HC Deb 11 March 1947 vol 434 cc163-6W
103 Mr. Zilliacus

asked the Secretary of State for War whether he is now able to make a statement concerning the murder of a representative of the Yugoslav Government by Chetniks and Ustashy in a displaced persons camp under British military authority near Naples.

Mr. Bellenger

I have now considered the findings of the court of inquiry which has been investigating this affair.

On 25th November, 1945, the Yugoslav representative on the Advisory Council for Italy applied through the Allied Commission for permission for two representatives of the Yugoslav Government to visit the Yugoslav refugee camp at Naples with the object of persuading its inmates to elect for repatriation to Yugoslavia. Previous requests of this nature had been refused because of the known hostility of the Chetniks to representatives of the Federated People's Republic and because the Allied authorities wished to avoid disturbances similar to that which had already occurred during a visit by Yugoslav officials to a camp in Germany. Nevertheless in view of the insistence of the Yugoslav Government it was decided that on this occasion the application should be accepted on condition that two British officers were present throughout all visits and that the British authorities should not be held responsible for the bodily safety of Mr. Gluncic and Mr. Engel or for any incidents which might occur during their visit. When the Yugoslav representatives called on the military authorities at Caserta on 23rd January these conditions were explained to them and they were clearly and unequivocally warned of the hostile reception which would probably be given to them by the Chetniks in the camp. On receiving an assurance that the Chetniks were not armed, the Yugoslav representatives accepted these conditions and announced their intention to proceed with the visit.

On 23rd January at 5.30 p.m. Mr. Engel alone arrived at the camp in the artillery barracks at Naples. He stated to the sentry that he was an American and was escorted to the main office building of the barracks where, in the absence of the commanding officer, he was received by a junior officer. Mr. Engel requested permission to interview Chetniks in the camp and the officer accordingly made provisional arrangements for two parties, each of twenty-six Chetniks to be brought up for interview on the following day.

On the following morning, 24th January, Mr. Gluncic and Mr. Engel were received at the artillery barracks by the commanding officer who informed them that their mission would be likely to create serious disturbances and that the proposed interview with the Chetniks must be postponed until he had consulted higher military authorities. He warned Mr. Gluncic and Mr. Engel clearly not to return to the artillery barracks until he had discussed the matter with the authorities at Caserta and until he had communicated with the Yugoslav representatives on the telephone.

In view of the dangers which he foresaw the commanding officer informed the British military authorities at Caserta that in his view the Yugoslav representatives should interview the Chetniks in small bodies outside the camp and should not again return to the artillery barracks. The commanding officer then attempted several times to telephone to Mr. Gluncic and Mr. Engel in order to inform them of this decision but he was unable to get in touch with either on 24th January and accordingly proposed to communicate with them further on the following morning.

In spite of the warning which they had received not to return until notified, Mr. Gluncic and Mr. Engel arrived at the artillery barracks at 9.30 a.m. on the morning of 25th January. They carried revolvers, which were afterwards found upon them at the hospital. They were unexpected and the commanding officer was not in his office when they arrived, nor was there any opportunity of taking precautions to ensure their safety. The commanding officer reached his office shortly afterwards and at once pointed out to the Yugoslav representatives the foolhardiness of their action and impressed upon them that they stood in grave bodily danger. Meanwhile, the news of their arrival had become known to the inmates of the camp, since they had arrived in a black saloon car clearly marked "Yugoslav Delegation" which was parked within sight of the camp. While the commanding officer was remonstrating with the Yugoslav officials, a crowd of Chetniks with sticks and iron bars, but not of course with fire arms, surrounded the building and broke into the office. The commanding officer, assisted by the Chetnik officers, who did their utmost to control their men and to prevent their entry into the office, were forced aside by weight of numbers and it was some minutes before it was possible to bring up British soldiers to control the mob. Immediately this had been done Mr. Gluncic and Mr. Engel were placed in a lorry, guarded by British troops, and were taken to hospital.

Thus it will be seen that by arriving in the artillery barracks on 25th January, without awaiting further information from the British military authorities as arranged at the interview on 24th January, Mr. Gluncic and Mr. Engel made it impossible for the British staff of the camp to arrange in advance for their personal safety. Consequently, while nothing can justify the brutal behaviour of the Chetnik mob, I do not consider that any blame attaches to the British military authorities.

I am satisfied that the British officers concerned, as well as the senior Chetnik officer and the Chetnik interpreter, did all in their power to protect the two Yugoslav representatives and to rescue them from their assailants and that no blame can be attached to any of these persons.

Despite the careful investigations which have taken place, it has not been possible to identify any of the assailants of Mr. Gluncic and Mr. Engel. Mr. Engel himself has been questioned on this matter but he has stated that he is unable to identify any of the men concerned. It will be appreciated that the attack was a sudden one and that in their efforts to restore order and obtain assistance none of those present had time to identify the attackers.

Forward to