HL Deb 04 December 1969 vol 306 cc263-78

6.32 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.

Moved, That the Report be now received.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 1 [Maintenance pending suit in cases of divorce, etc.]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

moved Amendment No. 1: Page 2, line 14, leave out from second ("the") to ("and") in line 15 and insert ("presentation of the petition"). The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the first Amendment standing in my name. Before doing so, may I say that nearly all these Amendments are purely drafting Amendments which have arisen on points made primarily at the Committee stage of the Bill by noble Lords, and particularly by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and also by the Law Society, the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division and others.

This first Amendment makes it possible to back-date an order for maintenance pending suit to the presentation of the petition, instead of to the making of the application for the order. It is normal practice to make such an order run from presentation of the petition, and in most cases this is also the date of the application, because the rules require the application to be made in the petition. If, however, the court gives leave to do so, the application may be made at a later date. In such a case, it might well be desirable to make the order run from the date of presentation of the petition. For example, a wife petitioner might well rely on her husband's informal assurance that he would maintain her until decree nisi, and she might therefore not include a claim for maintenance pending suit in her petition. If the husband then paid nothing and she got leave at a later date to apply for maintenance pending suit, it would be reasonable for the court to make the order run from presentation of the petition. My Lords, I beg to move.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I think this is a good Amendment, and I hope it will be supported.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 2 [Financial provision for party to a marriage in cases of divorce, etc.]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

moved Amendment No. 2: Page 2, line 40, leave out ("discharge any liabilities") and insert ("meet any liabilities or expenses"). The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, if no noble Lord objects I suggest that I speak to Amendments Nos. 2, 3 and 4 together, because they all relate to the same point, and also, if I may, to Amendment No. 12. Amendment No. 2 is a drafting Amendment designed to meet a point raised by the Law Society. As drafted, Clause 2(2)(a) empowers the court to order the payment of a lump sum so as to enable the payee to "discharge any liability" incurred before making an application under Clause 2. But the payee may in practice have been able to raise the money to pay, for instance, a child's school fees (for example, by selling her jewellery) and thus already have herself discharged the liability. What she then needs is a lump sum to reimburse herself. The Amendment makes it clear that this can be ordered. The Amendments to Clause 3 and Clause 6 are analogous. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 3 [Financial provision for child of the family in cases of divorce, etc.]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 3 and 4.

Amendments moved—

Page 3, line 34, after ("liabilities") insert ("or expenses").

Page 3,line 36, leave out ("discharge") and insert ("met").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 4 [Orders for transfer and settlement of property and for variation of settlement in cases of divorce, etc.]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

moved Amendment No. 5: Page 4, line 26, after ("including") insert ("such"). The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this drafting Amendment meets a further point raised by the Law Society. The words in parentheses in Clause 4(c) might, it is said, raise an inference that any settlement made by will or codicil is to be variable, whereas the intention is merely to ensure that a settlement which has the characteristics of an ante- or a post-nuptial settlement is not to be incapable of variation merely because it was made by will or codicil. In all probability, the courts would interpret paragraph (c), as drafted, in the way intended; but the Amendment removes any possibility of misconstruction. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to

Clause 5 [Matters to which court is to have regard in deciding what orders to make under Sections 2, 3 and 4]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, if no noble Lord objects I will take Amendments Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 together. These Amendments make it clear that in considering financial provision either for a spouse or for a child the court is to have regard not only to the current resources, needs, obligations, and so on, of the parties to the divorce proceedings, but also to those they are likely to have in the foreseeable future. On Second Reading, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, at col. 485, raised this point in connection with provision for children and the need to take into account the likelihood of either parent marrying again and starting a second family. I promised to consider the point, and in Committee I indicated my intention of putting down an Amendment.

The Amendments that are before the House to-day go rather further than Lord Colville had suggested: he was concerned only with provision for a child, and then only with the consideration that either parent might remarry and have a second family. But the possibility of second family is not the only relevant future event. For example, the husband in the divorce proceedings may himself have ageing parents who are going to need increasing help; on the other hand, he may have prospects of inheriting, in the near future, a large estate. It would be reasonable to take such probabilities into account in deciding whether he would make a settlement on a child of the family, or transfer a capital asset to him. It is equally reasonable that such considerations should be taken into account when deciding whether the husband should be ordered to settle property on his wife, and for this reason the Amendments operate on Clause 5(1)(a) and (b), which apply to a spouse's application for financial provision and are brought in by Clause 5(2) when provision for a child is being considered. The Law Commission had always meant Clause 5(1)(a) and (b) to include foreseeable future resources, obligations, and so on, and an earlier draft of Clause 5 annexed to their Report in fact included words corresponding to those proposed to be inserted by the Amendments. It was, however, thought that these words were not necessary to achieve the desired result, and they were therefore dropped. Thus, the Amendments do not represent any change of policy. If no noble Lord objects I will put those four Amendments together.

Amendments moved—

Page 4, line 39, leave out first ("of") and insert ("which").

Page 4, line 39, at end insert ("has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future").

Page 4, line 40, leave out ("of") and insert ("which").

Page 4, line 41, at end insert ("has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for dealing with this matter, and for taking it rather further and explaining the reasons. I wish I had thought that it was so simple to draft as it has turned out to be. I must say that I shrank from the task myself, and I am glad to see that the form of the words chosen is comparatively easy. I think that it is correct to make these Amendments to the Bill, because although there is no doubt that the courts could have interpreted the words now in the Bill in the sense intended by the Law Commission, there is equally every possibility that litigation would have been needed, with a fairly high-level decision given by the Court of Appeal before the matter could be established. I am always in favour of trying to make it clear in the Bill itself, without the necessity for some unfortunate person to be a guinea pig in the courts to get the question settled that way. This was certainly the intention expressed by the Law Commission, and it was that thought that put me on to this track in the first place. Therefore I welcome these Amendments. I think they are thoroughly acceptable and just what ought to go into the Bill.

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

6.42 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

moved Amendment No. 10: Page 5, line 11, leave out from ("powers") to end of line 16 and insert ("as to place the parties, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards the other"). The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the effect of this Amendment is to require the court, in ordering financial provision for a spouse, prima facie to try as far as is practicable to put each spouse in the financial position he or she would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had discharged his responsibilities towards the other. Clause 5(1) sets out the criteria to be observed by the court, in accordance with paragraphs 81 to 83 of the Commission's Report. As appears from the note on draft Clause 5 in the Appendix to the Report, the intention is to give statutory form to criteria laid down by the courts in the past. But it has been pointed out that, as drafted, Clause 5(1), if rigidly applied, might constrain the courts to make orders which, in particular circumstances, could have undesirable results.

In its present form, Clause 5(1) requires the court, first, to consider the relevant factors set out in paragraphs (a) to (f) and then so far as it is practicable and, having regard to the conduct of the parties, just to do so", to put the party in whose favour the order is to be made in the position he or she would or should have been had the marriage not broken down. This formula could lead to the conclusion that, where no question of penalising misconduct arises, and where there is enough money to do so, the court must put the payee in his "pre-breakdown" position, regardless of the effect on the payer. This could produce a most unfortunate result. If one takes a case where there is a decree granted to a wife petitioner on the grounds of five years' separation and no question arises of misconduct by either husband or wife, the wife may be receiving an appreciable income of her own—for example from practice as a doctor or from the profits of a business—which is much greater than that of her husband. From the way the parties behaved before the breakdown, it may be clear that, but for the breakdown, the wife would have continued to be the financial mainstay of the family. It would hardly be right for the husband to claim that, on divorce, he was entitled to be put back in his financial status quo, even if this meant the wife's paying him more than half her income.

It is notoriously true that two separate homes are much more expensive to run than one. It will. therefore, in almost every case be impracticable so to reallocate the resources of the parties as to put one spouse in his or her pre-breakdown financial position without drastically reducing the standard of living of the other. In some cases, for example where that other's conduct is the more blameworthy, this may be a fair result. But where there is no question of one being more to blame than the other, it will not be fair. The principle underlying the Amendment is that the court should aim at getting as near as possible to putting both parties in their pre-breakdown financial position, so that, where some reduction in the standard of living is inevitable (as it usually will be), that reduction is shared and not borne entirely by one party—save where his own bad conduct makes it just that he should be the one to suffer the greater financial loss. My Lords, I beg to move.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, this is a point of peculiar subtlety, but it seems to me that the argument that the noble and learned Lord has deployed is a very sound one, and one wishes to avoid the type of decision that could have resulted from the rigid interpretation of the words in the Bill. I certainly support this Amendment. Incidentally, I think the next one is on very much the same point.

BARONESS BIRK

My Lords, there is a point that rather worries me about this matter. I support the Amendment, but I wonder whether it is intended to give a guide-line so far as the period of maintenance itself is concerned, which I think is one of the points some of us were worried about in this particular Bill. Although there is no suggestion in Clause 7 that the maximum term for maintenance should always be used, we all know that it is inclined to be the practice that judges and registrars do use the maximum amount of time for maintenance. Under this Bill that would be until remarriage, or for the life of the joint parties.

I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, that this is a very subtle Amendment, which I can see takes the emphasis from just the one party and puts it on the future and prospects of both parties. I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord could say if in some way this could also be interpreted as a guide-line, certainly to registrars and judges, so far as the maximum period is concerned. Because where a woman has young children or is elderly, then it is obviously important that the maintenance should be for a sufficiently long period to cover her need. There are many young women who are quite capable of training and working for themselves, and who, even when the children are grown up, would then like to undertake work. That seems to me to be the only answer in the long run to the tremendously difficult problem, which is quite insoluble, of how a man keeps two wives, so to speak. There should be encouragement for the woman who can be independent to be independent financially.

I think that if Clause 7 is going to be interpreted in the way the present laws are inclined to be interpreted, then that will offset what I feel is an improvement the Amendment will effect in this particular clause. I should be grateful if the noble and learned Lord could indicate whether this is in the nature of a guideline. At one point I intended to put down an Amendment to the clause, but it seemed impossible to work one out which would be acceptable and which it could not be argued was already implicit in the Bill itself.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I do not think the Amendment will have any effect on the interpretation of the clause as a whole, so far as time is concerned. Its only real effect will be to ensure that both parties are treated equally. I think is its real effect.

On question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment which brings the wording of Clause 5(2) into line with the wording of Clause 5(1). It makes no difference to the substantive effect of Clause 5(2). My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 5, line 34, leave out from ("the") to end of line 38 and insert ("financial position in which the child would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each of those parties had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards him").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 6 [Neglect by party to marriage to maintain other party or child of the family]:

6.50 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I spoke to this Amendment, Amendment No. 12, in moving Amendment No. 2. It raises the same point as Amendments Nos. 2, 3 and 4. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 7, line 41, leave out from ("enabling") to end of line 45 and insert ("any liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred in maintaining the applicant or any child of the family to whom the application relates before the making of the application to be met").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 11 [Power of court to order sums paid under certain orders to be repaid in certain cases]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

moved Amendments Nos. 13 and 14:

Page 12, line 7, after ("to") insert ("or liable to make")

Page 12, line 8, leave out ("that person under the order") and insert ("the person entitled to payments under the order in respect of a period after those circumstances changed")

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, if I may, I will take Amendments Nos. 13 and 14 together. These linked Amendments enable the court to exercise its powers under Clause 11(1) if there has been a change in the circumstances of either payee or payer. As drafted, Clause 11(1) makes a change in the circumstances of the payee relevant, but not a change in those of the payer. This distinction was intentional, and was made on the grounds that, whereas the applicant/payer might well be unaware of a change in the payee's circumstances, he must have been aware of a change in his own and, on becoming so aware, ought to have applied at once for a variation of the order.

Although this argument is sound, there are in practice cases where to ignore a change in the payer's circumstances would cause injustice. It is not uncommon, for example, for a wife to acquiesce in her husband's paying, over a period, less than the amount ordered because she is aware that he has been ill, or his income has dropped, or he has incurred unavoidable expenses. Often, no attempt is made to vary the order in such a case, unless and until the wife has resiled from her earlier position and enforced the arrears. If, then, the husband seeks to vary the order, it may be reasonable for the court to order repayment of the excess. Another possibility is that, by reason of illness or other misfortune, the husband may be unable to make a prompt application for a variation and may go on paying at the full rate during a period when, because of his misfortune, he had good grounds for getting the order reduced. My Lords, that applies to both Amendments. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 13 and 14.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I should just like to say that I am glad that this change has been made, because the general principle of the Bill is to give maximum flexibility to the courts, and this was an example of rigidity. The courts are perfectly capable of exercising proper discretion in this case, and it does not seem to me that there is any sense in laying down a prohibition which prevents them from taking such circumstances as these into account. If they could not do that before, then these Amendments, I am sure, are justified and necessary.

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 26 [Interpretation]:

THE LORD CHANCELLORmoved Amendments Nos. 15 and 16:

Page 22, line 19, after ("child") insert ("not being a child who has been boarded-out with those parties by a local authority or voluntary organisation").

Page 22, line 20, leave out from ("family") to end of line 23.

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, if, for similar reasons, I may take Amendments Nos. 15 and 16 together, these linked Amendments improve the drafting of paragraph (b) of the definition of "child of the family" in Clause 26(1). The intention is that a child boarded-out by a local authority or voluntary organisation should never be treated as a child of the family (because it is the authority's or organisation's statutory duty to make arrangements for such a child), but that a privately-fostered child should be capable of being a "child of the family" if he satisfies the test of being treated by both spouses as a member of their family. But not all privately-fostered children will fall within the definition, and it is not intended that they should. Each case will depend on its own facts.

It has been suggested that, as drafted, paragraph (b) could be construed as implying that a child boarded-out privately must necessarily be a child of the family. The Amendments are designed to exclude the possibility of such an implication arising. As proposed to be amended, paragraph (b) will read: any other child, not being a child who has been boarded-out with those parties by a local authority or a voluntary organisation, who has been treated by both those parties as a child of their family".

My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 15 and 16.

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 35 [Citation, construction, commencement and extent]:

THE LORD CHANCELLORmoved Amendments Nos. 17 and 18:

Page 25, line 35, at beginning insert— ("The following provisions of this Act, that is to say, this section, sections 28 to 31, 33 and 34(2), so far as it repeals section 20(3) and (4) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, shall come into force on 1st August, 1970 and the other provisions of")

Page 25, line 35, at end insert— ("( ) Any reference in any provision of this Act, or in any enactment amended by a provision of this Act, to the comencement of this Act shall be construed as a reference to the date on which that provision comes into force.")

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, if I may take Amendments Nos. 17 and 18 together the effect of these Amendments is to bring Part II (except Clause 32) and the repeals consequential on Clause 31 into force on August 1, 1970, instead of January 1, 1971 (which remains the commencement date for the rest of the Bill), and to make the necessary consequential provision for the construction of references to the commencement of the Bill.

Your Lordships will remember that on Second Reading the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, argued that the Bill should go through quickly; and he put down in Committee an Amendment, moved by my noble friend Lord Silkin, which would have brought it into force on Royal Assent. For the reasons which I gave in my reply, this would be impracticable. The essence of the matter, as I observed, is that Part I involves a fundamental recasting of the Matrimonial Causes Rules. So, to a lesser extent, does the Divorce Reform Act, which comes into force on January 1, 1971. While it would be theoretically possible to rewrite the Rules twice between Royal Assent and January 1, 1971, this would be neither practicable for the Rule Committee nor convenient to anyone.

It is likely that the Bill will receive Royal Assent between Easter and Whit-sun 1970. Although a provisional draft of the Rules could be prepared in advance of Royal Assent, it would not be finalised until thereafter and would then have to be considered by the Rules Committee. The earliest possible date for the new Rules to come into force would in practice be October 1, 1970, and, since the amendments consequential on the Divorce Reform Act will in any event have to come into force on January 1, 1971, there is nothing to be gained, and everything to be lost, by having two bites at the cherry in so short a time. All that applies to Part I.

Most of Part II, however, involves no rule-making or administrative arrangements. Clause 32 clearly depends on Part I and must come into force with it, but the remaining provisions in Part II could, with advantage, come into force sooner. The choice for these provisions is, therefore, between (a) a fixed date; (b) a date fixed by reference to Royal Assent (for example, one month thereafter); or (c) an "appointed day" commencement. The advantage of (a)—that is, a fixed date—is that it enables everyone to know at once what is the commencement date and makes it possible to fix an easily remembered date. The advantage of (b)—that is, by reference to Royal Assent—is that the date may be slightly earlier than under (a), though it will be less easy to ascertain or remember. The advantage of (c)—that is, an appointed day—is that it enables the first available convenient date to be chosen if the Bill makes unexpectedly rapid progress. But, against this, (c) involves a commencement order the effect of which may well not come to the notice of those concerned—an eventuality which, in another context, recently led to a commencement date not being brought to the attention of the High Court and a consequent reversal of the judgment of the High Court by the Court of Appeal.

The Amendments opt for (a). If, as is likely, the Bill receives Royal Assent about Whitsun, August 1 as a commencement date gives all concerned time to appreciate its effect. It is also easily remembered. My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 17 and 18.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, and the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, were very concerned on this point, and I believe that there was some other discussion in which the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, was interested. It would seem to me that the two Amendments represent a happy compromise between what is practicable in terms of making rules and what is desirable in terms of getting the law amended as quickly as possible. Perhaps I may be allowed to speak on behalf of those who are interested but who are not now in their places in thanking the noble and learned Lord for the Amendments.

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Schedule 1 [Transitional provisions and savings]:

7.1 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLORmoved Amendment No. 19: Page 29, line 37, leave out from beginning to end of line 42.

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is to omit paragraph 10 of Schedule 1. Paragraph 10 is a transitional provision, which provides for pending "Wilful neglect" applications to be dealt with under the old law. This is, however, not altogether consistent with the general principle of the Bill that the new, and extended, powers of the court should be exercisable from the moment the Bill comes into force. The effect of the opposite principle, that all pending proceedings should be governed by the old law, would be unsatisfactory. An order for financial provision is not something tied to a particular act occurring at a particular point in time; it is a remedy to meet a current need, and this is as true of "Wilful neglect" as it is true of divorce.

The omission of paragraph 10 means that pending "Wilful neglect" applications will fall within paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 and will therefore be dealt with under Clause 6. If paragraph 10 were left in the Bill, the only consequence would be that additional applications to vary orders might be necessary. Clause 9 is applied by paragraph 3 to orders made under Section 22 of the 1965 Act, since, under paragraph 10, the court's order would have to be one it could have made under Section 22, an applicant who though she could do better under Clause 6 would have only to apply subsequently for a variation of the Section 22 order and on that application she could, because of paragraph 3, exercise its Clause 9 powers and do what it could have done if Clause 6 had applied in the first instance. This would cause unnecessary complications and expense. The simple answer is to make Clause 6 apply to proceedings pending under Section 22. This is what the Amendment does. That would seem to me to be right. I beg to move.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I agree with that, too, but I wonder whether I may bowl the noble and learned Lord a rather fast ball, which I do not expect him to bat back to me to-day. It relates to a point on these transitional provisions which I have been unable to resolve, because they are very complicated. Somebody asked me about this point, which seems to me to be one of some importance—though the answer may be a simple one. Suppose that a divorce had been granted some time ago, and that there was a maintenance order, and that the person who was in receipt of this remarried. Then suppose that this Bill comes into force and that the person who remarried again gets a divorce. Under the old law, assuming that it is a wife, she could have gone back to the original husband on a variation and got the maintenance order restored. Under this Bill, she cannot do that because the maintenance order, if made under this Bill, would have died when she remarried.

What is going to happen in such a case? Is the old order going to continue in force, so that, notwithstanding what is in this Bill, she can on the second divorce go back and seek a variation, an increase, of the order against her original husband? Or is the practice or law going to be that, because she has remarried, she will not get anything on the second application? I can envisage either that the Bill says somewhere in these transitional provisions (although I do not think it does) that she is not going to be allowed to go back, or, possibly, that the practice of the courts will be to say that the general law has now changed and does not allow for maintenance to be claimable on this second occasion and therefore the court will not accede to this order. I think the point is of some importance, and if there is an answer I shall be grateful to have it.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, fortunately these transitional provisions will be only temporary; but I find them complicated. I am going to take advantage of the noble Viscount's offer and I will return the ball between this stage of the Bill and the next.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLORmoved Amendment No. 20: Page 29, line 46, leave out from ("divorce") to ("the") in line 47 and insert ("or nullity of marriage in which a decree nisi has been granted but not made absolute before").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the effect of this Amendment is to apply Clause 17, and not Section 33 of the Act of 1965, to pending divorce and nullity proceedings in which decree nisi has not been pronounced when the Bill comes into force. Apart from the procedural advantages of applying Clause 17—namely, the need for an order of the court giving a right of appeal against it—the only differences of substance are that, first, if Clause 17 applies, there is no room for doubt about the effect of failure to comply, and, secondly, the class of children affected is slightly wider.

So far as the first difference is concerned, the merits of making the position clear are explained in the notes on Clause 17: the fewer cases where there may be some doubt about the validity of the decree, the better. So far as the second difference is concerned, if the right policy is that arrangements made for any "child of the family" should be considered before a decree is made absolute, there is no good reason why the policy should not, merely because the petition was presented before the Bill comes into force, be applied to, for example, a foster-child falling within that description. Where, however, decree nisi has already been pronounced, and the court has already considered the arrangements made for the children relevant at the time of decree nisi, it would cause confusion if decree absolute had to be held up because the existence of some other child, the arrangements for whom were at the time irrelevant and whom the trial judge had never had to consider, had not been brought to the attention of the court. The Amendment omits any reference to judicial separation: the reason being that in judicial separation there is no decree nisi. Either the effective decree has been granted when the Bill comes into force, in which case Section 33 has already been applied, or it has not, in which case paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 applies Clause 17. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 2 [Minor and consequential amendments]:

THE LORD CHANCELLORmoved Amendment No. 21:

Page 31, line 21, at end insert— (" . In section 8(3) of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 (grant of decree of judicial separation) for the words "section 33 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965" there shall be substituted the words "section 17 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1969".")

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment makes a consequential amendment to the Divorce Reform Act. Its effect is to ensure that in judicial separation proceedings to which Clause 17 applies the Divorce Reform Act cannot be construed as requiring a decree to be granted without Clause 17 having been complied with. Since, as a result of the Bill, the Divorce Reform Act will never apply to any such proceedings which are still governed by Section 33 of the 1965 Act, it is correct to substitute in Section 8(3), for the reference to Section 33, a reference to Clause 17. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.