Commons Sitting of 21 January 1808

Preamble
The house met this day for the dispatch of business. At three o'clock, Mr. Quarme, yeoman usher of the black rod, appeared within the bar, and informed the house that the lords, authorized by virtue of his majesty's commission, desired the immediate attendance of the house, in the house of peers, to hear the commission read. The Speaker, accompanied by several members, accordingly attended. On their return, the Speaker took the chair, and acquainted the house, that in pursuance of the provisions, of an act of the 24th of his present majesty, he had ordered writs to be issued for the election of members for the following places: Beaumaris, in the room of lord Newborough, deceased: Lincoln, in the room of colonel Monson, deceased: Tavistock, in the room of lord viscount Howick, now earl Grey: the county of Monaghan, in the room of R. Dawson, esq. deceased; and the county of Donnegal, in the room of H. V. Brooke, esq. deceased.—The Clandestine Outlawry bill was, according to custom, read a first, and ordered to be read a 2nd time.—New writs were ordered as Ulm: For the borough of Mitchel, in the room of G. G. Mills, esq. who had accepted the Chiltern Hundreds: for Whitchurch, in the room of time hon. W. Broderick, who had accepted the office of one of the, lords commissioners of the treasury: for Stamford, in the room of general Leland, deceased; and for Clithero, in the room of the hon. J. Cust, now lord Brownlow.

THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS' SPEECH.
The Speaker acquainted the house that that house had been in the house of peers, where the lord chancellor, one of the lords authorized by his majesty's commission, had read a most gracious speech from his majesty, of which, to prevent mistakes, he hall obtained a copy.—He then proceeded to read the Speech from the chair, for which we refer to our report of the proceedings of the lords, see p. 1. After the Speaker had finished the Speech,
Viscount Hamilton (son of the marquis of Abercorn)rose to move the Address. His lordship began by observing, that he would not waste the time of the house, by entering too much into detail on a subject which they understood a great deal better than he could possibly pretend to do. But they all knew the situation of Europe, and the situation of Great Britain; they all knew the nature of the struggle in which this country was engaged; they all knew the inveteracy of the merciless and exasperated foe, who was bent on their destruction; they all knew the value of the objects for which Great Britain had to contend; they all knew that she stood alone in the contest, that on no human power could she place any reliance, that she had to depend only on her own resources, on her own spirit, and on her own determination. These were facts that were self-evident, they were subjects of public notoriety, and he, therefore, trusted that the house would acquit him of presumption in speaking of them. We were not only opposed as man to man, or as nation to nation, against one of the most gigantic powers that ever existed in the world, but to a power which, in addition to its own strength, had succeeded in absorbing into itself almost every other European state. The situation of the country was, therefore, most critical; it required the most vigorous exertions, it demanded the most liberal sacrifices. Faint heartedness would be our destruction. There was no mid-way fur us between success and ruin. Tinder such circumstances, the contemplation of the resources and spirit of the country, was a subject of consolation and pride; and, however the protraction of the war, with the inevitable burdens, and the partial obstruction to commerce, which that protraction occasioned, were to be lamented, we had only to look around us, to be thankful for the contrast which we presented to the neighbouring nations; to be thankful for the
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liberty, for the happiness, for the preeminence which we enjoyed; to be thankful, that instead of our means having been impaired by our difficulties, they had, on the contrary, increased with them, and had been cemented by the very circumstances which were projected for their destruction. Great Britain at the present moment exhibited the astonishing spectacle of a country, which, at the end of 15 Years war with a most powerful antagonist, had gained every thing, and lost nothing. Every where we had inflicted blows on our enemy; no where had we received a blow from him. Our commerce had flourished; our wealth had encreased; our possessions had multiplied. Our navy, always formidable, had swept every hostile fleet from the face of the ocean. War, the curse of every other nation, had to Great Britain been a comparative blessing. Indeed, such was the extraordinary state of Europe, that he apprehended very much that war was the only mode by which the advantages which we had acquired, could be maintained. Peace, under the present circumstances, while it would be as expensive to us as war, would be tenfold more dangerous. Successfully, however, as we had resisted the machinations and the violence of the foe, still the house was not less bound to take care that those ministers, whose duty it was to direct the resources and the energies of the country, were fulfilling that duty; that they were competent to the discharge of the functions with which they were invested; and that they deserved a continuation of the confidence of the country. This would be best ascertained by a retrospect of their acts, and those acts were so fully described in his majesty's most gracious speech, that it appeared to him needless to recapitulate them. In the regret which his majesty expressed at having been compelled to adopt hostile measures against Denmark, the house would undoubtedly join; but it would be a regret unmixed with reproach, it would even, be regret overpowered by feelings of gratitude to his majesty for his paternal care in rescuing the country from the most formidable danger to Which it had ever been exposed; for, after the Treaty of Tilsit, after the subsequent conduct of Austria and of Denmark, it was impossible that any man could doubt of a combination of powers having been formed against us. Perhaps, among the various causes which had laid the continental states at the foot

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of France, none had contributed more largely to produce that disastrous effect, than the facility with which those states admitted every violation of the law of nations, of which the enemy wished to avail himself. We alone had avoided becoming the victims of the credulity, the irresolution, and the delay, that had overwhelmed all other countries. God forbid that we should ever degenerate into an imitation of them! He trusted that at such a crisis, encompassed as we were by external perils, we should never be cursed with the greatest of all evils, a timid and feeble government. High as the spirit, and extensive as the resources of the country were, its danger would indeed be imminent, were the administration of its affairs placed in the hands of men who, with their eyes open to the designs of the enemy, would be content to reply to his acts by arguments, or hesitate to act themselves from the apprehension of responsibility. Too long, indeed; had that enemy been permitted to proceed in his career of violence to neutral powers for the aggrandizement of his own. That the expedition to. Copenhagen was most important and most critical, every one must have felt when its termination was in suspense; every one must now feel that it was most wise. Its criterion was its success. With respect to the evils by which it was accompanied, every effort had been made to avert, and subsequently, to mitigate them. He challenged the annals of Europe to produce an instance of a warlike enterprise, in which so much entreaty had been resorted to before success, and SO much forbearance manifested after it. What his majesty's ministers had planned with decision, they carried into effect with a force which could leave the Danes no hope of triumphing in a contest; and he confessed, he could no more consider the Danish government as justified in sacrificing the lives of so many gallant men in a hopeless resistance, than he could admire the heroism of the prince, who, himself escaping from the dangers by which he was environed, coolly devoted his capital to destruction, and its inhabitants to slaughter.—The conduct of the Russian government was another proof, that on ourselves we must depend for our security, and even for our existence. This last lesson that we had received, was, surely, the last lesson we could require to prove to us, that however ready we might be to co-operate
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with the nations of Europe in the cause of Europe, to our own cause, to ourselves alone we must look. Accustomed as we had lately been to witness extraordinary events, he could not avoid expressing the astonishment which he felt to see the emperor of Russia, the champion of the continent, secured by his situation from the fate which had overtaken other countries, voluntarily put the last band to the degradation of the powers of Europe; to see him descend from the proud eminence on which he had been placed, for the purpose of violating his engagements, and of crouching under the throne of that usurper whom he had so recently insulted and defied. That such should have been the conduct pursued by the emperor Alexander, must be deeply lamented. Unsatisfactory indeed, was the consolation, that the time would soon come, when he would have infinitely more reason to repent that conduct, than we had now to lament it. The contrast which the firmness and magnanimity of the king of Sweden displayed, commanded equally our admiration and our support; and he was sure that the house would gladly enable his majesty, not only to fulfil his engagements with that gallant prince, but also to show the world that it was not by the quantum of immediate interest that we measured our national faith and friendship.—Of the many important subjects of consideration suggested by his majesty's speech, none were more important than the principles adopted, and the steps taken by our government, to frustrate the enemy's designs against our commerce. So important and so complicated were these subjects, that he felt he should presume too far, if he troubled the house with an opinion upon them of such little weight as his own. As far, however, as regarded the principle of the measures adopted by his majesty's ministers he might, perhaps, be allowed to avow his sentiments. It was the broad principle of retaliation and self-defence. The conduct of France had annihilated every thing in the world like neutrality. There existed but two powers—the enemy's and our own—fortunately, these powers were too unequal to alarm us for the consequences; even should America be added to the number of our foes; an event which could in no wise be attributed to misconduct or precipitation on the part of his majesty's government. In a moment of frenzy France had issued edicts levelled at our commerce. Had

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the object of these measures been obtained; had they even partially crippled our means, the consideration that a temporary distress to ourselves was utter rum to our opponents, must have induced us to persevere in the contest with tranquillity and firmness: but, the very reverse was the fact. So far from our means having diminished, although the different branches of our commerce might vary in extent, the aggregate of it exceeded that of the most prosperous period of our history; so much so indeed, that his majesty, in his most gracious speech, expressed his confidence, that no material increase to the burdens of his people would be necessary.—The noble lord trusted, that we might look forward with as much hope and satisfaction as we could look back with content and gratitude. There was one subject from the contemplation of which, in every point of view, unalloyed pleasure must be derived; it was the rescue from the power of France, of one of the oldest and most faithful of our allies, transferred from a country weak and indefensible, to one secure and powerful; an occurrence which afforded a field for brilliant anticipations on our part, into which he would not enter, as he felt that they were of an extent and importance beyond his powers of description, holding out commercial and political advantages in the highest degree encouraging to us. He was afraid that he had trespassed too long on the attention of the house, and should therefore only add, that under the impression of the feelings which he experienced, he should move,
"That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to return his majesty the thanks of this house, for the gracious Speech which he has directed to be delivered by the lords commissioners:—To assure his majesty, that, in this important conjuncture of affairs, he will find in us the same determination with which his majesty himself is animated, to support the honour of his crown, and the just rights and interests of his people; and humbly to thank his majesty, for having been graciously pleased to inform us that as soon as the result of the Negotiation at Tilsit had confirmed the influence and controul of France over the powers of the continent, his majesty was apprized that it was the intention of the enemy to combine those powers in one general confederacy; that such confederacy was to be directed either to the intire subjugation of his majesty's kingdom, or
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to the imposing upon his majesty an insecure and ignominious peace; and that, for this purpose, it was determined to force into hostilities against his majesty, states which had hitherto been allowed by France to maintain or to purchase their neutrality, and to bring to bear against different parts of his majesty's dominions, the whole naval force of Europe, and specifically the fleets of Portugal and Denmark; and humbly to assure his majesty, that we concur with his majesty in thinking, that, under those circumstances, the placing of those fleets out of the reach of such a confederacy, became an object of essential and indispensable necessity for the security of his majesty's dominions:—That while we feel perfectly convinced, from the knowledge we have of the natural generosity of his majesty's mind, that it must have been with the greatest reluctance that his majesty, in pursuing this important object, so far as related to the Danish Fleet, felt himself compelled (when his majesty's endeavours to open a Negotiation with the court of Denmark had failed), to order his commanders to resort to the extremity of force; we at the same time most heartily congratulate his majesty upon the success which attended the execution of this most painful but necessary service:—That we learn, with great satisfaction, that the object which his majesty had to accomplish, with respect to the Fleet of Portugal, was happily attainable in a manner more congenial to his majesty's feelings; and. that the timely and unreserved communication, by the court of Lisbon, of the demands and designs of France, confirming to his majesty the authenticity of the ad-vices which his majesty is graciously pleased to state that he had received from other quarters, naturally entitled that court to an entire confidence on the part of his majesty, in the sincerity of the assurances by which that communication was accompanied, as well as to every degree of forbearance compatible with the ultimate and indispensable object of security to his majesty's dominions:—And to offer to his majesty our most hearty congratulations, that this confidence and forbearance of his majesty have been justified by the event; and that the fleet which had been destined as the instrument of vengeance against Great Britain has been preserved from the grasp of France, and is now employed in conveying to its American possessions the hopes and fortunes of the Portuguese mo-

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narchy; joining with his majesty in imploring the blessings of Divine Providence upon that great enterprise, and rejoicing in the preservation of a power so long the ally of Great Britain, and in the prospect of its establishment in the new World in augmented strength and splendour:—To lament, in common with his majesty, that the determination, on the part of the enemy, to excite hostilities between his majesty and his late allies, the emperors of Russia and of Austria, and the king of Prussia, have proved so successful; and to concur with his majesty in the propriety of his not having accepted the proffered mediation of the emperor of Russia, until his majesty might have been able to ascertain that Russia was in a condition to mediate impartially, and until the principles and the basis on which France was ready to negotiate were made known to his majesty; and whilst we see with regret the course pursued by the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia, to assure his majesty, that we are happy in hearing that his majesty has given them no ground of complaint, and that they have not even at the moment when their ministers respectively demanded their passports, alledged any pretence to justify, or any distinct cause to account for that proceeding:—To return his majesty our humble thanks for having been graciously pleased to direct, that Copies of the Official Notes which passed between his majesty's ambassador and the ministers for foreign affairs of his imperial majesty the emperor of Russia, pending the Negotiations at Tilsit, as well as of the Official Note of the Russian minister at this court, which contained the offer of his Imperial majesty's mediation, and of the Answer returned to that Note by his majesty's command; and also, Copies of the Official Notes of the Austrian minister at this court, and of the Answers which his majesty commanded to be returned to them, should be laid before us.—That we hear with concern that his majesty's earnest endeavours to terminate the war with the Ottoman Porte have been defeated by the machinations of France, not less the enemy of the Porte than of Great Britain:—That we rejoice to find, that while the influence of France has unfortunately proved too successful in exciting new wars, and preventing the termination of existing hostilities against this country, the king of Sweden has resisted every attempt to prevail upon him to abandon his
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alliance with Great Britain; and to convey to his majesty our assurance, that we feel with him the sacredness of the duty which the firmness and fidelity of his Swedish majesty impose upon Great Britain; and that we will cheerfully enable his majesty to discharge it in a manner worthy of this country:—To thank his majesty for informing us, that the Treaty of Commerce, Amity, and Navigation, between his majesty and the United States of America, which had been signed by commissioners duly authorized for that purpose, has not taken effect, in consequence of the refusal of the President of the United States to ratify that instrument:—To acknowledge with great satisfaction, his majesty's justice in offering spontaneous reparation for an Unauthorized act of force committed against an American ship of war, and to lament that an attempt has been made on the part of the American government to blend the question arising out of this act, with pretensions inconsistent with the Maritime Rights of Great Britain; and, while we concur with his majesty in earnestly hoping that the American government may still be actuated, in the discussion now pending between the two countries, by the same desire to maintain peace and friendship on which his majesty has uniformly acted, at the same time to offer our humble and hearty acknowledgments to his majesty for the determination which he has been graciously pleased to express, to maintain unimpaired the Maritime Rights of Great Britain:—Humbly to thank his majesty, for having been graciously pleased to order that Copies of the Orders should be laid before us, which his majesty has issued with the advice of his privy council, in consequence of the Decrees of the enemy, which declared his majesty's dominions to be in a state of blockade, and subjected to seizure and confiscation the produce and manufactures of this kingdom, and to assure his majesty, that we will not fail to take these Orders into our early consideration:—To return his majesty our humble thanks for having ordered the Estimates of the current year to be laid before us; and to assure his majesty, that he may confidently rely upon our readiness to make such provision for the public service as the urgency of affairs may require:—That we hear with great satisfaction, that notwithstanding the difficulties which the enemy has endeavoured to impose upon the Commerce of his majesty's subjects, and upon their

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intercourse with other nations, the resources of the country have continued in the last year to he so abundant, as to have produced, both from the temporary and permanent revenue, receipts considerably larger than that of the preceding year; and that our satisfaction, arising from this proof of the solidity of these resources, will be greatly increased, if, according to the hope which his majesty has been graciously pleased to express, we shall be enabled to raise the necessary supplies for the' present year, without any material additions to the public burdens:—To assure his majesty, that we feel the firmest conviction, that, if ever there was a just and national war, it is that which his majesty is now compelled to prosecute: that this war in its principle is purely defensive; and that much as we should rejoice, in common with his majesty, at the attainment of a peace which would secure to us the safety and blessings which belong to peace, yet that we are firmly persuaded, that such a peace can only be negotiated on a tooting of perfect equality: and that if we display, as it is our fixed determination to do, in this crisis of the fate of the country, the characteristic spirit of the British nation, and face unappalled the unnatural combination which is gathered around us, the struggle, under the blessing of Divine Providence, will prove successful and glorious to Great Britain:—And finally to assure his majesty, that in this awful and momentous contest, we confidently rely upon the firmness of his majesty, who has no cause but that of his people; and that his majesty may reciprocally rely on the constancy and the affectionate support of his faithful commons."
Mr. Charles Ellisrose to second the address. Seldom, he said, had so many important events been crowded together in such a short space of time, as that which had intervened since the close of the last session. These had been stated so comprehensively in the speech from the throne, that it was unnecessary for him to enter into any enumeration of them. The vigilance with which his majesty's ministers had watched the projects of the enemy, and the energy with which they had defeated those projects, had been amply manifested. With respect to the design entertained by France, of compelling Denmark to join the confederacy against Great Britain, his majesty had declared, that he had previous intimation; which subsequent events corroborated. As to the nature of
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this intimation, it perhaps could not be laid on the table of the house, nor perhaps ought to be so. If ministers were in possession in July of the information alone, which has since been publickly disclosed, they would have failed in their duty had they not acted as they had done. He hoped that no greater difference of opinion would exist on this subject in the house, than what existed throughout the country at large. If, however, his majesty's ministers should be attacked upon it, they would be well able to defend themselves. Of this he was convinced, and he was willing to admit it, that had the gentlemen opposite remained in power, they would have clone no such thing. A similar attempt had been made by France on Portugal, but the frankness of the court of Lisbon, and its determination neither to lend its aid to the confederacy against Great Britain, nor to abandon British persons and property to the possession of the French, entitled it to the confidence of his majesty's government, and justified that government in pursuing a different line of conduct from that adopted in the case of Denmark. Adverting to the Russian Declaration, the hon. gent. contended, that a character very foreign from that of Russia marked the composition, not only in the sort of arguments adduced, but in the peculiarities of the style, which, if not French manufacture, was the most happy imitation of it that he had ever seen. Had the Russian manifesto appeared without a title, no one could have hesitated to ascribe it to the same pen as that by which the defence of it in the Moniteur had been produced.—The relative situation of this country and America might afford ample room for remark, but the subject was of such a delicate nature that he should abstain from enlarging upon it at present. The magnanimity of his majesty in offering reparation for injury, was most praise worthy. He trusted that the Americans would sec that it was not their true policy to unite themselves to France. The exception made in their favour in the British Orders of Council would, he hoped, be felt by them; an exception, of the propriety of which he somewhat doubted, disposed as he was to bestow on those orders his general and decided approbation. The project of excluding us from the continent was now trying; the trial would require on our part great constancy, great exertions, and great sacrifices. Of the result, there could be no apprehension. They had enjoyed the

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satisfaction of hearing from the throne of the stability of the resources, and the flourishing state of the commerce of the country. In the moral character of our government and of our people, in the wisdom and energy of the one, in the bravery and unanimity of the other, we possessed complete assurance of success in the Contest in which we were engaged. If he dwelt more on the necessity of war, than on the more popular topic of the possibility of peace, it was not because he estimated too lightly the blessings of peace, but because he dreaded the effects of a hasty and premature one. We had ample means of carrying on war. In our navy we had not only the most efficient defence, but a greater power of active hostility than perhaps we were yet ourselves aware of. By exerting our naval force in every possible direction, we might show the enemy that a predominant navy gives a power scarcely inferior to that of a conquering army; we might controul the haughty mind of the ruler of France, and inspire him with that respect for this country, which alone would insure permanent tranquillity.
Lord Miltondid not rise to oppose the address, but to express his regret that when Russia offered her good offices as a mediator, his majesty's ministers had not thought fit to accept them. He could not be suspected of any disposition at this moment to encourage a division of opinion on the subject of peace or war, after recent occurrences of considerable publicity, in which he had taken a decided part. To the opinion which he then expressed, he still adhered. He conceived it much better to repress any clamour on the subject until it should be ascertained what steps had been taken by his majesty's ministers for the restoration of peace. At the same time, when he heard flourishing descriptions of the state of the country and of its commerce, he could not avoid remarking, that had the persons who made those assertions attended more to the subject, they would have abstained from them. Locked up as we were from the continent, closed as every market was to our manufactures, how was it possible that our commerce could thrive or be in a flourishing condition? He owned that he had hoped to have heard some assurance from his majesty's ministers, that they were anxious for the restoration of peace; and that they were ready to embrace an opportunity of negotiation, from whatever quarter it
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might proceed. No such assurances had been given. On the contrary, his majesty's speech breathed a warlike spirit, declaring that we were ready to act with hostility not only against France but against the whole world. A great deal had been said on the attack of Copenhagen. It had been asserted, that the house and the country must give full credit to his majesty's ministers for the motives by which they had been actuated. He would say, that to attack a neutral country as we attacked Copenhagen was, prima facie, unjustifiable. It might be justifiable; but he repeated that, prima facie, it was not so. For his part, he could not see the probability that Denmark would have sided with France had we not attacked her. It seemed to him more likely that she would have resisted France. The summer had been an eventful one. We had gone to war with Denmark; we had gone to war with Russia; Austria had recalled her ambassador; the Orders of Council and other transactions would probably produce a rupture with America; and yet, under such circumstances, the house were to be amused with fine declamations on the extent of our resources, and on the progressive encrease of our commerce. Undoubtedly, after the necessary papers had been laid on the table would be the more proper time for discussing these subjects; but he could not refrain from thus publicly recording his regret, that his majesty's speech contained no assurances of a disposition to restore peace, at a time when the whole body of the manufacturers of the kingdom were experiencing such severe calamities.
Mr. George Ponsonbyobserved, that his majesty's speech contained such a variety of topics, that it was difficult to express an opinion upon it. Had the usual course prevailed in this instance; had the substance of the speech been known to the public for two or three days before the delivery of it, this difficulty would have been much lessened. Not only did the speech embrace a great variety of topics, but it was the longest speech, he believed, that was ever read from the chair. It required, therefore, the utmost circumspection in speaking of it, to prevent the expression of ideas not exactly conceived. The first object of the speech as it concerned this country, related to peace or war with France, and the other powers of the continent. It was impossible for him to give a direct opinion of the negotiation

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or intercourse between the court of London and the courts of Petersburgh and Vienna. Were he to speak generally on the subject of peace or war, he would say, that peace was beyond all question the first interest of England, it was our greatest blessing; but this was an abstract proposition; he could not decide positively on this particular subject, in the absence of the papers, which would show, whether or not peace could have been obtained, compatibly with the honour and interests of the country. Of this he was sure, that the first object of any statesman in the country ought to be to procure a peace, provided such a peace were compatible with that honour and those interests. He begged not to be understood, as in the least degree advising, that in any negotiation this country should tamely listen to the demands of France. To France he hoped England would never bow her head. At this particular time he was fully aware how much it became her, to stand firmly on the high ground to which she was entitled, by her honour, by her dignity, by her resources. He was most ready to admit, that his majesty's ministers would be fully justified in assuming the attitude he had described. If England stooped her head before France she would never raise it again; but to say, whether ministers had acted right or wrong in the particular case to which he alluded, was impossible. His majesty had declared, that all the papers necessary to elucidate the subject, should be laid on the table. 'Till that were done, any opinion must be premature. He would, therefore, abstain from any further reference to the conduct of government on this subject. If it should be shown that that conduct had been right, he would approve it; if wrong, he would not hesitate to express his disapprobation.—The next subject of great Importance in his majesty's Speech was the conduct of government with regard to Copenhagen. If he might describe what appeared to him the intention of his majesty's ministers on this point, it was to obtain from parliament an unqualified approbation of their conduct, without laying before it any evidence of, the urgency of the motives by which they had been impelled. They were ready to submit to the house the papers relating to the intercourse between Petersburgh and Vienna, but they seemed desirous to abstain from the production of papers which led to a step involving in itself what ought to be
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the clearest object of national concern—national character. He hoped he should not be charged with asperity in the remarks which he felt it his duty to make on what had fallen from the noble mover of the Address, and from the hon. seconder. He had heard the noble lord with great pleasure, on account of the considerable ability which he had displayed: but, with the highest deference and respect towards him, he was bound to make a few observations on the doctrine he had broached. Ministers, in his majesty's speech, justified the attack of a country, neutral, as it yet appeared, and unoffending, as it yet appeared, by declaring that a determination existed on the part of France, to seize the fleet of Denmark, and to convert it into the means of hostility against this country. This was the justification in the speech. But the noble lord and the hon. seconder justified the step on the ground that his majesty had too long forborn, and had been too long patient of the flagitious conduct of France to other powers, and that lie was right in departing from the course which, until that hour, he had prescribed to himself. Now, with regard to the first ground of justification, how the determination of France to endeavour to compel the Danes to join the hostile confederacy against this country, could justify our government in attacking the capital, and seizing the fleet of Denmark, without knowing whether or not she would have agreed to join that confederacy, was beyond his comprehension. If comprehensible at all, it must be from the supposition that the weakness of Denmark might induce her to submit. Now, if he understood the other ground of justification, it was, that our government were not hound to wait for any indications from neutral nations; but that, because Bonaparte had acted unjustly to such nations, our government were authorised in acting unjustly too. In the whole course of the present war it had been the high boast of this country, that her conduct had been uniformly fair, forbearing, just, and mode- rate. It had been always used as a great argument in that house, to induce the people to support their difficulties with firmness, that however unjust and oppressive the acts of France had been, England had evinced an opposite disposition, and had been as remarkable for her good faith as France had been for her treachery. The maintenance of such a character for honour, dignity, and fidelity, must, in a long

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contest, be the surest pledge of success. If, therefore, the right hon. gent. opposite did not mean to produce any papers, to throw a light on the inducements for the Copenhagen expedition, it was impossible for him to concur in that part of the address which pledged him to an approbation of it. He agreed with the noble lord who spoke last, that the expedition might be defensible; he would not say that his majesty's ministers were in error. They might be justifiable. The facts were unknown to him, and, therefore, he could not be expected to offer an opinion on them; but should the right hon. gent. opposite persist in withholding any information on the subject, he pledged himself to move for such papers as would bring the discussion fairly before the house. There were two points which demanded attention; the first was the right, the second was the policy of the measure; on both these points the house was at present without the materials of judging, and the most objectionable part of the address appeared to him to be that the house was pledged to approve of the measure without having these materials before it,—There was another topic in the speech, respecting a new state of hostility, in which we had been lately involved with the courts of Petersburgh, Vienna, and Berlin, on which it was almost impossible to decide till the papers containing the correspondence were laid before the house. He should only now observe, that nothing to him appeared more surprising than the circumstance of England being at war with Austria. That that power, which had uniformly been our prop and support, our partner in misfortune, and our friend on all occasions, should have been influenced to sacrifice its ancient attachment, and to break the numerous ties by which she was united to us, really seemed to him almost incredible—this was something which he could not understand. But, if Austria had been compelled in her fallen state to acquiesce in the demands of France, he hoped that on the part of this country every degree of forbearance would be exercised towards her. In regard to her, surely no conduct could be too moderate, no language too conciliatory. To France ministers might use as harsh language as they thought fit. She had been liberal in her abuse of us, and those who judged it proper might retaliate. But a difference should be made between France and those powers who had been induced
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to take up arms against us, not from choice, but necessity; and it was besides suitable to the noble and generous feelings of the English nation to employ at all times language as healing and conciliatory as possible.—Another topic of the speech on which he had one observation to make, was contained in that paragraph which related to the king of Sweden, and where his majesty is made to express a hope that the house will feel with him the sacredness of the duty which the firmness and fidelity of that monarch had imposed upon him, and that it would concur in enabling his majesty to discharge it in a manner worthy of this country. If engagements had been contracted with the king of Sweden, lie had no doubt of the readiness of the house to enable his majesty to fulfil them. But if it was in contemplation to grant pecuniary subsidies to that monarch, he thought the house ought to pause before it sanctioned such an application of the public money. For, in the course of two or three months they might see gentlemen rising up on the opposite side, and speaking of him in terms similar to those which they had this evening heard applied to the emperor of Russia. It was in the recollection of every one present, that a very short time ago panegyrics, quite as highly coloured as those now bestowed on the king of Sweden, had been lavished upon the emperor Alexander, when he was represented as magnanimous, generous, disinterested, in short, every thing that was great and good. Here, too, it was possible, that he might be wrong, but all that he wished was that the house should not give any pledge till they were in possession of the information necessary to regulate their judgment.—The house, he asserted, was equally destitute of information upon the question relative to America and neutral nations, and, till this information was granted, he had no wish to anticipate their opinion. He should only observe generally, that he should be willing and ready at all times to support any measures which might be found necessary for the assertion of our honour, or the maintenance of our interest.—There was another topic of much importance which might have been introduced into the speech, but respecting which it was wholly silent, namely, the present state of Ireland. On this subject not one word was said, though there was certainly none to which it was more the duty of ministers to call the attention of parliament. He

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hoped, however, that it was their intention to supply this omission, in the course of the session of parliament. He was fully sensible of the importance which every measure of a public nature derived from coming directly from the servants of the crown; and he hoped that much time would not elapse before they came forward with some proposition calculated to quiet those apprehensions which were at this moment, he was afraid, equally general and well founded.—Having said these few words, he professed to have no intention of taking the sense of the house upon the address. Upon questions where they were wholly without information, it would be absurd to call upon it to express an opinion. And as to the affair of Copenhagen, he promised that he would, on a future occasion, move for the production of the necessary documents, so that it might at least be fairly brought under discussion. All that he wished now was, not to be understood as approving of it; and the remarks he had made were intended chiefly to prevent his being told afterwards, that by consenting to the address he had precluded himself from any future investigation of this important topic. Certainly, no event had occurred in the course of the last century the cause of which so loudly called for inquiry. He hoped that ministers had conducted themselves in a manner deserving the approbation of the people of England; if not, he was well assured that the country would not submit to the obloquy of a disgraceful transaction.
Mr. Milnessaid, that in offering his sentiments on the present occasion to the house, he should endeavour, as much as possible, to compress closely, as well the ideas which he conceived himself, as those which had been suggested to him by others. Though the gentlemen on the other side had contemned many of the measures adverted to in the speech from the throne, it had not been asserted by any one, that they had not been completely successful; and, whatever they might think of the principle upon which those measures were founded, they could not but consider, it fortunate for the country, that they had, by success, proved beneficial to its interests. He could without difficulty, concur in the address, because he had no hesitation in giving his entire approbation to the conduct of his majesty's government. If ministers had, since the termination of the last session of parliament, performed so many essential services to the nation, if they had crowded,
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as had been well and ably stated by his hon. friend, if he would allow him to call him so, into so short a space of time, a greater number of important events than had ever in the compass of a similar period been accomplished, and certainly than had been effected by the administration which preceded them in office, he could not possibly feel any difficulty in supporting the address which expressed approbation of their measures. He looked upon it to be no inconsiderable test of the unobjectionable nature of the address, that neither the sagacity of the hon. member, who had just sat down, nor of the noble lord who preceded him, could select any one point to which they could seriously object. But, when the speech comprehended, as it did, so many and such various topics, respecting Russia, Austria, Denmark, Portugal, and Sweden, it was extremely easy for any gentlemen to comment upon a separate point, on which each might leave that house indulging the high ambition, that his had been the speech which remained unanswered. And when ministers were to be called to account for what they had clone, it must follow that those who should do the most, would have the most to answer for. He would agree with the right honourable gentleman opposite, that it would be impolitic to adopt any measure by which the character of the country might be affected, if the powers of Europe retained their independence, or if the government of Denmark could have been considered free to follow that course which its honour and interest dictated. But no gentleman would contend, that there was a power on the continent which could have resisted the mandates of the enemy. The question respecting the Danish expedition had been considered by the right hon. gent. with reference to two general propositions; first, whether the necessity justified the measure; and secondly, whether the conviction of his majesty's ministers respecting that necessity, was sufficient to justify them. The first had been stated by the noble lord (Milton,) the latter by the right hon. gent. who had just sat down. it was the first duty of ministers to act upon the necessity, and it was equally their duty to use their discretion in judging of that necessity, and if, in acting upon it, they were to err at all, it was much better that, they should err upon the side of public security. He should not then enter into an argument to show that government were

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justified in acting upon probabilities, because that doctrine was consonant with the law of nations, if any public law had survived the subjugation of the powers of the continent, or if there was now any rule for the conduct of nations to be found in Europe but that of the Napoleon code. He had lately met with a passage in Vattel which fully justified that principle. The passage he alluded to stated, "that when the security of a nation was threatened, its government should act upon reasonable presumption," and concluded with asserting, "that too scrupulous an attention to justice in times of danger, paved the way to slavery." So far the authority of this great civilian justified the conduct of his majesty's ministers. On the ground of confidence alone he should be disposed to concur in the address, though ministers had not submitted the sources of their secret information either to the curiosity of that house, or to the vengeance of Bonaparte. But though he could give his vote for the address on the ground of confidence as to their secret information, he yet felt, that he could justify the conduct of ministers upon facts which were accessible to them all. If Denmark had been really worse disposed to this country than she was, would she not have pursued precisely the same course she had followed? Would she not have delayed her Declaration till she was fully prepared, and reserved some causes of complaint, till she might seasonably make them the ground of might hostility? We were not to expect any explicit declaration of their motives from powers under the influence of France. Denmark had acted precisely as she would have done if she had entered into the views of our enemy, and this was a sufficient ground for the measures adopted by ministers. The extraordinary concentration of French troops on the frontiers of Holstein, and the submission of Denmark to the decrees of France, and her remonstrances against our maritime rights, together With her active and formidable naval equipments, were sufficient evidences of her submission to Bonaparte. Another ground of his confidence in ministers was derived from a view of the state of Europe. Let us pass over every other evidence, said the hon. gent. and look only at Europe, confederated as she is against us; to Prussia, Whose Declaration against England France hardly thought it necessary to conceal in the hard conditions of her peace; to Russia, who,
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under great disguise, still found no protection from French controul in her unbroken strength; to Portugal, who equally found none in her weakness and compliance; and to Austria, who, without any maritime interests, seemed forced into this maritime league only to finish and round off this confederacy, to supply whatever was this night wanting in arguing from the analogy of the rest of Europe, and to show how miserable indeed was the deception, if Denmark ever imagined that she alone of every other state was to be exempted from the invasion of her neutrality. With a large navy, with a more extended commerce, and with the keys of the Baltic in her hands, would Buonaparte have allowed her to remain as a monument of reproach to the vassalage of surrounding countries, and to have broken the continuity of the chain which binds every shore of Europe?—He ought not to quit the subject without bestowing a remark on the opinion of the noble lord (Milton), that the expedition should be condemned, because the Crown Prince of Denmark was in Holstein, and his forces unprepared. Strange as that sentiment might be, it excited no surprise in his mind. It was a specimen of the politics of the school of which the noble lord was the disciple, or perhaps leader; arid when a noble lord (H. Petty) announced that their leading policy was "nos rebus servamus secundis," or that they would never assist a friend till he was in a condition not want it, he could not but think the advice of the noble lord perfectly natural, that we should never resist an enemy till he is, in a condition to despise our resistance.—The hon. gent. insisted, that the more concealed the attempt, the greater necessity there was to guard against its mischievous tendency, by a prompt and vigorous defeat of it. The treaty of Tilsit had fixed and bound the emperor of Russia fast to the views and measures of Buonaparte; every act of his, since the execution of that treaty, had daily and hourly evinced his increasing adherence to his plans and designs against this country. The right hon. gent. had declined to enter into any argument on the subject of the Rutsian mediation, because information had been promised to be laid before the house; and also on the conduct of the courts of Vienna and Berlin, because he should move for information on those subjects on a future day. He would not, therefore, take up the time of the house, by entering

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further on either of those topics at present; but he would observe, that he had no doubt on his mind, but that the conduct of both those powers had been actuated and guided by the predominant and overbearing influence of Buonaparte, who would not suffer any power on the continent to continue at peace and amity with us; and therefore he thought ministers were no ways culpable on account of the recent conduct of those governments. He then adverted to the dispute with America, and hoped that the good sense of the moderate and thinking people in that country would so far influence its government, as that matters might still be brought to a fair and reasonable accommodation. His majesty's present ministers had on their part shewn every desire to do away every cause of complaint as far as they could, without making a sacrifice of our most important rights. Mr. M. then wept into the various questions of Russia, Portugal, and Denmark. These were the various topics, which arose out of the Address; they with him bespoke individually the prudence and activity of ministers, and presented in the aggregate a prospect the most satisfactory. What might be the issue of these our endeavours, whether peace or war, he could not say; if war, we had the hope of similar success; if peace, the consciousness that we had earned it. That peace, of which they had that night heard so much, he would entrust to the hands of ministers. They would on the one hand perceive and estimate, what the sincerest lover of peace must admit to be discouraging; that peace, in its most flattering aspect, would be little more than a suspension of hostilities, and that no formal act of government could root out rancour and stifle jealousy; and if therefore we did return the sword, that our hand must never quit the hilt, and above all, feeling that Bonaparte would in his terms wish to question our maritime supremacy, a patrimony entailed upon us, and therefore not matter of negociation, they would judge how far a peace was promising under such appearances. He repeated it, that were Bonaparte to abdicate his throne, and depose all his minion princes, were he to restore to France her legal government, and to Europe the balance of power, they would not in his mind be equivalent for the sacrifice of our command at sea, or justify ministers in dishonouring this unattainted title, by which we style ourselves Englishmen. On the other hand, he trusted that ministers were fully
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awake to the exigencies, that they required no speeches or petitions to tell them that privations must be numerous, and the pressure deplorably severe. He hoped ministers wanted not to be told that peace had fewer calamities than war. And, in vindication of that part of the country with which he was locally connected, he would say, that if the noble lord (Milton) supposed that that public voice was meant only to express the existence of misfortunes which all in part felt, he was sure he was right; if he meant to say that it was connected with airy political opinion whatever, as sure was he that he was wrong. Under these impressions, he should give his unqualified support to the Address.
Mr. Whitbread,whatever might have been his disposition not to trouble the house with any observations on the present occasion, could not remain silent after the speech of the hon. gent. who had just sat down. However he might respect the talents of that hon. member, and the discernment with which he applied those talents in commenting on the eloquence of those who had preceded him, he could not agree with him in his observation, imputing a defect of sagacity to his right hon. friend (Mr. Ponsonby), than whom no man possessed that faculty in a more eminent degree. Neither the hon. gent. with all his talents, nor all the concentrated talents of Europe, could overturn the eternal principles of justice which his right hon. friend had asserted. The hon. gent. had quoted a passage from Vattel, in justification of the expedition to Copenhagen; but this passage would not apply to the defence of a measure so cruel and unjust in its principles, and which he feared would prove so baneful in its consequences to this country. He agreed with his right hon. friend, that it was possible it might be justified, and he hoped he would follow up the notice he had given for papers to ascertain that point. The hon. member who had seconded the address, and for whom he entertained a high respect, had talked of the private morality of the nation; but he wondered that hon. gent. did not blush for the right hon. gentlemen below him, when making that observation. Had this country, which had been so long calling upon the Living God in defence of morality and social order, now at length found out that its conduct was wrong, and that Bonaparte, who had been all that time worshipping Baal, was right? By the attack upon Denmark we had gained fifteen

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or sixteen hulks, but had excited an inextinguishable hatred in the breasts of the Danes, and given the whole maritime population of that country to France. It was urged, that the attack, was made in order to prevent Denmark from joining France; but had it not shut us out from that country, and thrown its whole resources into the arms of France? Ministers asserted that they had some information of the designs of Denmark, which they kept back, but which justified their conduct. From his heart he believed they had none, but if they had, they owed it to the house to produce it. The hon. gent. under the gallery (Mr. Milnes) had asserted, that the collection of the Danish army on the frontiers of Holstein was a proof of the understanding between the court of Copenhagen and the courts of Russia and France. But if Denmark had leagued with Russia and France, was it not more likely that she would have collected her army in Zealand to resist the attack of the power against whom she had formed a connection? Upon this point they had assertion against assertion, and he had no hesitation in saying, that he believed the assertion of the prince royal of Denmark in preference to that of his majesty's ministers; and here he must express his regret, that the noble lord who had moved the address, should have given way to an insulting taunt upon that gallant prince. If his courage had not been already tried, if he had not steadily persevered in the principles upon which he had professed to act during the present war, and shewn that in his country's defence he was insensible to personal fear, such observations might have been well timed. He could not but remark here, upon the language in general applied to powers who had been in alliance with us, and were afterwards compelled to side with our enemy. The emperor of Russia had not made peace with France from a feeling of despondency, but from hard necessity, similar to that which led to the peace of Presburgh. He was sorry that the hon. gent. had alluded to any consequences that might result from the effect of the Treaty of Tilsit upon the people of Russia. He had seen, with regret, similar allusions some time since in the public prints, and he mentioned the circumstance then, only to shew his reprobation of that practice. Much more might be said on the subject of the Danish expedition, but he should reserve what he had to say till another opportunity.—There was one point in the
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speech which had not been touched upon by his right hon. friend, that he thought deserving of notice, namely, the credit taken by ministers for the emigration of the court of Lisbon. This was an event which he believed might in time be beneficial to his country, but that ministers had any credit for the arrangements made for that purpose, he could not see any ground to admit. The hon. gent. must be aware, that the prince of Brazils had a short time before his departure from Lisbon, issued a proclamation for shutting his ports against this country, and uniting with the continent to procure a maritime peace. It was not until the appearance of an article in the Moniteur, declaring that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign, that the prince determined to emigrate, and lord Strangford, after having quitted Lisbon, for the first time met the prince on his voyage. With all his admiration of the talents of the noble mover of the address, and of the hon. gent. who had just sat down, he could not concur in the principles they had that night laid down. They were very young men, and might live to witness the advantages this country, if it should survive the vigour of the present ministers, would derive from the emigration of that prince to the Brazils; for his part he was satisfied he should never live to see it, fir he did not expect such sudden effects from the bare emigration of the court. On this score he thought the ministers had no merit, and were intitled to no approbation. With respect to the attack upon Denmark, they had, in his opinion, great demerit, because that attack was cruel and unjust without any necessity, and if he thought that the address would pledge him to any approbation of it, he would not fear to take the sense of the house upon it. It was with concern, he observed, that there was no allusion whatever in the speech to a prospect of peace. Gentlemen were in possession of his sentiments upon the subject of peace, and he was free to repeat, that in the negotiation which had taken place lately with France, that object was lost, not because France was always wrong, but because England was frequently wrong, and that many opportunities of effecting peace had been lost. The time would come, when the documents respecting the discussions with the courts of Russia and Vienna would be produced. He should say, however, in the mean time, that, if ministers would yield to common sense and prudence, a peace

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compatible with the honour and interests of this country might be obtained. He knew not whether the disposition of the people of this country was for peace or for war, but he would assert, that the late Orders of Council would be found to produce great inconvenience to the great mass of the people. If any felt this inconvenience, it was their birth-right to express their sense, and the constitutional course was by petition. He not only would not repress it, but, if the disposition of his majesty's ministers should not incline them to peace, would think them justifiable in petitioning for the removal of such ministers, in order to make way for others more disposed to peace. Peace, in his opinion, was necessary to the salvation of the country; but he would rather that the country should perish, than submit to a dishonourable peace.—As to Ireland, he regretted, with his right hon. friend, that no allusion had been made to that country. Ministers, notwithstanding all their vigour, must have been sufficiently urged upon that subject by men acquainted with the country, during the recess. If something was not done for Ireland, the security of the empire would be put to hazard. At the same time he agreed with his right hon. friend, that they should have patience, and not press the subject precipitately forward, in the hope that ministers would in time take it into consideration. On the subject of America he should not say much, as his majesty's ministers seemed to hold out a hope, that our differences with that country would be amicably accommodated. When gentlemen talked of the prosperity of the country, and of the productiveness of the income tax, and. the flourishing state of our resources, he would ask, whether an indefinite war would not be ruin? We should not go on in a blind security, that death would never come. We had fought 15 years against France, and reduced all the powers of Europe, except Sweeden, to a state of subserviency to France, to a power, the greatest the world ever saw, and governed by an individual, as able to wield that power as any person the world ever produced. He begged to deprecate the use of acrimonious language towards a power with which we must, sooner or later negociate. He should not, trespass longer on the attention of the house, as he should have opportunities of delivering his sentiments at length, when the separate, points should come under discussion.
Mr. Secretary Canningexpressed some
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surprize that the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Ponsonby) should have required time to marshal his arguments, with a view to convince any small portion of persons who might be persuaded to agree with him in his opinion upon the matter of the address. The intention of that right hon. gent. to postpone delivering his sentiments upon that subject, was undoubtedly, in some degree, embarrassing to those who differed from him. But m the state in which the fact then was, when the debate, however protracted, could lead to no decision, and in the confidence of his impression, that a great majority of that house thought as he did on thin occasion, he should indeed be culpable if he went into a great length of discussion in the, present instance. But, as the gentlemen opposite had thought proper to state to the house the course they meant to pursue, he felt it a respect due to the house, to state the manner in which, in all probability, their arguments would be met, when the discussion should come on. He did not mean to undervalue the talents of the right hon gent. opposite (Mr. Ponsonby), but it would be rather surprising, if he alone of all those who had filled the place which it seemed he was now to occupy, should require a day's preparation to deliver his sentiments upon topics on which the mind of the public had been long made up. The right hon. gent. had stated also, as a ground of delay, that the communications respecting the intercourse between his majesty's ministers, and the courts of Austria, and Russia, were necessary for their discussion; but the right hon. gent. seemed to understand these communications in a larger sense than the words of the speech would warrant. By what had fallen from the right hon. gent. he seemed to expect voluminous documents respecting treaties with those courts; but on a reference to the words of the speech, he would find that they referred only to official Notes, which passed between his majesty's minister and the Russian and Austrian ministers. If the right hon. gent. should think that his majesty's ministers were justified in not accepting the mediation offered, until they could ascertain whether the power offering it was in a situation to mediate impartially, and the Notes to be produced should prove that fact, he hoped for his approbation of their conduct, in not consenting to treat till they should know upon what basis—a question that had occupied three months

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in the late negotiation. As to Austria, she had never assigned any cause for her hostility to this country, and this fact would appear from the documents to be produced.—With respect to the motion of which the right hon. gent. had given notice, for papers relative to the expedition to Copenhagen, it was very possible he might move for some information which might safely be produced. But if he should, for the purpose of removing, as he represented it, the foulest stain that ever attached to the annals of any nation, Move for the secret information upon which that expedition was undertaken, as far as his judgment went, he believed he would never have ocular conviction. The right hon. gent. was at a loss to imagine why this secret intelligence was not published. But he would assure that right hon. gent. that as the fact now stood, and as it would be made out in argument, ministers would trust to it for their justification, and never expose the source of their secret intelligence. If this subject was again to be brought into discussion, he begged to state, that he would prove the measure not to have been unprecedented, and though the conduct of his majesty's ministers might be held up in a few speeches in that house to the execration of the country, they would run than risk and incur that penalty, rather than suffer the secret to be torn from their bosoms. But, was this the moment when such documents were to be called for? Was it possible, at a time when there was no capital on the continent where the power of Bonaparte could not drag the offender against him to execution; when there was no British accredited agent in any country of Europe, was it possible, that such a time should be fixed on for divulging the sources of secret intelligence? Was this country to say to the agents, who served it from fidelity, or from less worthy motives, you shall serve us but once, and your life shall be the forfeit? He should contend, as his hon. friends had done, that the arrangements at Tilsit, and the measures which ensued, without any document, fully justified the measures of government. He should be glad to know what motives could be ascribed to his majesty's ministers for acting as they had done, if not from the conviction of the necessity of the case. He could easily conceive a factious motive for imputing to them an intentional delusion of the public, but he was confident he
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could make out a full justification, though he thought it right to state before hand that no force should extort from them, the secret source of their intelligence. If any doubts could be entertained of the designs of Bonaparte, thus far he could tell the hon. gentlemen, that the communications from the Portuguese government related as well to the Danish as to the Portuguese navy. What had happened in Portugal was sufficient to convince every fair thinking man of the truth of the information respecting Denmark, and the wisdom of the steps taken upon that information. In taking those steps, the present ministers had the example of their predecessors before them. It was only necessary to apply to Denmark the principle they had applied to Portugal, to threaten and coerce secret enemies, or at least suspicious neutrals, instead of old and faithful allies. The same cause that prevented parliament from possessing similar information respecting most o the other projects of the late ministers, prevented it from possessing the documents respecting the expedition of earl St. Vincent to Lisbon, namely the failure of the plan. The traces however were to be found in the Foreign Office. The instructions were the same, but the issue was different.—With respect to the late proceedings at Lisbon, it was necessary for the country to know, that the court of Lisbon always made an unreserved communication to his majesty's representatives, of the full extent of the demands of France, as well as of the extent to which it was disposed to comply with those demands, rather than proceed to the last extremity; and of the point beyond which it would refuse compliance, let the refusal be accompanied with what risk it might. These communications were accompanied with an assurance, that in no case should the persons of British subjects, or their property, be injured or violated. Under those circumstances his majesty's government thought it right to allow some latitude for obtaining by negociation, and particularly by chewing the vigorous determination of Great Britain, the forbearance of France. Even though some doubt might have been entertained of the stability of the good faith of Portugal, it seemed better to run all risks; and the issue had justified the determination. With respect to sending an army to defend Portugal, we had the assurance of a most able officer, that no army Great Britain could send would be adequate to that object, and

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the presence of such an army was deprecated by the prince Regent, as tending to precipitate his ruin. A secret treaty, signed in Oct. last, bound the Portuguese government not to admit a French garrison into the Portuguese forts, and to protect the persons and properties of English subjects. This treaty was faithfully executed on the part of Portugal. It was a fact, that a French fierce had entered Portugal, and had advanced some way before the fact was made known to the head of the Portuguese government; and this was at the moment when the known presence of such a force on the frontiers, and a promise that it would forbear to enter, had induced the prince Regent to shut the ports against the English, and to seize the small remains of British property that were to be found. This proceeding called forth some degree of hostile retaliation on our part, which was abandoned as soon as the discovery of the actual invasion of Portugal by the French led the Portuguese government to see that its only chance of safety was in the alliance and under the protection of Great Britain. The advantage of this conduct was felt. in the emigration of the Portuguese government, in perfect friendship and alliance with Great Britain, to the Brazils, and yesterday, more immediately, on the arrival of the dispatches announcing the surrender of Madeira to this country. There was, certainly, reason to believe that there was treachery in some part of the Portuguese government, and to that part must be attributed the occasional prevalence of French interest, and the concealment of the advance of part of the French army, at a time when assurances were given that it would not pass the frontiers.—It was remarkable, that while the application of force at Copenhagen was condemned by the gentlemen opposite, the non-application of it at Lisbon was censured no less severely; but so it would have been if the force had been 'applied at Lisbon, and negotiation at Copenhagen. Censure would have still followed the force and the negotiation. Copenhagen, then, would have been lost by foolish confidence, and Portugal outraged by unprincipled and impolitic violence. A French army could not have reached Lisbon in less than five or six weeks; but a French army was on the very frontier of Holstein, ready to overrun that province, and to enter Zealand immediately after. The Danish army was not in a condition to resist; the, compromise of shutting the ports and surrendering
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the fleet was of course to be looked for, and then the confidence in Denmark would have been commented on as weak and imbecile as the confidence in Portugal was said to be at present. It was strange that this proceeding with respect to Copenhagen was objected to by the very men who advised the occupation of Madeira without the consent of the Portuguese government in the year 1801. That measure was viewed with as much indignation by the Portuguese government then, as the seizure of the Danish fleet was now by the court of Denmark. Certainly, the repugnance was as much justified on principle; but the Portuguese government itself had since recognized the justice and propriety of the proceeding; for Portugal herself could not have preserved the Island from falling into the hands of France—With respect to the points of mediation and peace, he had no objection to discuss those also at the present moment. Though there was reason after the Treaty of Tilsit, for this country to entertain a more hostile policy towards Russia, every thing that friendship and conciliation could dictate was done to the last moment, when the hostile Declaration came with as much surprize upon Petersburgh as it did upon London. So it was also with respect to Austria. No complaint, no remonstrance, no discussion had preceded the recal of the ambassador of that power; not even so much as a notice: so it was also with respect to the recal of the Prussian Ambassador; and here he felt himself called upon to contradict an insinuation in the Moniteur, which charged baron Jacobi with giving to the court of London the secret information respecting the proceedings of the French government in Prussia, when the fact was, that this information came from a British minister. With respect to the late supposed negotiation for peace, no tangible overture had been made by the French, or the Austrian government. Prince Stahremberg, with that generosity of character for which he Was so distinguished, had made an offer of his personal services to institute and establish a pacific intercourse. But that was not the mode of negociation which could be satisfactory to a country like this. The gentlemen at the other side sneered, as if they knew more than he did on this subject. There had been a period within his memory, when the minister of a party had braved the king's minister in a foreign court [alluding to Mr. Adair's

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conduct at St. Petersburgh, during Mr. Pitt's first administration], but he hoped such an instance would never occur again, and he would not advise any one to try it. The expedition to Constantinople had been instituted at the recommendation of Russia, as a diversion which, it was said, must be successful, if accompanied with troops. No troops were sent, and it was unsuccessful. There being no object for the further continuance of hostility, a negociation for peace with the Porte was commenced, in conjunction with Russia, and the Treaty was far advanced when Russia broke off from us, to negociate under the influence of France, and thus induced the Porte to break off the negociation with us.—With respect to the only remaining independent state, namely, Sweden, it was our duty to invigorate, inspire, and support it, rather than to excite doubt and despondency. He should say more on this subject in a few days, when he should probably have to bring down a message from his majesty, calling on the house to make provision for subsidiary engagements w hick were about to be concluded with the king of Sweden, and which would be communicated to the house of course.—With respect to the differences with America, it had been thought right, frankly and voluntarily to disavow the unauthorised act of hostility towards the Chesapeake. The provocation the officer who had committed that act had received, went far to excuse him: but the right of searching ships of war had never been acted upon long or to any extent, and in later times it had not been acted upon at all. It was, therefore, thought right to abandon this unfounded pretension unequivocally; but in doing so, his majesty's ministers were determined not to concede a point of what the strict and established right of Great Britain, and the usage of nations justified, and required the British government to support. With respect to the late Orders of Council, retaliating the restrictions of the French government upon our commerce, he maintained our right to go as far as France, and that it was only by making France feel the effects of her own injustice, that we could hope to bring her to more reasonable conduct. The vigour of the British navy when put forth with a determination which the moderate spirit of the government had hitherto restrained, would prove equal to cope with the power that France had established on the land. It would appear, that if France combined all the
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powers of the continent to oppress us, the effect was but to increase our strength and energy, and to make us triumph under oppression. He had thought it right to say thus much now, in explanation of the grounds he meant to go upon when the several questions should come to be more particularly discussed hereafter.
Lord Henry Pettysaid, that whatever merit as to style, the speech ascribed to his majesty might possess, it wanted the more vulgar but more important merit of a full statement of facts. It was a singular instance to be in a state of war with a power against which there were no documents to prove an hostile act. The only reason stated for refusing information was, that those who had communicated the intelligence might be thereby injured. But, all the mischief that could be occasioned by this had been done already, for ministers had in a public Declaration stated, that they had intelligence as to the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit. It was extraordinary in those who had, about a year and a half ago, exposed the ministers of different courts to animadversion, by their communications, to be so scrupulous on this point. With regard to the expedition to Lisbon sent out by the late ministers, it was curious enough to hear it said, that it had failed, merely because its object had been attained without the violence employed against Denmark. if lord St. Vincent had proceeded as ministers had done, where would now have been their golden dream as to the Brazils? He wished for no. better parallel than the instructions which had been given to lord St. Vincent, compared with those given to lord Cathcart, and he wished the right hon. secretary would move for them. He contended that the principles of right and wrong were to be considered in politics as well as in philosophy, and on these they must reason generally till a particular case was made out. It became those, who checked petitions for peace, to take care that no opportunity of negotiation should be let slip, merely on points of form. We ought to examine with jealousy into the subsidiary connection with Sweden. He agreed in the propriety of keeping the affair of the Chesapeake distinct from other points, and. in the necessity of maintaining our essential rights; but we ought, at the same time, to guard against unnecessary irritation, and to beware of being led away by the name of vigour, so as to inflict a severe blow on our own commerce. The noble

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lord expressed his regret, that there should be so little in the speech respecting the temporary policy as to Denmark, and nothing at all as to the permanent policy intended to be pursued towards Ireland.
Mr. Bathurstadmitted, that if it could be proved, that there were secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit hostile to this country, and his majesty had information of them, the justification of ministers would be complete. But it would be too much to take all this for granted on the bare assertion of ministers. It was singular, that while the arguments were suspended, we were called upon to come to an immediate conclusion. He contended, that all the danger that could arise from a communication of the particulars of the intelligence, had been incurred already. He was surprized that those who had examined whether Portugal could be defended against France, had not also inquired into the practicability of defending Zealand, and whether the Danes were able and disposed to defend themselves. He certainly thought that ministers were hound, in their justification, to shew a good cause, or produce some document or information which might lead the house to discover that there was good ground for the expedition to Copenhagen.
Mr. Duckettspoke in favour of the address. If the occupation of Alexandria was justifiable, so was that of Denmark. The only difference was, not in the principle, but in the issue. The expedition to Alexandria had proved injudicious and disastrous, and that to Copenhagen wise and successful.
Mr. Windhamconsidered the Address, in that part which related to the Copenhagen expedition, without evidence to support the necessity of the measure, as one of the most outrageous proceedings that ever was attempted in parliament. Absolute necessity Might justify any thing; but, as far as the evidence went, the effect of it was to shew, that no such necessity existed. There were two points of view in which this question was to be considered: first, the justice of it; and, secondly; supposing the thing to be just, the policy of it. It might be, that the proof of each was the same. By sheaving the measure to be necessary, you would, at the same time, shew it to be just. But, the proofs required might be separate. There might be circumstances, which would, strictly speaking, give you a right to do what you have done, which yet
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would be very far from rendering such a step either prudent or advisable. Such, he was ready to maintain, was actually the case here. Whatever became of the question of right, on which he would agree to suspend his judgment till further information, he had no hesitation in pronouncing at the present moment, that the measure was wholly unwise and impolitic. He would suppose that the hon. gentlemen could make out a case of right; he would suppose further, what was a separate supposition, and still inure remote from what he conceived to be the truth, that they could make out a clear case of right; that they could prove to a certainty, that if the fleet and stores had not been seized as they were, they would inevitably and speedily have fallen into the hands of Bonaparte: still, he should say, rather let him have them in the circumstances in which he must have taken them, than we in the circumstances in which we have taken them. This was his opinion, and this, he was persuaded, notwithstanding the flattering hopes indulged by the honourable seconder of the motion, would soon become the opinion of the greater part, if not of the whole, of the nation. They were now running riot,—those of them to whom the question of right and the effect on the national honour were objects of no concern—and were indulging in the contemplation of the plunder they had acquired; but this satisfaction would be of short duration; the time would soon come, when they would be called upon to pay the penalty of their misdeeds; when the stores would be used up, the ships be worn out or lost, and new stores and new ships have been supplied in their room to the arsenals and dock-yards of Denmark; and when they, the perpetrators of the acts in question, would be left only with the shame of what they had done, and the serious and lasting consequences, which. that shame would bring along with it:
"Then comes the reckoning, when the banquet's o'er,
The dreadful reckoning, and men smile no more."
We had acted upon this occasion, from the impulse of a principle, often, one of the most improvident and short-sighted, namely, that of fear; and had looked only to our temporary and partial, instead of to our general and permanent interest. Nothing could be snore transitory than the advantages that we had gained; nothing more durable than the evils at the price of which these advantages had been pur-

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chased. The objects themselves were not less disproportionate. We had got ships, and we had lost men: we had gained a navy, but we had lost a nation. Never more were we to look to the Danes for any thing but the most deep-rooted ill-will, the most inflamed and bitter enmity. What was of still more consequence than even the friendship or enmity of any people, however powerful, we should have lost the, fair fame and character of the country.—In all this we had been imitating that very conduct of the enemy, which, hitherto, it had been our constant and just object to expose and decry; our imitation, too, was just of a sort to give us a full share in the disgrace without any share in the benefit. We were increasing the power of Bonaparte instead of diminishing it. The course of proceeding in conducting the present business through the house was not less to be remarked on. We were to decide the question to night and argue the merits of it afterwards.—The right hon. gent. ridiculed the idea, that any Credit was to be given to the present ministers for the step taken by the court of Portugal, when their own narrative stated the resolution to have been taken, and the purpose executed, in the absence of our minister, and without his knowledge. He should have thought that the right hon. gent. so prone to ridicule others, would have seen the ridicule that must redound upon himself, should he attempt to set up any such claim.
The Chancellor of the Exchequerdenied that ever his majesty's ministers had said they were in possession of the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit. The expression imputed to them was in his majesty's Declaration, in answer to the Manifesto of Russia, in which it was stated that it was not unknown to his majesty, that secret articles had been agreed on in that Treaty, for either obliging this country to accept an ignominious and insecure peace, or forming a confederacy of all the naval powers of Europe against England, and more especially those of Denmark and Portugal. His majesty's ministers had a communication of the substance of those Secret articles from the most unquestionable authority: and, assured as they were of the truth of that communication, they would have incurred the deepest criminality and disgrace, had they waited until an evil had actually occurred so perilous to our naval superiority and very existence itself. In his mind the best criterion of
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the authenticity of the communication, and the conduct of government thereupon, was, to advert to the antecedent conduct of the present ruler of France, in seducing or forcing every other power on the continent into a confederacy with him against this country; and when we then considered his means of attacking Denmark with a powerful army in Holstein, was it not probable that he would avail himself of his power of oppressing Denmark, and possess himself of her ships, which, though they were now. in our hands, and might decay in 20 years, would not have decayed in his hands before the opening of the spring, when, in all probability, they would have been employed in carrying troops for the invasion of Ireland. But, there was another proof which had since occurred to, support the veracity of the intelligence respecting the secret articles at Tilsit, on which the government had acted towards Copenhagen; namely, the attack on Portugal, and the march of a French army for the invasion of that country, and the seizure of its fortresses and its fleet. The latter, however, was happily preserved by the measures adopted by government, founded upon one and the same communication; and would any man venture to say, that if this communication had not been promptly acted upon, that both those fleets would not have been this day in the possession of France?
Mr. Sheridanrose and spoke as follows:—I never entered this house, sir, with so little expectation of having occasion to trespass on its attention as I did this day; and until I heard the speech of the right hon. gentleman who has just sat down, I never felt the least disposition to obtrude upon its notice. But, sir, I would now, while that speech is yet tingling in our ears, and fresh in our memories, call the observation of this house to the pitiful, petty-fogging, quibbling justification set up by his majesty's minister, upon a proceeding, in which the character and the renown of this country are so materially involved. Have his majesty's ministers any know ledge of the facts upon which they pretend to justify the proceedings against Copenhagen? Have they any authentic documents to spew to the house for their vindication upon a transaction so outrageous and unprecedented? No, says the right hon. gentleman, we have not the contents of the secret articles at Tilsit, but we are in possession of the substance.

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Sir, if they have the substance, why have they not produced it? If you produce the article itself, you might certainly endanger your informant; but, by giving in the substance, you expose him to no danger whatever. Sir, the right hon. gentleman has assumed, this day, a tone which ill becomes the cause he has to defend: he mocks our moderation; and he asks my right hon. friend, "why don't you move an amendment?" and he puts this, give me leave to say, rather in an insulting tone; and talks to my right hon. friend (Mr. G. Ponsonby) of what he calls "the commencement of his career in leading an opposition." Sir, the right hon. gentleman seems to have forgot the short time that he himself has been a leader of the administration he now directs, or that he is somewhat in his novitiate in a situation, his fitness for which may require the test of some probationary years. It don't become him, sir, to assume such a, deportment towards my right hon. friend; but I hope my right hon. friend will take a lesson front his suggestion and propose an amendment, for which it is not yet too late, and the amendment I would suggest would be to leave out of the address the whole of the paragraph which relates to Denmark; as, after what I have heard this night, I have strong objections to go to a decision upon that part of the Address until I see fuller information before the house. I do declare, sir, that I entered the house this night with a strong disposition to support his majesty's ministers in the specific measure respecting Copenhagen, because I took for granted they were ready to lay before parliament the most irrefragable proofs of imperious necessity to justify the proceeding. But, sir, from what I have heard, my disposition is materially altered. I heard a young and eloquent member (the mover) in his speech this night, assert that the mind of the country Was made up on the subject. I own my mind was made up to a certain degree, because I hoped ministers would not have suffered themselves to be so critically involved, if they could not prove the absolute necessity under which they felt themselves obliged to resort strong measure for the defence of their country; and therefore, sir, if they can prove that necessity, to justify the proceeding against Denmark, I shall be perfectly ready to give them on this occasion my most cordial support. But how is the house to say the measure was justifiable? We have it, indeed, from
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the sacred lips of his majesty,, that he was in possession of the proofs of a secret understanding and collusion between Russia and Denmark to form a confederacy with France against this country. But have his majesty's ministers attempted to shew this by any proof, not even approaching to legal evidence? It was upon the reliance that they could adduce such proof that I was disposed to support them, because I really did not imagine, that without the most irrefragable proofs of the necessity, they would have proceeded to measures which otherwise must be considered a gross outrage upon every principle and feeling held sacred amongst mankind: for had such proofs really existed, I do not hesitate to say they would have been fully justified, in such a proceeding, to keep the fleet of Denmark out of the grasp of the French ruler. In such a case self preservation is paramount to all other considerations. Fiat justitia ruat coelum,' sir, is a principle I admire as much as any man. But if I am to maintain this principle towards a power who refuses all adherence to it, and if I am, in that spirit, to look tamely on, while my enemy seizes from a defenceless power a fleet which I am satisfied he is determined to employ in direct hostility against me; I say that to adhere to the maxim on my part would be Fiat stultitia, ruat patriam.' I say, prove such an intention and I am satisfied. But what is the proof offered? His majesty's minister says, no! you shall have no proofs; I can give you none without betraying the confidence of my spy, and he will be exposed to suffer. But, sir, in such a case, is his majesty's minister to tell this house, "though the character of the country is staked upon this issue, I will give you no proofs—and you must take my word." Why, sir, is this a ground to justify this house in voting implicit approbation to a measure of such evidence? I think not: and I say that I for one will not now believe it; although I did not suppose it possible that his majesty's ministers would have ventured to prostitute the sacred authority of his majesty's name to cover an assumption which they could not adduce one tittle of evidence to substantiate. I do not want, sir, to annex any authority to the expressions of the French government on this occasion. But I find in his majesty's Declaration that he is informed there are Secret Articles in the Treaty of Tilsit for forming a confe-

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deracy in the North of Europe highly hostile to this country, and to which Denmark is a party. Now, who made the treaty of Tilsit with France? Not Denmark, but, your late ally the emperor of Russia. Do you attack Russia? No! no! you pass by the principal, and you attack the supposed accessary: you bombard his capital, you send your bomboats and rockets to fire his city and massacre its inhabitants; you seize his fleets; you plunder his arsenals; and after you have compleated this outrage, which nothing but the most imperious necessity could justify, what do you then do? Why, you apply to the emperor of Russia, the principal in this hostile confederacy, only to mediate with Denmark (an accessary bullied and seduced by his influence) for a peace with you. Why did you not attack the principal? Why not proceed against Cronstadt, and seize the fleet and arsenal? Why did you not seize on the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean? Why suffer three Russian ships of the line to sail through your squadrons unmolested? How did you learn the Contents of the Secret Treaty at Tilsit? Was the emperor of Russia your informant? For he only was privy to it, as one of the confederating parties; and yet it is this very emperor of Russia, and no body else, to whom you send an ambassador in order to coax him to an interference with Denmark for the restoration of peace with you, after the outrage you have precipitated upon that country. If your information was not true, your attack on Copenhagen can never be justified, and if the Treaty of Tilsit was the source and origin of this hostile confederacy, I assert that his majesty's ministers deserve impeachment for not having attacked the principal as well as the accessary.—I shall next advert to another point highly important to the character of this country, namely the necessity for the attack of our arms on Copenhagen, Which I was informed his majesty's Ministers would he fully able to justify, but for which they certainly as Yet have offered nothing like justification. I have heard from authority to which I am disposed to attach strong credit, that the emperor of Russia had taken every pains to persuade the prince of Denmark to join the confederacy against this country, but that he peremptorily refused, and declared that nothing should induce him to violate his neutrality. I have heard a gentleman on whose veracity I can rely, say, that at the very time our expedition was pro-
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ceeding against Copenhagen, the crown prince was in Holstein with thirty thousand Danish troops and forty thousand militia, ready to defend Holstein against Bonaparte; and determined to persevere to the last man, rather than he induced to violate his neutrality. Now, sir, it is said that if Buonaparte was in Holstein, he must next, as a thing of course, have taken possession of Zealand, but if I am rightly informed, nothing was so nearly an impossibility as that the. French could have taken possession of Zealand, if the prince' was determined to fight for its security, sustained by the assistance we might have afforded him. It is next said, that by the attack on Copenhagen we have gained an important advantage, in the possession of a Fleet, which must otherwise have fallen into the possession of the French. Why, sir, I am ready to excuse his maj.'s Ministers most completely upon this subject, if they will prove to me that Denmark was unable to defend Holstein. I say they are bound to make out their case by some such proof, or they have no right to call on this house to sanction their conduct.—But it is asked, what have you got? and what have you lost? and it has been fairly stated in answer, that we have got the ships, but they have got the men; that we have got the Body, and our enemy the Soul, of the Danish navy. Yet for this, the honour of the country is tarnished, and the crime aggravated, by the refusal of ministers to lay any information before parliament to justify the outrage. But it is said, forsooth, that by this capture of the Danish Fleet, you have prevented the invasion of Ireland. By the way, this is the first notice, that, in the course of this discussion, his majesty's ministers have deigned to take of that country, which, from their professions at the close of the last session, I should have expected to find a prominent feature in the speech from the throne. But, instead of an act of the grossest outrage and injustice against Denmark, to prevent the danger you apprehend from an invasion of Ireland, and for which you are so much alarmed, why have you not taken the stronger and more obvious mode of securing to yourselves that Country, by resorting to measures of conciliation and justice, rather than by an attack on the territory of a suspected foe. In God's name, if you would secure the British empire, if you would make peace with Buonaparte, first make peace with Ireland, by conciliating the affec-

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tions of the Irish people, and you will then have a security for your defence infinitely superiour to what any of this sort can afford you. First protect and conciliate, and then you may firmly confide in the population of that country without any necessity for seizing on the fleets of your real or supposed enemies to guard her against invasion.—But, sir, beside the attainment of ships which we did not want, what are the other advantages we have reaped from this expedition I understand they consist of hemp and timber taken from the Danish arsenals, adequate to one month's supply for the British navy; and for which, beside the expence and the odium of the capture, the country will still have to pay at the highest rate of valuation according to the market price of those commodities. But, sir, is this all?—No: for the country, I understand, has paid still a much dearer price; for in consequence of the avidity for conveying, those prizes to British ports, so completely has our commercial marine in the Baltic been abandoned and exposed, that the enemy has actually captured more of those very stores from you than you have taken of him, and this on board of five or six and fifty British vessels in the Baltic trade, which have fallen into his hands since the departure of the British fleet from the Copenhagen expedition. Let us therefore; sir, put all the advantages we have obtained in the scale against the moral justice we have violated, and the dignity of character we have lost by this adventure, and ask, if it is such a proceeding as entitles his majesty's ministers, who planned the enterprize, to the approbation and thanks of this house. In the language of his majesty's ministers and their supporters, every hour teems with, abuse of the present ruler of France, and every day brings forth some new accusation against Buonaparte, as an usurper, a tyrant, a murderer, a plunderer, and every thing atrocious and abominable; and I am sorry to observe, sir, this language echoed through the public prints of this country, the editors of which are sensible men, and would not, I and sure, persevere in such abuse, if they were not encouraged to it. It is, however, something to the character of that ruler, that towards the enemies who have left the power of doing him injury, he has acted with humanity. But British rulers have lost all character for humanity or national honour, by the attack upon a peaceable and defenceless nation, which
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had no power to injure or even resist them; and they have thus put it into the mouth of every Frenchman to retort upon them the charge of all those enormities with which we have accused France. The French ruler may say to his majesty's ministers, "you may talk about my having seized the duke D'Enghien, on a neutral frontier and put hint to death. But I answer, it was an act of violence necessary to my own defence, surrounded on all sides as I was, at home and abroad, by nations and partisans conspiring for my destruction. But you, who had nothing to fear from Denmark, a distant, peaceable, unoffensive, neutral nation; you have wantonly violated her neutrality; you have attacked her unawares; you have bombarded her capital, you have thrown bombs, shells, and rockets to set fire to the habitations of her peaceable citizens, and you have deluged their public streets with the blood of their murdered wives and children, whose mutilated bodies have been left unburied, on purpose to excite new rage, horror, and indignation against the British nation and name." There is this great difference between the situation of the heads of the government in the British and French nations: the ruler of France has been raised by his own efforts to the situation in which he is placed, and was surrounded on all sides by enemies confederated for the subversion of his government, and the destruction of his life. But will any man say the head of the British government feels any apprehensions of such atrocities; that our gracious monarch has any thing to fear from conspiracy, against the safety of his sacred person, or the security of his crown? The ruler of France may plead, in the jealousy, hatred, and assassinating spirit of his enemies, an excuse for his atrocities, which the rulers of this country cannot offer; our government has no charge to apprehend, our beloved monarch no lurking danger to fear. Another topic, sir, to which I have to advert, is that of the late petitions for peace, brought forward in a great manufacturing country. But, sir, I cannot, as some gentlemen have done, impute those petitions to a factious spirit, or to any wish of urging, his majesty's ministers to a premature, humiliating, or dishonourable peace; but merely to impress them with a state of the distresses they sustained under the continuance of a war which has the effect of excluding their manufactures from all the markets in continental Europe. I know, sir, that

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nothing would tend more to embarrass his majesty's ministers, or to defeat them in the object of obtaining an advantageous peace, than urgent petitions for that purpose from any very great portion of the manufacturing population of this country, and therefore, sir, I would earnestly deprecate such petitions. But if every opportunity of negociation is rejected, and wars are to be continued only for the gratification of those who delight in carnage because they batten upon the spoils, and grow rich by the calamities of others, then it becomes the duty of the people to petition for peace, and of the house to attend to the prayers of the industrious but starving manufacturers, and to urge his majesty's ministers to a negociation. By the way, sir, I am rather surprised that a right hon. friend of mine, his majesty's principal secretary for foreign affairs, whose place, so ably filled, is become now almost a sinecure, has not endeavoured to commence a negociation for peace through some medium or other, if it were only to find something to do for his amusement. What I would now ask the right hon. gent. is, whether there has not been lately a very favourable opportunity afforded him for that purpose? I have good authority for stating that this opportunity was offered under the mediation of Austria, through the medium of count Stahremberg; and I must say, that if any offer was made for negociation by Bonaparte, and that he did propose count Stahremberg as the medium, it was the strongest proof of his sincerity in that purpose, because the known partiality of count Stahremberg for this country was a sufficient earnest that this nobleman would not have consented to become the instrument of a negociation founded on principles hostile to the honour or the interests of Great Britain. If this was the case, however averse I may be to encourage premature petitions, urged as they might be by the temporary pressure of war upon the manufacturing interests of the country, I could not withhold the most decided reprehension to those ministers who, rejecting the wishes of the country, prefer the advice of those who are friendly to the continuance of a war now without any objects for the interests of this country. I fear, sir, this fact can be proved against his majesty's ministers. But if the right hon. gent. can shew that count Stahremberg has in this affair acted for himself, and not in consequence of any authority from Bona-
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parte; that he was not authorised to sign passports, in a regular way, between this country and France, as he had repeatedly done; that it was the mere officious act of an individual to propose such a negociation, I for one shall chearfully support his majesty's ministers in their refusal to entertain such an overture. But if it shall appear that those ministers have rejected a fair opportunity to negociate, I shall not hesitate to express my reprobation of their conduct. For, unless they can make out some fair intelligible cause to continue the war, and shew they have not let slip any fair opportunity for negociation, no human power shall extract from me the least sanction to their conduct.—In every former period of this contest there was at least some ostensible cause, some plausible pretence on the part of his majesty's ministers for prolonging hostilities. At one time it was to resist jacobinical principles: at another it was to support the cause of religion and social order, then it was to effect the opening of the Scheld, afterwards, it became a war for the defence of our allies; a motive now of little import, as my right hon. friend, the foreign secretary will attest, since his time begins to hang so heavily on his hands, and all his foreign concerns and diplomatic missions are reduced to the solitary business of sending his ambassadors-errant to look after the emigrant monarchy of Portugal. At another time it was a war for the restoration of the Bourbons; an object which has ended in excluding them from every part of continental Europe as well as France, and leaving them no other asylum on earth but England: then it became a war to obtain indemnity for the past and security for the future, and to meet this object Ceylon and Trinidad were to be ceded to us by France; and lastly, we were at war because we would not make peace separately from our ally the emperor of Russia, a consideration from which, whether fortunately or unfortunately, we are at last relieved; and, I now defy his majesty's ministers to name any object for continuing the contest that would not be just as good an argument for eternal war.—But, unless ministers can shew the people of this country why the war is continued, and identify their interests with the contest, you cannot keep back petitioners from stating their misfortunes, and urging you to overtures for a peace.—There is another point, sir, on which I differ from noble and rt. hon.

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friends of mine, who now sit near me; his majesty's late chancellor of the exchequer for England; the late chancellor for Ireland, and a right hon. gent. late secretary for the war department, who say they wish to give his majesty's ministers further time, and not to press the matter forward too early, in hopes of hearing something on the subject from those ministers; I allude, sir, to the state of Ireland. On this subject, sir, from What 1 know of their views, their habits, and inveterate prejudices, I am not disposed to give his majesty's ministers so much as a single week's credit for their intentions, or to believe that the subject has given them the trouble of a day's consideration. When, towards the close of the last session, I proposed to bring forward this subject, and appoint a committee to enquire into the state of Ireland, if his majesty's ministers did not, a right hon. gent. his majesty's chancellor of the exchequer, assured me, that the subject of Ireland, the promotion of its interests, and the amelioration of its internal affairs, formed a ground of anxious consideration and earnest solicitude with his majesty's ministers; and that, in the course of the recess, it would occupy their most earnest attention. But how have they proved even the sincerity of their professions? Is the name of Ireland even so much as mentioned, or the situation of that country the subject even of the slightest allusion in the speech from the throne? I see, laid on your table, a return made of the state of glebe lands, ruined churches, and dilapidated parsonage houses in that country, probably with a view to some improvement upon those points: but do his majesty's ministers think this will do? Is their disposition to ameliorate Ireland only to be found in plans for the building glebe houses, the repairing of dilapidated churches, or the increase of protestant charter schools! Means, which instead of removing, will exasperate the feelings, and aggravate the evils, which it is most desirable to obviate. But, sir, I will keep my pledge with Ireland, and at no distant day bring forward the grievances of that country to the consideration of this house. I was told at the close of last session to demand no pledge, but to trust to ministers, during the recess. Have I any inducement now to confide in them further, when they have not condescended even so much as to mention Ireland in the speech from the throne, as if it was beneath their high and proud notions of vigorous policy? Shall I post-
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pone that salutary line of conduct, who, in the present state of the world, look to Ireland as every thing; to Europe as nothing to this country? A great Roman orator, speaking of eloquence, has said that to the perfection of that art, the first consideration is action, the second, action, and the third, action. To his majesty's ministers, sir, I would seriously urge that to the security of this empire amidst the perils that surround us, their first consideration should be. Ireland, their second, Ireland, and their third, Ireland; for convinced I am, as every thinking man in the country must be, that the loss of Ireland, would entail irretrievable perdition on the British empire.
Mr. Montague Matthewexpressed, in strong terms, his mistrust of a set of ministers, who had come into office with an avowed hostility against five million of his majesty's subjects in Ireland, and said, that he hoped in God he should not see them in their situations that day six months.—The question was then carried without a division.