Machinery of Government

HL Deb 09 July 1997 vol 581 cc677-701

6.24 p.m.

Lord Annan

rose to call attention to the case for co-ordinating relations between Ministers, political advisers, the Civil Service and Cabinet committees; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, ever since the First World War when Lord Hankey set up the Cabinet Secretariat and Lord Haldane laid down the principles governing the accountability of civil servants, British governance has been praised for its efficiency. That is very different from what happens in Washington. There each agency goes its own way in the hope that the President will come down on its side. Lord Halifax once compared American administration to a disorderly afternoon's rabbit shooting: nothing comes out where you expect—and then something emerges from the far end of the field.

In Britain, of course, traditionally policy was made by individual Ministers. They would discuss their ideas with their civil servants who would then consult their colleagues in the Treasury. A paper would then go to the appropriate Cabinet committee. After they had chewed it over, it would then go to Cabinet. So long as there was no change in the law it was up to the Minister and his civil servants to tell their colleagues if policy was being changed.

That was the pattern for making policy before 1979. Mr. Gerald Kaufman accurately described that in the book that he wrote in 1980. Unfortunately, in the 1997 edition of his book, he seems to imagine that it still holds good, but it does not.

The old system had two failings. Few Ministers had the experience of managing a large organisation, and the Permanent Secretary in effect was responsible for the efficient management of his department. But Permanent Secretaries were more interested in enlarging rather than contracting their departments. In the 'eighties fiscal crises forced the Government to insist that government departments should aim to be as efficient as private enterprises in which profit ruled. So internal markets were set up and areas of business were hived off to executive agencies or to quangos.

The second failing was personified by Sir Humphrey. My old colleague from the days of the future of broadcasting committee, Sir Tony Jay, put his finger, in his immortal television series, on a problem that sometimes faced Secretaries of State. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, relates in his memoirs that when he became Home Secretary he found that the Permanent Secretary would recommend a single course of action. When he asked for the file to see whether any other options had been considered, the Permanent Secretary was outraged. That was why—in part—the Home Office had become the graveyard of several political reputations.

Ministries develop a philosophy of their own. If some outside adviser was infiltrated to put a different slant on policy, he could find himself marginalised; departmental papers mysteriously failed to come his way so that he appeared in conference ignorant and idle. Even more unwelcome was a challenge from inside to the prevailing philosophy because it was very properly laid down that the department must have a single view. In other words, Permanent Secretaries claimed to have a monopoly of advice instead of a claim to co-ordinate advice.

How did Ministers defeat Sir Humphrey? Ever since 1964 (indeed before that) they brought their own political advisers into their departments, or they set up a private office, or their party financed a private think-tank. In the 'eighties special advisers in No. 10 second-guessed the policies individual Ministers put forward. Policy began to be made in No. 10 and departments were told to carry out that policy. Indeed, it became common to announce new policies to the media or to a party meeting before Cabinet had considered the matter.

But perhaps the most notable change was in Cabinet itself. In the old days papers were remitted to official Cabinet committees. It now became customary to remit business to ad hoc committees which the Prime Minister appointed. The official committees no longer met. Oral reports by Ministers replaced the minutes of Cabinet committees. Indeed at one time the Cabinet itself seems not to have discussed policy.

This lack of Cabinet papers drew comment at the Scott Inquiry. The judge said that he could not discover what government policy on arms sales was. Apparently government policy was whatever the Minister said it was. Again, in the row over the Prison Service, Mr. Derek Lewis said that the Home Secretary did not consult him before making or altering Prison Service policy.

That leads to another constitutional malaise. The House well knows what happens if a noble Lord complains about a BBC programme. He will be told smartly that that is a matter for the governors. They were set up precisely to protect the BBC from political interference in its day-to-day affairs. But what happens if there is a break-out from prison? Can the Prison Service be exempt from ministerial responsibility? If the Child Support Agency is alleged to be unfair, can the Minister say that that is no concern of his?

Whole sectors that used to be in departments have been transferred to quangos. Moreover, in the interests of reducing public expenditure, units in ministries have been disbanded, including several in the Treasury itself.

As a result relations between Ministers and civil servants have deteriorated. Civil servants were once partners to all decisions that Ministers made. It was the duty of civil servants to listen in to their chief's telephone calls. They could save a Minister's time in taking the vast number of decisions he has to take because they came to know his mind. What is more, they were there to protect him from pressure groups, lobbies and crooks. They could also warn him if they thought that he was about to make a decision that could be challenged and lead to a judicial review. A Permanent Secretary would say, "If you do X, Minister, then in all probability Y and Z will follow. Is that what you want?"

Yet one hears of civil servants complaining that they were not called in to discuss the briefs that they had given Ministers. One hears of Ministers giving a paper to Cabinet which his civil servants had never seen. Perfectly reasonably, it seems to me, a Minister may choose to have meetings with his junior Ministers and his parliamentary private secretary without civil servants being present. But to take policy decisions in such a meeting without consulting them is another matter. One hears of Back-Benchers being brought into such meetings who, perfectly reasonably, have a particular axe to grind. That is dangerous because the power of the lobbies grows stronger every year and if a lobbyist can get an amendment to a clause in a Bill his organisation will consider that money has been well spent.

The other problem is consultation. People dislike change in their own bailiwick, even the most remarkable performers. I think in particular of the profession of law. People dislike change, and the offer of consultation is often rewarded by a blank refusal to accept the need for change. But never to consult is equally foolish. The little world in which I have some experience was amazed when the polytechnics and certain colleges were upgraded to universities without any consultation with the universities although that step had immense repercussions on funding, research and the curricula. It was contrary to the organisation of higher education in all advanced countries where distinctions are very properly made between different types of institution.

What has happened? The influence of the Civil Service has declined. Fiascos and cock-ups in governance have increased. The most recent was the BSE affair. It seems that the Civil Service brief was around for months before Ministers considered it. When the crisis broke, Ministers did not have time to review the evidence. They called in various people to give evidence unsystematically, and I thought that they were stampeded by public opinion. Not until far too late were European relations considered. And that disaster is still with us, and costing millions of pounds.

The most spectacular disaster was the poll tax. I do not wish to go over that ground again. But I think that one thing should be said. It is clear that if one does not consult local authorities—they were never consulted during the whole process—one will be in great difficulties. It is clear that the checks and balances in our unwritten constitution were insufficient to avoid the calamity which cost the taxpayer £2.2 billion.

There is one particularly difficult problem in public administration. How can one have proposed legislation properly considered when more than one department is concerned? For instance, the item "reducing unemployment" requires an input from the DfEE, the Treasury and the DTI. There are others that noble Lords can easily bring to mind.

Considering this matter, Sir Christopher Foster suggested in a recent paper that a new kind of Cabinet committee, a task force, should be set up. Each department would be represented by a Minister and the chair should be taken by a non-departmental Cabinet Minister. He should act not as an independent, impartial chairman but as a broker between the departments. Whereas other committees respond to papers put to them by Ministers, task forces should take the initiative and put forward papers and solutions themselves and work to deadlines.

From what I hear the present Government are addressing themselves to some of those problems. Official Cabinet committees were reinstated by Mr. Major, but I hear that now on each of them sits a member of the Policy Unit at No. 10. When the Minister winds up, I wonder whether he could tell us how this Policy Unit at No. 10, under the chairmanship of the Minister without Portfolio, works? Is it there to put questions to departments? Is it there to consider the evidence resulting from consultation and then to ensure that a Bill is drafted that is logical and acceptable—in other words, to judge what the public will wear? Is it for departments rather than the Policy Unit now to put up policies and draft White Papers? Who now sets the Government's timetable and establishes deadlines for legislation? Will the Policy Unit supervise the work of departments? Will it assess their efficiency?

Are the advisers in No. 10 primarily concerned with policy, or—since many have had careers in the media—are they more concerned with ensuring that Bills and White Papers are acceptable to the electorate? In fact, are they superior public relations advisers studying polls and other devices to discover what Rousseau called the General Will?

Finally, will the Minister without Portfolio act as the presidential chief of staff does in the White House? That is to say, will he act as a gatekeeper to the Prime Minister?

I am not asking these questions with hostile intent. Nor am I blaming previous Administrations for all the diseconomies of the past 20 years. When the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, was Prime Minister, she had good reasons for making some of the changes in the country's governance. All I want to do this evening is set the stage for others who are far better informed than I. The House is awash with noble Lords who have first-hand experience as former Ministers or distinguished public servants; or, like the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, have pondered on these matters for years. I am a historian; and, as we all know, historians are wise only after the event—and sometimes not even then.

My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

6.40 p.m.

Lord Beloff

My Lords, we should thank the noble Lord, Lord Annan, for initiating a debate on the important topic that is before us but we should regret that the hopes expressed in the final paragraph of his remarks have clearly not been fulfilled, for although the House comprises many people with long experience in the public service, they have not seen fit to speak in the debate. That is much to be regretted. It reminds the House once again of the great loss sustained in the premature death of Lord Bancroft.

I find it even more difficult since it means that there are no Members here who can assist me in trying to penetrate the mixture of dogmatism and insinuation that marked the treatment by the noble Lord, Lord Annan, of recent history. Some of it was very familiar; some of it was new to me. I find it difficult to know how far it was intended as an indictment of previous administrations and how far as a note of warning to the recently elected one. To begin with, 1979 shows a foreshortening of perspective which does not altogether assist in solving a very real problem. The problem arose when the position arrived at through the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of the 19th century came up against the vastly expanded responsibilities of the modern state, bringing, as the noble Lord, Lord Annan, reminded us, considerable executive tasks on top of policy making.

During the two world wars the problem was addressed by bringing into government service, both at ministerial and official level, people from other walks of life, notably industry and commerce. However, wartime expedients have rightly not been thought altogether satisfactory in peace time. There is a great deal to be said for the original idea, which I have defended in previous debates in this House, of a core element of professional and professionally trained civil servants.

That approach has, as the noble Lord reminded us, some dangers. Within departments there are likely to be views—what may be termed departmental lore—which might impede an incoming Minister with radical and reforming intentions, although one must be careful about choosing examples. To take a point on which I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Annan, in his analysis of the recent past—namely the headlong rush into university expansion and the way in which it took place—I have no evidence whatever that civil servants in the Department for Education were hostile to the move. In some respects they may indeed have encouraged it in the hope that they would thereby acquire a power over the higher education sector that they had not hitherto managed to establish. That is a matter for historical argument. Again, the difficulty for both the noble Lord, Lord Annan, and myself is that we do not have the documents. There is an occasional shaft of light, as for instance through the Scott Inquiry—an episode important in itself but which can hardly, by extension, be used to illuminate what happens in government generally.

As the noble Lord, Lord Annan, said, there have been various attempts to bring in advisers of one kind or another from outside the Civil Service in order either to bolster a Minister's own opinions or to give him access to those sections of the active community whose opinions he desires to know. It was an element given some consideration by the Labour Party in its earlier years as an alternative party of government. There were members of that party who believed that the Civil Service was so much a part of the Oxbridge-educated establishment that it would be necessary for Labour governments to recruit from outside. That never acquired the status of a doctrine but may have influenced action. The first government to do so on any scale in recent years, as the noble Lord, Lord Annan, will know, was the Wilson government of 1964. The recently published diaries of Sir Alec Cairncross, a senior Treasury figure at the time, reveal the awkwardness created in the Treasury by an inability to know whose advice Ministers were taking and what was the position of such advisers in relation to the permanent Civil Service.

It is always likely that an incoming government will feel the need to bring in people from outside. The question is how they then relate to the official advisers to a Minister and whether they may sour his relations with them. An article in the current edition of the Economist suggests that the present Chancellor of the Exchequer goes around the Treasury accompanied by, I believe the phrase is, his "band of trusties" and that means that he does not receive the full support of civil servants who would otherwise have been anxious to co-operate with him. Whether or not journalism is a suitable source for our information, I merely say that this kind of thing echoes from time to time in all governments.

What worries me far more is the matter referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Annan, and mentioned in our debates in recent years; namely, the confusion that exists between the type of people and the incentive shown at its best in private industry and commerce and the type of people and the incentive most appropriate to government service. There has been a blurring of that distinction.

Many noble Lords argued, when the recruiting side of the Civil Service was privatised, that it would have deleterious results. The activities of the new body since it was established already show a pattern of applying to would-be public servants measures of performance, measures of ability and measures of personality which would be suitable if one were looking for people to enter private industry but which may not be suitable for those who are supposed to enter upon a life of public service. The qualities that make a good salesman of lingerie are not necessarily the same qualities that make a good permanent secretary or the ambassador to a friendly country.

The confusion has perhaps been accentuated by the exaggerated attention paid to the handbooks and the gurus of the business school world who appear to have developed both techniques and a jargon which, even for industry, may not be quite so appropriate as they believe. I have known some notable entrepreneurs, including the late Lord Nuffield. I do not believe that Lord Nuffield would have been any more successful if he had had an MBA. There are others who come to mind, whose names I shall not repeat.

That seems to me to be a serious problem. It is true that governments deal with a great number of issues which are highly specialised and which demand a knowledge of many matters which people in happier and simpler ages did not require. The problem seems to be a permanent one. Every government will solve it in a different way. Whether they solve it with the correct balance, only the future historian will be able to determine. Even now our views of some major departments in the relatively remote past, such as the 1920s and the 1930s, are being revised by successive generations of historians, as more and more archives come to light.

What is obviously important—the question was not put in the form in which I would have framed it, but I understand the thrust of it—is whether there is also a shifting balance between the Prime Minister's office and the other departments and whether in the current situation we may be moving too much towards a prime ministerial—or, as Dick Crossman used to think of it, a presidential—form of government. Again, it is far too early for those who are not involved in the arcana of Whitehall to answer that question. But some statement from the Minister about that balance would be acceptable, since some pronouncements raise questions about the shape of the new Cabinet committees and the degree to which they are more than offshoots of policy-making at the centre.

Most important of all, I repeat, is that, whatever the system—we cannot expect the system to remain unchanged—we should be able at all times to rely on government service being an attraction to the most energetic portion of the most able and ambitious young people. If that should cease to be the case—because they believe that by going into a party machine, the media or a think-tank they can get to the top by means other than hard slog and promotion within an existing service—the country would be poorly served.

6.55 p.m.

The Earl of Northesk

My Lords, like my noble friend, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Annan, most warmly for affording us the opportunity to discuss this matter. To start with, so far as I am concerned, I must disavow the praise contained in the noble Lord's final paragraph. I speak very simply out of keen interest. To my mind, the noble Lord quite rightly identifies in his Motion that good governance is in direct proportion to the quality, health and robustness of co-ordinated relationships within government.

I was very struck, in the aftermath of 1st May, by an observation from the honourable Member for Great Grimsby, who commented: New Labour took the politics out of politics in opposition. Now we are taking the governing out of government". That is a snappy turn of phrase, to be sure, but then many a true word is spoken in jest. Mr. Mitchell does make a serious and very valid point about the nature of the relationship between the executive and the various arms of the administrative machine. It is a point of particular relevance in the context of the Motion before us today—but more of that later.

As we all know, much of the British constitution is predicated not upon laws written in statute but upon parliamentary and ministerial conventions. One of the less well acknowledged inheritances from previous administrations, the benefit of which the Government are now enjoying, is the sense in which such conventions have been eroded over recent years. The noble Lord, Lord Annan, referred to that. Indeed, notwithstanding the platform of very considerable and far-reaching constitutional change upon which the Government won their mandate, we should be conscious that, in the words of Sir Christopher Foster in the paper to which the noble Lord, Lord Annan, referred: the decline in the influence of civil servants … is arguably the most important constitutional development of the last 17 years". By way of example, your Lordships will, of course, be conversant with the Haldane principle defining the relationship between Ministers and their civil servants. In passing, I ask the Minister, when he comes to wind up the debate, whether he can give us some indication of the Government's attitude towards that and whether there is any intention on the Government's part to reinvigorate it. Sir Christopher Foster expresses it thus: British practice has judged that efficiency and effectiveness is best based, not on a remote subordination, but on a two way relationship between the two". He goes on: This relationship has been deteriorating recently—especially in home departments—with strongly adverse effects … The main causes have been the increasing number of Ministers and their tendency to deliberate and decide much more with their parliamentary private secretaries, their political advisers and often other political cronies". While accepting that it is a matter of interpretation, I suggest that the net effect of this and other erosions has been to create an executive that is, at best, over-mighty. As it were, the inter-relationships, of which the noble Lord's Motion speaks, are out of balance. In that context, noble Lords opposite may care to reflect (as we on this side now have to do) that the rather sour fruits of opposition—that sense of impotence in the face of the might of government—have to be endured rather than enjoyed.

In that sense at least, all of us should have some sympathy with the Government's analysis of the ways in which this problem impacts upon ordinary people. Their manifesto expressed it thus: People are cynical about politics and distrustful of political promises". That said, I have some difficulty in accepting that the many and varied constitutional changes that the Government espouse as the means to resolve that problem will in fact do so. The simple truth will remain; namely, that a political elite, whatever its party complexion and wherever it has its seat of administration, remains a political elite. More pertinently, none of what is proposed will address the quintessential problem of the executive's relative supremacy within the administrative machine. Indeed, it could justifiably be argued that the programme of constitutional change will entrench the power of the executive even more immovably into its fabric. Bluntly, that is a deeply worrying prospect.

However, that said, it pays to attempt to assess, in so far as we can, what style of administration the Government intend in that regard. My impression is that the signs are not good. It is a matter of record that there are already many more political advisers within Whitehall than has ever been the case before. I could be persuaded to accept that there is nothing wrong with that per se. However, bearing in mind that they are all unelected, unaccountable officials with, so far as anyone can tell, direct influence over the interpretation and substance of policy, I wonder whether the Minister might be prepared to make available to Parliament a specimen contract of employment broadly defining the areas of responsibility and job profile of such individuals. To do so would go a considerable way towards setting minds at rest, especially—and beneficially—with respect to the Civil Service and future recruitment to it. Or perhaps the Government have in mind a strategy of developing the principle of political secondment into an art form?

As I say, it may be that a case can be made for the use of political advisers. Notwithstanding the style and nature of the Government's programme of constitutional change, it may be that the same could be said of Mr. Christopher Foster's reference to "other political cronies". In that context, I read with considerable interest an article from Alf Young in the Herald entitled "A Britain under boardroom control". He writes: The real threat to the Civil Service under New Labour comes not from Millbank Tower or Walworth Road, but from the growing stream of leading British businessmen who will now preside over everything from setting the national minimum wage to the practical nuts and bolts of delivering the new administration's promised welfare-to-work programme". Of course there is merit in any government seeking non-partisan input and advice. That gels with the insistence in New Labour's manifesto that: Government and industry must work together to achieve key objectives". But it is less easy to find its relevance with the Government's stated desire to push back the frontiers of the unelected state and the statement in the manifesto that: Over-centralisation of government and lack of accountability was a problem in governments of both left and right". Moreover, as Alf Young illustrates in his article, there are worrying and very considerable inconsistencies in some of the appointments. He writes: Even the Scottish Office is not immune from this New Labour love affair with the potentates of corporate Britain. Who can put some fresh economic impetus into the Prestwick area now that production of the Jetstream 41 aircraft is to cease with the loss of 380 highly skilled engineering jobs? Easy. Sign up Sir Richard Evans, the executive at the helm of British Aerospace, for your new Prestwick Airport task force. Isn't he the same Dick Evans who has just decided to scrap Jetstream production? Indeed he is. But who could he closer to the problem?". I repeat that, whatever the merits of the government of the day tapping a pool of experience and talent outside the conventional political world, a political elite remains a political elite. And any such elite is, of necessity, antipathetic to the creation of the sort of co-ordinated relationships that we are discussing today.

There is a further aspect to the matter. Sir Christopher Foster recognises that one cause for the breakdown in relationships within Whitehall is the role of the media. In recent years a great deal of politics, particularly in the province of expression and development of policy, has been driven by the insatiable demand of the media— PR, sound-bites, spin-doctoring have all become the norm.

My own interpretation is that that is a particularly relevant consideration to this administration. I would therefore ask the Minister and his colleagues to pay especial attention to the solution to this problem that Sir Christopher advances; namely that, It would advance public understanding if there were a return to the convention that the first authoritative statement of a new or changed policy is made to Parliament". The Budget and the Government's White Paper on education with their respective "leaks" are cases in point.

Moreover, as an addendum to that, I would also respectfully suggest to noble Lords opposite that a populist mandate is a very different creature from a popular one. Pursuit of policy on the basis of some kind of PR turf war between the political parties is deeply objectionable. Again the Budget is a case in point. Andrew Grice, writing in last Sunday's Sunday Times comments that: Brown's allies insisted that news management had been a big success", and cites one of the Prime Minister's aides as saying that, Before every budget, expectations are lowered. It's just that we are better at it than the Tories". The point is this: the substitution of policy driven by public interest with that driven by public opinion intrinsically and necessarily will ultimately lead to weak and inferior government.

In the circumstances, can we infer that there is something of a crisis at work in the relationships within Whitehall? Moreover, on the basis of the style so far manifest in the current administration, is it credible that this crisis is set to deepen rather than ease? I believe that the answer to both those questions is yes. That can only serve to damage the health and effectiveness of our democracy. Accordingly, the Government should pay due heed to the recommendations of Sir Christopher Foster that: for the sake of good government the Civil Service must be returned to its role in the co-ordination of advice, the implementation of policy and the drafting of government papers and bills". For my part, I make this point to the noble Lord. If the Government are truly sincere in their worthy aspirations to re- engage the people in politics and to return governance to them, there is no alternative but to address the fundamental imbalance within government of which I have spoken. I am sure the noble Lord would allow that, without this, without addressing the core problem of the supremacy of the Executive, the consequences to our democracy will be dire.

7.7 p.m.

Baroness Park of Monmouth

My Lords, with your Lordships' permission I intend to speak briefly in the gap. I wish I had been able to take a proper part in the debate, but unfortunately I was not.

My main point is that I am extremely concerned about the dilution of the Civil Service caused, partly, through the creation of the agencies. I hope that there will be no more of them. The difference between the attitude of public service and, for instance, the idea of performance-related pay is one of the examples one has to offer. The Minister of Defence genuinely thought that performance-related pay for the Army was a reasonable suggestion. Fortunately, that was rejected.

As for the issue of the status of the Civil Service, as far back as the mid-1980s undergraduates were saying to me that they did not intend to try for the senior Civil Service; it had become like Marks and Spencers. That was not meant as a compliment.

There are too many accountants involved in the agencies; there are perhaps too many advisers and, as noble Lords have said, those advisers are not accountable. Not only are they not accountable but, by the very nature of Whitehall, it is difficult for them to have the information on which to base good advice. There is an enormous complexity and quantity of information in Whitehall. The Scott Report showed how difficult it was to ensure that any report reached everybody who ought to know about it. In the nature of things, advisers will find it even more difficult to be aware of all factors, particularly since many subjects do not concern only one Ministry. One needs only to look at the organophosphate issue to see that several ministries had been peddling along in parallel until recently.

Another point I should like to make is that the more cynical, rightly or wrongly, the public become about politicians, the more necessary it is for them to believe in something and that something must be the Civil Service, its impartiality, its wisdom and its loyalty. It is extremely important that no more should be done to reduce its standing and its value. We have seen too much overweaning power exercised, I am sorry to say in my own previous government, from the Cabinet Office. I deeply hope that that will not continue because it has very real dangers in terms of lack of accountability. It is also a procedure that will sap the belief of civil servants themselves in the value of what they do. That is an extremely important point to consider.

Lastly, there are, and have been in the past, advisers whose influence has been disproportionately great and whose right to that influence has not been sufficiently well known. I can think of at least one example in the Ministry of Defence. That is another serious danger.

7.10 p.m.

Lord Gillmore of Thamesfield

My Lords, perhaps I may take this opportunity to speak in the gap. I had not thought to intervene in the debate, but in the light of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, and as a former "Sir Humphrey", perhaps I may be permitted a few moments.

The noble Lord, Lord Annan, is correct to say that during the latter part of the 1980s the process by which government co-ordinated opinions and views and looked at the options underwent a change. That change stemmed from a greater reluctance at the time to use the traditional machinery of Cabinet committees. In previous times Cabinet committees had fallen into two categories: those composed of Ministers and those, often understudying the ministerial committee, composed of officials. In the late 1970s I remember taking part, as a relatively junior official, in a Cabinet committee established ad hoc. Its title was, I think, Misc.200, which indicates that there were up to 200 miscellaneous committees considering one matter or another in the course of that government. Our advice was given to Ministers from a variety of departments. Ministers on the ministerial level committee passed that on to Cabinet. The process of co-ordination between departments in Whitehall was thus established. The breakdown or the disuse of those committees seems to me a pity and can be held to blame, I believe, for some of the mistakes that were made. I hope very much that the Minister will be able to reassure the House that the re-establishment of those committees will help to ensure co-ordination between departments in Whitehall.

My second point concerns agencies. Here I am in some difficulty because, as a member of your Lordships' Committee on the Public Service, it is precisely one of the areas which we have been researching and studying. Many of us, including those who have been in the public service, have learnt a great deal which was previously unknown to us.

The issue the Government have to address is that of accountability. There is no doubt in my mind that in many respects the creation of agencies has had a beneficial effect on the conduct of public business. The delivery of simple services, whether passports or vehicle licences, has been done more effectively and efficiently and the public have benefited. But there are agencies whose tasks step very close to the politically sensitive. There, I think, the question arises of who is answerable to whom and whether the Minister or Secretary of State in charge can, to quote Aneurin Bevan's comment, be responsible for bedpans in hospitals. Who answers to whom? Can a civil servant be called upon to give evidence to a Select Committee; and, if so, when he does give evidence, is he speaking on behalf of his Minister? That question needs careful consideration. If, as Sir Christopher Foster recommends, and as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nolan, is now suggesting, a civil servant should speak independently of his Minister, that changes the relationship between the civil servant and the Minister. That, in turn, will produce a significant shift in the role of the Civil Service and the relationship with Ministers.

In my personal experience, which is limited and somewhat specialised, the role of political advisers has been helpful provided the political adviser in a department is part of the machine. It is essential that he should be brought in together with civil servants. My experience is that civil servants rather relish and enjoy the breath of outside air and the questioning which an external adviser can bring. This, if properly conducted, can be a virtuous process and not one which leads necessarily to disruption within the department.

I ask the House to forgive me for intervening. I believe the matters I have mentioned are worthy of considerable thought, particularly the questions of responsibility and accountability and of co-ordination within government. For many years that was conducted through a series of Cabinet committees which, on the whole, by and large, ensured that the government were provided with advice from across Whitehall horizontally and from which, in my submission, they benefited.

7.17 p.m.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill

My Lords, we are all grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Annan, for initiating a debate on a matter of real importance—the provision of efficient and good government in the public interest. For my part, I am particularly glad that two noble Lords have spoken in the gap. Each of them has had particular practical experience. Indeed, they were exactly the kind of speakers that the noble Lord, Lord Annan, was hoping would participate in the debate. I agree with everything both have said and will not repeat any of it. I am only sorry that they were curtailed by time from giving us the benefit of their experience in more detail.

The best thing I can do is to speak very much from modest, practical experience. I had the pleasure and privilege of serving as one of those special advisers—a special policy adviser—between 1974 and 1976. I served my noble friend Lord Jenkins of Hillhead and my noble friend Lord Harris of Greenwich, who is sitting next to me, whose presence here this evening might have a slight chilling effect on what I would otherwise reveal about those days more than 20 years ago.

I do not altogether share the pessimism of some speakers about the state to which the present Civil Service has come. I shall leave it to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Hendon, another person with practical experience, to defend her Government's record on that when she speaks in a few minutes' time.

One aspect has not been mentioned at all. The healthiest department of government during the Thatcher and Major years, the one which renewed itself best and the one which is now in the best condition of the three branches of government, was the judicial department. It was the judicial department of government which managed to evolve some constitutional principles and began to call Ministers and civil servants to account and act as a counterweight to the domination of Parliament by the executive branch of government. But that is not the central issue raised by the debate today; and nor are judges civil servants.

I should like to deal with one or two problems which the Motion indicates. The first is the problem of securing co-operation between government departments. That is a perennial problem and not one created by the previous government. I am sure that it is with us now.

Professor Peter Hennessy and his colleagues published an interesting Fabian pamphlet in April. They wrote, One of the trickiest areas of any government is to get ministers and government departments to cooperate. Many policy objectives require the cooperation of a number of Whitehall departments, and securing this can be a problem. Whitehall is well geared to working vertically, with both ministers and civil servants representing departmental interests and defending their turf, but bad at dealing with issues that cut across departmental lines". That was certainly my experience when I was a special policy adviser in the Home Office. I remember the problems that we had in seeking to tackle serious problems of racial disadvantage, cutting across government departments dealing with housing, education, employment, family policy, social security, policing and criminal justice. It was like rowing in treacle: cumbersome, laborious and in the end wholly ineffectual. It certainly has left enduring scars in that area.

I agree with Professor Hennessy and his colleagues that cross-departmental problems must be seen as a high priority of the Prime Minister and of the Government if they are to get the attention of high calibre Ministers and officials who can push through a solution. I agree with them that political will is the key to success.

There is a second matter I wish to refer to briefly. It is one that has arisen several times; namely, the role of political advisers and their relationship to Ministers and civil servants. Special advisers are appointed by the Secretary of State and they are his or her creatures. I was one such creature, as I have said. Although they are paid by the Civil Service they are outside its formal structure. As your Lordships know, there are two main kinds of special adviser. There is the political adviser whose job it is to stick to the Minister, manage his interests and explain the Minister to his department. In Professor Hennessy's happy phrase, those special advisers are, guardian angels of the political agenda which the Minister came to office with". Then there is the other kind, the special policy adviser appointed to provide expertise and direction on specific areas of policy. That was my task in seeking to develop policy for legislation on sex and race discrimination in particular.

I am sorry to say—and I have said it before—that in my personal experience there was real obstruction at official level to agreed policy, especially on sex discrimination legislation. That obstruction was not always done as skilfully as one sees on television in "Yes, Minister" or "Yes, Prime Minister". It did not result in better government; it was sometimes downright unethical and it should not have happened. It led, among other things—if one reads the noble Lord's memoirs— to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, sending me home to write a White Paper on equality for women for want of co-operation in a minority Labour Government which the civil servants did not regard as having a proper mandate and probably thought would be booted out shortly at the second general election.

It was of course vital to have our ideas tested by civil servants. It was vital not to steamroller policy through. But it was counterproductive to have separate politics of the bureaucracy being pursued in the way it happened in that brief period. It was not typical; it did not happen for very long, but it was quite deplorable.

I believe that the use of outside special advisers, as the noble Lord, Lord Gillmore of Thamesfield, indicated, with appropriate qualifications and experience, in an adequately staffed ministerial policy unit—in his word "integrated" as part of the machine— should make it easier for governments to implement their policies without that kind of obstruction or other problems. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, that everything depends on the personality, expertise, strength and integrity of the special adviser and developing a healthy, honest, professional relationship with permanent officials and Ministers.

When I was a special adviser I always made it a rule, when discussing any matter of importance with Ministers, only to do so in the presence of a private secretary. That was to avoid any impression of backstairs intrigue or improper influence. I am not sure that the reverse compliment was always paid. I suggest that that is a vital and sensible rule of practice.

It is healthy for Whitehall to be exposed to outsiders and for outsiders to learn how Whitehall works. That flourished under the previous government and I do not criticise it. There needs also to be a sufficient core or critical mass of special advisers in an effective ministerial policy unit in the Prime Minister's office and in some government departments. But the ground rules need to be appropriate and workable.

However, on the other side of the coin, which needs to be emphasised, there is a compelling need to avoid undue reliance on outside experts sympathetic to the policies of the government of the day. If they were given too much influence they would demoralise the permanent career service. If they were given too much power they would undermine the relationship between Ministers and civil servants. If they became too numerous, powerful and influential, then the Civil Service would become dangerously politicised. But we have not, with all respect to the noble Earl, remotely reached that point or anything like it in this country under the present Government or before.

I believe that it is in the public interest that the Civil Service itself should be a main source of innovation, able to command the confidence of Ministers and able to execute their policies intelligently and sympathetically. Ministers are entitled to take a close interest in the choice of their senior Civil Service advisers. Equally, I believe that civil servants are entitled to be strongly protected against being punished by transfer, non-promotion or otherwise for not pleasing their political masters. I believe that civil servants are fairly well protected against the introduction of a political spoils system, but I shall suggest one or two changes that might improve matters.

The next point I would like to mention briefly is the need for a constitutional Civil Service. We need to ensure that the functions of the public service can be carried out within the framework of a constitutional set of values based on the principles of freedom. I believe that great progress was made in that direction by the previous government in developing a Civil Service code, largely under the leadership of Mr. Giles Radice and the Select Committee in another place, by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, in another capacity as head of the Association of First Division Civil Servants, and by Sir Robin Butler, the Cabinet Secretary. That was a great step forward in my view. When the present Government incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law, that again will provide a constitutional code of values and duties for Ministers and public officials. It will combat the vice of ethical aimlessness which has afflicted some parts of the public service.

I am also convinced of the need to replace what I call the East India Company (John Company) model of the Civil Service that we now have under the Royal Prerogative—based on a model that was appropriate for a chartered company in ruling India before the Mutiny— by a proper statutory system. I was lucky to participate in the joint committee of the Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties on constitutional reform a few months ago. There was common ground that there should be a Civil Service Act to give legal force to the code of conduct for the Civil Service, emphasising its political neutrality and making clearer the lines of Civil Service accountability. I am encouraged by the recent statement made by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Dr. David Clarke, the Cabinet Minister in charge of the Office of Public Service, who said that he was considering putting the Civil Service code on a statutory basis.

I very much hope that the Government will find the parliamentary time to introduce a short non-controversial civil service Bill, meaning that the Civil Service would no longer be regulated by Orders in Council made under the Royal Prerogative, but by orders made by statutory authority. The code could be given statutory recognition in a schedule so that it can be easily amended by secondary legislation. Civil servants would no longer be Crown servants, but would have the same employment rights and duties as all other employees, plus a few others because of their particular employment. Appeals by them against improper pressure would no longer be to the First Civil Service Commissioner, but to an independent ombudsman, as happens with the Armed Forces, or to a staff councillor, as happens with the security services. The code of conduct would need to be tidied up as well, as would the rules for appearing before parliamentary committees.

I very much welcome the fact that the Government are committed to a White Paper and to legislation on freedom of information to tackle another vice of the English bureaucracy, unnecessary secrecy. That will do a great deal to produce more accountable government. I was heartened to hear the Lord Chancellor say at last Friday's seminar that that was a high priority.

All of those ideas, and others mentioned by your Lordships, have been stimulated by the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Annan. I very much hope that what seems to be a dry and arid subject has to some extent been given life by this evening's debate. I do not altogether share the pessimism of the noble Lord, Lord Annan, about the current condition of the Civil Service. Indeed, some of the fruits of its work have already become evident under the new Government. However, I agree with the noble Lord that there are always dangerous pressures which need to be resisted if the Civil Service is to maintain its independence, impartiality and deserved reputation for excellence.

7.31 p.m.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, perhaps I may join the other noble Lords by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Annan, for having initiated this timely debate from the Cross-Benches. I stress the noble Lord's position as a Cross-Bencher because that indicates that the subject is a matter of important principle, and not of party political point-scoring.

The debate is timely because within hours of this Government taking power on 2nd May political appointments were being made to the Prime Minister's Office ahead even of the completion of the appointment of his team of Ministers. Indeed, on Saturday 3rd May—I repeat, on a Saturday—even though there was no national crisis of any sort, about a mere 36 hours after the polls had closed, a special meeting of the Privy Council was held at Buckingham Palace. That was so that the Civil Service Order in Council of 1995 could be amended to allow, among other things, the creation of an extra appointment in the Prime Minister's Office.

I should say at the outset that I do not see any objection in the appointment of "special advisers" from outside the Civil Service. Indeed, I agree with those, like the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, who say that such appointments mean that Ministers can receive the political advice and assistance that they need without in any way impugning the impartiality of the Civil Service of which we are justly proud and of which other countries are envious.

In my own all too short time on the Government Front Bench I discovered how rigidly and jealously departments guarded themselves from political involvement. Indeed, in the case of one clearly political question which the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, asked me on 5th July 1995, there was the distinct impression that no department wanted to take it on. My own colleagues also regarded it as such a hot potato that as the most junior person in the whole of the government hierarchy I was told that I had been unanimously volunteered to deal with it.

The concern to which I referred is not only occasioned by the timing of some of those appointments, but by the reluctance of the Government to make public any details of those appointments. It is difficult to understand the reasons for that evasiveness, which continues to this very day. I hope that the Minister will take the opportunity of this debate to answer some of the outstanding questions. If he cannot do so today, I hope that he will at least undertake to ensure that an unequivocal answer is forthcoming by 19th July at the latest.

It is a tradition of Parliament that individual civil servants should not normally be publicly criticised because they are not in a position to defend themselves. I should like to make it clear that I am not voicing any criticism of any of the 53 political advisers although by the very nature of their jobs they place themselves in the firing line and cannot expect the same exemption as a career civil servant.

The problem lies in three directions. I refer first to the haste with which some of the appointments were made and the nature of two of those appointments. I refer here to the appointment of the Prime Minister's press secretary, Mr. Alastair Campbell. No one can doubt that gentleman's abilities, but when on 10th June I asked the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, what made Mr. Campbell better qualified for the post than a long-established civil servant, the noble Lord replied: I do not wish to comment on Mr.…Campbell's specific qualifications".—[Official Report, 10/6/97; col. 831.] The noble Lord pointed out that outsiders have been appointed to the Press Office in the past—indeed, they have—but it has been customary since the departure of Mr. Joe Haines as Harold Wilson's press secretary some 20 years ago—and even before that time—for the press secretary to be a career civil servant. There is a very good reason for that. Modern communications, particularly the instancy and persistency of television news broadcasts, mean that the media should be able to distinguish between the communication of factual news and political propaganda. The proper place for the latter is not 10 Downing Street; it is Millbank Tower.

The other appointment to which I should like to refer is that of Mr. Jonathan Powell, another gentleman with undoubted talents. It is not the fact that he was appointed that raised eyebrows; it was what he was appointed as. The kite was flown that he was to be the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, probably the second most senior position in the Civil Service. However, Sir Robin Butler, the head of the Civil Service, let it be known that the idea made him, and I quote, "seriously unrelaxed". That is a masterpiece of Civil Service understatement. I suppose that, translated, it means something like "seething with anger". The kite was hastily hauled down from the roof of Millbank Tower. The noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, told me in that same answer that, there has never been any question of his taking over the role of a permanent civil servant". He was merely the chief of staff to the Prime Minister. I wonder what it was then that "seriously unrelaxed" Sir Robin. In his reply to my question, the noble Lord told us what Mr. Powell would not be doing, but we have yet to learn which of the duties formerly performed by the Principal Private Secretary Mr. Powell now carries out.

The second problem is the sheer number of such political appointments—53 in all, so far. The Secretary of State for Health seems to be able to rub along with just—

Lord Lester of Herne Hill

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, but I wonder whether in the light of what she has just said she will clarify something for me. I refer to what exactly was the role of Sir Bernard Ingham under the previous Government if it was not to produce what the noble Baroness has called "propaganda" on behalf of the then Prime Minister and her Government. Secondly, is it really appropriate to quote in this House statements attributed to the Cabinet Secretary by a newspaper when that civil servant does not have the opportunity himself to give any official explanation and when we are relying on what is really nothing more than gossip?

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, with regard to the noble Lord's first comment, my understanding is that Bernard Ingham was a factual press secretary—

Noble Lords

Oh!

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, with regard to the noble Lord's second question, from my own experience I do not know whether it is improper to quote something that Sir Robin Butler has said. If it was improper for me so to have quoted him, I apologise, but I really do not know. I am afraid that I am not experienced enough to know whether that was correct—

Lord Lester of Herne Hill

My Lords, it is not at all improper; it is simply that a newspaper attributed those words to Sir Robin. We do not know whether those were his words or what the context was. As the noble Baroness has rightly said that it is not customary to criticise civil servants by name, it seems equally inappropriate for us to rely upon what was in a newspaper when the Minister has given a very clear account of the position in the past.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I do not believe that the Minister commented on the particular point that I have made, but I note what the noble Lord has said.

I note that the Minister without portfolio does not have an adviser but, as the fountainhead of all political advice to the Government, obviously he would not need one. One can only hope that, in the interests of the public purse, when Ministers become more used to their jobs they may not need so many advisers.

When one talks about the public purse, there is another problem. Questions to the Prime Minister on 2nd June by two of my honourable friends and again on the 15th June elicited no information about the salary bill involved, except that five of the special advisers—we do not know which—were being paid a total of £163,000 and that the salaries of the remainder were still being negotiated. On 13th June the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, informed my noble friend Lord Northesk in a Written Answer that information on the total salary bill would be provided when agreement had been reached with each individual on his employment terms.

During the election campaign the Prime Minster asked people to trust him. I am glad to see that all of these special advisers are following that exhortation by leaving their previous employment without knowing the terms of their new employment. I draw the attention of the Minister to the Employment Rights Act 1996 which requires every employee to be given a written statement of the terms of his employment not more than two months after the commencement of the employment. That is the significance of my earlier reference to 19th July. As it is clear from the small amount of information provided in the other place that the appointments had been made prior to 19th May, perhaps the Minister can tell the House when the Government will be able to overcome their coyness and publish the details. I remind the noble Lord that the Prime Minister also promised open government.

With all of these additional special advisers taking away the powers and duties of an impartial Civil Service we do not want to have the same situation as in the United States of America where whenever there is a change of administration there is a total upheaval in the machinery of government instead of the smooth overnight transition that we traditionally have. We are beginning to see attempts by this Administration to marginalise Parliament: the curtailment of Prime Minister's Questions; an attempt that was thwarted by the Speaker to move a constitutional Bill off the Floor of the other place and into Committee; the plan to set up separate parliaments and regional assemblies; and the attempt to gag a Member of another place. We also do not want to see the establishment of a system in which decisions are taken in a secret conclave where unelected advisers play a key role from which senior civil servants are excluded.

Accountability is very important. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Annan. He said that civil servants were not just there to say "Yes, Minister" but to ensure that all of the pros and cons were carefully considered. I believe that policy decisions are to be taken by Ministers based on both political considerations and the advice that they receive from whatever quarter, including their special advisers. We do not want to see the introduction by government of cronyism. The experience of established civil servants accumulated over many years is no less valuable than the advice of the most astute politician that the Government can hire.

In supporting the noble Lord, Lord Annan, in introducing this debate, I agree with the earlier comments of my noble friend Lord Beloff that it is a pity that some of the experienced Members of this House have not spoken in this debate. However, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that that deficiency was very well made up for in the gap. I urge the Government to learn at this early stage of their Administration that the Civil Service is well aware that it is its duty to carry out the Government's decisions loyally and effectively. That is what it has always traditionally done.

7.45 p.m.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

My Lords, in preparing as far as I could for this debate I recognised that possibly three kinds of issues might be raised—on the relationship between special advisers, Ministers, civil servants and Cabinet Committees. I also recognised that those could be issues of propriety, efficiency and where power lay. This has been a remarkable debate in which serious and thoughtful contributions have been made on issues of efficiency and power. I propose to answer those aspects of the debate with the seriousness that they deserve. We have had a single speech from the Opposition Front Bench which is no more than a series of abusive comments about propriety.

Baroness Miller of Hendon

My Lords, I certainly did not say anything about propriety that was abusive. I asked the Minister some questions.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

My Lords, I shall seek to justify what I have just said.

Lord Burnham

And to answer the questions?

Lord McIntosh of Haringey

My Lords, I shall answer those questions, too. However, those questions were put to me in such a way that they involved allegations that deserve to be treated perhaps not with contempt but without the degree of seriousness that I propose to adopt in my response to the remainder of the debate. The noble Baroness who has spoken from the Opposition Front Bench claims that there is a whole series of outstanding questions which the Government, due to coyness or evasiveness—she has used both words—failed to answer when challenged. I repudiate that charge. In no case has there been either coyness or evasiveness in the answering of outstanding questions.

The noble Baroness began by speaking about the haste of the appointments on Saturday 3rd May of Mr. Jonathan Powell and Mr. Alastair Campbell. She complained that I had refused to comment on their qualifications for the job. Indeed I did—and I shall do so again. I shall refuse to comment on the qualifications of any special advisers for their individual jobs, just as in the past Ministers would have refused to comment on the qualifications of Sarah Hogg, Norman Blackwell or any others. I do not believe that when in opposition we would have presumed to ask such questions.

The noble Baroness said that the kite had been flown and that Mr. Jonathan Powell was to be the Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister. She then claimed that the kite had been hauled down from Millbank Tower when I made it clear—I repeat it—that there was never any intention of appointing Mr. Jonathan Powell as the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary. The allegation that Millbank Tower made that claim has been specifically repudiated by me. I repudiate it again. It is an unworthy allegation. The noble Baroness chose to use press comments, which she could never verify, that the Cabinet Secretary was seriously unrelaxed about any such appointment. Since there was never any intention to make such an appointment, although I acknowledge that the phrase is one that Sir Robin Butler, as a witty man, might well have made in other circumstances, there is no truth to the claim that he expressed any objection to the appointment of Mr. Jonathan Powell to the post that he holds. There is no truth in any suggestion that he was to be appointed to any other post.

The noble Baroness asked me about the number of political appointments. That has been made clear on many occasions. There has never been any question of trying to conceal the number of political appointments. If one wants to make a comparison with the previous administration, it is true that there are more special advisers to the Government than in the past, but the noble Baroness forgets that the previous government also had a considerable number of expert advisers. Some political appointees to the previous government were paid at Permanent Secretary level rather than at the lower levels which are within the range for special advisers at the present time.

The noble Baroness seems to think that there is something sinister about the salary bill. I have said, and we have all said, that as soon as negotiations on salaries for all special advisers have been concluded then the total salary bill will be published. There will be no concealment of any kind. There is no special significance in two months, because of course special advisers were appointed at different times.

The noble Baroness claimed that we are seeking to marginalise Parliament, but she produced very little evidence for that claim. The number of Statements and announcements of policy that have been made to Parliament make it clear that the Government take Parliament extremely seriously. In the serious part of my speech I shall refer to the efforts that we wish to make to improve the efficiency of parliamentary scrutiny of government activities.

I move on to the rest of the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Annan, gave us some historical analysis. That was deepened by the noble Lord, Lord Beloff. The noble Lord, Lord Annan, suggested that the debate could take the form of an historical analysis or act as a note of warning. I prefer to take it as a note of warning. I prefer to think of it as being an admonition in the sense of warning rather than of reproof at this stage, because I do not believe that we have quite reached that stage.

A number of concerns have been raised about the component groups which provide advice to Ministers— civil servants, special advisers, the policy unit, and Cabinet Committees. It is proper to question, from the point of view of efficiency and the locus of power, how that works. I take first the Civil Service. I am delighted to have the opportunity to put on record the Government's total commitment to retaining a politically impartial Civil Service. The Civil Service plays a vital part in underpinning the constitution, and in sustaining good government.

The noble Baroness, Lady Park, expressed concern about devolution to agencies. I know that she has been doughty in defence of the Recruitment and Assessment Service in the private sector. I pay tribute to her for that. I was interested that the noble Lord, Lord Gillmore, thought that the agencies were beneficial. I tend to agree with that from my experience, in that agencies, although they are to a certain extent more remote from parliamentary control, nevertheless can be assigned specific and clear objectives. They can be held to account if they do not achieve those objectives. That was very much more difficult with the previous departmental systems.

The noble Lord, Lord Beloff, rightly drew attention to the need for the Civil Service to attract the most able. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, made the same point. I can confirm not only that we are considering bringing forward legislation to give legal force to the Civil Service code but that we are committed to do so. There is no question of us retreating from that.

The noble Earl, Lord Northesk, referred to the Haldane principles. Those principles are critical to our consideration of efficiency, because they refer to the requirement that advice given to Ministers should be based on the full evidence available from whatever source. I can confirm that we adhere to the Haldane principles. Indeed, some aspects of them are enshrined in the present Civil Service code which is to be made statutory.

The noble Earl, Lord Northesk, was concerned that special advisers might be diluting the role of the Civil Service, if I understood him aright. There is a continuing role for the provision of honest and impartial advice to Ministers. The Government benefit enormously from the Civil Service's commitment to provide that impartial policy advice. The noble Lord, Lord Annan, confirmed the necessity for that.

Special advisers provide an additional source of advice to their Minister in the development of government policy in a party political context. That has always been the role of special advisers, and there is no particular change in that. I was glad again to have the confirmation of the noble Lord, Lord Gillmore, that he had found that helpful. The noble Baroness, Lady Park, wondered why special advisers should not be accountable. I am not clear as to what she means by accountable unless she means publicly accountable. Privately, they are accountable to their employer. Publicly, surely, they are no more accountable than any others giving advice to Ministers. When we come to the freedom of information legislation I shall be interested to see whether she takes the view that advice to Ministers by civil servants or special advisers should be made public. I rather think that she will not.

We have set out clearly and openly the role that special advisers or civil servants must play. In answer to the particular point made by the noble Lord, Lord Northesk, the Prime Minister set out a copy of the terms and conditions for the employment of special advisers in the Library of the House. That is publicly available. I am not sure whether that has ever been done in the past. It includes a comprehensive description of their roles and responsibilities, which are complementary to the role of career civil servants.

An additional strand of advice which has been referred to is the policy unit at No. 10 Downing Street. There may be questions as how that relates to the old Central Policy Review Staff. It dealt with metapolicy above departmental level, whereas the No. 10 policy unit is set up to work closely with departments at all levels to determine longer term policy. In case there is any doubt, Cabinet Committee policy advisers may well attend when it is appropriate, but special advisers do not attend.

There appeared to be differing views about outside advice from business people and others. I take seriously the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Annan, although it was a historical view, that Ministers lack managerial experience and that Permanent Secretaries tended to take advantage by filling that gap. I was puzzled by the fact that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, seemed to think that bringing outside business people into government and into contact with government, and using their services, was somehow a diminution of the efficiency of government. I do not believe that to be the case. The presence of people such as Mr. Martin Taylor of Barclays Bank, to name but one, and business people such as my noble friend Lord Simon of Highbury, to name someone in a different position, is enormously valuable to government.

One of the problems of government has always been that we do not have the movement between the private sector and the public sector which is a feature of government in the US, with all its other defects which have been referred to.

Cabinet Committees provide a framework for collective consideration of major policy issues. Let me make it clear again that in the interests of open government we have continued the proper policy introduced by Mr. John Major in 1992 of publishing the names, terms of reference and membership of Cabinet Committees.

I do not have a great deal to add to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Annan, who referred to the growth of ad hoc committees. I believe that he was referring to ad hoc committees in the Thatcher years. My impression is that the openness of Cabinet Committees described the real situation and that those committees are as they appear to be in public. Cabinet Committees perform an essential function because they have the benefit of consideration by career civil servants, by special advisers where appropriate in main departments, by the No. 10 policy unit and by the Minister responsible for the issues discussed.

It is too early to say whether during the two-and-a-half months since the Government were elected there has been any significant change in the efficiency of government. I accept that the proof of the pudding will be evident over the next five or 10 years. I am sure that, during that period, Ministers, whoever they are, will always be willing to answer debates of this kind. At the same time, I am confident that the ability of your Lordships' House to provide expert critiques of the way in which government do their business will always be welcomed by the Government, as we have welcomed this debate.

8.1 p.m.

Lord Annan

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, I was a little disturbed at being unable to rally some noble Lords who have great experience of these matters. I wrote or spoke to some 25 noble Lords and received replies much like those in the parable in the gospel of St. Luke, where the host sent his servants to bid many to come to a feast and with one consent they all began to make excuse. Indeed, one noble Lord made the reply that is in the parable; that he was taking to himself a wife! Therefore, I was most disappointed.

However, having listened to the debate, I can say that it was absolutely splendid. I was grateful in particular to the noble Baroness, Lady Park of Monmouth, and the noble Lord, Lord Gillmore, who spoke in the gap and materially enhanced our deliberations. I conclude by thanking all noble Lords who took part, and in particular the noble Minister, who has earned his salary in no less than two debates today. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion for Papers.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.