, that caution with which the wisdom of their ancestors thought it necessary to guard the government and constitution against any foreign interference or influence whatsoever; and that the petitioners do not presume to point out the modes by which, at the present day, under new circumstances, an adequate security

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against the occurrence of such danger may be obtained; but they beg leave humbly to express their hope that should any concessions be thought expedient for the relief and conciliation of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, they should be solemnly declared to be final and conclusive, and should not only be accompanied with such measures of salutary caution as should allay the apprehensions of the Protestant mind, but should also, by being made a fundamental law of the empire, adequately and permanently secure from all future encroachment the rights and privileges of Protestants, and all those existing establishments under which this empire has so long prospered, and its inhabitants of all classes have so long enjoyed a degree of civil and religious liberty unknown to any other nation."
A Petition of the mayor recorder aldermen and citizens of his Majesty's ancient city of Chichester, was also presented and read; setting forth,
"That the petitioners, impelled by a due sense of the sacred obligations they owe to their country, beg leave, with the utmost deference, to make a public declaration of their sentiments on a truly important subject, which will probably come under the discussion of parliament, namely, the expediency of adopting the Catholic Claims; and that incapable as the petitioners are of rancorous bigotry, and disdaining to be influenced by a narrow spirit of unjust exclusion, they nevertheless submit to the judgment of the House, that laws, which were enacted for the national peace and security, and interwoven as it were with the welfare of a Protestant state, ought to remain undisturbed, or at least to be touched with a gentle hand, and so as to offer no injurious encroachment on that venerable monument of British wisdom and patriotism, our unrivalled constitution; but after all, so wide is the difference between religious and civil privileges that the petitioners cannot help expressing their concern that their fellow subjects should complain of restrictions in the latter, while they enjoy all the benefits of toleration in the former; this it is apprehended is to urge that they are hardly treated, in being denied a transient good, while they possess, under legal sanctions, the supreme blessing of man; and that these few observations the petitioners entreat the liberty of suggesting, but with perfect liberality towards their
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Christian brethren, and a firm reliance on that wisdom and impartiality which they doubt not will mark the progress of the deliberations of the House."
And the said Petitions were ordered to lie upon the table.

COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BRITISH PRESS NEWSPAPER.
Mr. M. A. Taylorsaid, he rose to complain of an unmerited attack which had been made upon him by an individual in one of the daily prints, and which, while he had a seat in that House, he would not submit to. He had no objection to the publication of the debates of the House; but in these debates false accounts ought not to be suffered to go out to the public, nor false insinuations allowed to be thrown out, which might have a tendency to lower the character of any member of that House in the public estimation. He had occasion to notice an attack which was made upon him in the same paper about two years ago. Whether this originated in any ill will entertained against him by the Editor of the paper or not, he could not say. This was not his case alone, but that of every other member of the House. The press was now teeming with these sort of attacks, and every individual ought to resent them. Within these walls he had a right to look for protection. He appealed to the House if there was a syllable of truth in what the Editor had asserted. He alluded to the British Press newspaper. The Globe, which contained the same account, was, he believed, edited by the same person. In the account of the debate on the Vice-Chancellor's Bill on Thursday night, he was described as having been assailed with loud noise in the course of his speech. He appealed to the House if this was the case. In the paper in question he was described also as having, with a degree of arrogance, said he would not waste his valuable time in answering lord Redesdale's book. Such was the vicious and unfounded mode of attack resorted to by the Editor of this paper. (A. general call of "Read, read!")—It was not his intention to read the account, us he did not wish that the individual in question should be visited with punishment.
The Speakersaid, if a complaint was made by the hon. member, he ought to deliver in the paper. The House was not to notice a practice which it did not mean also to punish.
Mr. Taylorsaid, he did not wish the

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matter carried farther at present; but if the practice were repeated, he should certainly move for the punishment of the individual.

VICE CHANCELLOR'S BILL.
Lord Castlereaghmoved the order of the day for the House going into a Committee on the Vice-Chancellor's Bill. On the question for the Speaker's leaving the chair being put,
Mr. Leach,in rising to oppose this motion, said he must admit the extent of the evil against which it was the declared intention of the Bill to provide, and that the evil demanded an immediate remedy. He was perfectly aware that some decisive measure was imperiously called for to counteract the inconvenience which, under the present system, was experienced, but to that now before the House he had the strongest objections. He opposed it because it appeared to him to tend in its consequences to disengage the Lord Chancellor from a great portion of his judicial functions, and to render an office which was primarily judicial and secondarily political, primarily political and secondarily judicial. He opposed it, too, because there was another and an adequate remedy to which no objection could be made.
In stating that it would have a tendency to disengage the Chancellor from a great portion of his judicial functions, there were two things to be established. It would be necessary, therefore, to enquire, 1st, whether it would be an evil if the measure were to be attended with such consequence; and then, 2dly, whether it would be followed with such consequences?—It seemed to be pretty generally admitted in the former debate on the Bill, that there would be a manifest evil in such a change of the office. He would, however, shortly state the views which he himself entertained on the character of the evil of such a change. Every gentleman who heard him, whether a lawyer or not, was well acquainted, that in all modern trials in Chancery the judicial duties of the Lord Chancellor were not only satisfactorily, but splendidly discharged; but that they would be performed with equal benefit if the proposed alteration were to take place was a proposition to which he could by no means accede. Besides this part of the functions of the Lord Chancellor, there was another which, in his conviction, was of the utmost importance, and which he thought
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had not hitherto been sufficiently attended to in the discussion on this Bill. As the head of the law of this country, the Lord Chancellor was the patron in some sort of judicial appointments. His recommendation had, it was known, great weight in the nomination of the puisne judges, and the appointment to various offices of the courts of justice, which were termed ministerial, were materially influenced by his opinion. The manner in which the various Lord Chancellors had exercised this authority and influence was the main reason, why, down to the present period, such offices had been held by men of integrity so sound and legal knowledge so extensive. Our seats of justice had been hitherto filled with persons of a learning and character unknown in other countries. That this patronage had been always hitherto so splendidly executed, could not be the effect of accident, for accident was attended with one consequence today and another tomorrow, whereas this state of superiority had been regular and invariable. The inherent source must be in the character and constitution of the office. He would, therefore, ask, what was it? The, Lord Chancellor was always one of the most eminent lawyers of his day: and why? because the great and important duties of his office necessarily required that he should be so. He had always filled the seats of justice with persons of merit, integrity, and legal learning; because, having lived all his life with lawyers, his knowledge and feelings as well as his honour prompted him to attend only to legal merit in his selection of individuals to fill the subordinate, although not less important offices of the law, and his recommendation of them to appointments. If this was true, did they not, by the alteration in question, hazard a change in these results? Surely, it behaved the House to enquire if the advantages which the country had heretofore derived from the existing character and constitution of this great law officer would or would not be put in jeopardy by the present measure. If the Chancellor's situation were, as he contended it ought to be, considered as primarily political, and secondarily judicial, would not the judicial seat be likely to be conferred on those who had most aptitude for the primary duties? If the choice were thus to be directed by political consequence and political connection, the effect would be, that when a lawyer saw that it was not legal eminence but other talents

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and other qualities which led to the judicial seat, all persons of talent would be drawn from the law to seek after political distinction.—Lawyers observing that eminence was to be obtained, not, as heretofore, by professional learning and skill, but by other qualities, would withdraw themselves from the acquisition of legal knowledge, and apply themselves to the attainment of political science, character, and influence.—Thus would a most material change be affected in the whole judicial constitution of the country,—a change which all must allow would be a very serious evil. The Court of Chancery, as an appellant court, would lose its consequence in the eyes of the country. If the Chancellor did not live with lawyers; if he was himself a politician, would he not be apt to make choice of politicians rather than lawyers for judges? The magnitude of the evil, therefore, was, as he had already said, nothing less than a change in the whole of the judicial constitution of the country.
Having shown that such would be the evil resulting from the disengagement of the Lord Chancellor from a great portion of his judicial duties, he would proceed to enquire, whether, in point of fact, it was likely that the Bill before the House would so disengage the Lord Chancellor, and lead to the evils which he had anticipated? The Bill bore to be framed on the principle, not to render the duties of the office less laborious, but to provide an assistance for the dispatch of that increase of business which the labour of the Chancellor could not possibly perform. It was not to make the Chancellor of the present times less engaged than the Chancellors of former times, nor to detach from the office any of those duties which had hitherto pertained to it, but to provide for the increase of business which had since taken place. The Bill was calculated to relieve the public rather than to relieve the Lord Chancellor. The great objection which he had to the measure was, that thus professing merely to provide the means of getting rid of that increase of business which the Lord Chancellor was unable to transact, it tended to afford him an opportunity of disengaging himself from a great portion of his judicial duties, and of that business which he was able to transact, and which he had hitherto transacted The first question to be considered was, what was the extent of the increase? In very recent times, 16 or 20 years ago, the person who was Lord Chancellor was
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not only adequate to discharge the judicial but the political duties of his officer By political duties he meant merely his duties as Speaker of the House of Lords, and a cabinet minister, and not as President of the Court of Appeal. Now, if he were to suppose that the business of the Court of Chancery had been even doubled since that period, it by no means followed that if another judge were to be appointed, that judge would not have the whole of his time occupied, because the Chancellor had formerly a great part of his time occupied by the discharge of political duties, and consequently if it had not been for these duties must have been able to dispatch a great deal more of Chancery business. But to say the business was doubled within the last twenty years was a proposition so utterly extravagant as not to be entertained for a moment. Should they state the increase at one half? This was a supposition, when compared with the fact, almost as extravagant as the other. But say it amounted to one half? what would be the quantity of time unemployed? There was first the time occupied in the political duties, and then' half the rest of the time. But there was something like a measure to estimate the amount of the increase by—he said something like a measure, for from the nature of the subject it was obvious, that no precise measure could be obtained. The actual quantity of the accumulation was known, and by dividing it into years, beginning with the year when the excess first happened, they would have the measure of the excess from year to year. If the period, for instance, was 20 years, it would be exactly the measure of 20 years increase, provided that the pressure of business did not lead to extraordinary exertions on the part of the Lord Chancellor. But it was impossible that there could be any extraordinary exertion; for the year was wholly occupied by ordinary exertion. He meant that the extraordinary exertion' could not be to any considerable degree'—because, in August last year, the present Chancellor was occupied a fortnight more than any of his predecessors; but then the additional time withdrawn for the addition to his political duty was an abatement more than equal to the other. If, therefore, the actual accumulation (incapable of being kept down by the Chancellor) was the measure of the increase of business, the question was how long it had proceeded? Had it proceeded for 20, or,

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10 years? On this subject the documents on the table were by no means satisfactory. All was conjectural in them. For his part, he was disposed to think that the accumulation had existed for a period longer than that of which the House was aware. That it had existed for only ten years would, however, be sufficient for his argument, and he would assume that, therefore, to be the fact; consequently, the present accumulation represented the increase of ten years. Now, how long would a judge be occupied in reducing it, supposing him to apply himself solely to that task It appeared from the reports upon the table, that there were at present undecided 270 Appeals in the House of Lords, and 30 original causes in the Court of Chancery, besides 60 or 70 which were not original, making in all 470 causes. This was the number set down for hearing; but it would not be fair to consider them as the number actually to be heard, as many of them were set down in the mere current of business. Therefore, allowing 70 for the current business of the Court, the arrear might be taken at 400 causes. How long then, he repeated, taking the existing accumulation at 400 causes, would a single judge be in subduing it? If a single judge could subdue this arrear in one year, then would the dispatch of the same increase of business in future occupy only one tenth part of the time of that judge. Viewing the matter as he did, he was persuaded that it would not take above one year of the labour of a single judge to dispatch the whole of the arrear, provided that judge sat on every juridical day. Of such days there were 200 in the twelve months, and so, at the rate of two causes in the day, the whole arrear of 400 causes would be disposed of in one year. But it ought to be recollected that even these 400 causes could not all be efficient. A great many of them proceeded from no other object than delay; as, wherever an accumulation began to take place, it naturally fed itself, and an arrear of legal business naturally led to an augmentation of arrear. Of the 400, he could not suppose that fewer than 50 were for delay, the number to be determined was consequently only 350. It was, as he had already said, his opinion, that a single judge could subdue the accumulation all in one year. This however, was only his private opinion. But, he asked, had the House no mode by which to determine how far this opinion was or was not likely
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to be well founded? Had they no standard by which to estimate the number of causes that a judge could hear in a given period? Unquestionably they had. By the documents on the table it appeared, that on the average of the years 1810 and 1811, the Master of the Rolls had heard in each year, 370. litigated causes, and of petitions not of consent had settled 670, which were equal to twice 30 causes. But taking them as being equal only to 30 causes, this made up 400 causes decided by the Master of the Rolls within one year. But, it was proved by evidence before the House, that the Master of the Rolls had a great part of his time occupied in other business besides that of equity. In how many juridical days did the House suppose the Master of the Rolls disposed of those 400 litigated causes? In 120 juridical days. The Master of the Rolls sat in equity no greater number of days in the course of the year. The days that he did sit too, were improperly termed days; they were but the fractions of days. He sat, in reality, but 20 juridical days in the course of a year, and the other days on which he did sit were but fractions of a day, namely, from six to ten in the evening. Then, in how long a period would a judge, sitting juridical days, subdue this arrear? The Chancellor's regular juridical day consisted of six hours; 200 juridical days of the Lord Chancellor, therefore, were equal to 300 of the Master of the Rolls' days; and, of course, a person sitting 200 juridical days of six hours each, would decide three times the number of causes now decided by the Master of the Rolls within the year; that is to say, 1,200'causes of the same nature, with the 400 at present decided by him. But in answer to this, it might be said the causes so decided by the Master of the Rolls were not of the same difficulty with the causes now in arrear, that they were neither so important and complicated as the Appeals before the House of Lords, nor in their nature so weighty and momentous as those heard in the Court of Chancery, and that therefore this assumption did not hold good. He would grant the argument to a certain length; but suppose three, however, to be only equal to one, and thus reduce the 1,200 to one third, still, on the principle now laid down, the same judge might within the year dispose of 400 difficult causes Suppose also that the present increase had been produced in ten years, and that one year would be

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sufficient to bring up the arrear, it followed that the assistant judge would in future render all the aid to the Lord Chancellor, which, by the present Bill, it was meant he should afford, in the tenth part of each year; and, when the increase which had already accumulated, was subdued, that only one tenth part of the time of such assistant judge would be necessary for the dispatch of the business which he would have to execute. He would allow, however, that this was an exaggerated view of the subject, and would for argument's sake admit that even one fourth part of the time of this assistant judge should be employed: he asked, was not this likely to lead to the evil to which he had already alluded? Would not three-fourths, or say one half of his time, after the discharge of the arrear, be unemployed, unless he were to devote it to the execution of those duties which had hitherto employed the Lord Chancellor in the Court of Chancery. Was it not to be expected, that some other part of the ordinary business of the Lord Chancellor would be thrown upon him? Gentlemen might say, this was not a legitimate argument, and that it was not fair to say, that there must be, because there might be abuse. He allowed that the argument might not be legitimate merely as such, but the question here to be considered, was, if the convenience of the use expected to be produced, might not be outweighed by the inconvenience of the abuse of which the proposed measure was susceptible? And, in his opinion, the latter infinitely outweighed the former. It was asked, also, how it could be supposed that the Lord Chancellor would be guilty of a neglect of his duty or an abandonment of his judicial labours; but he would ask in return, whether the principle of all law was not contrary to this blind confidence in personal character? The law did not presume that a man would do his duty, because he might do it: it rather took care to provide that he should do it. If it was to be supposed that a man would do his duty, there was no law on the subject wanted. Here a case arose in which the Vice-Chancellor employed on the increase which existed in Chancery, would have a considerable portion of time on his hands. His time was placed at the command of the Chancellor, vested with the power to instruct his deputy in the performance of his duty in his place. The Chancellor had the functions of a burthen-some office to discharge; he had also other
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services of a different description, which, were occasionally required of him. In these circumstances, considering the strong temptation placed before him by the creation of such an office, was it not possible that he might feel inclined, at times, to yield to the pressure, and employ the Vice-Chancellor in what ought properly to be executed by himself? Might not the House naturally conclude that the purest and best of men might occasionally sink into the indulgence presented to his acceptance. But it was said by the advocates of the Bill on the other side, the eye of the public would be upon him, so that no change of the kind was to be dreaded. This he did not question. He did not expect any violent change; and it was true that the public observation might restrain him from any sudden or great alteration; but the innovation would not be of that nature. What he anticipated was, that the practice would creep in imperceptibly, and that the proper duties of the Chancellor would, one by one, be transferred over to the Vice-Chancellor, till it should in time be forgotten that there ever was a Chancellor with those duties. And this, too, would be the case even where the Chancellor was effective and the Vice-Chancellor was not. This, however, was not all. There was another view of the case in which it appeared most important that the duties now performed by the Chancellor should not be transferred over to the Vice-Chancellor. If there existed any jealousy with respect to this officer, there might be a safeguard; but when he was invested with the same legal trust, the safeguard of public jealousy disappeared, and the Chancellor might, in obedience to higher commands, become involved in the mazes of political intrigue, to the abandonment of all duties except his appellant ones. When it appeared to those who had the command over the Chancellor, that there was an assistant who had sufficient time on his hands to ease him of part of his judicial duties, was there not reason to dread that he would be involved still deeper than he had hitherto been in political business, and in intrigue not known to belong to his office? No rational man could look at the present measure with attention, and not see, that if adopted, the Chancellor would, at some time or other, and, he presumed to think, at no great distance too, be withdrawn from all except his appellant duties; and would not that lead to all the evils to which he had allud-

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ed as likely to result in respect to all our other judicial situations?
Among the arguments used by the supporters of the Bill, there were none which excited in his mind more surprize as addressed to a deliberative assembly than that which maintained that gentlemen had no right to object to the present measure unless they had something better to propose in place of it. Surely no proposition could be more unreasonable in principle, or in its application to this particular case. On a subject of such a nature how few even of the members of that House could be supposed adequate to form an exact opinion of the evil, or bring their minds to an investigation of all its branches and bearings; and, if there were not probably more than six gentlemen in the House who had maturely considered the subject, and were aware of the evil, how could they be supposed to have found a remedy? But suppose that he, as a person who had applied his mind to its consideration, thought some system as an adequate remedy to the evil complained of, was to be found in a person of eminence already holding a judicial situation, how was be, an unauthorized individual, to come with it matured for the approbation of the House? No man could come without authority with a matured plan for the consideration of the House; but any man might come forward and state his opinion on such plan as was submitted for their consideration. It might be, that he had revolved a plan—it might be, that he conceived that one learned judge had more time than was necessary to the discharge of his peculiar duties, and might beneficially assist in the removal of the evils complained of in another court; yet to suppose that he or any other person, under those circumstances, could bring forward a perfect plan for adoption, was to suppose what did not belong to the nature of the subject. Without assuming, therefore, more than belonged to the circumstances that attended the examination of the question before them, he should suggest to the House a remedy, which, he was satisfied, would be found fully equal to meet the evil in its broadest extent. There was an office created for no other purpose but to assist the Lord Chancellor, and when that judge wanted more assistance, was not their attention naturally directed to the office so created? The office of the Master of the Rolls was such office, and the question was, could the
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House, by a different distribution of the business, make him more effective for the end for which he was constituted? As he had only 20 effectual juridical-days, and only 100 fractions of days at present occupied, so it followed that he had one half of his time unappropriated. But an hon. and learned friend of his had said, that though the Master of the Rolls had less of his time occupied in court, he had many other important duties to discharge; for his part, he did not understand what was meant by the word attached to the office—he did not understand any duty to be attached to an office unless it entered into its constitution and specially belonged to it. Those duties described to be attached to the office of Master of the Rolls were Prize and Plantation Appeals. He however, contended, that the Master of the Rolls had no more to do with those causes than any other privy counsellor. He had his (the Master of the Rolls) own words for saying so, for he, five years ago, withdrew from them for 15 months. Could any man conceive that this great and excellent officer would have withdrawn himself from those-causes, if it had been his duty to have attended to them. What censure would not he have subjected himself to, if, for the gratification of his private feelings, he had withdrawn himself from the duties of his office? Such, however, was not the case; but it was a mere voluntary occupation of his unemployed time. And should the House not rather call on this great officer to do that for which he was created, rather than suffer him, because he was not sufficiently occupied in that, to employ his time in what was not his duty? It became the House not to appoint two assistants to the Chancellor, when the business of equity could be done with one. On the supposition, then, that the Master of the Rolls were withdrawn from the Cockpit, the question was, could he give the assistance required to the Lord Chancellor and meet the evil of the accumulation they were desirous of removing? If he were to assert at random, that he knew the Master of the Rolls had time enough for the purpose, he might not get credit, and might be met by an assertion of an opposite tendency; but he professed to state, with actual and positive precision, the grounds on which his opinion was founded. To decide this question, let it be seen how much of his honour's juridical time was employed in matters of

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equity. With this in view, he must go I into a pretty minute detail. The juridical year, deducting ten weeks for the long vacation, consisted of 36 weeks, and of this remainder there was to be a further deduction for Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide; after which, the sum being multiplied by six, gave 206 juridicial days, from which, six holidays were to be subtracted, leaving a total of 200 days in the juridical year, during which the Chancellor sate for the administration of justice. Then, on how many of those days did the Master of the Rolls sit for the purpose of assisting the Chancellor? To shew this, he should state when he did not sit. During term time he sat three evenings in the week, and on the other three days he did not sit at all. There were three terms in the year of three weeks each, so that there were nine days in each of these terms in which he did not sit; this made, for the three terms, 27 days on which he did not discharge any business. The fourth term consisted of four weeks, producing 12 days on which his honour did not at all sit, making a result on the whole of 39 days on which he was unoccupied. He never sat on Saturdays out of term, except on the first Saturday after each term; this gave 19 Saturdays out of term on which he did not-sit at all; this, added to the former 39, made 58 days on which his honour did not at all sit in equity. He did not mean to say, that the learned judge did not sit elsewhere, but he now went upon the assumption that he was withdrawn from those other functions. His honour never did sit on seal days, and that for a reason which did not now exist, namely, because it was formerly no unusual matter for the Chancellor to sit on seal days, probably till two o'clock on the following morning, and the counsel being the same in both courts, they, of course, would be engaged before his lordship. These seal days amounted to 20, making, with the former 58 days, a total of 78 days wholly unemployed by the Master of the Rolls in equitable jurisdiction.
It remained to be inquired whether those would meet the evil complained of. According to the statement of the noble lord who introduced the Bill, it was intended that the Chancellor should sit three days in the House of Lords. Now the Chancellor's day, though he ought regularly to sit from ten o'clock till four, would be overrated if stated to be, on an average, four hours. The days of the Master of the
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Rolls would consist of six hours; so 60 of the Master of the Roll's days would be equal to 90 of the Chancellor's: to this add 20 seal days, which would be equal to 110 days, which the Master of the Rolls would be able to add to the 200juridical days of the Lord Chancellor. Here, then, was an adequate relief on the supposition of any imaginable increase, the whole juridical year consisting, as he had stated of 200 days, distributed in the proportion he had described. Suppose the increase of business to be equal to one half of the whole; here it was all provided for and more! He asked of his hon. and learned friends to consider this, and to answer it if they could. Let them swell the phantom to any size they pleased, and let them say if these 110 days would not only afford ample assistance to the Chancellor, but were out of all measure above the evil.
Assuming, then, as facts what he had endeavoured to lay down, with what shadow of reason could that House venture on a measure, which appeared pregnant with so much danger, when they found in the constitution of the office already created for that purpose, ample means to meet and remedy the evil complained of. He was aware that there could be no objection to what he had now suggested, except what was personal to that great judge to whom he had so often alluded; and it might be urged, that if he were to sit 200 juridical days, a much larger proportion of his time would be occupied, though surely not more than that of the other judges, or than the Chancellor himself, who united the offices of Speaker of the House of Lords and cabinet minister. With respect to the compensation which this additional labour would demand, there could be but one feeling; but he felt confident, that if an encroachment on the ease of that extraordinary and excellent person would be productive of public benefit, he would feel that to be an ample compensation. He was sure that it would not require more than two years to subdue the existing arrear, and when that was done the leisure afforded to the Master of the Rolls by withdrawing him from Prize and Plantation Appeals, would be more than equal to the increase of business in Chancery. The business which he purposed to withdraw from the Master of the Rolls, to be sure, was not so great as that which he had suggested the propriety of imposing on him. But, he asked, would this

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truly meritorious person, in that case, have more to do than the other judges? The Chancellor had as much to do at present; and why should not the situation of Master of the Rolls be rendered as efficient? If any magistrate in this country was en titled to call for a sacrifice to be made to his private feelings, he confessed that the present Master of the Rolls was exactly the person. But no magistrate whatever had a right to call on the public to make any sacrifice to their private feelings. There must, in consequence of the in creased labour, be an increase of emolument, not adequate, indeed, to the encroachment made on the ease of this most excellent and valuable judge; but he was certain that highly respectable character would submit to the additional labour, feeling, as he must do, that the good of the country called for it. The encroachment on the ease of his honour, too, he was certain, would not be for more than two years, as then the arrear would have been made up; and he would have the satisfaction of having so eminently served the country, while the alteration would, in the result, be a relief to himself, rather than a burden.
Having thus stated his opinion, both of the present measure, and of the remedy which he himself would propose to substitute in place of it, for the evil which he could not deny existed, he should not now press his negative to the present Bill. He was satisfied that there was not, and could not be in this House any struggle for or against a particular measure like the present; but that the object of all was equally directed to the providing of the best possible remedy for a public evil. If his hints, or those which had been more ably urged on a former night, by some of his hon. and learned friends near him, required investigation, as to the facts or calculations, he hoped gentlemen would take time to satisfy themselves as to their being strictly accurate; and that they would pause before they irretrievably committed themselves, by adopting a measure like the present.—The hon. and learned gentleman concluded by moving as an amendment to the original motion, "That the House do resolve itself into a Committee on the said Bill on this day fortnight."
Lord Castlereaghsaid, that it could not be considered as a compliment in him to observe, that any proposition which came from a member of such eminence and weight as the hon. and learned gentleman
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on all subjects, but more particularly on one connected with his profession, must be entitled to consideration. In urging, therefore, the committal of the Bill, after the distinct and perspicuous statement with which the hon. and learned gentleman had favoured the House, he begged leave to assure him that he was not influenced by any un can did motive, or by any disrespect to his suggestions, which were worthy of every consideration; but he thought it due to the dignity of their own proceedings. If by postponing the discussion, or in any subsequent stage of the Bill, the hon. and learned gentleman should succeed in convincing the House, the mode would then be, to negative one Bill and substitute another; but until the present Bill was completed in its details, and amended in its form by passing through a committee, it was not fair to put it in competition with another scheme, and make it optional to decide between it and a plan which could not be digested sufficiently. The hon. gentleman might hereafter, if he felt so inclined, bring forward his ideas in the shape of a substantive proposition, and it would then be for the House to determine, but in the meantime it would be only right to mature the original measure by suffering it to go through the Committee. At the same time, he thought it right to state, that as far as he was able to follow the ingenious statement of the hon. and learned gentleman, he did not apprehend that the remedy he proposed was adequate to meet the evils which he acknowledged to exist. In the proposition offered by the hon. and learned gentleman, he appeared to him to have begun at the wrong end of the scale; for it did not follow that the time in which 400 causes were disposed of in the Rolls Court, could suffice for the same number in the Court of Chancery, and still less in the appellant jurisdiction of the Lords. The question was not, how many causes the Master of the Rolls could decide, but how many Appeals the House of Lords could hear, and how much of the Chancellor's time would be thereby occupied? The hon. and learned gentleman had removed the Master of the Rolls from the Cockpit without suggesting how the important business transacted in that Court was to be carried on in the absence of the learned judge who now attended; he was also much mistaken, as he apprehended, in the distribution of the time of the learned judge, who, so far from having time to spare, suffered so much in health

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from his un remitted exertions and continued labours as to be obliged (to the great loss of the House) to relinquish his seat. Thus, what would be gained in Chancery by the Master of the Rolls sitting in that court from ten till four during so great a part of the year, would be lost in the judicial business which that learned officer now discharged at the Cockpit. Here he certainly might be and was as beneficially employed as he could be in any other court. The hon. and learned gentleman had assumed, that a judge in equity was not employed usefully except in court, but he was as necessarily employed in examining cases and preparing judgments when out of court; it therefore appeared that there was nothing conclusive in that argument. If the expedient proposed by the hon. and learned gentleman were really as practicable as he represented it, it was extraordinary that it should never have suggested itself for such a long course of years; and this, he thought, afforded the most pregnant proof that it was impossible to resort to any other measure than that of an additional judge. Another evidence of this might also be adduced from the conviction in the mind of the noble lord who filled the station of Lord High Chancellor, that the evil of delay could not be adequately counteracted by the sitting of the Master of the Rolls, or of any other existing judge, insomuch so that that high personage had consented to this measure which went to establish an officer, half of whose pay would be derived from his own emolument. He did not comprehend, how the evil which was apprehended from the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor by withdrawing the Lord Chancellor from his judicial to political pursuits, would not take place in an equal degree, if the Master devoted so great a portion of his time as had been proposed, to the business of Chancery. Under these circumstances, he deprecated any course of proceeding which would obstruct the form that would best enable the House to form a final judgment upon the merits of the Bill which was now under their consideration. He was, therefore, hostile to any proposal which might hinder the Bill from being put into a state in which a correct opinion might be formed on it. By going into a committee, the clauses necessary to a correct judgment on it would be inserted, and on receiving the report, or on the third reading, it might be negatived or not, as it seemed good to the House, when the hon. and
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learned gentleman's proposal might be brought forward in a more detailed form.
Mr. Leachexplained. The noble lord had not fairly represented him, to say that he had allowed only the same period for the average length of causes before the Master of the Rolls, and those of which this mass of delay was composed: for, it must be in the recollection of the House, that he had allowed thrice as much time for the latter as for the former. The House would probably indulge him in a few words, which might not be strictly termed explanation. The appeal causes which came before the privy-council in the Cockpit, were in part legal, in part equity causes. The employment of the Master of the Rolls in that court was in consequence of the causes of an equitable nature, but there was a judge, who entertained jurisdiction over both these species of causes, and who would, it could scarcely be denied, be a very proper judge to be entrusted with the administration of justice in this particular branch. Such a judge was the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, an officer whose functions rendered him equally competent to decide in questions of law and in matters of equity, and he was also already a privy counsellor. It had been said, that the time of this judge could not be taken from the Court of Exchequer without inconvenience. But this objection was easily obviated, without any inconvenience. For ten days after each term, the judges were occupied in the Exchequer with what were termed equity sittings. These 40 days were more than equal to the time occupied by causes at the Cockpit. During these sittings the Lord Chief Baron might sit at the and there would be left three judges at the Exchequer to hear these equity causes. Could this be esteemed an inconvenience, when the business of the first equity court in the country was managed by one judge? With reference to the same point, too, he had to observe, that whenever the great seal was put in commission, the number of judges appointed was three. So that in the present case there could be no great inconvenience in having three judges, the number which he proposed to leave in the Court of Exchequer, instead of four as it was now constituted.
Mr. Wetherallbore testimony to the ac curacy of the statement of his hon. and learned friend, and the clearness with which it had been made. His objections could only apply to the arrangements

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which his hon. and learned friend had founded on his statements. He would not deny that these arrangements would keep down the accumulation of causes in Chancery. But there were three objections to the arrangements proposed by his hon. and learned friend: the first regarded the feelings of that excellent judge who filled at present the situation of Master of the Rolls. 2. The Master of the Rolls would be still allowed to sit in parliament, but the privilege would be nugatory, as his time would be entirely occupied by the business of his court. The third and main objection was to the transposition of the Chief Baron from the Exchequer to the Cockpit. If the head of the Court of Exchequer were thus to be cut off as proposed by his learned friend in the enthusiasm of his plan, he did not know why the same operation might not be performed on the other courts. He knew, however, why it should not be performed on the Court of Exchequer. Two of these judges were especially qualified for the legal business, and two only were selected from equity lawyers. By removing the Chief Baron only one judge-acquainted with the equity business would therefore be left in the Exchequer, and the grievance which now existed in the Court of Chancery would be entailed on the former court. There was at present a little gout in the Court of Chancery—the legal fluid did not circulate—and this gout was to be transferred to the Exchequer. With the professed view of accelerating the decision of an equitable litigation, it proceeded to retard them in one court in order to quicken them in another. Indeed, there was such delay at present in the Exchequer that it had been proposed to separate the equitable from the legal jurisdiction, in order to further and promote the discharge of business. The arrangement in question would make three innovations to remedy one evil, and the proposition of his hon. and learned friend would, be, in his opinion, productive of infinitely more mischief than that which it professed to remove.
Mr. Abercrombysaid, he had been glad to hear the accuracy of the statements of his hon. and learned friend admitted, and still more so to hear it conceded that the arrangements proposed by him would meet the evil; and his satisfaction was not a little encreased, when he heard the objections to those arrangements. Compared with the admissions that had been
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made, he was sure the fresh objections started would weigh but little with the House. As to the first objection of his hon. and learned friend who had spoken last, he did not agree with him in thinking that the excellent judge alluded to would be unwilling to afford an assistance which was necessary to the public, and which should be called for by parliament. His hon. and learned friend opposite had stated, that by increasing the duties of the Master of the Rolls, he would be prevented from attending in this House, an evil which, he owned, could not be sufficiently deprecated. But how came it that on this important Bill, with the nature of which he must be supposed to be so intimately acquainted, the House was deprived of the assistance of the Master of the Rolls. The inconvenience from the Master of the Rolls not having a seat in that House, they at present laboured under; neither had the authority of this excellent judge been quoted as favourable to the Bill, however weighty an argument it would be in favour of the measure, if that Bill had come to the House backed by his name. His hon. and learned friends (sir S. Romilly and Mr. Leach), after devoting more of their time to their legal business than the Master of the Rolls would be, under the arrangement proposed, obliged to devote, found time for attendance in that House, The hon. and learned gentleman had asked, why not extend the principle of his hon. and learned friend to the other courts? The answer was, that the other courts had an unmixed jurisdiction; that it was of a most extensive nature, and that from the various and laborious duties to be performed on circuits, a certain number of law judges was indispensable. It must-have occurred to his hon. and learned friend that, the reason for the number of judges in the courts of law was, not to transact to greater advantage the ordinary business, but to secure a sufficiency of legal knowledge on nice and important cases. To give any further answer to the third objection would be only to weaken what had been so well stated by his hon. and learned friend. He could not but consider that none of the objections had any weight when compared to the solid arguments and perspicuous eloquence which had been that night displayed; he trusted, therefore, that if the committee did sit that night, a future opportunity would be afforded of giving to the suggestions of his hon. and learned

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friend all that candid consideration to which they were so well entitled. These three objections were all that had been set up against the arguments in opposition to the Bill, which had been urged with such weight, eloquence, and wit, on that and on a former night.—The hon. gentleman then generally defended the plan proposed by his hon. and learned friend near him, and maintained that all the objections urged against that plan by the last speaker, even allowing that they stood uncontradicted, could have no weight against the evils of the measure now before the House, the principal of which would be to estrange in a short time the Lord Chancellor from his high judicial functions. One point more he would put to the candour of the noble lord opposite, and he was sure that appeal would not be made in vain. He had himself no objection to the Bill going into a committee, as he was anxious to hear the amendments which had been announced from various quarters, but he hoped that after the Bill had gone through that stage, the noble lord would not press immediately the consideration of the Report.
Mr. Hornesupported the Bill; but from the low tone in which he spoke, it was impossible to collect the greater part of his speech. The evil which called for remedy arose in part in the Court of Chancery, and in part in the House of Lords. To the inconvenience in the latter place the Master of the Rolls could apply no adequate remedy. He also supported the Bill, on the ground, that the Lords had approved of it, and that as the arrear of causes lay with them, it was natural to suppose they were the most competent to ascertain the remedy.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, that it was not his intention to press a decision on the Bill, until it was printed with the amendments, and in the hands of the members. There was no desire to hurry it through, nor to call for any decision, till an opportunity was afforded for every member, to make himself fully acquainted with the nature of the measure proposed, and ascertain whether or not it was likely to be efficacious in remedying the evil under which the country laboured. He should propose Friday, or that day se'nnight, as the day for bringing up the Report.
Sir S. Romillysaid, that before going into the committee he should say a few words on the provisions in this Bill, and in the first place offer some remarks on the
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plan of his hon. and learned friend. In this plan there was no innovation on the existing judicial constitution, but it called into use those means, which, though dormant, yet resided in it at that hour, ft consisted merely in that remedy which all courts had recourse to on an increase of their business, namely, to increase their sittings. It was not necessary for his hon. and learned friend to move specifically the plan he had submitted to the House; it was enough for him to have pointed out a way by which the evil now before the House could be obviated. The Cockpit business had been said to belong peculiarly to the Master of the Rolls. But the fact he believed, was, that before the present Master of the Rolls' predecessor, certainly, in the time of sir T. Sewell, that judicial officer did not take part in this business. He was not quite sure whether lord Kenyon had ever attended in that court; but he knew that before him no Master of the Rolls had ever exercised such a function. The attendance of the Master in the Cockpit was therefore itself a novelty, and if it was contended that the new duties, which his hon. and learned friend proposed to impose upon him, would interfere with his other avocations, then let a new office be created, but let it be an effectual one, for the particular purpose of presiding in that court of appeal. If an additional judge were necessary, it would surely be better to create one to attend at the Cockpit; because when a new judicial office was erected, should it not be endeavoured to avoid breaking in on the present judicial establishment? He did not know how it happened that out of so many privy counsellor's who had filled the great offices of state, and many of whom were in the receipt of large sums of public money, there could not be found any to attend the judicial business of the council. He was ignorant of any reason that could be assigned, why such of them as from education, professional habits and experience, might render important assistance, did not give their presence and aid to the adjudication in the Cockpit. The Chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, for instance, was an officer who was frequently an eminent lawyer, as was the case at present. Yet neither this officer, nor any of the 120 other privy counsellor's (except the Master of the Rolls) performed the duty in question. He could not see why the Master of the Rolls should be taken from his usual occupations to transact this

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business instead of assisting the Lord Chancellor, when out of this number of privy counsellor's so many might be found competent to supply the deficiency. Four or five days only were necessary for Plantation causes, and a few more in time of war for Prize Appeals. It was, besides, an error to suppose that trifling causes only were decided before the Master of the Rolls, many of them were of the most complicated nature, requiring the most mature deliberation, and, in fact, took very often twice as much time as causes before the Chancellor. It was true that the case had been different in the time of former Chancellors. Twice as many causes were usually heard in the Rolls during the time of the present Master, as during that of any of his predecessors, so that the present Chancellor had less to do than formerly. The fact was, that the duties of the Master of the Rolls had been greatly changed and multiplied in the time of the present Chancellor. A vast deal had been transferred from the latter to the former, and in that proportion the latter had been relieved. He was sorry that an hon. and learned gentleman, whose mind was so well formed to struggle with the objections urged against this measure, had left them almost entirely untouched. He drew a strong conclusion from the silence of that hon. gentleman (Mr. Horne). As to the argument which had been used, that the eyes of the public would be on the Court of Chancery, and that thus the evil arising from the absence of the Chancellor on political business, would be prevented by public jealousy, nothing could be more futile. Who composed the public here alluded to, or who was to make the grievance public? Was it to be supposed that the counsel, or solicitors of the court, would complain of the absence of the Chancellor during four days instead of three? during five days instead of four? It must be obvious that the evil must grow to a monstrous magnitude before any such complaint would be made. The main objection was, that the evil would be irremediable. Why should not the Bill be made a temporary one? Why should the officer be appointed for life? When the Chancellor was estranged from his court, and the evils consequent on this estrangement became manifest, this Vice-Chancellor could only be got rid of by turning the office into a sinecure. A much readier and safer way to relieve the Lord Chancellor from the pressure of business, of
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which he complained, would be, as he had observed before, to separate from his high office the bankruptcy cases, which took up so much of his time. Nor was the idea so novel as some gentlemen had affected to represent it. The bankrupt causes, of which it had been proposed to strip the Chancellor, had been said, on the other side of the House, to be essential to his office. These causes, were, however, a modern excrescence on the office. After the first statute concerning bankrupts in the time of Henry 8, bankrupt causes were subjected to three commissioners on their present footing, in the time of queen Elizabeth.—These commissioners were at first supposed to determine bankrupt causes without appeal, and consequently there was no appeal until the time of Lord Chancellor Nottingham. Lord Chancellor Nottingham hesitated for some time to entertain jurisdiction in the case, and stated as a reason, the possibility of the inconveniences which have since arisen. He at last consented, and was the first to exercise this jurisdiction; but during the time of lord Talbot, lord King, and lord Macclesfield, there were so few interferences of this kind that there were not 20 before the time of lord Hardwicke, when a great increase took place in consequence of the statute 5 George 2. It was from this period that bankrupt causes came exclusively to be brought before the Lord Chancellor, and it could therefore be no innovation to detach from that office, that which had never been entailed upon it by statute. The only reasonable objection was, that these causes were too important to be heard without appeal. But it was proposed to give in the Committee the power of hearing these causes without appeal to the Vice-Chancellor. With regard to the emolument, in his opinion the Vice-Chancellor's proposed salary of 4,000 l. was quite an inadequate recompence to any lawyer of great talents to induce him to leave the bar; and it was strange also that this officer, who was to take precedence of the Master of the Rolls, of the Chief Justice of Common Pleas, and of the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, should be placed in so degraded a situation. As to the Master of the Rolls, if the salary of that office was small, it must be collected that it arose only from the disinterestedness of the judge, who filled that station at present, as he had refused an increase of salary when it was granted to

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the other judges, alleging the increased, fees of his court; but this would) not be the case with the new law officer they were called upon to create, as all the fees of Chancery were to belong, as formerly, to the Lord Chancellor. He was however anxious to hear the amendments which were intended to be proposed, and which were to make the Bill now under contemplation quite different from what it was in its original state; he would not in consequence press the motion, nor did he believe it was intended so to do. He wished to hear the improvements which were to be proposed, since the Solicitor General had supported the Bill rather as what it might possibly become, than as what it actually was.
If it were necessary to create a new office, it should be a far different one from what was under discussion, and, indeed, a pretty strong censure had been passed on the Bill by a learned serjeant (Mr. Best), who also said he voted for it not as it was but as it might be. Before he sat down he would, however, submit a few more observations to the House. It had been said that the subject had been discussed before; this, however, he would utterly deny. The Bill had certainly undergone no discussion in the other House, and the only discussion which he had heard in the profession consisted of a wish that the Attorney-General might be appointed to the new office, and that which took place in this House on Thursday last. He thought of course, they could not be too cautious how they proceeded on that delicate subject. He had been accused of writing a pamphlet on that question, but he could not well see how this could be made a matter of accusation against him. He had never denied the fact, and had even sent the production as a present to most of his acquaintances. He thought the subject of the highest importance, and felt it as his duty to state publicly the insuperable objections he saw to the measure. He was sorry his hon. and learned friend, the Solicitor General, had not read them; his hon. and learned friend had expressed himself in favour of the measure; but he had declared, at the same time, that he would not vote for the Bill such as it then was, but such as it would be when coming out of the committee. His hon. and learned friend had owned, besides, that he was but little acquainted with the practice of the Court of Chancery, so that he was pretty well convinced that his opinion on
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that subject would not have with the House the same weight to which his well-earned professional reputation would entitle him on any legal subjects.
The objections which had been urged against the Bill were not worthy of consideration. As to what had been said concerning the Master of the Roils not having a seat in that House, he thought it would be a great benefit to the public if no judicial officers had seats in that House—no masters in Chancery—and no Welsh judges.—A judge was generally the worse judge for being a member of parliament—the worse member of parliament for being a judge—nor were they ever to be found to take an active part in the rugged professional business of the bar. What in his view of the matter was to be feared, was that the Vice-Chancellorship might in a short time become a sinecure, and, that in that case, the way to it would be not through the rugged paths of the law, but through the pleasant avenue of that House. The hon. and learned gentleman then adverted to the necessity of ascertaining first, the measures which the House of Lords were likely to adopt to avail themselves of the more frequent assistance of the Lord Chancellor in hearing appeal causes.
It would be necessary, if this Bill passed, to make some provision that there should be a fuller attendance in these cases. At present it was said that the Chancellor was often seen pacing up and down the House for three or four hours before there was an attendance. The House, indeed, had never met before two o'clock, till within the last three days. Within that period, the attendance had been most exemplary. It was true, that within these three days the noble lords had sat earlier than usual to dispatch their judicial business. On Saturday the sitting was announced for ten o'clock, but on their arrival at the House, the suitors and counsel were informed, that their lordships would not be ready before one o'clock. This morning they had sat at eleven o'clock, and the same hour was announced for tomorrow. But he was apprehensive that, from this short trial, their lordships might be disgusted with their laborious task, and conceived it to be indispensably necessary to ascertain whether they would give their attendance regularly before that was insisted on as an argument, or made the ground of an enactment.
Mr. Bathurstsaid that after the delay which had been granted by the noble lord

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he did not think that the objections to the measure would have been pressed at this time. It was not true that the subject had not been brought under the consideration of the House. Papers had been laid before them on the subject as long ago as June or July, 1811; and if no attention had been paid to it, it was not the fault of those who brought the measure forward. The project which had been produced tonight, for the first time, of exonerating the Chancellor by throwing the burden on the Master of the Rolls, had, however, met with the immediate approbation and adoption of the learned gentleman who required so much time to consider. The hon. gentleman had made use of arguments against the exercise of the judicial functions of the House of Lords, which were equally applicable to the expedient which he was himself disposed to countenance. It was very obvious that no step could be taken to impose on the Master of the Rolls the very laborious duty which it had been suggested he might undertake without the concurrence of that officer, and the hon. gentleman seemed not to be aware when he was objecting to innovation on the one hand, that he was on the other advocating a very violent innovation, namely, a complete change in the judicial functions of a magistrate, whose duties were so important as those of the Master of the Rolls. Could this proposal be carried into effect without the consent of the Master of the Rolls himself? It evidently could not. Was it then no novelty to call upon a great law officer for his concurrence in a legislative measure, which would be rendered nugatory without it? What security was there that the Master of the Rolls would regularly attend to this increase of business, unless compelled by a superior authority; and if he were made amenable to the Chancellor, the same objection would occur as had been insisted on against the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor. It had been said that the evil was temporary. It would therefore require the application of an immediate remedy, and this remedy was to be supplied by the increased exertions of the Master of the Rolls, whose health had made it necessary for him to decline several of the duties in which he was already engaged. Several experiments had been proposed with respect to alterations in different courts of judicature. Among others, to remove the Chief Baron for a certain part of the year to the Cockpit.
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And it had been argued in this subject, that the three remaining judges in the court of Exchequer would be as good as four, entirely forgetting the rank and weight of the Chief Baron, and the loss of authority to the court, which would follow from his withdrawing himself to hear prize and plantation appeals elsewhere. It had been stated, that in 1806, when the Master of the Rolls declined attending at the Cockpit, the business went on as before. This was only true of the ordinary routine business, for important causes were uniformly held back. Another objection had been stated, that the decision of bankrupt causes was comparatively a novelty, an excrescence from the office of Chancellor. Now the only proof of this was, that the quantity of business of that kind had greatly encreased of late. But as long as any questions of that kind existed, though in a much less proportion, they had always been referred to the Court of Chancery, and therefore referring the increased number of causes of bankrupts to the same Court was no innovation, no excrescence. The subject was, no doubt, argued according to the most correct syllogistical form by the logicians on the other side of the House. If the business was to be transacted by the House of Lords, the Chancellor must preside there, and if so, he must be taken from his own court for the purpose, and thus in remedying one evil another would be created. It had also been suggested that the House of Lords should attend in a body, but assuredly, no one who thought calmly on the subject, could wish, however full their attendance might be," that their deliberations should want that weight and authority which they derived from being directed by a person of avowedly high character for legal knowledge and abilities. From the assistance of such a person, their decisions would derive a claim to satisfy suitors, of which no one could wish to see them deprived. The measure now before the House had met with the approbation of the House of Lords, and that was a circumstance which could not be sufficiently insisted on, entitled as they were to judge of the subject. But no advantage had been taken of this to hurry the measure through that House, on the contrary, it was proceeding through it slowly and regularly, such opportunities being afforded for due deliberation as its importance demanded.
Mr. Stephensaid, that his hon. and learned friend had expressed his intention

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to be brief in the observations he had addressed to the House; but he had, never the less, proceeded to say so much, and that so well and so antithetically put, that it was impossible to pass it over in silence. His hon. and learned friend had disputed his sufficiency to judge of the subject before the House; it was certainly true, that he had not so much business in the Court of Chancery as he (Sir S. Romilly) had; but he was sufficiently conversant with it to dispute the correctness of a statement which he had made very prejudicial to the character of the English bar. The hon. and learned gentleman, in speaking of the Chancery bar, seemed to think that if great and flagrant abuses prevailed there, abuses plain and palpable, no gentleman in that court would stand up to point them out and oppose them—that there would not be spirit enough among those who officially attended there, to remonstrate against any open and gross dereliction of duty on the part of a Lord Chancellor—he saw nothing in the conduct of the persons conneated with that court to warrant such an opinion. Indeed, he was sure if any abuse were observable, his hon. and learned friend would be the first man to expose it. As to the idea with which his hon. and learned friend seemed to be impressed, that a person might be chosen as keeper of the great seal, rather for his political influence, than for his professional knowledge, he thought it was the veriest bugbear that ever the imagination conjured up, to believe that a minister would select for that high office, any person who did not possess great legal information. It would be impossible for any minister to appoint any individual to that office who was not fully adequate to the discharge of its duties, and whose incapacity would be soon exposed to the eye of parliament and the country. And, if there even were all that servility in the court, which would induce the gentlemen attending it, to conceal the want of knowledge of the individual placed at the head of it, were he indeed unfit for his situation, in that case, he hoped there would be at least spirit enough within the walls of that House, to remedy the evil. Sure he was, if such a state of things existed, his hon. and learned friend would not sit long amongst them without making it known, and he felt convinced, the House would, in the true spirit of constitutional feeling, listen seriously to the appeal. A little reflection would make his hon. and learned
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friend sensible of the injustice of such an assertion; and, indeed, it only needed to be said, that he himself practised in that court in order to make every other person who was acquainted with his character sensible of it. Now, with respect to the question before the House, it had been argued that it was the object of ministers to create a magistrate, who, under the cloke of magistracy, should be really a purely political character, and such being their design, a person would be installed in the new office who, from a want of professional ability and practice, would be totally incompetent to perform the duties of the Chancellor in his absence, a phantom, a shadow, who would bring into disgrace the very office, the duties of which he would affect to perform, and who would occasionally have to decide in a court of appeal a cause which he could scarcely decide in the court from which the appeal would lie, without creating a necessity for it. He thought that these views imputed to ministers were at once absurd and unjust; but supposing they were disposed to act on such views, could they expect that their election of an individual to fill the office, if improper, would go unquestioned, or that there were not many individuals there who, in the spirit of the constitution, would call the attention of the House to the circumstance. The hon. and learned gentleman had expressed an opinion, that it would be better if Welsh Judges and Masters in Chancery were not permitted to have seats in parliament; as, to use his own phrase, they were worse judges for being members of parliament, and worse members of parliament for being judges. He could feel no other sensations than those of pleasure, in being thus placed in company with the Master of the Rolls; but the memory of that gentleman's parliamentary career had not so entirely faded from their recollection, his great talents, his well known integrity, were not so completely forgotten, as to induce a presumption that his hon. and learned friend's proposition would meet with much approbation. He could not see why persons who held judicial situations were improper to be admitted to seats in the Commons House of Parliament. He thought that the reasoning, if true, ought to be carried farther, and that not only judges, but lawyers who might wish to become judges, ought to be equally excluded. And, with all the absence of ambition which distinguished his

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hon. and learned friend, he did not think he would stand up and say, that great professional characters, at present members of that House, should not be made judges. It, however, the sarcasm was personal and aimed at himself, he could only say, that his hon. and learned friend had the experience of two years, as to the manner in which the business of the situation which he (Mr. Stephen) held, was performed—and! he could tell whether his parliamentary duties prevented him from properly attending to the office which he filled. If any neglect were apparent in that office, he called on his hon. and learned friend to pronounce that sentence which his conduct deserved. He was very much astonished that his hon. and learned friend should support a proposition which had for its object to increase the labours of the Master of the Rolls: that right hon. gentleman, it was well known, in consequence of ill health, and the increasing duties of his situation, had found it absolutely necessary to abridge his attendance in that House; and yet, the plan which was adverted to, and which his hon. and learned friend seemed ready to support, would increase his duties three fold. The hon. and learned member then went on to state the necessity of the attendance of the Master of the Rolls in the Privy Council. With regard to an expression he had made use of on a former night respecting the duties attached to this office, the hearing of Prize and Plantation Appeals, he had meant simply that they were attached to it by custom and by choice, not by necessity. He concluded by expressing his opinion, that it would be highly improper to intrust the business of bankrupt petitions, which was of a more delicate and important nature than any other in Chancery, to a subordinate officer.
Sir S. Romilly,in explanation, said, that in the observation he had made, as to persons being members of parliament, as well as judges, he certainly had no intention to insinuate that his hon. and learned friend did not discharge his judicial duties with great propriety, because he was a member of that House. He had on the contrary, no hesitation in saying, that his hon. and learned friend's duties could not be better or more correctly performed by any person than they were by him. He merely meant what had fallen from him as a general proposition, without intending to allude to any individual. Of this he was sure, that the present Lord Chancellor had
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stipulated with some gentlemen, before he admitted them to be Masters in Chancery, that they should not become members of parliament.
Mr. Stephensaid, that was done merely for the convenience of business; and he was entirely ignorant of the proposition standing on any constitutional objection to the propriety of the Masters in Chancery holding seats in parliament.
Mr. Marryattwas of opinion that the Chancellor would derive a great relief from the business of bankrupt petitions being withdrawn from him. He had been himself recently an assignee in a commission of bankruptcy, in the course of the proceedings consequent on which the Chancellor had to hear six petitions immediately, and live others remotely connected with the commission. The House would estimate the amount of labour that might be spared him not only in the hearings but in the perusal of the multifarious documents on which he was to frame his decisions.
Mr. Simeonobserved, that, eighteen years ago, when he became a Master of Chancery, not one of the ten gentlemen who composed that body had a seat in parliament; and, of those who had been admitted by the present Chancellor, a very small portion were members of that House; it was consequently but just to infer, that, in appointing them, no political object was attended to.
The question being put, the Amendment was negatived, and the original question carried. The House then went into the Committee.
Lord Castlereaghproposed to fill up the blank left for the Vice-Chancellor's salary, with the sum of 5,000 l. per annum; one moiety thereof to be paid by the Lord Chancellor; and, for the payment of the other moiety, the sum of 60,000 l. taken from the dead fund in Chancery, to be vested, which would rather more than cover it.
Mr. R. Gordonthought, if the Chancellor were to pay any part of the salary, he ought to pay the whole, as he gave up the principle by contributing any portion. He would therefore oppose the clause.
Lord Castlereaghwas proceeding to explain the manner in which the payments would be made, when
Mr. Gordonobserved, that his objection did not go to the method in which the payment was to be made, but to the payment altogether.
Lord Castlereaghsaid, that, of the various sums paid into Chancery, a part must remain unclaimed; and they were not acting on any new principle, in taking a portion of this dead cash, to defray the expences of Chancery; particularly as care would be taken that no appropriation of this money should interfere with the claim of any suitor who could make good his title.
The clause thus filled up, was then agreed to. His lordship next proposed a clause, restricting the Vice-Chancellor, or his officers, from receiving fees, which was also agreed to.
Mr. Ponsonbysaid, ironically, it gave him great satisfaction to find, that those hon. members who expressed their conviction that, in the committee, such improvements would be made in the Bill as would render it quite palatable to them, had all their wishes fulfilled by the introduction of the clauses and the filling up of the blanks as proposed by the noble lord. The Bill was so framed that the Court of Chancery must be now rendered a perfect model of legal dispatch and judicial celerity. So complete was it in all its parts, that he was almost tempted to believe it would banish litigation from the world. Nothing would remain but a little amicable controversy, as to who had a right to this, and who had a right to that. He could not help again congratulating those gentlemen who expected that the Bill would be rendered so perfectly palatable.
Mr. Prestonobjected to the payment of any part of the salary of the Vice-Chancellor, out of those funds which belonged to the suitors of the Court. If no other person undertook the task he should feel it to be his duty to bring the subject of the dead fund under the consideration of the House.
Lord Castlereaghobserved that similar objection would lie to the payment of the salaries of the Masters in Chancery, and to a variety of other expences, which were defrayed from this fund, for which there were no claimants.
Mr. Prestonsaid, that commissioners ought to be appointed to examine into the nature of that fund, and to probe it to the bottom. It was not right that property should be left in Chancery, "a dead fund," as it was termed, because those to whom it belonged had not an opportunity of extricating it. He hoped, therefore, some legislative provision would be made to render this an active fund. And, if no
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other gentleman had the resolution to propose a measure on the subject, he repeated that he should feel it his duty to submit to the House a Bill for the attainment of so just an object.
Mr. Simeonsaid, the hon. gentleman had most strangely mistaken the fact. He seemed to think that the Court took the property of suitors from them, to apply it to its own purpose. The truth was, that vast sums of money were paid into Chancery, and from thence lodged in the Bank of England, where they lay dead and unproductive, unless the parties applied in time to have them vested in the funds, and the dividends carried to a distinct account, for the benefit of the successful suitor. Every shilling was appropriated to the benefit of the suitors, and, if they neglected to make their claims, it was their own fault, not that of the Court.
Mr. W. Courtenaythought the case put by his hon. friend (Mr. Preston) was a very strong one. It appeared that a fund was formed out of sums of money belonging to persons who, from poverty or other causes, were unable to make good their claim. It was the property of those who represented the persons to whom it originally belonged and not of the Court of Chancery. He, therefore, thought some mode should be adopted, by commissioners or otherwise, to give relief to individuals thus situated.
Mr. Simeonsaid, that the principal of those sums was not used. The interest, arising from the investment of a portion of this fund, which would otherwise lie dead and produce nothing, as no claimant was known who could direct its application, was alone appropriated to the expences of the court.
Sir S. Romillysaid, the observation of his hon. friend (Mr. Preston) was perfectly correct. There was, in the Court of Chancery, a very large and an increasing fund, which was undoubtedly ready, when the suitors came and claimed it. But there were a variety of circumstances, which rendered it almost impossible to make out a good title; for instance, the death of the parties, the difficulty of finding representatives, the neglect of solicitors, &c. In consequence of this, large sums remained in Chancery, which had not been claimed for many years, and perhaps never would. But the Court ought to afford facilities for getting out a great part of this property, as it seemed, that it was locked up there, on account of

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some defects in the constitution, or in the forms of that Court. What his hon. friend said, did not cast an imputation on any person, but only went to this, that such a fund ought not to be suffered to exist, if the persons to whom the property belonged could be discovered. Now, the sums thus lying dead, were not like the unclaimed dividends, the property of persons who had died without making a disclosure of their having money in the funds; on the contrary, much of this property belonged to persons who knew of its existence, and had, perhaps, for years, been vainly endeavouring to procure it. Whether this evil arose from the forms or practice of the Court, the cause ought to be removed.
Mr. R. Gordonsaid, that the suitors' money, in his opinion, should be put out at interest, to accumulate for their benefit, and not be suffered to lie dead in the Bank of England, or be applied to purposes such as were proposed by the present Bill. What had fallen from the hon. gentlemen opposite confirmed him in his opinion of the impropriety of paying any part of the Vice-Chancellor's salary out of this fund. He hoped the next time the Bill came before them, the noble lord would be authorized to state, that the Lord Chancellor, since the measure was for his benefit, coincided in his objection, and had volunteered to come forward and pay the whole salary himself. He was sure such a determination would be approved of by the whole House, and he might even add, by the whole country.
Mr. Stephenwished to explain the misapprehensions which seemed to exist relative to the dead fund. If a Chancery suitor applied to have the litigated property vested in stock, it was always done: but, where the parties did not express a wish to that effect, the Court did not like to interfere, lest a loss might be sustained, which was not unlikely to happen, where stock was purchased in one term, and sold in the next. If such a loss were occasioned by the mere act of the Court, unauthorised by the suitor, the latter might conceive himself hardly dealt by. When the fund in the Bank of England accumulated very much, a part of it was vested in stock, the interest of which was laid out in the building of the Six Clerks Office, and defraying other expences connected with the Court of Chancery; but every act of parliament provided for the security of the persons whose property was thus put
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out at interest, if any just claimant appeared. Of course, when the amount of property floating in Chancery was 25,000,000 l. it was natural to expect that a considerable sum would remain for ever unclaimed.
Mr. Wetherallsaid, that the use made of the dead fund was a mere conditional appropriation, in the same way as government applied to the exigencies of the state, one million of the unclaimed dividends.
Sir S. Romillysaid, it was very strange that the Court of Chancery would not invest any part of the dead fund for the benefit of the suitors, without being desired by them, and yet, without their leave, would put it out at interest for the benefit of others,
Mr. Baringsaid, it was clear this fund did not belong to the public, and it was, therefore, dishonest to meddle with it. Those who could make out a claim to the principal, had an equal right to the interest.
Mr. Tierneywas of opinion, that, as it was proposed to take 5,000 l. worth of labour off the hands of the Lord Chancellor, the learned lord (whose fees and emoluments were increased by the access of business, which rendered this relief necessary) ought to defray the whole expence.
Lord Castlereaghrejoined, that a moiety of the 5,000 l. was as much as, in justice, the Lord Chancellor should be called upon to pay. Instead, then, of charging the other moiety on the consolidated fund, it was proposed to be defrayed from the dead fund in Chancery, by which, not the Lord Chancellor, but the public, were relieved. As the suitors would receive the benefit from the additional celerity and dispatch of business, they could and ought to have no objection to this arrangement.
The House then resumed; the Report was brought up, and ordered to be taken into further consideration on Monday next.