NORTHERN IRELAND SECURITY

HL Deb 25 September 1975 vol 364 cc591-630

9.6 p.m.

Viscount BROOKEBOROUGH rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a Statement on their secturity policy in Northern Ireland. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I beg to move the Unstarred Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. I must first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, for the inconvenience which I inadvertently caused him, and also to my noble friend Lord Belstead. Both of them know that the choosing of this particular day to have this debate was not of my making. I apologise to the House as a whole for taking up time when the House is working overtime on important business, and when I feel the day-to-day business was not necessarily an affair of this House. But in spite of all that, the situation in Northern Ireland is so serious with regard to the future of the United Kingdom as a whole that it is appropriate that we should discuss it tonight.

My Lords, I say at the outset that it must be very difficult indeed for anyone who is not in daily contact with the situation in Northern Ireland, in daily touch with the agony that the whole population of Northern Ireland is going through, to realise just exactly how much things have changed. In the last 12 months there has been a dramatic change, because for the very first time in the whole of this Emergency it is now quite literally true to say that there is a total and absolute lack of confidence in the reliability of statements emanating from the Government. This is now shared, and has been freely expressed, by leaders of every single representative Party in Northern Ireland, whether they are Roman Catholic or Protestant, whether they are hard line or soft line. We are all demanding, every one, strong and equal security throughout the whole Province. I do not believe that the Government have realised—certainly they have not given any indication of having realised—that there is total unanimity among the democratically elected people in Northern Ireland in asking for a firm law and order policy throughout the whole Province applying to everybody. This is an oppor- tunity which has not been given to any Government since the Emergency started, and in my view the Government are missing an opportunity. It is for that reason that I have raised this matter now.

I have to say, in criticism of people in the Northern Ireland Government—and the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, will not like me paying him a compliment and then criticising the rest—that they, the Government operating from Stormont Castle, get into an enclave surrounded by barbed wire and troops from which they will not get out. To the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, that does not apply. Nobody has gone about more in Northern Ireland and made more personal friends than the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson. I know I am paying him an embarrassing compliment, but it is totally genuine; it is felt by many people, and especially by the farming community throughout Northern Ireland. I am afraid that this does not apply to his colleagues. It is a sad thing. It is not because they would not be liked and would not be welcomed if they in fact broke out of the barbed wire.

I am not arguing tonight as to whether or not my comment about the lack of belief in the content of Government statements is true. I am merely recording it as being a terrible and dangerous fact with which the Government simply must deal. To me it is a very painful fact, because the whole of my life has been built up on the ideal of the union of the United Kingdom, and nobody has fought harder for it, though there may be many people who have fought as hard as I have. Added to this is the next question. Throughout Northern Ireland there is a lack of confidence which is quite simply based on the questioning of the existence of the will to win. Whether it be the IRA, who have dealt with the so-called ceasefire, or whether it be us normal citizens in Northern Ireland, we really are worried about whether democracy, in the face of an attack by a determined terrorist organisation such as the IRA, has got the will to beat the terrorist. It is these two elements to which I should like to direct your Lordships' attention tonight.

To take the first, which concerns the credibility of the Government's utterances, it really surrounds, unfortunately, the contacts with the IRA in the so-called truce. I am absolutely certain, in what I believe is the correct word, that in juristic terms there is between Her Majesty's Government and the IRA no agreement, for indeed how could a binding agreement exist between what is an illegal and criminal organisation and Her Majesty's Government? But, of course, the problem is that under a revolutionary attack the population is not juristic in its judgment. The Government have declared their intention to react to the IRA, and they have in fact accepted that they will take on a low profile, order their forces to take on a low profile over security, provided that the IRA reduces its level of violence.

One might almost say that we are entering a new era of criminal law, in that some bonus exists if you do not commit too many murders. The Government fully admit that they have explained to the IRA British policy with regard to that; that is all absolutely agreed. The incident centres have been set up to provide regular channels of communication. But these incident centres—and I do not think the importance of them as centres should be exaggerated—have become the symbol of authority within the Roman Catholic controlled areas, because they provide an access to power and to Government over a wide range of human life which is denied to the elected representatives. I think that the noble Lord mouthed the word which I thought I read, but he cannot deny that my right honourable friend Mr. Whitelaw's ceasefire broke down over a matter of housing. He cannot deny that this access to Government is in fact a symbol of authority. Whether or not from his point of view, or the Government's point of view, it provide nothing, is irrelevant, because to the Roman Catholic people in that area it does, and the SDLP, who are the elected members, are quite satisfied that their position is being undermined.

I do not know the whole truth about the document found with O'Connell or, indeed, whether there was a document found with O'Connell, but I think that everybody agrees that there are various documents that have been flying around. I and the whole of the Ulster people who I know (I do not presume to know the whole lot, but I know all of the elected members) believe that it is a genuine version of the contents, or we can call it an agenda, of the various conversations or meetings which have gone on between Her Majesty's Government—that is to say, the civil servants who, after all, are conducting these with the authority, or the power of attorney, of Her Majesty's Ministers—and Sinn Fein. I gather that they have said today that it was direct with the Army Council, but I do not give credence to them because I have always thought that it was the men of violence anyway.

I believe also that in Stormont Castle there is a similar document in the same order, recording in exactly the same way the items which were discussed between the civil servants and the IRA. Our experience in Northern Ireland, having been under revolution for so many years, is that this is so. If the civil servants who are negotiating with the IRA, say to the IRA, "If you do this, we will do that" and if that occurs, then we in the North of Ireland, having seen and heard of these documents, feel that the resulting understanding is negotiation. No matter how much the Government may deny it, they constitute the equivalent of negotiations, agreements, or what have you. Quite honestly, to say anything else is nothing but sheer hypocrisy, and I think that the position should be cleared. Whether or not the noble Lord agrees with me, I am absolutely certain that I am speaking not for 99 per cent. but for 100 per cent. of the people of Northern Ireland. because the IRA believe that the denials of a negotiation are a hypocrisy because they believe that negotiations have existed. One of the first things we must do is to stop the doubletalk and the apologia.

Any doubts we might have had on the reality of these understandings has been removed by our actual experience on the ground. May I look for a moment at the provisions within that particular document? The first referred to the withdrawal of troops to barracks and the reduction of troop levels. The Government would be quite right to explain—and the Government have never denied it —that this is what they did. They explained that if the level of violence goes down, the number of troops will go down. That is obvious and there is no distagreement on that. Secondly, there was the end of widespread arrest, screening, and immunity of people to arrest. Nobody would deny that the screening stopped and that the widespread arrests stopped.

For the immunity of certain people, the classic case is that of Twomey. In case your Lordships forget, intelligence reports show that for some time he was moving about freely and observed by the troops. It is well known that Twomey is the top IRA man still at large, and he was on the wanted list until after the ceasefire. I find it difficult to understand exactly why, if it was not related to the ceasefire, he suddenly came off the wanted list. The Secretary of State has said that anybody who can be prosecuted, will be prosecuted. I should like to ask the Government whether we are to assume that we cannot attach a prosecution to Twomey for being a member of the IRA. The noble Lord will remember that when we passed the Emergency Provisions Act I queried whether, if we passed all these things, the Government would use their powers. What is the point of passing powers if they are not used?

Even if they were not going to use their power, are the authorities not aware that Twomey is a violent escaped criminal, a convict, who escaped from Portlaoise, from the Irish Republic? Would it not have ben a courtesy, would it not have been an encouragement, to the Dublin Government to have arrested him and to have encouraged them to ask for the extradition of this man? I have criticised the Dublin Government on many occasions for their failure to extradite known criminals—and there are plenty of them at the moment in the South of Ireland—to our jurisdiction that they may be tried to meet justice.

I contrast this treatment with what happened to O'Docherty yesterday, when he was charged in Northern Ireland and then the Director of Public Prosecutions withdrew all evidence and he was taken to London and arraigned before the court here. I have no doubt about the justice of this, but to my mind the whole of the British Isles, the civilised world, should deal with people on an equal basis. Within the British Isles we should surely all co-operate in this particular way and I feel that the question of Twomey weakens our case in dealing with the Dublin Government. My contention is that nearly all points of that document, that so-called agreement, have been met and I say quite clearly that the IRA can never be negotiated with because they have one point on which they have never negotiated and which they have maintained throughout the campaign. They wish Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland. That is something on which they will not negotiate and I believe that they entered into this ceasefire because the British Government—I should say those who were negotiating or who had contact; I must be careful because the noble Lord will deny the word "negotiation"—or those who spoke for the British Government blurred the issue and denied that it was their absolute determination to maintain union within the United Kingdom as expressed under the Border Poll, which in my view it was their duty so to do.

In dealing with the question of the will to win I shall confine my remarks to the area of South Armagh because while the principle of what I am about to say applies to larger areas of Northern Ireland, one can only deal in this debate with a certain amount, and I see from the clock that I have already been speaking for 14 minutes. When I last spoke about these matters, about the subject of South Armagh, in August, the hour was late and the noble Lord did not appear to be paying very much attention to what I was saying, but I felt then that the situation within South Armagh was developing to be very dangerous. I said then that the only military presence was in the form of posts which were supplied by helicopter. The Forces were ordered to cease vehicular patrolling—that is, actual presence on the ground—in any area of South Armagh, south of Gridline 26, and if noble Lords look on the map they will see that that means that quite a large area of South Armagh became unavailable to ordinary Regular Army operations. That does not mean that the Army could not get in there, and the noble Lord and all his Ministers can always say that there is no part of Northern Ireland that is not available to the Forces.

But the facts of the matter are that law and order can be properly enforced only by the police, and if the Army is not regularly patrolling in that area of Armagh then the police cannot go in and enforce law and order. The effect of this has really been to nullify one of the factors which the Secretary of State and his Ministers have kept on saying; they keep on saying in a way that is like personal critcism of those who were involved in the original internment that the way to deal with this particular problem is through the courts. I was there, in South Armagh, on Tuesday and I assure your Lordships that there are, or were, no police in that area and that there was a whole range of population who used to co-operate—and they are not necessarily Unionists; in fact they are the opposite—with the forces of law and order. The troops stopped patrolling there and these people have been left bare to the extortion and the rule of the IRA. They have been abandoned.

I shall give two instances of what has happened, one of which I am sure the noble Lord will know a great deal about because it is in his Department. Sometime during the summer there was afire in the forestry area. It raged for two days. The forestry service fought the fire and they were protected by armed men. Those armed men were IRA. That is the extent of the difference in what has happened during the last 12 months. Secondly, I should like to refer to the tragic case of Mr. Meaklim, who was a small grocer who had a grocer's van—a mobile shop—and who operated throughout the whole of that area. He was kidnapped and for two days he was tortured. I am told that the tortures were absolutely horrific. The locals asked for a rescue operation to be mounted. It was not mounted because the low profile meant that to mount a rescue operation would be to put the ceasefire at risk. I ask my noble friends in the Conservative Party—my own Party—is that bipartisan policy? I do not think so.

The Government appear to me to welcome the change to sectarian violence as opposed to the violence against the forces of law and order, hut, to me, this is similar to what would have happened in wartime if the Admiralty had ordered naval escort vessels away from a convoy and had claimed that casualties to the Navy had been much reduced while the convoy was sunk. Further to that and, in my view, much worse, I believe that this is recognising and aiding the IRA to a major victory. The first aim of a terrorist—and I have said this many times—is to make life unbearable so that retaliation occurs and so that one section of the population takes action against the other. In this case it is done so that the IRA can go back to claiming that they are the protectors of the Roman Catholic community and vice versa. In the other place the Prime Minister revealed this matter when he revealed the plans found in the Malone Road.

I have gone on—as I know the noble Lord will agree—too long already, but I must draw your Lordships' attention to the political effect of this because he has told me many times that politics and security are inextricably mixed and I agree with him. However, what has been happening since December is that the Government have demonstrated that the way to the top is to be a paramilitary. The men of violence—I am not referring only to the IRA—have been rejected time and again by the electorate, yet the IRA have access to the Government and to power through the incident centres and, as the noble Lord will know, the paramilitaries on the Protestant side have had access to Ministers. If I mention one thing about the inconsistency of the whole matter, I would say this: my friend Mrs. Dickson, who has been a local councillor for many years and who is an elected Member of the Convention, was asked by a tenants' association to see a Minister and when that Minister saw that she was on the list to see him he said that the deputation could not be seen because she was a Member of the Convention.

So far as the paramilitary is concerned, there is an elected Member called Mr. Glen Barr. He was one of a deputation to see the noble Lord's colleague. When the Minister saw that Mr. Glen Barr was a member of the deputation he said: "I cannot see him". So Mr. Glen Barr said: "But I am coming to see you as a paramilitary"; so he was seen by that Minister. I am sure that your Lordships will agree that this is the elevation of the men of violence and the degradation of those who have gone to the polls in the exercise of democracy.

The noble Lord will know that his Secretary of State has lectured to us, as elected Members of the Convention, that we were not elected to govern. I agree with that. It is totally correct, and it could be stood over if it were not for the fact—of which I have told your Lordships—that the men of violence have, in fact, affected Government in many, many ways, because the first duty of Government is to provide law and order. They have altered the course of law and order, although we who were elected are not given access to Ministers.

I am afraid that I feel that the past actions of the Government and the actions which the Government took prior to the withdrawal from Aden are so similar that there is no coincidence. Unless the Government take strong action now to bolster democracy and to support those who are elected in the future, the outlook for the Province of Northern Ireland and the future for the United Kingdom—and I believe in the unity of the United Kingdom—is not very good. I am sure that nobody in Northern Ireland will deny the Government total support in an evenhanded security policy throughout the whole country.

But at the same time it must be remembered—and it is no use anybody denying it here because I know that the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, and my noble friend Lord Moyola will support me—that there is not a sinner in Northern Ireland (and we are all sinners) who does not agree that there is no confidence at present in what occurs in speeches and statements from the Government of Northern Ireland, and there is not confidence that the Government have the will to win. We must build up democracy, demonstrate our will to win and, for goodness sake, stop being hypocritical. I await the reply from the noble Lord.

9.33 p.m.

Lord BROCKWAY

My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, will not expect me to agree with much of what he said. Nevertheless, I welcome the fact that he has delivered his speech tonight. I welcome it because if we are to approach any contribution to a solution in Northern Ireland we must understand the point of view of the two communities. The noble Viscount has spoken for the majority community. We must seek to understand it. He has spoken with intense sincerity, and his attitude, and the attitude of those for whom he speaks, must be appreciated if we are to approach any solution in Northern Ireland. My only regret is that there is not someone in your Lordships' House who can speak for the minority community and for the SDLP, because we must understand the attitude of the minority as well as the attitude of the majority and seek some conciliation between them.

The tragedy and the complexity of the problem in Northern Ireland is such that none of us today can speak with dogmatism about how we should proceed. All we can do is to make suggestions—but tentatively, with reservations because of having no solution. It would be a very bold and arrogant man who today said that he could find any solution to this problem. I want to say at once that I do not think there is any Member of the Government for whom I have more sympathy than Mr. Merlyn Rees. He has difficulties which are inestimable, and if any of us are to speak on this problem it must be to try to contribute some suggestions for consideration even though they may not be finally acceptable.

I want to endorse the view which Mr. Merlyn Rees has so often expressed, that the solution to this problem must be found by the people in Northern Ireland itself. It was for that reason that I welcomed the suggestion of the constitutional Convention. By accident I was the first in both Houses of Parliament to propose the idea that a Convention of this character should be established. I admit that as it proceeded I became fearful as to whether it would make a recommendation which would be a contribution to the solution of the problems of Ireland, because now we have the confrontation of the Loyalist majority who say, "No power-sharing in the Cabinet", and of the SDLP minority who are insisting upon it.

I regret very much that in the final report from the Loyalist majority the paragraph has been deleted which suggested that in an emergency situation there should be a Coalition Government. I pay tribute to Mr. Craig in his advocacy of that proposal. But in this situation, when the Loyalist majority is saying, "No power-sharing", and the SDLP is saying, "We are not prepared to accept any proposal which keeps us out from the Cabinet", I want to urge that we should still be seeking some proposals for an agreement between the two sides before the situation reaches a point of emergency where there will be no reconciliation.

I am not asking Her Majesty's Government to accept tonight a proposal which I am now making after some discussion with others, which I hope may be a ground for an agreement between the Loyalist majority and the minority in the Convention. It is this: that while the Cabinet in Northern Ireland should be composed of Members of the majority Party, there should be attached to it an authoritative Commission, with a status greater than Departmental committees, with the duty of establishing security and containing violence and that this Commission should be representative of both the Loyalist Party and the SDLP for the period of the emergency.

My Lords, I do not ask for an acceptance of this proposal tonight. I do ask the Government to consider whether on these lines, even at this late moment, there might not be a basis of agreement between the Loyalist majority and the SDLP minority. This proposal would meet the Loyalist demand for a Cabinet composed only of Loyalist Members; but it would give the SDLP the effective coalition for dealing with the confrontation between tilt two communities and its terrible consequences. I ask the Government to look quite seriously at this proposal which might possibly bring agreement.

My Lords, having said that one recognises that power-sharing in the effective control of Northern Ireland is desirable now, desirable particularly during the period of negotiation, power-sharing should not be regarded as a permanent solution. In this country we reject Coalition Governments and similarly in Northern Ireland Coalition Governments will be no solution of its problems. Underlying the conflict between the two communities there are social and economic conditions and discrimination which contribute to that conflict. It is difficult to conceive of any power-sharing by Loyalist Members—the leaders of whom, though not the democratic members of the Workers' Council, represent big business interests—with the SDLP which has many sincere Socialists resulting in a long-term agreement about the solution of its social and economic problems. Therefore while we may look forward to power-sharing in one form or another in the Cabinet—or in effective commissions which control the problems of security and containing of violence—as desirable, power-sharing is not the permanent solution to the problems of Northern Ireland.

My Lords, for 50 years the Government at Stormont suppressed the minority community and practised in its administration discrimination against the minority. What is supremely required today is, whatever Government are in power, that there should be basic civil rights without discrimination. I have twice introduced in this House a Bill of civil rights for Northern Ireland. I suggest that the immediate necessity in Northern Ireland is a charter of civil rights with statutory powers which will secure for the Catholic minority the rights against any discrimination. Much has been done already in housing; little has been done in employment. But if in Northern Ireland there could be a basis of civil rights for all without discrimination, then whatever Government were in power, there would be a feeling among the minority community that their rights had been established.

Such a Bill of civil rights in Northern Ireland would demand a human rights commission, to which appeals could be made if that charter was disobeyed. We have a human rights commission in Europe. Its inadequacy is the long time before any decisions are reached. But I urge very strongly that the basis, whatever Government are in power in Northern Ireland, should be a charter of that kind, where reasonably rapid decisions could be made when any appeal was put forward against its denial. That is the basis of ultimate Government in Northern Ireland.

I should like to see the issue of partition in Northern Ireland put on one side. It is now agreed that the question of any agreement of Northern Ireland to unite with Southern Ireland should be a matter of the consent of the majority of its people. If that is true, then should not the period meanwhile be used by the coming together of the Catholics and Protestants to concentrate on the problems of Northern Ireland itself—the problems of unemployment, the problems of housing, the problems of the poverty of its people? There could be unity between the workers in the Protestant and Catholic community in uniting for their common aims against their social and economic injustices. That example of Catholic and Protestant unity in dealing with the problems of Northern Ireland itself, and for a time forgetting the issues of the partition, would be the best preparation for any unity between the Catholics and Protestants throughout all Ireland. I make these suggestions not because I believe they will solve all these problems, but that they represent the kind of approach which is necessary if we are to find an ultimate solution.

9.50 p.m.

Lord MOYOLA

My Lords, I should like to start by saying how grateful I am to the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, for being here tonight, because I know he is here at some considerable personal inconvenience. Then I should like to say that I have not come here to criticise the integrity of the Secretary of State, nor to impugn his motives, which I am quite certain are genuine enough. What I have come here to do is to criticise his security policy, which seems to be hung around this ludicrous ceasefire, which is nothing more now than an exercise into Alice in Wonderland.

We are faced with the situation when we are told we have a ceasefire, yet people are killed in the Hilton. We are told we have a ceasefire, yet 18 bombs can go off in Northern Ireland, as they did last Monday. Several others have gone off since, and we are still told we have a ceasefire. We are told, "You can have a ceasefire by degree", but the Royal Ulster Constabulary are exempted by the IRA from the ceasefire. They may be targets and at the same time, because of the low profile approach to which the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, has referred, the Army are in the difficult situation where, if they do too much in an effort to help the Royal Ulster Constabulary, they are in danger of breaking this farcical ceasefire.

It is the low profile approach of which we in Northern Ireland are complaining. It has already allowed months of what I can only call semi-peaceful penetration by the IRA. The media assured me over the last few days—and indeed I have seen a certain amount of activity and can confirm from personal knowledge what they say—that the level of activity by the Army has greatly increased. But what we need in Northern Ireland is an assurance that this level of activity is going to continue and, if possible, that it is going to increase. The plain fact of the matter is that the IRA can turn the violence off whenever the fancy takes them; and if that is the case then we need the assurance that the Army will be allowed—and I emphasise the word "allowed"—to pursue the terrorists relentlessly, regardless of the ceasefire and whatever its purpose may be.

To return to the ceasefire, we have had all this violence, and yet this pretence still continues. Why is it continued? What is the purpose of it, and what is it achieving? What is its importance now? Nobody can possibly pretend it is saving lives. Over the months since the ceasefire came into existence an enormous number of lives have been lost. I do not know the exact figures, but I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, can tell us. I am not suggesting for a moment that they have all occurred as a result of the ceasefire, but certainly some of them have.

What the ceasefire undoubtedly seems to have done is to allow the IRA to re-group, to re-equip, to reorganise and to collect more money. Above all, as the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough said, it has removed all confidence in the Government's will to win. It is no exaggeration to say that there is now quite often a feeling among reasonable people which I can only describe as akin to despair, because there seems to be no progress at all.

Of course, this lack of confidence simply encourages people to take the law into their own hands. Their attitude is that they say to themselves, "If the Security Forces are prevented from defending us, then we will defend ourselves." This in its turn is breeding private armies, paramilitarism, whatever one likes to call it. It follows from that that the power is being removed from the politicians, and if we believe in democracy it is with them that the power in fact should lie. Further than this, because this violence can be turned on and oft the prospects of peace get further and further away. Indeed, my Lords, the only credit I can see—and some people would not concede it as a credit at all, but I would—is that it has allowed the Secretary of State to release a number of internees. I do not believe that this farcical ceasefire was needed to do that.

It may be that the ceasefire has been encourged and efforts have been made to keep it going with a view to keeping things cool while the Convention was meeting. I have said before in your Lordships' House and I would say again, that it is the priorities that we have wrong. Political solutions will come much more easily when violence is at an end. The pressures that violence produces are such that one is never going to obtain any reasonable answer. The proof of that is that the Convention, I will not say has collapsed but is now in grave difficulty. It got into grave difficulty just after the worst of the sectarian violence a few days ago.

I hope I have said enough to make it absolutely plain that there is a total lack of confidence in the security policy—I say here, not in the Security Forces but in the policy. There is also now a situation where people are becoming thoroughly frightened. This was not so until a few weeks ago, but the situation has now changed. If an unexpected knock at the door comes at night people now begin to wonder whether, if they open it, they are going to be alive in two minutes' time. It is because people are frightened—and they are indeed frightened—that everyone, it does not matter what is their creed or what are their politics, everyone except the terrorists, wants to see this situation stopped. I am absolutely certain in my own mind that people would put up with any measures, however inconvenient, if they could see a prospect of peace returning. But on the present policy no one can see peace for eternity.

I am not going to be an armchair tactician. I have complete confidence that the Army can devise the necessary measures for dealing with the problem provided that it is allowed to. The only point I want to make in this connection concerns the Royal Ulster Constabulary who are not covered by the ceasefire to which we still seem to be clinging. Everyone knows that the Royal Ulster Constabulary needs a massive increase in strength. What we have basically is a law and order problem, and in the end it is the Royal Ulster Constabulary who will have to deal with it. This extraordinary situation whereby they are not covered by the ceasefire cannot be anything but very lowering for their morale, and it certainly can be no help to encouraging further recruiting. I was very glad to see what the Secretary of State said, I think, last night. But the Royal Ulster Constabulary will need a lot more than statements; they will need massive support.

I think back to the decision which my Government took years ago to disarm the Royal Ulster Constabulary. We did it because there was an undertaking that by putting the Royal Ulster Constabulary on the same footing as the other police forces in Britain we would get a change of personnel and would be able to ask for reinforcements to deal with particular occasions. These promises have never been fulfilled. I mention this simply because I want to make it plain that the RUC has had a rough deal all the way and that this bogus cease-fire and their exemption from it must not be added to their burdens.

All I want to do tonight is to make plain that the policy of worrying about this non-existent cease-fire is leading absolutely nowhere. It will not bring peace. I for one cannot find any justification whatsoever for it, unless it is preparing the ground for an unitimate surrender and I shudder to think what the consequences of that might be. All that we want in Northern Ireland is a new policy that leads to the restoration of law and order. I believe that because people are frightened this is the moment that it can be restored and the nettle grasped. I believe absolutely that people would put up with any measure, however inconvenient it might be, if they believed that it was working towards the restoration of law and order.

10.2 p.m.

Lord DUNLEATH

My Lords, I have listened with great interest to the three noble Lords who have already spoken. All three have said things that I was going to say. I will just mention that having heard the speech of my noble friend Viscount Brookeborough, the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, said what a pity it was that there was nobody in your Lordships' House this evening who was able to speak for the minority. Why does the noble Lord think that I cannot speak for the minority? The answer is that I am a nonentity; I am insignificant, and I understand that. However, the minority vote for me. I work for the minority and I speak for both the majority and the minority. I do not believe there is any conflict whatever. I think that the noble Lord is trying to rise to his feet and I am wondering whether he wishes me to give way?

Lord BROCKWAY

My Lords, I simply want to apologise immediately. If my noble friend is speaking for the minority I welcome that fact. I regret that I did not realise that this was so.

Lord DUNLEATH

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his generous remarks. Perhaps I overstated it but I was trying to point out that it is possible to speak for both the minority and the majority in Northern Ireland. difficult though it may be at times. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, mentioned also the question of human rights. I agree with him entirely that this is some thing for which we have been pressing and for which we shall continue to press in a tireless manner.

So far as security is concerned, the Alliance Party which I represent has deliberately avoided what one might call race-bashing. We have tried to avoid destructive criticism of the Secretary of State because we do not believe that it does any good, nor do we believe that it does any good to make unrealistic suggestions such as, "Let us have martial law; let us have a Province-wide curfew; let us have minefields right along the Border; let us seal off the Border." I think this does not do much good. We respect the Secretary of State as being a sincere man who is doing an unenviable and thankless task to the best of his ability, and I do not know of anyone who could do it better. I think people who jump on the "Rees must go" band-wagon are people who are unrealistic or hypocritical. Right enough, he may have made errors—we all do—but I would say that Mr. Rees has rendered a service to Northern Ireland and I would say "thank you" to Mr. Rees and "thank you" to those, including my noble friend Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, who work with him.

I am sorry to say, however, my Lords, that the public impression is much as has been described by my noble friends Lord Brookeborough and Lord Moyola; there is a feeling that Government policy is undermining democracy in Northern Ireland. There is a feeling that the contacts which have been made, not just with the Provisional IRA through the incident centres but also with some representatives of the so-called Loyalist paramilitaries, indicate that there is a greater measure of contact between these non-elected people than there is between the Secretary of State and the elected representatives. There is also the feeling that Her Majesty's Government are being held to ransom, that any time the Provisional IRA feel like it they can break the so-called ceasefire, and immediately there is a flurry while senior civil servants get on the telephone to see whether they can reach some accommodation. I am not saying this is the case, but I am afraid it is the impression that exists. This impression has been reinforced by the recent spate of bombings that has been referred to, and I think particularly the sectarian assassinations that have taken place, which really have caused much more fear in the community than even the bombings. When you live in a remote farmhouse in South Armagh or mid-Tyrone and you hear that one of your neighbours has been assassinated and perhaps his wife and family injured as well, you wonder whether it is going to be you the next night. This really strikes fear into the community, and as other noble Lords have said there is a greater lack of confidence and a greater sense of fear in the community than has been the case even at the height of the bombing campaign.

I am afraid the elected representatives are made to look irrelevant in certain ways; the contacts, as I have said, with the non-elected representatives of the paramilitaries; also the fact that Mr. Rees—and in a way I can understand his motive here—has not felt it possible to give unlimited access. At times he has not found it possible to give access at all to elected representatives, but I am afraid this gives the impression, not just to the public but to Convention Members as well, that whereas they have the mandate and they were democratically elected they are not accorded the same respect, they are not taken into the same confidence as representatives of the IRA and the UVF who have not been elected. Indeed, at any time the IRA would not face it. They opted out and recommended the boycott of the last election, and the UVF had a go. They put up a pathetic performance, and they lost their deposits. So I think it is a question of the ballot box or the bullet. I am afraid that in Northern Ireland there is this feeling that perhaps Her Majesty's Government are paying more attention to those who wield the bullet than those who have been democratically elected and have a mandate from the electorate through the ballot box.

My Lords, having said that, I think it is the responsibility of the elected representatives to try to make constructive and realistic suggestions. In the Party which I represent we have a Security Committee, of which I am the chairman. We meet regularly to discuss the security situation, and recently we met the Secretary of State and made a number of proposals to him. Having gone through all the various proposals that have been made, such as curfew, martial law, "sieving "the Border, putting minefields at the Border, and so on—having gone through all those, we have come to the conclusion that there are no such things as instant solutions. There is no easy answer, otherwise someone who has access to far more intelligence than we have would have come up with it before now.

My Lords, contrary to what was said not very long ago by the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, we cannot agree that there is any such thing as a straight military solution. If all the terrorists, whether IRA or UVF, spoke with a thick German accent or wore uniform all the time, it would make things much easier. But they are not as accommodating as that; they are not so thoughtful as to do that. We do not believe there is any such thing as a straight military solution. The role of the Army is to try to create a climate in which a political solution can be brought about. It is regrettable that it has not yet been possible to create that climate. I am afraid the progress that was being made towards creating that climate earlier this year has receded, and the outlook is not so optimistic.

However, our Security Committee made a number of suggestions to the Secretary of State. One of those suggestions was that the law should be strengthened. In accordance with the recommendations that we made to the Committee chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, we suggested that it should be incumbent upon defendants to be accountable for their movements, and that they should have no right of silence in court. In other words, if they declined to give an account of their movements, declined to recognise the court, it would be taken for granted and assumed that they were not contesting the prosecution evidence proffered against them. We put this proposal to the Gardiner Committee.

My Lords, another proposal we put to the Gardiner Committee, and which they actually accepted, was that there should be an independent complaints procedure for the police. This we feel should also cover the Army, the UDR, and all arms of the Security Force, in the interests of the Security Forces themselves, and with a view to making them more universally acceptable so that smears could not be directed against them. The Gardiner Committee suggested that this should be set up in Northern Ireland without necessarily waiting for an equivalent procedure to be set up in England. We regret that Her Majesty's Government have not yet been able to see their way to doing this, because we think it would do much to enhance the acceptability of all the Security Forces in Northern Ireland.

Another thing that we put to the Secretary of State was this. I personally welcomed the cessation of the proscription of the UVF, as indeed was the case at the same time with Provisional Sinn Fein, because I hoped that they might move in a political direction and become politically involved. I am afraid we have come to the conclusion that that has not been the case, and therefore I think Her Majesty's Government should perhaps look carefully once again at proscribing the UVF, who, after all, quite openly admit to murder and violence. Can Her Majesty's Government sit back and say, "This is a perfectly legal organisation; there is nothing wrong with being a member of that"?

Another moredetailed suggestion I made followed the rather frightening incident, which your Lordships may perhaps remember, when a phoney UDR patrol stopped a show band in the South, I think in County Down, and assassinated a number of them. I know from my own experience how difficult it is in the headlights of your car, which you are asked to turn off at night, clearly to identify the nature of a vehicle checkpoint. It is quite easy to "doll up" a Land Rover so that at night it looks like a Security Forces Land Rover. Ideally, if here were enough Saracens to go round, and if there could be a Saracen at each vehicle checkpoint, they are not nearly so easy to simulate. But in the absence of that assistance, we suggested to the Secretary of State that there is an electronic device which gives a limited range sonic tone of high frequency, which would not be all that easy to simulate. If the public could be made aware of that, and if such a device could be circulated around the UDR and the Army, I think it would create greater public confidence.

I must say that perhaps we in the Alliance Party are rather like Macnamara's Band—we may be few in number but we are the best in all the land. We and other Parties, such as that represented by my noble old friend-cum-adversary, Lord Brookeborough, perhaps have the benefit from time to time of the advice of various categories of public convenience technicians. We in our Party have access to some very consider able expertise. A professor who runs a department of computer technology has told me that there would be a very much greater scope for usage of computers, not just in listing stolen vehicles or suspect vehicles, but also in compiling and recording case histories of all personnel.

I realise this is contrary to what people regard as being the normal civil right of citizens in the United Kingdom, that there should be a file on every person. In normal circumstances I would completely agree; I should not like to think that, lurking away somewhere in its circuits, a computer had details of my own murky history. But my computer expert tells me that it would be very much easier for Security Forces, when they stopped someone on the road, to ensure that they could confirm that he was who he said he was, and that he was doing what he said he was doing, if they could ask a few simple questions of a computer. This, entirely as an emergency measure during an emergency situation, indeed would, I think, be very much more effective than identity cards, which can more easily be forged.

Further, are we really deploying our Security Forces to the best advantage? From information I have received from members of the Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Ulster Constabulary Reserve—those who have made the sacrifice of joining up and causing inconvenience to themselves and their families—they soon find that they are doing rather boring routine duties. They are necessary duties perhaps, but are their duties as important as getting a grip on the situation in South Armagh where all these assassinations have taken place, or in the murder triangle in North Belfast. I suggest that it would be a tremendous service to the wretched people living in these areas, and would do a great deal to boost the morale of the volunteer security forces, the part-timers, if they could be put in and made to feel that they were really getting their teeth into the problem that needed to be solved, because at the end of the day it will have to be Ulster men who solve the problem in Northern Ireland. We cannot do without the Army yet, but one of these days it will be our own people who will have to solve this problem, and this is an appropriate time for our Ulster volunteer security personnel to show that they really could do it.

The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, mentioned an overriding security committee. For something like two years we have suggested and proposed that there be an all-Party security committee in Northern Ireland or something, but unfortunately other Parties would not agree to it. I am very glad that the noble Lord, with his wide experience, has added his support to this, and I sincerely hope that an all-Party approach to security can be taken in the not too distant future.

To conclude, my Lords, it cannot be said often enough that the vast majority in Northern Ireland want peace, democracy and normality. The fact that they want democracy is indicated by the last Election, the Convention Election, where the percentage polled was higher than it was in the October 1974 General Election, despite a boycott because the IRA knew that they could not face it. They had not the nerve to face an election. They advocated a boycott, but even so there was a reasonably high poll by any standards, and higher than the previous election.

The vast majority are tired of the minute minority who have no mandate from the electorate but who try to bulldoze their point of view out of the barrel of a gun. The vast majority want nothing to do with them at all, and the vast majority want the support of Her Majesty's Government. I must say that the vast majority are also sickened and disgusted with small-minded politicians, short-sighted men, who are politically ambitious and who are prepared to make a political football of the tragic situation and of the personal tragedy of people in Northern Ireland. There is a great sense of disillusionment in politicians of all shades in Northern Ireland. I wish that a leader would arise and cut through all this nonsense of filibustering Press statements, and zig-zagging, and political sorting about. I can tell your Lordships that the people of Northern Ireland would respond to it. I wish we could get away from the small men with the small minds, relegate them, leave them behind. Let us move on to something more honourable, and with a more realistic future to it.

If such leadership were to arise it might galvanise the people because it is time for the people to unite in the face of a common enemy, and the common enemy is the violent minority. They are not confined to Northern Ireland; they are not uniquely Ulster people by any means. As a matter of interest, I was speaking this morning to an authoritative person who told me about the way in which the civil rights movement was infiltrated by outside elements who were not remotely interested in civil rights but who wanted to manipulate that organisation for their own anarchistic purposes.

The resistance we must show in Northern Ireland to anarchy and the forces of evil and violence should apply to the rest of Great Britain, for it will not necessarily be confined to Northern Ireland. The two islands are not very far apart and, as Karl Marx once said, the best way to get into Western Europe is through Ireland, and there might still be truth in that. I therefore appeal to Her Majesty's Government to keep the Convention going—depressing though it may seem at the lack of progress there has been—because there are a lot of deep-seated difficulties to overcome and a lot of history to cover and overcome in what the Convention is trying to do. Of one thing I am sure: if stalemate is reached, a referendum of the people of the country could well reveal a very different result from what the politicians would give one to understand. I hope, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government will not lose patience but will be determined to keep the Convention going and give it every opportunity to reach a conclusion.

10.27 p.m.

Lord O'NEILL of the MAINE

My Lords, as we are discussing Northern Ireland tonight I should like to make a very few remarks. I doubt very much whether anything your Lordships say tonight will have the slightest effect on the situation in Northern Ireland as it exists today. We heard on the Northern Ireland Radio on Monday morning that your Lordships' House would be having a full debate on Northern Ireland, yet there are only 15 people in your Lordships' House tonight. This may or may not be an example of the interest which the British people have in Northern Ireland affairs.

I fear that most British people would like to sweep Northern Ireland under the carpet if they could because it is an embarrassing and incomprehensible problem for them to consider. Unfortunately there are some eternal truths in the Irish situation. To begin with, the extremists have a vested interest in the continuation of violence. If peace were to break out tomorrow the extremists, be they politicians or men of violence, would cease to have any relevance, and for people to cease to have relevance to a situation is a very serious thing for them. Therefore, I think your Lordships can take it that violence will continue, otherwise the extremists will come to an end. Extremists—who are not men of moderation—will not be willing to bring about their own demise.

Secondly, I should like to repeat what I have so often said in your Lordships' House: in Irish history the extremists have always won. In 1916, as I have often told your Lordships, the vast majority of the population of Dublin were entirely hostile to the rising which took place at that time, but, once the Right Wing of the British Cabinet had ensured that those who took part in the rising should be executed, the whole Irish situation became insoluble. So, wherever these extremists are living, be it London, Belfast or Dublin, they will ensure that the situation will be impossible and that the extremists will always win.

I fully agree and find myself in total sympathy with very much of what the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, has just said. No one in the Secretary of State's position can possibly please both sections of the community, but I would at the same time plead with the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, that he should pay attention to what my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham said the other day because, to me, one of the most important things from the British point of view and from that of Northern Ireland is that the bipartisan policy should continue. It seems to me to be absolutely essential that this should be the case. There can be no profit whatsoever for the Protestants in Northern Ireland that their case should be taken up by the Conservative Party in opposition to the Labour Party. If people do not believe me, they should read Lord Carson's last speech in this noble House, in which he said that he realised years later that he had been used by the Conservative Party, but that they had never really supported his views.

The bipartisan policy must be continued and that is why I should like to repeat to the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, that if it be the case—and I believe that perhaps it is—that Mr. Rees, whose appointment I welcomed in this House, is not keeping the Conservative Party fully abreast of his thinking, he should make every effort to do so. I feel that this is a very important point indeed, Speaking entirely personally, I always found that the Conservative Secretary of State was very keen to talk to all and sundry. He made mistakes; everybody makes mistakes in Ireland. It is impossible to win in Ireland. I hope that Mr. Rees will take heed of what my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham said the other day. I believe that it is most important that this bipartisan policy should continue.

The Press and all the media have been fascinated during the last three weeks by the position which Mr. Craig has suddenly taken up. Of course I have known Bill Craig for the last 20 to 25 years. He used to be a great personal friend of mine. He is a brilliant and, at the same time, perhaps a slightly unbalanced personality. I hope to God that he will win through. But I still remember, a year ago, the noble Earl, Lord Longford, speaking from the Benches opposite, saying what a very high regard he had for Mr. Murray, the leader of the Protestant strike last summer, whom he had met at the Oxford conference. After that debate I told the noble Earl, Lord Longford, "If you have a high regard for Mr. Murray let me assure you that Mr. Murray will be disowned tomorrow"; and, sure enough, he was. He was kicked out!

Going on precedents, I fear that if Mr. Craig wants to survive he will have to go back on the statements he has made during the past three weeks. I hope to God that I am wrong in saying that. I hope to God that he will survive, and I hope to God that his policies will survive. But if we go on precedents it will be very difficult for him to survive.

Once again following in the footsteps of the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, I myself, who proscribed the UVF, was slightly shocked—although I did not say anything at the time—when Mr. Rees legalised them. I am not sure that history will show that he was correct. I shall not dwell on that subject any further, but I have some doubts, as expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, that this policy will turn out to be correct.

I do not want to delay your Lordships any more. I very much doubt whether this debate will achieve anything whatsoever, because it is the extremists who count in Northern Ireland. I wish the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, well, and I hope that he will pass on some of my remarks to the Secretary of State, bearing in mind that, so far as Britain is concerned—as apart from Northern Ireland—the important thing is that the bipartisan policy should continue.

Baroness LLEWELYN-DAVIES of HASTOE

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down I am sure that he would not wish the remarks with which he opened his speech to be interpreted wrongly—bearing in mind that at this very late hour, at the end of an extremely grueling week, there are not very many of us here. This does not in any way represent a lack of interest on the part of your Lordships in the Northern Irish question. We have debated this question often and often, and in great depth. I should not like anything that the noble Lord has said to be interpreted, especially in Northern Ireland, as showing any lack of interest on the part of your Lordships, and indeed Parliament in general, in the tragic events that are taking place there. I am sure that the noble Lord himself—although he need not say so—will agree with what I say.

Lord O'NEILL of the MAINE

My Lords, while I accept what the noble Baroness says, I should point out to her that when I said that very little notice would be taken of the debate, the noble Lord who deals with Northern Ireland agreed with me.

10.38 p.m.

Lord BELSTEAD

My Lords, listening to the speeches this evening, it is clear that from each of the three noble Lords who speak with detailed knowledge from living in Northern Ireland there has come a fundamental questioning of current security policy. I am bound to say that I did not really detect that the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, exactly radiated a message of hope this evening. However, I am sure that we would agree that the Unstarred Question from my noble friend Lord Brookeborough this evening is being put to the Government at a crucial moment for Ulster; after all, the Convention is still in Session.

The opportunity for political agreement, at least on some essentials, has not yet slipped away, but the political and security problems are closely entwined, as noble Lords have made clear. As the Convention is concluding its work, it is the fact that the security situation has deteriorated quite considerably. Perhaps the first question that anyone who longs for peace in Northern Ireland would naturally ask is: are terrorists being pursued as energetically as possible? I am well aware of the contents of the Secretary of State's Statement which was made in this House on Monday evening, and my question is in no way related to that.

I wish to know, for instance, whether arrests of wanted men are being achieved as successfully in recent months as they were before; whether the recovery of arms, ammunition and explosives has recently increased or decreased; whether there are areas where it has been agreed that the Army will not penetrate at all—a question which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, put the other day in an exchange on the last Statement. In putting that question, I am not referring only to urban areas; I bear in mind what my noble friend Lord Brooke-borough said about South Armagh.

I think also that law-abiding people need to be re-assured that the security policy on detention rests on a success rate in bringing those who are arrested before the courts. From this side of the House we have previously pointed to the danger of releasing large numbers of detainees at a time when violence is increasing. Although I confess that I do not agree with the Secretary of State's timing in this matter, I understand and respect the reasons which he has for persisting with the release of detainees. But, at the very least, that policy must be backed by having a high proportion of those arrested then charged with scheduled offences. I note from the newspapers today that the Secretary of State has reported the figure of 42 persons charged this week with terrorist offences. That is interesting; but what I am asking is whether the success rate of persons arrested, then charged during the period of the ceasefire is at a satisfactory rate.

I should be interested to know what estimate the Government make of what I call general lawlessness: the stealing of cars, the omission to license vehicles, the withholding of rent and rates, and armed robbery. I think that these things take their toll of public confidence and undoubtedly they assist the terrorist to escape. He may drive a car which cannot be traced, live in a house whose owner is unknown to the authorities, finance his activities through armed robbery. All these things have been going on for some time. I make no political point here. It is far easier for the terrorist to merge imperceptibly into the background of general lawlessness and evade capture. Those are questions which long suffering members of the public in Northern Ireland are bound to ask and to draw their conclusions from the answers. I accept that the response to such questions needs to be interpreted with understanding of the prevailing security situation; but, in general, I think it is those sort of issues which at least gives us some yardstick of the prevailing security success.

But, my Lords, the events of the last six weeks, and particularly of this week, pose, I think, a deeper and more fundamental question. Has the motive for the Provisional IRA ceasefire been merely to buy time and to mislead, or was there a real hope that it might lead to a more lasting peace?

When, nine months ago, Parliament reassembled for the New Year, the Secretary of State, reporting in another place on January 14th, on what he had stated following the Christmas ceasefire, repeated: … the actions of the Security Forces in Northern Ireland would be related to the level of any activity which might occur." —[Official Report, Commons, 14/1/75, col. 201.] At that time this was the only reasonable response which a Secretary of State could make; and in both Houses from these Benches we shared the Government's hopes for the ceasefire and promised our support provided that there were no secret negotiations with the TRA and provided the Secretary of State would undertake to hold himself ready to respond if the Security Forces warned that the ceasefire was a pretext for the IRA to re-group and to re-form. During the year the Secretary of State has done everything in his power to trust the intentions of the IRA. But that trust has been betrayed and it is now a contradiction in terms to refer any longer to a ceasefire. I do not suggest that, for instance, the incident centres should be disbanded, or the hope of further reduction of violence should be abandoned.

What I suggest is that the events of this week must surely leave the Secretary of State free to take the measures which the security situation demands, and certainly I would accept that the Government have responded to this week's sudden escalation of violence. The reply of the noble Lord the Leader of the House to the Private Notice Question of my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone on Tuesday made that abundantly clear. My worry is this. In that reply, the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, repeated once again those familiar words: the Security Forces will respond to the level of violence which occurs. I must put it to the Government that it seems this has now become a policy of reacting to events instead of attempting to shape them. A policy of military repression against the wishes of the majority is a tragedy for any free country.

But this is not the situation in Northern Ireland. The IRA are a cruel minority relying, as the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, said in his speech, solely on the power of the gun for persuasion. The principal sufferers from terrorism are the majority of the ordinary people who look to the Government for protection. The elected representatives of all shades of opinion have made clear that they need strong security if their political decisions are not to be usurped by paramilitary organisations. This was perhaps the most valuable point which my noble friend Lord Brookeborough made in his opening speech.

Also my noble friend asked whether on these Benches we can support a bipartisan policy which failed to retaliate against a particularly brutal murder which he mentioned. Apart from the fact that my noble friend does not need to be reminded that this year sectarian murders have been perpetrated by both sectarian extremes, perhaps I could reply by saying quite openly that I do not think anyone can seriously claim that a consistently determined policy against terrorism, not a policy of response, would be other than a reflection of the will of the people of Northern Ireland at the present time.

It is clear that the processes of searching and screening always draw accusations of harassment. But one can be forgiven the conjecture that such protests usually come from those who have something to hide. It is significant that harassment has been given by the IRA from Dublin as at least one reason for this week's appalling violence. So far as I know, there has been no protest from Northern Ireland politicians about increased activities of the Security Forces and, indeed, at the beginning of the week both the official Unionists and the STLP were issuing statements condemning the IRA, and also voicing their suspicions which were answered in full by the Secretary of State's Statement which was made on Monday.

This leads me to one further point which was raised by my noble friend on Tuesday, and was also referred to by my noble friend Lord Brookeborough in his speech. Since the start of the Convention, apparently it has been the policy of the Secretary of State not to meet Members of the Convention on deputations. I realise this policy stems from a desire to see Northern Ireland representatives work out a political future for the Province without interference. But in consequence, Northern Ireland politicians have obviously come to feel isolated, unable to warn, advise or seek assurance. Equally, the Secretary of State has in a sense become isolated from first-hand views of grass roots opinion. I would ask the Government seriously to consider some dialogue between the Secretary of State and the elected Members of the Convention.

I believe it is essential that the Government should be certain and be able to report to Parliament that they are certain—that all participants in the Convention fully grasp the serious consequences of a complete political impasse in Ulster. I also think it would be informative for the Secretary of State to take views about the continuing contact with the Sinn Fein if there is to be no contact with Convention Members. I think he would discover quite a considerable depth of feeling on this subject; and surely it would be wise to have some two-way discussions on the part the Convention might usefully play while its report was being considered by the Parliament at Westminster. That could be a period of very considerable strain, during which it might be highly desirable to have some political life going on in Northern Ireland.

This debate does not signal a break in what has been called the bipartisan policy, but I believe that the resurgence of IRA violence releases the Secretary of State from the undertaking concerning a policy of response, which he has kept faithfully since the ceasefire began. It would be naive to assert that a political solution to centuries of conflict is going to fall into place provided a consistent security policy is followed; but upon some form of agreement between politicians is going to rest the acceptance in Ulster of institutional authority—Government Department, the RUC and the UDI—and clearly it is asking a great deal of the Convention and of public opinion to reach political solutions while the IRA operate within the bogus alibi of a ceasefire.

As all your Lordships know, the Army have done a job in Northern Ireland which no other soldiers could have equalled, and the RUC have a remarkable record of crime detection; but the Security Forces cannot do everything. Only upon their work can be built a political solution. If this debate does nothing else, I hope that your Lordships' speeches will once again have impressed upon the Government that there is a crisis of confidence; and this evening I believe the Government can help to dispel this crisis by informing the House as openly as possible of the immediate prospects at this critical moment for Northern Ireland.

10.53 p.m.

The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge)

My Lords, this has been a sombre debate about a particularly awkward and serious situation, and I can assure your Lordships that there is nobody, from the top to the bottom of the Northern Ireland Office, who is not fully aware of it. It was to be expected that as the Convention got near to its final word, whether constructive or unconstructive, things were liable to go wrong. This was no surprise to anybody: it is beginning to happen.

I shall make a reasoned statement of the Secretary of State's general position in a minute, but before doing so I will deal with one or two of the many points that have been raised by speakers this evening. The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, said that the Secretary of State should feel free to take the measures necessary to deal with the situation. I think these were the Secretary of State's actual words: he had always felt free to do this. There is no inhibition of any kind. I could not make this point more forcefully or clearly. The Secretary of State is a free man.

I cannot say anything about the Convention itself, but I should like to say a word or two on a point which has worried several Members and which was raised by the noble and learned Lord the other day about the lack of support which it has been alleged the Secretary of State has given to Convention Members. We must bear two points in mind. First, the Convention is not a legislature and is not part of the apparatus of the Government of Northern Ireland. It has the much more fundamental and much narrower task of considering what the future apparatus of Government should be. Secondly, those who are currently the elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland for the purposes of the Convention should of course receive the recognition which is properly due to them as individuals. These are two points, one on either side.

The Government have consistently maintained that, whatever the technical position of Members of the Convention, it is clearly right that the Government and Ministers should do all they can to help deal by normal correspondence with cases which Convention Members put forward on behalf of individuals. That is happening every day. Beyond that it is not easy to go. Although Convention Members naturally have strong views on matters of current interest such as security, their membership of the Convention gives them no formal role on such matters. I think this must be so. I do not think there is any way round it.

Viscount BROOKEBOROUGH

My Lords, will the noble Lord give way? The fundamental problem is not that we have been denied access and ability to make known our views on these subjects. That would have been perfectly all right if at the same time access had not been granted to men of violence whose position within the community had been rejected by vote after vote. It is the interaction of these two matters which has made the position of the Convention so irrelevant. Like my noble friend Lord Dunleath, I know in this matter that I am speaking for every single elected Member. This is the problem which I do not feel the Government have appreciated. We have tried to tell them that it is not a simple matter; it is a matter of recognition and the influence that the men of violence have had and the lack of influence of the men who have been elected. We do not claim that we are elected to governor to take part in the Government. But we do reckon that the men of violence were rejected, not elected.

Lord DONALDSON of KINGS-BRIDGE

It is a negative rather than a positive view, my Lords, that the noble Viscount is putting forward.

Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE

My Lords, I do not want to prolong this debate, but the noble Lord is putting forward a legalistic case, which I understand. What I tried to put to the noble Lord the Leader of the House the other day and what I now try to put to the noble Lord is that the legalism of this case will not do. The feeling on the part of all Members of this elected body is building up to a point at which it is interfering with the discharge by the Secretary of State of his proper duties. It is that that I want the noble Lord to convey to his colleague.

Lord DONALDSON of KINGS-BRIDGE

My Lords, that I will do. I think the noble and learned Lord exaggerates. A certain amount is going on about this. There have been a number of interviews with the Chairman. The Secretary of State has made it clear that lawful and responsible political Parties in Northern Ireland have a genuine and important role to play and can be seen by him or his Ministers in the ordinary way. But the point will of course be relayed to the Secretary of State. He is aware that there is some resentment about this. He has made a decision on very careful grounds which he thinks to be right. He has eased away from it a little. Whether what the noble Viscount says will persuade him to ease away any further, we shall see. So much for that.

I am very grateful that the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, supported the bipartisan policy and I shall say something about that in a minute or two. I was a little unhappy with the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough. He seemed not to begin, as the noble Lord, Lord Moyola, and the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, did by saying they had faith in the honesty of the Secretary of State. I should have preferred it if he had said so.

Viscount BROOKEBOROUGH

My Lords, will the noble Lord give way again? I certainly have complete faith in his integrity. I am afraid that I have no faith in the policy that is being pursued at the moment—because it is being expressed by 100 per cent. of the people of Northern Ireland.

Lord DONALDSON of KINGS-BRIDGE

My Lords, I am very glad to hear it.

One of the points the noble Viscount raised was that one could not negotiate on the IRA's demand for a withdrawal of British troops. Well, of course one could not. Nobody has ever thought of it. I am astonished that the noble Viscount should even suggest such a thing in this House.

A number of small points were made, but I shall not go into all of them. My noble friend Lord Brockway is always optimistic. I am afraid that he is rather too optimistic, but it is marvellous to find anybody who is at all optimistic. If the kind of thing he wants could be brought about there is not a single person who would not be delighted, but I do not see it coming about very quickly. On the question of basic civil rights, my noble friend probably knows that the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Feather, is dealing with this matter—and dealing with it quite fast. I would rather leave out any reference to a united Ireland. My noble friend spoke about this but I do not believe that it would be of any help at this time.

The noble Lord, Lord Moyola, raised a point which is of the greatest worry to everybody—the alleged exclusion now of the RUC from the ceasefire. The ceasefire means very little at the moment, but if it excludes one half of the Security Forces it means even less. This is a very difficult situation and I do not know what is the right reaction to it. However, I can assure your Lordships that it is not a matter which has been overlooked in any way.

I shall speak about the ceasefire in a short while. One other point I should make is that the noble Lord, Lord Moyola, did not give any credit for what has been achieved in the way of saving life during the ceasefire. Nobody thinks it has been a miracle; it has been a very half-baked thing from beginning to end. However, over the five year period the average number of casualties among the police, Army and civilians was 200 a year. Last year the figure was 172. It is not an enormous drop but the ceasefire was, of course, in operation for only half of the year. In the same way, the shootings averaged 4,500 a year against 1,334 last year. These figures are not very convincing but there was a very real reduction. As those of your Lordships who live in Northern Ireland know, for six months the behaviour of the ordinary citizens of Belfast was quite remarkable. They went about the town as if they owned it.

Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE

They do!

Lord DONALDSON of KINGS-BRIDGE

Which indeed they do! The noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, raised a number of interesting points in relation to the Gardiner Committee. He has put them to the Secretary of State and they are being considered. The right of silence is one which interests me. It is one which the noble and learned Lord opposed very bitterly when it was applied on this side of the water, but we shall have to wait and see what happens over there. Those are the general points with which I wanted to deal, but I feel I should make a fairly short but reasoned defence of our general position in relation to the security situation.

On the 22nd September, 20 bombings and other acts of criminal violence were committed in various parts of Northern Ireland. The targets were in the main commercial premises, although in two of the incidents the intention was clearly to kill or maim members of the RUC. Since then there have been 29 further explosions and 18 shootings; 7 bombs have been neutralised. This spate of bombings does not fit into the pattern of violence which can be traced back to the start of the Provisional IRA ceasefire, but it would be premature to work on the assumption that there has been another fundamental change in the security situation in Northern Ireland as a result of these out rages. There has, however, been a definite change in the nature of violence since the beginning of the ceasefire on 10th February. Over that period there have been many fewer bombings and shooting incidents. Attacks on the Security Forces have diminished, although the number of deaths and injuries of civilians is still serious, mainly as a result of sectarian and interfactional attacks, coming more or less equally from both sides. The ceasefire has brought into sharp relief undisciplined gangsterism and lawlessness, exhibited by individuals acting independently or under the auspices of small paramilitary groups.

Firm measures have been taken to deal with sectarian violence from wherever it comes and there will certainly be no let up. The measures taken include the intensive patrolling of likely trouble spots, especially sectarian interfaces; the use of observation posts, vehicle checkpoints and quick reaction patrols to deal with incidents. The A-squad, an interdivisional RUC team, has been set up solely to deal with assassinations and there has been a reinforcement of detective teams particularly in Belfast, Dungannon and South Armagh.

The Government fully back the Security Forces who are taking these measures to prevent loss of life and the further destruction of property. As a result of the violence at the beginning of this past week, the RUC and the Army have stepped up their activities and a number of people, in the current euphemism, are helping the Security Forces with their inquiries into the events of last Monday.

My Lords, in view of continued speculation, which we have heard again tonight, I should like to make it clear that the Provisional IRA unilaterally declared a ceasefire. The response of the Government was publicly stated in another place on 14th January and in subsequent Statements by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State and communicated to Provisional Sinn Fein. The Government's hope was that this would encourage progress through political processes in which all legitimate political Parties are free to take part. The Government have played their part. Large numbers of detainees have been progressively released. The level of Army activity—that is to say, screening, searching and that kind of interference with private life—was closely related to the change in the security situation. The lowering of the level of violence as the result of the ceasefire brought about a different situation and for the last six months the citizens of Belfast have benefited from it and have gone out at night to dances and cinemas in a way they feared to do before.

Following their recent acts of violence, the Provisional IRA have made a number of wild accusations. These allegations of harassment and torture are not only false but are fabricated deliberately to mislead people who live in areas in which the IRA seek to recruit support and sympathy. Their claim today that the Security Forces have broken a truce agreed with them is untrue—the ceasefire is unilateral. The Government from the beginning have made it clear that they will act appropriately in relation to the level of violence, whether it is up or down. The Provos' statement is clearly designed to justify murder, bombs and intimidation.

The noble Lords, Lord Belstead and Lord Moyola, both suggested that the Secretary of State should now feel himself uninhibited by the unilateral truce. I referred to this earlier. I must make it absolutely clear that he has never been so inhibited from the beginning, and he has related the actions of the Security Forces—with their full agreement—to the reality of the situation. Not only you, my Lords, but the whole community will make its own judgment as to the credibility of these people. Let there be no doubt that those who indulge in criminal acts of any kind will be relentlessly pursued. As I explained to your Lordships' House on Monday, the Government's policy has been fully set out at all times in the House of Commons: the Secretary of State will continue to follow this practice; and he will not be influenced by threats, distortions or lies.

As I have just said, the action of the Security Forces is related to the level of terrorist activity. I said this on Monday. Events this week have demonstrated the point. I must, however, deal with allegations that have been made that the Secretary of State is in some way "holding back" the Army. Frequent regular meetings are held between the Secretary of State and his security advisers, the chief constable and the GOC. There is complete agreement between them that the policy adopted during the ceasefire is the right one, and agreement as to each change of that policy which is introduced.

The balance between defeating violence with force and defusing or de-escalating the situation is a delicate one and our response must be, and is, flexible. I must add, however, to make sure that there is no doubt on the point, that the Security Forces are not restrained in any way whatsoever by political constraints from dealing with acts of violence from whichever part of the community they might emanate. On the first occasion on which I spoke on Northern Ireland in this House, some 18 months ago, I was asked the same question—the answer is unchanged. Indeed, I am greatly encouraged by the Royal Ulster Constabulary's successes in bringing terrorists before the courts.

In this context I must say that I found it sad when a highly respected friend and colleague of a few months ago turns and rends the Secretary of State, as Mr. Paddy Devlin did two nights ago on the television screen. As to his general attack I will not comment, beyond saying that it seemed to me singularly divorced from reality. In one respect, at least, in which he was seriously misinformed, he needs correction. He said, "The level of conviction is extremely low at the present time". In fact this is the opposite of the truth. So far this year, up to 23rd September, 821 people have been charged with serious terrorist-type offences, including 92 with murder, 67 with attempted murder, 321 with firearms offences and 60 with explosives offences. In the same period, the number of convicted criminals in custody has gone up by some 500. With the help of the community in providing information I am confident that the Security Forces will maintain and improve upon this impressive record. It is a most impressive record when one considers the difficulties that the Royal Ulster Constabulary are up against. The Government and the Security Forces are well prepared to meet any renewed threat of organised violence, from whatever organisation it might come. They will not shrink from it, nor is there any question of holding back.

In conclusion, my Lords, I should like to take up a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, in your Lordships'House on Tuesday. He implied that the Government were being less than open with the Opposition on events and policy in Northern Ireland. The facts do not bear this out. Only the day before, the Secretary of State had held a lengthy and cordial meeting with the Opposition spokesman on Northern Ireland—this meeting was the latest in a lengthy series between Mr. Neave and Northern Ireland Office Ministers. Less than two weeks previously the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State had met Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Airey Neave for discussions on Northern Ireland. Earlier in the summer, at the request of the Shadow Cabinet spokesman on Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State met a representative group of Conservative Members of Parliament to brief them on the Northern Ireland situation. I know that he would be more than happy to meet them again in the near future. On none of those occasions has mention been made by the Opposition that they are not being kept fully in formed.

My Lords, I hope that what I have said will satisfy the noble and learned Lord. The Secretary of State is totally loyal to the bipartisan policy and regards it, as I do, as a vital factor in our policy towards the never-ending problems of Northern Ireland. If we are to quarrel among ourselves as to the right course of action we shall add enormously to difficulties which are formidable enough already.

My Lords, the hour is late, and the subject is sombre. In spite of some criticisms, I am grateful to my old friend and protagonist Lord Brookeborough for raising this matter, and to those noble Lords who have spoken. It has been a useful debate, and will be noted extremely carefully. The views of your Lordships will be passed on to the Secretary of State and the relevant people.