Commons Sitting of 22 December 1806

MINUTES.
Mr. Johnson from the office of the chief secretary of Ireland, presented the 3d and 4th reports of the commissioners appointed to enquire into the Fees, &c. of the public offices of Ireland.—On the motion of Mr. Hobhouse, the usual committee to enquire into Expiring Laws was appointed.—On the suggestion of lord Howick, it was resolved, that no petitions for private bills should be received after Friday, the 27th day of Feb. next.—It was also understood, on the intimation of lord Howick, and with the acquiescence of the Speaker, that public business should commence every day at half-post four o'clock.—The Speaker having enquired whether or not there were any Election Petitions to be presented, and having stated the order by which, according to the rules of the house, the several classes of those petitions ought to be arranged, the following were presented and read, and ordered to be taken into consideration on the days attached to them, viz.—From Horsham Jan. 8, Penryn Jan. 8, Saltash Jan. 13, Westminster Jan. 13, Tregony Jan. 20, Maldon Jan. 20, Aberdeen Jan. 22. The Westminster petition, presented, by lord Folkestone, was from
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James Paull, esq. complaining of the undue return of R. B. Sheridan, esq. The petition stated, that, regardless of the laws against bribery and corruption, Mr. Sheridan had been guilty of those offences, by giving rewards, in various ways, to many of the electors who voted for him; that he had used threats to induce those who would otherwise have voted for Mr. Paull, to vote for him; that he bad procured a considerable number of illegal votes, and that by such means he had obtained a colourable majority, and was returned, with sir S. Hood, as a member in the present parliament for the city of Westminster. The petitioner concluded by praying relief.

THE. LORDS COMMISSIONERS' SPEECH.
Mr. Lambbrought up the report of the address to his majesty, in answer to his majesty's most gracious speech. On the motion for its being read,
Lord Howick,unwilling that any thing which he might have said should mislead the house or the country, rose to explain two circumstances in the debate of the preceding evening. It was certainly not extraordinary, in the new and important situation in which he found himself placed, that his embarrassment should be productive of some error, however unintentional. He certainly had last night conceived and stated, that Mr. Fox's last letter, respecting any negociation with France in which Russia should not be included, was dated as far back as the 26th of March; but having since referred to the official documents, he found that the date of the letter to which he had alluded was the 20th April; and therefore so far the argument of the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Canning) carried with it more weight than in the other case it would be entitled to. Having said thus much in correction of his statement, he should proceed to the explanation of another point in dispute. Very heavy censure had been passed by the noble lord (Castlereagh) and the right hon. gent. against his late right hon. friend (Mr. Fox) for not having repelled the accusation of preceding administrations contained in M. Talleyrand's reply to his first letter. To prevent any misapprehension that might go forth, before the papers should be laid on the table of the house, he would distinctly declare, that his right hon. friend had repelled that accusation, though the French government, in the publication which they caused to be made of the correspondence, had thought proper to suppress that part of it.
Mr. Canningfelt himself under the utmost obligation to the noble lord for the extreme candour, which prompted him to come forward and make the statements which he had done. With regard to the date of Mr. Fox's letter, it certainly had surprized him very much yesterday evening, when the noble lord declared the date which he had just corrected; but he did not see that the alteration of date made such a difference in the state of the argument, as the noble lord seemed willing to allow, He had contended, that not on one particular day alone, but that on every day the situation of this country, with respect to Russia, ought to have been present to the minds of his majesty's ministers, and to have influenced their conduct. With respect to the suppression by the French government of the defence, which it now appeared by the noble lord's statement, had been made by Mr. Fox, of the conduct of antecedent administrations against the foul charges preferred against them, it gave him great satisfaction to find that such a defence had been made. The house would recollect, however, that he had last night only reasoned hypothetically on this subject, declaring, that if the chasms in the correspondence which he had described should not be properly supplied, such and such must be the consequences necessarily to be deduced from that omission. In pointing out these chasms, he conceived that he had done a service to his majesty's ministers.
Lord Howickadded to his former statement, that Mr. Fox in his letter declared, that what he did was with the direct approbation of all his colleagues.
Mr. Percevalsaid, he did not rise to oppose the address, but merely to notice one or two points which had been omitted in his majesty's speech to the house. There were a few topics also to which he wished to advert on the present occasion, just to let the noble lord who introduced them, see that his triumph was not as complete as he had induced himself to imagine. The noble lord had, in the course of his speech last night, drawn a comparison between the 15 years opposition, of which the noble lord had been a distinguished member, and the present opposition, which he characterized as factious and harassing, while he complimented his own, as one which had been uniformly actuated by principle. Allowing the noble lord all the enjoyment which he could derive from his retrospect, he
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should tell him, that however he might please to denominate the present opposition, he would find them at their post, attending to the progress of public business, and paying particular attention to the conduct and measures of ministers. If the noble lord thought that this kind of opposition, founded on public duty, was harassing, he frankly informed the noble lord in time, that he could not expect much indulgence or sound repose during the session. The noble lord had laid great stress on the term popularity, which he emphatically declared the present opposition did not possess. This was a point, however, on which be did not see that the noble lord had great reason to exult. Let him look to the result of the general election. A reference to the contests in those places where the largest share of popularity might have been manifested, would soon skew what quality and description the popularity of the ministerial candidates was composed. Look to Norfolk and Southwark; come then to Hampshire; but of the election for that place he should not now take any other notice, than just mentioning that his lordship would hear more respecting it, before the end of the session,than might be palateable. The noble lord could not be ignorant of the sort of popularity which distinguished the treasurer of the navy (Mr. Sheridan) from the other candidates, at the election for Westminster. Observing that the right hon. gent. was not in his place, he should abstain, at present, from taking a view of ministerial popularity in that city. He would take the liberty, however, of asking a right hon. gent. (Mr. Tierney) whom he was glad to see in the house, what he thought of the point at issue? Why was he unsuccessful at Southwark, if the friends of ministers had been as popular as the noble lord would infer from comparison? The fact was, that as soon as the right hon. gent. connected himself with the negative quality of popularity which belonged to the present ministers, he found that he could not be returned.—With regard to the subjects referred to in his majesty's speech, there were many points which would be open to future consideration, when the official papers should be before the house. This, however, he wished the noble lord to believe, that in his opinion—and it was an opinion in which every man in the house and the country must coincide—were no papers produced but those already published by the French government, it would

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be no difficult matter to prove that England, during the whole of the negociation, had maintained her character for sincerity and honour. On the very face of those papers appeared artifice on the one side, practising on credulity, on the other. There was one occurrence in the progress of the negociation which, it struck him, required explanation. It appeared by the French publication, that there had been two notes written on the same day, the 14th of June, contradictory to each other. The argument in the longer of these notes, was completely opposed by the act in the shorter of them. They related to the rejection of any negociation, but in concert with our allies; but it seemed very probable that the communications from lord Yarmouth would clear up this at present inexplicable point. With regard to the omission in the address, of any condolence with his majesty on the death of the duke of Brunswick, if it had been possible to suppose that ministers could have contemplated that event without the proper feelings that it was calculated to excite, the impressive and pathetic manner, so highly honourable to himself, in which the noble lord had last night mentioned the circumstance, must completely have destroyed such a supposition. But the noble lord declared, that he had in vain ransacked the parliamentary records for a precedent. What precedent could he expect to find? Was there ever an instance of the brother-in-law of the sovereign, and the father of the princess of Wales, stripped of his dominions, and dying in battle, in defence of the laws and independence of Europe? Was there a precedent of such a fact? Certainly not; and certainly, therefore, there could be no precedent of such a condolence. He therefore did think, that in the address to his majesty, it would have been proper to express the feelings which the house of commons must entertain on such an occasion. But there were greater omissions in his majesty's speech, which he would slightly notice. For the first of these omissions, which respected the glorious battle of Maida, he felt himself totally at a loss to account; for that government were sensible of the value and importance of this victory, was evident from the notice given by the right hon. secretary for the war department, that he would on Monday propose to the house a vote of thanks to the gallant officers by whom it had been obtained. But why of an event
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so proudly honourable to the British arms, deprive his majesty of the satisfaction of declaring his sentiments of approbation? He believed that not a single instance could be found in the annals of our history, of a victory achieved during the interval between one session of parliament and another, and which victory was considered of sufficient importance by government to claim the recorded gratitude of the two houses of parliament, which had not been made a subject of communication from the throne in the speech with which every session was opened. Why all reference to the splendid victory to which he alluded had been avoided in the speech, he was at a loss to conceive; for he could not suppose that it was the wish of government to keep the king's countenance at a greater distance from the army than ever.—He was also desirous of knowing how it happened, that in his majesty's speech not a single word was said of the flourishing state of the finances and revenue of the kingdom? Were they not flourishing?. He trusted and believed that there was no ground for any apprehensions on that score; but assuredly this was the first instance in which the crown had made a demand on the public purse, without taking the opportunity of at least affording to the people a pleasing and consolatory picture of the situation of public affairs. As to Buenos Ayres, his right hon. friend (Mr. Canning), understanding that the expedition, of which the result was the capture of that province, had been undertaken without the knowledge of government, had, very properly, confined his animadversions on the omission of any notice of that occurrence in his majesty's speech, to the omission of any statement of the advantages which the country must derive from such a valuable acquisition.—He supposed that the discussion which related to the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and America had not been brought to a close, otherwise it assuredly would have been mentioned from the throne. When he recollected the bills which were introduced into the house during the last session on this subject, when he considered their nature and principle, when he remembered that they went to the destruction of that on which our naval strength and superiority had been founded, and when he reflected on the character and sentiments of the persons who had been chosen

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by this country to carry on the negociation with America, he owned that he looked forward. with considerable apprehension to the period when that negociation would terminate, He hoped he might he permitted to hint, that the blockade lately declared was a circumstance to which government should be watchfully attentive in their discussions and connections with neutral powers. It behoved them to take good care to come to some good understanding with those neutral powers, as to the interpretation which they might put on that blockade. This was a subject on which at present he would say no more. There remained an omission in his majesty's speech yet unnoticed by him. No mentionShad been made of the state of Ireland. He trusted that this silence might be ascribed to the total want of foundation for the alarming rumours that had reached this country. Ministers must unquestionably be the judges how far the usual prerogatives of the crown were sufficient to suppress insurrection or rebellion, in whatever quarter it might appear; the decision rested with them: he only begged them to consider that the protraction of the necessary day of punishment was not mercy; and the delay which allowed insurrection to proceed, until it became impossible to quell it without a considerable shedding of blood, was, not kindness. He hoped that the omission of any notice of the situation of the sister island was occasioned by the absence of any necessity for an extraordinay exertion of the law. Should such a necessity unfortunately arise, and should ministers call on the house for an enlargement of the executive power, he could assure them that they should meet with no opposition on his part to any proper measure of vigour which they might think it expedient to propose. Having thus expressed his sentiments on the various subjects which had been agitated, he sat down, declaring that it was not his intention to oppose the motion for reading the report of the address.
Lord Henry Pettybelieved, that in the present state of the house, and in the present state of the information before the house, he should best consult the wishes of the house by adjourning the consideration of many of the points on which the learned gent. had touched in a speech, which, although certainly it was not a very long one, yet comprised an infinite variety
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of matter. .He should not, indeed, have thought it necessary to rise at all, but for that part of the learned gent.'s observations which were directed at the department of government in which he had the honour to hold a situation, and which therefore might be considered a personal allusion to himself, The learned gent. expressed his wonder, that nothing had been said in the speech from the throne on the state of the finances. Nothing said! general expressions alone were to be looked for in documents of that sort, and it was distinctly, though generally declared, that "the great sources of our prosperity and strength were, unimpaired;" a declaration calculated to, satisfy every reasonable mind, and which it would soon be his duty in the committee of ways and means to prove, by entering into particular statements, was founded on just grounds. Let it not be supposed that he was unwilling to give all due praise to the solid system of finance, the result of the abilities of a late great financial minister; he should avail himself of the opportunity to which he had alluded, of doing justice to the merits of that system, and to those of its founder, and he should avail himself of the same opportunity to do justice to the merits of the noble viscount (lord Sidmouth), by whom, on the commencement of the present war, that system had been renovated, and firmly established.— The learned gent. had hoped that there was a good cause for certain transactions apprehended to have taken place in Ireland not having been mentioned in the speech from the throne, There was a good cause, The allusion to them could not have been attended with any useful purpose; and the house would perhaps agree with him in thinking, that had the learned gent. himself abstained from alluding to them, it would have been at least as well. What object had the learned gent. in his observation on this subject? For their conduct with regard to Ireland, ministers were responsible. From the faithful discharge of their duty they never would shrink. The learned gent. had noticed several other omissions, as he imagined them, both in the speech and the address. With regard to the omission in the address, of any condolence with his majesty on the death of the duke of Brunswick, after what had been said by his noble friend last night, no one could suppose that that omission originated in any want of proper feeling; but it was obvious that expressions of condo-

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lence must be governed by forms and habits of proceeding; a line must be drawn. If usage precluded the expression of a sentiment, was it thence to be inferred that the sentiment did not exist? But the omissions on which the learned gent. had dwelt with peculiar emphasis, were the omission of any notice of the capture of Buenos Ayres, and of the brilliant victory of Maida; but more particularly of the latter. No man could be more sensible than he was of the valour displayed by the British troops in Calabria on that gratifying occasion; but it must be recollected that they formed merely a detachment, a small body, not under the orders of a commander-in-chief, but of an officer who was himself commanded by a superior; and there was no instance on record, of, any victory, however brilliant, however striking, gamed under such circumstances, having been noticed in the speech from the throne. Let gentlemen refer to the events of the last war. One of the most brilliant victories gained on the continent, and precisely in the same circumstances as those in which he had mentioned the victory of Maida was obtained, was the victory of Lincelles; and yet it would be found that no notice was taken of this affair, or of the officers and troops engaged in it, in his majesty's speech which immediately followed.—As to the subject of America, the learned gent. had indulged himself in an attack on the two noble lords, who were employed on the part of Great Britain in carrying on the commercial discussions with the United States. This, however, he would maintain, that if it were possible to find two persons better qualified, who possessed more general knowledge, more good sense, and more affable and conciliating manners, than any others, those noble lords were the men. But here the learned gent. only pursued the course taken by his right hon. friend yesterday (Mr. Canning). He anticipated censure, in ignorance of the facts; and at this early period, and before it was possible he could be in possession of the nature or progress of the discussions with America, the learned gent. augured an unfavourable result. He would not at present go at length into the learned gent.'s remarks on the popularity of government, as displayed at the general election; at some future period he should be happy to join issue with the learned gent. on this point, and enquire on what side the popu-
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lar voice had been manifested; but he confessed that he was astonished to hear the learned gent. priding himself on the popularity of Mr. Paull, as—
Mr. Canningcalled to order, not conceiving it right to mention, in terms of indirect censure, the name of a petitioning candidate.
The Speakersaid he did not know of any order prohibiting the mention of any name but that of a member of that house.
Lord H. Pettywas glad to find he had not transgressed the rules of order in mentioning the name of Mr. Paull, by doing which he did not mean the slightest disrespect to that gentleman. He begged to assure the gentlemen on the other side of the house, that he did not intend to hurt their feelings by stating in the most indirect manner, that there was any similarity, between their principles or their popularity; he knew they were quite opposite. He begged pardon for having occupied the time of the house with this explanation, but seeing that the right hon. gentlemen were sore upon this. point, he thought it right to give them the full benefit of his testimony, and, to exculpate them from any such political connection.
Mr. Percevalexplanation, denied that he had imputed any want of information to the two noble lords who were engaged in the commercial discussions with America. What he had said was, that the manner in which the bills on that subject were introduced into parliament last session, evinced the bad principle on which the negociation with the United States was founded. As to the matter on which the noble lord had dilated at the close of his speech,, he assured him that he had no idea of priding himself on the popularity of Mr. Paull, but the contrary. In alluding to the popularity of Mr. Paull at Westminster, he only meant to, shew, that, comparing popularity with popularity, Mr, Paull had completely beaten the treasurer of the navy, until the government coursers were harnessed to the car, by which means the right hon. gent. got a-head of his rival. [Cry of Order! Order!]
Sir J. Pulteneyentered into an eulogium on the victory of Maida. So few were the opportunities offered to our brave troops, of meeting the enemy on fair ground, that he sincerely regretted that notice of this. victory did not make a feature of his majesty's speech, although whenever similar opportunities did offer, he was satisfied

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that similar results would ensue. Adverting to what the noble lord had said of Lincelles, he contended that it was quite a different affair from that at Maida. The victory of Lincelles was highly gallant, and highly honourable, but it was obtained by a mere detachment, who were sent to attack a post under the very eye of the commander-in-chief.
Mr. G. Johnstone,in addition to what had fallen from the hon. baronet, observed, that at the battle of Maida, general Stuart actually possessed the chief command in Sicily; for sir J. Craig had left that island, and the commander-in-chief appointed to succeed him had not arrived. The statement therefore made by the noble lord was by no means strictly correct. But had it been correct, it would by no means have justified the omission complained of. When lord Nelson achieved the splendid victory of the Nile, was he not under the command of lord St. Vincent? yet that achievement had been noticed in the speech from the throne. The omission of any allusion to the situation of Ireland had been attempted to be justified by declaring that no good was likely to result from such an allusion. This was very true; but ought not every thing important and connected with the interests of the empire to find a place in his majesty's speech without any qualification? He was happy to hear that government looked to the state of the finances of the country with such confidence, and he cordially concurred with the noble lord in the just praise he had bestowed on lord Sidmouth for his attention to this subject.
Lord H. Pettyin explanation, allowed, that he found he had not been altogether Correct in his statements, with regard to the precise state of rank which sir J. Stuart held at the time of the battle of Maida. Admitting this, he still maintained, that there was no distinct rule of proceeding; but that his majesty's ministers were bound to regulate their conduct by the various circumstances which different cases must necessarily present.
The report was then read and agreed to, and the address was ordered to be taken up to his majesty, by such members of the house as were of his majesty's most honourable privy council.—It was then ordered, that the speech of the lords commissioners to both houses of parliament, be taken, into consideration upon Monday next: after which the house adjourned.

PAPERS
RELATIVE TO THE NEGOCIATION WITH FRANCE; PRESENTED BY HIS MAJESTY'S COMMAND, TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT,
No. I.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to, M. Talleyrand; dated Downing-street, Feb. 20, 1806.
Sir; I think it my duty as an honest man, to communicate to you, as soon as possible, a very extraordinary circumstance which is come to my knowledge. The shortest way will be to relate to you the fact simply as it happened.—A few days, ago, a person informed me, that he was just arrived at Gravesend without a passport, requesting me at the same time to send him one, as he had very lately left Paris, and had something to communicate to me which would give me satisfaction. I sent for him—he came to my house the following day—I received him alone in my. closet; when, after some unimportant conversation, this villain had the audacity to tell me that it was necessary for the tranquillity of all crowned heads, to put to death the ruler of France; and that for this purpose, a house had been hired at Passy, from which this detestable project could be carried into effect with certainty, and without risk. I did not perfectly understand if it was to be done by a common musket, or by fire arms upon a new principle.—I am not ashamed to confess to you, sir, who know me, that my confusion was extreme in thus finding myself led into a conversation with an avowed assassin: I instantly ordered him to leave me, giving, at the same time, orders to the police officer who accompanied him, to send him out of the kingdom as soon as possible. After having more attentively reflected upon what I had done, I saw my error in having suffered him to depart without having previously informed you of the circumstance, and I ordered him to be detained.—It is probable that all this is unfounded, and that the wretch had nothing more in view than to make himself of consequence, by promising what, according to his ideas, would afford me satisfaction.— At all events, I thought it right to acquaint you with what had happened, before I sent him away. Our laws do not permit us to, detain him long, but he shall not be sent away till after you shall have had full time

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to take precautions against his attempts, supposing him still to entertain bad designs; and when he goes, I shall take care to have him landed at a seaport as remote as possible from France.—He calls himself here Guillet de la Gevrilliere, but I think it is a false name which he has assumed. At his first entrance, I did him the honour to believe him to be a spy. I have the honour to be, with the most perfect attachment, sir, &c. C. J. Fox.
No. 2.—Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, March 5, 1806. Received March 19th.
Sir; I have laid your excellency's letter before his majesty. His first words, after having read it were, "I recognize here the principles of honour and of virtue, by which Mr. Fox has ever been actuated. Thank him, on my part." I will not allow myself, sir, to add any thing to the expressions of his imperial and royal majesty. I only request you to accept the assurances of my distinguished consideration. (Signed) CH MAU. TALLEYRAND.
No.3.—Extract from a Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated, Paris, March 5, 1806. Received March the 19th.
It may be agreeable to you to receive news from this country. I send you the emperor's speech to the legislative body. You will therein see that our wishes are still for peace. I do not ask what is the prevailing inclination with you; but if the advantages of peace are duly appreciated, you know upon what basis it may be discussed.
No. 4.—Extract from a Speech delivered by the chief of the French government to the legislative body on the 2d of March, 1806.
I desire peace with England. On my part, I shall never delay it for a moment. I shall always be ready to conclude it, taking for its basis the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens.
No. 5—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to Talleyrand; dated Downing-street, March 26, 1806.
Sir; The information which your excellency has given me of the pacific disposition that prevails in your councils, and of the basis upon which peace may be discussed, has induced me to lay that part of your private letter before the king.—His majesty has repeatedly declared to his parliament his sincere desire to embrace the first opportunity of re-establishing peace upon a Solid basis, such as may be compatible with
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the interests and permanent security of his people; his wishes are uniformly pacific; but it is a safe and a lasting peace that his majesty has in view, not an uncertain truce, which from its very uncertainty would be the source of disquietude as well to the contracting parties as to the other powers of Europe.—With regard to the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, which are proposed as the basis of the negociation, it has been observed here, that this phrase has been interpreted in three or four different ways, and consequently, that further explanations would be necessary, which could not fail to produce great delay, even did no other objections exist.—The true basis of such a negociation between two great powers, equally despising every idea ochicane, would be the reciprocal recognition of the following principle; viz. That the object of both parties should be a peace, honourable for both, and for their respective allies; and at the same time, of a nature to secure, as far as is in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe.—England cannot neglect the interests of any of her allies; and she is united to Russia by such close connections, that she would not treat, still less conclude upon any thing, but in concert with the emperor. Alexander; but whilst awaiting the actual intervention of a Russian plenipotentiary, some of the principal points might however be discussed, and even provisionally arranged.—It might seem, that Russia, on account of her remote situation, should have fewer immediate interests to discuss with France than other powers; but that court, so respectable in every point of view, interests herself, like England, warmly in every thing that concerns the greater or less degree of independence enjoyed by the different princes and states of Europe.—You see, sir, how inclined we are here to remove every difficulty that might retard the discussion in question. With the resources that we possess, it is most assuredly not on our own account that we need fear a continuance of the war. Of all the nations of Europe, England, perhaps, is that which suffers the least by its prolongation; but we do not the less commiserate the misfortunes of others.—Let us then do all in our power to terminate them, and let us endeavour, if it be possible, to reconcile the respective interests and the glory of the two countries with the tranquillity of Europe, and the happiness of the human race. I am, &c. C.J, Fox,

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No. 6.—Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, April 1st, 1806. Received April 7th.
Sir; The very instant I received your letter of the 26th of March, I waited upon his majesty; and I am happy to inform you, that he has authorized me, to send you, without delay, the following answer: The emperor covets nothing that England possesses. Peace with France is possible, and may be perpetual, provided there is no interference in her internal affairs, and that no attempt is made to restrain her in the regulation of her custom duties; to cramp her commercial rights; or to offer any insult to her flag.—It is not you, sir, who have displayed in many public discussions an exact knowledge of the general affairs of Europe and of France, who require to be convinced that France has nothing to desire except repose, and a situation such as may enable her, without obstruction, to give herself up entirely to the labours of her industry.—The emperor does not imagine that any particular article of the treaty of Amiens produced the war. He is convinced, that tire true cause was, the refusal to make a treaty of commerce, which would necessarily have been prejudicial to the manufactures and the industry of his subjects. Your predecessors accused us of wishing universal conquest. In France, England has likewise her accusers. Very well! We only ask equality. We shall never require an account of what you do at home, provided that, on your side, you never require an account of what we do at home. This principle is reciprocally just, reasonable, and mutually advantageous.—You express a desire that the negociation may not terminate in a short-lived peace. France is more interested than any other power that it should be permanent. It is not her interest to make a truce; since a truce would only pave the way for fresh losses. You know very well that nations, similar in this respect to individuals, accustom themselves to a state of war, as well as to a state of peace. All the losses that France could sustain, she has sustained. This will ever be the case, in the first 6 months of war. At present, our commerce and our industry [se sont rèpliès sur eux-rnêmes] have taken the channel dictated by the circumstances of our country, and are adapted to our state of war. Consequently a truce of 2 or 3 years would be the thing of all others the most opposite to our commercial interests and to
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the emperor's policy.—As to the intervention of a foreign power the emperor might accept the mediation of a power possessing a great naval force, because, in that case, the participation of such power in the peace would be regulated by the same interests that we have to discuss with you; but the mediation you speak of is not of this nature. You do not wish to deceive us; and you are well aware there is no equality betwixt us in the guaranty of a power which has 300,000 men on foot, and which has no naval force For the rest, sir, your communication has a character of openness and precision, which we have hitherto never seen in the communications between your court and us. I will make it my duty to employ the same openness, and the same precision, in my reply. We are ready to make peace with the whole world. We wish to dictate to no one. But we will not be dictated to; and no one possesses either the power or the means of doing it. It is in the power of none to make us relinquish treaties which are already carried into effect. The integrity, and the complete and absolute independence of the Ottoman empire form not only the sincerest desire of the emperor, but constitute also the undeviating object of his policy.—Two enlightened and neighbouring nations would be wanting in the opinion they ought to entertain of their power and wisdom, should they call for the intervention of foreign and distant powers, in the discussions of the great interests which divide them: Thus, sir, peace may be treated upon and concluded immediately, if your court really entertains the desire of attaining it.—Our interests are reconcileable, inasmuch as they are distinct. You are the rulers of the ocean, your naval forces are equal to those of all the sovereigns of the world united. We are a great continental power; but there are many who equal our power by land, and your maritime preponderance will .always place our commerce at the mercy of your squadrons, immediately after your declaring war. Do you think it reasonable to expect that the emperor should ever consent to submit himself to your discretion, in continental affairs also? If, masters of the sea through your own power, you propose being masters of the land likewise by a combined force, peace is impossible; for in that case you will be striving for an object which you can never attain.—The emperor, accustomed as he is to encounter every

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risk, which holds out the prospect of greatness and of glory, wishes for peace with England. He is a man; after so many fatigues he is desirous of repose; the father of his subjects, he wishes, as far as it is compatible with their honour and with security for the future, to procure for them the blessings of peace, and the advantages of a successful and uninterrupted commerce. If then, sir, his majesty the king of England really wishes for peace with France, he will appoint a plenipotentiary to repair to Lisle. I have the honour of sending you passports for this purpose. As soon as the emperor shall be informed of the arrival of the minister from your court, he will appoint one, and will send him without delay The emperor is ready to make every concession, which, from the extent of your naval forces and of your preponderance, you may desire to obtain. I do not think that you can refuse to adopt the same principle of making him proposals conformable to the honour of his crown and the commercial rights of his dominions. If you are just; if you desire only what is possible for you to obtain, peace will be soon made.—I conclude, by declaring that his majesty fully adopts the principle laid down in your dispatch, and offered as the basis of the negociation, "that the peace proposed should be honourable for the two courts, and for their respective allies." I have the honour to be, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.
No. 7.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated Downing-street, April 8th, 1806.
Sir; I did not receive until yesterday evening your dispatch of the 1st inst. Before I reply to it, allow me to assure your excellency that the frankness and obliging tone which prevail in it have produced the greatest satisfaction here. A spirit of conciliation manifested on both sides is already a great advance towards peace.—If what your excellency says respecting domestic affairs relates to political affairs, an answer is scarcely requisite. We do not interfere in such concerns in time of war, much less shall we do so in time of peace; and nothing can be further from the ideas which prevail here than any wish either to interfere with respect to the internal regulations Which you may judge proper for the management of your custom duties and for the support of your commercial rights, or to offer insult to your flag. As to a Treaty of Commerce, England supposes
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that she has no greater interest in desiring it than other nations. There are many who think that such a treaty between G. Britain and France would be equally beneficial to the two contracting parties; but this is a question upon which each government must decide according to its own ideas, and the party rejecting it gives no offence, and is no way responsible to the party proposing it.—It is not my individual opinion alone, sir, but it must be acknowledged by every reasonable man, that the true interest of France is peace, and consequently that the true glory of her rulers ought to be placed in the preservation of it.—It is true that we have mutually accused each other, but it can answer no purpose at the present moment to discuss the arguments upon which those accusations were founded. Like you, we desire to treat upon equal terms. Assuredly we are not accountable to each other for what we do at home; and the principle of reciprocity that your excellency has proposed on this point Appears just and reasonable.—It cannot be denied that your arguments respecting the inconveniences to which France would be subject by a short-lived peace, are well founded: but on the other hand, those which we should suffer would likewise be very considerable. It is perhaps natural, that in such cases each nation exaggerates its own dangers, or at least that she examines them more minutely, and with a more penetrating eye than those of others. —With respect to the interposition of a foreign power, one cannot refrain from observing, that in whatever relates to peace and war between England and France, Russia can never be considered a foreign power, in as much as she is in actual alliance with England, and at war with France. For which reason the interposition of the emperor Alexander was proposed in my letter not as a mediator, but as a party. Your excellency, in the last paragraph of your dispatch, acknowledges, that The peace "ought to be honourable, not only for England and France, but also for their respective allies." This being the case, it appears to us impossible, considering the close alliance subsisting between the two governments, that that of England can commence any other than a provisionary negociation, without the concurrence, or, at the very least, the previous consent of her ally.—As to what relates to the integrity a independence of the Ottoman empire, no difficulty can present itself, those objects

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being equally dear to all the parties interested in the present discussion. It is perhaps true, that the power of France on land, compared with that of the rest of Europe, is not equal to the superiority that we possess at sea, considered in the same point of view: but it can no longer be concealed, that the project of combining the whole of Europe against France, is to the last degree chimerical; besides, it is in truth carrying the apprehension of what may happen hereafter rather too far, to consider the alliance between England and Russia (the two powers of Europe the least calculated to attack France by land) as tending to produce such a consequence.—Nor can the intervention of Russia in the negociation, be considered as the formation of a congress, either in appearance or in reality, in as much as there will be only two parties, England and Russia on one side, and France on the other. A congress might be desireable in many respects, after the signature of preliminaries, in case all the contracting parties should be of that opinion; but this is a proposition that may be freely and amicably discussed, after the principal points shall have been arranged.—Thus, sir, I have laid before you, with all the clearness in my power, the sentiments of the British ministry upon the ideas which you have suggested. I entertain the gratifying persuasion that there remains only one essential point upon which we are not agreed.—As soon as you consent that we shall treat provisionally until Russia can take a part in the negociation, and from that moment, conjointly with her, we are ready to begin without the delay of a single day, at whatever place, and in whatever form, the two parties may judge best adapted to bring to a happy issue the object of our labours, as expeditiously as possible. I am, &c. C. J. Fox.
No. 8.—Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, April 16, 1806.—Received April 19th.
Sir; I have taken the pleasure of his majesty the emperor and king, before whom I lost no time in laying the dispatch which your excellency did me the honour of writing to me, under date of the 8th instant.—It appeared to his majesty, that, admitting as you do the principle of equality, you nevertheless still persist in requiring form of negociation which cannot accord with that principle. When in a discussion between two equal powers one of them calls for the interference of
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third, it is evident that she seeks to destroy that equilibrium so favourable to a fair and free discussion of their interests. It is manifest that she is not willing to content herself with the advantages and the rights of equality. I am ready to believe, sir, that in entering for the last time. upon this discussion, I shall succeed in persuading your excellency, that, under no plea and on no account, should Russia be called upon to take part in the proposed negociation between England and France.—When the war broke out between the two countries, Russia was at peace with France. This war has produced no alteration in the relations which existed between her and us. She first proposed her mediation; and afterwards, in consequence of circumstances foreign to the war which divides us, a coolness arose between the cabinets of St. Petersburgh and the Thuilleries; the emperor Alexander thought proper to suspend his political relations with France; but at the same time declared in the most positive manner, that it was his intention to take no part in the existing disputes between us and England.—We do not think that the conduct which Russia has since held, has in the smallest degree altered this determination. She has, it is true, concluded a treaty of alliance with you; but it is easy to see from what has been made public of this treaty, from the object it had in view, and still more from the consequences of it, that it had no connexion with the war which has been carrying on nearly 2 years between us and England.— This Treaty was an agreement to take a part in a war of a different nature, more extensive and more general than the first. From this war the Third Coalition sprung, in which Austria was a principal and Russia an auxiliary power. It was only in intention that England participated in this war. We have never had to oppose her forces in conjunction with those of her allies. Russia acted only a secondary part in it. No declaration addressed to France informed us that she was at war with us; and it is only upon the field of battle where the Third Coalition was destroyed, that we have been officially informed that Russia was a party to it.—When his Britannic maj. declared war against France, he had an end in view which he made known by his manifestoes. This object directed the nature of the war; when, 18 months afterwards, his Britannic majesty formed an alliance with Austria, Russia, and Sweden, he had other objects

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in view. This was a new war, the motives of which must be sought for in the official papers which have been published by the different powers; amongst these motives, the direct interests of England are never mentioned. These two wars therefore have no common connexion; England in reality never participated in that which is terminated. Russia never took any part directly or indirectly in that which still exists. There is, therefore, no reason why England' should not singly terminate a war, which she singly has waged against us. If his maj. the emperor were now to adopt the principle of negociating with England jointly with her new allies, he would implicitly admit the actual existence of the Third Coalition, the continuance of the German war, and the identity of this war with that which France sustains against England. He would implicitly accept for the basis of the negotiation the conditions of M. Novosiltzoff, which excited the astonishment of Europe, and were revolting to the character of the French people:—and the conqueror of the Coalition, the emperor, would voluntarily place himself in the situation of the conquered.—At present the emperor has nothing to discuss with the Coalition. He is entitled to refuse the recognition of the relations which you have had with it; and in treating with you there can be no other question, than the object and the interests of the war which was entered into previous to your alliances, and which has survived them.—Notwithstanding only 6 months have elapsed since the veil which concealed the secret combinations of the last war has been removed, it, is nevertheless true that the continent is at peace. Your principal ally, Austria, has made a separate peace. Prussia, whose armies were for some time on the war establishment, has concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with us. Sweden is not worthy a remark. As to Russia, there exist, between her and us direct proposals of negociation. Powerful as she is, she requires the protection of no one, and she cannot call for the intervention of any court to terminate the disputes between us. Her remote position places her so entirely out of our reach, and deprives her so completely of all means of annoying us, that the alteration in our respective connexions, occasioned by a state of war or a state of peace, is purely of a diplomatic nature. If in such a situation, the emperor were to accept the condition of negociating
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jointly with England and Russia, would he not resign all his advantages? Would he not admit the existence of a war which he has gloriously terminated? Would he not, in fine, abandon, in favour of England, the principle of equality already agreed upon between us? If, sir, you will only examine with the discernment which belongs to you the considerations which I have the honour to lay before you, you will agree that such a negociation would be far more prejudicial to us than war, and even than a congress.—In fact, in a congress, if England, Sweden, and Russia contended in support of the principles which formed the basis of the Third Coalition, Prussia, Denmark, the Porte, Persia, and America would protest against those principles, and would require equal laws for navigation and a just division of the empire of the seas. Doubtless, in this discussion, the diminution of the power of France would be frequently voted; but as frequently would the diminution of the power of England also be voted. The balance of power in the south of Europe would be demanded by some, but others would demand the balance of power in the north. Many would bring forward the balance of power for Asia; all would feel an interest in the balance of power on the seas; and if it were possible to hope that any result could be formed in the midst of such complicated and turbulent discussions, that result would be just, because it would be complete; and certainly his majesty has declared, under every circumstance, that he would have no repugnance to make sacrifices for the public tranquillity, whenever England, Russia, and all the great powers shall he disposed to recognize established rights, to protect the weaker states, and to adopt the principles of justice, moderation, and equality; but the emperor knows mankind too well to allow himself to be led away by chimerical ideas, and he feels that it would be in vain to seek for peace in a labyrinth of ten years of discussions, which during that period would perpetuate war, and would only have the effect of rendering its termination still more difficult and uncertain. It would then become necessary to change the system, and, as was done at Utrecht, leaving the allies to perplex themselves in vain and endless disputes, to enter into a separate negotiation; to discuss, as was then done, the interests of the two powers and of their respective allies; at last to make

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peace for ourselves, and to make it so equitable and so honourable as to be immediately agreed to by all the powers concerned. This is the mode in which it becomes two such nations as England and France to terminate, not at the distance of 10 years, but immediately, the differences which divide them, and at the same time to establish the regulation of their rights and of the interests of their allies.—To resume, sir; I see in the proposed negociation, only 3 possible forms of discussion; negociation with England and the allies which she acquired at the time of the formation of the Third Coalition; negociation with all the powers of Europe, with the addition of America; negociation with England alone.—The 1st of these forms is inadmissible, because it would subject the emperor to the influence of the Third Coalition, which no longer exists. The emperor would have negotiated in this manner if he had been vanquished. The 2d form of negociation would eternalize the war, if the unavoidable occurrences to which it would at every instant give rise, and the passions which it would let loose without controul, did not cause the discussions to be broken off with violence a few years after they should have been entered into. The 3d therefore is the only one which can be desired by those who really wish for peace. His majesty is confident, that the just and moderate dispositions which he has the satisfaction of observing in the tone and language of the ministers of his Britannic majesty, seconding, in conformity to his desires, the pacific sentiments of which he is more than ever determined to afford proofs to his allies, and even to his enemies, the nations exhausted by the efforts of a war, the interest of which it is as difficult to perceive as its real object is difficult to discover, will thus see a peace, which is called for by all their wants and all their wishes, result from the proposed negociation.—I request, Sir, &c. CH. MAU.TALLEYRAND.
No. 9.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated Downing-Street, April 20th, 1806.
Sir; I received the day before yesterday your excellency's dispatch of the 16th inst.—After having repeatedly read it with all possible attention, I do not find in it an argument sufficient to induce our government to change the opinion which it has already declared, namely, that any negociation in which Russia is not included as
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a party, is absolutely inadmissible.—We wish for peace; but we cannot wish for any thing which may be injurious either to the dignity of our sovereign, or to the honour and the interests of the nation, But if we negociate without Russia, considering the intimate ties by which we are united with that power, we should conceive ourselves open to the reproach of having failed in that scrupulous fidelity to our engagements, on which we pride ourselves; whilst, on the other hand, by persisting in our demand that Russia be admitted, we do not conceive that we do any thing contrary to that principle of equality to which both of us lay claim. When the three plenipotentiaries are assembled, how can it be thought that any question could be carried by the majority of voices? or even that such an assembly could have any thing in common with a general congress? There would be in fact but two parties in it; on one side, France; on the other the two allied powers. Moreover, if it is thought so advantageous in an affair of this nature to have two against one, no objection would be made to your introducing whichever of your allies you may judge most expedient.—Sincerely desirous of avoiding useless disputes, I do not allow myself to enter into a discussion of the consequences which your excellency draws from the events of the last campaign.— I will only remark, that I do not see any reason why an alliance should be considered as null with regard to the powers who adhere to it, because a power who formerly belonged to it has been detached from it by the misfortunes of war.—With regard to the overture which Russia has made you, we have no knowledge of it; but, whatever may be the nature of it, we are persuaded that that court. will never conduct itself so as to commit, the acknowledged honour of its character, I or to weaken the ties of friendship and of confidence which still subsist between England and Russia. To return to the point; your excellency mentions, that, in the proposed negociation, you know but of three, possible forms of discussion. The first appears to you inadmissible.—According to what I have had the honour to write to you, you must he convinced, sir, that the 3d is incompatible, both with our fundamental ideas of justice and honour, and with our conception of the interests of our country. The 2d is not perhaps bad, so far as regards its principle; but besides the delays which it would occasion, it

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would scarcely be practicable in the present conjuncture.—It is therefore with much regret, that I am obliged to declare frankly to your excellency, that I see no hope of peace at this moment, if you should not be disposed to negociate in the manner which we have proposed.—I think myself obliged to add, that this form is essential to us, not only for the reasons which I have had the honour to explain to your excellency, but in so much as any other form might create suspicions that you really entertain the chimerical project with which you are charged (wrongfully as I willingly believe) of excluding us from any connection with the continental powers of Europe; and even, that such an idea is less revolting to us than it ought to be, and than in reality it is. It is not necessary to declare to a minister so enlightened as your excellency, that England can never consent to an exclusion which would degrade her from the rank which she has hitherto held, and which she believes that she may ever hold, among the nations of the world.—The affair, in fine, is reduced to one single point; Will you negociate conjointly with Russia? We answer, Yes: but if you require us to negociate separately, we answer, No.—Although we have not succeeded in the great object which we proposed to ourselves, the two governments may well pride themselves on the candour and frankness which have characterized the discussion of their differences; and I owe to you, on my own account, sir, thanks for the obliging manner in which your excellency expresses yourself with regard to me. I am, &c. C. J. Fox.
No. 10.—Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, 2d June 1806.—Received June 4th.
Sir; I have laid before the emperor the last letter, which your excellency did me the honour to write to me. I can only, by his orders, repeat to you, that to require of France that she should treat with you upon the principle of your alliance with Russia, is wishing to reduce us to a constrained form of discussion, and supposing us in a state of humiliation, into which we have never fallen. The enemies of France must not hope to dictate to her either the conditions of peace, or a mode of negociation contrary to the established usages. Such an attempt with respect to either of these points, would equally affect the French character; and I do not hesitate to say, that to overcome all our repugnance on
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this point, it would at least require that an English army should have invaded Belgium, and should be at the point of entering Picardy, by the mouth of the Somme.—I must, sir, again repeat to you, that his maj. is truly desirous of peace; and why should not I add, what we might have said, what we really have said at the rupture of every negociation for peace, that the continuance of the war has never been prejudicial to the grandeur of France, and that, in time of peace, a great nation can use its power only to maintain itself, and preserve in their present state its relations with the neighbouring countries.—France, sir, does not object to your right of choosing and preserving your allies. In war she has not the choice of her enemies, and she must fight them separate or united, as it may suit their convenience to concert among themselves, for the accomplishment of their Views of aggression and resistance, and for the formation of alliances so little conformable to the real interests of their respective countries, that the first clause of them has always been a condition of secrecy.—Because we wish, in this case, to follow the form of negociation which has been customary at all times and in all countries, you conclude that we desire that you should have no connection with the continent. I do not conceive that we ever gave you any reason for drawing such an inference. We cannot hinder any government from forming an alliance with you, and we cannot wish either what is unjust, or what is absurd. It is one thing, that you should form alliances according to your own choice, but it is another, that we should concur in them, and aid you in contracting them. But to consent to treat upon the principle of your alliances, and to introduce them into the discussion of the direct and immediate interests that divide us, is doing much more than suffering and acknowledging them; it is in a manner consecrating, cementing, and guarantying them. I have already, sir, observed to you, that we cannot yield upon this point, because the principle is in our favour.—To leave, however, from henceforward, no room for any misunderstanding, I think it my duty to propose to you, 1st, To negociate in the same preliminary forms which were adopted during the administration of the marquis of Rockingham, in 1782; forms, which were not renewed with so much advantage in the negociations of Lisle, but which were perfectly suc-

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cessful in the negotiations which preceded the treaty of Amiens: 2dly, To establish as a basis, two fundamental principles; the first, which I take from your letter of the 26th March, namely, "That the two states should have for their object that the peace be honourable for them and their respective allies, and at the same time of a nature to secure, as far as is in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe." The second principle shall be, an acknowledgement on the part of the two powers, of their mutual right of intervention and guaranty in continental and in maritime affairs. His majesty, far from being unwilling to make this avowal, delights in raising it to a principle; and, in thus explaining his real intentions, I think I have given you a decisive proof of his pacific dispositions. His majesty is at the same time persuaded, that, in preventing for ever all subjects of complaint, uneasiness, and remonstrance on this point, he has, in a case which is of essential interest to the good of human nature, done his duty as a man, and as a sovereign.—I should sincerely regret, sir, that a discussion, begun under such favourable auspices, should terminate without the attainment of its object. Should the hopes which I cherish vanish, I shall, at all events, have the consolation of thinking, that the fault cannot be imputed to France, who demands and wishes nothing but what is just and reasonable.—Accept, sir, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.
No. 11.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated Downing-street, June 14, 1806.
Sir; I received a few days ago your excellency's dispatch of the 2d inst. I cannot understand how, in treating conjointly with England and Russia, you will acknowledge the principle of the alliance subsisting between the two courts; at most, you will only acknowledge the fact; much less can I conceive how you can consider yourselves in any degree lowered by this mode of treating. We do not by any means pretend to dictate to France, either the conditions of peace, or a mode of negociation contrary to the established usages.—In 1782, the epoch which your excellency alludes to in your dispatch, we did not think ourselves in a state of degradation; yet when M. de Vergennes informed us that it was necessary for the honour of his court, that we should treat conjointly with France, Holland, and Spain, we did not think ourselves in any degree lowered by adopting the
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mode of negociation to which that minister appeared to attach so much consequence. Your government is sincerely desirous of peace. In this country the same sentiment prevails; and yet I could very well say of England what your excellency says of France; namely, that the continuance of the war has never been prejudicial either to its glory or to its grandeur; perhaps indeed, it has been so to its real and permanent interests, but it has been equally so to those of France.—With respect to the secret conditions of our alliance with Russia, your excellency is too enlightened not to allow, that in what concerned the war and the propositions to be made to Prussia and Austria, secrecy was absolutely necessary. All that is now at an end; to act in concert for the establishment of the repose of Europe, and for its subsequent preservation, is the principal, and I may even say the only object of our present communications.—After the open disavowal which you have made of the intention falsely imputed to you with respect to our continental connections, no doubt can exist upon that essential point, and it would be the more distressing that difficulties in form rather than in substance should prolong a war which the two governments equally desire to terminate.—Let us now come to what your excellency proposes. The form of negociation which took place during lord Rockingham's administration is more particularly present to my memory, as I then held the same office with which his majesty has lately been pleased to honour me. Let France and England change situations, and the form you mention is exactly similar to that which I have proposed. We then treated with France and her allies. Let France now treat with us and our allies. The basis offered in your second proposition is exactly conformable to the views of our government, provided it be well understood that, whilst we mutually acknowledge our respective rights of intervention and guaranty with regard to the affairs of Europe we also mutually agree to abstain from all encroachment upon the greater or lesser states which compose it.—I should regret equally with your excellency, that this discussion should break off. If we can only act so as not to incur the reproach of a breach of faith towards an ally, who for so many reasons deserves our entire confidence, we shall be content, and the more so as we know that an honourable peace

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would be no less conformable to the wishes of Russia, than to those of France and England.—I have the honour to be, &c. C. J. Fox.
No.12.—Communication made by the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated June 13th, 1806.
A few days after my arrival at Paris from the depot at Verdun, M. Talleyrand desired me to call upon him; having done so, he told me that the French government had been looking out for some means by which a secret and confidential communication might be made, explanatory of the, sentiments and views of France, as well as the outlines of the terms on which peace might be restored between the two countries.—Having mentioned the extreme desire of making this communication in such a manner that no publicity might in any case ensue, should the object of it not he obtained, M. Talleyrand proceeded to state, in a long argument, which it is useless to repeat, as it forms the substance of several of the French government's dispatches; the reasons which prevent their treating for a general peace jointly with Russia.—He said, that in a dispatch sent some weeks before to Mr. Fox, he had been ordered to name Lisle rather than Amiens for the negociation of a definitive treaty, in order to remove all former discussions, and to facilitate to England the possession of Malta.—I then took the liberty of interrupting M. Talleyrand, to say that however flattering the confidence he was ordered to place in me might be, yet that, feeling as I did, the interests, and above all the honour of my country, it was impossible for me to be the bearer of a communication having peace for object, against which I should feel obliged to vote in parliament; and viewing the restoration of Hanover in this light, I could not receive any further communication till I had explicit declaration with regard to his majesty's German dominions.—M. Talleyrand then broke off the Conversation, desiring me to return the third day after. At the expiration of this time I waited upon him again, when he informed me that, considering the extreme stress which appeared to be laid upon this point, Hanover should make no difficulty.—Authorised by the concession of that in which the honour of the king and that of the nation appeared most interested, I enquired whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so
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said "Vous l'avez, nous ne vous la de. mandons pas; si nous la possèdions, elle pourroit augmenter de beaucoup les difficultès." [You are in possession of it, we do not ask it of you; if we possessed it, it might very much augment our difficulties.] Considering this to be very positive both from the words and the manner of delivering them, I conceived it improper to make further questions. " Nons ne vous demandons rien;" [we ask nothing from you] amounting to an admission of uti possidetis as applicable to his majesty's conquests.—M. Talleyrand mentioned strongly the recognition of the emperor and the different branches of his family as absolutely expected. On this I took occasion to state the solidity which the recognition of G. Britain would give to their establishment, and enquired whether the French government would guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman empire. The answer was yes, but it must be soon. " Beaucoup se "prèpare, mais rien n'est fait;" [a great deal is in preparation, but nothing is yet done.] Reverting to the first conversation, I desired to know whether a middle term might not be found at the same time to obtain the object desired by the French government, and that desired by G. Britain, of not treating in a manner unconnected with Russia. To this he answered that they were entirely ready to give every facility to the arrangement of the respective interests of the two powers, or that a British Minister should, being authorized by the emperor Alexander, stipulate for both.—The last words of M. Talleyrand were: "Les sentiments de la " France sont entièrement changès; l'aigreur qui caracterisoit le commencement de cette guerre n'existe plus; et ce que nous desirous le plus, c'est de pouvoir vivre en bon intelligence avec une aussi grande puissance que la Grande Bretagne."*(Signed) YARMOUTH.
No. 13.—Note from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated London, June 14, 1806.
Sir; I just write you a few words to express to you the pleasure which I feel at the desire you have manifested for place.
*The sentiments entertained in France are entirely different from what they were. The asperity which characterized the commencement of this war, no longer exists; and what we most desire is, to live in harmony with so great a power as Great Britain.

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I have only to add, that lord Yarmouth possesses all my confidence, and that whatever he shall say to you, you may consider as said by myself. In great haste, I am, &c. C. J. Fox.
No. 14.— Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, June 19, 1806. Received June 21st.
Sir; I have the honour to inform you that, in obedience to your orders I made all the haste in my power to arrive at Paris as soon as possible; calm at sea however prevented my getting here till the afternoon of the 16th.—I immediately waited upon M. Talleyrand to deliver to him the dispatches you entrusted to my care, and requested to put off any conversation on the subject of my journey till next day. I intended employing this interval to endeavour to see M. D'Oubril if at Paris, and communicate with him previously to seeing again M. Talleyrand, or at any rate to obtain some knowledge of his motions.—Previous, however, to my leaving M. Talleyrand, he expressed to me that although the desire of peace was equally sincere now as it was when I quitted Paris, yet that some changes had taken place which be had hinted at the possibility of, when I last saw him, alluding to the readiness of Russia to treat separately; and further mentioned that the emperor had received reports from his brother and the general officers under his orders, stating that Naples could not be held without Sicily, and the probability they saw of gaining possession of that island. I answered him, that, being ordered to require the restoration of Naples to the king of Sicily as a necessary article of peace, there would be no question of their separation.—I conceive Sicily to be the great difficulty, though perhaps, were there no other, it might be got over. M. Talleyrand often and seriously stated the absolute determination of the emperor not to consent to our demands of Naples, Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, or to alienate any part of his Italian states to form a provision for the king of Sardinia.—Against cessions in the West Indies or elsewhere I solemnly protested; nor do I think they care sufficiently about these objects to give any sufficient continental equivalent for them.—M. Talleyrand often repeated that the emperor had enquired whether I had any powers? adding, "qu'enpolitique on ne peut parler même langue si on n'y ègalement autorisè;" [that in politics it is impossible to hold the same language, un-
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less both parties are equally authorized;] and as frequently said that they considered that Hanover for the honour of the crown, Malta for the honour of the navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the honour of British commerce, to be sufficient inducements to induce his majesty's ministers to make peace.—P. S. On Tuesday June 17, I waited upon M. Talleyrand, and began the conversation by alluding to the changes he had hinted at the night before, and desired leave to repeat the substance of what had passed at my former interviews with him, and which I had by his desire communicated. He agreed that the statement was accurate.
No. 15.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing Street, June 26, 1806.
My lord; I had the honour, on Saturday evening, to receive your lordship's letters of the 19th; and should sooner have answered them, if I had not been for these 3 days past totally incapable of attending to business.—I am very happy to learn that M. Talleyrand acknowledges your accounts of former conversations to be accurately correct; but when he does acknowledge this, I have no conception on what ground he can recede from what he said so distinctly to your lordship before, upon the subject of Sicily: " Vous l'avez, nous ne "vous demandons rien," [you are in possession of it; we ask nothing from you,] are words that made the more impression on me, because those contained in the latter clause of the sentence had been used by his excellency in one of his letters to me. It was on the faith of the uti possidetis being to be strictly observed as the basis, and particularly Sicily, on which satisfaction had been given to your lordship, that his majesty was induced to authorize your lordship to hold further conferences with M. Talleyrand. Any tergiversation or cavil therefore on that article,would be a breach of the principle of the proposed basis in its most essential part. To say that Hanover is an exception to the principle is in vain, inasmuch as Hanover is to be yielded expressly in honour of the crown; while, on the other hand, the recognitions proposed with regard to the French empire and its dependents, are not only in honour of the crown of France, but tend substantially to establish the solidity of her power. With regard to the complaint of the want of full powers; to

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avoid all pretence of cavil on that account, I am commanded by his majesty to transmit to you the instrument accompanying this letter. But your lordship should fairly state to M. Talleyrand, that you are not authorized to make any use of them formally until M. Talleyrand returns to his former ground With respect to Sicily. Your lordship is directed further, to acquaint that minister, that, if Russia offers to treat separately, it is only in the way in which we do; that is to say, separately in form, but in substance, in concert with each other. And here you will recollect that this very circumstance was canvassed in your former conversations with M. Talleyrand, when that minister expressed himself clearly that there would be no objection on the part of France to such preconcernt.— result of What I have stated to your lordship, is this: 1st, that Sicily is a sine qua non; on which subject, if the French minister recedes from his former answer, it is in vain that any further discussion should take place. It is clearly within his first opinion delivered to your lordship; it is clearly within his fast description of places which are reciprocally possessed by the two countries, and cannot in all probability he recovered by war.—If, according to the hope conceived by your lordship, this matter should be arranged, you may open your full powers; stating at the same time, the determination of this court not to come to any final agreement without the consent of Russia. You will of course again mention the questions of Naples and Istria. If we could attain either of them, it Would be well; but if we cannot, your lordship will not state these points as conclusive reasons against agreeing on preliminary articles, provided such articles be considered as provisional and subject to the approbation of Russia.—With regard to the mode of provisional agreement, two suggest themselves to my mind: the one, to send the agreement we shall have entered into, either to Petersburgh, or to some authorized agent of the emperor Alexander, at Vienna, Paris, or elsewhere, for his approbation; the other, to copy the precedent adopted by lord Lansdowne and Dr. Franklin in the year 1782. At that time a provisional treaty was signed by the plenipotentiaries of G. Britain and the United States of America, with the reservation, that the said treaty should not have effect till a peace should be agreed upon
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between France and England. Of these two modes I should prefer the latter.—It does not appear that there has been any conversation between your lordship and, M. Talleyrand on a point which was mentioned to you, and which appears to be of considerable importance; I mean, the future admission of Russia and Sweden to become parties in a definitive treaty. I do not say that this is a point that must be determined upon previous to your settling the basis proposed; but it is one which should not be lost sight of, but, on the contrary, urged as far as possible.
No. 16.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 1, 1806.—Received July 4.
Sir; I had the honour to receive on Saturday night, the full powers with which it has graciously pleased his majesty to entrust me, and your dispatch of the 26th of June.—I waited upon M. Talleyrand next morning, and stated to him in the strongest manner the impossibility of my conversing any further upon the general outlines of peace, until he should return to the former ground, and consider Sicily in its true and real situation, namely, a state not conquered by France, or likely to be so, and coming most strictly within the meaning of his own words; that it had been clearly expressed by him, and repeated to you in the first instance, that France did not intend to make Sicily an obstacle to peace. M. Talleyrand answered, that whilst the war continued, and till terms were actually agreed upon, change of circumstances were always to be considered as reasons for a partial change of terms; that Bonaparte had been but lately convinced of the facility of taking Sicily at some future period of the war; but that, above all, he felt more and more its absolute necessity to make Naples and the neighbouring territories tenable: that had any confidential overture been made 3 months ago, they would have been ready to settle the question of Naples in the manner most satisfactory to G. Britain; the same a month later with regard to Holland. Those subjects were now arranged, and the emperor would consider any retrograde measure as equivalent to abdication. I observed to that minister, that however much good faith may be necessary in every transaction of the world, yet that being more peculiarly so, when, a communication is made secretly and verbally, I had a right to be

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doubly surprized at any change of ground. He defended himself by his former argument about altered circumstances; and said, that when no change of disposition was manifested towards G. Britain herself, as to the restoration of Hanover, or the possession of Malta and the Cape, he thought we might suffer them to possess themselves of a part of the states of their enemy, necessary to the tenure of the rest, Which no consideration would now induce France to restore.—M. Talleyrand then asked, whether I had any powers. told him that I must decline answering that question, until he should inform me that there would be no further discussion about Sicily; but that he might easily draw a conclusion that I had, from the honourable manner in which G. Britain endeavoured to remove every obstacle not in its. own nature insurmountable.—The minister then mentioned his being obliged to go to Cloud, and asked, what I said. I answered, "That I was ordered to continue no "conversation till I should be inform"ed that this new demand, changing en"tirely the proposed basis, should be" urged no more." He appointed next Meaning for me to receive an answer.— I accordingly returned to the office yesterday morning, when M. Talleyrand repeated the same demand, offering to desist from the recognition by G. Britain of any or all the new states, waving this concession to the honour of the powers created by France, and setting Hanover against Sicily, and pleading that, no such recognition being demanded, Hanover would then appear a fair equivalent for that island. He read the draft of an article to this effect: That G. Britain and France should not oppose each other's arms against such of the powers now at war, as should not be named in the preliminary articles.—To this I declined making any answer, repeating my orders not to converse further till he should abandon this proposition, and return to the former basis. I added that, unless he did so, could expect nothing but your order to return to England.— M. Talleyrand wished to revert to the old topic, on which I repeated to him that it was impossible for me to converse on any part of the subject, till he should entirely relinquish every mode of seeking for the possession of Sicily.—M. Talleyrand desired me to inform you, that on the 29th of June the French troops were to take possession of, Cattaro.
No. 17,—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 1, 1806; midnight.—Received July 4.
Sir; After closing the dispatch I had the honour to address to you this morning, I went for the passport M. Talleyrand had promised to have prepared for the messenger's return.—Instead of giving me the passport, he made many excuses for its having escaped his memory, requesting me to wait till he should come back from St. Cloud.—When I returned, M. Talleyrand proposed to me to offer the Hans Towns as an establishment for the king of Naples, and that the British troops should occupy them the same day they retake possession of Hanover. On a little further conversation, I had little doubt that were England to provide in any other manner for his Sicilian majesty, the king might add the Hans Towns and their territories, in full sovereignty to his German dominions.—The proposition about the Hans Towns being entirely new, I promised to refer it Without any comment to you for his majesty's consideration.—I have the honour to be, &c. YARMOUTH.
No.18.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmonth; dated Downing-street, July 5, 1806.
My lord; Your lordship's dispatches of the 1st inst. were received here, early yesterday morning, and I lose no time in apprising you of his majesty's commands upon the present state of the discussion with the French government.—The abandonment of Sicily is a point on which it is impossible for his majesty to concede. Your ldp. has already stated unanswerably to M. Talleyrand, that this demand is inconsistent with his express declarations, and with the whole principle on which the negociation rests. It is, besides, a proposal in itself quite inadmissible. The king's troops occupy Sicily for its defence, but with no right to cede it to France. It is not easy to contend; that the possession of Sicily can be necessary to that of Naples; nor, if it Were so; could that be assigned. as a reason for his majesty's consenting to abandon that island, Which he may justly, hope his naval and military force will be. able to defend against all attacks. The Hans Towns could not, in the present circumstances, answer the purpose of an equivalent for Sicily, even if there were not other obvious objections to such a pro-

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posal. Nor would it be possible that any solid basis for the public tranquillity of Europe could be established on the idea thrown out to you by M. Talleyrand, leaving G. Britain and France at liberty to prosecute the war against the allies of each other; a state of things in which their respective fleets and armies would in fact be as much opposed to each other, as they are now, and the peace between them would be merely nominal.—It is, therefore, to be hoped, that the French. government will revert to its original proposals with which your lordship was charged by M. ,Talleyrand. To that basis of negociation it must be your lordship's endeavour to recall him; and if, unfortunately, you should find this to be impracticable, nothing can remain but that you should state; in perfectly civil, but decided terms, that you are not at liberty to treat on any other ground, and must therefore desire your passports to return to England.—I have stated in my last letters the different ideas that had occurred here for combining our negotiation with that of Russia; providing, at the same time, for the safety of Sweden and. Portugal.—Until we are informed what other proposal is made in this respect M. Talleyrand, I can only desire that your lordship will keep this subject in view, so as not to admit of any thing inconsistent with the principle of good faith to which, his majesty must in substance adhere, but in such form as may best facilitate the great work of peace.—I am, &c.
No.19.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox;dated Paris, July 9, 1806.—Received July 12.
Sir; I had the honour to receive your dispatch of the 5th inst. early yesterday morning, and as soon as possible after waited upon M. Talleyrand to communicate to him that the offer made by France was by no means admissible, and that I had no authority to listen to any proposals whatsoever for the restoration of peace till he should desist from all pretension to the island of Sicily.—M. Talleyrand not being willing to make any such declaration, I asked him to give me a passport to return to London; be desired me to wait one day till he should again have taken the emperor's orders ,—I accordingly returned this morning, when he desired me to propose Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa, as an indemnity for the loss of Sicily to his Sicilian majesty; to this I answered that as the
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messenger was returning I should communicate this proposition, but that it by no means authorised me to expect any answer, and therefore I must beg leave to return to England.—Had M. d'Oubril not been here I should immediately have insisted on passports.—I must now inform you that on Monday M. Talleyrand took me aside and told me the telegraph announced the landing of Basilico, expressing at the same time a wish that the dispatches he would bring might lead to peace. I answered that I could expect no such result whilst France demanded Sicily; and added, that if I might believe public report, the emperor so far from shewing any pacific disposition, every day threw new obstacles in the way.—I then mentioned the changes in Germany. M. Talleyrand said that they were determined upon, but should not be published if peace took place. He has since repeated this to M. d'Oubril and myself, saying if peace was made, Germany should remain in its present state.—M. d'Oubril writes both to you and to the comte de Strogonoff; his letters will probably contain more than mine, as I conversed very little with M. Talleyrand. I felt on very delicate ground. Had I entered sufficiently into the question of indemnities for the king of Sicily, to obtain a precise idea to what extent they could be carried, M. Talleyrand might have formed an opinion that I had some instructions, and was prepared to abandon Sicily whenever I was assured of sufficient compensation.
No. 20.—Extract from a dispatch froth Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, July 18, 1806.
My lord; Your lordship's last dispatches have been received, and considered with all the attention which their importance naturally demanded.—It is unnecessary for me to recall to your lordship's recollection that the demand. of Sicily, in whatever shape it may he brought forward by France, is in express contradiction to the offers originally made to your lordship by M. Talleyrand. But it is material that this topic should never be lost sight of in the course of these discussions; and that your lordship should observe to M. Talleyrand, that whatever difficulty now obstructs the conclusion of the negociation, arises ,solely, from this unexpected departure from the basis originally established.—An exchange is now offered for Sicily, and it is in that

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view, and not in that of an absolute and uncompensated cession, that the question is to be considered. In this shape of the business it is obvious that the value of that exchange must be to be judged of, not only by this country and by Russia, but also by his Sicilian majesty. As the king, whose troops were admitted into Sicily for its defence and protection, naturally feels insuperable objections to any proposal for abandoning that island, unless with the free and full consent of its sovereign, and in consequence of such an arrangement as should provide for his interests by a compensation really satisfactory both in point of value and of security. The plan of creating for him a new kingdom, to consist of Dalmatia, Ragusa, and Albania, does not appear likely to answer this description. Albania, which forms so large a part of this proposed sovereignty, is now a province of the Turkish empire; the dismemberment of which it is a principal object of the policy both of G. Britain and Russia to prevent: that province has indeed been frequently involved in the same sort of confusion which prevails in many other parts of that empire, but this circumstance only increases the difficulty of giving any consistence to a state to be formed out of such materials. It does not lessen the other objections to such a plan.—There are in like manner many and strong objections to that part of the proposal which respects Ragusa; an independent state whose territory has never been ceded to France by any treaty, and of which she can consequently have no right to dispose, her occupation of it being indeed of very recent date.—But even with Albania and Ragusa, and much more without them, his majesty sees no hope that such a power could be formed in that quarter as would, either in extent of territory or in amount of revenue, afford the means of opposing any barrier for Austria or Turkey, or even of maintaining its own independence.—What advantage then could be gained to the allies by creating a nominal kingdom, without any sufficient power either to reduce the countries of which it would be composed under any uniform system of government, or to defend himself against the first attack which may be made upon it from without?— If there could, with the consent of his Sicilian maj. be any question of an exchange for Sicily, by the creation of a new state in that quarter, it is obvious that this could no otherwise be
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done than by annexing to Dalmatia not only the whole of Istria, but also a very large proportion if not the whole of the Venetian states, including, if possible, the city of Venice itself. In some such shape as this it is possible that the proposition might be rendered not wholly unacceptable to his Sicilian maj. And although the interests of this country separately would be far less consulted by such a plan than by the continued occupation of Sicily, yet the sense which the Russian minister at Paris appears to entertain of the advantage which might result from it to Austria and to Russia from the recovery of Dalmatia, if it were well combined with future arrangements of defence, might induce his maj. to accede to proposals of this description; on the supposition above mentioned of a bonâ fide consent on the part of his Sicilian majesty.—There appears, however, so little probability of inducing France so to extend her offer, that any further discussion of it might scarcely have been worth pursuing, had not M. d'Oubril so strongly expressed his wish, that this court might rather seek to temporize than abruptly to break off a negociation now brought to a state which affords so little promise of success. It is only in compliance with that desire that his maj. has been pleased to direct your lordship to continue the Conferences with M. Talleyrand, so as to ascertain whether any more practicable shape can he given to the proposal of an exchange for Sicily. If this cannot be done, your lordship's attention will then, of course, be directed to the object of recalling the French government to the basis on which the negociation was originally placed by themselves, and on which his majesty is still ready to conclude it.—M. d'Oubril has stated to count Strogonoff the proposals which have been made to him for the conclusion of a separate peace, and the inducements which, he thinks, might lead his maj. to judge such an arrangement useful to the general interests of Europe. His maj. has undoubtedly been at all times ready to make great sacrifices for those interests: but very little expectation is entertained here, that Russia could, in such course, obtain any effectual security for them, at a time when so much new danger is to be apprehended, and in so many quarters, from the projects of France with respect to Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Porte, Spain, and Portugal.—In the present circumstances of

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Europe, the last hope of averting these dangers is to be found in the union of the only two powers on whom France has as yet made no impression, Great Britain and Russia.—And although the mutual good dispositions and confidence of those two powers should in fact remain (as his maj. trusts they would) unimpaired by the difference of the situation in which a separate peace would place them, yet it is obvious, that the enemy would build the most extensive hopes on that foundation, and would be more encouraged by that, than by any other circumstance that could be stated, to proceed in the execution of the plans already announced to your lordship and to M. d'Oubril.—His maj. therefore, directs that you should express to that minister how material it is in every case, that the two courts should continue to combine their measures both of peace and war, and that no expectation should be held out to the enemy, of success in any endeavour to conclude a separate peace with either of the allies; a line to which, as your lordship will have informed M. d'Oubril, his maj. has, on his part, strictly adhered.
No. 21.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 19; 12 o'clock at night.—Received July 22.
Sir; On the 10th, gen. Clarke was named plenipotentiary to treat with M. d'Oubril: they have since had daily conferences of many hours, yesterday of fourteen. I hear every where that peace will be signed to-morrow, between Russia and France. On the 17th M. d'Oubril admitted to me, that he had produced his powers, and that if conditions, such as he should judge necessary to ensure the repose of the continent could be obtained, he should sign a truce of ten months; and this night, on pressing him, and remonstrating both upon his conduct and the impropriety of disguising His intention, I drew from him these words, which I wrote down in his presence: "Que voyant le danger immè diat de I' Autriche, s'il pouvoit la sauver, il croiroit de son devoir de le faire, même par une paix particulière." ["That being aware of the immediate danger of' Austria, if it was in his power to save it, he should think it his duty to do so, even by a separate peace."] All he now appears to claim is the return of the troops from Germany; and if he is willing to make peace on receiving an assurance that
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orders to that effect shall be sent, nobody can doubt, but that it will be signed; and probably not a battalion make a retrograde movement of 50 miles.—M. Talleyrand says, that M. d'Oubril is willing to abandon Sicily and Dalmatia, and even to eugage to solicit the junction of the former to Naples, &c.—I have used every argument to dissuade M. d'Oubril from so unadvised and unwise a measure, I hope more than I believe, with success. Indeed, I feared, from the first hour I met him, that he was come, determined to make a peace, good or bad, with or without G. Britain. I may perhaps gain a day, which may be a great deal, if that day should produce dispatches from M. de Strogonoff.—On the 17th, at night, the new arrangements for Germany were finally determined upon. The princes and the ministers who signed were scarce allowed time to read the deed. —There is a considerable army forming at Bayonne; 30,000 men are there already. This army is ostensibly destined against Portugal, but will take Spain likewise. M. Herman, one of the secretaries of the foreign office, set off for Lisbon with a mission on the 13th.—All the officers of the army now in Germany received yesterday orders to join their regiments instantly. The court say, this is to have troops to occupy the states seized by the new confederacy. The public ascribe this measure to a desire to frighten the emperor of Germany; and myself, to a wish to hurry M, d'Oubril, who has shewn so much anxiety for the evacuation of Germany.—M. d'Oubril and M. Talleyrand have, as I have learnt, fixed upon Majorca, Ivica, and Minorca, for his Sicilian majesty, if they can prevail upon us to evacuate Sicily.
No. 22.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 20, 1806; 11 at night.—Received July 24.
Sir; At 9 this morning, having had the honour to receive your letters by Mr. Longuinoff, and written a few lines to you in addition to my dispatches of last night, I went to M. d'Oubril; and as I am happy since to find, anticipated the contents of your dispatch of the 18th inst.—I used every argument and means to obtain delay; engaged to break off, if he did; and, finally, authorized him to hold out hopes, that I would listen to propositions of indemnity in lieu of Sicily for his Sicilian maj. if proposed by him, and accompanied by a joint negociation.—I begged he

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would do nothing till after Basilico should have arrived, as I had learnt by the telegraph, that he had landed last night.—I did not find him disposed to listen to me; and, not being willing to be too communicative towards him at that moment, I went away.—At 12, I waited upon M. Talleyrand: he was not to be seen. At 4, I heard from good authority, that peace was signed. At 6, Basilico arrived. I then went to M. d'Oubril. He was said not to be at home; but, seeing his carriage, I forced my way. He admitted the fact, peace is signed; the conditions, the evacuation instantèr of Germany by the French troops; the integrity, &c. of the Ottoman empire; no attempt to be made upon Swedish Pomerania; and, by a secret article, Russia promises to obtain his Sicilian majesty's consent to an exchange of Sicily for Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica. Russia to use her good offices to restore peace between France and England. I have not seen the treaty; but I believe it contains nothing else material.—M. d'Oubril sends a copy to count Strogonoff, and goes himself to St. Petersburgh. I had no patience to listen to M. d'Oubril's defence of his conduct, so I did not claim his good offices. I must have asked him officially to stay, which I did not choose to do.—I have the honour to be, &c. YARMOUTH. No. 23.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 21, 1806.—Received July 24.
Sir; I saw M. Talleyrand today. I can perceive that the terms of France, are increased, but still not as much so as the sudden defection of Russia had led me to apprehend. Hanover, Malta, the Cape, and India, remain pure and unsullied; and I took an opportunity in conversation to protest, that, come what come might, these were points I never would suffer to be mentioned, but as points agreed upon.—M. Talleyrand demanded my powers. I did not think myself authorised, in the present circumstances, to withhold them.—Gen. Clarke is named to treat with me.
No. 24.—Full powers given to the Earl of Yarmouth, which were communicated to M. Talleyrand on the 21st of July 1806, and exchanged with Gen. Clarke, the French Plenipotentiary, on the 23d. George R. —George III, by the grace of God, of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland king, defender of the faith, duke of Brunswick and Lunenburg,
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arch-treasurer and prince elector of the holy Roman Empire, &c. To all and singular to whom these presents shall come, greeting!—The flames of war having already raged too long in the different quarters of the world; it is the more incumbent upon us to re-establish the public tranquillity, by putting an end to so many quarrels and controversies. We have therefore judged it expedient to invest a fit person with:full powers on our part, for the better carrying on this great undertaking.—Know therefore, that we, reposing especial trust in the fidelity,diligence,judgment,perspicuity,and experience of our trusty and well beloved Francis Seymour, esq (commonly called earl of Yarmouth), have nominated, constituted, and appointed him, as by these presents we do nominate, constitute, and appoint him our true, certain, and undoubted procurator, commissioner, and plenipotentiary; giving to him all and all manner of power, faculty, and authority, together with general as well as special orders, (so that the general do not derogate from the special, nor on the contrary), for us and in our name to meet and confer with the ministers, commissioners, or plenipotentiaries of any other princes or states whatsoever, who may be interested therein, whether our enemies or our allies furnished with sufficient powers for that purpose, as well singly and separately, as aggregately and conjointly; and to consult and agree with them for the speedy restoration of sincere friendship and amity, and of a firm and lasting peace; and for us, and in our name, to sign all such matters and things as shall be agreed upon and concluded, and on the premises to form such treaty or treaties, or other instruments as shall be necessary; and mutually to deliver and receive the same in exchange, and to do and perform all such acts, matters, and things as may be in any way proper and conducive to the purposes above mentioned, in as full and ample a manner and form, and with the like validity and effect, as we ourself, if we were present, could do and perform; engaging and promising on our royal word, that we will accept, ratify, and confirm in the most effectual manner, all such acts, matters, and things, as shall be so transacted and concluded by our. said plenipotentiary, and that we will never suffer any person to violate the same in whole or in part, or to act contrary thereto.—In testimony and confirmation of all which, we have caused our great seal of our united

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kingdom of G. Britain and Ireland to be affixed to these presents, signed with our royal hand.—Given at our court at St. James's, this 26th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1806, and of our reign the 46th.
No. 25.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 24, 1806.—Received July 28.
Sir; I had the honour to send by M. de Longuinoff, dispatches acquainting you, for his majesty's information, of the peace signed between the Russian and French plenipotentiaries, and with as accurate a statement of the terms as I was able to obtain. M. d'Oubril himself set out for Petersburgh early on the morning of the 22d.—On the 22d I received the official notification of the appointment of gen. Clarke to treat on the part of France, (a copy of which I have the honour to in close, marked A.) preceded by a private communication from M. Talleyrand, saying, that the Russian peace being signed, and the season of the year favourable to the accomplishment of the ulterior views of France, no arrangement, which might remove for some weeks, or even months, a definitive treaty, could now, take place.—I answered the official note (marked A.) with one, a copy of which I inclose, (marked B.) —In the evening gen. Clarke proposed a conference for evening following morning, at Which we should mutually exchange our full powers. We accordingly did so; and I have the honour to inclose (marked-C.) a copy, of those of gen. Clarke.—This Conference began by an historical recapitulation of what had previously passed, gen. Clarke saying, he had not yet received his final instructions on all the different points in discussion; it was therefore agreed to adjourn the conference to this day, when each should come prepared With a memorandum of the intentions of his government, founded on what had already passed; gen. Clarke at the same time declaring that a separate peace with Russia was to be considered equal or superior, in the present circumstances of the World, to any great success in war, and consequently as entitling France to terms Much more advantageous than those to Which she would have subscribed some days ago: This was accompanied by some animadversions upon the conduct of Russia, to which I could only answer, that I felt it my duty abstain from any remark, and should, therefore, be entirely silent
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upon that subject; but that I could assure him that if an intention existed of making any change in the great points upon which we had such positive, though certainly not official, assurances, namely, his majesty's German dominions, Malta; and the Cape I must consider the negociation as stopped in limine, and that there would remain only for me to return to England, and acquaint the king, that no peace, consistent with his majesty's honour or that of the country, could be made. Gen. Clarke reverted to his want of full instructions, and promised to meet me properly prepared, the next day.—At 3 o'clock this day, I again met Clarke; when I read a paper, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose (marked D.), containing the abstract of What I had always stated to be the basis and terms on which his maj. could alone consent to treat. I did not, however, deliver it to him, considering it merely as the heads of past conversations.—Gen. Clarke then said, that as it was impossible I could be prepared with the assent of his maj. to the arrangement proposed by Russia for his Sicilian majesty, on Which the terms might much depend, I must consider the communication he made, as not strictly official in point of form, but as depending only on that circumstance to make it so.—Gen. Clarke proceeded to state, that in the situation France was in at this moment, the emperor would feel authorized to withhold some of the great points; but that having repeatedly said the contrary, though not in an official manner, he would abide by it.—Gen. Clarke first conversed about his majesty's German dominions. On this subject, by secret articles, any thing his majesty thinks right may be stipulated; by the public article, the promise not to object to some acquisition of territory to be, made by Prussia. I stopped gen. Clarke here to say, that his majesty never could consent to the king of Prussia's obtaining the Hans Towns. Gen. Clarke said, that it was Fulda, Hoya, and some other trifling principalities over which it was proposed to extend the sovereignty of his Prussian majesty, but that the independence and present state of the Hans Towns should not be meddled with.—On the subject of Malta: Malta, Gozo, and Conino in full sovereignty to his majesty, with a clause in the article, declaratory of the dissolution of the order, and that the two powers "n'en connoissent plus-l' existance,"no longer recognize the existence of it.]

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Some pensions for the chevaliers and others, having "des droits rèels dans I'isle," [real rights in the island.] This not to extend to foreign commanderies of the order, or to any claim not local.—The Cape in equal full sovereignty; as a condition it is desired, " qu'il y soit ètabli un port franc" [that there should be established there a free port] to all nations: either the port itself declared so, or a part appropriated to that purpose.—On the subject of the maintenance of the integrity of the territories and possessions of the sublime Porte, gen. Clarke proposed an article, a copy of which I have the honour to send (marked E.). I told him the usual full clause would be sufficient; he persisted that I should send it for his majesty's consideration.—To the usual full clause of the integrity of the territories and possessions of his most faithful majesty, gen. Clarke Weighed upon a proposed addition of the word "partout;" [in every part of the world] and when asked for explanation, said, he thought his Britannic maj. might occupy some of his most faithful majesty's foreign possessions.—The integrity of his Swedish majesty's dominions in the usual manner.—Having dismissed these points, gen. Clarke stated the demands of France: Pondicherry, St. Lucie, Tobago, Surinam, Goree, Demarara, Berbice, Essequibo.—The recognition in the usual words, " est reconnu," [is recognized] of the different branches of the reigning family; of the electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg as kings; of the new dukes of Cleves, Baden, and Darmstadt.—In discussing for many hours these demands, I never for an instant admitted the possibility of his majesty consenting to the cessions required. I sought, however, to ascertain to what extent, and in what manner they could be modified.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Paris, July 22, 1806.
My lord; I have the honour to inform your excellency, that, having laid before his maj. the emperor, the copy of the full powers from his Britannic maj. which you have done me the honour to communicate to me officially, I have received his majesty's orders to inform you, that he has Made choice of his excellency gen. Clarke, his principal private secretary, to negotiate and conclude the treaty which is to put an end to the present war, and restore at length to Europe, and to the commerce of
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the world, that peace and tranquillity which have been so long interrupted. I have just transmitted to gen. Clarke his majesty's orders, and I have no doubt that he will immediately arrange with your excellency the opening of a negociation, to the result of which are attached such important interests, and the prompt issue of which appears to me to be equally desired by both governments and both nations.— I request,&c, CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, Prince of Benevento.
Second Inclosure (B.) —Copy of note from the Earl of Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, July 22, 1806.
Sir; I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter, acquainting me with the choice made by the emperor of his excellency gen. Clarke, his principal private secretary, for the purpose of negociating and concluding the treaty which is to put an end to the present war.—I request that your excellency will be persuaded of the earnestness with which I shall enter into arrangements on this subject with gen. Clarke, as soon as his excellency shall inform me of his wishes in this respect. I request, &c. YARMOUTH.
Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of General Clarke's full powers.
Napoleon, by the grace of God, and by the constitution, emperor of the French, king of Italy, reposing entire confidence in the fidelity to our person, and zeal for our service, of the general of division Clarke, our privy counsellor of the cabinet, and great officer of the legion of honour, we have given to him, and do give to him by these presents, full and absolute power, commission, and special orders to agree upon, decide, conclude, and sign, in our name, and with the minister of his Britannic maj. duly authorized thereunto, such treaties, articles, conventions, declarations, and other acts, as he shall judge to be expedient; promising to agree to, to maintain, to accomplish, and punctually to execute, all that he the said plenipotentiary shall have promised and signed, by virtue of the present full powers; as also to have the letters of ratification prepared in due form, and to deliver them, in order that they may be exchanged within the time agreed upon.—In witness whereof, we have given these presents, signed with our hand, countersigned and sealed with our seal.—At St. Cloud, the 21st July, 1806, in the 2d year of our reign. NAPOLEON.

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Fourth inclosure (D.)—Extract from a paper read to Gen. Clarke by the Earl of Yarmouth.
The situation in which the two belligerent powers are now placed by the course of the events of the war, leaving few points of immediate contact between them, or on which they may not, according to all appearance, come now to an understanding, his Britannic majesty, animated no less than the emperor of the French, with a desire to put an end to the calamities of war, has authorized the undersigned (furnished with the full powers of his majesty) to discuss the basis, and to give full effect to this reciprocal desire.—The immense acquisitions made by France since the commencement of hostilities, and the direct and immediate influence which she has obtained, having entirely changed the political system of Europe, his Britannic maj. finds himself obliged to seek in the conquests he has made, and in the possession of Malta, a just and reasonable counterpoise. His maj, would consequently treat generally on the basis of the uti possidetis.—It is at the same time understood, that the German possessions of his Britannic maj. of which he was deprived from motives foreign to the war between the two powers, shall be restored to him entire.—It is like, wise understood, that the peace shall secure the integrity of the territories and possessions of the Sublime Porte, of his most faithful majesty, of his maj. the king of Sweden, and the present state of Switzerland.
Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of an article proposed by Gen. Clarke to the Earl of Yarmouth for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
The two contracting powers reciprocally guarantee the entire and absolute integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire. They will mutually oppose the pretensions of any power to any thing contrary to the usages, the rights of sovereignty, and the possessions of the Sublime Porte.
No. 26.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, July 26, 1806.
My lord; Your lordship's dispatches conveying the mortifying intelligence of the signature of a separate treaty between Russia and France, were received here yesterday; and his majesty's ministers have since had the opportunity of being acquainted. with the precise terms of that
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treaty, which it appears had not in all respects been accurately represented to your lordship.—The king was most particularly struck with the great difference which was perceived between the actual arrangement made respecting Sicily, and that which had been described to your ldp.—In writing to your lordship, it is not necessary to dwell on the humiliating conditions to which M. d'Oubril has thought proper to bind his sovereign. Of that minister's misconduct your lordship appears fully sensible; and I doubt not you exerted yourself to the utmost to prevent it. When this was found impracticable, your lordship was naturally placed in circumstances of considerable difficulty, and for which every allowance is to be made. But it is necessary for me to say, frankly, that it would on the whole have been more satisfactory to the king's servants, if your lordship had waited to know the impression which this new event might create here before you had produced your full powers.—It was originally declared by your lordship to M. Talleyrand, that your full powers were not to be produced till the French government should have reverted to the basis of negociation originally proposed by themselves, that of the uti possidetis universally, with the single exception of Hanover. By subsequent instructions, your lordship had indeed been acquainted that, in compliance with the wish so strongly expressed by the Russian negociator at Paris, his maj. would not refuse to enter into the consideration of such proposals as might be made to him for a fair equivalent to be given to his Sicilian majesty in lieu of Sicily, with the full and free consent of that monarch. The proposal of such an equivalent, and its acceptance by his majesty's government, would have replaced the negociation on its original footing, that of a uti possidetis, to be departed from only by mutual consent, in those cases where any exchange for a reasonable equivalent might meet the ideas of both parties; and the case for the production of your lordship's full powers would thus have arisen clearly and unequivocally, Even as the matter now stands, it does not certainly preclude discussion. But this might have been continued unofficially. And it is apprehended that, by producing your powers on the very day after the signature of the Russian treaty, an impression may have been created very unfavourable to the further progress of the negociation.—In the situation .to which the business is now.

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brought, his majesty thinks it necessary to lose no time in taking every proper step for replacing the discussions between the two countries on their original footing.—The first proposals made by France were, that a plenipotentiary should be sent from hence with full powers to treat, and to conclude a separate peace with France and her allies. This was declined here, not from any unwillingness to enter into discussions for peace on just and honourable terms, an object which his maj. has uniformly expressed himself desirous of accomplishing, but because the king was bound by engagements. to Russia, which precluded him from treating otherwise than in concert with that power. Subsequently to this, a proposal was conveyed through your lordship for the conclusion of peace on the basis so often referred to; and the intermediate. communications received from Russia enabled his majesty, consistently, with good faith, to entertain those proposals, and to express his disposition to accede to them, provided that, in the mode of treating and concluding, the most intimate concert should still be maintained with Russia.—The extraordinary step taken by M. d'Oubril has now removed all necessity of further, reserve on, this, point.—His majesty, in this state, of things, thinks it proper to combine together the two proposals which he has at different periods received from France; and, as the difficulty which before prevented the sending from this country a public minister, openly accredited, to treat for peace, now no longer subsists, and as an. acceptable basis of negociation has been proposed to him, by the enemy, his majesty directs, that your lordship should apply to M. Talleyrand fur, passports for a public minister so, authorized and accredited, to whom it is his majesty's gracious intention to join, your lordship, in the full powers to be granted. by his, majesty.—The great advantages which the king's service will derive front the employment of a person fully instructed as, to the sentiments, a his majesty's government all the various points of discussion that may arise, cannot fail strike your lordship in the same light in which they are seen here; and. the king's servants entertain no doubt of your lordship's zealous and hearty co-operation it the execution of the joint instruction which such a person will bring with him. I have only, therefore, to add, that you lordship may assure, M. Talleyrand, that as soon as the necessary passports are re-
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ceived, there shall not be an hour's delay in his setting out; and that, his majesty's government continues ardently to wish for the conclusion of peace, provided it can be accomplished on the same grounds of national honour, which have never been lost sight of here.
No. 27.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated, Downing-street, July 28, 1806
My lord; Your lordship's dispatch of the 24th inst. was received here this morning, and as it is probable that, in the course of this day, or tomorrow at farthest,your ldp. will receive mine of the 26th, inst., I do not think it necessary to do more at present, than to request that your lordship will assure M. Talleyrand, that, immediately on the receipt of the passports which you, have been instructed to demand, the earl of Lauderdale, who has been humbly recommended to his majesty for this important trust, will be prepared to set out; and that he will, therefore, of course, be with your lordship, in a very few days from this date. I need hardly observe to your lordship, that it. is of the utmost importance, that, in the interim, your lordship should, avoid taking any step, or even holding any language, which may tend in the smallest degree to commit the opinion of his majesty's government on any part of the matters now depending.
No. 28.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 30th, 1806.—Received August 1st.
Sir; I had the honour to receive your dispatch of the: 26th inst, late at night on the 28th, and next morning lost no time in asking for blank passports for a person fully instructed with the sentiments of his majesty's government, whom it was their intention to join with me in, the important commission of treating for peace. M. Talleyrand told me be. must take the emperor's orders. I accordingly returned this day, when that minister informed me, that the emperor could consider this demand in no other light but that of unnecessary delay, because his majesty's secretary of state was actually in possession of a blank passport, which would enable any person or persons to come to Paris without the loss of time occasioned by this demand; but that "pour surcroit de facilitès," [for still greater facility,] there could be no difficulty about giving more. I answered

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that I had no knowledge of this circumstance. M. Talleyrand said it was certain, because he had sent two entirely in blank, and that one only had been used, namely,that with which I returned.—It is unnecessary for me to add any thing to what I have already said in my former dispatches, relative to the signature of the Russian treaty; any inaccuracy in the statement of its contents, such as I was enabled to transmit them, may easily be accounted for by the circumstance of my not having seen the treaty itself, and by the unwillingness M. de Oubril naturally felt to open himself to me on that subject; he informed me at the time that he should send a copy to M. de Strogonoff, who would communicate it to his majesty's ministers.—It is with pain, sir, proportioned to my zeal for his majesty's service, and to the fair and honest conviction of my having done nothing which the peculiar and trying circumstances of the moment did not require from me, that I have learnt by the same dispatch the expression of a wish that I had delayed the production of my full powers till I could know the impression which this event of the Russian treaty might produce in his majesty's councils, and the apprehension that by the producing them, so soon after the signature of the Russian treaty, an impression might be created unfavourable to the further progress of the negociation.—If the question regarded only my own personal feelings, I should not think myself at liberty to allot to it so large a portion of a public dispatch; but it may not, I conceive, be unuseful, with a view to the conduct of the negociation, that you should be apprized of some details which I have hitherto omitted dwelling upon, partly from the urgency of more important subjects, and partly from my desire not to trespass upon your attention to so great an extent. I trust, sir, that his majesty will see in these details wherewithal to justify my conduct in the difficult situation in which I was placed.—The fate of Holland and Naples was settled before I was honoured with his majesty's confidence.—My conversation here with M. Talleyrand soon convinced me that these were only preludes to still greater changes in the system of Europe. I saw at the same time a great desire of negociation, before the final execution of some of the emperor's schemes should have removed any hope of its being attended with success.—This opinion, not preconceived or lightly taken up, but gra-
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dually formed from a variety of circumstances, was confirmed by the nature of the offers held out, unofficially indeed, but in such clear and unequivocal terms, that it was impossible to entertain any doubt of the intention of this government to adhere to them.—The point which of all others was the most essential, and that on which satisfaction was due to the national honour and to that of his majesty, Hanover, would, I was assured, be given up without restriction; for I did not then know we should be asked to allow the king of Prussia to obtain the sovereignty of some of the lesser principalities.—I received similar assurances about Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope; nor have I any reason to doubt but that before Russia had made her peace separately, these terms might have been obtained, and the treaty have had solely for its basis the uti possidetis, with the sole exception in our favour Hanover restored, and bitterly indeed of some arrangements tolerable to all parties in exchange for Sicily.—M. Talleyrand held the same language to me, with respect to Russia, which he had before held with regard to the affairs of Germany. "You have now been here a month; we have been willing to converse with you, to give you an insight into our views, and to communicate them to the British government. We told you, that if you had the powers, and would enter into negociation, we would not sign the arrangement of Germany. A reasonable time was left for you to consult your government; we had no answer. The arrangement was signed, et nous reviendrons jamais, [and we will never recede from it]. We now ask you whether you will treat before Russia has signed, which will not pass two days."—It cannot be necessary to state my answer to such a proposition. I will only add, that the treaty with Russia was signed within the time mentioned, and then commenced the difficulty of, my situation. "Switzerland," I was told by the same authority, "is on the eve of undergoing a great change. This cannot be averted but by a peace with England; but still less can we alter for any other consideration, our intention of invading Portugal. The army destined for that purpose is already as sembling at Bayonne. This is for the determination of G. Britain."—But I confess, the point of all others the most decisive in inducing me to produce my full

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powers, was the language held respecting Prussia. "Prussia demands from us a declaration respecting Hanover; we can not consent wantonly to lose the only ally France has had since the revolution; the declaration once made nous n'en pouvons nous retracter, [we cannot retract]. Would you have us break entirely with Prussia, when we cannot even say that G. Britain gill negociate with us? Are you here only with orders to delay our measures till the season of the year makes exertion impossible, or can you treat? If so, is not the assurance we give you, that Hanover, Malta, and the Cape,shall not be contested, sufficient to induce you to do so? Must we lay before the British government our exact terms, before they will even avow a negociation with so great a power as that of France? or shall we execute our other projects, as we did those in Hol "land and Naples?" —Undoubtedly, sir, conversations of this sort, confirmed even as they were by the events passing under my eyes, could never have induced me to commit his majesty's confidential servants upon any point upon which I had not received their instructions, and which left no time to receive them; but I did not think myself at liberty to shift from myself the responsibility thus thrown upon me, at the risk of seeing Portugal and Switzerland share the same fate which Germany has just experienced, and Hanover confirmed to Prussia, until such time as his majesty arms should recover the possession of it. The mode of proceeding of this government left me no alternative. Either to avow negociation, or shut up every opening to it, was my only option.—I felt that I pledges his majesty to nothing except the fact of negociation, already privately known to every court in Europe.— I carefully for bore giving any written paper, or admitting even the possibility of any other basis. than that of uti possidetis.— I have ascertained the real extent of the pretensions of France; and I did consider myself to have prevented a great evil at small expence by having give time to yourself and his majesty's other confidential servants, to provide by the further instructions you neigh judge proper, for the interest of the powers, thus, for the moment at least, saved from the grasp of France.—I persuade myself that the motives here detailed upon which I acted at the moment, will place in a stronger light the difficulties of my posi-
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ion, and will on further consideration obtain his majesty's gracious approbation of the conduct which I thought myself obliged to hold in consequence.—His majesty's ministers would have relieved me from much painful responsibility, if they had commanded me to proceed no further, and wait the arrival of the person alluded to, and for whom I have the honour to inclose the necessary passport which I have this moment received.—Mr. Goddard, whom a long residence in France, independent of his abilities and correct information of what has passed here, renders entirely able to give his majesty's ministers every explanation they may wish for, is so good as to take this dispatch with him to England, where he is returning at the end of his long captivity in this country, I have the honour to he, &c. YARMOUTH.
No. 29.—Copy of a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-Street, August the 2d, 1806.
My lord; Mr. Goddard arrived here yesterday evening with your lordship's dispatch of the 30th July.—His majesty's servants always did justice to the motives which induced your lordship to produce your full powers, though the step is one of which it is not possible for them to express approbation, thinking it, as they do, likely to have given so much more countenance than was desireable to the new and increasing demands of France."—The full powers which lord Lauderdale carries with him, are drawn jointly in his name and your lordship's. In the present disposition of the French government, there is, I fear little probability, that peace can be concluded on such terms as are alone admissible. The trial should, however, be made with frankness and good faith; and it is with this view that his majesty has beers pleased to direct that the earl of Lauderdale should proceed to Paris, notwithstanding the present unfavourable aspect of the negociation. His instructions your lordship will consider as equally addressed to yourself, and as the rule of your conduct in any conferences which, in conjunction with him, you may have with M. Talleyrand or gen. Clarke; and, in any point of doubt that may occur, it is his majesty's pleasure, that your lordship should be guided by lord Lauderdale's opinion formed, as it will be, on the fullest a knowledge of the sentiments and views of a his majesty's government. I am, &c. C. J. Fox.

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No. 30.—Copy of a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, Aug. 3, 1806.
My lord; I was unwilling to detain lord Lauderdale for the purpose of replying particularly to the unfounded allegations of M. Talleyrand, which you have recapitulated in your dispatch of the 30th ult. But some points are there mentioned which cannot be left without an answer, such, indeed, as I trust your lordship has already given to them.—It is true, as stated by that minister, that when the demand was made for lord Lauderdale's passport, there still remained here a blank passport, one of the two sent here some time before your lordship's arrival, when it had been proposed to us to treat separately from Russia. That proposal having fallen to the ground, the circumstance of our being still in possession of the passport was overlooked; but, even if it had occurred, some doubt would probably have arisen, how far it might be proper, in so different a state of things, to make use of it for lord Lauderdale, without some previous communication of such an intention. This whole matter is, however, very immaterial. The principal point to which I feel it necessary to advert, is that part of M. Talleyrand's language which imputes to this country needless delays in the negociation, and attributes to that cause the unjustifiable measures pursued by France in Germany, and elsewhere.— In the instructions given to lord Lauderdale, the repeated tergiversations of France, during the negociation, are detailed. It is from thence alone that delay has arisen.—Your lordship truly states, that the offers made through yourself were so clearly and unequivocally expressed, that the intention of the French government could not be doubted. But they were no sooner made than departed from. In the first conference after your lordship's return to France, Sicily was demanded. In the former offers, it had been distinctly disclaimed: "Vous l'avez—nous ne vous la demandons pas. Si nous la possèdions, elle pourroit augmenter de beaucoup les difficultès." [You are in possession of it. We do not demand it of you. If we possessed it, the difficulties might he much increased.] This demand, therefore, could not have been foreseen, being in contradiction to their own assurances; and your lordship could only take it ad referendum. This produced a delay attributable solely to France. Our answer was immediate and distinct. The new demand
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was declared to be a breach of the principle of the proposed basis in its most essential part. To obviate a cavil on the subject of full powers,they were sent to you; but with an express injunction not to use them, nor even to produce them formally, till the French government should return to its former ground respecting Sicily. Your lordship stated this to M. Talleyrand, and you received in return, a proposal, of giving to his majesty, or to the king of Naples, the Hans towns in lieu of Sicily. This being again a proposition entirely new, could only be referred for his majesty's consideration. On the very next day after it arrived, it was decidedly rejected here; and, so little were we disposed to delay, that the same dispatch conveyed to you his majesty's orders, if the demand of Sicily should still be persisted in, to desire your passports, and return to England.—Of this order your lordship informed M. Talleyrand, and its execution was delayed only by a fresh proposal of exchanges brought forward by France, and supported by the Russian minister, as affording the means by which his majesty might prevent,amongst other things, the changes meditated in Germany. M. Talleyrand, it appears, now represents this communication in the following terms; "We told you, that if you had powers, and would enter into negociation, we would not sign the arrangement in Germany." M. Talleyrand's real communication is to be found in your lordship's dispatch of the 9th July, in which he says, that those changes "were determined upon, but should not be published if peace took place."—That dispatch was received here on the 12th; and on the 17th, in direct violation of these assurances, in whichever form they were conveyed, the German treaties were both signed and published.—They must of course have been prepared at least one day before. What M. Talleyrand therefore calls a reasonable time allowed to your lordship to consult your government, was, at the most, 24 hours, even supposing the utmost possible expedition to be made by the messengers to and from England, and no accident or delay to occur by land or sea. These dates will undoubtedly not have escaped your lordship's attention, and will have enabled you to refute, in the most decisive manner, the unfounded pretences by which the French government seeks to attribute to delays on our part, the results of its own injustice, and repeated breach of promise.—The whole of our intercourse

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with France bears indeed so different a character from that of delay, and the whole of the king's conduct in this, as in every other instance, is marked by so many striking proofs of his desire to avert, even by the greatest sacrifices, such calamities as he is now accused of producing, that your lordship may perhaps have felt it less necessary to enter into a particular refutation of such a charge.—But after the experience which in this negotiation we have had of the conduct of the French government, it is of the highest consequence not to suffer such imputations to pass unnoticed, and, by disregard, to acquire strength and currency.—Of the subsequent proceedings, no explanation can be necessary. It had not been decided here, that in the event of the signature of the Russian treaty, the negociation on the part of this country should be pursued on any other basis but that of the strict uti possidetis, with the exception of Hanover. The resolution of admitting even the possibility of equivalent for Sicily, had been adopted only in consequence of M. d'Oubril's desire, and in order to maintain, if it had been possible, the union of council and measures between G. Britain and Russia. But by the production of your lordship's full powers, his majesty was in some sort pledged to continue the negociation. It was then judged proper that a fresh negociator should be added to your lordship, and not an instant has been lost in giving effect to that determination; nor has any considerable delay occurred on this side the water,except in the single point respecting the passport, which I have explained in the outset of this dispatch. I am, &c. C. J. Fox.
No. 31.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 6, 1806; 9 o'clock A. M.—Received Aug. 13.
Sir; The desire expressed by commodore Owen, in the uncertain state of the weather, to get off the coast of France as soon as possible, prevented me from detaining the boat for the purpose of announcing to you my arrival at Calais. After a very quick passage in his majesty's frigate the Clyde, I was put on shore on Sunday morning the 3d, about 11 o'clock. At Calais I received every mark of attention and civility front the magistrates and the commanders of the army, and of the marine, as well as from the inhabitants of the place, who were in crowds on the shore, expressing their wishes for peace. I have now to inform you, that
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on Tuesday I got to Paris about 12 o'clock; where I immediately sent the inclosed note, (marked A.) to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, from whom I soon afterwards received the answer, (markedB.) which I also inclose. At the hour appointed, I waited upon his excellency, with whom I had a short conversation, in which his anxiety for your speedy recovery formed the principal topic. He informed me that gen. Clarke was the person named by the emperor to negociate with lord Yarmouth and myself, and appointed this day at 11 o'clock for the formal exhibition of our powers. As the frequency of communication gives rise to false speculations in England, it is not my intention to send a messenger until I shall have something more important to communicate. I am, &c. LAUDERDALE.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated August 5, 1806.
The earl of Lauderdale, appointed by his Britannick majesty, plenipotentiary at the court of France, has the honour to inform his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, of his arrival at Paris, and at the same time to request that he will have the goodness to inform him at what hour he may call upon him.
Second inclosure (B).—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated August 5, 1806.
The minister for foreign affairs has learnt with pleasure the arrival of the earl of Lauderdale. He will be happy to see him today at 5 o'clock. He has the honour to present to the earl of Lauderdale the assurances of his high consideration.
No. 32.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug.7,1806. Received Aug. 13.
Sir; In consequence of the appointment mentioned in my dispatch of yesterday's date, I called on his excellency, the minister for foreign affairs, at 11 o'clock, and exhibited the powers with which his majesty has been graciously pleased to invest me.—According to custom, I left with his excellency a copy of the powers, and he delivered to me a letter which I have the honour to inclose, informing me that gen. Clarke had been appointed to negotiate with lord Yarmouth and myself.—To gen. Clarke I was introduced before dinner, at the house of his excellency the minister, and in the course of a short conversation with him, fixed our first meeting for 12

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o'clock this day. I have reason to think that he did not wish it to take place so soon, though he certainly made no explicit objection when I proposed it. I am, &c. LAUDERDALE.
Inclosure referred to in the preceding dispatch.—Copy of a, note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Aug. 6th, 1806.
The undersigned minister for foreign affairs has lost no time in laying before his majesty, the emperor and king, the full powers which his excellency lord Lauderdale, minister plenipotentiary on the part of his Britannick majesty, has done him the honour to communicate to him. He has the honour to inform lord Lauderdale, that gen. Clarke has been appointed, by his majesty, and has received his credentials to treat for peace, and that it is with that minister that their excellencies, my lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth, will have, to enter into negociation on the subject of the present discussions, which the two governments equally desire to see happily concluded. (Signed), CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.
No. 33.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris; Aug. 7, 1806.—Received Aug. 13.
Sir; I received in due time, and in their order; your several dispatches of the 8th ult. and the 2d and 3d inst. As no messenger has been dispatched from hence since the receipt of them, I. have been obliged to defer, till now, replying to their contents.—It was with great satisfaction that I learnt,by your dispatch of the 2d inst. the intelligence of lord Lauderdale's departure from England; as, independently of the advantages I, must derive from communicating with,a person charged with the latest and fullest instructions from his majesty, his arrival here afforded me the opportunity of evincing, in the clearest manner, that I had in no instance thought myself at liberty to depart from the basis, originally laid down as the only one on which his majesty's ministers could consent to treat with the French government.— It must be evident that whatever delays have occurred in the negociation are imputable to France, and, to the perpetual variation of the terms proposed by her; and I had not failed before the receipt of your dispatch of the 3d inst. repeatedly to do justice to the conduct a his majesty's government in that respect.—As in the- line of conduct
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which I thought it my duty to observe previous to the earl of Lauderdale's arrival, I had no other object in view than the fulfilling to the best of my abilities the mission with which his majesty had been graciously pleased to charge me, I can, under the present circumstances, have no other ambition than that of co-operating with my best endeavours in the negociation entrusted to us jointly, upon the same basis on which I had originally placed it.—I have the honour to be, &c. YARMOUTH.
No. 34.—Full powers given to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, which were communicated to M. Talleyrand on the 6th of August, 1806.
George III., by the grace of God, of the united kingdom of G. Britain and Ireland king, defender of the faith, duke of Brunswick and Lunenburg, arch-treasurer and prince elector of the holy Roman empire, &c. To all and singular to whom these presents shall come, greeting!—The flames of war having already raged too, long in the different quarters of the world, it is the more incumbent upon us to re-establish the public tranquillity, by putting, an end to so many quarrels and controversies, We have therefore judged it expedient to invest certain fit persons with full powers on our part for the better carrying on this great undertaking.—Know therefore, that we, reposing especial trust in the fidelity, diligence, judgement, perspicuity, and experience of our right trusty and well-beloved James earl of Lauderdale, and of our trusty and well-beloved Francis Seymour esq. commonly called earl of Yarmouth, have nominated, constituted, and appointed them, as by these presents we do nominate, constitute, and appoint them, our true, certain, and undoubted procurators commissioners, and plenipotentiaries: giving to them conjointly or separately, all and all manner of power, faculty, and authority, together with general-as well as special orders, (so that the general do not derogate from the special, nor on the contrary,) for us and in our name to meet and confer with the ministers, commissioners, or plenipotentiaries, of any other princes or states whatsoever, who may be interested therein, whether our enemies or our allies, furnished with, sufficient powers for that purpose, as well singly and separately, as aggregately and conjointly and to consult and agree with them for the speedy restoration of a sincere friendship and amity

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and of a firm and lasting peace; and for us and in our name to sign all such matters and things as shall be agreed upon and concluded on the premises, and to form such treaty or treaties or any other instruments as shall be necessary, and mutually to deliver and receive the same in exchange, and to do and perform all such acts, matters, and things, as may be in any way proper and conducive to the purposes above mentioned, in as full and ample a manner and form, and with the like validity and effect, as we ourself, if we were present, could do and perform; engaging and promising, on our royal word, that we will accept, ratify, and confirm, in the most effectual manner, all such acts, matters, and things as shall be so transacted and concluded by our said plenipotentiaries, conjointly or separately, and that we will never suffer any person to violate the same in whole or in part, or to act contrary thereto.—In testimony and confirmation of all which, we have caused our great seal of our united kingdom of G. Britain and Ireland to be affixed to these presents, signed with our royal hand.—Given at our court at St. James's, this 1st day of August, in the year of our Lord 1805, and of our reign the 46th.
No. 35.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 9, 1806.—Received Aug. 13.
Sir; Thinking it unnecessary to send a courier to England with the details of the mere matters of form which necessarily took place after lord Lauderdale's arrival, we have delayed writing till there appeared something of importance to communicate to you.—We have now to inform you, that lord Lauderdale, having exhibited his powers, and delivered a copy in the customary form, our first meeting with gen. Clarke, the plenipotentiary of the French government, took place at his house, on Thursday 7th Aug. at noon.—Our conversation commenced by gen. Clarke's observing that as lord Lauderdale had just arrived from London, with full instructions from his majesty, he had probably something new to communicate.—Lord Lauderdale in substance replied that it was his wish before intermeddling with the negotiation now pending, distinctly to recall to the recollection of gen. Clarke what had already passed between his majesty and the government of France, and at once precisely to state the only
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footing on which his majesty could consent to treat. To effect this object, he informed gen. Clarke, that he had prepared a note (marked A.)which he begged to deliver to him as official.—Gen. Clarke read the note twice with great attention, and afterwards placed it in his portfolio, saying that he must take it ad referendam.—Very little passed at this meeting sufficiently interesting to merit being detailed; the general objected to the practice he apprehended lord Lauderdale meant to introduce of conducting the negociation by writing; and said that he was afraid the emperor would regard it as a means of endless delay, if a note was to be delivered upon every insignificant question which it might be necessary to discuss, The reply consisted merely in stating the distinction betwixt delivering a written note for the purpose of at once bringing to a point the basis on which the negotiation was to be conducted, and resorting on every trivial occasion to that practice. The first, it was contended, must accelerate; the latter, its was admitted, would delay the negociation; and it would be therefore carefully avoided, as it was his majesty's wish that no delay should take place.—Gen. Clarke, with something like an insinuation that an unfair advantage was taken by the government of G. Britain, announced that as there had been two plenipotentiaries appointed by his majesty, it was the emperor's intention to do the same, and that the name of the person selected would be communicated to us.—It is proper to state, that in the course of this conversation lord Yarmouth recalled to gen. Clarke's recollection that in all the interviews he had had with him, he uniformly stated the uti possidetis as the only basis upon which he could possibly treat. Gen. Clarke in reply said, that he could make no answer to what lord Yarmouth stated, without alluding to conversations which he affected to consider as loose, calling them "des romans politiques;" [political romances;] at the same time by his silence he clearly admitted what lord Yarmouth most distinctly stated.—Our first interview terminated with an appointment to meet at lord Lauderdale's apartments on Friday the 8th at 12 o'clock, the general observing that it, might be perhaps necessary to put off the appointment, as he wished to have full time to consider the note which had been delivered, and as the new plenipotentiary might wish to have an opportunity carefully to read the cor-

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respondence that hitherto had taken place. He promised at the same time, if this was the case, to give us notice by writing in the morning—On Friday the 8th at 11 o'clock, the inclosures (marked B. and C.) were left at lord Lauderdale's apartments, and an answer was sent to general Clarke, stating that an appointment had been made by lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth to receive the Turkish ambassador at 4 o'clock, and requesting that the meeting should take place on Saturday the 9th at noon.—Gen. Clarke, and M. Champagny, minister of the interior, the newly appointed plenipotentiary, afterwards put off this meeting till 4 o'clock today, as the latter was obliged to attend the emperor's privy council at St. Cloud. Late on Friday night, lord Yarmouth received the answer to the note delivered by lord Lauderdale; a copy of. which (marked D.) is inclosed, to which lord Lauderdale and lord Yarmouth immediately returned the answer, also inclosed, (marked E.).—Gen. Clarke and M. Champagny came to the meeting appointed at 4 o'clock, and a conversation took place which lasted for upwards of two hours. Into the details of this it is impossible now to enter. The general object of it was to engage lord Lauderdale to depart from the basis which he had insisted should be recognised, to prevail upon him to consult his government, or to take 10 or 15 days for consideration; but it terminated by lord Lauderdale's declaring that the last note was to be considered as a prelude to his demanding passports, for which he should apply to M. Talleyrand in the course of the evening. The letter, a copy of which (marked F.) is inclosed, was dispatched to M. Talleyrand half an hour after the departure of the plenipotentiaries, and it appears highly improbable that any proposition should be made which can alter our resolution of leaving France, the moment the passports arrive. We have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note delivered by the Earl of Lauderdale to GeneralClarke on the 7th of August, 1806.
The undersigned plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, previous to entering upon the negociation actually pending between his sovereign and the court of France, thinks it necessary briefly to retrace the circumstances in which it originated. At the same time, he conceives it consistent with that character of openness and since
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rity, which, as his Britannic majesty's plenipotentiary, he is determined invariably to support, to declare the only basis upon which he can consent to treat, to be the principle which Fsance herself originally laid down; and to define the nature of the discussion into which he is about to enter.—The strong and energetic language in which the French government, a few months since, expressed its desire for peace, whilst it inspired his majesty with confidence in the real sincerity of the wishes of the court of France, left him only to regret that the proposal of treating with his majesty separately from his allies, appeared to prevent both France and England from profiting by that happy disposition of their respective governments; it being at that time impossible for his majesty, conformably with the good faith which he has ever evinced, to treat otherwise than conjointly with his ally the emperor of Russia.—Since that time, his majesty having found that circumstances which it is unnecessary to detail here, permitted his majesty to negociate separately: He received with great pleasure, the proposal of treating generally, upon the basis of uti possidetis, which was to be scrupulously observed except in the case of Hanover, which was proposed to be ceded to his majesty with all its dependencies. It is true, that this proposal was not made either directly, or through the channel of an accredited minister of its authenticity, however, no one could entertain the smallest doubt. Independently of the authority which it derived from the character of the person employed to communicate it, it seemed to agree completely with what had been previously announced, For "The emperor desires nothing that England possesses," (an avowal made at the commencement of the correspondence between the two courts) was a natural prelude to such a proposal.—His majesty regarded the cession of Hanover as a proof of the spirit of justice in which the proposal was conceived, because this electorate, although occupied on account of a supposed identity of interests and of measures, in fact had no relation whatever with the disputes Which produced the present war: and his majesty saw in the principle hitherto acknowledged as the general basis of negociation, a basis peculiarly adapted to the relative situations of the two parties, which he considered a proof that France was as sincerely disposed as Great Britain to put an end to an order of things

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equally prejudicial to the interests of both countries.—In fact it appeared to his majesty to be the only principle upon which it was probable that a negociation could be brought to a successful issue. From the nature of the interests of the parties engaged in it, there was but little hope that any satisfactory arrangement could be made on the ground of reciprocal restitution, by giving up their respective acquisitions; on the other hand, the principle of uti possidetis naturally presented itself, as the mode of terminating the unfortunate hostilities between the two nations, both of whom were in possession of conquests extensive and important in point both of territory and of influence; France on the continent of Europe, and Great Britain in other parts of the world.—This truth appeared still more striking to his majesty, upon reflecting that the state of possession in which the two nations held their respective acquisitions could scarcely suffer any important change by the continuance of the war; the superiority of the naval force of G. Britain being, according to all appearance, not less firmly established on the seas, than that of the armies of France on the continent of Europe.—It was under the impression which these ideas naturally produced, that his maj. accepted, without hesitation, the proposal of treating upon the principle of uti possidetis, with the reservation due to the connection and the concert that subsisted with the emperor of Russia; and, as a proof of his sincerity, his maj. fixed upon the person by whom the communication had been made, to announce the readiness with which he had acceded to the basis proposed for the conclusion of a treaty.—The undersigned is by no means disposed to conceal the satisfaction his majesty derived from these happy prospects of speedily restoring to his subjects the blessings of peace, upon just and equitable principles, such as were conformable to the honour of his crown nor the regret which his maj. felt, when, almost at the very moment of his declaring his acceptance of his proposal that had been made to him, it was signified that this principle was suddenly abandoned by the demand of the evacuation and cession of Sicily; a demand which has hitherto been modified merely by projects of indemnity for his Sicilian majesty which appear to be totally inadequate and inadmissible.—This demand, so incompatible with the avowed principles upon which the two powers were
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treating, was in itself sufficient to put an end to the negociation; but the anxiety of his maj. the king of Great Britain and Ireland to concur with his ally the emperor of Russia, and to secure to his subjects the blessings of peace, induced him to receive any new proposal for obtaining for his Sicilian majesty, in exchange for Sicily, a real and satisfactory equivalent, such as that sovereign should consent to accept.—No satisfactory proposal of this nature having yet been made, the undersigned must declare that he cannot consent to treat upon any other principle than that of the uti pus sidetis, as originally proposed to his sovereign by the court of France: At the same time he is desirous it should be well understood, that the adoption of this principle will not prevent him either from listening to any just and adequate indemnification to his Sicilian majesty for the cession of Sicily, or from accepting any proposition for the exchange of territory between the two contracting parties, upon just and equal principles, such as may tend to the reciprocal advantage of the two countries.—The undersigned is well aware that since the uti possidetis was proposed by the court of France, peace has been concluded between France and the emperor of Russia, and that, in consequence, the relative situation of the two countries is no longer the same; but, on the other hand, he must also observe, that since that time France has acquired fresh advantages in consequence of the extensive changes which she has made in the constitution of the German empire; an arrangement, the preventing of which was represented by France to the court of G. Britain as a powerful motive for the immediate conclusion of peace on the basis of uti possidetis. If then this principle formerly appeared just to France, it cannot fail at present, according to her own views of the subject, to be more favourable to her interests than to those of the British empire.—The undersigned thinks it at the same time necessary to observe, that although France may have other important views upon the continent of Europe, his maj. the king of Great Britain and Ireland may very fairly form views in other parts of the world, of infinite importance to the commerce and to the power of his empire, and consequently that he cannot conformably with either the interests of his people or the honour of his crown, negotiate upon any principle of inferiority either avowed or supposed. He can treat upon no other

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footing than the supposition, that the continuance of hostilities is equally disadvantageous to both parties. There can be no reason to suppose that the conquests which his maj. proposes to retain by the peace can be wrested from him by war; and the undersigned is persuaded that the best proof of the equity of the conditions upon which he proposes to treat, is to be found in the fact, that they were proposed by France herself at the first opening of the communications between the two governments, which have led to the mission with which his sovereign has been pleased to entrust him conjointly with the earl of Yarmouth. (Signed) LAUDERDALE.
Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from Gen. Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, Aug. 8, 1806.
General Clarke requests their excellencies the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth will be pleased to postpone to 4 o'clock in the afternoon the conference which was fixed for 12 o'clock. Should the hour of 4 be inconvenient to their excellencies, gen. Clarke begs they will name one that will suit them. The general will wait upon lord Lauderdale with his excellency M. de Champagny, minister of the interior, who has been appointed by his maj. the emperor and king, to be his plenipotentiary conjointly with gen. Clarke, to negociate a peace with Great Britain. Gen. Clarke has the honour, &c.
Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, Aug. 8, 1806.
My lords; I have the honour to inform your excellencies, that his maj. the emperor and king has judged it expedient to join M. de Cbampagny, his minister of the interior, as additional minister plenipotentiary, to the mission which hitherto had been entrusted solely to gen. Clarke, and that these two ministers are equally authorized to confer with your excellencies on the great object of conciliating the politics and the interests of the two states. I lost no time in acquainting them with the intentions of his maj., and I doubt not they will concert measures for the immediate prosecution of the negociation which gen. Clarke has had the hononr to enter upon with your excellencies, and which his maj. hopes as well as desires to see terminate in a result equally advantageous and honourable to both nations. I request, &c. (Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.
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Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from General Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, August 8, 1806.
The undersigned minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, has laid before his government the note transmitted yesterday by his excellency lord Lauderdale, plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty. His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, could not see without pain, that a negociation which has already been the subject of so much discussion, which has occasioned the dispatching of so many messengers by both parties, which was, in a word, already brought to maturity, should have suddenly taken a retrograde direction, so as to present obstacles founded, not in the nature of the stipulations, but on the very ground on which that negociation was commenced.—The court of France has constantly refused to admit in the same negociation, the courts of England and Russia, and whatever desire his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, may have, to see a general peace shortly re-established, no consideration could induce him to violate that principle of his policy. The negociation which France had commenced at Petersburgh, had moreover convinced his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, that the English cabinet deceived itself with respect to the nature of its relations with Russia.—After several months of discussion, the cabinet of London yielded this point, and his excellency the Earl of Yarmouth arrived publicly at Calais, and afterwards at Paris, for the purpose of treating for peace. He had conferences with his excellency the minister for foreign affairs immediately after his arrival in this capital, having previously made known to him that he was duly authorized by his government.—Since that period Russia has concluded her peace with France. The undersigned has been appointed minister plenipotentiary to negociate with the plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, and the first step was an exchange of his powers with those of his excellency the Earl of Yarmouth, whom he was bound to believe, as is expressed in his excellency's full powers, authorized to negociate, conclude, and sign a definitive treaty between France and the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.—Very frequent conferences, most of them of several hours, have since taken

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place between the two plenipotentiaries, who, with good faith on both sides, endeavoured to do away the difficulties, and put aside every thing that could have tended to irritate their minds, or to embarrass and unnecessarily retard the progress of the negociation.— Instead of transmitting to each other notes, more or less ingenious, but which rather remove than approximate the object which it is wished to attain stead of beginning those written controversies, which are not less injurious to humanity than open hostilities, and which prolong the miseries of nations; instead, above all things, of negociating peace in the same manner in which war is carried on, the plenipotentiaries had free conferences, in which his majesty the emperor and king granted all which he could grant, without losing sight of the dignity of his crown, his love for his people, and the interest of his allies.— His majesty will never be reduced to make further sacrifices.—Does not the method taken by his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, the new plenipotentiary on the part of his Britannic majesty, appear to announce that a multitude of notes will not be sufficient even to bring the governments to an understanding? And is not a risk evidently incurred, by adopting such a method, the abuse of which has been so manifest in our recollection, of being still further from a good understanding than we have hitherto been? If, on the contrary, it is only wished to form documents which may hereafter be presented to the parliament of G. Britain, his majesty the emperor and king has no similar inducement, it is peace that he desires; a peace equally honourable for France, for G. Britain, and for their allies, which the mutual and assiduous labour of the respective plenipotentiaries shall have rendered acceptable to both governments.—Nevertheless, that his love of justice, and the sincerity of his pacific sentiments may be manifest to every one, and that it may be truly known, to whom all hindrance to the progress of the negociation ought to be attributed, his majesty the emperor of the French has deigned to permit the undersigned to discuss here the gain question relative to the basis of this negociation, which was already advanced and on the point of being terminated.—In the letter written to his excellency Mr. Fox, on the 1st of April, by his excellency the French minister for foreign affairs, that minister declared that his majesty the em-
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peror of the French entirely adopted the principle set forth in the dispatch of his excellency Mr. Fox, of the 26th of March, and offered as the basis of the negociation: "That the proposed peace ought to be honourable for the two courts, and for their respective allies."—In his letter of the 2d June to his excellency Mr, Fox, his excellency the minister for foreign affairs went still further; he proposed in the name of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, to establish as a basis two fundamental principles, the first of them taken from Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of March, namely; "That the object of the two powers should be a peace honourable to themselves, and to their respective allies, at the same time that this peace should be of a nature to insure as far as should lie in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe." The 2d principle was, "an acknowledgement in "favour of both powers of the right of interference and of guarantee with regard "to continental affairs, and with regard to maritime affairs."—Such was the basis adopted by the British government, and agreed upon with it. It could never have entered into the mind of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, to take the "uti possidetis" as the basis of the negociation. If such had been his intention, he would have kept Moravia, a part of Hungary, Styria, Carniola, Croatia, the whole of Austria, as well as its capital—Trieste, and Fiume, and the surrounding coast would still be in his power, as well as Genoa and Venice. Hanover, Osnaburgh, and all the mouths of the great rivers of the north of Germany would be subject to his dominion; and, doubtless, his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, might then, without difficulty, have left his Britannic majesty in possession of the Cape, Surinam, Tobago, St. Lucia, Pondicherry, &c.—As to Sicily, in this very supposition his majesty the empeperor and king would not have left it to his enemies; but his majesty would only have thought that the conquest of this island should have preceded the opening of the negociations; and while Prussia and Russia have either guarantied or recognized the changes which have taken place in the kingdom of the two Sicilies, is it to be supposed that England could have prevented the conquest of Sicily, which is separated from the continent only by a channel of less than 2000 toises?—And even suppo-

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sing that the Cape, Surinam, and other Dutch possessions could have been finally detached from the kingdom of Holland, is it not certain that its existence as a nation would become from that very cause impossible; and that its incorporation with the French empire would have been the necessary consequence of a refusal given by England to restore to it its colonies? What, in fact, could be the means of maintaining a nation which would have nothing but debts, and from which the total deprivation of all commerce would take away the possibility of paying them? Whatever their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of his Britannic majesty may alledge, it is impossible that they should not be convinced, that it is a very different thing for G. Britain, to see the Texel and the, mouths of the Rhine and of the Meuse in the power of the French revenue officers, or to see them in the power of the Dutch Thus, therefore, Holland, without the restitution of its colonies, would necessarily become a province of the French empire; for, on accepting the crown of Holland, prince Lewis formally declared his intention of renouncing it, if the Dutch colonies were not restored at the general peace.—Let Hanover become a province of France; let Trieste, Fiume, and their territory likewise become provinces of the kingdom of Italy, and let G. Britain keep as a compensation, the Cape, Surinam Malta, and Pondicherry, &c. France will consent to it, and the great principle uti possidetis will be applied in its full extent, both as to the present and as to the future.—Let the new minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, point all in the history of the world, a negociation terminated upon the principle of the uti possidetis between two great nations: him examine whether this principle does not belong rather to an armistice than to treaty of peace? It is impossible not to say, that, in proposing to France the uti possidetis, particularly under the present circumstances, a strange idea must have been formed of the character of the emperor Napoleon, and it must have been believed that he was reduced to a singular state of humiliation and distress.—But, in demanding the uti possidetis, his excellency, the earl of Lauderdale, plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty, without regard to the principle which he advances, wishes, to change entirely the destiny of a continental state, which gave 25,000 men to
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England, and furnished her with a part of the means which she afforded in the 7 years war, and even in the war of the French revolution, to the armies of the north. Thus, therefore, it is wished to maintain the principle of the uti possidetis, in order to deprive France of all her commerce, and of all her establishments, and to ruin her allies; but it is wished to violate the principle of the uti possidetis, in order to oblige France to renounce her engagements, to break her treaties; in a word, to dissolve her whole continental system! Is not this to propose a peace a thousand times more disastrous than the longest war, and conditions calculated to excite the indignation of every Frenchman? What! shall France have conquered all the powers subsidized, by England during three coalitions, to see imposed upon her conditions as unjust as they are dishonourable, notwithstanding the moderation and generosity which she has shewn?— excellency Mr. Fox himself proposed, that" the peace should be honourable to both courts, and to their respective allies."—His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, could not consider the peace as honourable, if, by one of its conditions, he was to lose a single subject, and of however little importance the colony of Tobago may be, it suffices, that it made part of the French empire at the time his majesty took the reins of the government, to prevent his ever signing a treaty in which the alienation of that colony, or of any other which belongs to him in the same manner, shall be comprised. No reasonable Englishman can have flattered himself with the contrary; and his majesty, in the position in which he stands, would, by consenting to it, lose the esteem of every brave and generous person, even among his enemies.—The undersigned is directed to declare, that his majesty the emperor and king considers as a disgrace the very idea of a negociation, founded on the uti possidetis. It is the more contrary to his principles, inasmuch as his majesty has restored his conquests, and that he should be now reigning over a population the double of that which he in fact governs, if, at the conclusion of the treaties of peace. I which he made at the expiration of the several coalitions, he had taken the uti possidetis for his only principle.—The undersigned is also directed to declare, that tin only conditions of negociation which his majesty the emperor and king is willing to adopt, are those proposed in part by his

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excellency Mr. Fox, contained in the letter which was addressed to him on the 2nd of June by the minister for foreign:affairs,and repeated in the 12th paragraph of the present note.—His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, requires nothing of G. Britain which can be contrary to the, interests of her allies. He is entitled to expect that nothing will be exacted of him which can be contrary to the interests of his own allies.—The undersigned is directed to add, that he refers to what had been prepared by the mutual efforts of his excellency the earl of Yarmouth, and the undersigned.—If peace shall not be re-established, it is not France who can be accused of having changed, but England: although peace between France and Russia and other events unfavourable to G. Britain have taken place since the negociation was entered upon and nearly brought to a conclusion, in concert with his excellency the earl of Yarmouth. The under signed avails himself,&c. (Signed)CLARKE.
Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Gen. Clarke; dated Paris, August 9, 1806.
The undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Britannick majesty cannot allow themselves to enter into a detailed consideration of the official note, dated the 8th of August, which has just been delivered to them on the part of his excellency gen. Clarke From the manner in which the different points which form the subject of this note are treated, it would be impossible for them to discuss them with that calmness and that regard to propriety, which the character with which their sovereign has invested them demands. But the subject of this note is of a nature, so general and so foreign to the object under discussion, that. it would be perfectly useless to take it into consideration at the present moment.—The undersigned the earl of Lauderdale, far from thinking that the manner of discussing in writing the fundamental points of a negociation can in any shape increase the difficulty of coming to an understanding, is, on the contrary, of opinion that he already perceives evident proofs of its utility, inasmuch as the official note presented by him since his arrival has brought the negociation to an unequivocal issue, and has put an end to those misunderstandings, without doubt real, which have taken place, and which never could have occurred if the same method had been adopted at the com-
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mencement of the negociation.—The undersigned the earl of Yarmouth finds himself compelled to recur to the manner in which it has been stated to him, that he landed at Calais invested with a public character to treat for peace. He only came to give in person, and vivâ voce, the answer to a communication that he had been requested to make to the English government, founded upon the basis of the uti possidetis, in conformity with the following words of his excellency M. Talleyrand: "We ask nothing from you;" accompanied with positive assurances that the restitution of the possessions of his majesty in Germany would meet with no opposition. The same sentiment also recurs in the letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox of the 1st April in these terms: "—The emperor covets nothing that England possesses."—The earl of Yarmouth feels himself under an equal necessity of not passing over in silence the remarks made by his excellency gen. Clarke, on the subject of the delays of the negociation and of the frequent communication by messengers. The answers of his Britannia majesty have ever been frank and prompt: and if the number of messengers has been considerable, it can only be attributed to motives foreign to the wishes of his majesty.—The undersigned the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, can by no means subscribe to the opinion held out by his excellency gen. Clarke in the said note, that the negciation "had been begun and nearly brought to a conclusion" in the interval which elapsed between the time when lord Yarmouth officially communicated his full powers, and the arrival of lord Lauderdale; on the contrary, they consider the negociation as having commenced. The conversations to which allusion has been made, consisted, on the part of the French plenipotentiaries, in making demands which the undersigned the earl of Yarmouth has uniformly declared to be inadmissible; and on the part of lord Yarmouth in keeping strictly within the bounds of the uti possidetis, not having any instructions on the part of his government to admit any other conditions of negociation; conditions suggested by France in the communication made by the earl of Yarmouth, and previously announced in M. Talleyrand's letter of the 1st of April.—The undersigned earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth think it unnecessary in this place to repeat the motives set forth in the official note

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presented by lord Lauderdale, and which induced his majesty to consider the basis of the uti possidetis proposed by France peculiarly applicable to the respective situation of the two countries. It is to them subject of deep regret that, by so absolute and decided a departure from that basis or the part of the French government, the hopes and expectations of the two nation must be entirely frustrated.—It only remains for the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to declare, that his majesty, ever ready to listen to just and honourable conditions of peace, relies with confidence upon the means which he derives from the loyalty and affection of his subjects. He will never listen to any proposals of negociation whatsoever upon terms incompatible with the honour of his crown and the real interests of his subjects. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.
Sixth inclosure (F.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, August 9th, 1806.—Half past 6 P. M.
The pretensions brought forward by the French government in the official note of his excellency gen. Clarke, so incompatible with the basis formerly proposed by the government, not leaving us any other alter native than that of returning to England we have the honour to request your excellency to have the goodness to send the necessary passports for ourselves and our suite. We avail ourselves, &c. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.
No. 36.—Extract from a Dispatch from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 11th, 1806.—Received Aug. 13th.
Sir; In our last dispatch of the 9th inst we had the honour of informing you, that on that evening we had applied for passports to return to England, and also for passport for a courier we intended to have dispatched immediately. We have only now to mention that, on Sunday at 11 o'clock, we sent the inclosure (marked A.), renewing our demand; and that this morning, having received no answer to either application,the inclosure (marked B.) was sent to M. Talleyrand's house, Ruëd' Anjou. The courier Basilico, who carried the note, returned soon after to inform us that he was directed at M. Talleyrand's house to go the foreign office, where he accordingly went, but was told that no communication would he received then till between 12 and 1. We then begged of
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Mr. Goddard to go himself to the foreign office, and deliver the letter: He found that the clerks had only just arrived, and that M. Talleyrand was gone to St. Cloud, not to return till 4 o'clock. At half after 5 we received from Messrs. Clarke and Champagny an official note (marked C.) Immediately upon the receipt of this note, we wrote the inclosure (marked D.) to M. Talleyrand, and received from him at 9 o'clock an answer (marked E.), which is also inclosed. The inclosure (marked F.) is the reply to the official note which we intend to send, the moment it can be copied.
Addition by the Earl of Yarmouth.
As the French government has in every instance admitted the exactness of the communications made by me, I beg leave, in addition to this dispatch, to remark that the intention expressed to me by the French government, as that which made them prefer communicating through my channel rather than on paper, was the expressing to his majesty's government their readiness to restore his majesty's German dominions in toto, but that for obvious reasons this could not be expressed on paper till every other condition of the treaty should be settled.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated August 10, 1806.—11 o'clock A. M.
The earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth have the honour to repeat to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, the demand which they had the honour to make to his excellency yesterday, at half past 6 o'clock in the evening, of passports necessary for them and their suite, as well as of a passport for a messenger who is now waiting for it, to proceedon his journey.
Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Aug. 11, 1806, 10 o'clock A. M.
Sir; It is your duty to repeat the demand which we have already twice made, of a passport for a messenger, and of passports for our return to England.—We think it right also to remark to your excellency, that these demands were made the day be fore yesterday (Saturday) at half past 6 in the evening; that they were renewed to; your excellency yesterday (Sunday) at 11 o'clock, and that to the present moment we have not received any answer to them.—When your excellency recollects that near 24 hours have passed since we addressed

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ourselves for the second time to your excellency; and that, to say nothing of our own passports, we have been deprived it the interval, of the means of sending messenger to England, you must be persuaded, that if we abstain from all remark upon a proceeding so extraordinary and so contrary to the established usages, it is from a desire to avoid as much and as long as possible, any thing that may occasion animosity, and change the nature and tone which have hitherto characterized the communications between the two governments.—We request, &c. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.
Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from Messrs. Champagny and Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth dated Paris, Aug. 11, 1806.
The undersigned, ministers plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, have read with attention the note dated the 9th of August. addressed to them by their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of his majesty the king of the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, in which they again propose the uti possidetis as the basis of the negociation—The French plenipotentiaries know not, whether, by the adoption of this principle, England would obtain the right of exacting from the French government for herself and her allies, every restitution which may suit her convenience, without being bound to make any restitution to France and her allies of the conquests which she has made. This demand would be so extraordinary, that it would be equivalent to saying that France should sign all the conditions which it may please the English plenipotentiaries to commit to writing. One cannot suppose that such is really the intention of the English ministry. They have not sent over plenipotentiaries for the sole purpose of requiring the admission of an indefinite basis which would render them masters of all the conditions of the treaty. In a state of things so obscure, the French plenipotentiaries demand such explanations a; may enable them to understand, and to proceed in the negociation. These consist in making known what are the conquests which England wishes to keep, what are those which she will restore to France and her allies, and what conquests of France she requires to be restored. This will unfold a system of compensation, which may give a clear idea of the principles and intentions of the British cabinet. The French pleni-
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potentiaries will then know what engagements they contract in adopting the basis which is proposed to them; for they can certainly never consent to this adoption without knowing what is demanded of them.—In laying down the principle of uti possidetis, have the English plenipotentiaries had it in view to propose a means of exchange and of compensation? If this is their meaning, the emperor adopts it, because it appears to him conformable to the two principles already agreed upon by both parties, in the letters of the French minister for foreign affairs, and of the English secretary of state for the department of foreign affairs, viz.—1st. To the principle laid down by Mr. Fox in his letter of the 26th of March last, "that the object of both parties ought to be that the peace should be honourable for both, and their respective allies; and at the same time of a nature to insure, as far, as should be in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe."—2d, ,To the principle subjoined to the preceding by the minister for foreign affairs, in his letter of the 2d of June following, which consists of an acknowledgement, in favour of the two parties, of the full right of intervention and of guaranty in continental and in maritime affairs.—The undersigned take this opportunity,&c. (Signed) CHAMPAGNY. CLARKE.
Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Aug. 11, 1806; half past 6 P. M.
Sir; We have this moment received a note signed by their excellencies M. de Champagny and general Clarke, to which under any other circumstances we should have immediately replied. But it is our duty previously to remark to your excellency, that we have remained since half past 6 o'clock of the evening of the day before yesterday, without any answer to our demand of a passport for a messenger, or to that of our own passports, although this demand has been repeated three times in this interval.—It is of the highest importance, in our present situation, to be certain of a communication perfectly free and uninterrupted, and as constant as we can desire, with our government. We therefore entreat your excellency to satisfy us on this point, in order that we may know whether, in all the possible cases in which we may think proper to demand passports either for ourselves or for messengers, we shall be sure to obtain them without delay.—We

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are also under the necessity of remarking that we have received no answer to the request we made to your excellency on the subject of Mr. Goddard.—We take this opportunity of renewing, &c. &c. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.
Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, Aug, 11, 1806.
The undersigned, minister for foreign affairs, has the honour to transmit to then excellencies lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth, ministers plenipotentiary of his majesty the king of England, the passport for a messenger which they demanded. He regrets that the relaxation from business granted in the offices on Sundays, should have prevented him from sending it sooner, With regard to the passports their excellencies have demanded for themselves, the undersigned flatters himself that they will give to the delay in sending them, the interpretation the most natural and the most proper to prevent all complaint on their part. The undersigned can never fear the responsibility of delays, which have for object to prolong, for some days, the hope of restoring peace between two great powers, and of putting an end to the scourge of war in the four quarters of the world.—The undersigned begs, &c. &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.
Sixth inclosure (F.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Messrs. Champagny and Clarke; dated Paris, Aug. 11, 1806; 11 o'clock P.M.
The undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Britannic majesty would not have delayed their answer to the note of this day's date, addressed to them by their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of the French government; but as their reiterated demands to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs for passports, even for their messenger, remained unanswered, they thought it right first to ascertain, whether they were still to enjoy an open and uninterrupted communication with their government, such as, in similar cases, has always been permitted by every government in Europe.—The explanations which the undersigned have received from his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, induce them to hope that a like delay will, on no occasion whatever, again take place.—After having maturely considered the note of their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of the
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French government, the undersigned have to remark, that the British government, far from pretending to "exact from the French government every restitution which may suit their convenience, without being bound to make any restitution to France," never expressed any other wish than that of treating with the French government on the basis which was proposed to them by France herself; as it is expressed in the note of lord Lauderdale, viz. "to treat generally upon the basis of uti possidetis, which was to be scrupulously observed, except in the case of Hanover, which was proposed to be ceded to his Britannic majesty with all its dependencies."—They must also observe, that if it were possible to mistake the result which would necessarily follow from this principle, the verbal discussions which took place on the 9th inst. between the .French plenipotentiaries and the undersigned, leave no room For doubt, whether the proposition thus laid down was perfectly understood by hose plenipotentiaries.—The undersigned have therefore only to repeat, that they cannot, consistently with the instructions if their government, do otherwise than insist upon the previous recognition of this principle. It is on this condition alone that they are authorized to continue the negociation.—As soon as this principle shall be agreed to, the undersigned will be ready to proceed to the discussion of the other points mentioned in the note of lord Lauderdale.—It only remains for the undersigned to add, that if the French government expresses a disposition to adhere to the proposal, such as his Britannic maj. understands it to have been made by them, they shall congratulate themselves as on a most fortunate event; an event which promises (according to the expression of Mr. Fox, quoted by their excellencies) "a peace honourable for the two nations, and it the same time of a nature to insure the Future tranquillity of Europe." (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.
No. 37.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, Aug. 14, 1806.
My lords; The messenger, Basilico, arrived here early this morning, with the dispatches with which your lordships had charged him; and, although it appears most probable, that, before he can again reach Paris, your lordships will be no longer there, yet, as there is still a possi-

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bility, from the last note from the French plenipotentiaries, that the negociation may proceed on the basis pointed out for it by your instructions, it has been judged proper that no time should be lost in re-dispatching him, in order that you may be apprized of his majesty's full approbation of the tenour of the different notes which have been delivered on your part since the earl of Lauderdale's arrival at Paris. As no other point but that of the general basis of negociation has yet been brought into discussion, nothing need be added to the former instructions, by which the course of any further discussions that may take place is still to be entirely guided.
No. 38.—Copy of a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, Aug. 14, 1806.
My lords; His majesty's servants have observed, from the dispatches received this day, that some insinuation has been thrown out by the French government, of a disposition on the part of this country to gain some unfair advantage by the employment of two plenipotentiaries in the present discussions. That government has since taken the obvious mode of counteracting this advantage (if any such there was) by naming, on their part also, a second plenipotentiary But, the king's government is desirous while it adheres steadily to the substance of those points which are thought fit to be insisted on for the honour and interest of his majesty's crown, to leave no pretence for cavils as to the form in which these discussions are carried on. The advantage which was to be looked to from the personal share which the earl of Yarmouth originally had in these transactions as the bearer of the overtures made by France, has now ceased; and, while his lordship has, on the one hand, properly recorded his decisive testimony as to the, reality of these overtures, and as to the exact terms of peace so offered, the French government has, on the other hand, no only refused to adhere to those offers, but has expressly declared, that they never can even have entered into their thoughts. "Jamais il n'a puvenir dans la pensèe de sa majestè l'empereur des Francois, roid Italie, de prendre pour base de la nègociation l'uti possidetis;" [it never could have entered into the thoughts of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of ltaly, to take for the basis of the negociation, the uti possidetis.] In this state of things,the
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King's servants are not aware of any benefits that would be likely to result to his majesty's service from imposing on lord Yarmouth any farther duty in this respect; nor do they wish that any such ground for cavil as I have before alluded to, however unfounded it would be, should be left to the enemy.—They have, therefore, submitted it as their humble advice to his majesty, that, in case of the continuance of the negociations, the French minister should be informed, that they will henceforth he conducted by the earl of Lauderdale alone, the earl of Yarmouth having obtained his majesty's gracious permission to return to England; but that, his majesty does not, on his part, make any objection to lord Lauderdale's treating with both the persons who have been named by, the French government for that trust:—A proof perfectly decisive, in all its parts, that no unfair advantage, such as the French government appears to apprehend, can have been in the king's contemplation. I am, &c. C. J. Fox.
No. 39.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale of Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 16, 1806.—Received Aug. 19th.
Sir; The note to the plenipotentiaries of the French government, dated the 11th inst., of which a copy (marked F.) was sent in my dispatch of the 11th inst., was delivered early in the morning of the 12th, as you will see from the inclosed receipt (marked A.)—No answer having been received, it was thought proper on the 14th to send to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, a letter, of which a copy is also inclosed (marked B.)—No answer to. the official note transmitted to the plenipotentiaries of the French government on the morning of the 12th, has yet been given; and gen. Clarke, upon whom lord Yarmouth and I waited this morning merely for the purpose of shewing him a mark of attention, informed us, that it was in the possession of the emperor, who had not as yet signified his pleasure on the subject.—At one o'clock we received a note from M. Talleyrand (marked C.), and nearly at the same time another (marked D.), from gen. Clarke.—Copies of both of these are herewith transmitted.—I think it evident from what gen. Clarke says, that no communication will be made for two days.—There is perhaps nothing sufficiently important to authorize my sending a courier. Indeed my principal motive for doing so is

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to quiet the anxiety which you naturally feel from receiving no information for so many days, concerning the state of a transaction so important in its consequences.—I have the honour to be, &c. LAUDERDALE.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a receipt, dated Paris, Aug. 12, 1806.
I have received a sealed packet, addressed to me, and to M de Champagny minister of the interior, at half past seven, Aug. 12, 1806. CLARKE.
Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Aug. 14, 1806.
Sir; We think it our duty to acquaint your excellency, that early in the morning of the 12th inst. we transmitted to their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, a note in answer to that of their excellencies received on the 11th inst. In this answer, we endeavoured again to set forth the points which appeared to us to require, in some form or other, a previous explanation, to authorize us, in conformity to our instructions, to pursue the present negociation.—The silence of their excellencies the plenipotentiaries in this respect, gives us reason to presume that we must not, at the present moment, expect such an explanation on their part.—Impressed with this idea, we desire to put an end to the general expectation of both nations, considering the slight appearance there is of seeing it realized. We feel that the demand which we make, under such circumstances, of passports for our return, may be susceptible of interpretations of a nature to retard the happy moment when the views of the French government shall approach nearer to those which it had been supposed to entertain. It is in order to prevent the possibility of such a misinterpretation, that we think it incumbent on us to assure your excellency, that a step which would have the effect of causing any obstacle to the renewal of the negociation, would be very far from our intention, though, from the reasons which we have detailed, we find ourselves obliged to put an end to our mission.—It only remains for us to assure your excellency, that if, fortunately for both nations, it should happen that we have been mistaken in the inference which we have drawn from the silence of the French plenipotentiaries, we will wait during a reasonable time for the explanations which their excellencies have to communicate to us, In order, however, to
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prevent the repetition of a demand, as painful for us to make, as it would be for your excellency to receive, in case the negociations should not have a favourable issue, we request you to furnish us with the necessary passports for us and our suite, to be made use of according to circumstances. We have the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.
Third inclosure (G.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, Aug. 16th, 1806.
The undersigned minister for foreign affairs, hastened to lay before his majesty, the note which their excellencies the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth did him the honour to address to him on the 14th instant. As soon as he shall have received orders relative to the objects of this note, he will not fail to inform the plenipotentiaries of his Britannic majesty. The undersigned requests, &c.(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.
Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from General Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, August 16th, 1806.
On going to the prince of Benevento's, I learnt that Basilico arrived yesterday at Boulogne, I lose no time in communicating this circumstance to lord Lauderdale, I learnt also, that his majesty the emperor is gone to hunt at Rambouillet, where his majesty intends remaining to-morrow.—I request lord Lauderdale to inform lord Yarmouth of this, and to accept, &c. (Signed) CLARKE.
No. 40.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, August 17th, 1806.—Received August 22d.
Sir; I take the opportunity of lord Yarmouth's return to England, to inform you that in consequence of his majesty's pleasure signified in your dispatch of the 14th instant, I this morning wrote to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, stating to him, that lord Yarmouth had his majesty's permission to return to England; and that his majesty had been graciously pleased, in the event of the negociation proceeding, to confine the future management of it solely to me. About 11 o'clock, M. de Champagny and gen. Clarke paid me a visit of ceremony; lord Yarmouth happened to be with me at the time; and we mentioned to them the change that had taken place, and shewed them the note

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which I was just about to dispatch, and a copy of which is inclosed. The object of the visit was merely to ask the plenipotentiaries, and the gentlemen attached to the mission, to dine with M. de Champagny to-morrow.—Nothing whatever was said that related to the negociation, and I believe no answer will be given either to the note of the 11th, or to the note sent to the minister for foreign affairs on the 14th, till the emperor's return from Rambouillet, which, they informed me to-day, was uncertain. The mode in which I have mentioned to the minister for foreign affairs his majesty's permission to lord Yarmouth to return to England, seemed to me calculated to afford as little opportunity as possible to the French government to cavil about a change of form in the mission.— I think it proper to add, that in doing this, every facility was afforded by lord Yarmouth, who in the handsomest manner desired me on this, as on other occasions, to consider only what I thought most advantageous for the public service. I have the honour to be, &c. LAUDERDALE.
Inclosure in No. 40.—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, 17th August, 1806.
The undersigned has the honour to inform his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, that his Britannic majesty has been pleased to grant the request of the earl of Yarmouth, and to allow him to return to England. According to the tenour of his full powers, which have been already communicated to their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, the undersigned is authorized to treat jointly or separately with the French government; and he has just received from his court precise instructions to that effect, in case the answer to the note of the 11th instant should be of nature to permit the undersigned to pursue the negociation. The undersigned has the honour, &c, LAUDERDALE.
No. 41.—Extract from is dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Downing-street, Aug. 23 1806.
My lord; The contents of your last dispatches do not appear to require any particular answer, and this messenger is set back only that you may be enabled to keep us regularly informed (so long as you shall still continue at Paris) of the state the negociation there. If, on the arrival of any intelligence of the decision of Russia not to ratify without the consent of
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this court, the French government should increase their offers in order to separate his majesty from the emperor of Russia,our lordship is on all such occasions to observe, that it is M. d'Oubril's treaty alone that has released his majesty from he obligation not to separate in substance his treaty from that of Russia; an obligation to which his majesty had determined scrupulously to adhere, and from which, even in point of form, he had departed no farther than he had learnt to be the wish of Russia. herself. Should, therefore, M. d'Oubril's treaty not be ratified, the two courts would revert to their former situation, with the additional bond of union which would result from the mutual proofs they would thus have afforded to each other of their resolution to adhere invariably to the spirit and principles of their alliance,
No. 42.—Copy of a dispatch from Lord Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, August the 25th, 1806.—Received September the 3d.
Sir; In my dispatch of the 16th inst. I had the honour of transmitting to you a copy of a letter sent by lord Yarmouth and myself, on the 14th inst. to the minister of foreign affairs. I have now to inform you that my desire to combine with firmness the utmost degree of forbearance that appeared to me consistent with the character with which his maj. has been pleased to invest me, induced me patiently to suffer the silence of the French government, without remark, from the 14th till the 22d, when I transmitted to the minister for foreign affairs a note, of which I have the honour to inclose you a copy, marked (A.)—No notice having been taken of this note by his excellency, I have this morning sent a second note, of which I have also the honour to inclose a copy, marked (B.)—I have the honour to be, &c. LAUDERDALE.
First Inclosure. (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Aug. 22, 1806.
Sir; The undersigned, minister plenip. of his Britannic maj. finds himself under the necessity of recalling to the attention of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs; 1st, That in the morning of the 12th inst. a note, signed by the undersigned and the earl of Yarmouth, and dated the 11th, was transmitted to his excellency gen. Clarke, in which the undersigned observed, "The British government, far from "pretending to exact from the French go-

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vernment every restitution which may suit their convenience, without being bound to make any restitution to France, never expressed any other wish than that of treating with the French government on the basis which was proposed to her by France herself; as it is expressed in the note of lord Lauderdale, viz. to treat generally upon the basis of "uti possidetis, which was to be scrupulously observed, except in the case of Hanover, which was proposed to be ceded to his Britannic maj. with all its dependencies. They must also observe, that if it were possible to mistake the result which would necessarily follow from this principle, the verbal discussions which took place on the 9th inst between the French plenipotentiaries and the undersigned, leave no room for doubt, whether the proposition thus laid down was perfectly understood by those plenipotentiaries. The undersigned have therefore only to repeat, that they cannot, consistently with the instructions of their government, do otherwise than insist upon the previous recognition of this principle. It is on this condition alone that they are authorized to continue negociation." 2dly, that on the 14th inst, the undersigned, together with the earl of Yarmouth, had again the honour to state in writing to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs; "The silence of their excellencies the plenipotentiaries in this respect, gives us reason to presume that we must not, at the present moment expect such an explanation on their part Impressed with this idea, we desire to put an end to the general expectation of both nations, considering the slight appearance there is of seeing it realized. We feel that the demand we make, under such circumstances, of passports for our return, may be susceptible of interpretations of a nature to retard the happy moment when the views of the French government shall approach nearer to those which it had been supposed to entertain. It is in order to prevent the possibility of such a misinterpretation that we think it incumbent on us to a assure your excellency, that a step which would have the effect of causing any of obstacle to the renewal of the negociation, would be very far from our intention though, from the reasons which we have detailed, we find ourselves obliged put an end to our mission."—The un-
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dersigned, on finding that no answer was made to these communications, persuaded himself that this delay might proceed from dispositions favourable to the progress of the negociation, and that he should be at length rewarded by an answer conformable to this expectation; even when he found that no answer arrived, he still persevered in a conduct which must have incontestably proved the sincerity of the desire he had evinced, to receive explanations which might enable him to follow up the objects of his mission. But if, so early as the 14th inst. the undersigned, together with the earl of Yarmouth, found himself obliged to observe to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, that he feared (from the silence of their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries) that no answer would be given on the subject; and if, at that period, they thought it incumbent on them to declare the necessity they were under, in pursuance of their sovereign's orders, of demanding passports for their departure, the undersigned has no occasion to remark to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, how imperiously the fresh delays that have taken place since that date, prescribe to the undersigned the pressing renewal of this demand.—The undersigned must at the same time add, that, not being able to persuade himself, that in case an unfavourable answer had been intended, his excellency the minister for foreign affairs would have so long deferred the adoption of the only alternative, namely, the sending passports, he does not even now give up the hope of a renewal of the proposal, such as the ministers of his Britannick maj. understood it to have been made on the part of the French government, since it is thus alone that the expectation of both nations can at last be realized. Even if these hopes should not be well founded, the undersigned will never regret a delay which has afforded him the opportunity of manifesting in an unequivocal manner, the sincere desire of a solid and honourable peace which his maj. has never ceased to entertain, and of which his maj. has given the most convincing proof, in authorizing the undersigned to negotiate on the basis proposed in the first instance by France. It is with this view that the undersigned has borne so long a state of uncertainty, without making the least observation on the unaccountable delay.—The undersigned, in now requesting his excellency the minister for foreign affairs to transmit to him

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provisionally, and for the purpose of been made use of in the cases already pointed out, passports for himself and his suite, conceives that he has adopted the only means for preventing the necessity he might otherwise find himself under (if he was forced to repeat this demand) of accompanying it by representations, such a would be authorized by the law of nations, and by the dignity of his sovereign. (Signed) LAUDERDALE.
Second Inclosure(B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M.Talleyrand; dated Paris, Aug. 25th, 1806.
The silence still maintained by their excellencies. the French plenipotentiaries, as well as by his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, after the official note delivered by the undersigned and the earl of Yarmouth on the 11th inst. after the letter addressed to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs on the 14th inst.; and after the official note of the undersigned dated the 22d inst., appears clearly to announce, that the French government has abandoned every wish for peace, on the conditions which they themselves had in the first instance, proposed, and which the undersigned has uniformly declared to be the sole basis on which he was authorized to negociate with that government.—In this state of affairs, the undersigned cannot flatter himself with the possibility of any advantage resulting from the prolongation of his stay at Paris; he feels too that farther delay would necessarily give to both nations and to all Europe reason to believe that peace, the object of their desires, is on the point of being concluded, at the very moment when all reasonable hope of attaining it appears to be completely at an end.—The undersigned, strongly impressed with this idea, finds himself obliged to terminate his mission, by making to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs the formal demand of passports for his return into the presence of his sovereign.—At the same time, and in conformity with the spirit of conciliation which has constantly characterized his whole conduct Since his arrival at Paris, the undersigned, at the moment when he feels himself obliged by his instructions to demand his passports, cannot resolve to prevent the possibility of a communication on the part of the French government, of a nature to enable him to carry on the negociation, although, from the continued silence of that government, he can scarcely retain
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hopes of so favourable an issue.—It will not therefore be until the morning of Wednesday the 27th inst. that the undersigned will have the honour of calling on his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, for the purpose of making a formal and definitive demand of the necessary passports for himself and suite. He has only to add, that the passports which he proposes to demand will be for his immediate return, and not to be made use of according to circumstances, as he lately demanded them. LAUDERDALE.
No. 43.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated August 29th, 1806.—Received September 3d.
Sir; In my last dispatch, dated August the 25th,I had the honour of stating to you the detail of the negociation till the afternoon of that day. At 11 o'clock at night, I received from the plenipotentiaries of France a note, intimating their desire of having a conference on the subject of the note written by lord Yarmouth and myself, on the 11th of the month. Of this, as well as of the answer agreeing to the proposal, I have the honour to inclose copies (marked A. and B.)—On the 26th, at the , hour appointed, I went to the office of the minister of the interior, where I found M. de Champagny and gen. Clarke, the two plenipotentiaries of the French government. The general result of what passed, impressed me with a conviction that the French plenipotentiaries no longer thought of making peace, upon the grounds on which France was understood to desire it at the time of lord Yarmouth's communication; and I am confident that the part I bore in the discussion thoroughly satisfied them, that I was resolved firmly to adhere to the ground which I had taken in the note of the 11th, on which I was invited to hear their remarks.—The hour of dinner terminated our conference, a renewal of which, on any day I should name, was after dinner anxiously solicited by M. de Champagny. I objected to it, as apparently unnecessary, and only calculated to protract my stay in this country to no purpose; but before I left him, expressed my willingness to comply once more with the wishes of the French plenipotentiaries, as a farther mark of my anxiety to do any thing which even they could think had a tendency to produce that peace, which his majesty was so anxious to accomplish on equitable terms; and another meeting was fixed, to

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take place on Friday the 29th, at 3 o'clock —Late on the evening of the 26th, I Waited on the minister for foreign affairs, for the purpose of informing him, that, at the request of the plenipotentiaries of France, I had agreed to a renewal of the conference He had gone to St. Cloud, and, as by the minister's absence, I had no opportunity of explaining my reasons for not waiting on him, for the purpose of asking passports a announced in my note of the 25th, I though it right, early next morning, to send letter, of which a copy is inclosed (marked C.).—On the 27th, after dinner, I had a very long conference with the minister for foreign affairs, the substance of which confirmed me in the opinion I had antecedently formed, in consequence of what passed at the meeting with the plenipotentiaries of France, that there is at present no disposition to make peace on the term tendered for his majesty's acceptance; ant I am convinced you will have the same impression, when I state to you that M. Talleyrand, in the course of our conversation repeatedly made use of the following marked expression: "Jamais l'empereur ne cedera un grain de poussière du territoire François."—In the course of this conference, the minister frequently alluded to the situation of Hanover, and stated, that within eight-and-forty hours, its fate must be determined for ever. He seemed muck surprised that nothing appeared to make any impression upon me, frequently repeating, that, in getting the Cape, Malta, and his majesty's Hanoverian dominions, I should make a glorious peace; and assuring me, that if this opportunity should be lost, he did not foresee any means by which peace could be ever attained, as the emperor way determined to make war all his life, rather than yield any part of the territory of France, the integrity of which he had sworn to maintain.—Our conversation ended, by my assuring him, at the time I was about to retire, that while these sentiments continued to prevail in this country, it was impossible peace should be made, and that with the knowledge I now possessed of the opinions entertained by the French government, I could not acquit myself of trifling, if I should remain any longer to carry on what must consider as a farce.—After a full consideration of all that has taken place, I have, therefore, this morning, resolved to bring things to a point, by delivering to the plenipotentiaries of France, the detailed note of which I inclose a
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copy, (marked D.) I am, &c. LAUDERDALE.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of anote from Messrs. Champagny and Clarke to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, August 25th, 1806.
The plenipotentiaries of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, wishing to confer with his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, his Britannic majesty's plenipotentiary, upon the subject of the last note [of the 11th inst.] his excellency addressed to them, request his lordship will call at the office of the minister of the interior to-morrow about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, where they will meet, provided the hour is convenient to his excellency.— M. de Champagny has the honour of inviting the earl of Lauderdale to dine with him after the conference, and hopes that his excellency will bring with him to dinner Messrs. Goddard, Stewart, and Maddison. (Signed) CHAMPAGNY CLARKE.
Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to Messrs. Champagny and Clarke; dated Paris, August 25th, 1806.
The earl of Lauderdale, plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries have just transmitted to him. He will do himself the honour of calling at the office of the minister of the interior, about 3 o'clock to-morrow, and of dining afterwards with his excellency M. de Champagny. Messrs. Goddard, Stewart, and Maddison will also have the honour of dining with his excellency.
Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, August 27th.
Sir; I called yesterday evening at your excellency's house, that I might have the honour of seeing you, and of informing you that, in consequence of the request which was yesterday made to me by their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, of another conference on Friday next, the 29th instant, I have postponed my demand for passports, which I intended to make this day to your excellency. Their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries appeared to attach so much importance to, my consenting to another interview, that I gave with pleasure this new pledge of the, pacific and conciliatory spirit by which I have ever been guided; and if I, cannot flatter myself that there will result from-

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this demand the prospect of a happy issue to the negociation, I shall at least have the satisfaction of having again manifested in the most unequivocal manner, how much my personal sentiments agree in this respect with those of my government, and with what eagerness I avail myself of every opportunity of giving to the persons, with whom this negociation has procured me the advantage of being acquainted, fresh marks of the distinguished sentiments which I shall never cease, under any circumstances, to entertain towards them. I am, &c. LAUDERDALE.
Fourth inclose re (D.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to Messrs. Champagny and Clarke; dated Paris, 29th August, 1806.
The undersigned plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, being on the point of renewing with their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries the conference of the 26th instant, thinks himself obliged to lay before their excellencies the state of the negociation, such as it stood after the not transmitted on the part of the undersigned and of the earl of Yarmouth on the 12th instant. Their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries will perceive from this statement, that the discussion is come to a point which will no longer permit the undersigned to continue it, unless, by the admission of the only basis on which he is authorised to negociate, their excellencies should afford him fresh motives to justify such a determination.—In the official not transmitted to their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries on the 12th of August it was observed to them, "That the British government, far from pretending to exact from the French government ever restitution which may suit their convenience, without being bound to make any restitution to France,' never expressed any other wish than that of treating with the French government on the basis which was proposed to her by France herself; as it is expressed in the note of lord Lauderdale, viz. 'to treat generally upon the basis of uti possidetis, which was to be scrupulously observed, except in the case of Hanover, which was proposed to be ceded to his Britannic majesty, with all its dependencies That even if it were possible to mistake the result which would necessarily follow from this principle, the verbal discussions which took place on the 9th in instant, between the French plenipoten-
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tiaries and the undersigned, leave no room for doubt, whether the proposition thus laid down was perfectly understood by those plenipotentiaries. The under signed have therefore only to repeat, that they cannot, consistently with the instructions of their government, do otherwise than insist upon the previous recognition of this principle. It is on this condition alone that they are authorized to continue the negociation."—This note remained without answer till the 25th of that month, when their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries informed the undersigned by a letter, that, "the plenipotentiaries of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, wishing to confer with his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, his Britannic majesty's plenipotentiary, upon the subject of the last note his excellency addressed to them, request his lordship will call at the office of the minister of the interior to-morrow about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, where they will meet, provided the hour is convenient to his excellency."—The undersigned forbears making any observations on the length of the interval which elapsed between the sending the note of the 11th and the period when it was answered; as well as on the manner in which their excellencies avoided entering into discussion in writing on the contents of that note, according to the usage of all times, and of all countries, whenever affairs of such importance are in question. He confines himself to remark that, when, after so long a delay, and the undersigned accepted an invitation from their excellencies to renew the discussions, in the hope of receiving at length the decision of the French government on the contents of the official note of the 11th, the conference appeared to tend, on the part of their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries solely to engage the undersigned to present the detailed project of a treaty.—The undersigned, jointly with the earl of Yarmouth, had already, in the note of the 11th inst., formally declared, that, until France had adopted the basis, such as the British government understood it to have been originally proposed by her, he could not enter into a detailed negociation. If indeed the undersigned could have forgot himself so far as to accede to the proposition made at the last conference by their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, it would not only have been necessary for that purpose, that he should have

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abandoned the only conditions which his instructions authorized him to admit, as the basis of the negotiation, but moreover that he should expose himself to a manifest contradiction, in presenting at first an entire project of a treaty, the details of which were to result from the negotiation itself; a negociation which the undersigned had declared that he could not enter upon till after a previous acknowledgement of the basis in question.—In this state of things, the undersigned, after having attended, conformably to the desire of their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, at the conferences which they proposed to him; after having maturely reflected on all the communications which he had received from their excellencies, and thus fully convinced himself, that the present views of the French government are far different from those which his Britannic majesty had aright to expect from them; in a word, that the continuance of the present negociation can henceforth have no other effect than that of keeping up in both nations, a hope which Cannot be realized, the undersigned thinks it his duty formally to declare to their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, the resolution which he has taken, in conformity to the instructions of his sovereign, to put an end to his mission. The admission, in writing, of the basis so often brought forward by the undersigned, can alone occasion a change in this determination, (Signed) LAUDERDALE.
No.44.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, August 30th, 1806.— Received September 3d.
Sir; When I reflect on the contents the dispatch I had the honour of making up for you yesterday, I cannot help anticipating the surprise with which you must receive the intelligence, that I am now under an engagement to renew the conference with the plenipotentiaries of France, on Thursday the 4th of September. On going yesterday, at 3 o'clock, to the office of the minister of the interior, I confess I did not foresee the possibility of any thing occurring that could prevent my executing the resolution I had formed, of demanding passports this morning, and of returning immediately to England. I trust I need scarcely assure you, that I have as strong an impression as any man can have of the bad consequences that may attend exhibiting any thing which looks like versatility of
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conduct; and yet,Under the circumstances in which I found myself placed, I am satisfied I had no choice, and that I could not refuse, with propriety, the solicitations of the French plenipotentiaries to renew the conference.—At the commencement of our interview, I perceived a disposition to greater cordiality than I had hitherto experienced. To M. de Champagny's enquiry, whether they had been fortunate enough, by what they had said, to induce me to deliver the project of a treaty, I answered, by recalling to his recollection, the reasons I had formerly stated for declining such a proceeding till the basis that had originally been proposed was again formally recognized; and I informed him, that, in order to give them an accurate view of my conception of the subject, I had prepared a note which I wished to submit to them, delivering to them the note, a copy of which I had the honour of inclosing-in my dispatch of August 29th.—After reading this note, and observing in general that they did not know whether, if we should come to a particular explanation, we might not arrive at a conclusion coincident in its effect with the object I had in view, when I insisted on the general principle, they entered into a detail with respect to the necessity of some immediate determination on the subject of Hanover, and afterwards stated their views as to the French possessions in the East Indies, the Dutch colonies, St. Lucie, and Tobago; on all of which, they talked in a style so perfectly different from any thing I had before heard, that I should not be more surprised if, at our next conference, they were to give them up, than I was at the change of tone manifested on this occasion.—A great deal more passed in the way of general conversation; all of which tended to shew me, that, although they were still at a wide distance from such terms as I could accede to, they had wonderfully relaxed from the tone. they had antecedently assumed.—M. de Champagny then invited me to name a day for resuming our conference. To this, I decidedly objected, admitting, at the same time, that they had made concessions in the course of our discussion; but, adding, that they were still so far from agreeing to admit what the English government uniformly conceived the original proposition to have conveyed, that I could not yet indulge any hopes of our coming to an agreement, and should therefore feel it necessary to termi-

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nate my mission.—M. de Champagny asked me with some warmth, whether I wished for peace on the terms which I myself had stated? whether I thought myself authorized, after the concessions they had just made, to refuse them time to consider how much further they might go? and whether I might not reasonably entertain hopes that, with a little time, the differences which appeared now to separate us, might vanish? On receiving such a remonstrance, I thought it impossible not to agree to a renewal of the conference; and after some conversation, Thursday was fixed for the day of our meeting.
No. 45.—Extract from a dispatch from Earl Spencer to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Downing-street, September 4th 1806.
My lord; I am commanded by his majesty to inform your lordship, that he is pleased to approve entirely the conduct you have held in the circumstances detailed in your last dispatches, and to express his majesty's satisfaction in the good effect which appears to have resulted from it.—It is proper, however, to remark, that a the French plenipotentiaries have not bound themselves as yet by any written note, nor have even in conversation agreed to replace the negociation on its true basis; the present appearances of greater facility on their part, may probably arise only from their desire of keeping your lordship at Paris till the answer from Petersburgh shall be received; an object which your lordship's last note had shewn them they could no longer accomplish without some departure from the ground on which they have hitherto stood— the Russian treaty shall not be ratified, his majesty is then (as I have already observed to your lordship) replaced, with respect to the emperor Russia, in the same situation as before the signature of M. d'Oubril's treaty; but with the additional tye, which the two courts would in that case feel from the fresh proofs each will have given to the other of a steady adherence to the system of alliance: and it will then be necessary that our peace shall be so far made dependent on that of Russia as is pointed out in the instructions originally given to lord Yarmouth.—Since the above was written, we have received the important intelligence contained in the indorsed papers [intelligence of the refusal of the emperor Russia to ratify M. d'Onbril's treaty] copies of which I have thought it necessary
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to forward to you. without a moment's delay, for your information; the case is already provided for in this dispatch, and in the present state of our information on the subject, I have nothing to add to what is above stated. A few days will now probably put us in possession of the further views and intentions of Russia, to which reference must of course be had in every succeeding stage of the negociation; and as I shall lose no time in transmitting to your lordship such fresh instructions as these may give rise to, so we shall be anxious to hear as soon as possible from you what effect this event may produce on the disposition of the French government.
No. 46.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Sept. 4, 1806.—Received Sept. 7th.
Sir; In my last dispatch I informed you that in consequence of the solicitations of the plenipotentiaries of France, urged in the manner I there stated to you, I had consented to a renewal of the conference this day at three o'clock.—About half past two I received from M. Talleyrand a note, a copy of which (marked A.), as well as of my answer (marked B.), I now inclose. —On going to M. Talleyrand's office, I found him just returned from St. Cloud. He began by informing me that till yesterday they had received no certain information from Petersburg; but that the courier who arrived last night, had brought intelligence that the emperor had positively refused to ratify the treaty. He stated that he had the emperor's orders to say that this change of circumstances would certainly induce him to make peace with England on more favourable terms than he would otherwise have at present consented to; and further to declare, that as he would find it necessary to give to his plenipotentiaries new instructions; so he thought it proper to communicate this to me, that I might write to my court to receive also such further instructions as they might think proper to give.—In answer to a question which I asked, whether there was any reason to expect the arrival of any minister to renew the negociation on the part of Russia, he said that no information on that subject had been received. On taking leave, I assured M. Talleyrand that I should report to you the apparent openness with which the communication had been made, and that I should dispatch a courier this evening with the information.

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First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 7, 1806.
The minister for foreign affairs has received the orders of his majesty the emperor and king, to hold a conference this day with his excellency lord Lauderdale. He has therefore the honour to propose to his excellency to call at the office for foreign affairs at half past two. He begs him to accept the assurance of his high consideration.
Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 4, 1806; half past two P. M.
Lord Lauderdale has this instant received the note dated the 4th Sept. by which his excellency the minister for foreign affairs proposes to lord Lauderdale a conference at his excellency's office this day at half past two o'clock.—This invitation was not delivered at lord Lauderdale's hotel till half past two, the time specified for the conference: but lord Lauderdale will have great pleasure in waiting upon his excellency in a quarter of an hour at farthest.
No. 47.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Sept. 7, 1806.—Received Sept. 11 th.
Sir; I received last night, by the courier Parsons, the dispatch dated the 4th Sept. signed by the earl Spencer.—Though the latter part of it is written in the knowledge that the emperor of Russia has refused to ratify the treaty made by M. d'Oubril, and refers to the instructions antecedently given me, on the supposition that this event should take place, I shall delay pressing for any renewal of the conferences, till I shall receive further advice from England.—I am led to this resolution, because I wish to hear from you after you have received my dispatch of Sept. 4th, and, because I further think that it would be highly advantageous previously to be informed concerning the nature of the communication, which the court of Petersburgh intends to make to the French government, with respect to the basis on which his imperial majesty will renew the negociation. And it appears to me from the note, a copy of which you transmitted to me, that a communication of this sort may be daily expected.
No, 48.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Windham to the Earl of Lau-
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derdale; dated Downing-street, Sept. 10, 1806.
My lord; Your lordship's dispatch of Sept. 4, has not failed to engage his majesty's most serious attention. The language held by M. Talleyrand appears directed to the object of engaging his majesty in a separate negociation, to the exclusion of Russia; but the interests both of this country and of Europe have always been considered here as essentially connected with the maintenance of the strictest union of councils and measures between his majesty and the emperor of Russia. It was with deep regret that his majesty saw the apparent violation of this principle in the separate treaty signed by M. d'Oubril; and he cannot but consider the steady and upright conduct of the emperor of Russia on that trying occasion, as imposing on his majesty a fresh obligation not to separate his interests from those of so honourable and faithful an ally.—Your lordship must therefore in the first place represent to the French government, that, the refusal to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty, has replaced the two courts in their former state of close and intimate alliance; and that any attempt on the part of France to separate them, must henceforth be considered as hopeless. She can now form no expectation that she can conclude peace with either of them, until the negociation with the other shall be brought to the same conclusion.—In reverting to this resolution, his maj. does not however desire to carry the operation of this principle at all farther than before. He has no objection to its being understood as was expressed to lord Yarmouth in Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of June, that the two courts shall treat separately in form, but in substance in concert with each other. In this mode of treating, the separate interests of Great Britain and France may as before be separately discussed between them. But his majesty is determined, as is expressed in the same dispatch, that he will not come to any final agreement without the consent of Russia; and that any arrangement of the points depending between him and France, is to be considered as provisional, and subject to the case of a like arrangement to be made by his ally.—With respect to the separate interests Of Great Britain, his majesty adheres to the basis originally proposed to him by France; and on which your ldp. has so often had occasion to insist, that. of the uti possidetis for the two powers and

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their allies in all parts of the world, with the single exception of the restitution of Hanover, as having been originally attacked on grounds which cannot be defended.—This is the offer of France as originally made to his majesty; it is the demand on which his majesty still thought fit to insist, when apparently abandoned by Russia; and his majesty has no desire of increasing it under circumstances, which, according to the avowal of France herself, entitle his majesty to expect more favourable conditions than France has lately been inclined to accede to. The uti possidetis thus described, must however now of necessity include the kingdom of Sicily.—Every endeavour was made, in the outset of the negotiation to obtain the restitution of Naples to his Sicilian majesty; and the grounds on which it was thought fit finally to desist from that claim on the part of his majesty are detailed in the correspondence of this office with lord Yarmouth and your lordship.—But the case of Sicily was always deemed to be widely different from that of Naples. Our actual occupation of that island brings it fully within the benefit of the uti possidetis. And recent events have shewn how very distant are the hopes of conquest in that quarter, which were so much relied upon in one of the notes presented to your lordship by the French plenipotentiaries.—Lord Yarmouth had been uniformly instructed to insist on this demand as a sine quâ non condition of all arrangements for peace. On the refusal of France to accede to this claim, his lordship had actually, in pursuance of those instructions, demanded his passports, and it was not in the smallest degree departed from or relaxed until a desire was expressed to him by M. d'Oubril, that this government. would listen to proposals for an equivalent to be given for Sicily. In compliance with the supposed wishes of his ally, and on that ground alone, his majesty consented to entertain the consideration of such an equivalent, but none has ever been suggested that appeared at all likely to meet the just expectations which his Sicilian majesty would have been entitled to form on that head. And his maj. has now the satisfaction of learning, that the sentiments of his ally have in fact never been different from his own on this point; and that the preservation of Sicily is considered in Russia, as well as in England, as a just condition of any peace with France. On both these grounds, therefore, both on
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the principle adopted for his own negociation, and on the ground of his determination not to separate himself from Russia, his majesty thinks it absolutely necessary to maintain this point with the same firmness which he had originally manifested respecting it.—This includes all that is necessary to say on any point respecting the immediate interests of this country, or of any possession hitherto known to be occupied by his majesty's arms.
No. 49.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer; dated Paris, Sept, 18, 1806.—Received Sept. 22.
My lord; I had the honour of receiving the dispatch, signed by Mr. Secretary Windham, dated Sept. 10, late in the evening of Friday last.—Unfortunately I had a slight degree of fever for tour days preceding, and I never was more unfit than on Saturday morning to attend to business of such a magnitude.—On considering the instructions contained in the dispatch with all the attention I could, they appeared to me to relate to two distinct subjects: first, to the form and manner in which his majesty thought proper that I should conduct the negociation; secondly, to the terms which under the present circumstances of the two countries, it is proper to ask.—To this distinction I conceived it to be the more necessary for me to attend, because I thought it regular and proper to address what I had to say on the first point to the minister of foreign affairs, whereas the plenipotentiaries of France, should the government authorize them to proceed, seemed the proper channel of communication on the second.—In pursuance of this idea, I immediately wrote a note, a copy of which (marked A.) I inclose, addressed to M. Talleyrand, which I sent by Mr. Goddard in the evening, as I was myself confined to my bed.—On Monday, about five o'clock, M. Talleyrand called, and though I was very ill at the time, I resolved to admit him. He sat upwards of half an hour. The outline of his conversation consisted in his expressing a desire to have a full communication with me, in his assuring me, that if the difficulties, in respect of form, could be got over, he did not think the objections to the terms would be material, and that, where peace was seriously in view, as it was with them, it figured as an object of such importance as to give a disposition to accommodate about conditions: in a word, that he had little

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doubt that he and I would arrange the business.—On my part, I stated, that I was afraid he proceeded on the supposition that I might give way in some of the .points in question, which I thought it fair to assure him at once was impossible. I stated to him generally the demands I was to make on the part of England, which would no way vary from the terms we had originally understood to have been proposed; and that he must expect I would be as positive in relation to the conditions for Russia, with which he was acquainted, as I should be with respect to any point more peculiarly of British interest. I then thought it right to introduce the subject of my having no powers from Russia, observing that, although there might be some irregularity in this mode of proceeding, yet that, under all the circumstances of the present case, it seemed unavoidable, because the principle and feelings of his majesty would never permit him to think a treating, but in such a manner as might insure to the court of Petersburgh an honourable peace, at the moment that peace should be concluded between England and France; and that unless I could be allowed to state the objects ,of Russia, this could be hardly effected.—He assured me that they would wave all objections with regard to form and that they would be perfectly ready to hear me on the subject of a treaty of peace with Russia; his objection to my proposal being founded, not on the circumstance of my wanting powers from Russia, but or the very unusual proposal of concluding treaty, which, when signed, was only to take place in a certain event. I mentioned to him that the same thing had been done in Paris in 1782, when Mr, Oswald concluded a treaty of peace with Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adam.—During the whole of this conversation, I had gone even out of my way to repeat to him the necessity of his laying his account with my adhering rigidly to the terms I had detailed; and yet he left me with such expressions as could no fail to create a belief, that he intended to accede to my propositions.—At the moment he quitted me I was much better than I had been for some days, and was in such hopes that I was about to get well that I undertook to write to him next morning, Tuesday the 16th, to say whether I could appoint a meeting in the course of that day. Unfortunately I had a miserably bad night, and finding myself
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in the morning totally disqualified for exertion, I wrote to him a note of which now inclose a copy (marked B.)—Your lordship will perceive, that in this note I pressed for an answer in writing, in a manner as strong and as inoffensive as I could devise.—On the morning of the 17th, I wrote to M. Talleyrand a short note (marked C.) expressing my desire that he would come to me any time after three a o'clock, which was hardly dispatched before I received a letter from his excellency, announcing the arrival of a courier at Boulogne, and the melancholy account of Mr. Fox's death. A copy of this, together with my answer, a copy of which ,(marked D. and E.) I have the honour of inclosing.—In the evening I received the inclosure (marked F.) from which your lordship will perceive that I shall at last have a meeting with M. Talleyrand tomorrow at one o'clock.—I have the honour to be, &c. LAUDERDALE.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 13, 1806.
The undersigned, plenipotentiary of. his Britannic majesty, lost no time in transmitting to his court the communication which his excellency the minister for foreign affairs made to him on Thursday the 4th inst.; and he now hastens to reply to that communication, by informing his exacellency of the line of conduct his majesty has thought proper to direct him to pursue under the present circumstances.—His Britannic majesty, ever anxious to maintain the intimate connection and alliance which subsist between his majesty and the emperor of all the Russias, naturally finds in the recent conduct of his illustrious ally, and in the proofs which he has lately afforded of the interest which he takes in the welfare of Great Britain and in the general happiness of Europe, additional motives not to, separate, in any case, his interests from. those of the court of St. Petersburgh.—It is not, however, the intention of his majesty to carry this principle farther than the earl of Yarmouth was instructed to carry it by Mr. Fox, in his lordship's communications with the French government. There is nothing to prevent the interests of Great Britain and of France from being treated separately: only his majesty does not authorize the undersigned to sign any treaty except provisionally: such treaty not to have its full effect until peace shall have been concluded between that faithful ally

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of Great Britain and France. It is upon these conditions alone that the undersigned is at present authorized to negociate.—The undersigned has orders to add, that his Britannic majesty, fully acquainted with the desire entertained by the court of St. Petersburgh for peace upon conditions reciprocally honourable and advantageous, and at the same time compatible with the interests of Europe, has authorized him to impart to the French plenipotentiaries the conditions upon which Russia (according to the full and perfect knowledge his Britannic majesty has of the intentions of that court) would be willing to negociate with the French government; to reduce them into the form of a treaty in the event of their being agreed to on both sides; and to insert an article in the provisional treaty between G. Britain and France, by which his Britannic majesty should engage to employ his mediation, for the purpose of obtaining the accession of his majesty the emperor of all the Russias to the said treaty.—The undersigned is aware that he ought to make the official communication of the conditions to the French plenipotentiaries: in the mean time, and for the satisfaction of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, he has no difficulty in telling him that they will be in substance the same as those which have already been communicated to his excellency by his excellency baron de Budberg.—The undersigned expects with great impatience the answer to this communication, which his excellency the minister for foreign affairs will have the goodness to send in writing, It is the more necessary for him to receive it in that form, as his court has remarked that the communications the undersigned has already made, have frequently remained without a written answer.—The undersigned has the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE.
Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 16, 1806.
Lord Lauderdale has the honour of informing his excellency M. Talleyrand, that he has passed a very bad night, and finds himself utterly incapable of entering upon business to-day.—Lord Lauderdale will have the honour of writing to his excellency to-morrow morning, when he hopes the indisposition under which he now labours, will have taken such a turn as may enable him to hold the conversation with his excellency, which he so much de-
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sires.—Lord Lauderdale hopes, nevertheless, that his excellency will be pleased, at, this interview, to put into his hands a written answer to his last note.—He entreats his excellency to believe, that it is by no means from a desire of insisting upon a demand merely because it has been once made, that he now renews it, but the orders of his court are positive in this respect, and lord Lauderdale feels it the more indispensable for him to remind his excellency of this circumstance at the present moment, since he finds himself called upon to treat for a court from which he has received no direct powers.—Lord Lauderdale has the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE.
Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 17, 1806.
Lord Lauderdale, although still too unwell to leave the house, thinks himself able to hold a conference with his excellency M. Talleyrand to-day, if his excellency will do him the honour of coming to the hotel de l'Empire, any time after three o'clock that may best suit his excellency.—Should this proposal interfere with his excellency's engagements, or be in any other respect inconvenient to him, lord Lauderdale hopes to be able to go out to-morrow, and will wait upon his excellency M. Talleyrand at whatever hour may best suit him.—He has the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE.
Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 17, 1806.
The prince of Benevento has this moment learnt that the messenger, Johnson, is arrived, and will be in Paris to-day. It is with sincere regret that the prince of Benevento, at the same time, heard of the death of Mr. Fox, of which event, he has the honour of informing his excellency lord Lauderdale. Mr. Spencer succeeds Mr. Fox provisionally.—The prince of Benevento hopes that lord Lauderdale finds himself better to-day. He has the honour, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.
Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris,Sept. 17, 1806.
Lord Lauderdale received the note that his excellency the prince of Benevento sent him this morning, at the moment when he had just dispatched the note in which he proposed to hold a conference with his excellency this day. Lord Lauderdale

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presumes that, considering the state of his health, and the approaching arrival of the messenger, his excellency will agree with him in opinion, that the conference may be postponed till to-morrow,—Lord Lauderdale thanks his excellency the prince of Benevento for his attention in acquainting him with the arrival of the courier. The death of Mr. Fox occasioned him no surprise; and it appears from what his excellency mentions in his note, that the seals of the foreign department (as is usually the case) have been provisionally entrusted to lord Spencer, secretary of state for the home department, until a successor is appointed.—Lord Lauderdale has the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE.
Sixth inclosure (F.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 17, 1806.
The minister for foreign affairs, on his return from St. Cloud, found the note which his excellency lord Lauderdale had done him the honour of writing to him. He regrets extremely the continued indisposition of his excellency. To-morrow being the day of his official attendance at St. Cloud, he cannot have the honour of seeing his excellency, but he will not fail to wait upon him the next day about 1 o'clock.—He has the honour, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.
No. 50.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer; dated Paris, Sept. 19, 1806.—Received Sept. 22.
My lord; At one o'clock this day, M Talleyrand called upon me according to the appointment which I announced to your lordship in my last dispatch. I immediately perceived, that his plan was to exhibit extreme civility, which no one knows better how to execute. After some time spent in compliments, and in condolence on the great loss the world had sustained, he told me, that as I insisted on an answer in writing, one was prepared, which contained a declaration consonant to what he supposed me to wish on the two most material points. 1st, That the emperor was willing to admit of an article being introduced to answer the objects I had in view in relation to Russia, and to instruct his plenipotentiaries to hear me with respect to the interests of that power. 2dly, That France would be ready to make great concessions for the purpose of obtaining peace.—After some conversation, all tending to impress me with the idea that peace was their main
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object, and that they were even ready to make any sacrifice to secure it; he produced the paper to which he had alluded (marked A.); and which I had at first understood he meant to transmit to me when he should go home.—Before he opened it, he looked at me, and said, that there was s mixture in it of what perhaps I should not like, but that I must take the evil with the good. He begged that I would allow him to read it through without interrupting him. When he had finished, I said that I should of course send such an answer as I thought becoming end proper. I told him, and, I trust, with perfect temper and seeming indifference, that the most important thing for me to know was, whether these concessions would be to the extent of allowing us to retain what they had originally proposed? He answered, that the emperor would leave every thing open to the plenipotentiaries.—On his going away I felt myself so extremely fatigued, in consequence of the weak state in which my late illness has left me, that I was obliged to lie down and recruit my strength before I could turn my mind to the formation of what I conceived to be a proper answer to his note. I trust your lordship will approve of the answer I have sent, a copy of which I have the honour of inclosing,(marked B.) My object in framing it, was to facilitate as much as possible the immediate progress of the negociation, and, at the same time, to let the government of France feel that I was alive to what, in point of dignity, belonged to the plenipotentiary of his Britannick majesty. I have, &c. LAUDERDALE. First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note delivered by M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 13th, 1806.
The undersigned, the minister for foreign affairs, has laid before his majesty the emperor, king of Italy, the note which his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, minister plenipotentiary from his Britannick majesty, did him the honour to address to him or the 13th of this month.—His majesty the emperor and king sees with regret that the negociation seems to take every day a retrograde course, and he is at a loss to discover what point the English government wish to attain.—In the first instance, obsolete forms were brought forward and urge for our acceptance, the text and the substance of which had never been admitted nor even discussed, by the French government, and when this difficulty appeared to be removed, and the French plenipoten-

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tiaries held out a prospect of sacrifices which proved more and more the desire of their government for peace, points antecedent to the negociation were recurred to, and a question was started again which had been three times decided; 1st, by the powers given to M. d'Oubril, with which his Britannick majesty's plenipotentiaries were acquainted, afterwards by the powers given to the earl of Yarmouth, and lastly, for the third time, by those of the earl of Lauderdale. One might have supposed that a discussion, terminated before the first conference of the respective negociators, and decided even by the very fact of their negociation, would not again be brought forward.—His majesty the emperor wishing however to give a fresh proof of his uniform desire for the re-establishment of peace, adheres to the following proposal; That the negociations between France and England shall continue; that the minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the king of Britain shall be at liberty to introduce into the treaty, either as a public or a secret article, or in any other form which would answer the same end,whatever he may conceive would tend to reconcile the existing differences between France and Russia, and would procure for the latter a participation in the benefits of peace, it being well understood, that no proposals shall be admitted except such as are respectively honourable, and are not injurious to the real power and the dignity of the two empires; and that we shall not see again brought forward the extraordinary proposals which M. de Novosiltzoff was charged to make on the part of Russia, and which having marked the origin of a coalition conquered and destroyed in its birth, ought equally to be forgotten with the coalition itself. There are proposals which, being only the result of blind confidence, and of a species of infatuation, and, being founded neither on the real force of the parties, nor on their geographical situation, are deprived of a pacific character, and carry with them their own condemnation.—France ough tneither to abandon the interests of the Ottoman empire, nor a position which enables her to sustain that empire against the aggressions with which she is openly menaced by Russia; but as all the objects destined to enter into the arrangements of the treaty, must be reserved for discussion, the undersigned will not seek to anticipate the result which it may produce.—If, after the changes which have taken place inthe cabinet of
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his Britannick majesty, peace is still wished for in England, peace may be made, and that without delay. The emperor will not hesitate to make some sacrifices in order to accelerate it, and to render it durable; but if the dispositions for peace should have changed in London, if the wise and liberal views manifested in the first communications which took place with the illustrious minister, whom both nations lament, should no longer prevail, a vague discussion, immoderate pretensions, and ambiguous proposals, wide of that tone of frankness and dignity necessary to conduce to a real reconciliation, would only have the effect of producing more irritation, and would be unworthy of both nations. France does not pretend to dictate either to Russia or to England, but she will be dictated to by neither of these powers, Let the conditions be equal, just, and moderate, and the peace is concluded; but if an imperious and exaggerating disposition is evinced, if preeminence is affected, if, in a word, it is meant to dictate peace, the emperor and the French people will not even notice these proposals. Confiding in themselves, they will say as a nation of antiquity answered its enemies,"you demand our arms, come and take them."—The undersigned, &c. CH MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.
Second Inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from Lord Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Sept. 19th, 1806.
The undersigned plenipotentiary of his majesty the king of G. Britain, in answering the official note of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, dated the 18th inst., which has been received to-day, begins by remarking, that he purposely abstains as much as possible from all observation upon those points contained in it, which are foreign to the immediate object in question. By this means, he will avoid discussions of a nature to lead him to forget that tone of moderation which it is his duty to observe in the whole course of his mission. He will thus maintain the line of conduct which is conformable to that love of peace, which characterizes all the proceedings of the king his master.—When the undersigned reflects, that became to Paris, authorized to conclude peace upon terms understood to have been proposed by France; that notwithstanding the refusal of his imperial majesty of all the Russias to ratify the treaty signed by M. d'Oubril, and the splendid successes obtained by his

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majesty's arms in Spanish America, he was authorized to give assurances (as he had the honour of doing to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs) that the demands of his court, in its own favour, would not in consequence of these successes be materially increased; the undersigned had reason to be surprized at finding his government charged with manifesting an "imperious and exaggerating disposition." He is not less astonished, that his excellency, in replying to a note in which lord Lauderdale had the honour of explaining distinctly to him, that the conditions pointed out by his excellency baron de Budberg, were in substance what would be insisted upon by G. Britain in favour of Russia, should .have thought it necessary to reprobate so strongly conditions proposed by M. de Novosiltzoff under totally different circumstances, and of the nature of which, the undersigned is entirely ignorant.—Nevertheless, after the explanations given by the undersigned to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, and the declaration made by him to his excellency, that the undersigned is not authorized to negociate otherwise than so as to ensure the conclusion of a peace with G. Britain and with Russia at the same moment; and, after having received, in the official note of yesterday's date, assurances that the French government does not refuse the admission of an article the design of which shall be to provide for this indispensable object, the undersigned will make no difficulty in resuming the conferences with their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, as soon as their excellencies shall be duly authorized for this purpose.—The undersigned, &c. LAUDERDALE.
No. 51.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.—Received Sept. 28th.
Nothing material happened after the conference with M. Talleyrand, which I detailed in my dispatch of the 19th inst till the 22d, when I received from him communication, informing me that the emperor having thought gen. Clarke's service near his person necessary in a journey he was about to undertake immediately, M. de Champagny would be instructed to conduct singly on the part of France the business of the negociation in future.—This communication was made in a letter which I enclose (marked A.) together with a copy of my answer (marked B.)—On the
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23d, being anxious that the negociation should proceed as soon as possible, I took the opportunity of M. de Champagny's sending to enquire after my health, to urge him, in writing, to renew the conferences without farther loss of time. Your lordship will find a copy of my letter (marked C.), together with his answer (marked D.) enclosed.—On the 24th I received from M. Talleyrand an answer to the demand I had made for an explanationon the subject of passports, in my letter of the 22d. This communication (marked E.) I think it proper also to transmit to your lordship.—On the 25th at 1 o'clock, M. de Champagny called on me, as had been previously agreed, for the purpose of renewing the conferences.—After the usual interchange of civilities, he proceeded to say, that, to secure peace, the emperor had determined to make great sacrifices.—1st, That Hanover with its dependencies should be restored to his maj.—2d, That the possession of Malta should be confirmed to Great Britain.—3d, That France would interfere with Holland to confirm to his majesty the absolute possession of the Cape.—4th, That the emperor would confirm to his majesty the possession of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Mahee, and the other dependent comptoirs.—5th, That as Tobago was originally settled by the English, it was meant also to give that island to the crown of Great Britain.—To all this he added, that what he had now said, proceeded on the supposition, that Sicily was to be ceded, and that the French government proposed that his Sicilian majesty should have as indemnity, not only the Balearic islands, but should also receive an annuity from the court of Spain to enable him to support his dignity.—I here interrupted him, expressing my surprise after the full explanation I had with M. Talleyrand on that very point, that the possibility of our giving up Sicily should be mentioned again; that the guarantee of it to the king of the two Sicilies was as much an object with England as M. Talleyrand knew it to be with Russia; and that I was happy to take that opportunity of stating to him fairly, that I felt myself bound to consider the obtaining for Russia the arrangement which she desired; as an object more interesting it possible to England, than those points Which might be considered as peculiarly connected with her own interests.—He informed me, that there was no clause in his instructions empowering him to hear me on the part of Russia; but

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that he had even seen M. Talleyrand's note to me, and, being satisfied that this was an accidental omission, which would be forthwith remedied, he had no objection to proceed as if such a clause had been inserted.—It was agreed that I should go to him to day at 2 o'clock to renew the conference.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 22, 1806.
My lord; I have the honour to inform you, that his majesty having thought it for the good of his service to retain gen. Clarke near his person, during the course of a journey he is about to undertake; M. de Champagny will henceforth be charged with conducting singly the negociation entered into with your excellency.—I have communicated his majesty's intentions to that minister, who has received orders to concert with you such measures as may prevent any interruption to the continuance of the conferences, and of the correspondence between the two missions. I should at the same time acquaint you, that being myself directed to follow his majesty, I shall nethertheless continue to correspond with your excellency as before; the general order of the service being such, as to secure the daily and regular deliver of all dispatches addressed to me on the affairs of my department. I beg, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.
Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand dated Paris, Sept. 22, 1806.
Sir; I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of this date, in which you inform me that M de Champagny will in future be directed to carry on singly the negociation with me and that this minister has received order to make such arrangements with me as may prevent any interruption to the continuance of the conferences and of the correspondence.—In returning my thanks to you excellency for this communication, I have the honour to remark to you, that it is no less essential to take measures, as you excellency will doubtless do before you departure, for ensuring a communication by messengers with my government during your absence, without any delay or obstacle whatever, in the same manner a has been practised since my arrival here. It cannot escape your excellency's observation how impossible it would be for me to transmit to you in sufficient time the
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demands which I may he obliged to make on this subject, as occasion may require; and I have in consequence to request you would have the goodness to inform me to what person I am to address myself for this purpose during your absence. I request, &c. LAUDERDALE.
Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. de Champagny; dated Paris, Sept. 23, 1806.
Sir; It is impossible to be more sensible than I am of the interest which your excellency takes in the state of my health. For some days past I have been much better, and I now consider myself quite or nearly well. His excellency the minister for foreign affairs has informed me, in a note of yesterday's date, that your excellency is henceforward to carry on, singly, the negociation with me. The state of my health being no longer an obstacle, I request your excellency will he pleased to consider me at your disposal, either to receive you here, or to call upon you, as it may he most convenient, in order to resume the conferences, which, from various circumstances, have been so long interrupted. I request, &c. LAUDERDALE. Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 23, 1806.
M. de Champagny has learnt, with the utmost satisfaction, the re-establishment of the health of his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, and he congratulates himself on the prospect of continuing with his excellency the relations on which he sets the highest value. He is extremely anxious to renew the conferences which had been interrupted; but the extraordinary business occasioned by the approaching departure of the emperor, does not allow him to do so, either to-day or to-morrow, as he could have wished. He has, therefore, the honour to propose to his lordship Thursday next, being the first day in which he shall have a moment's leisure. The conference shall be held at whatever place and hour his lordship may name; and M. de Champagny requests him in making this appointment only to consult the state of his health. He requests, &c. CHAMPAGNY.
Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 24, 1806.
My lord; I have the honour to inform you, that I have taken his majesty's pleasure on the subject of the letter which your excellency did me the honour to ,write to

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me on the 22d Sept. and that his majesty immediately authorized M. de Champagny, his minister plenipotentiary, to deliver to you all the passports which may be necessary to insure the regularity and expedition of your excellency's communications with the ministers of his Britannick majesty.I have the honour, &c. CH MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.
No. 52.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.—Received Sept. 28th.
My lord; In conformity with my engagement made yesterday, which I had the honour of mentioning to your lordship in my former dispatch of this date, I waited on M. Champagny this afternoon at 2 o'clock. He informed me, that the accidental omission in his instructions had been remedied, and that he had now powers to talk with me on the interests of Russia, with a view to arrange the conditions on which France would make peace with that country: but he, at the same time, proposed, that we should, in the first instance talk over the terms of peace between France and England. I observed, that as the greatest difficulties in our last conference seemed to arise from the conditions that I had proposed as necessary to be granted to Russia; and, as England was resolved not to make peace without obtaining for Russia all the objects on which she insisted, I thought the more natural order would be, to resume our conversation on these last topics.—A long discussion accordingly ensued, which ended in his informing me that, on the subject of concession to Russia, he was authorized to communicate to me, that the government of France was willing, in addition to the treaty made by M. d'Oubril, to Cede to that power the full sovereignty of the island of Corfu; but that he had no authority to go any farther.—I then informed him, that I was sorry to learn that the negotiation was at an end, for that my instructions were precise, and that I should feel it my duty, the moment I left him, to state to M. Talleyrand, that all hopes having vanished of bringing the negotiation to a favourable issue, I had only now to request passports for my return to England.—After strong expressions of mutual regard, he attendee me to the outer room, where he again proposed a renewal of our conferences, in case his government should give him new instructions.—My answer was, that I had
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on choice in immediately applying for passports; but that, as long as I remained in this country, I never would refuse to see him; and that if, before my departure, he should come with powers to grant all the objects on which I had explained myself, I should feel the greatest satisfaction, though at that moment, I thought any appointment perfectly unnecessary.—On my return home I sent to M. Talleyrand a letter demanding my passports, a copy of which, (marked A.) I inclose; and, I understand from the courier Basilico, that he received it ten minutes before he got into his carriage to go to Mentz.—About 6 o'clock, I received from M. de Champagny a note, of which, as well as of my answer, I inclose copies to your lordship, (marked B. and C.)—Whilst I am writing, I have received the note, which I inclose, (marked D.)—I have, &c. LAUDERDALE.
I open this dispatch to inclose a note (marked E.) I have this moment received from M. de Champagny.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.
Sir; I lose not a moment in acquainting your excellency that the result of the conference which I have had to-day with his excellency M. de Champagny, unfortunately leaves me no hope of being able to bring the negociations, on the part of G. Britain and of Russia, to a favourable issue. In this state of things, and according to my instructions, no part remains for me to take but to address myself to your excellency for passports, for my return into the presence of my sovereign. In thus making this demand to your excellency, I cannot deny myself the pleasure which I feel in expressing my thanks for all the personal attentions which your excellency has shewn to me during my residence at Paris; and in assuring your excellency at the same time, of the sentiments of esteem which I have always felt, and which I shall ever feel, for your excellency, I request, &c. LAUDERDALE.
Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 26, 1806.
M. de Champagny has made a report to his government, of the conference which he this day held with lord Lauderdale; as several days must necessary elapse before he can receive fresh orders from his government, he thinks it may tend to advance that very desirable object, peace, to con-

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verse again on the subject with his excellency; and he has the honour to propose to his excellency to receive him at his house on Monday next, at the hour which may best suit his health. M. de Champagny requests his excellency the earl of Lauderdale to accept the assurances of his high consideration.
Third inclsoure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. de Champagny; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.
Lord Lauderdale has this instant received the note of his excellency M. de Champagny, in which, after informing him of his having made a report to his government of this day's conference, he expresses a desire again to converse with lord Lauderdale. Although the result of the conference which lord Lauderdale has this day had with his excellency (at the conclusion of which his lordship thought it his duty to ask for passports, for which he has just made application to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs) leaves no hope of bringing the negociation to a favourable issue; the wish expressed by his excellency M.de Champagny to have another conversation with lord Lauderdale is decisive; and lord Lauderdale hastens to reply to this invitation, by informing his excellency that he will either meet him at his office, or will have the honour of receiving him at home, on Monday next, at whatever hour may best suit his excellency. Lord Lauderdale has the honour to repeat, to his excellency M. de Champagny the assurance of his high consideration.
Fourth in closure—D.)—Copy of a note from M.d' Hauterive to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.
My lord; I have this moment received a letter from you for the prince of Benevento. He is this instant set out, and I embrace the opportunity offered by the departure of one of his suite, whose carriage will follow him immediately, to forward it to the prince of Benevento; it will probably reach him on the road, but at all events on his arrival at Mentz. I beg, &c. HAUTERIVE.
Fifth inclosure (E.) Copy of a note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.
M. de Champagny will have the honour of calling upon lord Lauderdale op Monday next, at 2 O'clock, which he supposes will be the Most convenient time.—He sends the passports lord Lauderdale desired for the messenger Basilico. He requests his excellency to accept the assurances of his high consideration.
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No. 53.—Extract from a dispatch from Viscount Howick to the Earl of Landerdale; dated Downing-street,Oct. 1,1806.
My lord; your dispatches of the 26th ult. brought by the messenger Johnson, have been laid before the king.—His majesty has seen with great regret that, after inure than 6 months spent in negociation, the French government still hesitates upon We admission of points constantly urged by his majesty as the only grounds on which he could consent to peace, and that in so unsatisfactory a state of things, the chief of that government, together with his principal minister, has suddenly left Paris*, creating thereby new obstacles to the progress of the negociation. Whatever views the French government may have in keeping up this state of suspence and uncertainty, his majesty feels that it is equally prejudicial to the interests of his subjects and to those of Europe. If the professions of France are sincere, there can be no reason why she should not give a plain and decisive answer to demands which have been so long under consideration; and the time is now come when such an answer must be required as indispensable to your continuance at Paris.
No. 54.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Viscount Howick; dated Paris, Oct. 4th, 1806.—Received Oct. 6th.
My lord; Yesterday at 4 o'clock, M. de Champagny sent me a note to announce the arrival of a courier at Boulogne, who reached Paris this morning at 3 o'clock.—On reading your lordship's dispatch, dated Oct. 1st, it appeared to me; that his majesty had been pleased to approve of the demand of passports which I had made.—Your lordship may depend on my pressing for them with the utmost possible earnestness and assiduity; but how soon I may be able to succeed, it is impossible for me, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, to prophesy.
No. 55.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Viscount Howick; dated Paris, Oct. 6, 1806.—Received Oct. 8.
My lord; Late last night, M. de Champagny's principal secretary called upon me with a letter from him, inclosing a letter from M. Talleyrand; both of which I have the honour of transmitting to your lordship (marked A. and B.).—From these your
*The chief of the French government left Paris on the night of September the 27th, and was followed by M, Talleyrand on the 96th.

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lordship will perceive, that the negociation is now at an end, and that M. de Champagny has been authorized to give me the passports I required. I have this day accordingly renewed my demand to him in a letter, a copy of which I inclose (marked C.)—On considering M. Talleyrand's note, it seemed to me necessary, that I should not take the step of asking my passports from M. de Champagny, without accompanying my demand with a reply to some of the observations made by the minister for foreign affairs. Your lordship will accordingly find inclosed, a copy (marked D.) of an official note addressed by me to that minister. I have sent the courier, Lyell, for the purpose of conveying this information, and I have given him a letter to admiral Holloway, desiring him instantly to announce by the telegraph, that I shall leave Paris on Thursday morning.—I have taken this step because it occurred to me that government being thus in possession of the intelligence, that the negociation is at an end, ten hours before it can reach London, they may have it in their power to take the most prudent means to make the fact public. I have, &c. LAUDERDALE.
First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Oct. 5, 1806.
M. de Champagny has. the honour to transmit to his excellency the earl of Lauderdale the accompanying dispatch, addressed to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs. He is also charged to inform him, that he is now authorized to deliver to him the passports which he has demanded. This, of all the duties which he has had a discharge towards his excellency, is the only one which will have appeared painful to him; and it will be greatly so. He waits to be informed of the further dispositions of his excellency. M. de Champagny begs, &c. CHAMPAGNY.
Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Mentz, Oct. 1, 1806.
The undersigned, minister for foreign affairs, has laid before his majesty the emperor, king of Italy, the note which his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, minister plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty did him the honour to address to him on the 26th of this month. His majesty, after having, from a desire of peace, listened to every proposition which could have rendered it durable and of reciprocal advantage to the two contracting powers, and to their
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allies, will see with pain the rupture of a negociation, to which his own disposition had led him to hope a more favourable conclusion. If the English cabinet is resolved to forego the prospect of a peace, and,if his Britannic majesty's minister plenipotentiary must depart from France, his majesty still flatters himself that the English cabinet amid lord Lauderdale will, when they shall measure the extent of the sacrifices which he was disposed to make, in order to facilitate the return of a sincere reconciliation, be convinced, that his majesty, in order to promote the happiness of the world, would not hesitate between any advantages in comparison with those to be expected from peace, and that the desire to insure its benefits to his people, could alone have determined his paternal heart to make sacrifices not only of self-love but of power, more considerable than even the opinion of the English nation could have pointed out in the midst of a war, in which he had obtained constant advantages without any mixture of reverse. If, however, it is the destiny of the emperor and of the French nation still to live in the midst of the wars and tumults, which the policy and influence of England have raised, his majesty having done every thing to put a stop to the calamities of war, finding himself deceived in his dearest hopes, relies on the justice of his cause, on the courage, the affection, and the power of his people. At the same time calling to mind the dispositions which he has ever expressed throughout the negociation, his majesty cannot see but with regret, that England, who might have strengthened and confirmed her vast power by the blessings of peace, the want of which is felt by the present generation, and by the English people as well as all others, willingly Suffers the most favourable opportunity of concluding it, to pass by: the event will disclose whether a new coalition will be more disadvantageous to France than those which have preceded it. The event will also disclose, whether those who complain of the grandeur and ambition of France, should not impute to their own hatred and injustice this very grandeur and ambition of which they accuse her. The power of France has only been increased by the reiterated efforts to oppress her, Nevertheless whatever inferences for the future may be drawn from the examples of the past, his majesty will be ready, should the negociations with England be broken off, to renew them in the midst of any

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events, He will be ready to replace them on the basis laid in concert with the illustrious minister whom England has lost, who, having nothing to add to his glory except the reconciliation of the two nations, had conceived the hope of accomplishing it, but was snatched from the world in the midst of his work. The undersigned has the honour to inform his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, that M. de Champagny has been authorized to deliver to him the passports which he has demanded. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento. Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. de Champagny; dated Paris, Oct. 6, 1806.
Lord Lauderdale has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of his excellency M. de Champagny, dated the 5th of this month, and of the dispatch which accompanied it, from his excellency the minister for foreign affairs. Lord Lauderdale, learning that his excellency M. de Champagny is authorized to deliver to him the passports which he has demanded, requests his excellency to have the goodness to forward them to him, as well for himself as for his suite, and at the same. time a separate passport for the messenger Scott, who, perhaps, may not accompany him. (Signed) LAUDERDALE.
Fourth inclosure (1)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Oct. 6, 1806.
The undersigned minister plenipotentiary of his Britannick majesty, received late last night the note which his excellency the minister for foreign affairs did him the honour to address to him on the 1st of this month. The undersigned, learning that his excellency M. de Champagny is authorized to grant him the passport; which he has demanded, and which he is on the point of receiving, cannot refrain from observing to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, in answer to his note, that he has some difficulty in imaging from what circumstances his excellency has been able to infer, "that the British government have resolved to forego the prospect of peace." The undersigned was sent to France to negociate a peace, at a time when the illustrious minister, to whom his excellency has paid so just atribute of praise, presided over the department for foreign affairs. This great man then acted under the full conviction, that he had received from France an offer of peace on the basis of uti possidetis, with the
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sole exception of Hanover and of its dependencies in favour of his Britannick maj. And, notwithstanding the success of the arms of his Britannick majesty, as well in Italy as on the continent of South America; and the refusal of his maj. the emperor of all the Russias to ratify that treaty, which in the eyes of the French government was equivalent to the most splendid victory; not one new proposition has been advanced on the part of his majesty, incompatible with the principle which was at first proposed by the French government, through the channel of the earl of Yarmouth, as the basis of the negociation. It is not surely from such conduct that the inference can be drawn, "that the British government have resolved to forego the prospect of a Peace." Are the conditions which the undersigned was ordered to propose as the basis of a peace between his majesty the emperor of all the Russias and the French government, more of a nature to have given rise to this suspicion? Quite the reverse. If a solid and durable peace was the object of the two powers, these were such conditions as justice and expediency demanded. Justice; because certainly nothing could be more equitable than to grant to his Sicilian majesty and to the king of Sardinia a compensation for their immense losses on the Continent. Expediency; because, in order to ensure the duration of peace, such an arrangement of boundaries as may prevent disputes, must always be preferable to that which furnishes to one of the parties the means and the advantages of attack. It was on this principle that the proposed evacuation of Dalmatia and Albania by the French troops naturally suggested itself.—If, therefore, the undersigned has received orders to demand his passports, and to depart from France, it is certainly not because his sovereign wishes to renounce peace, but because his maj. finds himself obliged to do so; the French government not having consented to all the conditions which were comprised in the proposals originally made by them to his Britannick majesty, and having moreover rejected as the basis for the treaty with Russia the just and reasonable conditions which the undersigned was authorized to propose.—The undersigned has received with real satisfaction the general assurances of the disposition of the French government to renew the negociation at a future period, as expressed in the official note of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs. He has

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seen with no less pleasure, that the tone and the moderation observed in this communication correspond with the sentiments which accompany them. On this subject his excellency may rest assured, that the French government could not in any way express a stronger desire to see an end put to the calamities of war, than that which his Britannick majesty will invariably feel, whenever peace can be concluded on conditions compatible with the honour of his crown and the interests of his subjects.—The undersigned ought here to conclude the official answer which he has thought necessary to make to the note of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs. But he cannot pass over in silence one part of this note, where his excellency wishes to convey the idea, that the British government seems no longer disposed to act on the same principles which directed the conduct of the great man whom England has lately lost. The undersigned, without being authorized to mention this subject, nor even to introduce it in an official paper trusts in the known goodness and indulgence of his sovereign, when he allows himself to make the following observations on this subject.—During 26 years of intimate and uninterrupted connection with Mr. Fox, the undersigned, as much as any one, has had an opportunity of confidentially learning the sentiments of that celebrated man. From his knowledge of them, he is impressed with the strongest conviction, that no minister could give to the instructions of which he was to be the organ, a more perfect assent, or concur more effectually it their execution, than Mr. Fox would have done, in giving to the undersigned, on the part of his Britannick majesty, such orders as the undersigned has in fact received under circumstances in which peace (on the just and equitable conditions which had been proposed to that minister) would have appeared to him impracticable.—How much would this opinion have been strengthened in the mind of that minister on perceiving the French government refuse the just demands of that illustrious ally, who, by his fidelity to his Britannick majesty, has deserved on the part of the king; that his interests should be as dear to him as his own! The undersigned has the honour to acquaint his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, that he this morning applied to his excellency M. de Champagny for his passports. At the same time he requests, &c. LAUDERDALE
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No. 56.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Buyukdèrè, Aug. 25. 1806.—Received Sept. 29.
It was yesterday settled at the Porte, that the present Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be recalled, and that prince Charles Callimaki, the first dragoman of the Porte, should be named to the government of Moldavia, and prince Alexander Suzzo to that of Wallachia; at the same time Mr. Bano Hanchyry was appointed dragoman in the room of prince Callimaki.—To give you a perfect idea of the disrespect with which Russia has been treated in this instance, it is necessary that I should transmit to you an extract from the regulations respecting Moldavia and Wallachia, which were published in the year 1802. As no accusation whatever has been brought against either of the Hospodars who are now removed, there can be no excuse for breaking the convention; by which it was stipulated with Russia that 7 years should be the period of each prince's government. You will probably expect to hear that this measure has originated with the French ambassador; in effect, there are proofs sufficient that it is his work.
(Inclosure.)—Extract of a regulation respecting the principalities of Wallachia, and Moldavia; dated Sept. 24, 1802.
The term of the continuance of the Hosnodars in their governments shall from henceforth be fixed at 7 complete and entire years, to date from the day of their nomination, and if they are not guilty of any open offence, they shall not be displaced before that term is expired; if they do commit an offence daring that time, the Sublime Porte will inform the minister of Russia of the circumstance; and if, after due examination is made into the affair on both sides, it shall appear that the Hospodar has really committed an offence, in that case only his deposition shall be allowed.
No. 57.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Buyukdèrè, Sept. 29, 1806.—Received Nov. 9.
Sir; On the 18th of this month, the dragoman of the Porte communicated to Mr. Pisani [first dragoman or interpreter attached to the British mission] for my information, a note which had been presented by the French ambassador; a copy of which I have herewith the honour to inclose.(Inclosure.—) Note presented by the French

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Ambassador at the Porte, to the Reis Effendi;.Porte, Sept. 16, 1806.
The undersigned general of division, ambassador of his majesty, the emperor of the French, king of Italy, has the honour to lay before his excellency the Reis Effendi the following considerations. He has been positively informed, although in an indirect manner, that the Russian legation has delivered a note to the Sublime Porte, in which it is said that the emperor of Russia has refused to ratify the treaty of peace signed at Paris by his plenipotentiary. This refusal places Europe in the same situation in which she was 6 weeks ago, but it unmasks the projects of Russia. This treaty of peace stipulated for the independence of the 7 islands; a stipulation which removing the Russians from the Mediterranean, where they had established themselves in order to attack the Ottoman empire at various points, could not be acceptable to them.—Ragusa was restored to its independence under the protection of the Sublime Porte: this arrangement rendering it impossible for the Russians to keep up their intelligence with the Montenegrians and with the revolted Servians, was contrary to their views. Doubtless it is the article which stipulates for the independence of the Ottoman empire and the integrity of its territory which has occasioned the rejection of the peace at Petersburgh; Russia then perceived that she could no longer seize provinces of that empire by force of arms as she seized the Crimea, or extort them from her in time of peace, as she did with regard to Georgia and the passage of the Dardanelles. This treaty of peace, in line, leaving the French in Albania and Dalmatia, placed upon the frontiers of Turkey her most ancient ally and her most faithful friend, who would have remained and will ever remain ready to defend her. Such are the motives which have led the cabinet of Petersburgh to this refusal. I do not give way to vain declamation; I lay facts before you; I beseech you to weigh them with all the attention to which they are entitled.—If in these difficult circumstances the Porte does not form a true estimate of her dangers and of her force, if she does not form the decision her interests require of, her, I shall perhaps ere long have to lament her fate.—The undersigned has received the most positive orders from his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, to de-
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care to the Sublime Porte, that not only the principles of friendship, but those of the strictest neutrality, require that the Bosphorus should be shut against all Russian ships of war, as well as against every: other vessel of that nation, bringing troops, ammunition, or provisions; and that the said passage cannot be opened to them without committing an act of hostility against France, and without giving his majesty Napoleon the Great a right of passage over the territories of the Ottoman empire, in order to combat with the Russian army on the banks of the Dniester.—Any renewal or continuation of alliance with the enemies of France, such as England and Russia, would be not only a manifest violation of the neutrality, but an accession, on the part of the Sublime Porte, to the war which those powers wage against France, and his majesty would see himself compelled to take measures conformable to his interests and his dignity.—The Sublime Porte cannot maintain her relations with two missions from Naples, and his majesty the emperor of the French cannot suffer his august brother, Napoleon Joseph, king of Naples and the two Sicilies, to meet with difficulties here which he does not experience from any power in amity with France.—His majesty the emperor has a large army in Dalmatia: this army is collected for the defence of the Ottoman empire, unless an equivocal conduct on the part of the Porte, and a condescension towards Russia and England, which might again throw her into their power, should compel his majesty the emperor of the French, to bring forward his formidable forces for a purpose totally opposite to that which he had in view.—His majesty has ordered the undersigned to state to the Sublime Porte in the most friendly though energetic manner these demands, for the purpose of obtaining an answer in writing, and it is expected that this answer shall be positive and categorical.—No further delay can be allowed; and his majesty has no doubt that the Sublime Porte will give him the assurances he desires, and which are so much in unison with the interests of the Ottoman empire.—The undersigned has no wish to make a vain display of the formidable forces of the great Napoleon; his friends know how to estimate their importance; his enemies have felt their power. The genius of his august master is well known; his determinations are wise and prompt, his personal attachment to his.

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highness is sincere. He only seeks the independence, the integrity, and the glory of Turkey. He desires nothing. He asks nothing. What inducements to an union with him! at the same time what reason to apprehend the loss of his good-will by adopting a timid, uncertain, or inimical line of conduct! Under these circumstances the answer of the Sublime Porte will regulate the conduct of my august master. Let not the threats of the enemies of France impose upon the Sublime Porte; they have been vanquished, and they will ever be so. The great Napoleon will employ all his resources for the glory of his highness Selim III. his friend; and his resources are immense, his genius is still greater.—This note is of sufficient importance to he submitted to the profound wisdom of his majesty the emperor Selim III. and your excellency is requested to take the earliest opportunity of laying it before him.—The undersigned requests, &c. HORACE SEBASTIANI.

DECLARATION OF THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN; DATED OCTOBER 21, 1806.
The negotiations in which his majesty has been engaged with France having terminated unsuccessfully, his majesty thinks proper to make this public declaration to his subjects and to Europe, of the circumstances which have led to an issue which his majesty deeply regrets. He has no object nearer to his heart than the conclusion of a secure and permanent peace. He laments the continuance of a war affecting the happiness of so many nations, and which, even amidst all the successes that attend his arms, is so burthensome to his faithful and affectionate people. But he is confident that there can arise on this occasion no other sentiment, either in his own dominions, or in any part of Europe, than that of an increased conviction, that the restoration of general tranquillity is retarded only by the injustice and ambition of the enemy.—The French government, unsatisfied with its immense acquisitions on the continent, still openly perseveres in a system destructive of the independence of every other power. War is pursued, not for security but for conquest; and negociations for peace appear to be entered into for no other object than that of deluding the neighbouring powers into a state of false security, while France is herself preparing, arranging, and executing
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her unremitted projects of encroachment and aggression.—Her conduct in the recent discussions has afforded but too many proofs of this disposition.—The negociation originated in an offer made by the French government of treating for peace on the basis of actual possession, which was stated to admit of mutual compensation, and a distinct assurance was added, that his majesty's German dominions, which had been attacked without even the pretence of any cause of hostility, should be restored.—Such a proposal appeared to his majesty to afford a just foundation for negociating: it was therefore accepted with this reserve, that the negociation should be conducted by his majesty in concert with his allies.—No sooner had this basis been mutually admitted, than it was departed from by the enemy, and that too, in points of so great importance, as to call for an immediate declaration on the part of his majesty, that unless the principle proposed by France herself was adhered to, the communications which had been opened between the two governments must at once be closed.—This produced new professions of the dispositions of France to make considerable sacrifices for the attainment of peace, if the discussions were suffered to proceed; at the same time that a difficulty was started on account of the want of full powers in the person intrusted by his majesty with this communication. Steps were thereupon taken by his majesty for opening a regular negotiation by ministers duly authorized, in order to ascertain, in a manner the most satisfactory and authentic, whether peace could be obtained on terms honourable to the king and his allies, and consistent with the general security of Europe.—During these proceedings, a minister sent by the emperor of Russia to treat for the same important object, in concert with his majesty's government, was induced by the artifices of the enemy, to sign a separate treaty, on terms equally repugnant to the honour and interests of his imperial majesty.—Unmoved by this unexpected event, the king continued to negociate precisely on the same principles as before. He relied, with a confidence which experience has amply justified, on the good faith and steadiness of an ally, in concert with whom he had begun to treat, and whose interests he had maintained throughout with the same firmness as his own.—The French government, on the contrary, elated by this advantage, of

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which it boasted as equal in importance to the most decisive victory, departed in every conference more and more widely from its own offers and engagements. Not only did it take upon itself to change at its own will the basis of the negociation with Great Britain, but violated, in points, still more important, every principle of good faith with Russia. The chief inducement offered to that power as the price of all the sacrifices extorted from her minister, had been the preservation of Germany. Yet, before the decision of Russia on this treaty could be known, France had already annihilated the whole frame and constitution of the German empire; had reduced under her own yoke a large proportion of the states and provinces of Germany; and, not content with this open contempt of obligations so recently contracted, had, at the same time instigated the Porte to measures directly subversive of her subsisting enagements with Russia.—While such a conduct was pursued towards his majesty, towards allies, and towards all independent powers there appeared so little hope of any favourable issue to the negociation, that his majesty's plenipotentiaries demanded their passports to return to England.—This demand was at first eluded by an unusual and unexplained delay, and the French government afterwards, by some material concessions, accompanied with intimations that others of still greater conferences, might be the result of further discussion procured a renewal of the conference which were protracted from day to day till at length it was announced at Paris that the emperor of Russia had indignantly rejected the unauthorized and separate treaty signed by his minister.—In consequence this important event, the strongest assurances were given to his majesty's minister that France was now prepared to make sacrifices to a great extent, in order, securing peace with Great Britain, to re-establish the tranquillity of the world.—The object of these assurances appeared however to be, that of engaging his majesty in a separate negociation, to the exclusion of his allies; a proposal which his majesty had rejected in the outset, and which he could still less admit of at a time when the conduct of Russia had impost on him an increased obligation not to separate his interests from those of so faithful an ally. To these insidious overtures, his majesty steadily refused to listen; but he
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took the most effectual method to avoid all appearance of delay, and to accelerate, if possible, the favourable issue of the negociation. The confidential intercourse which he had constantly maintained with Russia, enabled his majesty to specify the terms on which peace with that power might be obtained; and his minister was accordingly instructed to state to France, in addition to the king's demands, those of his ally, to reduce them into distinct articles, and even to conclude on those grounds a provisional treaty, to take effect whenever Russia should signify her accession.—This form of negociating was, after some objection, acceded to by France; terms were now offered to his majesty more nearly approaching than before to the original basis of negociation; but these were still far short of what his majesty had uniformly insisted on, and was now more than ever entitled to expect; and the decisive rejection of the just demands of Russia, as well as of the conditions proposed by his majesty in behalf of his other allies, left to his majesty no other course than that of ordering his minister to terminate the discussion, and return to England.—The foregoing short and simple exposition of facts stands in need of no comment. The first overtures which led to negociation were made by the enemy, and they were accepted by his majesty in the sincerest spirit of peace. Every opening which seemed to afford the most distant prospect of accommodation has been anxiously embraced, nor was the negociation finally broken off, while any hope of a favourable issue could be entertained. His majesty's demands were uniformly just and reasonable; directed to no objects of personal aggrandizement, but to such only as were indispensably required by the honour of his crown, his engagements to his allies, and a due consideration of the general interests of Europe.—It is with heartfelt concern that his majesty contemplates the continuance of those evils always inseparable from a state of war; but it is with his enemies that this awful responsibility rests; and for the issue of the contest his majesty trusts, with confidence, to the justice of his cause; to the resources and bravery of his people; to the fidelity of his allies; and, above all, to the protection and support of the Divine Providence.—In contributing to the great efforts which such a contest must unavoidably require, his faithful and affectionate subjects will not forget

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that all their dearest interests are at stake; that no sacrifices they can be called on to make, are to be compared with the certain disgrace and ruin of yielding to the injurious pretensions of the enemy; that with the inviolable maintenance of the good faith and public honour of their country, its prosperity, its strength, and its independence, are essentially connected; and that in asserting the rights, and upholding the dignity of the British empire, they defend the most powerful bulwark of the liberties of mankind.

MINUTES.
Lord Ossulston stated, that his majesty had been waited upon with the Address of this house upon his majesty's

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most gracious speech, as delivered by the lords commissioners, when his majesty was pleased to return for answer, that he thanked his loyal Commons; that their zeal and attachment gave him the greatest satisfaction; and that they might be assured, nothing on his part should be wanting to the maintenance of the honour and prosperity of the country.—Mr. P. Moore presented a Petition from Mr. Bowyer of the Historic Gallery, Pall-mall, for leave to bring in a bill to enable Mr. Bowyer to draw by a separate lottery, in case the next State Lottery should not contain a sufficient number of tickets for his purpose. The hon. gent. observed that Mr. Bowyer had concluded to draw his lottery, and given it out to the public, that it should certainly take place by the state lottery which was drawn in October last; but unfortunately for Mr. Bowyer, that lottery containing only 20,000 tickets, he was of course prevented, and which delay, the hon. gent. observed, had been attended with a considerable loss to Mr. Bowyer.—Mr. Grant presented the Third Report of the commissioners of Military Enquiry.—Lord Howick presented the Papers relative to the late Negociation with France. They would be ready, he said, for circulation this evening. It was desirable that as little time as possible should elapse before they were taken into consideration. But as they were very voluminous, it was necessary the members should have full time to peruse them. He did intend that they should be discussed on Wednesday se'n-night. But he did not think it Would be so likely to procure an attendance then as on a subsequent day, and as he wished the attendance might be as full as possible, he would propose that day fortnight, beyond which day the discussion would not be postponed. The papers were then ordered to lie on the table; (see p. 92.)

BATTLE OF MAIDA—VOTE OF THANKS TO SIR J. STUART, &c.
Mr. Secretary Windham rose in pursuance of his notice on Friday, to move that the thanks of the house should be given to general sir John Stuart, and to the officers and men engaged under him, in the glorious battle of Maida. He did not conceive that any thing more would be necessary to be said, on his part, in order to obtain the unanimous concurrence of the house in his motion. There had been so very general, so very lively, and so very proper a feeling manifested throughout, the country on the subject, that he was
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convinced, that as no motion of this description had ever been agreed to with more perfect unanimity than this would, so none had ever more completely carried the feelings and approbation of the country with it. The action to which his motion referred was one of the most distinguished exploits that ever appeared in the annals of this or any other country. Every man must be so thoroughly impressed with its character and importance, that it was altogether unnecessary to dwell upon its value. If he ventured to say any thing upon the subject, it was purely from an impulse to give indulgence to his feelings. The character of the exploit itself, and the advantages that flowed from it, must present themselves to the sober reflection of every man; and, indeed, that house and the country at large had already, by their admiration and gratitude, pronounced upon the value of the glorious achievement. There was not a single one, of the various views in which this exploit could be considered, that did not rank it with the proudest achievements of our ancestors; that did not raise it to a level even with the memorable days of Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. In mentioning these scenes of British fame and valour, he could not omit to state one peculiar character which belonged to this distinguished service, namely, the accession it produced to our stock of national glory, the most valuable possession of a great nation. Other services might cut a greater figure, in relation to their effect in adding to national importance, by acquisitions of strength, resources, or territory, though not of character to call for the sort of honours and distinctions merited by achievements of this kind. In this respect the value and importance of the exploit was highly augmented, even in the midst of those splendid and brilliant triumphs to which this country had been so much accustomed. The glory acquired in this action had not often been equalled, and never had been surpassed in the records of military renown. Of what value it was to keep up this high character for military spirit; how necessary it was to encourage it with every honourable distinction of public approbation and gratitude; how impossible it was for any great country to preserve its character and independence without the possession of such feelings; these were topics upon which it was unnecessary for him to dwell. But if ever

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there had been a period of the world, when a strong military feeling was wanted for the preservation of the greatness and glory of a country, it was the present. It was this period, when the whole world had become, as it were, one universal camp; when all nations were occupied with military views, military fame, and military services; when these military pursuits were substituted in place of the civil arts of life; when no country could be safe that did not cultivate them, and when any country, that did not cultivate them, could no longer hope to continue its independence. We were come to that state of society when, as had been well said, the soldier was abroad; when, in the language of the poet, "man and steel, the soldier and the sword," were the only productions of a country that could be looked to with confidence for its protection and security. It was not because we had lost any part of the military spirit or character of the country that he dwelt with such pride upon the value of this exploit; certainly not. This country had never forfeited its just character for military superiority. Yet, from the circumstances under which the war had hitherto been carried on, and the pre-eminence of our great and glorious naval exploits, we had not had the same opportunity of distinguishing our arms by land as by sea. The nations of the continent too, as if they derived consolation in their humiliation from the impression, seemed to have been brought over to the opinion, that our military power, in the largest sense of the word, was wholly confined to naval operations. They seemed to think, that this country, was, he should not say proportionably weak, but that it was not proportionably strong by land as by sea. Now, the immediate tendency and effect of the glorious battle of Maida was, that it would meet these opinions, and correct the error in which they originated. It was impossible to contemplate this glorious exploit in all its circumstances, and not give way to a feeling of triumph at the superiority of national valour displayed in it. Yet, it might be said that it was not by naked valour that the skill, the discipline, and experience of the veteran troops of the enemy were to be overcome. It resulted, however, from the experience of this action, that British disciplined troops possessed a decided superiority over those of the enemy. Many persons in this country appeared to entertain, and in their
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writings avowed the opinion, that the troops of the enemy were superior to British troops. The opinion was flattering to the enemy, but he trusted it had not gone far in the country, and was convinced, that it had not made any impression upon the people or the army. British soldiers were strangers to any feelings that would prevent them, whenever they came in contact with the enemy upon nearly equal terms, from making British valour as conspicuous by land as by sea. It was a general opinion, that all our naval exploits had been achieved by a superiority of experienced discipline and skill; but he could not subscribe to such a position. Many of those heroic achievements which raised the glory of our navy to the highest pitch, had been effected by the naked valour of Britons, without the aid of skill or discipline. Of this description were the exploits performed in boarding ships, in cutting out vessels from under the protection of batteries, and in various other operations performed by British seamen on shore, in every one of which the native valour of our countrymen was uniformly triumphant. There were no such instances to be found recorded in the military annals of the enemy. The enemy, however, had persuaded other nations, that they were as superior to us by land, as we are to them by sea; and the delusion seemed to have prevailed on the continent. But the battle of Maida had broken the charm. Every circumstance of its progress, the conduct of the officers, and the bravery of the men, had established the ascendancy of British valour, and maintained that superiority, which this country possessed in all ages. In proof of this he could appeal to the determination, as appeared by the gazette, of sir John Stuart, to advance with his inferior force to the attack of the enemy, even in the strong position be occupied, if the enemy had not advanced to meet him. The issue of the action that ensued would prove to the chief of the enemy, and to his troops, who arrogated to themselves a superiority over all other troops, that they are not invincible, as they would represent themselves, that they could not withstand the valour of British troops when fairly committed against them in action. And yet, from whatever causes, certainly not from want of courage in their adversaries, the events of the late wars had contributed to countenance this opinion of their being invincible. They conquered because they thought they could

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conquer: "Possunt quia posse videntur." This victory, however, had dissolved the spell. It was obtained in the face of Europe, in the view of the nation for whose interest the expedition was undertaken, and had proved to the world, in a manner not to be disguised or concealed, that French troops are inferior to British troops. And here it was necessary for him to take some precaution to guard against any possible misconstruction of his meaning. Nothing could be farther from his intention, than to represent this exploit as exclusively glorious for the reputation of the British arms. The whole of the campaign in Egypt was equally conspicuous for the lustre it cast upon the military character of the British nation. This achievement condensed into a single action, all the same merits, that had been displayed in every operation during that glorious campaign. It was a lesson to this country, to the enemy, and to the world, of the comparative value of British and French troops, and thoroughly confirmed the decisive superiority of British valour. There never had been an action so completely calculated in all its circumstances, so perfectly framed, to establish that truth. He could not more forcibly illustrate this fact than by adopting the eloquent language of sir John Stuart on the subject: "It seems," said the gallant general in his dispatch, "as if the prowess of the two nations was to be brought to trial before the world." Certainly no action, under any circumstances, could be better calculated for such a trial. If two sets of philosophers were to have undertaken to make an experiment, by doing away every thing extraneous to their process, they could not have succeeded more accurately. In the first part of the action the two armies advanced against each other with the bayonet; an operation, though much talked of, that very seldom took place between great bodies of men. Every circumstance, even in the most minute detail that had happened previously to the shock, concurred to bring the courage and intrepidity of the two rival nations to the trial. The contest was decided, not by any superiority of corporal strength, but by the predominance of personal intrepidity. Both armies advanced firmly to the charge, until within half a yard of each other. In this moment of perilous trial, British resolution and valour held out, and the enemy shrunk back with panic from the terrible contest.—It was not improper to state here, that hardly any of our men
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were wounded by the bayonet.—He had to apologize to the house for having trespassed so long on their attention; but really the theme was so pleasing, that he could not refrain from dwelling upon it with peculiar satisfaction. The detail of the action exhibited merits of all sorts, equally honourable to the skill of the officers, and the firmness and valour of the soldiers. Having been led thus far by the natural pleasure one felt in speaking of so grateful a subject, he should not detain the house longer than whilst he could state some circumstances respecting the action, which were not generally known. By these circumstances it would appear, that the victory had been more decisive, and the defeat of the enemy more complete than was at first supposed. Sir John Stuart had correctly stated the amount of his own force as under 5000 men; but he had not the means of accurately ascertaining the force of the enemy, when he wrote his dispatch. In that it had been stated at nearly 7000, but it should have been stated at nearly 8000 men. This fact had been discovered from returns found upon the persons of some of the officers that had been killed. The next circumstance he had to mention respected the amount of the enemy's loss. Sir J. Stuart stated the numbers of the killed at 700; but it had been afterwards ascertained, by observations made upon the spot, that the number of killed in the action amounted to 1300. Fifteen hundred prisoners had been the immediate fruit of the action, and a considerable number more fell into our hands from the consequences of the action. So that thus a number, nearly equal to the whole of the British force, had been disposed of by this brilliant action. Another consequence of the exploit was, that it had set the Calabrians free from the presence of the enemy, and had totally broken up the force of general Regnier in these provinces, which amounted to 13,000 men.—It was not perhaps necessary to have dwelt so much on the advantages that resulted from this battle; but the glory that had been acquired in it, he considered of infinitely greater importance than any immediate benefits that had been derived from the action. This it was that would carry the effect of the brilliant exploit beyond the single instance, by restoring the military renown of this country, which had been called in question. He who gave glory to his country, gave that which was far more valuable to it than

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any acquisition whatever. Glory alone was not to be taken away by time or accidents. Ships, territories, or possessions, might be wrested from a country, but the mode of acquiring them could never be forgotten, and the glory of the conquest was independent of all accidents. The acquisitions that were the consequence of the glorious days of Cressy and Poitiers, had long since passed into other hands; but the glory of those illustrious achievements still adhered to the British name, and was immortal. It was that fine extract, that pure essence, that indured to all ages, whilst the grosser parts, the residuum passed away, and were lost in the course of time. On this ground it was, that he thought that the victory of Maida would stand as high as any exploit upon the records of our military achievements, and that the glory of general Stuart and his brave army, would survive to the latest posterity, unless the country should, at any time, sink into such a state of degradation, that the memory of former glory would be a reproach to existing degeneracy. Even in such a state of degradation, he was sure, that such an instance as this, would be calculated to rouse a nation to emulate the exploits of its ancestors. The name of general Stuart would justly be ranked among the foremost in our military annals. The right hon. secretary said, he had felt pleasure in dwelling upon the various merits of this brilliant exploit, because it revived and resuscitated, as it were, that half of our national character which had been called in question, and proved that Britons had the same superiority over the enemy by land as they had by sea. The right hon. gent. concluded by moving: 1st, "That the thanks of this house be given to major-general sir John Stuart, knight of the most honourable order of the bath, for the distinguished ability displayed by him on the 4th of July last, in the brilliant action on the plains of Maida, which terminated in the signal and total defeat of the superior forces of the enemy. 2. That the thanks of this house be given to brigadier-general the hon. George Lowry Cole, brigadier-general William Palmer Ackland, and the several other officers, for their distinguished exertions on the 4th of July last, in the brilliant action on the Plains of Maida, which terminated in the signal and total defeat of the superior forces of the enemy; and that major-general sir John Stuart do signify the same to them. 3. That this
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house doth highly approve of, and acknowledge, the distinguished valour and discipline displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the forces serving on the 4th of July last, under the command of major-general sir John Stuart, in the brilliant victory obtained on the Plains of Maida, and that the same be signified to them by the commanding officers of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant and exemplary conduct."
Sir John Doyle, in seconding the motion, expressed himself, in a maiden speech, in the following words:—Mr. Speaker; in rising to address you for the first time, I feel, sir, how much I shall stand in need of your countenance, and the kind indulgence of the house; but I trust that the motives which induce me to trouble you, while they plead my excuse, may obtain for me a patient hearing, and I shall endeavour to mark my sense of that indulgence, by trespassing upon it but for a moment. Sir, having witnessed upon many trying occasions the zeal, discipline, skill, and courage, in this instance so brilliantly displayed, by this gallant officer and his brave companions, I cannot reconcile it to my feelings to confine myself to a cold and passive assent. I should not, sir, trust the cause of these valiant men to so feeble an advocate as myself, did I not know that they will find a ready and warm advocate in the breast of every man I have the honour to address. The thanks of parliament were never better deserved, nor would they be any where more highly prized; and I feel that the motion is not more justly applied, than it is happily timed; for as the crisis is fast approaching, when the country will expect that every man shall do his duty, what a noble incitement will it be for men, not barely, but enthusiastically, to do their duty, when so well assured of being rewarded by the gratitude of their country. It is in upholding and encouraging the high sense of honour so conspicuous in the fleets and armies of Great Britain, that the country will find its best security, and it is because the measures of the right hon. mover are built upon this foundation, that they not only meet my approbation, but, as a soldier, demand my grateful acknowledgement. I know, sir, so well the feelings of these gallant men, that whatever privations they may have endured, whatever labours sustained, or whatever dangers encountered,

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they will find themselves amply repaid by the most glorious of all rewards, the approbation of a beloved sovereign, and the thanks and plaudits of a brave and free people. The exclamation of every man will be, "When I cease to be actuated by such motives, I trust I shall cease to exist." I rely upon the good feeling of the house to pardon this effusion so naturally drawn forth, and which, if I were willing, I am unable to suppress.
Mr. Johnstoneobserved, that it was not his intention to add any thing to the very glowing and eloquent panegyric which the right hon. gentleman had pronounced; but there were one or two observations which so naturally arose out of the speech of the right hon. gent., that he could not refrain from stating them to the house, being deeply convinced that they were of great importance. He had ever regarded the right hon. gent. as one of the persons most sensible to whatever concerned the honour of the army, and the speech he had just then delivered had confirmed him in the opinion. At the same time, he had been led to believe, that the right hon. gent. was convinced, like every other gent. who had reflected much on the subject, that the best means were not found in our present military system, to excite in the army a spirit of enthusiasm, which, whenever it prevailed, was the sure omen of victory. Neither was the military profession followed by public approbation; nor was a soldier honoured and esteemed in this commercial island, in the degree due to him who devoted his life to the protection of his country. This evil was the necessary consequence of the peculiar favour with which we cherished our navy, and of the constitutional jealousy with which our military establishments were regarded. If our armies had still proved superior to those of all other nations with whom they had to contend, it resulted from the natural courage and energy of the British character. Yet every reflecting man must feel, that at the present crisis, it was desirable to practise those means used by all other powers to foster and encourage military virtues and military talents. He had therefore witnessed with much satisfaction the appointment of the right hon. gent. to the head of the war department. And when the splendid victory of Maida had been obtained, it had afforded him no less satisfaction for all the reasons that had been stated, than because it seemed to pre-
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sent a fit occasion for introducing a fundamental amelioration into our army, by granting promotions and distinctions to such officers as had displayed extraordinary merit. But all the hopes and expectations he had cherished had been disappointed. General Stuart had been honoured with the order of the Bath; but neither the four distinguished officers who commanded brigades, nor any one of the field-officers, had been advanced in military rank for their services on so memorable a day. He did not state this by way of charge against his majesty's ministers; because he was very sensible, that the present military system afforded no precedent for what he suggested. But it would scarcely be credited by posterity, or by other nations, that a victory, which exalted in the highest degree the national glory, which in our annals would be recorded with the triumphs of Cressy and Poictiers, had not obtained military rank or military honours for any of those brave men by whom it had been achieved. It was not thus that our Edwards and our Henries rewarded their companions in arms. It was not thus that our enemy had raised a spirit of enthusiasm in his army, which rendered him more formidable than all the conquests he had obtained. It was a fact well known, that throughout every military establishment in Europe, officers who distinguished themselves in the face of the enemy, were immediately promoted and honoured at the same time with various badges of distinction. In our naval service, when a victory had lately been obtained by admiral Duckworth, each of the captains were honoured by medals, and the senior lieutenant in each ship had been promoted. It was now the unvaried practice to promote every officer who distinguished himself, and not a little of the glory which had been obtained by our navy was the result of the emulation thus excited. Even when a frigate had lately been captured, the captain had been introduced to the presence of his sovereign, and received the honour of knighthood. But who could compare the merit of such an event with the glory that belonged to generals Cole and Ackland, and to colonels Oswald and Kempt, who commanded brigades at the battle of Maida? He trusted that his majesty would be advised to confer on them the like distinction; that all the field-officers would be advanced one step in rank by a brevet commission, and be authorized to wear an honorary medal in consideration

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of their services. To some, these things might appear trifling, as involving no substantial or solid benefit, but he hoped the number was few who would avow such sentiments. Titles and distinctions were indeed of little importance, when they were the reward of parliamentary labours or private attachments; but every distinction, however inconsiderable in itself, was precious, when it served to remind mankind of the courage and capacity by which it had been acquired.
Mr. Secretary Windhamreplied, that something of the nature of that to which the hon. gent. alluded, had been already done. But the circumstances of the army and navy were so essentially different, that the two services could not, in respect of honours, be exactly assimilated.—The motions were then agreed to, ncm. con.