§ 6.49 p.m.
§ Lord Kennetrose to ask Her Majesty's Government what is their policy towards Russia and its relationship with its former subject and allied states.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in the coming weeks the future of our relations with Russia will be decided, and so will the whole shape of international affairs, by intent or default. We may return to a version of the cold war with Russia set up as the grand opponent, or we may tailor our policies and reactions to others' policies and reactions so as to avoid that and get on with making our world sustainably habitable.
A few days ago Edward Shevardnadze, Gorbachev's foreign minister, now president of Georgia, on his return from Washington reported:
As for the danger of the cold war—and there were quite a lot of questions referring to this issue [in the United States] … a danger of recurrence is real … I spoke about the inadmissibility of this sort of confrontation, at every level … with the president … at the Congress … at the Senate …".To decide these things aright we must understand what has been happening, not just push the worst case analysis button and accept the file as gospel. What we have seen over the past few years has been a triple event: the simultaneous dissolution of a thousand years of absolutism, four centuries of empire and 70 years of a communist command economy. Our own Mr. Rifkind has recently said that we cannot allow Russia to resume control of the CIS. Indeed. But there are 24.5 million Russians still living in the former imperial territories, and the only infrastructure and organisation there are the old imperial and communist ones.So there are now multiple moves to re-attach the snapped links; to reconnect the networks and to establish "our own Maastricht" in their phrase, in order to live. Even the Polish Foreign Minister now advocates the reinstatement of CMEA-type economic partnerships in Eastern Europe. Poland was indeed interested in close association with NATO, but security concerns and economic interests, he said, can and should be distinguished. This is a straw in the wind. Ukraine meanwhile—another straw in the wind—is to be the first member of the CIS economic union also to have an association with the European Union. And, when Finland joins the European Union, it will have an immense common frontier with Russia.
558 To quote Mr. Shevardnadze again:
I tried to explain in my discussions that despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the territory which it occupied remains a single socio-economic space…. I am convinced that all the new independent states should be viewed as a whole. Otherwise the stability of even the largest and most influential of them may be undermined by instability on its borders".The difference between the Russian empire and the other European empires was that they walked and the rest of us sailed. The CIS countries touch Russia; their histories, their economies and their societies interpenetrate. In last Monday's International Herald Tribune, George Kennan recalled the situation in 1949; critically fluid, like today's. In 1946 he had proposed containment of the Soviet Union; with the Marshall Plan and the Berlin blockade containment "won", he advised discussion and possible collaboration. He writes now in his nineties,One of the great disappointments of my life [was] to discover that neither our government nor our West European allies had any interest in entering into such discussions at all".Instead, we procured,the vast and useless nuclear arsenals that … remain today a danger to the very environment of the planet [and] 40 years of communist control in [Eastern Europe. And] all of this because we were too timid to negotiate".The ball now is in our court far more decisively than it was in 1949. Today, we have a rather sensible Russian Government to deal with. It rules a dilapidated great power attempting to find itself again, to regain a valid self image. The self image it knows, and which reality still proclaims, is that of a great power. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin is balancing on the knife-edge between inflation and the social collapse threatened by the previous "shock therapy". "Pay no bills" seems to have been a prime element of it. Western governments have now recognised that democratic reform and laissez-faire market economics can be incompatible.The noble Lord, Lord Henley, told me last week in a Written Answer that the G7 Ministers are now to,
urge the Russian Government [that] a credible system of social support",should operate alongside its efforts to achieve,macroeconomic stabilisation",and that the IMF and the World Bank have been instructed by their member governments to the same effect. That is belated common sense.Kozyrev and Churkin are, for the time being at least, highly constructive, seeking collaboration through the UN, the CSCE in Bosnia, in Eastern Europe and in keeping the peace in their own "near abroad". There is a new and constructive chairman of the Duma, Mr. Rybkin, who did a fine job during his visit to the United States Congress. I trust that we shall soon see him here.
President Yeltsin himself is in a subdued mood after the cold bath of the December elections and after Mr. Clinton's hearty, but short-lived assurances of "partnership". The Duma's amnesty for the October Parliamentarians has let him off quite a lot of hooks. His suppression of the old Parliament was quite unlawful, despite our support for it, and state trials would have shown that up. It is a great pity that so much American and British opinion holds that Gaidar and his friends were the goodies, the real "reformers", and that the rest are nothing but hardliners wanting to restore communism by force.
559 The Western governments ought now to throw off their illusion that Russia might have been instantly transformed into an obedient, textbook democracy-cum-laissez faire market. Russia is moving towards some kind of democracy and markets are beginning to operate, but, when stability is reached, even if it is a stable market democracy, it will be entirely Russian in its characteristics and not American. The "state" element will be stronger than Western governments would instinctively approve—more like the Far Eastern model, which we cannot claim does not work.
After the December elections when democracy worsted shock therapy, Mr. Chernomyrdin felt able to call the former orthodoxy "economic romanticism" and to reject the romanticism while keeping the reform. Romanticism it was, particularly when Western governments were doing nothing to stem the outflow of capital from Russia and the other ex-Soviet CMEA states into Swiss and other Western banks. This is said now to amount to a billion dollars a month from Russia alone. For Ukraine, officials say that there are something like 7 billion to 8 billion dollars in Swiss banks, the press says nearer 18 billion. Our Western governments tolerate this haemorrhage on the grounds, I believe, of economic ideology. But it can only stultify the hope we and the Russians share for their prosperity. It is like bleeding a haemophiliac.
In the real world Russia will be nobody's poodle; and we must integrate Russia into the international community. Not only history dictates that, but the facts of life do, too: the nuclear weapons, the Security Council veto and the massive resources of raw materials that include much of Europe's oil and gas supplies. It would be idiotic if we shooed them out of Europe into an Asia where they also belong.
It will be hard to insist that Russia should not have military installations and spheres of interest outside their borders while the US may. If the United States goes on interpreting "manifest destiny" too energetically, it will find opposition rising up. Japan could become a nuclear superpower quite quickly; China is building up its strength. Today the United States is tangling with each of them and Russia is perhaps making overtures to them which could well be reciprocated.
What about the institutional problem? I believe that we should now call it that. We have NATO; a military alliance formed for collective defence against an easily identified and clearly threatening adversary. That adversary not only no longer threatens, it no longer exists. NATO is a fine implement that no longer has an obvious purpose. So what should we do with it? The danger is quite clear. It is that, if we integrate Russia too closely with it, NATO could come to be feared and resented all round the world. It could increasingly look like the White North under arms. Its very existence would he bound to provoke the question of its purpose. That is beginning to happen. It was risked with NATO's Sarajevo ultimatum We were lucky that Russia weighed in as she did and NATO bombs did not fall.
I had a Written Answer on 14th March saying: 560
On 11 March NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs led a PFP briefing mission to the CSCE in Vienna, during which he pointed to the complementary nature of the work undertaken in the two fora.Was that the first contact? That is an interesting question. Mr. Wörner has said that the Partnership for Peace and action in the North Atlantic Consultative Council,will aid in bringing about the conditions under which the CSCE can become the core of an effective pan-European security system".I hope so. That is a route which would make sense. Mr. Wörner was echoed by Mr. Kozyrev a few days ago,It is the CSCE that should play the main role in making the system of Euro-Atlantic co-operation truly stable and democratic".To that we should say "snap".It may be, strangely enough, that out of poor little Bosnia a solution will come. Mr. Zhurkin showed exemplary skill in both getting the Serbs outside Sarajevo to withdraw or hand over their guns and at the same time restoring America's UN balance after a bad wobble towards unilateralism. The Coldstream Guards' band playing on the Sarajevo football field could turn out to have been celebrating not only the beginning of peace in Bosnia, but also the beginning of a new European order in which Russia and the United States play co-operative roles in facing the problems that the whole world faces: starvation, population, environment, trade, currencies, drugs and arms.
§ 7 p.m.
Lord Belhaven and StentonMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for calling attention in his Unstarred Question to the matter of Russia and her former subject nations and former allies, if you could call them that. I fear that I shall not entirely follow the noble Lord's line, but perhaps it is as well to have two or more views on these matters.
To make sense of Russia, one must have regard to her history in the long term both under the Tsars and under the communist regime. The last time that the map of Europe looked at all like it does now was immediately after the revolution in 1918-20, when the nationalities, including Ukraine, enjoyed a brief period of independence. However, the Russian empire was swiftly reconstructed under the title of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Certain areas of the Russian empire were not regained immediately; namely, Finland, Poland and the three Baltic states.
In 1939-40, the Soviet Union tried, and failed, to subjugate Finland. She did, with Hitler's agreement, subjugate the Baltic States and East Poland. However, between 1945 and 1950, a whole area of Europe which had never previously been occupied by Russia was overrun and brought under a cruel and oppressive tyranny which survived until 1989. The list of those countries is impressive. In addition to Poland and the Baltic states, which had formed a part of the old Tsarist empire—at least, half of Poland had—those countries included East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Eastern Austria, Romania and Bulgaria. The extent of empire gained was enormous and the monster was still 561 not satisfied. The rest of Europe, including this country, was placed under threat and forced to form the defensive alliance that we now call NATO.
The havoc which Russian rule wrought in its subject territories is part and parcel of what we are trying to cope with now. They were subjected to the economics of the madhouse. Services such as shops, telephones, travel and communications were systematically run down. Police terror replaced police protection for most of the time in most of the areas. Furthermore, as I said, the monster was not satisfied. A whole group of third world countries, many of which had been part of the British empire, were destabilised and some were placed under Soviet-style regimes which took their orders and their armaments from Moscow. Civil wars were fomented throughout the African continent.
I could go on, but I say this because I believe strongly that Her Majesty's Government ought not to forget these facts of very recent history—and nor should we. Certainly in the past few years, there has been a huge change and the empire has gone back to the heartland of Russia itself. That is most welcome, but I believe that we should be very wary before we satisfy ourselves that the leopard has permanently changed its spots.
The fact is that, historically, Russia has always threatened her neighbours. Some time ago I watched a television programme in which the actor Peter Ustinov, himself of Russian descent, observed that Russia was more invaded that invading. Mr. Ustinov's Russian blood has made him over-patriotic, because that just is not true. It is so far from the truth that it makes one gasp and rub one's eyes, but it is a view which is held by many people who have failed to analyse historical fact. Let us take a bit of recent history. Russia was invaded by Hitler in 1941. That is a fact. In the two previous years, Russia herself had invaded Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Eastern Poland and part of Romania. Afterwards, the Russians said that they had done that because they wanted to go further west in anticipation of a German invasion. Any excuse, it seems, is better than none to overturn one's neighbours' borders, deport millions of their populations and subject the rest to police terror, poverty and starvation.
We can accept that Russia has changed only if we can be sure that she does not go back to her old bad habits. I believe that she should be encouraged to keep her army at home and I absolutely disagree with the idea that it ought to be used for peacekeeping. We have seen only too recently what Russian peacekeeping can lead to in Afghanistan. The possibility that Mr. Zhirinovsky—or someone of his persuasion, whether nationalist or communist—may succeed Yeltsin as president is too real for us to take any chances with the situation today.
We should be wary of voices that tell us that we must not "upset Russia". Mr. Zhirinovsky and his friends are upset already and no amount of appeasement will modify their scandalous ambitions. They are very near to the levers of power and, in my view, the West—that is, NATO—ought to act now to guarantee at least the central European nations which are already committed 562 to democracy and stability. That is the Visegrad group. The Russian army (under any guise) should not be seen again in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest or Berlin.
I should like to quote from the editorial in the Financial Times of Friday 18th March. It starts with what the West should be doing instead of what it is doing. That is quite common in newspaper commentaries. I quote:
First it must remember that Russia is both a nuclear power and Europe's most threatening neighbour. Its problems cannot be approached as if the country were the Philippines or even Brazil".It later states:The claims inherited from the Soviet Union greatly exceed the resources upon which the Government can lay its desperate hands. The budget deficit is supposed to be 10 per cent. of the gross domestic product. In fact, it is at least 15 per cent. before meeting the defence minister's demand for a doubling of the military budget".What is the purpose of doubling the military budget? One has a right to ask that. Are the aid and loans which are being given and which will be given going to go, as so often in third world countries, by direct or indirect ways into even heavier armaments? And this is at a time when we have what I think is the absurd Options for Change and when every country in the West (except, I understand, France) is reducing defence expenditure. What price the peace dividend now? It might be a very heavy price indeed.There are enough straws in the wind to make one feel uneasy. There is the concern which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, mentioned for ethnic Russian minorities in the newly independent states. That is an understandable concern, but we ought not to forget that a similar concern was Hitler's excuse for first destabilising and then destroying Czechoslovakia.
It was reported last week that Mr. Rutskoi, recently released from gaol, favours a referendum throughout the former Russian territories on the question of whether the former Soviet Union should be reconstituted. These are the sorts of policies which are favoured by communists and nationalists alike, but not by the present government. But we would be optimists indeed if we were to expect the present government to be in power for much longer. Already President Yeltsin has been forced to backtrack on his assurance given to President Walesa of Poland last August that he had no objection to Poland joining NATO. That was last August, not very long ago. We do not know what we may hear next August or next year, but we should follow the advice that I was given as a young man when I was selling cattle in a poor market, "Hope for the best and prepare for the worst".
I do hope for the best. I hope that what I am saying may not be true, but I fear that a lot of it—in fact, most of it—is true. The best way that we can help Russia out of her semi-bankrupt condition is to encourage her to help herself. If the government there can bring the bureaucracy under control and create conditions suitable for stable investment, I am sure that that investment will come. Russia is a huge country with unlimited possibilities. As I have already said, we ought to be very careful that aid and loans do not find their way immediately into armaments. Like all countries and people, the Russians ought to be encouraged to cultivate their own garden and to leave their neighbours in peace.
563 If those neighbours—the former client states—are left in peace, there is, in my view, a good chance that they will prosper, especially in central Europe and the Baltics. What they least need is the dead hand of Russia in a peacekeeping or any other guise. The next time round, their loss of independence may mean our loss of independence. It nearly happened to us 45 years ago, but we were lucky. I end with a fairly trite quotation, but a true one: The price of liberty is eternal vigilance. Let us not forget that.
§ 7.10 p.m.
§ Lord WeidenfeldMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, enables us to debate an issue not just central to our foreign policy, but one that presents the West with fateful options and challenges our fundamental views. But we must clear our field of vision of received ideas born of insufficient knowledge and entrenched distortions.
Sometimes I fear that we lack, or perhaps do not make sufficient use of, our sophisticated tools of political seismography to measure that great earthquake which was the fall of the Soviet Empire. General de Gaulle, in a prophetic statement 30 years ago, said that if the Soviet Union, the last of the great empires, were to implode and crumble, the Russians would have not one but a dozen Algerias on their hands. Today, nearly five years after the annus mirabilis, we view our relations with Russia sometimes with alarm, with wariness and with intemperate disappointment. That is only partly justified.
We should not be setting ourselves unattainable tasks for building a new order by believing that what took five, six, seven centuries of democratic evolution in some Western polities can be achieved in a country which, in a thousand years of history, had only eight-and-a-half years of qualified parliamentary rule. It would be equally naive to think that a government in Moscow—any government in Moscow—would ever desist from doing all in their power to preserve what can be preserved of the former Soviet Empire, and to widen its sphere of influence and push its security border further west.
The Russian revolution was not the end of history but the return of history to its habitual rhythms and patterns: power politics, the balance of power. It is not a fashionable but an enduringly valid notion. No one can say with certainty hew that Russian revolution will turn out. Is it entering a new stage? Will it take a Bonapartist turn? Russia could well be ruled by an amalgam of pan-Slav, neo-Fascist and recidivist communist forces, but more likely by an authoritarian compromise coalition, weary of quick new wealth and paternalistic in character, which would free the market slowly and sluggishly improve the quality of life.
If Boris Yeltsin is the best man for us to back at this moment, as I believe he is, so be it; but let us not focus all our policies on one man. It is easy to condemn a Zhirinovsky, but it would be dangerous to overlook or underrate men and movements in between the two political poles. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that we must not label politicians as "goodies" and "baddies". We are far too apt to talk of former 564 communists, neo-Stalinists, apparatchiks, obdurate managers of the military/industrial complex. There are so many answers and so many possibilities, and also some for the better.
We must not become casualties of oversimplification. Basically we have no reason and no right to insinuate ourselves and interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, to be condescendingly prescriptive. Only two principles should guide us. One is our enlightened self-interest and the other the insistence on a minimum threshold of human rights observance. We have not always been very clear in defining the former and we have been far from successful in attaining the latter. But one conclusion we can draw is that if one sets out with maximalist ambitions, holding inadequate means of implementation, one ends up making abject concessions, trampling over both moral principles and human lives. That is the lesson of Yugoslavia.
Essentially, our central policy towards Russia should be to recognise that she is still a great power politically and a superpower militarily. She must be conceded a sphere of influence that includes the CIS countries—the Ukraine, White Russia and the greater part of the Caucasian and Central Asian republics—all countries which for obvious reasons of economic independence, transport and demographic complexity, must be encouraged—yes, encouraged by us—to find an honourable and bearable modus vivendi with Moscow. Since we are clearly unable and unwilling financially, let alone militarily, to bear those sacrifices which in theory could achieve all the national aspirations of all those countries, we must confine ourselves to using such persuasive powers, such clout as we have with Moscow, to ensure that a code of human rights hold; sway, that a loose co-operative grouping does not infringe sovereignty unduly. We must prove that economic freedom in the area is in Russia's own interest and will allow her to plug into the circuit of world trade.
But at the same time as we concede to Russia that right to some form of rehabilitation, we must be quite clear about the fate of the lands between the Baltic and the Black Sea, and more specifically those countries in the heart of Europe which felt themselves betrayed by the West and oppressed by Hitler and Stalin—countries which of their own volition and in the West's vital interests must be allowed to form an integral part of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia (a small country which lives up to all the tests of eligibility) should speedily and unequivocally—phased in certainly with all current reservations—be allowed to join. We should have seized the opportunity and taken the Russians at their word when President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev publicly raised no objection to such a policy. Since then, Moscow has changed its tune, perhaps encouraged by the lack of determination shown in the Western camp. But I think the window of opportunity has not been slammed: there is still hope and need for negotiation.
The Baltic countries present a different problem. No self-respecting Russian government, Left, Right or Centre, could tolerate the guns of another great power or alliance pointing at St. Petersburg from the territory of 565 a next-door neighbour. To a Russian ear the word "neighbour", as George Kennan, who has already been quoted in the debate once put it,
does not have that friendly, warming sound it has to an American or Canadian. To a Russian, neighbour means Tartar, Turk and Teuton".A statute of neutrality, in the strictest sense of the word, must be elaborated for the Baltic states, together with built-in safeguards for the substantial Russian minority. Young Russians born in Riga, by now as much a Russian as a Latvian city, must not be punished for the sins of their fathers.I said previously that one of the priorities for Britain and Europe should be the integration of the Visegrad states into the European Union. Overwhelmed by other events at home and abroad, and perhaps misled by oversimplified reporting, we are not aware of how much progress has been made in some of those countries. It is true that the romantic shine of the velvet revolution has dimmed, but it is to be hoped that the present restoration is made up of coarser and perhaps more durable cloth. Of course some of the charismatic figures of the first phase have left the centre stage and are now writing books and editorials or lecturing abroad, but new men and women (important men and women) are at the helm and are producing results.
Poland has the biggest rate of growth in all Europe. The Czech Republic is economically a going concern. On the other hand, the Slovaks suffer from their self-induced divorce from Prague. To the Slovak leader, Mr. Mejczar, one might exclaim with Molière:
"Tu l'a voulu, Georges Dandin!"Hungary lags behind somewhat and is in danger of becoming enmeshed in ethnic quarrels with Slovakia and Romania. But still there is progress to report.The need to be precise in clearing up the position of those states in central and eastern Europe within the framework of wide-ranging negotiations with Russia is urgent and must not be left in limbo. It is high time that after half a century of changing frontiers, moving millions and the most horrendous cycle of ethnic barbarities in the history of man, eastern Europe, the fulcrum of the vast Eurasian land mass, might enjoy some of the blessings of a truly civil society.
§ 7.20 p.m.
§ Lord Thomson of MonifiethMy Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for asking this Question and introducing the debate. He made a characteristically thoughtful speech. He has long been a serious student of matters in the former Soviet Union and in eastern and central Europe. While I do not agree totally with all that he said, I believe that he introduced the debate with a thought-provoking speech.
The developments inside Russia and its relations with the countries of its former empire are some of the most important issues for western foreign policy. Whatever our views about the best way out, I believe that we have all replaced the original feelings of satisfaction, excitement and euphoria about the ending of Communist tyranny with an awareness of what the noble Lord, Lord Weidenfeld, called the unwisdom of 566 the maximalist position. Countries which have known little democracy for many centuries have suddenly converted. There has been the sudden dissolution of an empire, the creation of a new capitalist society in place of a communist command economy and the creation of a pluralist liberal democracy. In many ways, those are proving to be impossible demands in the kind of timescale that is being suggested. In Russia in particular, the recent elections gave a stark warning of the reaction of ordinary citizens to the impossible demands that have been made on them.
I was interested in the virtually unanimous verdict of foreign observers of the elections that the voting process was fair. I am associated with one of the international media organisations which monitored the elections. I was struck by its finding that the state-owned press and television and radio allocated equal time and space to the contestants. Against that background, one must meditate on the fact that Mr. Zhirinovsky emerged as the principal victor with nearly 23 per cent. of the votes. However, we must also recall that during the election he was given more editorial space in the western press than in the Russian press.
The conclusion must be that that reflects in Russia a mood of economic hardship and, perhaps more importantly, of national humiliation. That is shared by many Russians. John Lloyd, one of the most perceptive journalistic observers of events in Russia, recently remarked in the Financial Times:
These are hard times in Russia, and fears are growing that the country is becoming ungovernable, or governable only with an iron hand".The developments inside Russia are putting pressure on the other CIS states. Stalin was particularly fond of the old proverb that one cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. It is turning out to be more difficult to restore the original eggs of a 70 year-old omelette. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was right in describing the reality of life in Russia today as being a series of CIS countries in which there is a great mixture of ethnic groups, but in which there are substantial Russian minorities almost everywhere.I turn to the impact that the developments in Russia are making outside its immediate boundaries. One can take Belaurus as an example. There are moves for its reabsorption by Russia and moves for monetary union between Belaurus and Russia. The vital gas supply pipelines which served Belaurus have been taken over by Moscow. That is bound to be a disturbing development to democrats in the Balkan states and the Ukraine with their vision of a Baltic to Black Sea bloc, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Weidenfeld. That in turn would be bound to lead the Visegrad states to seek firmer security guarantees. The Ukraine may react by clinging on to its nuclear weapons instead of observing the agreement reached about their disposal. Such instability would feed the dangerous advocates of the new doctrine in Russia—or perhaps a revision of the old and dangerous doctrine of Brezhnev—of justified military intervention.
That gloomy analysis may be over-pessimistic; indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, may feel that it is. However, it underlines how far the western response to 567 the break up of the Soviet Union has failed. As the noble Lord. Lord Weidenfeld, said, it is not too late to do something better about the situation. However, I depart from his more modest views and refer to the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe. In its latest annual report it called on the G7 nations:
to commit themselves to a long-term reform programme on the scale of the post-war Marshall plan".The Economic Commission for Europe stated:One of the worst outcomes would be … a list of short-term measures, hastily put together with a maximum of publicity".That is too accurate a description of the West's reaction to the problems. The Economic Commission for Europe urges western governments:not to neglect other eastern European countries in their concern for Russia. A broader, regional perspective of the transition to market-based economies is needed".Those are wise words which even at this stage we ought to heed.Of course the problems of Russia, the CIS countries and the eastern and central European countries that were former Soviet satellites are different from the physical ruin of western Europe at the end of World War Two. What is needed is something on the same imaginative scale as we had at that time. The responsibility rests principally on the countries of the European Union. These developments, with all their risks and dangers, underline the need for the European Union to get together its political and economic diplomacy and its defence and security policies than has hitherto been the case. The European Union should take the lead in a new Marshall plan for the 1990s in Russia, the CIS countries and eastern and central Europe.
The prosperity and possibly the peace of our European continent are at stake. With the ending of the Cold War and that tidy bi-polar situation, with the balance of nuclear power terrifying as it was, it becomes increasingly a European problem and a European responsibility. I wish that I could see the European Union equipping itself to fulfil that responsibility. I wish that I could see the British Government taking an effective lead in that matter. Against the magnitude of the developments on our Continent, the response of the European Union is inadequate. As was said a few days ago by my noble friend Lord Bonham-Carter in the defence debate, when one is dealing with matters such as these the idea of inter-governmental arrangements for a joint foreign policy or movements towards a more effective security policy is a recipe for indecision rather than decision. If the European Union is to be effective in our dangerous modern world it must move towards more effective decision-making powers instead of bogging itself down, as the British Government are doing, in arithmetical questions of maintaining a voting minority, which is art absolute recipe for indecisiveness.
§ 7.30 p.m.
§ Lord Clinton-DavisMy Lords, as other noble Lords have said, the House is indebted to my noble friend Lord Kennet for tabling this Unstarred Question for debate this evening and for the profundity of his speech. The House will be grateful also to the characteristically eloquent speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Weidenfeld, who was right to remind us of 568 the seismic changes that have occurred with quite remarkable speed in regard to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire. As a number of your Lordships have said, we must bear that in mind when considering our approach to the current situation. In my view. the noble Lord, Lord Thomson of Monifieth, made a perfectly justifiable plea for a re-orientation of the thinking about this issue both by the European Union and Her Majesty's Government.
This is also a timely debate because the news that one read in the Financial Times this morning—and perhaps the noble Baroness can bring the House up to date as to any further changes—was of an apparent failure by the Russian Government and the IMF to reach an accord on the further loan of 1.5 billion dollars which was designed to aid economic reform.
That is part of the general aid package—as I understand it, the second tranche—and part of the total 43 billion dollar package which was agreed by the G7 in Tokyo last year. The loan that we are thinking of, and to which I have just alluded, is small viewed against the immensity of the problems confronting Russia at present. But we need to recognise that that would be seen as an emblem of some hope and confidence on the part of the West in the survival of a reformed Russia and the burgeoning of its democratic reforms, limited though they have been in practice up to the present time; and would help to curb further economic decline and to stay impending moral and fiscal bankruptcy.
There is a view, which I hope will be rejected by the Government, that there is increasing evidence that if the money were to be given, it would be simply thrown away because the Soviet Union does not have the ability to use it prudently. That would be a gesture of despair and would be untimely in the extreme.
We need to maintain a sense of proportion about the package that was, and perhaps still is, on offer. It is only 0.5 per cent. of Russia's GDP but its significance is infinitely greater in terms of both the signals that it will provide and the prospects of success for extreme nationalists whose power increases in direct proportion to the degradation of the state, its economy and of society generally. I believe that our future is inextricably bound up with the ultimate success of Russia as a democratic state.
The risk of failing to address the problem adequately, as my noble friend Lord Kennet pointed out, and as was reiterated by the noble Lord, Lord Thomson of Monifieth, is that the people of Russia will regard it all as hopeless; or, it may be that even if democracy survives, Russia will turn away from Europe towards China and Japan with regard to its trading policy and its overall global commitments. The worst scenario is that Russia will simply sink into totalitarianism, with all the attendant risks for us.
I cannot help feeling that much of the advice which was offered to President Gorbachev and then to President Yeltsin by the Chicago-school type economists and ideologues—ideologues not only in government but also in the IMF—has been utterly misconceived. That is a point that has been echoed in the debate. 'To have expected that the Russian leadership could have transformed the command economy of the Soviet Union 569 into a free market economy in a stable western-style democracy without any real appreciation of the alphabet, let alone the language, of the two concepts was fanciful in the extreme and has proved to be immensely damaging.
Any talk of gradualism on the part of the Russian leadership was not only questioned but denounced by those great pontificators whose record in the West has scarcely suggested that imitation in Russia and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe was bound to succeed. But belatedly, as my noble friend Lord Kennet reminded us, there has been some recognition of the need for social stability.
The situation of Russian decline has been accompanied by a sense of quite remarkable national humiliation. Some years ago, in 1990, I went to what was then the Soviet Union just before it collapsed. That sense of national humiliation was evident. People were able to speak freely and they spoke freely about that. They spoke freely about many other things. They spoke freely about their lack of confidence in Gorbachev at the time. They spoke freely about the evident hopelessness of the position unless we were prepared to accommodate the needs of the Soviet Union in our international policies because without that, and without some firm international aid, they could see no future.
Of course, on the basis of that short visit, I cannot speak as an expert. I was only there for a few days. I should need another two days at least to become an expert. But that sense of national humiliation is dangerous and it has been compounded by that appalling haemorrhage of capital, to which my noble friend Lord Kennet referred, which has desperately weakened an already desperate economy.
There is disillusionment, massive unemployment, dreadful inflation and burgeoning crime and the fear of it. People do not feel safe in their own homes these days. Senior academics and scientists are paid a pittance for their services, even if they have the opportunity to provide those services. Like so many of the former satellite states, Russia has many highly trained academics, scientists, technicians and technologists. Health is increasingly threatened by the degradation of the environment. Therefore, it is no small wonder that unpleasant overt racism and ideas of expansionism and totalitarianism are favoured by people like the opportunist Zhirinovsky, whose ideas have appealed to so many.
I believe that to suggest that that man is simply a clown could be a major miscalculation in itself. The noble Lord, Lord Thomson, referred to the elections in Russia. One wonders—and I only say this parenthetic-ally—how and from what source Mr. Zhirinovsky obtained his resources for the purchase of television time in those elections which seemed to be totally out of proportion to the television time allocated to others, except the Government.
I am not at all comforted by the Government's response to that serious state of affairs if it is reflected by a speech made in another place by Douglas Hogg, a colleague of the noble Baroness, on 2nd April last year. Of course it is right that our ability as a nation to 570 influence the direction of the changes taking place in Russia is limited politically and economically, as he said, and that essentially, it is for the Russian people to decide substantially the future of their country. But we are able to play some part as a member of the European Union; and, indeed, individually. It is ominous to say, as the Minister did on that occasion, that if Mr. Yeltsin ceased to be a reformer—that is to say an economic reformer, permitting industry to remain in the state sector—it would lead, in the Government's view, to the possibility of a withdrawal of support. If that is the idea underlying British foreign policy in that respect, I believe it to be extremely dangerous. Latterly, Mr. Yeltsin and his advisers have come to the view that a policy of gradualism would make much more sense. I only wish that that had been the voice of reason that prevailed much earlier.
Is the aid programme currently being offered (even if the IMF deal were to go through) sufficient? Is it aimed at the right objectives? Inward investment generally is stagnating as large western multinationals wait for political and economic stability to take root before they undertake substantial investment in Russia, and indeed in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, there are exceptions. But one cannot help generalising in a sense in such a short debate. It really is a chicken and egg situation.
I read today in the Guardian newspaper an article written by Margaret Sharp who canvassed the concept of a grand Marshall Aid type programme, shifting resources into the shattered economies of Eastern and Central Europe. It is not just a question of shifting money into Eastern and Central Europe; it is a question of the provision of expertise, of technical and financial aid packages and of the provision of transferred technology. I thought that there was a great deal of substance behind the article. She writes that we would be talking of something equivalent to a provision on the part of the West of something like £77 billion. That is an enormous amount of money. However, like Marshall Aid in the 1940s, it is not a question of being philanthropic. The aid programme which at that time buttressed democracy in reviving ailing Western economies and which enabled American industry to prosper with orders from Europe, was not only something which created prosperity in Europe: it also created prosperity for American industry. The European Union could not be in greater need of that today with 20 million people out of work, many of whom are youngsters, with new jobs desperately needed and re-equipment and re-skilling to cope with the new technologies vitally required.
There is also the question of support through such a programme for small and medium-sized enterprises which are so important. The quality of the aid programmes is also important. I would plead for much more emphasis to be given to the environmental ingredient which should, by European Union requirements, be an essential component of all policies. The levels of urban pollution of rivers, seas and other areas —and also of land—are incredibly high. There are inadequate waste and water-treatment facilities. Health and even life is threatened on a scale unknown in 571 Western Europe. It is a decomposing environment which not only threatens millions in Russia, and elsewhere but also the citizens of the European Union. The safety of nuclear installations has big question marks over it, many of which are based on the Chernobyl-type installation. We really should worry about that.
Are we responding sufficiently? Clearly, the views of most speakers in the debate tonight are in the negative. What priority are the Government giving to promote sustainable development in Russia and in the burgeoning democracies of what were former dictatorships ? I know that the Government would say that the Know-How fund is all important. Indeed, according to the Prime Minister. it seems to be the main focus of the United Kingdom's environmental and industrial aid to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In fact, the Know-How fund strategy statement utterly ignores the issue of sustainable development, despite numerous ministerial proclamations. The amount of environmental aid is minuscule; nor does the Know-How fund operate any formal environmental procedures. Environmental issues are simply not central, but marginal. At worst, they are even regarded as irrelevant by the Government so far as concerns Eastern and Central Europe.
It is not enough for the Government to shelter behind the PHARE programme (which does prioritise questions of the environment) since, as the Minister, on 14th October 1991, said:
The problems are so great there is no concern about the replication of assistance".I shall conclude on the question of defence upon which I shall say a few words. The "Partnership for Peace" —the provision for the former Warsaw Pact countries which want to obtain eventual membership of NATO —sets out the basis of co-operation with NATO. Should Russia still, as the noble Lord, Lord Weidenfeld, said, a great power despite its political and economic distress (as evidenced by its skilful diplomacy over Bosnia) be granted a special status, having some voice in which Central and Eastern European countries would be able to join ? It rightly asks,Who is to bear all the costs of standardising weaponry and equipment?What is the Government's response to that and, indeed, to the wider questions posed by other speakers in tonight's short but invaluable debate?
§ 7.46 p.m.
§ The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Chalker of Wallasey)My Lords, we are indeed indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for having tabled tonight's debate, which we have enjoyed. With our European partners, Britain re-established relations, first, with the Baltic states in August 1991 and then, between December 1991 and March 1992, we recognised the 11 successor states to the Soviet Union and Russia as its legal continuation. Since then our policy has consistently been to seek to help the new countries consolidate their independence and sovereignty. We are 572 doing that by supporting political and economic reform, both bilaterally and through multilateral organisations and the international financial institutions.
What is abundantly clear not only from your Lordships' contributions this evening but also from every exchange that we have had—which are ever more frequent, not only with the Russian federation but also with other members of the former Soviet Union and with the countries of central and eastern Europe—is that this time of very great change is not static: the pace is actually changing at a different rate in different countries. Their own relationships are extremely fluid. Therefore, in what I say to your Lordships tonight I shall not be dogmatic about what will or will not happen. However, I shall try to respond to some of the points raised and to ensure that our concerns are properly conveyed to the House.
There is no doubt that relations between Russia and many of the former Soviet Union states are close and they continue to be so. The economic and trading links remain important. In some areas, the links are being underpinned by the institutional development of the CIS (the Commonwealth of Independent States). We accept that Russia has important and legitimate political, economic and strategic interests in other parts of the former Soviet Union. But the independence and sovereignty of its neighbours are paramount. Those are the principles that we expect Russia to uphold in all its dealings with its neighbours.
Russia's relations with its former allies in central Europe are now, I believe, based on respect for each other's independence and sovereignty. However, I take to heart the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Weidenfeld, about the distrust which still exists as regards a number of relationships as they change country by country. We strongly support the important principle of independence and sovereignty but we also believe that we should encourage good neighbourly relations.
The central European countries are all seeking closer integration with the West. They turn to us before they think of continuing links with Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union. The West supports this aim and we expect Russia to respect the wishes of those countries in turning to the West. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, in his interesting opening remarks talked about the historical political process. I do not believe that that is yet over because democratic institutions and major economic reforms will not be achieved overnight. It is quite clear that while there has been substantial progress since the disintegration of the old USSR at the end of 1991, there have inevitably been a number of setbacks along the way.
We cannot and should not ignore the emergence of an extreme nationalist party but I urge your Lordships not to over-react. Zhirinovsky did not win the election; in fact only about 50 per cent. of the people voted. His party is not the biggest in the Duma, but in saying that I would not wish your Lordships to think that we are in any way complacent because I believe that the time is right now to reinforce and not to relax our efforts in underpinning the achievements of Russia to date. In that sense continued western support for its reforms is 573 essential. I have no doubt that a stable, democratic Russia is in all our interests but there will be a number of ways of achieving this.
I noted with great care what the noble Lord, Lord Thomson of Monifieth, said about the reading of Zhirinovsky's showing in the polls. Like many others, I believe it was very much a protest vote. Certainly it played on emotions and national pride, but I believe it would be dangerous to draw firm conclusions, because the same view was not taken within the federation as seems to have been taken by many western commentators about that election. Further, things have changed, even since that election. Russia is now going through a great sensing of its own values and strengths. The Duma is finding its feet and it is gradually gearing up to a peaceful existence. It is holding debates and its members are looking forward to new elections in 1995. It believes that its election process has only just begun. Its main business has been the budget where there has been a clear debate between the agriculturalists and the industrialists. The Parliament is also now addressing the all important question of the social safety net. I shall return to economic matters in a moment.
Mr. Chernomyrdin, the Prime Minister, has to conduct a difficult balancing act and that is an area where we should be giving support for the reforms that still continue. I wish to say a few words about the military angle before discussing other matters. It was my noble friend Lord Belhaven and Stenton who said that the Russians should keep their army at home. They are, of course, increasingly repatriating their army from all the satellite countries in which it was placed. However, we must be absolutely clear that Russia has decided that it could not afford to keep its army all over the place. Although there are some tendencies for the Russians to be more active in the south at the present time, in Tajikistan, for example, I believe there is a clear understanding between most of the former Soviet Union countries and Russia that Russia should only maintain a presence in those countries at the latters' invitation. Certainly, Mr. Grachev, the Minister of Defence, seems to be moving in that direction.
There is another aspect in all this that is important and that is the way in which the conventional forces in Europe treaty is playing its role. That is largely an unsung role, but I believe this is an opportune moment to say that in the 16 months to November last year Russia destroyed 799 battle tanks out of a total of 3,692 pieces of equipment reduced. At the end of the reduction phase in November 1995 Russia will have destroyed over 3,000 tanks and over 7,000 armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Certainly the inspection visits that have taken place since the treaty came into force in July 1992 have not shown any evidence of wilful evasion of the obligations. We shall continue to watch that process with the greatest of care.
This is going on at the very time when the Partnership for Peace, endorsed by the NATO Summit last January, aims to develop a practical working relationship between NATO and the individual states of the former Soviet Union and central and eastern Europe, 574 NATO's partners. Its aim is to enlist partners' assistance in peacekeeping operations and to guide their armed forces towards compatibility with those of NATO countries. The individual programmes under the Partnership for Peace could include joint military exercises and planning and training. There is also provision for monitoring progress towards respect for international treaties such as the one I mentioned; the civilian control of the military and the transparency of defence budgeting. Partnership for Peace has been offered on a non-discriminatory basis, as it will be for each partner to determine the level of its involvement. However, that level will be known to all other partners. I believe this is an important part of the developing relationship between the central and eastern European countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia.
The scheme does not entail membership for partners, but it offers a clear perspective on that goal and it allows the active partners to consult NATO in the event of a direct threat to their territorial integrity, political independence or security. General Grachev has said that the Russian Federation intends to sign the Partnership for Peace. We certainly hope that that will happen because the closer the partners work together in the Partnership for Peace, the greater the knowledge and accountability that will be required between partners. I believe that that is highly necessary for the stability of these emerging democracies. For our own part Britain is helping with the resettlement planning for redundant soldiers in the Russian Federation Army and a good deal of help has already been given as regards demobilisation. There was one argument—
§ Lord KennetMy Lords, is there any assumption, whether overt or just assumed, that the joint peacekeeping operations that Partnership for Peace might lead to should invariably be under the United Nations?
§ Baroness Chalker of WallaseyMy Lords, there is no assumption, nor is there any overt requirement, that it should be so but we shall have to see how international peacekeeping develops. I shall discuss the question of Bosnia in just a moment. However, it is clear that there has to be an open relationship in UN peacekeeping, particularly when forces which have not traditionally worked together suddenly start to work together. We are learning all the time, as I saw for myself in Bosnia last week.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, made one comment to which I must respond. He said that there was no obvious purpose for NATO. We have heard that allegation before. From what I have just said, and from what I hear on almost a daily basis, it is clear that there is a very obvious purpose for NATO in the minds of Central and eastern European countries. They are literally queuing up to join NATO because they believe that there is a vital role for NATO. It is a role in which they want to be involved.
When the noble Lord, Lord Weidenfeld, spoke about expansion of NATO I was minded to say to him that that enlargement which is sought by many countries is by no means a straightforward issue. It is highly complex 575 Alliance security guarantees are a serious undertaking. We would have no wish to create new divisions within Europe nor to diminish the effectiveness of the alliance. I believe that NATO will enlarge but that will only be when the time is right. That is why at the NATO Summit in January leaders stated clearly that they welcomed and expected enlargement but did not give any timetable.
We know that the Poles are extremely keen to join NATO. As my noble friend Lord Belhaven and Stenton said, any link between the Poles and NATO should not give rise to a confrontational relationship between the applicant nation and the Russian Federation. My noble friend will understand from what I said earlier about the Russian Federation wanting to join the Partnership for Peace that we do not believe on the present showing that that is likely to be a problem.
The central aspect which the central and eastern European nations are seeking is conflict prevention and peacekeeping. In that regard they see NATO as the main provider rather than looking to the United Nations as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, implied just now.
Perhaps I may say a word about the CSCE. When the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kosyrev, spoke recently about his proposals for a European security architecture he envisaged a co-ordinating role for the CSCE as the overarching regional political forum. That proposal is based on the Russian mistrust of NATO. However, on the current showing we do not believe that the Kosyrev proposals are likely to be taken up. We believe that the CSCE has an important role to play, but we retain our doubts about the possibility that it might be a co-ordinator of other security organisations. I know that many who are active within the CSCE framework do not see CSCE as a co-ordinator of others.
We have heard much tonight about the relationship between Russia and her neighbours. I believe that there will continue to be difficult discussions with most of them, but we shall always urge all sides to deal with those difficulties constructively and flexibly. That is why we look at the relationship between Russia and the Ukraine, which has been exceedingly strained at times over the past three years, in order to see where we can be of assistance. They have an agreement on nuclear weapons and Russia's role in helping to implement that agreement. We hope that that will be the basis of a more co-operative relationship. But that agreement will only be of real value when we see them working together to reduce their nuclear weapons. When and how we can help them is a matter which is constantly being considered by mernbers of NATO. That is an area in which NATO countries will have a major role to play.
We have heard a great deal tonight about the financial needs of Russia in particular, but those needs extend well beyond the Russian Federation. We have been adamant in the European Union that we should all be outward looking to the needs of the countries of the former Soviet Union and the central and eastern European countries. The European political and economic order is aimed at establishing stability and prosperity from the Atlantic to the Urals. Much of the work on the developing relations between the European Union and the countries to the East has involved frank 576 political dialogue and helping, through various means, to underpin the development of liberal trading relations. Certainly the partnership and co-operation agreement which is close to completion with the Ukraine gives a good indication of how that is done. The negotiation of an agreement between the European Union and Russia is also well advanced, giving a good indication of how the development of relations can be carried through. However, that can only be achieved on a case-by-case basis, and I believe that it will be some time before there is formal agreement between the European Union and all the countries we are discussing tonight,
So far as concerns the position of the United Kingdom—about which the noble Lord, Lord Clinton—Davis, asked a number of questions—we have pledged well over 1.8 billion dollars for support for Russia, both bilaterally and multilaterally. The G7 programme of phased support, linked to progress on reform, is worth over 46 billion dollars to Russia. Our Know-How funds, which the noble Lord did not seem to realise were so much valued in Russia, were doubled last year to £120 million and the annual rate of disbursement is rapidly increasing. By the end of the current financial year in a couple of weeks' time some £30 million will have been, spent on more than 100 projects. There are many more in the pipeline.
I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, that the Know-How fund is not only highly regarded by British industry, it is said time and time again by the recipients to be the most effective means of helping them because it is flexible. We channel aid to the institutions, the cities and the regions as they are prepared to change, and we do not go through central government. Therefore, the danger which my noble friend Lord Belhaven and Stenton mentioned of it going to a bank somewhere does not exist with the help that we give through the Know-How fund.
§ Lord Clinton-DavisMy Lords, I do not question its value. I suggested that it seemed to ignore or pay insufficient attention to the environmental component. That was my point.
§ Baroness Chalker of WallaseyMy Lords, if I misunderstood the noble Lord, I apologise. Indeed, we have taken account of the needs of the environment. However, one has to have the assistance and willingness of the Russians to implement some of the environmental changes. They say that they recognise the problems, but recognising the problems is only the first step. There has to be a willingness to act—and some of the central and eastern European countries have accepted help and support from us in that very field of nuclear safety. We have spent more than £3 million in the past few years on assistance in relation to reactor safety and nuclear fuel. We take nuclear safety extremely seriously. Our bilateral help, which is mainly technical co-operation, is contributing greatly to improved nuclear safety.
As regards the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's nuclear safety account, we have contributed more than £8.25 million. We work through the Atomic Energy Authority in trying to improve many of those aspects of nuclear safety which are so essential.
577 The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, also asked me about the report of the IMF on its most recent visit to Moscow. I do not have the detailed report to hand but conditionality on macro-economic support is important as a means of influencing the governments' decisions. I believe that the targets for deficit and inflation in the draft budget would in principle be acceptable to the international financial institutions. However, it is not yet clear how the Russian Parliament will react to the budget because that budget would impose monetary discipline at the expense of larger scale support for agriculture and industry. I was making that point earlier when speaking about the Duma.
We certainly have a critical role to play, both bilaterally and through the European Union, in assisting the former Soviet Union. TACIS rather than PHARE —the programme for the central and east European countries—is a wide-ranging programme. It is targeted on many different sectors such as public sector training and agriculture. There has been some impatience—indeed, I have expressed it myself—at the slow rate of disbursement of the TACIS fund, but we are working for improvements in its management. I shall discuss it later this week in Brussels.
TACIS is operational in all former Soviet Union countries, and not just Russia. Above all, what we have sought to do with British aid to the former Soviet Union and the central and eastern European countries is to help countries to help themselves. The Know-How funds are particularly targeted to do that and not to allow spending to go towards armaments. If my noble friend Lord Belhaven and Stenton would like it, I shall give him some good examples of the Know-How fund by letter, so as not to detain your Lordships too long tonight.
We are seeking to help Russia, the 11 CIS countries 578 and all the central and eastern European countries, in my noble friend's words, by helping them to help themselves. There is no doubt in my mind that in the past four years they have come an extremely long way. There is no single prescription for them. We do not know, for example, whether the CIS will become a genuine Commonwealth of Independent States or remain a loose economic alliance between some or all of them. Some see benefits in close co-operation. Russia is bound to dominate by virtue of her economic power and the sheer size of the country. But we look to Russia to conduct her relations responsibly because that is essential for stability and prosperity in the region as a whole.
By contrast, the situation in central and eastern Europe has normalised to a great degree. Eventual membership of western institutions is very much on their agenda. For its part, the West needs to build a relationship with Russia, such as the one already established with the Czech Republic. But one thing we must never do is to allow Russia to have a veto over what happens in central Europe. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Weidenfeld, that we shall not allow that to happen. We want a democratic and prosperous Russia, at peace with herself and her neighbours. We shall do all we can to support that goal and ultimately that is the only guarantee of long-term regional stability and security for all Russia's neighbours and allies.
I thank all of your Lordships who have spoken in the debate. We have much work to do to help Russia and the former Soviet Union and the central European countries forward. Noble Lords can be assured that Britain will do at least her part in that and will encourage others to do likewise.
§ House adjourned at fourteen minutes past eight o'clock.