HL Deb 15 November 1976 vol 377 cc1069-77

11 Clause 11, page 8, after "applies" insert "or any person concerned with the affairs of such an organisation,"

12 Clause 11, page 8, line 9, after "applies" insert "or any person concerned with the affairs of such an organisation,"

The Commons disagreed to these Amendments for the following Reason,"

13 Because the Commons do not consider it appropriate that Clause 11 should cover persons who are not acting as agents with the authority of the organisations to which the Clause applies.

Baroness SEEAR

My Lords, I beg to move, that this House doth insist on their Amendments Nos. 11 and 12 to which the Commons have disagreed. I have of course looked very carefully at the arguments put forward in another place by the Minister who led in discussing this Amendment. He made a number of points as to why these Amendments of the Lords should be rejected. In the first place, he said that these Amendments were unnecessary. The whole purpose of these two Amendments—because we are taking the two Amendments together—is to put personal responsibility on individuals concerned with organisations, and not merely on the organisations themselves. This is the gravamen of the Amendments. Of course, the persons referred to in this particular clause are the shop stewards in a trade union organisation.

So far from being unnecessary, I would argue that the shop steward is in fact the key figure in race relations at factory floor level. He is able to make or to break so far as good relations on the factory floor are concerned—and, of course, in matters of employment within a place of work it is the factory floor which really matters. I know, and many of your Lordships know, that there are many shop stewards up and down the country who are 100 per cent. on the side of good relations and who are doing all they possibly can to see that the spirit of the legislation, as well as the letter, is implemented. But, of course, among shop stewards, as among all other human beings, there are some who have contrary views; and this is well known inside industry and inside the trade union movement itself. It is because the shop steward is so important, it is because his power and his influence is so great, that it is far from unnecessary that these Amendments that your Lordships put in should be retained.

In another place it was also said by the Minister that, if a member of a racial minority felt that he was being unfairly treated by the person in the organisation, the thing to do was to take his case to the trade union, because the trade union, of course, will have legal responsibility under this legislation. As an argument in the Palace of Westminster this may sound very convincing, but let us look at the reality of what is likely to happen. Suppose an individual Pakistani or Wes Indian, or some person not very conversant with the English language, has a strong suspicion that he is not being adequately treated, and that that is so for racial reasons, by the shop steward. Is it really likely that in most cases that individual, by definition not supported by his shop steward, will make his way to the trade union, to the branch, to the district organiser, and will channel his own case all by himself and take it up with the trade union? What could be more unreal? Yet that is the argument which is used. We are urging that responsibility should not be put on the person in the place of work, the person who is there in front of the individual concerned, who is the person who in his eyes is in fact the trade union—because that is what the shop steward is to the great mass of ordinary people on the shop floor—to proceed on his own to get the trade union to act for him. It is quite unnecessary, because you can rely on the trade union doing it. It was said in another place, absolutely rightly, that the trade union movement as a whole is entirely in favour of good race relations and entirely opposed to discrimination. I believe that. I believe Mr. Len Murray and those who work with him when they say that they will do all in their power to see that on the factory floor race relations are handled on a basis of complete equity. But we know from experience in many other fields that in fact it is extremely difficult for the trade union movement to reach down to the factory floor—that was the whole burden of the Donovan Report—to see that the policies put forward on the factory floor and supported in all sincerity at higher levels are in fact implemented. In many cases they will be, but in the minority of cases they will not be. It is in those minority of cases where it is so very important to pin the responsibility on the person who is actually inside the factory.

Among the reasons put forward in another place, it was said that if responsibility was put on to the shop steward—and here I quote from the Minister in another place, which I believe is permissible: the shop steward might be subjected to close and extensive examination of his actions and motives. But that is precisely what everybody else is to be exposed to as a result of this legislation, and quite rightly. If we are going to have the Race Relations Act and to use this means—and I support it with modifications—then it is inevitable that all persons in a position to be responsible for race relations legislation will be exposed before an industrial tribunal to: … a close and extensive examination of his actions and motives. If everybody else, if the publican in the pub, if the person letting lodgings and if the supervisor, why not the shop steward?

It is not even that there is no good justification in ethics for making this exemption. It does not even make sense, because no one is going to be able to shield him from that examination of his actions and motives. If the case is taken up by the trade union organisation—and this is what has been recommended—and if the trade union is taken to the industrial tribunal, then the actions and motives of the shop steward will have to be examined. It will be the only way in which the industrial tribunal can reach a conclusion as to whether or not justice has been done inside the plant. Ultimately, if an appeal is made to a court of law, the same thing must inevitably happen.

As no doubt everybody in your Lord ships' House will know, this clause existed in the 1968 Act and, in theory (though not in practice for many reasons) it was said during the discussion in another place that it made such a great difference that the case would go to a conciliation committee. But then it was perfectly possible that from such a committee it would go to a court of law and so examination of motives and actions would have taken place in that court of law in exactly the same way; so there is absolutely nothing new about this. It is further said—and here again I quote from the speech in another place: If it so happened that a shop steward was determined to disregard the tribunal decision, there could be serious industrial relations problems stemming from that action. What are we doing? We are passing legislation, apparently, which, because it may be difficult, inconvenient and embarrassing to implement, we then proceed, in the very moment of passing the legislation, to make special exemptions. What sort of legislation is it which you have to pass and then say that because it is inconvenient you are going to exempt certain categories of people from the operation of the legislation. The principle being undermined here is one of a very high order—of the same order, indeed, as that which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, was defending in another context.

These two Amendments in the Bill have been pressed very strongly by persons outside your Lordships' House and they have great experience in race relations. It is well known that no less a person than Sir Geoffrey Wilson of the Race Relations Board was extremely anxious to see this clause—which, I repeat, was in the 1968 Act—carried forward into this legislation. Inside the trade union movement, I know, there are supporters for having this clause incorporated. I therefore beg to move that this Amendment from the Commons be rejected and that we insist upon our original Amendments.

Moved, That this House doth insist on Amendments Nos. 11 and 12 to which the Commons have disagreed for the Reason numbered 13.—(Baroness Seear.)

Lord MONSON

My Lords, if I do not follow the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, into the Division Lobby on this matter I assure her that it is not by reason of any sour grapes because of the fact that the Liberals, with one exception, did not support the Amendment I moved on Report, but because I genuinely and sincerely cannot make up my mind as to the merits of her Amendment. I think the arguments for and against are very finely balanced; but I am certain that the noble Baroness has every constitutional right to divide the House on this if she so wishes. I believe that the majority in another place against this Amendment was only 26, which was very much less than the majority against the preceding Amendments we have been talking about.

Having said that, I would ask the Liberal Benches to consider one thing. Would it not be slightly tactless if the only Amendment insisted upon by your Lordships tonight was seen to be one which imposed obligations upon shop stewards? If the Liberals succeed in carrying this Amendment, might I urge them to support also one liberalising Amendment—preferably No. 28—which, as your Lordships will know, was supported by over 71 per cent. of Liberals in another place on 27th October.

Lord HACKING

My Lords, like many noble Lords in this House, I have been enormously impressed by the argument put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, at the beginning of the consideration of these Amendments. I recognise that there is a grave danger that this House could be misrepresented and misunderstood, but I would submit to your Lordships that it is even more important for each individual Member of this House to do what he believes to be right. For that reason, I shall be supporting the noble Baroness.

Lord JACQUES

My Lords, I rise to oppose this Motion. The Amendments are worded similarly, but the reasons for opposing them are quite different. As the noble Baroness foresaw, we regard the first Amendment as unnecessary. The only people who can discriminate in regard to membership of a trade union are those who have the authority to receive applications and to decide whether or not the person who applies can or cannot be a member. If the shop steward has that authority, both he and the trade union are liable if there is discrimination. But if the shop steward does not have that authority, then he cannot discriminate. He cannot discriminate over something for which he has no authority. Those are the reasons why we regard the first Amendment as unnecessary.

I come now to the second and more important Amendment. We oppose this because we believe that, on balance, it would do more harm than good. This Bill is different from the 1968 Act, which allowed only the Race Relations Board to make the investigations and to pursue proceedings. But this Bill is quite different, and allows the individual worker to take action against another worker. Consequently, we believe that this Amendment could do more harm than good. It could result in the position where worker is versus worker before the industrial tribunal. That would not do good to race relations or to industrial relations in a factory.

The trade union movement is going along with the spirit of this Bill. The noble Baroness will be aware of the recent campaign to which the TUC was a party. It has set up special committees—the Equal Rights Committee and the Race Relations Advisory Committee—and the Government have asked it what further steps they might take to eliminate all forms of discrimination on the workers' side of industry, and the Council of the TUC is at present considering that. We appreciate the intentions of the noble Baroness, but we are convinced from past experience that this would do more harm than good to race relations and industrial relations, and I ask her not to run the risk of losing this Bill for the sake of these Amendments.

Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE

My Lords, I must say that that is a very odd argument. I have been arguing from the start that the provisions of this Bill will do more harm than good to race relations, and I am bound to say I have argued in certain contexts that it will do more harm than good to industrial relations, too. The funny thing is that, according to the Government, it never happens to he true unless you try to touch a shop steward. Then it becomes apparent that what I have been saying all along is true, but only in relation to the trade unions and the shop stewards, because they can be trusted never to do anything wrong. If we believe that, we can believe anything.

But I would make one or two comments of my own, which are rather different from those of the noble Lord, Lord Jacques. Incidentally, I rather hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, was not suggesting that any Member of this House, whether on this side or the other, is not doing what, individually, he believes to be right in this context. Obviously, every Peer acts according to his own conscience even when he is whipped, unlike Members of another place who sometimes, as we have now learned, act contrary to their conscience when they are being whipped, except when one or two of them actually take the bit between their teeth.

However, there are other arguments which can be presented. To begin with, I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Monson, that if I was going to fight on one issue in this Bill, I would fight on the old

Clause 70, and not on this one, for the reason that he gave and also because Clause 70 is a much worse provision than the provision which the noble Baroness wants to cure by her insistence on this Amendment. The second point is that I am not quite sure, in spite of what the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, said, that the Amendment affects a very important purpose. I have been looking at it quite a lot since I supported it—and I think rightly supported it—the first time around. If you look at Part IV of the Bill, I think you are bound to come to the concluson that if a shop steward, whether with or without the authority of a trade union behind him, instructs anybody—and I suppose that that includes a union, as well as an employer or a fellow worker—to do any act which is unlawful by virtue of Parts II or III, or induces or attempts to induce anybody to do an act which is unlawful by virtue of Parts II or III, or acts as an agent for another person with authority, express or implied, to do an act which is unlawful by this Bill, then he is liable himself.

I am not at all clear whether there is, in fact, an area of country where the noble Baroness, in either part of her Amendment, either that which the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, says is unnecessary, or that which he says is deleterious, will make a great deal of difference. At the end of the day I am not, for technical reasons, particularly keen on fighting this one. If I was going to fight any, I would fight Clause 70, which I think is fundamental, and if I were going to fight according to what would be my conscience if there were not constitutional difficulties, I would fight every one. But I cannot see myself selecting this one as the battle which I would choose to wage, and I think we should be misunderstood if we did.

7.7 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Motion shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 14; Not-Contents, 50.

CONTENTS
Banks, L. Byers, L. Rankeillour, L.
Barrington, V. Clifford of Chudleigh, L. Seear, B. [Teller.]
Beaumont of Whitley, L.[Teller.] Gladwyn, L. Swaythling, L.
Grey, E. Wade, L.
Bledisloe, V. Hacking, L. Wigoder, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Bernstein, L. Henderson, L. Oram, L.
Birk, B. Houghton of Sowerby, L. Pannell, L.
Blyton, L. Jacques, L. Parry, L.
Brimelow, L. Janner, L. Peart, L. (L. Privy Seal)
Brockway, L. Kaldor, L. Peddie, L.
Champion, L. Lee of Newton, L. Phillips, B.
Collison, L. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.[Teller.] Pitt of Hampstead, L.
Darwen, L. Popplewell, L.
Davies of Leek, L. Lloyd of Hampstead, L. Rhodes, L.
Davies of Penrhys, L. Longford, E. Slater, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. Lovell-Davis, L. Stedman, B.
Gordon-Walker, L. McCarthy, L. Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
Goronwy-Roberts, L. McCluskey, L. Stone, L.
Hale, L. Maelor, L. Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Hanworth, V. Milner of Leeds, L. Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Harris of Greenwich, L. Morris, L. Wells-Pestell, L.
Hayter, L. Northfield, L. Winterbottom, L.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

7.15 p.m.