HL Deb 21 November 1957 vol 206 cc459-76

3.49 p.m.

Debate resumed.

LORD GLYN

My Lords, if I may now continue the debate, I should like to say in regard to the Windscale affair that it is of the utmost importance to have a sense of proportion. The House owes a debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, for having raised the matter. I think that Parliament has not recognised the astonishing record of the Atomic Energy Authority over the last twelve years, in carrying through all these experiments without a single accident of any sort. It would be quite wrong to allow this small accident—because it is a small accident—at Windscale to pass without emphasising the wonderful achievement of the Atomic Energy Authority in carrying through all these developments, basing their work purely on theory and not on past practice, without any accident. I do not believe that such a thing has ever happened in the history of any scientific development in any country. And I think that Sir John Cockcroft and all those who work with him at Harwell ought to be pleased at the record so far, and not discouraged by this small accident at Windscale. Not a single person or animal was affected; no damage was done to anybody. I think that ought to be emphasised.

The Report that has been produced is of great benefit, because it is very frank and goes into great detail. Noble Lords will be able to read and appreciate it without being confused by any explanation of the technical details given by somebody not technical like myself; it is far better to leave it to noble Lords to learn from the White Paper all the evidence that is there displayed. However, there is one point that I think is of tremendous importance, and it is one to which the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, referred. I am not sure that it is right to set up an organisation against accident parallel to what is done in the mining industry.

LORD LAWSON

My Lords, I am glad the noble Lord has mentioned that. I did not mean that we should have a parallel organisation. I know that all the great scientific industries have their own particular organisations to meet the circumstances; and I.C.I., of which Sir Alexander Fleck is the chairman, have a peculiar organisation of their own. The only thing I want to be sure of is that there is an organisation to meet the circumstances.

LORD GLYN

I believe the position is this. The real danger from this accident is not what has occurred to anybody in the neighbourhood, but that it may affect public opinion throughout the country. It must be emphasised that there is no reason to believe that any of the new establishments that are being set up by the Atomic Energy Authority, with outside organisations, embodies any danger whatever to the public of this country. I am quite satisfied that, with the protection that is provided in carrying on these developments, it would be a great disaster if people got the idea that there was a danger wherever any new authority was set up. I happen to live within two or three miles of Harwell; I know everybody there fairly well, and already I have people coming to me and saying: "Are we going to have a repetition at Harwell of what has happened at Windscale?" The whole thing is totally different; there is no question of any parallel.

However, I think it is most important that whenever we discuss this question there should be some reassurance to the public that everything in the way of giving protection has been done. That is proved by this accident, where no real damage was done to man or beast. It shows, I think, that Sir John Cockcroft and others at Harwell, who have carried out the preliminary research work and have the chief responsibility for the development of atomic energy, have been more than justified in all that they have done. I think it would be a bad thing if the wonderful work that has been done by those comparatively few people were in any way brought into question in the public mind by this one accident, which, after all, has been absolutely free from any serious, permanent disaster.

I think this country stands now in the position of contributing probably more to the happiness and welfare of the world through atomic energy than any other country; and we must still lead in this direction. One of the things that might do more harm than anything else would be for any fear to arise in the public mind that there was danger in encouraging the development of atomic energy under the authority created by Parliament. I believe that this work has been carried out with the idea of developing the benefits of atomic energy but at the same time protecting the public in every possible way. Therefore, when the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, raised this matter I felt that it was necessary for somebody to pay a tribute to the original workers for atomic energy who have carried out all this development without any serious accident. I believe the results of this accident will be beneficial and will help the Atomic Energy Authority to provide safeguards in the future even more than they have in the past.

3.55 p.m.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, before the Minister replies, in view of what has been said I should like to put one or two short points to him. First, I would say that I appreciate the manner in which my noble friend Lord Lawson has introduced the Motion this afternoon. I do not need to comment on its contents. My noble friend has intervened in the hope of giving any assistance possible in securing that the right result is obtained from the investigations which have gone on and which in some cases arc still continuing. I was most interested in the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, who obviously has approached the study of this matter with some of the technical knowledge he has acquired in various spheres. I was particularly interested, too, in the appeal made by the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, a great friend of many of us in this House who knew him in the other place. I appreciate the spirit in which he has spoken, after his continuous contacts with people at Harwell.

As I have said, there are one or two points that I think are of great importance and to which I think the Minister might reply. The first is that, whatever lack of harm there has been to man or beast, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, there is the point mentioned in the conclusions (paragraph 29 (3)) which obviously the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, had in mind when he spoke and which seems to suggest that it is still quite possible that some long-period effect has been made upon the grass by the out-fall of strontium 90. Is that so, or not?

The second point I want to put is this. While, of course, the particular type of production of nuclear energy at Wind-scale may be different from that produced by another kind of system, either at Harwell, in its particular industrial products, or in the growing chain of atomic power stations for the production of electric power, little bits of gossip and rumour going about seem to indicate that, although there is not so much risk in these particular stations as there has been proved to be at Windscale, nevertheless no scientist can guarantee that there will be no effect at all from the outfall of strontium 90 from those other types of stations, particularly in its possible effect upon farm land, farm crops, forage and the like. In view of the experience of farmers in the North of England around the Windscale area, it is important that all those who live on farms in the neighbourhood of newly developing stations—and I am one of them—should have complete and sincere answers and information upon that second point. I am sure the Minister will do his best to give those answers.

As regards the conduct of the staff at Windscale in all the circumstances which arose there, like my noble friend Lord Lawson, I wish to raise no criticism of their action; they seem to have done a lot of good work in dealing with the situation. But the point which does arise is that, not merely in the Department of the Minister of Power, but in the Department of the Minister of Agriculture, there was no real, set plan to deal with the situation if such an accident as did occur arose. It was not there. With such a plan, if animals had been sold in Carlisle market and despatched to the scene of their new home in Devonshire, immediate action would have been taken by the authorities down there to avoid the risk of strontium 90 in those animals.

VISCOUNT HAILSHAM

It has nothing to do with strontium 90.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

I do not care. That was the fear.

VISCOUNT HAILSHAM

My Lords, if the noble Viscount will forgive me, as this did come within my ministerial province, may I say that it is very important indeed to know what the danger was and why this action was taken. The danger was from a radioactive iodine in the milk, and it persisted for only twenty-four hours after the last moment at which the cow might have eaten contaminated grass. It decays so quickly, and the danger persists for such a short time, that the mere destruction of the milk for twenty-four hours in that case was perfectly adequate to deal with any danger at all. I mention that—and I know the noble Viscount will forgive me for having done so—not to correct him, but in order to allay some apprehensions which undoubtedly existed amongst farmers that there was something wrong with these cows. There was nothing wrong at all with the cows. The danger was solely due to the danger of iodine in the milk.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, I am quite prepared to accept that statement, but I was going on to say that I should have thought that, if there were anything like a permanent basis of consultation between the atomic nuclear energy projects and industry or farming, then those particular animals would never have been sold in Carlisle market on the day they were. The marketing organisation would have entered into operation in the same way as it operates in taking immediate marketing steps to prevent such dangers when it is a case of foot and mouth disease. In that instance there is a permanent emergency operation which can be followed as a result of long experience.

Therefore I think the question of my noble friend Lord Lawson is one to which the Minister should give his attention. It is: in the light of the experience of other industries which are subject to the possibility of dangerous emergencies arising, what steps are to be taken to form a permanent organisation to deal with similar emergencies in this industry? It is an exceedingly good thing that the Minister has put Sir Alexander Fleming. at the head of the principal committees dealing with this matter, because I know the organisation of the I.C.I. pretty well and I know that they have factories manufacturing explosives, and the like, in which urgent risks arise. They have their own knowledge, also, of the sort of operations that can be put in hand at once when there is an explosion in a mine—as the I.C.I. control mines, or at least have had experience of them in the past, and they know all about the subject. If we can have an assurance that the Minister's intention is to establish a permanent emergency organisation, he will have gone a long way to meet the point raised by my noble friend Lord Lawson. At any rate, I should like to have an assurance on my question as to what are the risks in the case of other types of stations.

House adjourned during pleasure, and resumed by the Lord Chancellor.

4.5 p.m.

LORD REA

My Lords, may I apologise to your Lordships for intervening in this discussion when I had not intended to do so? I should also apologise to your Lordships and to the noble Lord. Lord Lawson, for not being present at the beginning of this debate. I hope that in my few remarks I shall not traverse again ground which has been covered. I have something in common with the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, who live near one of these stations where an accident might occur, in that I live very near where this accident did occur. It might be called the closest agricultural area to it. I should like to pay my tribute to the very active and efficient staffs for the good work they did as soon as this alarm arose. I should also like—and I think your Lordships would also—to pay a tribute to the stoicism of the Cumberland farmers who did not panic or take fright. There was a certain amount of Press excitement about it, and that is perfectly natural. One does not blame the Press for making a good story about it. But these good people were not in the slightest alarmed. They had had this immense factory among them for some years.

But although there was no panic, there was inconvenience. I had a letter from an old age pensioner who said, "It is a nuisance that I dare not cut a cabbage in my garden". That position went on for some days when in fact it was unnecessary. I should like to come to the point of over-security—out-of-date security. I shall ask the Minister and the Government to take the public a little more into their confidence about matters of this nature, particularly where they are common knowledge in London and other places where they talk, but which are not always known in the remoter parts of the country. Many of your Lordships will remember that in the First World War, 1914–18, a matter which was classified as a security matter in 1914 came out at the- end of the war still classified as "Security" and "Top Secret" although everybody knew all about it. Very much the same thing happened in the last war. "Top Secret" documents, enclosed in double cover, and, I am told, some Government messages, were marked "Burn before reading". Even at the end of the war these security measures were taken concerning matters which were often common knowledge and about which there was no need to have all this secrecy. I think that that continues even now.

I asked one of the Minister's predecessors some time ago whether it was wise to go on with this vast programme and whether he was sure that obsolescence would not overtake his building programme because invention was going on at such a pace. I suggested that in a few years we should not need a tremendous factory costing millions, and that a "backroom boy" with a black box might do the same thing. The Minister's predecessor said that as soon as Stephenson invented the steam engine it became obsolete. I found that neither helpful nor illuminating. At a later date, I asked the present Minister if he would say categorically whether this thing was dangerous at either Windscale or elsewhere, but he did not answer. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, pursued it, and asked the Minister to give a specific answer. He gave—if I may say this in no offensive spirit—a rather evasive answer. He said, "It is not that it is dangerous; it is that people think that it is dangerous." From that I could not gather whether it—whatever "it" was—was or was not dangerous. I think that there might be some little loosening-up on these security matters.

There is a place called Windscale of which I believe your Lordships have heard. It is nowhere near where the accident took place; it is a day's journey away on foot. But I am told that, at the beginning of the war, for security reasons. it was decided that it would be rather a good trick to fool the enemy by calling this other place Windscale. It might just as well be called Putney Bridge or Brighton. It is said that the Windscale difficulties will not he repeated; that they will not affect places like Harwell, Sella-field and Calder Bridge. I do not know whether your Lordships know the exact distance between Windscale and Calder Hall, and Calder Hall and Sella-field. They are one and the same area and, so far as I know, in the same fence; there is no distance whatever between them. They are merely put in as the schoolboy said about his riddle: "to make it more difficult".

I have one more point; I have not been asked to make it, and I am speaking for nobody. I was greatly impressed, as I am sure your Lordships were, by the tremendous efficiency, keenness and understanding of those who are working there. Because of what I can only call the red tape of the Civil Service, it seems to me worthy of question that a man, or two or three men, who are in charge of 3,000 or 4,000 workers, of plant worth perhaps £10 million, of the risk to a population of perhaps 100,000 people, should be paid on a Civil Service scale which is roughly approximate to what a more successful coal miner might get. With those few words, I hope the Minister will not think I have criticised unduly what has been done, which is, I am sure, appreciated by us all.

4.10 p.m.

THE MINISTER OF POWER (LORD MILLS)

My Lords, I am sure we are all grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, for the helpful and constructive way in which he introduced his Motion on this very important matter. I can fully appreciate his anxiety that this accident at Windscale should in no way impair the lead which this country has gained, thanks to its scientists and engineers. I was greatly fortified, too, by the support given by noble Lords, in particular, Lord Glyn, that we should not look upon this accident as any setback to the important work we are doing. At the same time, I think the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, may have left an impression on your Lordships' minds that no arrangements were made to deal with accidents. That is far from the case. Perhaps I can develop that aspect later.

I would, if I may, at the risk of wearying your Lordships, try to explain as simply as I can what happened at Wind-scale. I propose to be rather full about it. At Windscale, the Atomic Energy Authority have, besides other installations which do not come into this story at all, two piles in which uranium metal is irradiated with the object of producing the element plutonium for the military programme. Design started in 1947 and the piles were completed in 1950. The speed at which the neutron bombardment of the uranium takes place is moderated by having the uranium fuel elements surrounded by graphite. And the piles are cooled by having ordinary air pumped through them. This air goes up the 400-foot tall and often-photographed Wind-scale chimneys and out through filters into the atmosphere.

The graphite slows down the neutrons upon which the chain reaction depends. In the Windscale pile some of the energy which the neutrons lose as they are slowed down remains stored in the graphite. This stored energy—known as Wigner energy—tends to distort the graphite and is released by a periodic maintenance operation. The operation consists, in essence, of allowing the pile to diverge at low power (that is, of allowing the chain reaction to start, and thus heat the pile) without cooling air being pumped through it. When the temperature of the pile has risen sufficiently the chain reaction is stopped. The release of energy from the graphite continues in the warm pile. It is, in fact, an annealing process. It takes several days to complete it.

On several previous occasions it has been found that to obtain the release of all the stored energy it was necessary to heat the pile a second time—again by allowing the chain reaction to start. A second nuclear heating of this kind was applied during the release of Wigner energy that was taking place in No. 1 pile in early October this year. And it was this second nuclear heating that the Committee of Inquiry found to be the primary cause of the accident. The Committee of Inquiry, after full study of the technical aspects and records, came to the conclusion that this second nuclear heating was applied too soon and at too rapid a rate. It caused the failure of one or more cartridges whose contents then oxidised slowly and, eventually, led to the fire. The fact that there was a fire in the pile was discovered in the afternoon of October 10. It was fought by various means throughout the night and was brought under control on the following morning by the use of water. I am sure that all noble Lords will join with me, as those who took part in the debate did, in paying tribute to the devotion to duty which was shown by all concerned in dealing with the accident.

The accident was a serious one. It did much damage to an installation which, though old by atomic energy standards, was valuable. The restrictions which, for reasons that I will explain later, had to be placed on the distribution of milk caused considerable anxiety and concern. This was extremely regrettable. But I think it is, as I am sure noble Lords realise, of the utmost importance that this matter should be considered in perspective. In twelve years, having started, as has been said, with nothing but grey matter and green fields, British scientists and engineers, and the people who have built and operated our atomic generating plants, have indeed developed a new major industry. The nuclear power programme which I was proud to be able to announce to your Lordships in March is the only programme of its kind in the world.

Here, I should just like to answer the noble Lord, Lord Rea, by saying that I believe we have done the right thing in going forward with an ambitious nuclear power programme. I am quite aware that science is progressing and will progress very rapidly. But it is only by knowledge of the construction and operation of these nuclear power stations that we can hope to maintain the lead that we have established, as well as give ourselves meantime very much-needed energy for our factories. We have in Calder Hall the only industrial-scale nuclear power station that is actually working anywhere in the world. On the military side we have made ourselves one of the three countries in the world to possess nuclear weapons.

Until the accident at Windscale this had all been done without a single serious accident. What is of more importance to us in this debate is that, even taking the Winclscale accident into account, the Authority can still say that no one has ever been hurt, let alone killed, by radiation from one of their plants. This background of swift progress, of safety and of success must not be forgotten when we consider the Windscale accident. But, of course, this does not diminish the need to determine where the fault lay, how it can be remedied and what can be learned from what has taken place.

The Authority themselves, in the memorandum which you will find as Annex IV of the White Paper, addressed themselves to the question of responsibility, and stated that they had given overriding priority to the task of learning from the accident all that could be learned for the improvement of their organisation and civil techniques. As regards responsibility, they said that the cause of the accident lay partly in inadequacies of the instrumentation provided at Windscale for the maintenance operation that was being performed at the time of the accident, and partly in faults of judgment by the operating staff, these faults of judgment being themselves attributable by the Authority to weaknesses of their organisation. I can assure the noble Lord that there is no question of finding fault with any individual. Every man did his utmost, and did his duty with the instruments and the information with which he was provided. I should perhaps mention, in passing, that the Committee of Inquiry found that the accident was not caused by any experimentation which was going on in the pile, either for civil or for military purposes.

As noble Lords are aware, steps have been taken to deal with organisational weaknesses. The Authority recommended that an independent person of standing who has had much experience of processes involving the use and control of hazardous materials should evaluate the lessons of the accident and recommend improvements as necessary. As has been mentioned in your Lordships' House this afternoon, that task has been undertaken, at the Prime Minister's request, by Sir Alexander Fleck. No one who has the welfare of atomic energy at heart—as I feel we all have—could fail to be gratified by Sir Alexander's generous and ready acceptance of this task. I understand that his three committees—their terms of reference are set out in Annex VI of the White Paper—are already engaged on their task.

There have been suggestions to the effect that the Authority should have done more to inform and advise the local population. This is not a matter which was overlooked by those who were in charge at Windscale, even at the height of the incident. As soon as it was known that there was trouble, vans were sent out to carry out monitoring for radio-activity in the district, and these surveys were maintained continuously throughout the time of danger. I would break off here to say that I have noted with interest the suggestion of the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, that we might have barrage balloons. I am sure that that suggestion will be given careful consideration.

Reverting to the accident early on the Friday morning, I would inform your Lordships that the chief constable of Cumberland was warned that there might be an emergency. The chief constable immediately set up a liaison office in the factory and had plans ready for bringing in buses to the area to remove people if this should be necessary. In fact this was not necessary; and, on the basis of the measurements which were being made continually in the district, it was clear to the factory management that the levels of radioactivity in the district were not such as to justify any special warning to local people.

The Authority are not, however, satisfied that their arrangements for local liaison, as revealed in the case of this incident, are entirely satisfactory. The relations between the Windscale management and all local organisations in Cumberland are excellent, and this is due very largely to the work of the general works manager, over a number of years. Nevertheless, a certain amount of improvisation was necessary after the accident had happened. The Authority have therefore decided that in the case of all their works relations with all the local interests which might be affected by an accident should be put on a more comprehensive basis. Liaison committees are now in process of formation (one is already established at Windscale), and on these committees the steps which should be taken in an emergency will be fully studied with all the local interests which might be concerned.

My Lords, I want now to step back somewhat from the actual account of what happened and to consider some of the broader implications of the accident—on health, on the Authority's responsibility to anybody whose property is damaged by their activities, and on the power programme. The Medical Research Council, at the Prime Minister's request, appointed an independent committee to report on the health and safety aspects of the accident, and to comment on the findings with regard to health and safety in the report by Sir William Penney's Committee. The Report of the Medical Research Council Committee was published as Annex III in the White Paper. The Committee reported that, after examining various possibilities, they were satisfied that it was in the highest degree unlikely that any harm had been done to the health of anybody, whether a worker in the Windscale plant or a member of the general public". Similarly, the Agricultural Research Council are satisfied that there has been no harm to livestock, land or crops.

At this point I might make it clear to your Lordships that the Agricultural Research Council and the Ministry of Agriculture have been conducting very intensive research into the effect of radio-active fall-out on grass and crops, and I am sure that they will have full regard to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. The Committee reported that the nature of the fall-out was such that there was no danger from forms of radiation which enter the body through the skin—so-called "external radiation". In the early stages of the incident, however, neither the nature of the contamination nor the extent to which it might increase could be known. The Windscale management therefore thought it a prudent precaution to order the wearing of face masks for nearly an hour during the first night of the accident; though in the event this precaution proved an unnecessary one. The Committee agreed that the danger of genetic damage has similarly been negligible.

In this particular incident, any possible hazard to health would arise entirely from eating food or drinking water contaminated with radioactive substances—so-called "internal radiation". The Committee were satisfied that there has been no danger front drinking water or any food, other than milk and dairy products. The total effect of radioactivity from drinking water and all foods other than milk was completely negligible. The only substance that really mattered was the radioactive iodine concentrated in milk, although strontium levels also rose, to a lesser degree. The Committee endorsed the Authority's decision to stop the sale of affected milk. However, radio-iodine loses half its radioactivity every eight days, so the fall-off in the radioactivity of milk within the area of restriction was rapid.

As your Lordships will know, derestriction of the area is rapidly proceeding and an announcement has been made to-day that the last restrictions will be lifted at the end of this week on Saturday, November 23. The Committee observed that the highest levels of radio-strontium in locally produced milk were well below those at which an appreciable hazard would arise. Your Lordships will have been glad to note the Committee's conclusion that the measures adopted by those responsible for the health and safety of the population in and around Wind-scale were, despite certain organisational shortcomings, essentially right, and that, once they had been brought fully into play, they were applied decisively and were adequate to prevent ill effects.

From what I have said about the health aspects of the accident it will be clear to your Lordships that although no one was hurt a good deal of milk did not reach its normal destinations. The farmers concerned were paid for this milk in the normal way by the Milk Marketing Board. The Board will be reimbursed by the Atomic Energy Authority. Under Section 5 (3) of the Atomic Energy Authority Act, 1954, the Authority have an absolute duty to secure that no ionising radiations from anything on any premises occupied by them cause any hurt to any person or any damage to any property. They are liable if they fail on any occasion to discharge this absolute duty. They have announced that they will consider claims from persons who produce evidence that they have sustained hurt or damage.

As Minister of Power, I am naturally most closely concerned by anything which might prejudice the continued success of our nuclear power programme, and I would draw your Lordships' attention to the following points. First of all, there is the question of whether this accident could occur in the sort of reactors that will be used in power stations. The matter is, in fact, dealt with in Annex V of the White Paper. Some of the argument is technical but the conclusion is clear, and is this: … the accident which happened at Windscale could not happen with the Calder Hall reactors or with the reactors being built for the electricity authorities". The Authority explain that even if a fuel cartridge failed in the Calder Hall type of reactor, and fission products were released into the coolant, the incident could nevertheless quickly be brought under control by the use of the main fans to reduce the temperature. The amount of radioactivity in the coolant circuit, which is closed, would be small, and the amount which could escape into the atmosphere from leakages would be too small to constitute any hazard.

Secondly, there is the question of what implications the Windscale mishap holds for siting policy. The answer is that it reinforces the view of Her Majesty's Government that the policy announced in 1955, and still in force, is the correct one. It does not cause us to believe that alterations are necessary. The policy we pursue was set out in the White Paper called A Programme of Nuclear Power (Command Paper 9389) in 1955. It was there stated that: the reactors that will be built for the commercial production of electricity will present no more danger to people living nearby than many existing industrial works that are sited within built-up areas. Nevertheless, the first stations, even though they will be of inherently safe design, will not be built in heavily built-up areas". There is nothing in the Windscale accident to cause us to make our policy for the siting of nuclear power stations more restrictive. At the same time I should not like noble Lords to think for one minute that proper arrangements to come into force in the event of an accident will not be available for all these stations. Of course they will. I am grateful to noble Lords for stressing that point, for it is of the greatest importance. There is also the question of the siting of the Atomic Energy Authority's own establishments. These, in the nature of the case, differ from one another, and no general rule (except that of erring on the safe side) has been, or can be, applied. The cases (which are far from numerous) will, of course, continue to be considered on their individual merits and with the fullest realisation of the tremendous importance of protecting both public and workers.

My Lords, there are one or two further points with which I should like to deal. The noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, asked me questions about scanning gear and instrumentation. The scanning gear cannot be used without a flow of air through the pile. There it is not used as part of the Wigner operation; but if a burst cartridge is suspected an air flow can be started as a preliminary to the use of the scanning gear. This was done, but, as explained in the White Paper, the scanning equipment jammed and therefore failed to give the indications required. The noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, is quite right in what he suspected: that the White Paper, in the passage dealing with this subject, meant that immediately preceding this maintenance operation the engineers had examined the scanning gear and were satisfied that it was working properly, and it was only the result of the accident which caused it to jam. I think that the question of the contamination of pastures and the question of the renewal of pastures are covered by my remarks on the work of the Agricultural Research Council.

Listening to the speeches which have been made on both sides of the House I have been struck by the very clear evidence of the confidence which your Lordships have in Britain's atomic future. That confidence is fully justified. An accident remains an accident when all is said and done. I hope that I have made it clear that there is no tendency on this occasion to blink that fact. But mistakes, analysed dispassionately and remedied resolutely, can be turned to good. Those responsible for atomic energy in this country are determined to treat the Windscale incident in that way. The lessons to be learned from the occurrence, and any recommendations which may result from the studies of the Fleck Committees will, I can assure your Lordships, be carefully applied to the nuclear power stations to be erected and operated by the Electricity Authorities. I think we have had a most useful debate this afternoon, and I am indeed grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, for initiating it.

LORD LAWSON

My Lords, I think your Lordships will all be grateful to Lord Mills for the full statement which he has made upon this matter. I therefore beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.