HL Deb 25 July 1967 vol 285 cc692-720

3.0 p.m.

EARL JELLICOE rose to move, That this House regrets that the proposals in Command Paper 3357 gravely impair the capacity of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force to meet all the demands that may be made on them. The noble Earl said: My Lords, in our Defence debate some three months ago I deplored the fact that our defence policies were being distorted by the straitjacket of a quite arbitrary limit of defence expenditure. I predicted that, faced with the collapse of their economic policies and with thunder on his Left, Mr. Healey would once again take his knife to our Armed Forces. I suggested also that we might be graciously informed about his surgical intentions just before the Summer Recess. I regret that these surmises have proved only too close to the mark.

My Lords, we live in very unquiet times. We have all within the last two months or so come unpleasantly close to the brink in the Middle East. Much fire and much tinder still lie around that region. Africa, or large parts of it, is in convulsion; and in the Far East the running sore of Vietnam spreads. It may be that U Thant was exaggerating when he spoke recently of the proximity of a Third World War. Possibly he was. Yet few, I believe, would dissent from the recent words of the Canadian Secretary of State, Mr. Paul Martin, when he said to the United Nations General Assembly: The incidence of violence in the world has already reached the limits of international tolerance". Yet, my Lords, at this precise and perilous moment the British Government have chosen to announce proposals for crippling reductions in the ability of this country to defend itself and to help others to defend themselves. This White Paper may have the merit of brevity. It has few others. It foreshadows wounding cuts in the three Services—and I shall come to them in a moment—but it does nothing logically to relate them to our obligations and to our ability to discharge those obligations in Europe or elsewhere.

In Europe, the Government take the view that we must continue to make a real contribution to NATO. I agree. A further British retreat from Europe would be out of step with our general policy towards Europe, and it might well lead to a general dégringolade in NATO. Personally, I would not quarrel with the Government's desire to redeploy one brigade from the British Army of the Rhine back in this country, although unless it is to leave all its heavy equipment in Europe—and this means duplicating much of it—I have always wondered myself whether we could reposition it in time should the need to do so arise. But of course that redeployment remains conditional upon the agreement of our Allies, and all we learn about this from the White Paper now, three months after our proposal was first mooted by this most dynamic and persuasive of Governments, is that they "are confident" that our Allies will accept it. Never mind. We now recognise, or the Government do, that in Europe our contribution to the alliance will remain broadly on the same scale as at present. So reductions in our military establishment cannot be related to our European commitments.

Presumably these reductions are related in some way to the military withdrawals we aim to make from the Middle East. This may have underlain our decision not to couple a defence agreement with the grant of independence to South Arabia—a shabby decision which in retrospect may prove to be one of the most dis astrous taken by this disastrous Government. That wilful blunder has now been qualified by the package deal announced on June 19 last. Yet no one can conceivably predict, whatever their present hopes may be, that South Arabia will in fact achieve independence on January 9, as we hope, and how long thereafter it may require our external protection. We know, in any event, that the V-bombers will be based off Muscat for an indefinite period; and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, confirmed to your Lordships last week that the strong naval force, with an attack carrier, that we propose to base in South Arabian waters, could conceivably remain there after the first critical six months.

In any event, so far as the Middle East is concerned, I am not aware that we propose to renege on our commitments to CENTO. Nor does it appear to be the Government's intention to pull out of the Persian Gulf. In fact quite the contrary. We read that four R.A.F. squadrons are to move there—for how long?—and that there will be a small increase in the Army units stationed there. Indeed, our military dispositions in the Gulf are shrouded by this White Paper in a good deal of mystery. But, all in all, unless the noble Lord can correct me, it would hardly seem possible to justify any important rundown in our forces as a whole by the withdrawals to be anticipated from the Middle East.

But of course, the most ambivalent section of an ambivalent White Paper relates to Asia. We all recognise, I think, that we cannot seek to be a World Power in the good old Victorian way. We cannot, in the late Lord Rosebery's phrase, afford to be the knight errant of the world careering about to redress grievances and to protect the weak", although at times our present Prime Minister, in his pursuit of immortality, seems to have neglected that sage advice. Yet most of us would agree that, in the words of the White Paper: We have a political and economic interest in the stability of the world outside Europe, which makes it desirable to retain a capacity for contributing to the maintenance of peace where we can usefully do so". Nowhere does this apply with greater force than to South-East Asia—that vast region which is centred on Malaysia and Singapore, and which now includes, by their own definition and volition, Australia and New Zealand.

I believe that in the next decades the peace of the world may well be more affected by developments in this region, in South-East Asia, than perhaps anywhere else. The dangers, of course, are only too manifest: revolutionary China, with its latent energies and its hydrogen bomb; new pressures, already becoming evident on the Indian borders, against Burma, and in Hong Kong. All this apart from Vietnam. But the promise of the region is bright. There is a great economic upsurge. Many of the independent non-Communist States have taken off (to use the jargon) economically, or are on the point of economic take-off. And the direct British stake in the area is very considerable, too. There are our economic interests. Apart from our invisible earnings in the region—and I am excluding New Zealand and Australia from this calculation—we receive from direct investment and from a surplus in our balance of payments with the region substantially more across the exchanges than our military presence in the region costs us. We have definite defence commitments. Above all, we have long and deep political and cultural roots in the area. Not least—and here I think the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, would bear me out if he were here—we command much respect within the area. It is a very different situation from that with which we are confronted in large parts of the Middle East and of Africa.

I would not wish to overpaint this picture. The stability which a continuing British military presence can bring to South-East Asia may be marginal. Our military presence can in any event be only marginal compared with the resources which the United States can deploy. Yet, my Lords, on two occasions within the last two decades that marginal presence has decisively affected, and affected for the good, the destiny of the whole region—in the Malayan emergency and in Confrontation. And we should remember—and the Government should remember—that premature withdrawal of that marginal presence may encourage those within the United States who advocate an American withdrawal to Fortress America. The Government in one breath seem to recognise this. They assure us that they will continue to honour our obligations under the SEATO Treaty. They tell us that they will continue to honour their obligations under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. We must assume that they will honour their obligations towards the various British dependencies in South-East Asia and the Far East, including Hong Kong. And I suppose we can take it for granted that if ever Australia and New Zealand were imperilled we should stand by them. But, in the same breath, they announce that they intend to run down our forces in the area and to withdraw totally from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia by the mid-1970s.

I do not quarrel with the intention to run down. Some run-down seems logical and, given the end of the confrontation, acceptable. But I do quarrel, and quarrel violently, with the apparent decision to quit Singapore and Malaysia. If we were under pressure to get out it would be an entirely different matter. But the Prime Minister of Singapore implored the Government not to make this announcement. Only last year the Australians were told by Mr. Healey—and I quote his words from The Times—that It would not make any military sense at all for us to leave Singapore unless we had to. From every point of view, I think it is in our interest to stay in that part of the world so long as we do so with the consent of the local people. But that was last year; that was in Canberra; that was for Australian consumption. Presumably, a different slogan will be needed this year, in Scarborough, for the Labour Party Conference consumption.

Of course, there are the usual hedges which we have come to expect from this double-hedging Government. The precise timing of our total withdrawal is made dependent upon progress and stability in South East Asia and the Far East. How much better if, in the first place, our intention to withdraw had been clearly and exclusively linked to progress of this nature rather than hitched to an arbitrary date governed by the narrowest financial and political calculations!

Then again, at the end of the act, as one turns the page of Chapter III, we find the trick that conjuror Healey has kept up his sleeve all alone: that we may not, after all, totally withdraw. We learn that, after all that was said, we may not totally withdraw; that we are proposing to keep a military capability for use, if required, in the area and that some naval and amphibious forces may be kept permanently in the Far East. That sounds fine; but the concept looks pretty, almost deliberately, vague. It sounded pretty vague to me the other day on television when Mr. Healey was talking about our forces "sailing about" off South East Asia. It sounds pretty vague when one realises that naval forces at the other side of the world need a base; and so does their land-based air cover. It sounds pretty vague when we are told that we are giving up Singapore and presumably Butterworth, too. It looks pretty vague when, after two or three years' examination and discussions we are told that we are still examining and discussing bases in Australia and in the Indian Ocean. I hope the noble Lord will be able to make all this vagueness just a little more convincing.

My Lords, I have been suggesting that the cuts which the Government propose to impose upon our forces cannot logically be justified by cuts in our commitments, in our military obligations. Save possibly in South Arabia, no real cut in any of our major obligations is foreseen. This can be logically explained only if one assumes—and one must assume—that once again the Government are preserving our commitments but weakening our ability to discharge them. That is perhaps a logical explanation; but it is no justification.

Of course, in all this the deliberate imprecision of the White Paper makes judgment difficult, no doubt deliberately. We are told that the manpower cuts will be gradually reflected in a lower number of ships, units and squadrons than we deploy to-day". Fine! but although we can guess the number of units the depleted Army may possess in the mid-'70s, we cannot even guess the number of front-line squadrons and ships in commission which the depleted R.A.F. and R.N. will possess. And this from a Government who have always boasted that they would give us the defence facts. And this at a time when a cursory glance at the Congres sional Record reveals the strength of the American armed forces.

In any event, we know that savage cuts are intended for the teeth units of the Army; and my noble friend Lord Thurlow, who speaks on the Army with far greater authority than I, will be elaborating this point. But by 1971 we shall have only some 52 infantry units instead of the 60 that we possess at present. By the mid-'70s, if the reduction continues on a broadly similar basis, as forecast in the White Paper, the 52 will have shrunk to a mere 44. Can the noble Lord confirm that this estimate is, broadly speaking, correct? Can he also tell us that he is confident that this Army, shorn of most of its teeth units, will be able to meet its then-commitments, both towards NATO and outside Europe?

These reductions may be related to the Government's preference for sophistication. I do not suggest that we should not be prepared to help our friends and allies with sophisticated elements like air support or early-warning systems and the rest; but I would ask the Government to remember that in many situations in which our aid could be invoked it is not necessarily the sophistication of the equipment which will turn the balance. This was not the decisive factor in the Malaysian emergency or with confrontation. The decisive factor in both cases was the deployment on the ground and in the jungle of adequate numbers of superbly-trained and fit Regular infantry. Does the noble Lord think that 44 infantry battalions—a mere 44—will give us the necessary backing, both overseas and in Europe? Or do these cuts imply as I fear they may, that we are edging further and further towards a "trip-wire strategy" and a wholly nuclear philosophy?

My Lords, as for the Air Force, the Government may feel that they are discharged from the task of proving, or disproving as the case may be, that a given number of front-line squadrons will enable us to meet our obligations in the mid-'70s. This they may feel, since they deny us knowledge of the numbers of frontline squadrons they have in mind. However, even if they continue to feel so, they still have to convince us that an Air Force stripped of over one-fifth of its manpower will be able fully to discharge its tasks in the future. Moreover, that run-down Air Force will have to discharge not only its present tasks: to these will be added, when the last of the carriers go, support and maritime cover for the Royal Navy.

Noble Lords opposite have also to satisfy us about the equipment of that rundown Air Force. I recall that last May the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, told us that To a very great extent we have a settled programme of re-equipment for the Royal Air Force. But this does not denote that all we have to do is sit back and await delivery."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2/5/67; col. 823.] With the demise before birth of the Anglo-French Variable Geometry aircraft, described by the Secretary of State himself as the hard core, operationally and industrially, of our Air Force, the noble Lord's qualification has proved to be all too prophetic. The Government have still to tell us what they propose to do to enable the Royal Air Force to meet its future obligations now that its core has been so abruptly extracted.

The White Paper contains a brief but rosy brochure of the new types of vessels to be introduced into the Royal Navy, and it contains one rather surprising statement. The surprising statement is that, apart from the Polaris submarines, the "main striking power" of the Navy, after the carriers fade out, will be provided by the nuclear-powered Fleet submarines. What do the Government really mean by this, on the face of it, rather odd phrase? Do they mean that they have some new weapon under development, as we read, and can this weapon possibly be placed alongside the striking power provided by the modern attack carrier? The brochure is of course meaningless unless we know what numbers lie behind these proposed new vessels. Can the Government now tell us how many Fleet submarines they are proposing to build? What will be the size of the new cruiser force they talk about? Will the first of this new class be like the Type 82, the last of the class? How many escorts do they aim to commission by the mid-'70s? Unless the Government are prepared to let us have this information we have no possible criteria for judging whether the Navy they are planning for the mid-'70s will be in any wise adequate to meet our maritime obligations in that period.

Above all, my Lords, if we are to judge whether the Government are really serious about their intention to maintain some residual military capability in the Far East, we need to know much more than this very bare White Paper discloses about their intentions in this area. I should have thought there was a strong case for building up an effective task force with a balanced air and naval component. Provided we continue to keep bases within the region, this air component could just conceivably be deployed from the land. But if this is not the case, then the arguments for this task force being provided with its own air cover deployable at sea become to my mind overwhelming. And if we are looking into the '70s, and through the '70s into the '80s, the arguments for developing nuclear propulsion for some of the units in this task force are very strong. Yet of this, as of so much else, nothing is said in the White Paper.

When I read these brief paragraphs on the three Services I could not help reflecting how curiously they contrast with all that the Members of the present Government were saying only three brief years ago. They went to the country then claiming that in defence their emphasis would be on strengthening our conventional Regular Forces. Some people, unfortunately, took them at their word. What do we now see? We see a 20 per cent. cut across in the board in Service manpower. We see a 10 per cent. cut in the vital area of research and development. We see the Army reduced to a bare 44 teeth infantry units. We see a Navy which by the mid-'70s will have had its sharpest weapons extracted from it. We see a depleted Royal Air Force with its operational core torn out and with its front-line strength drastically reduced.

We see all this done under the guise, under the smokescreen, of a careful balancing of commitments and resources. In reality, my Lords, the truth is cruder. These are ruthless and arbitrary reductions, and they stem from the total failure of the Government to manage and extend the economy and a consequent desire to appease Left-Wing opinion. This is the old Socialist way of compensating for failure. When they are faced with a choice of sacrificial lambs, the axe, in their hands, comes squarely down on the necks of our defence and our Armed Forces. And I fear that this may not be the end of the story. There is no guarantee, given the record of this Government, that we are now witnessing the final twist in this downward spiral. This is bad enough. But to cap it all, the Secretary of State has the sublime effrontery to claim, in his conclusion on page 12 of the White Paper, that: The Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force, though reduced in size, will be capable of meeting all the demands that may be made on them. This sweeping claim is followed by two sentences of pious platitudes which your Lordships can read. Taken together, these sentences mark a horrid conjuncture of the pulpit and the soapbox.

But, my Lords, what is the reality behind this claim? With the dubious exception of South Arabia, we are, as I understand from the White Paper, as a nation still pledged to discharge all our major existing military obligations whether in Europe or the Middle East or South East Asia or the Far East. We all know that a major crisis in one of these areas, let alone in two, could stretch our existing forces, let alone our reduced forces, and stretch them almost to breaking point. But no matter. The bland claim is nevertheless made that our Armed Forces in the 1970's will be capable of meeting all the demands placed upon them whatever those demands may prove to be. The Government may kid themselves that this claim is founded on their prescience, on some "nicely calculated less or more." My Lords, it is my belief that it is based on folly and foolish arrogance. It needs a touching faith in our present rulers to believe that they will be able to substantiate this claim. Nothing in their record over the last thousand or so days allows me, unfortunately, that faith. That is why I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That this House regrets that the proposals in Command Paper 3357 gravely impair the capacity of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force to meet all the demands that may be made on them.—(Earl Jellicoe.)

THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD SHACKLETON) rose to move, as an Amendment to the Motion, to leave out all the words after "House" and insert: approves the proposals in Command Paper 3357 and welcomes the realistic view taken therein of Britain's commitments and capabilities, the plans made for the re-equipment of the three Services, and the substantial financial savings which will be achieved. The noble Lord said: my Lords, I rise to move the Amendment on the Order Paper but I should first like to congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition. I would not go so far as to say that he alternated between the pulpit and the soap-box, but I must say that it was a speech in striking contrast to the smug speeches we used to have from Leaders on the other side of the House when they were in Government. I thought it was a fair and typical speech, although not quite typical of the noble Earl, because he tends to be more constructive than he was to-day. I hope the noble Earl will forgive me if, for at least the greater part of my speech, I try to give information to the House and refrain from slanging the Opposition, because I have some information to give which I hope will fill some of the gaps in knowledge which arise inevitably from a fairly short White Paper.

I should like to try to set the decisions announced in the Supplementary Statement in perspective, both from the political and from the economic standpoints. I shall not, I promise the noble Earl, dodge the issues or the responsibilities of the Government, or the reasons why we have taken these decisions. The noble Earl was perfectly entitled to refer to the economic aspects. I cannot seriously believe that he thinks that economic aspects do not impose something of a straitjacket on a Government. Certainly the previous Government constantly reiterated' the need for economies and the difficulty. As numerous Defence Secretaries passed across the scene, each one kept pointing out the need to relate Government expenditure in defence to the national wealth. It is a pity that they did not heed their own words rather more. The economic aspects, and I admit this freely, relate to the pressing need to reduce overseas expenditure, a slower rate of growth than we had expected and hoped for in the British economy and the consequent necessity to keep Government expenditure as low as possible. Our public expenditure needs to come more into balance with our resources, and it is inevitable that overseas spending, of which defence spending forms a major part, should contribute towards the necessary savings.

Our objective (and about this I hope we are all agreed, whatever the failures of past Governments may have been) is to build an unshakable economic base for Britain. We consider that this objective is in the interests of our allies as well as of ourselves. To be an effective partner to them and to play our part in the world, we need, above all, economic strength. I do not propose to go into this aspect of our policy at greater length as my noble friend the Leader of the House will deal more fully with it in his speech, but I am fully prepared to acknowledge that this is a crucial part of Government policy.

In the Statement on the Defence Estimates published in February, 1967, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence made it clear that further economies in the defence field might be necessary. After saying that we had always recognised that the Defence Review must be a continuing process, he stated, … in particular, the scale of our overseas expenditure on defence requires an unremitting watch. We are, therefore, continuing to study the scope that exists for reducing our foreign exchange expenditure throughout the world, always with a proper regard to the interests of our allies and our ability to meet our commitments". It was also stated in the February White Paper that our aim was that Britain should not again have to undertake operations, on the scale of confrontation against Indonesia, outside Europe. The purpose of our diplomacy was, it was stated, to foster developments which will enable the local people to live at peace without the presence of external forces".

We had, therefore, already made it clear in February that we were considering whether there was scope for further reductions, provided that these were politically justifiable. I say "further reductions" because this Government had, of course, already, in the 1966 Defence White Paper, announced that we would leave the Aden base when South Arabia attained independence and had also announced decisions relating to substantial cuts in our overseas deployments in other areas, notably Malta and Cyprus. We had shown, in fact, that in a rapidly changing world our role must be a changing one. We must continue to play our part—but not go beyond our resources in doing so.

Forces based overseas do not exist in a vacuum. They cannot be moved about like counters, regardless of the effect. By their very presence, they can, depending on the political situation in the area, have a very important stabilising effect. The hope of every British Government is that their forces posted overseas will never need to undertake operations. However, it may sometimes be that the very presence of these forces pre-empts the need for involvement in hostilities. Forces posted abroad also become tightly interwoven into the life of the country where they are based. In some cases they may be called upon to perform internal security duties and thus to contribute by their presence not only to the stability of the area as a whole, but also to the stability of the country they are in. Not only this, but they may also play a very important part in contributing to the economy of their host country. On the other hand, the converse is sometimes true. Troops abroad, far from being a basis of stability, can become a focus for hostility. Under such conditions, there can be a bill to us not only in terms of budgetary and foreign exchange costs but also in terms of British lives. There is also the point—an arguable one, but one that is very important—that the prospect of our forces being withdrawn may encourage local Governments to take the initiative in developing, together with like-minded nations in the area, the necessary indigenous strength which alone, in the long run can give true stability in the part of the world concerned.

It has therefore been an objective of our policy to work as swiftly as possible to develop local strengths, so that, before too long, countries with whom we have been closely associated can stand on their own feet. This is a policy which successive British Governments have followed, not least the previous Government, and I give them credit for this.

A further crucial general factor of a political and also, to some extent, economic nature, which needs to be weighed very carefully, is the long-term effect on our political relationships with our friends and allies who are concerned, more or less directly, with the area where reductions of our forces are contemplated. An important consideration here is, of course, our specific obligations under treaties. If the effect of reductions is to provoke hostile reactions, we have to weigh this against the likely benefits—bearing in mind that hostile reactions can sometimes have awkward economic, as well as political consequences.

I hope that in this preamble I have shown that the Government have thought carefully along these lines. Against this background, I should like now to look briefly at the principal areas concerned. As the White Paper states, the security of Britain still depends above all on the prevention of war in Europe. We therefore regard it as essential to maintain both the military efficiency and the political solidarity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. We also need to take fully into account the evolution of Government policy towards Europe. Once the Far Eastern reductions are in train, the focus of our military deployments will shift decisively to Europe the White Paper decisions are thus fully consistent with our European policies as they have evolved, although, as I shall show later, this does not mean that we are losing complete interest in other parts of the world.

I hope that the noble Earl will forgive me if in the interests of time I do not deal at length with the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas. The 1966 and 1967 White Papers indicated that we should be making substantial reductions to our forces there, and the latest White Paper says that there will be a small increase in the Persian Gulf garrison to meet our remaining obligations. It has been suggested that we ought to make an announcement of our intention to "pull out" of the Persian Gulf area. Those who have studied the complex problems of this part of the world will recognise that a sudden withdrawal would upset the delicate balance of political forces there and jeopardise the emergence of the various States into a viable and stable existence by themselves.

It was in the Far East that it seemed there was more scope for reductions. Here, we had to take special account of the general considerations I have mentioned earlier, particularly our longstanding obligations to our Commonwealth friends and to our SEATO allies in the area. We had, in addition, to take very careful account of the shifts in the political scene which had taken place since February, 1966, when we said, in the White Paper, that we thought it right that Britain should continue to maintain a military presence in the area. Even then, however, I should point out that we said, As soon as conditions permit, we shall make some reductions in the forces which we keep in the area". The noble Earl has not quarrelled with that. Our obligations in the area are the result of a long, historical association with that part of the world, an association we wish to maintain. I think that the noble Earl put rather too much emphasis in his remarks on the economic and trading advantages of having troops in a particular area. So we made a thorough examination to satisfy ourselves that we could come to the help of our friends and allies in the area if we decided to reduce and finally to withdraw our troops from that area.

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, I think I should correct the noble Lord, because he has misunderstood me. I merely pointed out that in that area we are not in net deficit as a result of our military presence there. I was not claiming that the military presence contributed to our trading position, other than to contribute to the general stability of the area.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I am sorry if I misinterpreted the noble Earl. I certainly do not quarrel with what he has just said. None the less, there is a general tendency that our trading operations may cease in areas from which we remove our troops. But I am not accusing the noble Earl of that. The very thorough examination which I have mentioned showed that we should continue to be able to meet our obligations, despite the reductions we had in mind, though we should need to take a fresh look at the means that we would use to fulfil our obligations in a particular case.

A factor which enabled us to come to this conclusion was that by the time our forces are substantially reduced in the area our reinforcement capability will be very appreciably improved. I do not think that it is sufficiently recognised even now that the advent of the very longrange transport aircraft has put an entirely new complexion on the question of whether it makes better sense to keep troops on the ground far from home, or whether it is not preferable (it certainly makes better economic sense) to keep them, or some of them, at a high state of alert in their own country. Your Lordships will recall that the White Paper refers to the strengthening of the Strategic Reserve by a further infantry brigade from early in 1968. The Strategic Reserve will be enlarged by this additional brigade. I know that there are difficult arguments arising on acclimatisation and so on, and I merely state this argument straight as it is: that there is this greatly increased capacity for the new transport aircraft.

We concluded, therefore, that we could reduce our forces and still continue to be able to meet our obligations to our friends and Allies. The question remained whether gradual reductions of the kind envisaged made sense, in view of the political position in South-East Asia at the time. Here the ending of the confrontation against Indonesia was the crucial factor which encouraged us to think that considerable reductions could take place without upsetting the political balance of the area. Moreover, it seemed possible that our departure might contribute to the growth of cooperation among the countries in the area—this is not just an argument for debating purposes; it is a serious argument—and, therefore, we did not think that the political position in South-East Asia need in itself, at least, weigh against such a decision on our part. There was also the question of the impact of reductions on the economies of Singapore and Malaysia. Here there were considerable problems. We have, however, been in close consultation with the local Governments (and we shall be continuing these discussions) about measures to mitigate the effect of our withdrawals upon the local economies. These measures will include the grant of financial and other aid.

A factor of the utmost importance in our consideration of the manner and speed at which we could reduce our forces in South-East Asia was, of course, the views of our friends and Allies concerned with the area. We have consulted those Governments chiefly affected closely at each stage, and this includes not only our SEATO Allies, but also our NATO and CENTO Allies. Some of our Allies most closely concerned with the area made it clear that our proposals went further than they would wish. The Singapore and Malaysian Governments are, of course, the ones most closely affected by our decision. During our discussions, in which our Prime Minister and the Prime Ministers of Malaysia and Singapore played a leading part, as well as during the earlier consultations carried out by the Defence Secretary in the area, the two Governments concerned have responded to our proposals with characteristic robustness and realism. I should like to quote from the Straits Times of last Friday, which states that: Reaction in Malaysia and Singapore to the British Defence Statement has been realistic, sober and confident". We have also been in consultation with the Australians and New Zealanders, with whom we are linked through bonds of friendship which have been tested and tried over a very long period. If the noble Earl said that he supposed we should continue to support them in any emergency, let me assure him that there is no question of supposing. This has been stated clearly and firmly by Her Majesty's Government; and no one would wish it otherwise. But these Governments are naturally concerned about the general security of South-East Asia. While some of our proposals (I am trying to be quite fair to your Lordships in what I say) were unwelcome to them, they showed great understanding of our need to effect economies, particularly as we made it clear to them that we firmly intended to maintain a continuing interest in the stability of the area. The Prime Minister has also discussed the matter personally with President Johnson, who has recently been quoted as saying that he hopes that Great Britain will continue to maintain an interest in the area. As I have already made clear, we do intend this.

I should now like to show how the Defence Review decisions fit into the background I have described. The White Paper states We must continue to make a substantial contribution to NATO'S forces in order to play our part in the defence of Europe … I will not read the rest of it to your Lordships, because you will be familiar with it. But it will be seen that we thus retain our NATO capabilities. As announced earlier this year, we propose that a Brigade of the B.A.O.R. and a squadron of the R.A.F. will be redeployed from Germany early in 1968. Perhaps I should inform the noble Earl that quite a lot of the heavier equipment will be left in Germany, and this brigade will continue to come under the command (I believe it is) of No. 1 Corps; at any rate, it will certainly be under NATO Command: it will remain committed to NATO, and will not be lost to NATO strength. Therefore, I would emphasise that we continue to maintain the basis of the security of Europe.

In the Middle East and the Mediterranean our forces were already being substantially reduced. But since we retain a certain number of commitments which depend on the presence of British forces, we cannot for the time being plan on further reductions in those areas.

The reductions envisaged in the Far East are that our forces in Singapore and Malaysia will be gradually reduced so that by 1970–71 they will be at approximately half their present numbers—that is, 40,000 instead of 80,000, including local employees. We plan to withdraw altogether from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia in the mid-'seventies. I cannot state now what the date will be, because no actual date has been fixed. There is a good deal of flexibility in our plans. We have deliberately not tied ourselves to any absolutely precise programme. We have made it clear that the exact timing of our eventual withdrawal will depend on the progress made in achieving a new basis for stability in South-East Asia, and in resolving other problems in the Far East. We intend that Britain should play a continuing part in the area commensurate with our resources. As an earnest of our intentions, we plan to maintain a military capability for use, if required, in the Far East. Where this capability will be based, and its size, are matters that have not yet been decided—and I think quite properly, be cause we are talking of far in the future. Nevertheless, we are intending to retain a capability. A deployment of this kind will in our view be in conformity with the likely development—and I ask noble Lords to consider this seriously—of political relationships in the area in the second half of the next decade.

My Lords, I hope that I have dealt fairly and, as I believe, objectively with the Government's general case. I apologise if my speech is longer than I should have wished, but I should like now to give more information about the particular Services, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. My noble friend Lord Chalfont will be dealing with arrangements with regard to the Army, but I am particularly anxious to say something about the Royal Navy, and to give a picture from which I hope noble Lords who are interested—and I think particularly of the noble Lord, Lord Ampthill—will appreciate the really serious consideration that has been given in the determination to create a Royal Navy which will be able to fulfil the role that we seek for it, and that it will have firm roles in the future, markedly stronger and clearer roles than those set out in the 1957 Defence White Paper, which I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Ampthill, will remember with horror.

The first role is to deploy Britain's contribution, by means of the Polaris submarine force, to the stategic nuclear deterrent of the West. Progress with the Polaris programme has been maintained, and two of the four submarines have been launched. The first, the "Resolution", is now undergoing her sea trials, and will become fully operational next year. In passing, I should like to mention that there have been suggestions that our Polaris force is already out of date because of the development of anti-ballistic missile systems. We have, of course, been watching this matter very closely, but we are quite satisfied that the Polaris A3 missiles which we shall be getting will continue to provide an effective contribution to an interdependent Allied deterrent force.

The second role will be to play a leading part in the Western Maritime Alliance. NATO must be prepared to deter aggression at sea, as well as on land and in the air; and the concept of "shield" forces at sea is exactly analogous to that of "shield" forces on land. We are traditionally a maritime Power, and it is entirely appropriate that we should contribute strong naval forces in the Western Atlantic. The efficiency and cohesion of the European NATO naval forces owes much to the initiative and leadership given by the Royal Navy. We are determined to go on playing our part in maintaining the effectiveness of these forces. Thirdly, we plan to rely on the unobtrusive and flexible exercise of maritime power, in which the Royal Marine Commandos in the Amphibious Force will play an important and continuing part; and this is where they make a contribution to peacekeeping operations outside Europe.

May I say something on future equipment plans? I believe that the roles I have set out are solid ones, but we have to equip the Navy for them. The White Paper outlines our plans for a new class of cruisers which will in the later 1970s take over from the aircraft carriers and the "Tiger" class ships the tasks of Fleet command, aircraft direction and control, and the operation of the Seaking antisubmarine helicopters; a new class of destroyers which will enable us to build up, more rapidly than we could afford to do with the more expensive type 82s, the Navy's medium-range anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence based on the Sea Dart System; and a new class of frigates to follow the Leanders. There is a lot more I could say, and it may be that we shall in the next Session have an opportunity to go into some more detailed discussion on the equipment of the kind we used to have in the past.

Finally, the White Paper makes it clear that the capital ship of the future—and I am sorry if the noble Earl does not like this, because I understand it is very acceptable to the Royal Navy—when the last aircraft carrier phases out, is to be the nuclear-powered Fleet submarine, with its very great capability against both submarines and surface ships. We now have six of these submarines, either in service or on order; and a seventh will be ordered later this year. The seventh and later submarines will be very much improved versions of the "Valiant" class, with which the noble Earl is familiar, and they will have a higher speed, will dive deeper, and be very much quieter in operation. We are also studying—and I think this goes some way to answer the noble Earl—new submarine-launched anti-surface ship weapons in order to develop still further the potential of our Fleet submarines. It is too early to say what form these will take. Among the possibilities, however, are an air-flight missile of the type which the U.S. Navy have already developed for use against submarines, and fast-running torpedoes.

May I say something, very briefly, about the aircraft carriers and the Fleet Air Arm? We are going ahead with the modernisation of our two largest carriers, the "Ark Royal" and the "Eagle", and both will be equipped with Phantom aircraft. We are phasing out the oldest ship, the "Victorious" and the smallest, the "Hermes", over the next few years; but we regard carriers as playing an important role at present, particularly in assisting us when we are disengaging from overseas commitments. We will make the best use of the ships while we have them. But the further study of our defence policy in the 1970s has again confirmed the view of the Government of the correctness of our decision, against the background of our greatly reduced overseas commitments, not to build a new generation of carriers.

Following this decision, one of the most important considerations affecting the shape of the Fleet was the form of the light tactical strike capability to be introduced into our ships. Last year a number of systems were considered, from ship-launched missiles, such as the Norwegian Penguin, the surface-to-surface guided weapons and so on, to air-to-surface missiles launched from helicopters, or fixed-wing VTOL aircraft. In deciding which we had to go for, we had to consider not only the capability but also the relative cost, in order to ensure that we got the best and most effective solution, and this meant considering the vehicle to carry these weapons. Those studies pointed strongly in the direction of an air-launched weapon which would give greater flexibility than a surface-to-surface guided weapon and could be combined with an appropriate reconnaissance capability. Careful consideration was given to a naval version of the Harrier, but this would have cost a great deal and would have meant that a much smaller force of ships and forces could be deployed. The other alternative was to take advantage of the fact that all our ships of frigate size, or larger, would carry helicopters for anti-submarine work, and that these aircraft could be given a dual capability. The Harrier solution would have given a greater capability. It would have cost very much more.

Bearing in mind our reduced commitments, and the fact that there will be the long-range surface strike capability of the R.A.F., and the formidable anti-surface ship, as well as anti-submarine capability of the Fleet submarines on which we are to spend substantial sums, it was decided that the best answer to the problem of defence and offence against missile-firing craft and fast patrol boats was to equip the helicopter. There is a wide choice of weapons. I will not go into the consideration which has been given, and is now being given, to the possibility of equipping the Seaking, the large helicopter, with the Martel weapon, as well as a number of other ones with which your Lordships will be familiar. We are also planning to develop the Fleet anti-submarine capability in the 1970s.

Again, there will be increased numbers of Fleet submarines, and there will be the two new anti-submarine helicopters. One is the Seaking, which is one of the few items, if I may say so, considered during the Defence Review which went through without any argument at all, because its advantages seemed to be so very great. These will be deployed in the larger ships. There will be also the other, smaller helicopters. The new helicopters will carry a new and much improved air-dropped anti-submarine torpedo, the Mark 31. We believe that the new shape which we are planning for the Navy in the post-carrier era—based on the Fleet submarines and the new classes of cruiser, small destroyer and frigate, which I have mentioned—will form a sound and lasting basis for the future development of the Fleet; and there is this very interesting new development of the dual role for the helicopter, with its greatly increased anti-submarine capacity and its ability to strike at targets beyond horizon range.

Although the Fleet of the future will be smaller, I believe that the tasks which the Navy will carry out and the new ships, which will all carry missiles and helicopters, will present the same challenge and demand the same high standards as to-day's.

Perhaps, since time is getting on, I may say comparatively little about the Royal Air Force, because we have debated its aircraft programme at very great length. Perhaps it is enough to point out that new aircraft are beginning to come in. Over twenty Hercules are already in the country. Phantoms come in next year; and the F.111s, P.1127s and Nimrods in 1969. These, of course, will see the disappearance of old friends. If perhaps the noble Earl is hesitant about the word "Nimrod"—the mighty hunter—it is in fact the successor to the Shackleton, which I fear is still likely to remain on the scene for quite a while. I am particularly gratified with the name "Nimrod"—the mightly hunter—because, by a coincidence which may or may not have been known to Coastal Command, one of my father's ships was called the "Nimrod". This will, of course, be the maritime Comet.

The main decision now remaining is the question of an aircraft to replace the Anglo-French Variable Geometry aircraft. I thought the noble Earl was very fair when he spoke, in that he did not seek to attack the Government on a policy which I know had his wholehearted support, and it was with great regret that we heard of the French Government's decision to cancel the AFVG. I do not propose to discuss it in detail, beyond saying that I fully accept, and am satisfied, that the decision as communicated to us was based purely on financial reasons. I should like to say something about the next step. We are carrying out a project study. Perhaps I should point out that although the need for the AFVG is very great it is not very urgent. It was not due to come in until the late 1970s. The problem that confronted this Government when we first came into office was to meet the short-term need, and this we think we have done with the aircraft which we have ordered, plus the Jaguar and the helicopter programme. But the need still to be fulfilled is the replacement of the V-bombers in the conventional role in the mid-1970s.

EARL JELLICOE

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord for a moment? We have heard this phrase more than once now; it was my impression that the Anglo-French Variable Geometry aircraft was going to do more than replace the V-bombers in their conventional mode.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, it it always exceedingly difficult, as new aircraft come in, to match them against another aircraft of the spectrum. It could have been argued that the F.111 replaced the Canberra. In practice, of course, the Jaguar will have a performance which in many ways will exceed that of the Canberra. Perhaps I may leave it like this: that it was intended to meet the long-term needs for conventional strike and was intended to replace the V-bombers, and particularly the Vulcans, which are fulfilling this role at the moment.

EARL JELLICOE

Not reconnaissance?

LORD SHACKLETON

Yes; certainly reconnaissance. I could go on at some length on this. I think the noble Earl knows the answers fairly well. If he wishes, I will expatiate at greater length, but I think perhaps I had better press on.

The cancellation of the AFVG has been a setback, and we much regret it. But I should like to make one thing clear. There have been some disparaging remarks about the Government's contingency plans, and suggestions that we had not done very much thinking on this. This attitude arises, I think, from a lack of awareness of the nature of a project study. A project study is the next stage after the feasibility study in the process of building up towards full-scale development and production of a major new project. We had already been through the feasibility study stage with the French, and had the Anglo-French Variable Geometry continued we should have been embarking upon a project study. Consequently, in authorising B.A.C. now to carry out a project study of a United Kingdom Variable Geometry aircraft to a modified specification, we are in fact fully maintaining the impetus and natural sequence of the project at the same time as we explore, in collaboration, other possibilities and review, as it is obviously sensible and prudent to do, the size and nature of the requirement. The project study itself will involve work by a sizeable design staff element preparing a fairly detailed evaluation of the engineering and other characteristics of the aircraft so as to permit speedy and accurate translation into the cutting of development hardware.

I am sorry to have taken up the time of the House, but I wanted to give as much information as I can. I must now turn briefly to the Amendment tabled by my noble friend in reply to the rather odd Motion on the Order Paper. The Motion is not quite a Vote of Censure. It is critical; it wounds. But it is not perhaps intended to be mortal, and luckily it could not be mortal in this House. It has been claimed more than once in another place that the defence plans which the present Government inherited were basically sound, and it has been suggested that on assuming office we misguidedly exaggerated the problems with which we were faced in order to claim credit for an achievement which would otherwise have passed unnoticed.

We remember the miserable collection of White Papers we had at the time of the Tory Government (I see the noble Viscount, Lord Watkinson, in his place—he was one of the many able Secretaries of State who passed all too briefly, as I have already mentioned, across the scene), and looking at the Tory plans again I am inclined to believe that we erred, if we erred at all, in the direction of under-statement. It is true that the Defence Budget for 1964–65 was, by Tory standards, a comparatively modest affair, only about £70 million or £80 million larger, at constant prices, than the current Estimates. But in the field of defence planning (and I am sure the noble Viscount will accept this) it is extraordinarily difficult to alter course quickly. Mr. Sandys attempted to do so and we had to alter back again very quickly.

It is what you are committing yourself to, rather than what you are actually spending, which really determines where you are going. And the previous Administration—and this must be emphasised—were set on a course which would have led to a vast increase in the Defence Budget over the following five years. Even this programme contained gaps which would most certainly have had to be filled as time went by. When I took over as Minister of Defence for the Royal Air Force I was extremely aware of the anxiety, about the delays, with regard to both the P.1154 and the HS.681, and there is little doubt that whatever Government had been in power they would have had to order an interim aircraft. We have to-day over 20 Hercules aircraft already in this country, whereas on the basis of the development plan as it was seen early in 1965 the first flight of the HS.681 prototype was not scheduled to take place until September of this year. All 66 Hercules aircraft on order will have been delivered by the end of next summer.

Failure and indecision, as well as the smugness to which I have already referred, marked all the defence planning efforts of the Party opposite, and of course they left us, as they know—good, I thought we should get the noble Viscount up.

VISCOUNT WATKINSON

My Lords, will the noble Lord forgive me if I interrupt him? I do not want to interfere with his peroration but I hope he will take some account of the fact that defence planning is a matter for the Chiefs of Staff and the technical advisers of the Government, so presumably he is criticising them as well.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lord, I think that is a somewhat improper remark, but of course it is an absolute travesty of the facts. If the noble Viscount did not himself take responsibility when he was Secretary of State for Defence, that explains a great deal; and if his colleagues took the same view that would explain—I see he nods his head. Perhaps his colleagues did not take the same view as him, and if that is so—

VISCOUNT WATKINSON

My Lords, I do not want to pursue this point now, because I shall make my own speech in due course, and I will deal then with what the noble Lord has said. But he must pay some little serious attention to what I said. Of course Ministers take full responsibility; and I did, as no doubt he does. But I think one must be a little careful when making wild allegations about defence planning in the past: that there is no continuity and therefore, presumably, no resting on technical advice. He would be a very unwise Minister who did that.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I do not know what the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, was about if it was not a criticism of defence planning. I think perhaps the noble Viscount would do well to wait till he makes his speech.

The Defence Review fell into three phases. The first and most urgent task was to put some order into the aircraft procurement programme, which was threatening to consume so large a part of the defence budget. This has already been set out and fully explained, and has led to large savings and an improvement in the effectiveness of the R.A.F. This involved heavy costs in foreign exchange, but by negotiation we have been able, as the Government announced in May of last year, to cover all the dollar costs, not only of the aircraft we have ordered, but of the ones the noble Earl ordered, the naval Phantom aircraft and Polaris submarines to which the previous Administration committed itself, either by dollar receipts arising from U.S. forces spending in this country, or by receipts under the $725 million F111 offset arrangement.

The second main phase overlapped with the first. It concerned the aircraft carriers, one of the hardest decisions we had to take, because it was thought by some, sincerely, but in my view wrongly, as striking a lethal blow at a great Service. We decided, as is now well known, not to prolong the life of our carrier force beyond the mid-1970s by ordering CVA.01. No long-term plans for the carrier force had been worked out systematically by the previous Administration. They had neither the courage to take the steps necessary nor to discontinue our capability. They dithered; they talked about the carrier from 1960 on. Even then they never mentioned that if we were to have a viable carrier force we had to have not one but several CVAs in the future at enormous cost. We have had to reach conclusions, and we did so only after the most thorough examination of the value of the planned carrier force and the need to preserve these capabilities or perform them more economically by other means, given the sort of operations we judged it was within the capacity of this country to undertake during the 1970s. I commend this to the Opposition—though I doubt whether they will accept it—as a rational approach to defence planning. It starts by considering the political and economic realities and works out the military problems in the light of these realities. The net saving which arose from this major decision was £500 million over the ten years from 1965, a very large sum, bearing in mind the fact that during the whole of this period the carrier force would still be in existence and that bigger savings still are in store.

The third stage of my right honourable friend's task, which has occupied the past twelve months, was to reduce the defence budget in 1970–71 to about £1,900 million at 1964 prices; that is, about £500 million less than the programme we inherited—and goodness knows! how much that £500 million would have been when the escalation set in in those long-delayed aircraft—and £200 million less than the cost of the programme as it stood in mid-1966. In achieving this further cut, we had also to make the largest possible savings in overseas stationing costs, though these had already been cut by a quarter as compared with the previous Administration's programme.

To achieve further savings of this size obviously entailed making some cuts in overseas commitments. My right honourable friend has explained in the White Paper how the cuts in our forces overseas will be made. The policy we have developed on defence has not only marked out a course which will progressively reduce the foreign exchange burden to a size well within what we can afford, but has enabled us to make substantial savings in the short term despite criticisms opposite of each and every one of the plans devised. No coherent alternative solution has been offered by the noble Earl or any other spokesman opposite, either here or in another place, by which our stationing costs overseas could be reduced. Of course I except, perhaps, some of the ex-cathedrâ pronouncements by their own defence spokesman which seem to have been designed to embarrass the Opposition rather than the Government.

Criticism has been made in particular of our decisions with regard to the Far East. I should like to quote from some- thing that was said not so long ago which I believe sums up reasonably accurately the policy of the Government in regard to the Far East. After talking about the need to create regional agreements and a viable political environment in the area, these are the words that were uttered: It seems to me that on this basis it might well be possible to recast the whole of Britain's defence commitments in the Far East. We should still contribute our share to the protection and guarantee of our allies in that area, and a new era of self-reliance for the Asian nations would develop. We should still retain a military capability in the Far East: the ability to reinforce with air power and an amphibious force capable of showing a British presence in that part of the world, and useful not only for the support of the Asian SEATO but for international disorders and keeping the peace, and showing the flag in those areas of the Pacific for which we still have responsibility."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, cols. 834–5, 2/5/67.] That, I think, reasonably represents the views of Her Majesty's Government. The only thing is that on this occasion they were said only two months ago, not by conjuror Healey but by conjuror Carrington. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Leave out all words after ("House") and insert ("approves the proposals in Command Paper 3357 and welcomes the realistic view taken therein of Britain's commitments and capabilities, the plans made for the re-equipment of the three Services, and the substantial financial savings which will be achieved.")—(Lord Shackleton.)