SOUTHERN RHODESIA (UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS) ORDER 1968

HL Deb 17 June 1968 vol 293 cc321-44

2.44 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER) rose to move, That the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1968, laid before the House under Standing Order No. 62 on Monday, June 10, be approved. The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Shepherd I beg to move that this Order be approved.

The problem of Rhodesia is essentially a racial problem, because it relates to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which white men and black men are to live together, we hope in amity, in a part of Africa. That is why, although of course it is a British responsibility, it has always been recognised that it is a problem on which other countries feel deeply and even passionately. When I say "always", I was thinking back to the time in 1964, on February 22, when Mr. Duncan Sandys wrote to the Rhodesian Prime Minister and said: The Press here have been reporting from different sources that Southern Rhodesia may he contemplating a unilateral declaration of independence. I sincerely hope that these reports are without foundation, for I cannot believe that those who may be thinking like this have fully weighed the likely consequences. International reaction would be sharp and immediate. The issue would be raised at once in the United Nations, and we of course would not be able to offer any justification. The whole Commonwealth would be deeply disturbed, and the attitude of the newer members would be extremely antagonistic. Commonwealth and foreign Governments, with one or two exceptions, would almost certainly refuse to recognise Southern Rhodesia's independence, or to enter into relations with her. The African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia would probably set up a Government in exile, which many countries would recognise. Thus isolated, Southern Rhodesia would increasingly become a target for subversion, trade boycotts, air transport bans and other hostile activities organised in other African States. I am unable, offhand, to remember any other observation made by Mr. Sandys with which I am in agreement, but at that time he was undoubtedly right.

The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, putting the point with his usual brevity, said on December 22, 1965, in this House, in Volume 271 of the OFFICIAL REPORT at column 1148: The Government clearly had to tale into account not only the reaction of the Rhodesians themselves, but the reaction of the Africans, the Commonwealth and the rest of the Free World. To do less than to impose sanctions might well have created a situation in the United Nations and in Africa, and so on.

My Lords, the problem of Rhodesia is one which the Government have always thought and said, and I have always thought and said, has only one right solution, and that is the solution of agreement by negotiation. I have said in this House more than once without contradiction that there are only three possible solutions to the Rhodesian problem. The first is the use of force to remove the illegal régime. Of course, I am bound to recognise that there are millions of people in the 'world who believe that this is the right solution. It is to me always very depressing to discuss this subject with Africans, because however hard one tries it is very difficult to get them to realise that this is not really the right solution. One can point out what a long way we are from Rhodesia, how inaccessible it is, how many of the airports in Rhodesia art: surrounded with African houses, whit the logistic difficulties are, that force cannot be the right solution to what is else a constitutional question, that anybody who to-day starts to use force in any part of Africa in circumstances in which it may develop into a racial war is taking a responsibility which no-one ought to take, and that when you have removed force the real problem still remains.

Unfortunately, the Africans have this deeply ingrained belief. They say: "In every other Colony, when anybody has taken power by force you have always used force to remove them. But, of course, they were black, or yellow or brown, and it is only because the illegal régime are white that you do not use force". I have found it, as I think we all have, extraordinarily difficult in talking to Africans to get this idea a out of their heads, although it is in fact one which is quite unjustified.

My Lords, I do not think I need spend any further time in discussing this possible solution, because, however many people may believe that this is a right solution, the Government have always set their face against it and I think that nearly everybody in this House is of the same opinion. I well remember an occasion when the noble Lord Carrington, said that he thought my noble friend Lord Brockway believed in the use of force; but knowing my noble friend slightly better, I said that I did not think that that was so. I have not of course forgotten that the noble Lord, Lord Rea, with his usual clarity, expressed the view that sanctions would not succeed; that unless we were to be utterly disgraced we should have to use force sooner or later; and that probably it was better and cheaper to do it now. But that view, I think, found no support in this House. I take it that we can all agree that that is not the right solution.

My Lords, the second solution is to hand over the 4⅓ million Africans in Rhodesia to the Rhodesian Front. We, that is to say, this Parliament, is of course the only body in the world who can hand over the legal powers in Rhodesia to the Rhodesian Front. That again, I think, finds no support from any of the Parties in this House—certainly not from the Government; not from the Conservative Party; not from the Liberal Party. And we all remember the speech made by the most reverend Primate, who said that this was a moral issue. I am not quite sure whether anyone in this House really thinks that we ought to say, "We have done our best; sanctions have not succeeded and the simple solution for us —and it is a simple solution—is to recognise the illegal régime and wash our hands of Rhodesia".

There are, of course, a certain number of noble Lords who I think are sometimes called "The Rhodesia Lobby". This is a term which I use with no disrespect, for I have frequently in this House accepted the complete sincerity of the views they express; and if I could think of a better group term I would. In December, 1965, on a Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, specifically on pensions but which ranged very widely, being advised by the Conservative Party not to vote against the Government, twenty-three of them, mostly Peers by succession, did so. And later in that month, on a debate on the Petroleum Order, being advised by their Party not to vote against the Govern- ment, nineteen of them, the majority of whom were Peers by succession, did so. In February, 1967, on the first mandatory Sanctions Order, being advised by the Opposition not to vote against the Government, thirteen of them—eleven of whom were here because they are their fathers' sons—voted against the Government. I have never been quite clear whether that fairly small group thinks that this is really the right solution. If so, no doubt in the course of this debate they will make it plain—as I do not think so far they have ever made it plain—whether they think that that is the right solution or whether they would themselves be against it.

My Lords, it occurs to me that there is a possible fourth solution; although I would not describe it as a present one. I remember there was once one of these opinion polls on what we should do about Rhodesia, in which 70 per cent. —which I suppose is a fairly high proportion—was in favour of handing the whole problem over to the United Nations. But that manifestly is not a thing which we can properly do until, at least, we have tried to do everything we can to solve the problem ourselves, it being in fact our responsibility.

If I am right in thinking that the only right solution is a settlement by negotiation, then no doubt in those negotiations there will be questions of principle and questions of detail. On all questions of detail I would hope that everybody concerned would always be prepared to compromise to the greatest extent possible. But there are questions of principle to which we and our predecessors are committed because we have always said that we accept the Six Principles; and Sir Alec Douglas-Home has I think recently said that a Conservative Government—if a Conservative Government were elected—could accept a settlement only on those Principles. If I may, I will remind the House of what they are. First, the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution would have to be maintained and guaranteed; secondly, there would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution; thirdly, there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; fourthly, there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination; and, fifthly, the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. And to those five Principles the House will remember that the present Government added a sixth; it would be necessary to ensure that regardless of race there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority. We were, of course, thinking of the position of the Africans before majority rule and of the position of the Europeans after majority rule.

My Lords, the place of sanctions in all this is simply in order to try to effect a change of mind in Salisbury so that they are prepared to reach an agreement based on those Principles. On December 22, 1965 in the same debate, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington said: It has been the object of those who sit on these Batches to support the Government and to maintain the unity of the country in this grave emergency whenever possible, though many of us have had doubts what the outcome of the Government's policy would be. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that it would have been impossible that Mr. Smith's Government should not suffer serious consequences as a result of their illegal declaration of independence. If force was out of the question, as it was, and still is, then it seems to me that it was necessary to impose sanctions. If sanctions were to be imposed, then it really was quite impossible to differentiate between punitive sanctions and sanctions which were not punitive, since it was hoped that sanctions would bring home to Mr. Smith and his colleagues the consequences of his act of rebellion, and so impress the people of Rhodesia with the gravity of the situation that moderate men could emerge and take over the Government. I am bound to say, though I know that this view is not shared by some of my noble friends, that oil sanctions do not seem to me to be very different in kind from the other sanctions which have already been imposed."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, col. 1141.]

My Lords, sanctions, it is said, have not succeeded. Indeed, there seem to me to be two complaints about sanctions: complaints by those who say that they are not sufficiently effective; and complaints by those who say that they are too effective. Sanctions have, I suggest, in part, succeeded; because they have apparently succeeded in persuading some people in Salisbury that there is no good in their going on like this. After two and a half years there is still no country in the world which recognises the illegal régime as the legal Government of Rhodesia; their trade shrinks the whole time, and they will have in the end, as the only solution, to make an agreement with the British Government on the basis of this Six Principles.

My Lords, I take as an example, and because it does not come from the Government, an article from somebody who I suppose ought to know, and who is the regular Salisbury correspondent of the Economist. I suppose it is his business to know about the economy in Rhodesia. In an article published on the 8th of this month he says this: Rhodesia's industrialists have warned Mr. Ian Smith more bluntly than ever before that economic progress requires a return to normal trading with the outside world. Any new Rhodesian Constitution, they argue, must be acceptable to the world's major trading nations. For some time they have been pressing their points in heated private exchanges with the Smith regime. They have been accused of wanting a 'sell-out'. Now they have brought their demands into the open. On May 22, at the Annual Congress of the Association of Rhodesian Industries, the theme was announced sharply by the preside it, Mr. William Perry of Lancashire Steel. Delegate after delegate played variations on the theme, accompanied by applause, in the presence of visibly unhappy members of the Smith government. Some 200 manufacturers were present, representing 90 per cent. of secondary industrial production. They heard Mr Perry warn Rhodesia that it could not afford to ignore the looming threat of mandatory sanctions on all its trade—a threat that has become reality with the Security Council's unanimous resolution of May 29. Just before the 1965 declaration of independence, business was flourishing. Exports of manufactured goods to Zambia and Malawi were going up. Never had Rhodesia's balance of payments been so healthy. But the industrialists' warnings were ignored by the Smith men, the farmers and many top civil servants, and the plunge was taken. Then came the clampdown on imports to conserve foreign exchange, and the shrinking of Rhodesia's export market under the pressure of sanctions. Hundreds of factories switched to the home market. New industries opened up. To-day it is fairly hard to find imported goods in the shops. Some manufacturers have made a lot of money in this hungry market. They say so frankly. Others, especially the manufacturers of textiles, footwear and radios, did well in the comparatively new South African market until the recent restrictions secured by alarmed South African manufacturers. This is the bitterest blow of all, especially as South Africa has meanwhile captured former Rhodesian markets in Zambia and Malawi. Now the home market is reaching saturation point. The South African market doesn't look so good. Manufacturers need to move into the wider export field again if growth rates are to be maintained, factories kept busy and labour employed. There are fears of inflation and of African unrest. At the recent annual congress loud applause greeted Mr. Denis Berens, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, who said that: 'Any form of worthwhile sustained economic growth can only come to Rhodesia through a settlement with Britain in the political sphere.' As Mr. Coutthard of the Metal Box Company said: 'That view should have been expressed by us long ago.' What I venture to think has happened is that there has been this change of view among manufacturers, churches, universities and most educated people in Salisbury, but they have kept it so far to themselves, and they are only now beginning to press that view upon the artisans and small farmers who are still, of course, the majority of the Rhodesian Front. And it is perhaps also noteworthy that on the Queen's Birthday some 3,000 people took the trouble to go to the Governor and sign his book, a far larger number than in the previous year.

The second reason why sanctions have not so far been completely successful is that to start with we were the only people who operated them at all, and even since the first mandatory resolution of the Security Council, mandatory sanctions have been applied only to those goods which were specified in the resolution. The result seems to have been a pressure among countries to increase their trade with Rhodesia in the unprohibited goods; and, of course, so long as they can trade with Rhodesia in unprohibited goods it is perhaps not surprising if some prohibited goods get in by the back door as well. The third reason, I think, is that for so much of all the time that sanctions have been going on there have also been going on in Salisbury talks about talks about talks. I have, naturally, been familiar with the substance of these talks. Mr. Smith has always been most anxious that he should be able to tell his people in Salisbury that there were talks going on and, naturally enough, this has militated against a change of view by the ordinary white settlers; because they have always said, "There are talks going on; Smith is going to settle it; he has told us that this is the great prize and that he will end by settling it with the British Government on his own terms ".

My Lords, of course it was really only about a fortnight before the "Tiger" that any of these talks resulted in any sort of advance on Mr. Smith's position at all. Originally his position was clear. I was in the Cabinet Room at No. 10 when he said (this is on page 72 of the Blue Book) that he must make it clear that the Government party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule, and he was always quite plain about that. When it came to asking for a guarantee that the Constitution, if they were given independence, would not subsequently be changed backwards against the Africans, he always said that he could not agree to that. And the reason was that if at any time it appeared that there was actually likely to be an African majority elected, obviously they would have to have the right to change the Constitution backwards to stop it.

He said—and this appears on page 105 of the Blue Book: The Rhodesian Government must therefore retain their powers in this field since if it appeared at a future election that an African Government. was probable and the Rhodesian Government felt in the light of developments in countries to the north of Rhodesia that this would still be premature they must have the power to delay such a majority by, for example, a reduction in the B-roll seats in the last resort. This would be their only means of preserving their civilisation. My Lords, apart from a very brief hour in the "Tiger", Mr. Smith, has usually fairly frankly said that he does not believe in majority rule, and he cannot agree to entrenched clauses or to any sort of guarantee that he would not alter the Constitution afterwards against the Africans.

Some of your Lordships may have seen on April 28 an account of an interview with Mr. Smith by Mr. Ian Waller, of the Sunday Telegraph. The article said: An apparent end to all prospect of agreement between Britain and Rhodesia now seems inevitable. In an exclusive interview with me here to-day Mr. Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, rejected any … principle of African majority rule. Mr. Smith said that, failing an early settlement, Rhodesia would introduce its own Constitution, based on the report of the Whaley Commission proposing eventual parity between the 4 million Africans and 250.000 Europeans. Britain and the world would have to accept this as a fait accompli… I put this question to Mr. Smith, 'Do you think that any negotiations with Britain based on the principle of eventual majority rule would be acceptable to your Party or the country?' Mr. Smith replied, 'Not only as a party, but I don't think any white person in Rhodesia accepts this. Maybe Garfield Todd does, and you can perhaps find a dozen people. But generally speaking no one accepts it. They face up to the facts of life. I have never said I accept it, and I hope I have made it clear that on the evidence before me I think majority rule would lead to absolute chaos in Rhodesia at the moment. It may be different in twenty, a hundred years' time. I don't know. It is not a decision for me to make. My children will have to make it. The only way we could sell this would be to try to get people to believe that it did not really mean anything for the next 100 years. Maybe you could sell it to Rhodesians on that basis.'. If that is Mr. Smith's view, the present difficulty is to see what anybody is going to Salisbury to negotiate about. If we are right in maintaining the Six Principles and the Conservative Party are right in saying that they believe in majority rule; if, so far as I have been led to discover, there is no real difference between us about the word "when"—because the Prime Minister has always said that the Africans before they can get majority rule must show in practice that they are capable of governing the country, and obviously this must be many, many years ahead—what do we negotiate about, if that is Mr. Smith's attitude about that one of the Six Principles and if, as I have no doubt, Mr. Smith would, for his own purposes, like us to start again talks about talks about talks?

Speaking as recently as May 3 at Bulawayo, Mr. Smith said that he could tell in precisely one minute which he considered to be the most important ingredient of any Constitution for Rhodesia: the ability to change it, so that if in 10 or 20 years' time our children find that the course along which we have set Rhodesia is drifting, then they will be able easily to amend this and change the course so that it once more moves back on to the true course. I do not know how this can possibly be reconciled with the second Principle. Therefore, while the Government believe that the only right solution for Rhodesia is a settlement by negotiation, sanctions are for the purpose of inducing in Mr. Smith the same change of mind which has already apparently taken place among the businessmen in Salisbury.

May I then come to the United Nations resolution and the Order? There are still, so far as we know, between 50 and 100 Africans waiting in the death cells in Rhodesia. It was the executions, of course, which led some Afro-Asians to put a resolution before the Security Council. I am aware that those who are in the Rhodesian lobby—I call them this because I cannot think of any other appropriate group word—do not like the United Nations. We could, of course, leave the United Nations, but if we remain members then we must be realistic. I say that because sometimes they speak as if either we control the United Nations or we would control the United Nations if only we were not a Labour Government. But there is no way in which a member can be stopped from putting a resolution before the Security Council.

The Afro-Asians got their draft resolution in first. It was clear that they were not going to allow it to be voted on paragraph by paragraph, and they were entitled to have their resolution taken first. It does not matter whether we have a Labour Government, a Conservative Government or a Government of members of the Rhodesian Lobby, because there were only three things we could do: we could Note for it, vote against it or abstain. To be really practical, there were only two choices—either to vote for it or against it; because as the resolution was a mandatory one, if we merely abstained it would bind us all the same.

The original resolution contained things to which we could not possibly agree. No one with any knowledge of the world to-day would disagree with the proposition that it is a serious thing to use the veto. We have been a member of the United Nations for nearly a quarter of a century and we have used the veto only three times—twice on Suez (the less said about that perhaps the better). After something of a preamble, saying it was all our fault, the resolution then named South Africa and Portugal as the chief sanction-breakers and threatened sanctions against them. We have always made it clear that we were not going to he engaged in any form of trade war with South Africa. It called on us to use force. We have always made it plain that we could not agree to use force. It called for a complete cessation of all postal and commercial relations with Rhodesia. This would have meant that we should have had to withdraw our mission from Salisbury. A later draft of the resolution sought to impose on us an obligation to accept no independence before majority rule; whatever we agreed with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers could be altered by agreement. We could not accept that. Also there were to be no further negotiations.

I appreciate the effect throughout the Commonwealth and the whole world if we had used the veto in favour of Rhodesia. I do not believe that there is any other man in the whole world who could have done what my noble friend Lord Caradon did, patiently day after day arguing, negotiating with Africans, Asians and South Americans, with men who respect him for his views on racial subjects and for his integrity. I frankly say that if I had been asked 48 hours before the actual vote in the Security Council what I thought would happen, I should have had to say, strongly as I felt about it, that I was afraid that the probability was that we should have to use the veto. It is solely because of the efforts of my noble friend Lord Caradon and the personal terms on which he is with African, Asian and South American leaders, all of whom, it is right to say, felt that if it was possible to make such adjustments as would enable us to accede to it, that was what they would like, that eventually those clauses went and for the first time a resolution in relation to Rhodesia was passed by the Security Council with, among others, Brazil, Denmark, India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, America, Russia and (voting for the first time on Rhodesia) France.

The Order which I am asking your Lordships to approve may look rather long, because there are 19 clauses, but the sole reason for its length is that it revokes 11 existing Orders and puts them all together in one. Also, previously we did not have to put in any Order prohibitions with regard to goods not covered by the previous resolution on mandatory sanctions, because from the word "Go" we had stopped all trade with Rhodesia. So this Order extends the prohibition to all goods. Therefore, except for one clause dealing with residents in Rhodesia, the Order makes no change to anything at all. Of course, the resolution passed by the Security Council makes an immense change. The change is that now, for the first time, all the countries of the world who are members of the United Nations have to assume the same burden that we have been assuming ever since the start. On many occasions I have heard Members of your Lordships' House complain that we were losing all our trade and that other people were getting it. Now, for the first time, the burden we have assumed from the start will be taken by substantially all the countries of the world.

As this is an Order, I ought just to go through it briefly, and I will do so as quickly as I can. Article I of the Order restricts the importation into the United Kingdom of all goods that have been exported from Southern Rhodesia since the commencement of the Order. The prohibition is so framed that for the purposes of the Customs and Excise Act 1952 it has effect as an enactment relating to customs. The object of this is to attract the enforcement machinery and the ancillary provisions of the Act of 1952; for example, the provisions authorising the forfeiture of goods illegally imported, the provisions conferring powers on customs officers to detect evasions, and the provisions regulating the procedure in prosecutions. The Article is therefore virtually a repetition of Article I of the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) Order 1966, except that it applies to all goods and not merely to the goods that were specified by the latter Order.

Article 2 restricts the exportation of all goods from Southern Rhodesia and also restricts certain transactions which are ancillary to such exportation. In particular, it will be seen that paragraph (3) of the Article is aimed at dealings in goods that have been illicitly exported. Once again, this Article is, in substance, a repetition of the corresponding Article of the Order of 1966, except that it now applies to all goods and not merely to a list of specified goods. It will be seen that Articles 1 and 2 deal with traffic in goods originating in Southern Rhodesia, whether for export to this country or elsewhere. Articles 3, 4 and 5 deal with traffic in the reverse direction; that is to say, with goods consigned to Southern Rhodesia either from this country or from other countries.

Article 3 restricts the exportation from the United Kingdom of goods that are consigned for Southern Rhodesia. As in the case of Article 1, and for the same reasons, the Article is expressed to have effect as an enactment relating to the Customs and Excise Act 1952. And again, this Article—which, as I have already said, merely gives legal effect in a different form to a virtually total prohibition on exports to Rhodesia which has been in force in this country for a considerable time—substantially reproduces the corresponding Articles of the Order of 1966, but covers the whole range of goods and not merely those that were specified in the latter Order.

Articles 4 and 5 deal with the supply of goods to Southern Rhodesia from any place outside that country, and with the importation of goods into Southern Rhodesia. These Articles are also substantially the same as the corresponding Articles in the Order of 1966, again with the qualification that they now apply to all goods and not merely to certain specified goods.

Article 6 deals with the carriage in British ships and aircraft of goods that have been illegally exported from Southern Rhodesia or that are being illegally consigned to Southern Rhodesia. Again, this is very largely a reproduction of the corresponding Article in the Order of 1966. However, it goes slightly wider than the earlier provision in two respects. In the first place, and in order to meet the requirements of the relevant provision in the Security Council resolution it deals not only with carriage in British registered ships and aircraft but also with carriage by our nationals in foreign ships and aircraft which they have chartered. Secondly, and again primarily to give formal compliance with the terms of the resolution, the Article prohibits the carriage of goods in question in land transport vehicles within the United Kingdom.

Given our own interpretation of what constitutes importation into this country, and our effective control over it, I think that this particular provision can be regarded as pretty academic so far as we are concerned, but it was thought desirable to include a reference in the resolution to carriage by land transport, since some countries apparently take the view that goods carried in bond across their territory are not to De regarded as having been imported. The House will be pleased to know that this addition to the resolution effectively closes a small but not insignificant loophole in the application of the earlier Security Council resolution. It thus helps to ensure that foreign traders do not have an unfair advantage over our own businessmen.

Article 7 deals with the use or operation of undertakings in Southern Rhodesia for the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles. It also imposes restrictions on certain transactions concerning such undertakings if these transactions might enable the mail provisions of the Article to be evaded or disregarded. This Article is, to ill intents and purposes, a repetition of Article 6 of the Order of 1966, which gave effect to a particular provision of the Security Council resolution of December 16, 1966. It does not directly derive from the latest Security Council resolution, except in so far as that resolution expressly reaffirms the earlier resolution. But since, as I will explain when I come to deal with Article 18, the present Order revokes the earlier Orders, it was necessary to re-enact this particular provision. As I have said it represents no alteration in the law.

Article 8 is, in a sense, ancillary to Article 6. It confers powers on "authorised officers"—that is to say, naval and military officers, customs officers, consular officers and officials of the Board of Trade—to investigate British ships and aircraft that are suspected of being involved in the carriage of goods to or from Southern Rhodesia, contrary to the Order. In the case of ships suspected of being involved in the carriage of goods to or from Southern Rhodesia, authorised officers are given the power to divert and detain ships for investigation or to forbid them to land the cargo in question. Again, this Article is, in substance, a repetition of the corresponding provision in the Order of 1966.

Article 9 is a repetition of the provisions which were inserted into the Order of 1966 by the Amendment made in March. 1967: that is to say, the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Amendment) Order 1567. It confers certain powers on the Minister to prevent or restrict the transfer of the ownership of certain property overseas where such a transfer might lead to a contravention or evasion of the Order. The House will recall that when this power was first taken last year directions were given under it to prevent the transfer of the ownership of the pipeline which in normal times carries crude oil to the refinery in Rhodesia from the Port of Beira. No further directions have since been given. Since the earlier Orders are being revoked, it was necessary to reproduce this particular provision, and the House will see that Article 18(3) contains a transitional provision as a result of which the directions about the pipeline that were given under the earlier Order are to have effect from now on as though they were given under this Order.

I turn now to Articles 10 and 11 of the Order, which together give effect to paragraph 6 of the Security Council resolution, the paragraph which deals with the operation of aircraft into and out of Rhodesia and with what it describes as "linking-up" between Rhodesian airlines and other airlines. Article 10 deals with the first half of this topic. As required by the resolution, it restricts the operation to or from Rhodesia of British airline companies and British registered aircraft, and also aircraft that are chartered by British nations. As the House will realise, this is largely academic, since neither B.O.A.C. nor any of the independent airline companies have for some time now operated any flights between this country and Rhodesia.

The second half of paragraph 6 of the resolution—"linking-up"—is covered by Article 11 of the Order. As the House will see, this regulates the conclusion or the carrying out of certain arrangements or agreements which involve co-ordination or co-operation between Rhodesian air transport services and British air transport services. Again, it is not likely that these provisions will make very much difference to our own airlines, but the inclusion of this prohibition against "linking-up" in the resolution may well prove a great hindrance to the attempt by the illegal regime to gain acceptance for the so-called "Air Rhodesia Corporation" which it purported to set up in place of the Central African Airways Corporation.

I now come to Article 12 of the Order, which I recognise is the provision which is likely to be of most concern to the House. This Article is intended to give effect to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution, which calls upon all Member States of the United Nations to prevent the entry into their territories of certain classes of persons connected with Southern Rhodesia. I will say a word in a few minutes about how we have defined these classes in terms of our own legislation, but it may be convenient if I first of all explain to the House how the machinery established by this Article will work.

The House will see that the Article operates by attracting the relevant provisions of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 as, of course, amended by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968. It was thought desirable to proceed in this way so that the immigration officers, upon whom the burden of carrying out these measures will fall, can use the machinery of the 1962 Act, with which they are familiar and to which their organisation is geared. It was also thought desirable that the procedure for examining the cases of these would-be entrants from Rhodesia should be exactly the same—neither more nor less favourable—as applies in the case of persons coming from other Commonwealth countries.

Against this background, therefore, Article 12 applies to two classes of persons. The first consists of those persons whom the resolution describes as travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport. This is the class described in Article 12(1)(a) of the Order. There are two comments which it might be helpful for me to make in this connection. The first is that the concept of travelling on a passport is represented in municipal law terms by the concept of tendering a passport to an immigration officer on seeking entry into the United Kingdom. The test, in other words, is what the person concerned holds himself out as being when he arrives at the immigration control point. My second comment is that, as my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary explained to another House when discussing the resolution in its draft form, we do not think it is right, in giving effect to this part of the resolution, to deny entry to this country to persons who are our citizens whether or not they also hold Rhodesian passports. Accordingly, the House will see, from sub-paragraph (i) of Article 12(1)(a), that an immigration officer cannot refuse entry to a person who satisfies him that he is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies.

The second class of persons to whom Article 12 applies are those defined in Article 12(1)(b). These are residents of Southern Rhodesia who we have reason to think are active supporters of the illegal regime who are involved in sanctions-breaking activities. The House will see that in this case there is no exception—and this is deliberate—merely because they are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. But since the persons concerned are, by definition, ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia, they are not being excluded from the place where they have their home.

In relation to these two classes of persons the operative part of the Article —that is to say, paragraph (2)—provides that an immigration officer acting under the 1962 Act may (and I emphasise the word "may") refuse entry to a person who arrives here from abroad, or may admit him subject to conditions. This discretion will of course be exercised in accordance with instructions given by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, and in dealing with these instructions he will naturally have regard to the exception for humanitarian cases which the resolution specifically makes in the case of persons travelling on Rhodesian passports.

The House will also observe that paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 12(2) render persons to whom the Article applies liable to deportation if, but of course only if, they are convicted of offences against the Act in the form in which it applies to them by virtue of the Article. What this means in practice is that where a person whose entry is subject to control under the Article evades that control and enters the country illegally, or where he breaks the conditions upon which he was permitted to enter, he can, if he is convicted by a court of the offence which he thus committed, be put in the same position as if he had originally been refused entry.

The powers conferred by Article 12 are of course drastic. I recognise this. They are not powers which we have taken gladly or lightly. They are not and I must emphasise this—intended to operate by way of punishment. They are intended rather to be coercive, in the ordinary sense of the word, and deterrent. That is to say, they are intended, in so far as they impede the travel of ordinary Rhodesians, to bring home to them the isolation and estrangement from the rest of the civilised world which the actions of their leaders have imposed on them. In so far as they affect those who actively support the régime and further its policies, whether in the political field or in the economic field, they are intended to hamper their activities as far as lies within our power and to deter others who might be minded to follow their example.

But, of course, the question whether action should be taken in respect of any particular person for these latter reasons is in every case a matter of judgment. In the nature of things it can be only a matter of judgment, and it is part of the responsibility of the Secretary of State that the judgment must be his. It is a judgment for which he is accountable to Parliament, and he cannot, even if he would, shift that responsibility anywhere else. But he recognises that this is a matter where, in order to assure Parliament and the country that his responsibilities are being exercised reasonably and in good faith, it is desirable to set up some independent procedure for reviewing these cases; and I will say another word about that in a moment.

I should like to make clear at this point that in order to assist all States to apply the United Nations' resolution we propose to declare invalid all existing Southern Rhodesian passports. Her Majesty's Government will retain, as the responsible authority in Rhodesia, the power to issue in lieu of invalidated Southern Rhodesian passports United Kingdom passports where there are special reasons for doing so. I do not want to enter into detail now, but I think that the House will wish to knew that we propose to do this in the case of Rhodesians who are established residents in any country outside Rhodesia as well as in the following cases.

First, family members. If one member of a family holds a United Kingdom passport the other immediate members—husband, wife and children under 21—will qualify for temporary United Kingdom passports when the family is travelling as a group. Secondly, compassionate cases, which will in any case be eligible for entry under the humanitarian clause. Thirdly, political refugees. People in this class will have to satisfy us that they would experience genuine persecution for their political views if they were refused passport facilities. Passports for persons known to be terrorists will of course be refused. As the House knows, the Government have throughout condemned any actions by terrorists, whether inside or outside Rhodesia. Fourthly, all students as defined in the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 and the instructions to entry certificate officers. Fifthly, a small number of cases approved specifically by the Secretary of State or his deputy when the grant of a passport is in the public interest. We shall apply the same criteria to Rhodesians not possessing United Kingdom citizenship who have obtained six-months British passports in exchange for Rhodesian documents and who seek to have them renewed.

My Lords, I said that I would say something about the review procedure. Having carefully considered this, the Government have decided to set up an Advisory Committee to review the special cases in which United Kingdom passport facilities have been withdrawn in consequence of the Government's policy towards Rhodesia. I have seen Mr. Justice Cairns, who was formerly Chairman of the Monopolies Commission and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Justice when he was at the Bar, and he has agreed to accept the chairmanship of this Committee. My right honourable friend has also been able to secure the services as members of the Committee of Sir William Murray, formerly Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Scottish Office; Sir William Oliver, formerly Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff and High Commissioner in Australia; and Mr. F. J. Pedler, Deputy Chairman of the United Africa Company.

The detailed terms of reference are still under discussion and they will be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT as soon as possible; but, briefly, they are as follows. The Committee will scrutinise and report to the Secretary of State on all the cases in which the decision has so far been taken to withdraw passport facilities in accordance with the Statement made to the House by the then Commonwealth Secretary on January 25, 1966. They will also scrutinise all those cases in which it is decided that a United Kingdom citizen, or any other person who would ordinarily be entitled to enter this country freely, should be denied entry in accordance with Article 12(1)(b) of the Order now being debated. If a person wishes to have his case reviewed by the Committee the Secretary of State will arrange for this to be done.

As the House knows, the issue of passports has always taken place under the prerogative of the Crown. The final responsibility for the deciding action in individual cases must remain with the Secretary of State, but I can assure the House that he will give the fullest weight to the Advisory Committee's report and recommendations. It strikes me as a Committee such as a good many of us were fairly familiar with a great many years ago, during the war, the 18B Committee, of which Mr. Justice Birkett (as he then was) was Chairman. As an additional safeguard, in view of the public disquiet and the danger of arbitrary action, my right honourable friend has decided to define and make public the categories of persons against whom action will be taken in accordance with Article 12(1)(b) of the Order: first, sanction breakers; second, those who, by reason of the office they hold, must be regarded as giving active support to the illegal régime, for example, Rhodesian Front Members of Parliament; third, those who, in terms of the United Nations resolution, we have reason to believe have furthered or encouraged the unlawful actions of the illegal regime. A person in this last category will in future be notified and will be told the grounds upon which this decision has been taken.

I should like to take this opportunity of expressing the thanks of the Government to Mr. Justice Cairns and the members of the committee for giving their time to this matter. That, a clause of the resolution we could practically have done without, as far as we are concerned is almost the only effect which the Order which your Lordships are being asked to approve has, but I had better just shortly complete my review of it.

I turn now to Article 13, which deals with certain activities calculated to promote emigration to Southern Rhodesia. The House may be aware that we were under considerable pressure in the United Nations to agree to the inclusion in the resolution of a provision requiring all States absolutely to prevent emigration to Southern Rhodesia. We made it clear that such a provision was unacceptable to us both because of the probable ineffectiveness and unenforceability of any prohibition in these terms and because it did not seem to us to be justified on its own merits. But we had to recognise that it has for a long time been a matter of considerable offence to our friends in other countries that the régime and its supporters have been able, both in this country and elsewhere, to go around soliciting professional people and skilled workers to take up employment in Southern Rhodesia and thus to help boost the Rhodesian economy and protect it against the effect of sanctions. No doubt employment in Rhodesia is still attractive for those who would enjoy the privileged position of the European population there; and those individuals whose consciences permit them to take advantage of that privileged position must be left free to do so if they wish. But there is no reason why we should make it easy for the régime to run deliberate campaigns to attract them, the sort of campaigns which featured in the Press a few months ago and which justifiably caused indignation among many of my noble friends. Accordingly, we agreed that it was reasonable to insert a provision into the resolution aimed at these activities and for us to include in our own legislation a provision on the lines of Article 13. It will be seen that that Article does not strike at the individual emigrant but only at what may be broadly described as public advertisements or solicitations.

The remainder of the Order deals with such matters as enforcement, interpretation and similar ancillary topics. Article 14, which should be read together with the First Schedule, confers certain powers on the Secretary of State, the Board of Trade and the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. These powers are for the purpose of obtaining evidence and information to secure compliance with the provisions of the Order and to detect evasions. Once again, these provisions are substantially a reproduction of the corresponding provisions of the Order of 1966. The same is also true of Article 15. Articles 16 and 17 deal with interpretation, and Article 18 revokes the existing 11 Orders in this field, which are really the substance of the Order. As your Lordships will see, Lord Caradon obtained an amendment of practically every objectionable point contained in the original resolution before the Security Council, but now that the Security Council has unanimously passed this mandatory resolution I cannot see how any Government in this country could possibly do anything except to implement it, whatever Government was in power.

I should like to make two final points, apologising for taking so long. First, I would ask Members in all parts of the House to bear in mind the effect of any adverse vote on the reputation of this country throughout the world, not merely the Commonwealth, and also in the United Nations. Lastly, there is a point in connection with which I have a personal concern and which I hope will not be thought irrelevant. For months past I have been the chairman of the all-Party Committee on House of Lords Reform, a subject which, as we all know, in the past has proved to be one of great difficulty. We have been meeting, week after week, month after month, and while it has been agreed that the details of our discussion should be treated as confidential, I can at least say, not only that the conference has not broken down yet but that it is within a very short measure of a true all-Party agreement. It really seems to me that it would be most unfortunate if any action taken by any group on any side were to be such as to cause the end of these discussions which have been taking place. I am quite sure that we need a Second Chamber, and a Second Chamber in terms which can be defended before the modern world, and I would certainly very much welcome any comments on that which any of the other members of the all-Party Committee might think fit to make.

I am not an expert on constitutional law. I have heard the position stated in this House, and I do not know that I have ever thought of contradicting it, because it was people like the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who were expressing it. But on December 22, 1965, in the debate on the Petroleum Order, he said this: We in this House are in a very extraordinary position. Because of our composition, it is more than likely that if the Opposition decided to vote against the Government their vote would be successful. All of us have in the past tried to lay down certain guide lines as to how the House of Lords should conduct itself in situations of deep Party controversy. There is no precedent for the situation in which we find ourselves today. Nevertheless, if this Order were rejected by the House, although it has passed the Commons with a large majority, certain consequences would follow. The decision of the Government, taken in concert with the United States and supported by a number of other European powers and by the Commonwealth, would seem to be rendered inoperative on a vote taken by this House in defiance, in opposition, to the elected Chamber. Of course, the House is entitled to do that; but, my Lords, surely no Government could passively accept such an adverse vote. Either the powers of the House would be further curtailed or, more likely, there would be a very drastic reform of both the powers and the composition of the House. Noble Lords who feel strongly on this matter should, I think, make up their minds whether this issue is one on which the House of Lords should decide to use its ultimate power. Will not those who dislike these sanctions have made their opinion abundantly clear by the end of the evening? What can they hope to achieve by a vote? Is this really an issue on which, or is this the right moment, to face a constitutional crisis? To me, my Lords, the answer is clearly, 'No'; and, if I have carried any of your Lordships on these Benches with me in anything I have said this evening, I would earnestly beg you not to oppose this Order by voting, but to abstain, as I and colleagues who sit beside me on this Bench propose to do."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22/12/65, cols. 1151–52.]

An even closer parallel was, of course, the debate on the first mandatory sanctions by the United Nations. This was in February of last year, February 6. This really seems to me the very same point. The noble Lord, Lord Harlech, said this: I now come to the difficult problem of what we, in this Chamber, should do about these two particular Orders. I suppose it might be argued that however much we disapprove of the Government's course of action —and we made this disapproval abundantly clear, I think, during the debate in December —the Security Council has now, wisely, or as we think, unwisely, passed a resolution which makes it mandatory on the British Government to impose precise and rigorous sanctions. If we were now to vote against the Orders and succeeded in nullifying them we should be preventing the Government from acting in a manner in which they are compelled to act by the clear provisions of the United Nations Charter. I do not know how much weight noble Lords would wish to attach to this particular argument, but what seems to me to be the most telling argument against refusing the Government these Orders is that it would be an unprecedented interference by this, a non-elected Chamber, in the executive actions of a Government supported by a large majority in another place. I cannot feel that this would be a proper exercise of our powers."—[OFFICIAL RETORT, 6/2/67, col. 1157]

My Lords, I find it very difficult to see why, if those considerations were right then, similar considerations do not apply at the present time. Here is this unanimous resolution of the Security Council; here is this Order, and the Order—this is the only thing on which the House will vote—apart from this rather complicated matter of Rhodesian residence, does virtually nothing which we have not done all the way through. What the whole resolution of the United Nations really does is to impose on all countries burdens which we had ourselves borne in the past. It is on those grounds that I would ask the House to accept the Order.

I do not wish to say anything further which might in any way lead to any antagonism by one group against some other group. I felt, as Chairman of the All-Party Conference, I was entitled to point out that if in effect an agreement by all Parties of a modernised version of this House could be arrived at it really would be sad, to say the least of it, if because of anything in to-day's events all that were to be lost. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1968, laid before the House under Standing Order No. 62 on Monday, June 10, be approved.—(The Lord Chancellor.)