DEFENCE

HL Deb 22 September 1948 vol 158 cc137-204

2.44 p.m.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

rose to call attention to the Statement on Defence made in this House on September 14, and to move for Papers. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, the Motion which stands in my name on the Paper is to call attention to the statement made by the noble Viscount the Leader of the House on September 14 last on matters of Defence; and it is my intention to confine myself, so far as I possibly can, to examining the Statement as it was made, without attempting this afternoon any much wider survey. I realise, as I have no doubt most of your Lordships do, that the Minister of Defence is to make a Statement in another place to-morrow afternoon; and he would perhaps be less than human if he had interesting announcements to make and allowed the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, who I understand is to reply to this debate, to make them to-day. We cannot expect that.

This afternoon's discussion looks like being one of a fairly long series of debates which we have had ever since 1945. I was looking at some of those important debates last night and it struck me that we on these Benches had been pretty consistent in what we had criticised and suggested—those debates were not, I think, entirely destructive. We have always claimed that expenditure on our Defence Forces should be at a minimum which is certainly rather more than has been allocated to them in the last three years. The case for spending money and recruiting men does not depend only on the state of our export trade at the present time, or at any other time.

Now it is barely six months since the last White Paper on Defence entitled Statement Relating to Defence, 1948 (Cmd. 7327) was issued. I have looked at the debate on that Statement again and I certainly could not detect anything in the words of the Government spokesman suggesting that present events were casting their shadows before. I was, however, glad to see that the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, said that there was no question of renewing the ten-year rule in operation before the war. But in the interval between now and last March, when it was stated that there was no question of renewing the ten-year rule, I have not seen any real sign of stepping up defence preparations. Perhaps a straw may show the way the wind blows. I was looking at the Blue Book recently issued on the Colonial Empire and I saw that it made a comprehensive review of everything else concerning the Colonial Empire, but without any reference to local or any other defence. It may well be that defence has never been mentioned in a Colonial Blue Book before, but that does not alter the fact that in these days there ought not to be issued what purports to be a comprehensive review of the Colonial Empire without mention of preparations for defence and for the preservation of order.

The theme last March, as I understood it, was still the orderly transition from war to peace. Although that theme was not so prominent as it was in the 1947 White Paper it was still there. It is no part of my business this afternoon to anticipate anything that will be said in the Foreign Affairs debate which is to take place in your Lordships' House on Friday. We do not quarrel with the statement that we are living in a time of tension, but that tension certainly calls for defence plans which are designed to deal with the major crisis as well as with the minor upheavals with which we are at present faced in other parts of the world.

That leads me to my first question: Have the Government yet accepted any appreciation from the Chiefs of Staff as to the possible dangers with which we are faced at the present time and, if they have had such an appreciation, have they taken the steps to implement it? I know it is much easier to ask a question of that sort than it is to answer it. Questions of security come in, and it is certainly no part of our business on these Benches to assist in giving information to any quarter which perhaps should not receive it. On the other hand, I think it is a fair comment to say that it would be very difficult for us or, I should imagine, any other Party outside the Government to give to defence plans that whole-hearted support which we should like to give when, since the end of the Coalition Government, we have been completely lacking in information. One cannot have it both ways. If we had a return to the old days of the Committee of Imperial Defence, it would not be necessary to ask a question of this sort across the floor of the House.

None the less, I make that point because, unless the main appreciation has been made and has been accepted, one knows quite well that nothing whatever will happen. No plans can be proceeded with, no men can be recruited, no material can be designed, no financial sanction for any of these steps will be given; and it seems to us that, until that state of affairs is reached, until the real operational plan is being proceeded with, then in spite of anything which may be said, very little will be done to improve the defence position of this country. I am sorry to say that we in this quarter of the House have had the feeling since 1945 that some of the big decisions have been missing. One might almost wish that the approach made by His Majesty's Government to Defence had been the same bold and confident approach that they have made to subjects like the nationalisation of industry, which some of us think were less necessary. But no. When this Government came into power in 1945, so far as I am aware, they found themselves with plans prepared by their Service advisers. Those plans were ready, yet months and years passed by, and nothing seemed to be done—at least nothing was done openly—to settle whether those plans should or should not be adopted.

Nothing, for instance, was done to settle the thorny problem of National Service. I know that in 1946 the transitional White Paper appeared and, of course, it is perfectly true that National Service has been continuous from the end of the Second World War until the present time. But my point is that, by failing to deal with the whole question of National Service, and by dealing only with the transitional White Paper, no plans were made for Reserve service. Reserve service did not come in until the National Service Act. As a result, no training of the Reserves or of the Territorial Army can now begin until 1950. Your Lordships will see in a moment that there is some doubt even about that, whereas it might well have been wise and necessary to begin the training of Reserves at some time earlier.

Coupled with that, we from these Benches have regularly and persistently spoken about the need to lay down proper conditions for the service of Regular sailors, soldiers and airmen. We have always felt that the conditions of service which were laid down fell short, not only of what was wanted to attract the right people but also of the proper way to treat those people once they were in the Services. We will never let go of that. But to my mind, here again, even what has been done has been done late, with the result that in the early days, when the early numbered groups were being released from the Forces, a number of valuable non-commissioned officers and warrant officers in all three Services, particularly in the Army, were lost through the conditions and rates of pay not being fair. One can get away with all these defects for a time, but the time comes (and it has come now) when some of them come home to roost. I mention some of these things because, in the Statement made by the noble Viscount the other day, the Government stated that the weak state of the Forces was caused by the Government's obligation to those who were serving and to the economic situation. As I have just said, there was an obligation, and there always is an obligation, to those who are serving. My point is not that that obligation should have been discarded—because we want no such thing—but that more steps should have been taken to recruit the new entry, in which case the shortage would not be so great.

It is perfectly true, of course, that the economic situation is a most difficult one, and except of the strictest necessity nothing must be done which might interfere with our efforts to balance the Budget. But to say that the shortage of men was due to the economic situation is rather over-simplifying the real state of affairs. The economic situation and the needs of the economic situation ought to play an important part in regulating the number who from time to time go into the Services, and who from time to time come out; but the economic situation, whatever it may be, ought not to prevent the formation of a proper plan and a proper framework for the Defence Forces into which the right number of people can be put and from which the right number of people can be released. So do not let us be tempted into using the economic situation as a sort of joker, which people play whenever they want a quick way out of some particular situation, because that joker has been played fairly often lately, especially in regard to the Defence Forces, and that card is becoming just a little dog-eared and tattered. Let the Forces stand on their own legs, and let us treat them according to the need that we see at the time. Do not let us bring in the economic situation to "binge" up the Treasury for refusing things for which the Services' advisers have asked.

We come now to the present time. From what I have said, from what my noble friends have said, not only now but in previous debates, and from what is apparent to the public, I think it is plain that the whole plan has not worked out. The Regular cadres are smaller than they should be and, for that reason, if for no other reason, the intake of National Service men has had to be restricted. The men themselves have had a rather rough time. They have had to cover jobs which would have been done by other people had the Regular establishment been full. The worse the postwar plans have become, the greater has been the strain on the Forces. We all hoped a year ago that we should get rid of our commitments in places like Austria and Trieste, and I think it is true to say that because we hoped that, in our plans and our estimates we allowed no margin of troops to deal with unforeseen occurrences, such as have arisen in Austria and Trieste. Still less, I think, did we make any real allowance for disturbances in places like Malaya or, for that matter, for the much more unforeseen contingency, the Berlin Air Lift. So the whole machine is gradually being thrown out of gear. A great many units in the R.A.F. and in the Army are being taken away from their proper rôles and turned to some other rôle—a course which is always expensive and never efficient.

I honestly do not know at the moment what is the state of the Field Force in the Army or its counterparts in the Navy and the Air Force, but such common sense as I have tells me that you cannot meet all these unforeseen commitments without robbing the Field Forces, which are the greatest buttress of our foreign policy. There is a great deal of difference between having numbers of sailors, soldiers, and airmen, and having a Fleet, an Army and an Air Force. It may be said, that we have probably more people under arms than we ever had before in peace time, but I think it would be fair comment to say that never before were there so many people under arms and so few field units of the Field Forces. The only purpose of having soldiers under arms is to have efficient Field Forces which can take the field or the air, or wherever their duty lies, and be ready for battle. It is no good the Government thinking they can have dual-purpose Forces. It is no good thinking they can turn the Rhine Army largely into a training establishment and still have it fit for battle. Those of your Lordships who read an article in the Daily Telegraph the other day will very much admire the performance of the Commanders of the chine Army in working out this complicated system of training and in dealing as well as they are dealing with the National Service man. None the less, I think all of us will ask ourselves whether this is really a job that ought to be going on overseas, and whether it is really possible to combine training establishment and Field Forces. Personally, I do not think so.

However, His Majesty's Government have come to Parliament with the Statement which they made on September 14. Let us look at that Statement. First of all, we come to the three months that are added to the term of service of those who are due to be released. I will come back to that, if I may, in a minute. Next, and very important, are the efforts to be made to stimulate recruitment of Regulars in all three Services. We have not been told in the Statement exactly what fresh steps are to be taken. I agree, and we have often said, that a great many steps ought to be taken; we have said that on several occasions. But "handsome is as handsome does." I doubt very much whether it is right to leave untouched the pay of the Regular soldier when the pay of everybody else is raised. These matters must be considered together; it will never be satisfactory if increases in pay and rises in the cost of living continue, and a battle has to be fought to get the Service man his rights.

We have many times spoken in your Lordships' House about married quarters. A great deal was due to be done in 1945, not merely to repair the bomb damage caused in the war, and to restore the married quarters after their use by the Women's Services, but also because after the war many of the troops were in new locations which had not been used in peace time. We on this side of the House are still in complete ignorance as to whether Mr. Aneurin Bevan has parted with a single married quarter to his colleague, Mr. Shinwell, and we should very much like an answer to that. Then there is the question of food. We know that in the interests of economy no food must be wasted. But has not the food of the Service man been cut down a bit too low, bearing in mind what he has to do? I will leave that point, if I may, because I believe that at least one of my noble friends is going to make it.

We have as the third point in the Statement the recruiting campaign, which was originally started for the Territorial Army and which, I am glad to know, is now open to all three Auxiliary Services. In his Statement the noble Viscount who leads the House bespoke the support of everybody for the recruiting campaign. I know my noble friends will agree with me when I say that we on these Benches will do everything we can to support that campaign. Many of us, in all parts of the House, are already doing so as members of Territorial Army and Auxiliary Forces Associations. The only thing I would add to what I have said is this: the more we know of the effort and what is wanted, the easier it will be for us to support a campaign of this sort, as we should do so with our heads as well as with our hearts. There is one other point on this matter of recruiting. I know that the Council of Territorial Army Associations have put a number of proposals to the War Office in connection with this Territorial Army recruiting. Those proposals are based on careful thought and long experience, and I very much hope that those recommendations will be accepted in the War Office. They are all made with the idea of promoting the campaign.

Then, my Lords, the Statement goes on to deal with the supply position. On the face of it, the words actually used about the supply position read very well. They are encouraging, and the only reason that I do not use warmer words of praise is because one cannot tell from such a bald statement exactly how much is going on. We do not know whether the increase in tanks is to mean one or 100, or whether the increase in warships is to mean one or ten. It is difficult to answer a question of this kind, but my noble friends, Lord Teynham and Lord Selkirk, will deal with the Naval and the Air Force aspects of it. The question, however, would not need to be asked if that information were available confidentially to the Party to which I belong.

I would make only one more point in this connection—namely, that it is not sufficient merely to authorise the supply of ships, aircraft, weapons and vehicles, but it is necessary to see that the design is settled, and that arguments about design and tactical use stop in plenty of time for production to take place. I mention that because of the sad state of affairs I witnessed in 1939 and the early days of 1940, when, long after the invasion of France had begun, disputes about the right type of tank were still going on in the War Office and all the financiers were, I think—and this may be rather a hard ting, to say—glad that they had not to find the money for their production. It is part of the business of the Government to keep order among the experts in these matters, and to see that the design is settled in its proper time so that production can fit into the plan, otherwise we shall repeat our bitter experience all over again.

I will leave Civil Defence, which the Statement mentions, not because it is unimportant but again because my noble friend Lord Teynham will, I think, deal with it later in the debate. I want to return for a moment to the central feature of the Statement, which I take to be the extension of the call-up. Admitting that it is a necessary step to take at the present time, I am bound to say that, by itself, unless it is accompanied by further steps—which, it may be, will be announced to-morrow—it is a sorry way to deal with the problem. It is a short-term measure, if ever there was one, although, as I say, I admit that it is necessary and it will have the immediate effect of keeping 80,000 trained men with the Colours at a critical time. But it will have other effects which will not be quite so good, unless they are corrected later. First, it will only postpone the evil day and it can, I think, apply only to the men called up under the transitional scheme. And when the effect of the extra three months has worn off, the run-down will be steeper than ever—steeper even than if the three months had not been added.

The second point to be considered is this: How does it tie up with arrangements under the National Service Act? It will possibly seem quite all right, if we indulge in wishful thinking and imagine that these different crises all over the world are going to sort themselves out by 1949. But I am not taking that view. I say that we must look further, and see what else is necessary. We must bear in mind that if something is not done, and if the three months is kept on after 1950, then the whole of the Territorial and Auxiliary Forces recruiting campaign must go wrong for at least three months, because Reservists will not come out for three months after they were supposed to be released. So your Lordships will see that the whole matter as it stands is not in good order. Many of the things which we ventured to forecast some time ago seem to have come to pass. Worse still, this step of extending the Colour service for three months must interfere with the private affairs of many unfortunate men in the three Services who, it may be, have planned to go home to civil life, possibly to marry, perhaps to start their careers in industry.

It may well be that it was necessary because nothing had been done before, but it is true—indeed, I imagine it is not disputed—that Ministers must take their share of responsibility for it. But unfortunately it is not the Ministers who have to interview the men in the ranks and tell them that things have gone wrong again and that they must stay in the Service for another three months. This comes just at the time when Commanding Officers of ships, Army units, R.A.F. stations and so on have been trying to get into that position which we all know is so vitally important—the position where the leaders trust their men and the men trust their leaders. At this critical point this spanner is thrown into the works. To those of us who have had experience of regimental soldiering, it seems enough to break a lion's heart.

Something more has to be done and, I think, done very quickly. I feel that so far I have made rather a doleful and destructive speech. That is partly because the Statement itself has not been very constructive. We need more than what is outlined in the Statement to give back to the Services the stability which they must have if they are to be value for money to the taxpayer and value for money to the Government. We have not got it now, and this Statement, by itself, does little to point the way to it. I do not wish to range wider than matters which are covered in the Statement, and I do not expect an answer to-day to what I am going to say, but I should not like to finish my remarks without trying to strike a constructive note. These are the things that I believe are wanted. First, there must be an amending Bill to the National Service Act to give more scope than the twelve months' period gives now. Secondly, we must see that, whatever happens, we do not delay the inflow of the National Service men to the Territorial Army, beyond the time when it was forecast—January, 1950. Indeed I am not sure whether we ought not to have it earlier.

Then we have to deal with the legal powers relating to part time Civil Defence men, and also, I think, the Home Guard. We have, further, to make an honest and concerted attempt to clear up the conditions of service for Regular, Territorial and Auxiliary Forces, so that the conditions are such as to attract in the open market the right people whom we want. Last, but not least, there must be a proper settlement with the authorities in industry—the F.B.I. and the T.U.C.—over the whole question of reserved occupations, now and in wartime. We must have it settled what industry can spare and whom industry can spare, what industry cannot spare and whom industry cannot spare.

My Lords, that is what I feel about this White Paper. I consider that there is a great deal to be done, and although it is now nearly too late it is not too late yet. When I came to consider what this Statement amounted to, I was reminded of a review of a book on tactics which I read a long time ago. That review stated: Books on tactics are either sheep or else they are goats. This one is definitely a goat, but it is a good goat, as goats go. This Statement, I think, is definitely a goat, but it is a good goat, as goats go. In other words, it seems to represent the best way of taking immediate action to deal with a situation which, in our view, ought not to have come to such a pass. Whether it is to be accompanied by the wider-reaching and even more necessary measures which we think are called for, we may not hear to-day. Let us, at any rate, hope that we shall hear a rumour to-morrow. I beg to move for Papers.

3.18 p.m.

LORD MOYNIHAN

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity of joining in this debate to-day because I feel that, owing to the extremely unsettled state of the world, such a debate is of immediate importance and could ill have afforded to wait, as other subjects might well have done, till a later date. Few of us would have expected—and none, I believe, would have wished it—that just three years after the end of hostilities we would be debating Defence in your Lordships' House, not in a peace-time atmosphere but with the threat of war nearer, I suppose, than it has ever been in a comparable time in our history before. Few of us would have expected—although I am sure that a great number of us are agreed upon the step—that in peacetime American bombers would be allowed the use of British bases without the matter having been debated in either House of Parliament. Nevertheless, the situation in the world generally is such that we must ask ourselves now the question: Are we really ready? If the first bomb of the Third World War were to drop this afternoon, should we be ready to go into action with the full forces that are needed behind us? Obviously I am not asking for any secret military information, but there are a few points I would like to put before the Government for their consideration.

During the last two wars we apparently found that we could be unprepared at the beginning of the war and could spend the first few months in getting ready and up to date. Let us face the stark truth. If we did that again, we should not be able to hold this country at all. After what historians of the future would probably call the greatest losing battle in history, the few of us who remained here would have to watch the progress of the rest of the war as members of an occupied territory. That is what would happen if we were unprepared. I do not think that at the present moment many people in this country realise that fact; or, if they do, they are trying to forget it and to live from day to day. I should like to quote one sentence from last Sunday's Observer. Talking about the scheme for National Service men, it says: No further expansion is likely, but plans have been approved for increasing the number of workers to some 200,000 within a year of the outbreak of hostilities. What a hope in an atom bomb war! What is happening now—not what will happen when the war starts, if it does start—about the standardisation of transport? We shall, I hope, find ourselves in agreement with the United States of America and the rest of Europe. Are we in agreement about what kind of transport we are going to use or are we going on in the same old way, using anything that comes to hand?

I do not want to go into all the old arguments this afternoon. After the last war we had an orderly, well-thought-out scheme of demobilisation. That scheme was essential, just as it was essential to keep our Forces up to a certain strength, compatible with all the requirements we had to take over. We had to retain an adequate Army, and we did so; but some of us considered then, and still feel, that the method used was the wrong method. It is impossible now to judge what would have been the results if we had gone all out for a voluntary Regular Army, with a voluntary Territorial Army to support it, because the main deterrent to enlistment on a voluntary basis is the continued conscript service in peace time. We cannot turn over now, of course, with the state of the world as it is, and risk having only a voluntary force. But I believe it would be possible to attempt to do that, if we could make use of the 4,500,000 now on Reserve who fought for this country during the war. In my own opinion, the present system is not, and never will be, a success. I do not think it matters whether the National Service man's time is six, twelve, fifteen or eighteen months—or any other time. I do not think an extension of National Service will make the difference that is necessary. The change made on September 14 gives us, in the words of the Government, 80,000 more trained men at the end of the year. But it depends on what we mean by "trained men." In my opinion, very few of these men are up to the standard required to go into war immediately. I do not think they are even so well trained as those who had two or three years' fighting during the war and are now on Reserve.

The other point I would like to make on this matter is that, with the exception of certain regiments with the greatest and oldest traditions, which, because of this, had the biggest number of recruits, I do not think the Regular Army at its present size can possibly cope with the two types of work which it has to do—its own work and the training of raw recruits. My second point is that even if everything was going on all right, we would have a maximum of only 100,000 new men a year; and at the end of the year these men would be only half-trained. If your Lordships speak, as I know you all do, and as I take every opportunity of doing, to the ordinary National Service man in the streets on week-end leave, you will find there is always one thing he can tell you straight away—the day of his release. If he knows nothing else, he knows—or at least he knew up to September 14—the exact day he was expecting to go home. I do not think that is the spirit with which we can face another war.

Because of the international situation as it is now, and because we have to be prepared, may I make this suggestion? Let there be an immediate re-registration of the 4,500,000 people who were in the last war; tell them what they have to do, and where they are to go. Of these 4,500,000, I should think that at a minimum estimate those still available to serve number over 2,000,000. They could be held ready, at a moment's notice, knowing where they would have to go. Is that not the practical answer to our problem, and would that not have an enormous effect throughout the whole world—an effect which would make other people realise that we meant what we said, and that we would go into a war with far greater numbers and far better trained men than we have ever done before?

Obviously in a speech of this length this afternoon, I cannot go into details of how this could be done. But it could be done by part-time training, at least so far as the officers are concerned. I am not suggesting for a moment that we pass over the Territorial Army. I think that the Territorial Army and the Regular Army, relieved of their double task, would be able to tackle recruiting with very great success it the immediate future. Take the Gunners, as one example. Artillery officers could be sent for a course at Larkhill, where, with the latest equipment and good instructors, a week's training would be enough to bring the majority of them up to date. And it would be a great incentive to them to join the Territorial Army. I think we have to point out one thing to these 2,000,000. If they rejoin, as I hope they will have to, they will rejoin in the ranks open to them. The Territorial Army is very small, but those of us who are in it are learning the whole time, and when we reach a grade we are given the rank for that grade. It is becoming apparent that grades are going to be high and, however small the numbers of officers, Territorial Army officers will hold high and responsible rank in an emergency. It may be that the men who come in afterwards will be forced, if necessary, to take a lower rank. I believe that if we carried out this re-registration, it would relieve the Regular Army of its double rôle and we would have an opportunity of obtaining a voluntary Regular force some 350,000 to 400,000 strong and, at the same time, a fully prepared and strong Territorial Army. The deterrent of having to train unwilling National Service men would have gone.

As the noble Viscount, Lord Bridge-man, said in his opening speech, many things have still to be done. Army pay must be reconsidered. Married quarters must be considered—a question we have continually raised and insisted upon. At camp only a few weeks ago, I found young married officers having to pay enormous summer rents because there were no married quarters. For that they received not one penny more than if they were living in the camp itself. That cannot be fair, and it cannot be the way to encourage anyone with incentive to go into the Army. These arguments have all been put forward before, and I hope that we shall have another opportunity later on in the year to debate them again. In passing, I would like to mention a headline that I saw a few days ago in the Daily Mirror saying: "The higher your rank, the bigger your leave." That is a good step in the right direction, provided that the high rank goes with efficiency, and not with length of service. If it goes with length of service, then I cannot see any point in it at all.

Finally, as I think it is an integral part of our defence scheme at the moment, I would like to say a few words on the Territorial Army and the autumn campaign. The success of this really depends on how the campaign is conducted. We should show great appreciation to the Press of this country for the space that has been given in the papers to this matter of recruitment. I do not think it is the fault of the Press that the recruits do not come forward. May I appeal very humbly to those people who speak from the political platform, and to those with high military rank? What we want now is the old Territorial Army spirit, and we shall get that spirit back only if speeches are made with complete sincerity and with unity of purpose. I am a serving Territorial officer. It is always impertinent to criticise higher authority, even when the opportunity is presented, but I would like to say this. In the last few months I have found considerable differences of opinion among many senior officers. That does not help. If we are to make a success of this, we must have unity of purpose and complete help from everyone. May I remind them that if this is a success a very great weight will be lifted from their minds? The whole of the defence of this country is to be on quite a different basis. Surely, from their point of view as well as from the point of view of everybody else, that needs a tremendous effort.

Whomsoever you talk to in authority, be he in the Forces or an important political person, when the Territorial Army is mentioned, there is always the excuse that there is no money. Surely, with the country in its present condition, it will be cheaper to spend a few million pounds—and that is all it will cost—on putting these things right, rather than to risk a war. In the event of war there would be no millions left in the country for anyone. I do not want to be too gloomy on the matter of another war. My idea is to stop it coming, and the best way to do that is by being prepared. We cannot remain out of another war should it come, however much we want to, or however much we think we ought to. Our geographical position, which has always hitherto been our safeguard, is now exactly the opposite. Do not let us fool ourselves in that respect. Let us work as hard as we can to prevent a war; and at all costs, if it has to come, let us be prepared for it.

3.34 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM

My Lords, I am sure the whole House, and certainly those who sit on these Benches, very much welcomed the Statement on Defence made by the Leader of the House during the debate on the Address, even though it was not a very comprehensive statement. Particular interest, of course, attaches to the question of deferment. I propose to deal with that matter, and a little later to refer to the plans for defence as they may affect the Navy. In the first place, I would suggest that it is only partly true that the disturbed conditions in the world and the Berlin crisis have led to the revision of the demobilisation plans. There is little doubt that the high rate of demobilisation has had a great effect on the efficiency of the Fighting Services. It was clear many months ago that the whole scheme had got out of hand, but it is only now that His Majesty's Government have had the courage to bring forward this proposed amendment. Perhaps, in one respect, the Berlin crisis presented a welcome opportunity to His Majesty's Government to get out of their difficulties and to reorganise the Forces without causing too much strife and dissension in their own Party and amongst their own followers. In the past we have witnessed the folly of His Majesty's Government bowing down before the pressure of their Party, when the National Service period was reduced from eighteen months to twelve months. I hope that in the near future we shall see an amending Bill brought forward to extend the National Service period from one year—which I think comes into force from January 1 next—to at least eighteen months. There is little doubt that this is the minimum period of effective service that will enable the Forces to be properly trained.

But the matter goes much deeper than that. The present plan put forward by His Majesty's Government is, of course, only a stop-gap measure, and does not go anywhere like far enough. What is required is a fully trained Army in about two years' time, and not in four or five years' time as is envisaged by the present plans for the Regular and Territorial Armies. I suggest that the whole of our plans for the Army will have to be recast in the light of the present international situation. The present stop-gap measures will, of course, have comparatively little effect on the man-power of the Navy, owing to the small proportion of National Service men in the Navy as compared with the Regular recruits.

I believe it was said in another place that the Conservative Party were insistent after the war that demobilisation should take place as soon as possible, and should be much accelerated. That is quite true. But what are the facts? We recommended that demobilisation should commence as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities, but two years were wasted by His Majesty's Government before anything was done at all. I cannot help feeling that if demobilisation had been started much earlier we should have been in a much better position than we are to-day. It is perhaps interesting to recall the total figures for the Armed Forces which were recommended by the Conservative Party at that time. For the Navy the number recommended was 150,000 men; for the Royal Air Force, 400,000 men; and for the Army 1,000,000 men. That gives a total of 1,550,000. These figures were put forward by Mr. Churchill on October 22, 1945.

According to the latest figures which I have seen, the total Service man-power is now only about half the figure recommended by Mr. Churchill. I believe the figure on July 1 was approximately 860,000 men. There is little doubt that if the numbers put forward by Mr. Churchill had been maintained we should have had a properly balanced force in our three Services. Our position in relation to negotiations in foreign affairs would have been much more satisfactory, and the difficulties would thereby have been minimised. I would suggest that the proposal put forward by His Majesty's Government to retain for a further period of three months men in the Forces now due for release, is of comparatively little value. A considerable increase in our Forces will be required in the near future in order that our commitments can be carried out. It is clear that the short period of twelve months of National Service will have the effect of rendering the whole scheme of relatively little use to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. These two Services are highly specialised and they require, of course, a much longer period for effective training. On the present basis, I think only about 2,000 Naval Reservists will be produced under the present scheme, which, of course, is hardly a basis for a rapid expansion of the Navy should the need arise. I hope the First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to indicate how he proposes to build up extra Royal Naval Reserves.

The solution of the whole problem of increasing the strength of our Forces is not merely to extend the National Service period, but to adopt means to increase the strength of our Regular Forces. I am sure that the best and most efficiently conducted recruiting campaign will not attract men unless His Majesty's Government take steps to improve the conditions of pay and, last but not least, the rations of food which are issued to troops on foreign service and operational service. Men undergoing extensive and rigorous training require substantial quantities of food, and it is a fact that a great deal of the men's pay at present is spent in buying food in the N.A.A.F.I. canteens. There is little doubt that it has been a false economy on the part of His Majesty's Government to reduce the Forces' rations on the plea of economy in dollar expenditure. In any case, the financial saving is very small, and I suspect that the real reason is to be found in the suggestion that the Forces are being unduly favoured. I do not believe that the civilian population would in any way grudge an increase of food given to the men in the Forces.

I hope His Majesty's Government will give serious consideration to both pay and food, which I am sure will have to be considered as soon as possible in order to improve recruiting. It is the case that many young married junior officers and non-commissioned office -sin the Army, and Petty Officers in the Navy, have a difficult time in making both ends meet. It is extremely difficult for them to avoid running into debt, with the present rate of pay and the increased cost of living and high taxation. It is, of course, true that there are several millions of trained ex-Service men of the three Services in civilian life, and I should like to ask His Majesty's Government whether steps have been taken to set up a shadow register of these men and whether a mobilisation plan is, in fact, in existence, so that if an emergency arises we shall not see chaos and dislocation in industry.

The whole question is wrapped up in that of the most effective use of manpower, and there is little doubt that, in spite of the progress reported by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in regard to our recent industrial improvement, the plans for mobilising the labour force of the country have not been successful. Now we are faced with the necessity of allocating additional workers as soon as possible to factories engaged in aircraft production or on producing defence equipment. Can His Majesty's Government give any assurance that they have a real and effective man-power policy? Direction of labour has, of course, failed, and rightly so in a free society. But what do His Majesty's Government propose to put in its place? I suggest that there should be a constructive policy of attracting labour in the essential trades by suitable inducements and rewards.

In connection with the Naval Service, I should now like to refer to a matter which is of the utmost importance, and that is the Royal Naval Reserve. I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is replying for the Government, whether any steps have been taken to consult the shipping industry on this very important matter of the training of Royal Naval Reserve officers. I understand that some two years ago the Officers' Merchant Navy Federation were invited to express a considered opinion on the whole matter, but, so far as I am aware, no further developments have taken place. I need hardly point out to your Lordships the utmost importance of building up a fully trained Royal Naval Reserve as we have had in the past.

There is a particular aspect of Naval training to which I should like to draw your Lordships' attention. I understand that at present there is no West Country naval training establishment at all, and that both H.M.S. "Impregnable" and H.M.S. "Raleigh" have been closed down. I suggest that this decision is having, and will have in the future, a grave effect on the recruiting of West Country seamen. I would like to suggest that H.M.S. "Raleigh" should be open as a West Country training centre, not only for Regular boy recruits but also for the drafts of National Service men who are to be trained in the Navy. I know it is true that overheads at H.M.S. "Impregnable" were heavy in comparison with the number of boys trained, but this should not apply in the case of H.M.S. "Raleigh," where facilities are available for considerably larger numbers of men. I think it is deplorable that at the present time there is no training centre in the West Country for the rightful successors of Drake and perhaps the best seamen in the world.

I understand that West Country seamen are now trained in Scotland, but I have heard unconfirmed rumours that even this training centre may be closed down in the near future. Is it the intention of the Admiralty to concentrate all naval training in the future at Shotley Establishment on the East Coast? It is of great importance to have flexibility in training, and concentration of large numbers of men at any one establishment can only lead to a loss of personal contact between the training officers and the men themselves—contact which is so essential for a really effective and happy organisation. I hope the First Lord of the Admiralty will seriously consider the re-opening of a West Country establishment as soon as possible.

I should now like to touch upon a matter which is of vital importance to our problem of defence, and that is the replacement of our merchant fleet. It is, of course, just as true to-day as in the past that our sea power is largely dependent on our Mercantile Marine, and that our air power alone would be quite unable to transport all the food and materials that would be required in the event of war. What is the position of our Merchant Navy to-day? I understand that the total tonnage of merchant shipping under construction at the present time is something over 4,250,000 tons gross, of which one third is for foreign account, but owing to the low allocation of steel the output for this year in merchant shipping will barely reach 1,000,000 tons.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT HALL)

I regret interrupting the noble Lord, but I think he is confusing actual construction with orders for tonnage which it is estimated will spread over a period of four years.

LORD TEYNHAM

I quite agree: I am referring to orders for construction. But the fact is that construction cannot be proceeded with because of the low allocation of steel. It is vitally important that the Government should reconsider the allocation of steel to the shipbuilding industry. I know of one of the largest firms who are receiving only 40 per cent. of their maximum requirements in steel. This, of course, is having a grave effect on the Lime of delivery. We cannot afford to neglect our merchant fleet in this fashion, and I hope His Majesty's Government will again look seriously into the question of steel deliveries to the shipbuilding industry.

I would now like for a few moments to draw your Lordships' attention to the state of our Fleet, and to the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to escort and anti-submarine vessels. In the past it has been frequently pointed out in your Lordships' House—and I think especially in the recent debate on the Naval Estimates—that the majority of the escort vessels of the last war are now far too slow to deal effectively with the modern high-speed submarine. I would suggest that immediate steps should be taken to provide a nucleus of high-speed and seaworthy vessels suitable for escort and anti-submarine work. I hope the First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to give a satisfactory assurance on this important matter. I also hope that it will be the policy of His Majesty's Government to restrict the sales of any further destroyers, and cease to break up any more of them unless they are absolutely beyond repair. I hope at the same time that they will accelerate the building of those destroyers which are now under construction. The destroyer is still the only vessel which can deal effectively in open water with the modern high-speed submarine.

Perhaps the First Lord will also allow me to draw his attention to the Statement on Naval Policy which he made in this House on March 8. In that Statement he gave a long list of ships which were to be fully commissioned by the end of this year. I should like to ask if he can give some indication whether that estimate is likely to be fulfilled; and further, whether he can give any indication of additional ships which are likely to be put into full commission in the first quarter of next year. Perhaps he will also make a statement on the condition of the Reserve Fleet and on what steps are being taken, if any, to re-condition them and bring them up to date. I am sure your Lordships were interested to learn from the Press that the First Lord is proceeding with the Home Fleet to-morrow on their cruise to the West Indies. I am sure we all wish him a very good voyage. Perhaps before he goes he would like to indicate to the House the number and types of ships that will proceed with him and how they are manned.

We have recently seen announcements in the Press concerning Civil Defence. I do not wish to delay your Lordships long on this important matter because I understand it will be dealt with by a noble Lord later. But in a recent debate many questions were put to His Majesty's Government which were only partially answered; and the House were given to understand that the whole matter was under serious and urgent re-consideration. Perhaps His Majesty's Government would like to take this opportunity of making a statement on their proposed plans; and I hope that, in doing so, they will be able to indicate that the valuable experience gained, which has by this time, I hope, been analysed, is being taken into account. Many of us or this side of the House are not only anxious about our immediate stage of readiness as regards Defence, but are also particularly concerned about plans that may or may not have been prepared to deal with mobilization in case of emergency. Last, but not least, we are concerned as to whether His Majesty's Government have a well-thought-out man-power policy, on which so much depends. I hope the noble Viscount who is to reply will be able to give your Lordships a reassuring and satisfactory statement concerning Defence which I am sure would be welcomed on all sides of the House.

3.53 p.m.

LORD NEWALL

My Lords, the problems confronting His Majesty's Government and the Service Departments to-day, resulting from the international situation, are in many ways similar to those which had to be overcome in 1935 and the following years. The main difference is that in 1935 our defences had been allowed to reach a perilously low level over a long period—fifteen or more years—whereas to-day we are suffering from the results of a very rapid demobilisation immediately following the war. Perhaps I may make this difficulty clearer by a simple mechanical simile: in 1935 our national motorcar, so to speak, was at the bottom of a hill, facing the wrong way, and the engine was completely seized through lack of oil and years of neglect; whereas to-day our car is running downhill very rapidly in reverse gear. That is roughly the difference. We have acquired a considerable momentum in this run-down. The problem in both cases is the same—namely, to get the car moving again, forward, uphill and in a fit condition to accelerate if necessary.

I am keenly aware of the difficulties of the present situation, having myself been closely concerned with giving effect to the Government's change of policy in 1935 and the few years following. At that time, after many years of drastic reduction of every form of expenditure, it was naturally difficult for the Civil Service—the faithful watch-dogs of the Treasury—suddenly to attune their mental outlook to the new Government policy of expansion. I give place to no one in my admiration of the loyalty, integrity and conscientious zeal of the civil servants, but I do hope that His Majesty's Government will instruct the Treasury to emphasise the urgency of the present situation upon the accounting officers of the Services and other Departments in order that all measures that are approved may be acted upon without delay. I may say that in 1935 and the years that followed we experienced great difficulty in getting things done.

In the light of recently announced defence measures I suggest to your Lordships that it is now prudent that we should take stock of our position; and I will confine myself to the Royal Air Force. The Defence Policy of His Majesty's Government was announced in October, 1947, and the following priorities were given: first, defence research; second, the maintenance of the structure and of the initial striking power of the Royal Air Force; and third, the defence of sea communications. I think noble Lords will agree that it is an air striking force alone which can provide the threat which may deter a potential enemy from either resorting to or provoking war. If that deterrent should fail during the initial onslaught, our safety will depend entirely on the Royal Air Force and its radar screen. Rapid expansion of the Royal Air Force on the outbreak of war, or, in fact, at any time, is not possible without long and detailed planning and actual preparation, such as preparation in the factories over a period of years.

For more than three years prior to September, 1939, an emergency had been foreseen, and in consequence when war started the Royal Air Force was already in process of expansion (largely due, may I remind your Lordships, to the great endeavours of my noble friends Lord Swinton and Lord Weir), and we were able to speed up the machine, which by then was already moving steadily and in the right direction. Even so, and with the added advantage of the considerable period of relative inactivity after the declaration of war, it was only by a small margin that we were able to survive the scale of attack to which we were subjected in 1940. I cannot too strongly emphasise that the strength and efficiency of an Air Force is almost entirely a matter of long-term policy and long-range planning. There is no short cut, and measures taken to-day are unlikely to show results for a very considerable time.

Since the end of the last war, the Royal Air Force has been rapidly reduced, and large numbers of its most skilled and experienced men have left the Service. Throughout the war there was no long-service intake for Regular enlistment and, as a result, we now find the trade structure in the Service seriously unbalanced, an acute shortage in some of the key trades, and a general lowering of the level of skill and experience in the regular cadre. There is no quick remedy for this state of affairs; and I suggest very earnestly to His Majesty's Government that the exodus of trained men should now be halted and that inducements should be offered to skilled ex-Service men to return to the Service. Neither the National Service entry for a one year period nor the three months' suspension of releases recently announced contributes materially to the solution of the Royal Air Force personnel problem. The period of one year is too short, and the employment of so large a proportion of skilled men upon the training of frequent new entries, who serve for so short a time, is unsatisfactory. I think it is well known that it is only from its long-service element that the Royal Air Force can obtain full value. Unfortunately, the volunteer recruits who make the Service their profession are not coining forward in sufficient numbers. We are neither keeping the trained and experienced men nor attracting the long-service recruits, because the pay and conditions of service, and the prospects, compare unfavourably with those in civil life. Many suggestions for improving this state of affairs have been made in your Lordships' House, but so far as I am aware none has been adopted or accepted. I have even heard it said that the Royal Air Force is slowly dying from man-power starvation. Whether or not this is a true description of the state of affairs, it seems dear that the essential steps to maintain its structure and initial striking power have not been taken.

So much for personnel. I would now like to refer to the question of equipment. The production of the new types of aircraft, with their ancillary equipment, is an even more complicated problem than the provision of adequately trained men. Four or five years will frequently elapse between the issue of a production order to a factory and the first few deliveries to the Service, and further months will pass before they can be used on operations. Mention has been made recently of new long-range bombers to replace our present obsolescent types, and of jet bombers coming "soon"—I think that was the expression used. What does "soon" mean? It is the time factor which is all-important in this question. I do not ask for a reply, but an assurance from the noble Viscount who is to reply for the Government, that overriding priority is being given to the development and preparation for production of these new bomber aircraft would be welcome. With regard to fighter aircraft, we are fortunate that our latest types are among the best in the world, and it is extremely satisfactory to know—and here I quote the actual words of the recent Statement—that we are adopting measures that will nearly double the present output of certain fighters. The real value of these measures depends upon how soon the output will be nearly doubled. Here again, may we be assured that no effort will be spared and no reasonable expenditure withheld in order that this increased rate of production may be achieved in the shortest possible time? And may I ask why "nearly double"? Why not "double"? Why should it be "nearly double"? The use of the term "nearly double" sounds rather like a man putting something into a shop window for sale and marking it at 19s. 11¾ lid.—though I do not, of course, suggest that the motive in both cases is similar.

To sum up, the critical needs of the Royal Air Force to-day are: increased recruitment, particularly of Regular and Auxiliary personnel, necessitating improved pay, improved living conditions and improved prospects of getting a job on leaving; continued support of the aircraft industry, especially priority in the release of raw materials to enable production to be accelerated; and also actual preparation for increased production in the event of war. It cannot be too often repeated that the safety of our country depends more than ever now on the Royal Air Force. It is the air striking force alone which can provide the real deterrent to a potential enemy; and, should we again become involved in war, our immediate survival will, as in 1940, depend mainly on the strength, efficiency and readiness of our Fighter Command and its radar screen.

4.6 p.m.

EARL BATHURST

My Lords, I believe I am the most junior member of your Lordships' House, and I beg your Lordships' indulgence while I make just three points during this most vital debate. I have very recently returned from service with an operational regiment of the Army, and I am at present in the Territorial Army, so I hope that the three points which I wish to make, representing the point of view of a very junior officer, may be of use in your Lordships' debate to-day.

Up to nine months ago, on the autobahn from Hamburg to Lubeck, on a stretch of road closed for twenty miles, vehicles were parked bonnet to tailboard and side by side, four abreast. That makes eighty miles of vehicles, equivalent to the distance from here to Margate. A large percentage of those vehicles were extraordinarily costly armoured fighting vehicles, and they were all parked there for some four and a half years. The same thing was happening in dumps all over England. There were three instances of which I have knowledge. One was at Great Missenden; the second was at an aerodrome close to York, and the third was at Slough. Again, thousands of armoured fighting vehicles were there rotting in the elements. If some of your Lordships were to go round some of those dumps, or happened to go now to that autobahn at Hamburg, you would notice that the tanks had disappeared. If you were to make inquiries about those vehicles, you would find that they have been "b.l.r.-ed."—which means. "back loaded rear," to be reconditioned and repaired for reissue to other regiments and to units going overseas. My own regiment received seventy-five Cromwell tanks straight off the autobahn. They were almost brand new but, needless to say, they were in a filthy condition. Practically none of them worked until we had spent many man-hours cleaning them, pulling them to pieces and putting them together again.

A great many of your Lordships may know the Cromwell tank well, and may swear by it. It may be that a great many more have sworn at it! However, the Cromwell tank was an excellent tank. During the Second World War, it was second only to the German Royal Tiger tank. Nevertheless, this tank is now out of date. It has a 75 mm. gun which is, of course, far too small. Furthermore, in its hydraulic turret mechanism there is a very serious defect known as back-lash, so that my regiment, which is an operational regiment, is training National Service men on a completely out-of-date machine. Furthermore, other regiments more completely equipped than we were are now out in Germany, and they also are using these out-of-date Cromwell tanks and many other such vehicles.

There is another tank on the market, so to speak. That is the Centurion. So far, it has been available only in small numbers, but it is the latest design of tank. In fact, I think one might call it a sort of "push button" tank. It has a gun on it that will knock the ace out of the ace of spades at 3,000 yards in two shots. It may or may not be a good tank, but the designer left out of account the lap gunner, or co-driver. Many of my noble friends will remember that in a tank crew the lap gunner or co-driver is the vital man. When things are getting pretty hot, he is the man who brings up the brew of tea; and furthermore, when everything seems wrong, he is the man whose extra muscles enable a track-pin to be extracted or changed. I have been told by a certain squadron-leader now in Germany, who is acquainted with this very costly and beautiful machine, that it is a physical impossibility to fight and maintain these tanks in active service conditions. Of course, that has not been tried; that is only what one tank man who has this tank under his command says about it, and it may be true or it may not. Are tanks really going to come into the next war? If they are, obviously it is vital to us in the Armoured Corps to know that some new form of tank which has the best type of gun, the best armour and, furthermore, the best in fireproof engines, is somewhere just around the corner. We hope it is. If, on the other hand, tanks are no good in war, if we are not going to use a tank and it will merely be a matter of pressing a button to let off an atom bomb, why do we spend a great amount of man-hours and money on producing the Centurion tank and other tanks which are completely out of date?

That brings me to the question of manpower. In the Army to-day we have a great many officers many of whom are highly experienced, but a great many more are very inexperienced. There are also a certain number of sergeant-majors and old soldiers. But the backbone of the British army has completely disappeared. That man is the troop sergeant or, as the infantry people will say, the platoon sergeant. He has gone, and where can he be brought back from? The men who are appointed up to the rank of sergeant in these days—and this is not a slight to them—are those who some five or six years ago were possibly only lance-corporals. Without the equivalent of a proper troop sergeant or platoon sergeant, how can we fight? As has been pointed out earlier in this debate, we have the numbers but they are made up of National Service men. Again, as many of my noble friends will bear out, it takes two years to make a useful tank man; it will take a year-and-a-half to make a good all-round infantry soldier. Therefore fifteen months of National Service, of indifferent training on out-of-date equipment, cannot possibly go half way to make either. From what can be seen in the training of regiments, I think I can say that the man-power situation is not one about which we can be very pleased.

My third point concerns the Territorial Army. We in the Territorial Army are a reserve of enthusiastic volunteers from highly trained regiments, individuals who can be used by the Regular Army. I ask His Majesty's Government to give the Territorial Army the complete support that it needs to carry out this rôle. But we must have support not only from His Majesty's Government, but also from the Regular Army. At present we lack drill halls. Those we have are totally inadequate. Our equipment is out of date. We train on armoured cars or any other cast-offs that may be about. The permanent staff is too small in number. In regard to the permanent staff we have, I admit that the Regular Army have done us very well. They have most generously sent their best N.C.O.s and some of their best officers. But we still need more if we are to get our numbers trained. A little incident such as this will possibly illustrate my point. You might wish to take out an armoured car for an evening's training, but you have to choose between taking out three men to-night, to teach them how to drive, or going to camp the next week-end. It is one of the two, because you have not enough petrol to do both. That is fact. The other day another small incident occurred. I had to lend my squadron my own paint sprayer so that they could paint a couple of armoured cars to put in a local horse show. We must have support from His Majesty's Government and the Regular Army if we are to make a success of our rôle as a Territorial Army.

In conclusion, I should like briefly to run over my three points again. First of all, are tanks going to be standard equipment in the next war? If so, have we a real tank that is of some good to the Armoured Corps, should war break out? If tanks are not going to be used, why are we now spending such a great deal of money and man-hours on producing tanks? Secondly, will officers and men be able to get adequate training in the use of these complex machines with which they will have to fight should another war break out? Thirdly, we in the Territorial Army must have complete support from His Majesty's Government and from the Regular Army if we are to carry on our rôole as a tactical reserve to the Regular Army.

4.18 p.m.

LORD HAMPTON

My Lords, I am particularly glad that it falls to my lot to congratulate the noble Earl on his maiden speech. His was the sort of forthright, straight-frog-the-shoulder speech which it is very refreshing to hear in your Lordships' House, and I hope that this is not the last time by many occasions that he will address us.

I am not one of those who believe that a war is inevitable. No doubt to-day's proceedings and what has led up to them, in the Press and so forth, will be freely interpreted in the State controlled Press of various countries we wot of as "warmongering." "a prelude to aggression." and much else besides. But this will not deter us in spite of our difficulties, both here and abroad, from showing—if I may use a colloquialism—that we can still "pack a punch behind the sparring." Sparring, I suppose, is what we may say we have been doing for all too long. But if, unhappily, we should find ourselves again at war, although its approach may be comparatively gradual, its actual onslaught will probably be violent, without any or certainly not much warning. I imagine that, from an early stage of hostilities, we should have to face the dropping of sabotage parties all over the country, possibly fifth column activities, and even large-scale attempts at airborne landings with the same purpose in view.

Recently, in one way or another, we have heard a good deal about the reorganisation of Civil Defence, and here I should like to ask when we can expect a Bill to be forthcoming on that most important matter. But, so far as I am aware, no mention has yet been made with regard to a possible resurgence of the Home Guard. Your Lordships will remember that it was well after the beginning of the recent war that this force came into a somewhat haphazard and hastily contrived being. Your Lordships will agree that although this great body of volunteers never actually had to repel an enemy yet they fully justified their existence, and it may even be that the very fact that they did exist played no small part in the enemy's decision against invasion. I need hardly remind your Lordships of the great advantages of a force of this nature. In the first place—and this, in these days, is very important—it was probably the most inexpensive Army we have ever had in the long history of our country. It enabled practically every corner of our Islands to be watched and guarded by men who were intimately acquainted with the ground over which they might have to fight. That is an advantage which is denied to any other conceivable body of troops. It enabled men who were too old to offer their services to the Fighting Forces, or those who had to be retained in reserved occupations, to take part, if called upon, in the active defence of their country. It cooperated admirably with, and complemented, the Civil Defence Services.

Beyond all this—and I submit that this is a very important point indeed—the rebirth of the Home Guard could be brought about now with far greater rapidity than in the case of its first formation, because we have at hand—at least I hope we have—all the experience gained as to such matters as sectors, battalion areas, local defence schemes, strong points, personnel and so on. Added to this is the fact that in many districts Home Guards have kept in touch with each other through the formation of old comrades' associations, rifle clubs and social meetings. I myself am in touch with many. If the call for the services of these men went out again, I am convinced that it would be answered with the same enthusiasm, the same undefeated spirit as on the last occasion.

What I am concerned with this afternoon is to ask His Majesty's Government whether they have given—or, if not, whether they will give—consideration to the rebirth of the Home Guard, in case of need, as a definite and indispensable part of our defence scheme. If the decision is—as I hope it will be and as I think it ought to be—in the affirmative, I submit that plans for this rebirth should be laid now, so that they will be ready to operate immediately, or even before, the actual necessity arises. As I have pointed out, we already have much valuable experience both as to what to do and, what is perhaps even more important, what to avoid doing in a force of this nature. Perhaps I shall be forgiven if I venture to suggest, from my own past experience, some of the things which I think we should avoid. I am a great believer in the volunteering spirit, which so firmly laid the foundations of the original L.D.V., but I also believe that in a time of national emergency every able-bodied man and woman should be liable to serve the country in the capacity most suited to his or her station and attainments. I believe this latter view to be the more important consideration of the two, and I should like to see legislation embodying that view introduced at an early date.

The second point I would stress is that there should be no time lag, as there was at the start of the L.D.V., in the issue of uniforms, arms and equipment. If we ever have another Home Guard they will not want a repetition of arm-bands or denims or pikes, or of having to shoot bottles of phosphorous out of drain pipes. Nor, I imagine, will this be necessary. This leads me to ask the noble Viscount who is to reply to the debate on behalf of the Government whether he can give the House any assurance—in very general terms, of course—as to the reserve of uniforms, weapons, ammunition and equipment generally that are immediately available for defence purposes. And by weapons I am not referring only to rifles and Sten guns, though we should have been fortunate to have them early in the last war. A new Home Guard, if it comes into being, will require more in the way of up to date equipment at the start than it achieved at the end on the last occasion. The third of the many things to be avoided would, I suggest, be the dangerous loss of mobility which we all experienced in the past, owing to lack of trucks and sufficient field wireless. All these things, and many others, can be avoided by taking thought and planning well in advance.

Of course, one realises that the position in which we find ourselves to-day involves a very delicate balance in the utilisation of our available man-power. It is a problem which would tax the ingenuity of any Administration, of any Party. It is the old story of a tug-of-war between conflicting necessities, but, somehow, we have got to solve it—and solve it quickly. I submit, from past experience, that a resurgence of the Home Guard would do something—I do not put it higher than that—to reconcile the necessities of production and defence. The strain of the dual life upon the individual was at times great. One saw that. But I have yet to learn that efficiency was thereby greatly impaired. I hope that in saying what I have said, I have not been crying for the moon. If we are not to have a Home Guard, however, I shall be grateful if the noble Viscount who is to speak for the Government will inform us what, in the contemplation of His Majesty's Government, and their Service advisers, is to take its place.

4.27 p.m.

EARL HOWE

My Lords, on September 14, the noble Viscount the Leader of the House made what was undoubtedly a very important Statement with regard to Defence. But it seemed to me, listening, that it was extremely vague. It referred, of course, to the slow-up of demobilisation, and the noble Viscount spoke of the R.N.V.R. In the last war, the R.N.V.R. provided 80 per cent. of the officer strength of the Royal Navy. If the Royal Navy is ever called on again in a future war it is certain that the active list of the Navy will not be able to provide the entire officer personnel which will be required. The Navy will also require as many ratings as it can get from the Reserve Forces, including the R N.V.R. It seems to me that that makes the subject of the R.N.V.R. one of vital importance. It is true that the Government have said that they are going to bring the R.N.V.R. up to strength. How in the world are they going to do it?

In the first place, if one tries to recruit for the R.N.V.R. to-day the sort of men who were recruited before the war, one is told that they are earmarked for National Service, and are not available. The net result is that the R.N.V.R. Divisions today have hardly any men at all, and are not likely to have for the next two years. It seems to me that there is only one thing to do, and I would like to make this suggestion to the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty. I, and a good many others, I know, would appreciate it very much if the First Lord could deal with this suggestion in his reply. Would it not be possible to grant exemption from National Service to men who sign on to serve in the R.N.V.R. for a period of not less than five years and who undertake to carry out all obligations and training laid down? It seems to me that unless some step of that sort is taken there is not a hope of recruiting ratings for the R.N.V.R. in any appreciable numbers for at least another two years.

I also want to refer to the Force known as the Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary Reserve. This consisted before the last war, and is composed now, of yacht owners, who in many cases have master's tickets. There is a list of those prepared to come forward and join this Reserve, and I understand the strength stands at about what it was before the war—namely, about 3,000. It was decided during the war that on being called up these officers were to receive a minimum of three months' training. It so happened that I was employed in the appropriate department of the Admiralty during the war, and I know what I am talking about when I tell your Lordships that the average amount of training it was possible to give these officers was four and a half days. The reason was that these men were so extraordinarily valuable. They already knew their navigation backwards, and it was essential that as soon as they could be fitted out with uniform and railway tickets they should be drafted to sea.

I submit that if it was necessary last time, it will be equally necessary if the need ever comes again. It seems to me that the R.N.V.S.R. is a vital Force. I saw a great deal of the work of many individuals belonging to this Force during the war, and I assure your Lordships that some of these officers were the finest men I have ever struck in all my time in the R.N.V.R.—and, indeed, in the Navy itself. They performed highly responsible jobs with the greatest thoroughness, vigour and responsibility, and it is impossible to praise them highly enough. No training is laid down for this Force. Most of the men who belong to it to-day served during the war, but it is impossible for them to keep themselves up-to-date and efficient unless we give them some form of training, even if entirely on a voluntary basis. Before the war the condition was laid down that they were to have no training and were merely to be names on a list. They would not have been trained but for the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, who was at that time Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth. He made it possible for them to get sonic sort of training, which was of the greatest possible value when the war broke out. I beg the First Lord to give consideration to the question of the training of this Supplementary Reserve. If we want these men, we must give them some sort of training. If we do not, it is a damper on efficiency. It makes them feel they are not wanted. On the other hand, if we make them feel they are wanted they will become a most valuable recruiting agency. They are as keen as mustard. If they were not, they would not belong to the Force, as there are certainly no other inducements.

In the Printed Paper Office to-day I obtained a Paper which gives the numbers of the Army, Navy and Air Force and the state of recruiting. Why should it not also refer to the Auxiliary Services? Why should it not also include the Territorial Army, the R.A.F.V.R. and the R.N.V.R.? That would be of greatest value to noble Lords interested in these Forces and I suggest that they might be included. There are one or two other questions in connection with the R.N.V.R. which I have been asked to put to the First Lord by another noble Lord who has not been able to stay for this debate. He wants to know what is the attitude of the Admiralty towards the Light Coastal Force, and what facilities will be granted for training. If we are to have a Light Coastal Force in another war, as almost certainly we shall, it seems to me essential that there should be a certain amount of training. I would point out that most of the men who served in the Light Coastal Force in the last war will be too old for the same service in another war. Therefore this matter is of considerable importance. My noble friend also asked a question about the recommissioning of ships, with which I will deal later on.

Let me ask now the First Lord about the Navy proper. The noble Viscount the Leader of the House said that we were aware of the general plan on which the Government were working. We have had repeated debates in this House, but so far as the Navy is concerned I confess that I am still completely in the dark as to what sort of Navy is being aimed at. The Navy in the next war will have to deal, in the first instance, with submarines. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has pointed out to your Lordships that the anti-submarine craft of the last war are rendered completely obsolete by subsequent development of the submarine. This means that the strain of all anti-submarine work is bound to fall on destroyers, and the destroyer is already a hopelessly overworked craft, as all those who have seen the Navy in action know. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, also pointed out how many destroyers have been sold. Can the First Lord assure us that our reserve of destroyers is sufficient? I have seen a statement in the papers that the Navy is shaking the moth-balls out of various destroyers which are moored in harbours round the coast, at Harwich and the like. If the First Lord cannot give us the actual numbers, perhaps he can give us the approximate strength of the destroyer flotillas he is aiming at.

What strength is the Navy aiming at in aircraft? A week or two ago I saw at Spithead a large aircraft carrier and I asked why it was there. I was told that it was lying there because the Admiralty are trying to make up their minds whether or not to keep her. Cannot we be told a little about the Admiralty's policy with regard to aircraft carrier strength? It is obvious that the aircraft of the Royal Navy are just as important as aircraft ashore. Can the First Lord tell us what carriers we have, and whether we have a full complement of aircraft ready for them, and a full complement of trained personnel? I do not know whether the First Lord will feel it possible to answer these questions to-day, but I hope he will answer them at an early date. Another matter with which the Navy will have to deal is the question of raiders. During the last war, between 1939 and 1942, raiders were responsible for sinking 733,000 tons of our shipping. A very large number of cruisers are required to find one raider; during the war as many as twenty were employed to hunt down one single German raider. Can the First Lord give us an indication of what the cruiser strength of the Navy is to be? He will remember what Lord Jellicoe said about our cruiser strength; and he will know of the various utterances which have been made by other competent authorities since then.

With regard to defensively armed merchant ships, are the new ships which are being built to-day being strengthened to carry guns? If they are not, it will mean laying up the ships for a period of several months while the necessary strengthening is carried out. Also on the point of defensively armed merchant ships, are the guns available? Have they been "pickled"—or whatever the modern Navy does with things that are not wanted immediately? There is another question I would like to ask. I know that I shall not receive a detailed answer; in fact I do not want the First Lord to give it. But can the First Lord give us an assurance that the oil fuel stocks of the Royal Navy have been kept up in full to the necessary amount? I do not want to know what they are, but I would like an assurance on that point. I have said all that I want to say. I would again press the First Lord to consider the suggestion that I made in regard to the R.N.V.R. (that suggestion was made while he was out of the House, but no doubt it will have been brought to his notice) and the suggestion in regard to the R.N.V.S.R. I believe those two points are of some importance, and if anything can be done about them it will in each case give great encouragement to a body of men upon whom the Royal Navy must depend in the event of another war.

4.42 p.m.

LORD BLACKFORD

My Lords, if indeed it is to be our sad fate to become once more an advanced military base and a permanent aircraft carrier moored off the coast of Europe, then obviously it is up to us to take the earliest possible steps to ensure the safety of that base. The Foreign Secretary in another place two or three days ago was describing the usual preliminaries of Communist warfare—the fermenting of unofficial strikes, the political assassinations, the encouragement of civil strife, the sabotage of factories, and so on. We see that going on everywhere at the present time. It has gone on in Palestine, Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya—the same pattern on each occasion. If we were to be involved here in a war with a Communist Power, it is certain that a Fifth Column would reveal itself in this country. Of course, we all hope—and perhaps believe—that a Fifth Column here would not be anything like so powerful or so dangerous as it is in other countries; but it would certainly exist. We shall be very foolish to shut our eyes to that certainty and not to take proper precautions against it.

Therefore, if I were in charge of affairs, the first thing I would do by way of defence at the present time would be to bring the Police Forces all over the country up to strength. I understand that the Metropolitan Police Force is 6,000 under strength, out of a total complement of 24,000; and I am told that much the same proportions apply to the Police Forces all over the country. The members of the Police Forces are the people best qualified and trained to deal with the sort of menace which I have described. The Police Force, unfortunately, is unpopular at the moment because the pay and conditions are not so good as can be found in other walks of life. But there is a Committee, sitting under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Oaksey, dealing with this matter, and their deliberations are almost finished. If, as is popularly believed, their recommendations are for a considerable improvement in the policeman's lot, then I hope those recornmendations will be considered and put into operation by the Government at the earliest possible moment, so that we may raise our Police Forces throughout the country to their full complement.

With regard to Civil Defence, we are told that a Bill will be presented in another place early in the new Session. I am very glad to hear it. But, at the same time, it is rumoured that it will be based on the voluntary system. The voluntary system, of curse, has had many merits in the past, but I submit that it is not suited to the present conditions of total national warfare. The, voluntary system has three great defects. The first is a psychological one—namely, that the good-hearted volunteer does much more than his duty to the country, whereas the bad hearted slacker is allowed to get away with doing much less than his duty to the country. In my submission, in these days of total war and national danger we all ought to be compelled to do our fair share of duty to the country. The second disadvantage of the voluntary system is that a sufficient number of volunteers are not obtained until the emergency has occurred, because people are unwilling to listen to an unpleasant truth, and, therefore, they do not come forward until the danger has actually "hit them in the eye."

Surely, a good example of that was the formation of the Home Guard in June, 1940. I remember walking round to their temporary headquarters in Prince Consort Road, London, to offer my services. I was at once presented with 1,500 enrolment forms from three Metropolitan Police Divisions, which were supplemented during the next three or four days by 4,000 or 5,000 more, and I was told to get on with it and form a Home Guard out of them. No doubt others throughout the country had the same experience. That is an example of the inefficiency which is caused by the voluntary system, when volunteers come forward only after the emergency has occurred. The third disadvantage of the voluntary system is that volunteers rush to the popular organisations and avoid the unpopular ones, so that you get an unbalanced result. For example, fire watching was a very unpopular job in the last war, and there were few volunteers for it. Had fire watching been properly organised, at any rate in London, it is quite certain that three-quarters of the damage done to the City of London on December 29, 1940, would have been avoided. The fact was that three-quarters of the buildings had no fire watchers and, therefore, there was nothing to prevent the incendiaries from doing their work.

This is not the time to go into the question of Civil Defence in detail, but I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, had to say about the resurgence of the Home Guard. I should like to see the electorate of the country enrolled under the one generic term "Home Guard," which is a very fine title. The authorities should start from there to parcel them out to the specific duties which may fall to their lot in the event of war. Surely, the essential thing is to be prepared this time, so that each one of us—every man and every woman—knows what he or she is expected to do, and how to do it if the emergency occurs. That is my first point.

My second and only other point is concerned with the professional Army. In March last another place voted the Army Estimates. I have brought them along with me, "for greater accuracy," as is sometimes said from the Chair. The amount voted for the Army was a net total of £305,000,000. That is equal to about 3s. of the Income Tax, or considerably more than the whole beer duty—according to which thought appeals to your Lordships most. Under Vote A was the number of men voted, and, if I may, I would like to read to you those figures. They are: Garrisons outside Europe: British Troops, 114,100; Colonial and Gurkha troops, 151,000. That is a total of 265,000 men. One would have thought that they would be sufficient to take care of a small war in Malaya, without our having to call upon any troops in this country. The document goes on: Garrisons inside Europe: British Troops, 420,300 men; Polish Troops, 30,000 men"— odds and ends, 2,500 men; making a total of 452,800 men. Add those two figures together and it comes to something like 712,000 soldiers, voted only in March, at the cost of £305,000,000. Yet at the time of the Army Estimates an article appeared in the New Statesman to the effect that our striking force was only two Infantry Divisions and a couple of Tank Brigades. Although questions were asked in another place on the Army Estimates, not once but two or three times, the Minister would not deny that statement. Of course, very properly he would not say what our strength was, but he would not deny the statement, and one must conclude that "silence gives consent."

The other day we sent one Guards Brigade and one Armoured Regiment out to Malaya—a total fighting strength of considerably less than 4,000 fighting men. Yet I read in the Sunday Times that that constituted the bulk of our strategic Reserve. The Foreign Secretary, in the course of the same speech to which I referred, said words to this effect: "We are giving our maximum help to Malaya." All I can say about that is that there must be something radically wrong somewhere. I ask your Lordships' House: What value are we getting for £305,000,000 and 712,000 men, plus about half that number of civilians employed in servicing them, if the most we can do is to produce a striking force of two Divisions, a couple of Tank Brigades, and a miserable little collection to go out to Malaya, when one would have thought that the Colonial troops and the garrisons abroad were easily sufficient to deal with that trouble on their own account? Some colour is lent to my remarks by the excellent maiden speech delivered by the noble Earl on my left, who drew attention to the inefficiencies which came under his personal notice as a junior officer stationed in Germany.

I do not wish to go further into this matter, except to urge upon the Government that there must be something radically wrong with our Army if we pay these huge sums of money to these large numbers of men and we get such an absolutely miserable result. I would be inclined to suggest that far too many men are enrolled in the non-combatant Services. If you go about the streets of London and look at the shoulder lettering of soldiers you find "R.E.M.E.," "R.A.O.C." and "R.A.S.C." to such an extent that if you come across a fighting man you almost stop and look at him as a rare bird. Moreover, I suggest that as the noble Earl himself pointed out, our trained men are far too much employed on training National Service men without adequate result. As he says, an efficient soldier of any sort cannot be made in twelve months. As I understand it, the average regiment gets the man for only about nine months, because he spends two-and-a-half months or more in some preliminary camp learning to salute, to right and left turn, and that sort of thing.

I do not wish to delay your Lordships longer, because one cannot go into detail on this large question in a short speech; but I do urge upon the Government that things are not right with the Army; that we, the ration, are not getting anything like value, for either our money or our man-power, and that it would be far better if we were back in the days of 1914 when, for about one-tenth of the cost, we were able, within three weeks of the outbreak of war, to put six Divisions and one Cavalry Division of the highest quality in the field, and another Division within a month. In 1939 we put five Divisions and an Armoured Division in the field in much the same time. Could we do that to-day, at four or five times the cost that we paid in 1939? The answer, evidently, is "No." It is up to the Government to explain why it is "No," and to put matters right at the earliest possible moment.

4.57 p.m.

LORD WALERAN

My Lords, I want to speak very briefly this afternoon on radio equipment, which is vital, not only to my own Service, the Royal Air Force, but to the Royal Navy and the Army. I want to speak also of its serviceability. By radio equipment, I mean both radiolocation and communications. The radio equipment which was developed during the war is a very complicated piece of apparatus, and as such it needs a good engineer to deal with its service faults. Indeed, it needs not only a good engineer, but a good engineer who has had a specialist course in particular types of equipment. I do not think anyone will dispute the fact that there is a great lack of men of such calibre in the Services to-day. I hope that His Majesty's Government will do all that is possible (and here I support the noble Lord, Lord Newall, who has already made the point) to keep our specialist men in the Services and to recruit specialist ex-Service men into the Services.

Now the long-term view has also been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Newall, in regard to the planning and development necessary to produce such equipment. I would like for a moment to consider the short-term view and what would happen if we found ourselves in an emergency in a short period of time. We have had statements that destroyers are coming out of moth balls and aircraft are coming out of their cocoons—if they have been cocooned, as they cocoon them in the United States. But what is happening to the radio equipment, which is so vital? It is taken out of the aircraft and put into store. Very few stores are ideal, although some may be under A.I.D. inspection or the equivalent inspection in the Army and Navy. I consider that the majority of stores are damp and ill-looked after, and I think—in fact I am confident—that most of this equipment, if it came out, would become unserviceable in a very short time. It is obviously impossible for the Services to take out all this equipment, examine it and replace the necessary parts, as they have not even enough competent engineers to look after their own equipment. There is a precedent for the suggestion I am about to make, in that, as your Lordships may be aware, the public address equipment on aerodromes, which is so vital to fighter aerodromes, is maintained under contract by the manufacturers. I suggest to the Government that the logical and practical thing to do would be to put a contract out to tender among the radio manufacturers who made the equipment during the war, to examine and service it and put it back into store.

It is not only the difficult or complicated components that give trouble. When sets are operated they have to be connected to some source of electric supply. If your Lordships will forgive my going into detail, I would point out that the majority of connector plugs were made with a zinc alloy base. These in storage deteriorate and corrode—although I am aware that the type of plug recently developed does not do so nearly so badly. I have brought here to-day two examples to illustrate what happens and I propose to give them to the noble Viscount after the debate. In one of these the thread has entirely disappeared; in the other case, the die-casting has "grown" so that it is impossible to fit the plug to the socket. I hope the noble Viscount can assure the House that every effort has been made to find out what replacements are necessary. It must never be said that we put our Forces into battle and, at the same time, undermined their glorious morale by giving them equipment that had been inadequately looked after.

5.2 p.m.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, this debate has ranged over a much wider area than the Statement which was originally made; but, with respect, I do not see how anything else could have happened, since we are living in a time of very great urgency indeed. In the Statement on Defence it is stated that progress has already been made with plans for the reorganisation of the existing Civil Defence Organisation. That part of the State- ment has not been fully dealt with to-day; and I am informed, particularly by people in Scotland, that they have no knowledge of any plans having been made. I should be grateful if this point could be dealt with by the noble Viscount.

The Government appear to rest their policy substantially on two points, one being research, and the other National Service. I think the time has come when we have to put less reliance on research. With that in mind I should like to quote to your Lordships some words which Sir Henry Tizard uttered at the recent meeting of the British Association. Speaking of science and technology, he said, as reported in The Times, that: What was needed in this country was not general expansion of research, and certainly not the expansion of Government research remote from everyday industry, but to apply what was already known. I submit that that applies in much greater force in regard to the Services than in regard to industry. Certainly in the Air Force the gap between what is known and the equipment of the Service has been far too wide—and never wider than to-day.

The other point on which the Government seem to rest their policy is National Service. I think it is fair to read what the Chief of the Air Staff said on this subject nearly six months ago. Lord Tedder was reported in The Times of April 23 in these terms: Speaking 18 months ago, he had described the situation of the Royal Air Force as dangerous because it was not getting in men in the right quality and quantity to take the place of those being demobilised. Maintaining and operating modern air defence called for high technical skill and experience, requirements which took years to attain. The situation now is more dangerous than in 1946 because more men had been released and the compensating flow into the air defence forces was inadequate. Whether or not the world situation added urgency to this problem it was not for him to say. One thing was clear, in world affairs power politics were still a very real part of the international code and weakness aroused contempt and invited aggression. Some seemed to think that conscription was the complete answer to national defence, but when an organisation was equipped with material scientifically, technically, and in its operational performance far ahead of the most advanced material in use for civil purposes, men whose training and service was limited to 12 months could only have a limited rôle. I understand that the strength of the Royal Air Force by next spring will be about 226,000. It is known that some of these men are lent elsewhere—some, for instance, are lent to the Ministry of Civil Aviation. It is also known that quite a number of men are not properly trained. In fact, simple mathematics will show that, by the end of this year, something of the order of 50 per cent. of Royal Air Force personnel will not be trained. The noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, pointed out that there is undoubtedly a gap in the Royal Air Force at the present time of precisely the same type as that described in the article which I have read, a gap of men who formed a basis of experience and discipline before the war. We are discussing the matter, it seems to me, with much less information than we had before the war. We at least knew then what was the front line strength, and how many squadrons there were. I do not think these facts are known at the present time. It is difficult in this debate to keep away from the long-term problem, but what we should be debating to-day is the short-term problem, which the noble Lord, Lord Newall, in a speech which I think was of very great importance, showed to be one of great urgency. How are we to get the technical people, who are really the backbone of any technical service, back into the Service?

There is another point to which I would draw special attention. I am informed that at the present time there is a shortage of air crews, and there is difficulty in getting volunteers for this duty. Frankly, I am rather appalled by this. I feel that there is a kind of game of "Snakes and Ladders" which young men are called upon to play if they wish to enter for air crew duty. If the matter were properly put to young men at the present time, I do not believe they would be unwilling or reluctant to go in for duties of such great importance. A further matter which fills me with misgiving is that the training school at Halton is not as full as it should be. Before the war a young man thought it was a great step in his career if he could get to Halton. Why is there difficulty now? Is it a question of the conditions of service? I am informed that it is now the intention to commission, if not all, at any rate the greater part of air crews. I would like confirmation that that is so. I shall be glad if it is so, but it does imply certain other things.

In the first place, I submit with great respect, it involves a greater degree of officer training in the Royal Air Force than exists at the present time. Further, as a concomitant of that, another determined effort must be made to reduce the mobility of postings which exists now and which has always existed in the past. I am fully aware that this matter has been tackled before on many occasions, but I would commend to the noble Viscount who is to reply the suggestion that the matter be dealt with again. I. refer to the great frequency of postings, by which it is impossible for men to be retained in their particular crew a sufficient length of time.

We have already dealt with the question of pay and conditions of service. There is one question I should like to ask on the subject of prospects. This is a point which the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, has frequently brought up and to which he has never received a satisfactory reply. One of the most important points for the Service to-day is to ensure the future prospects of the men in the Service. If they are assured on that ground, they will come forward with greater willingness. There are several ways in which this can be done. In the first place, I would like to refer to the advertisement which states that forty-three trades in the Army are recognised as qualifying for trade union membership. If that is correct—and I have no reason to doubt that it is correct—I should like to be assured that there are no difficult conditions which cannot be fulfilled. This recognition is probably standard for the country; different sections of different units do not demand different conditions. There is a further point I should like to raise, which is a part of the scheme advanced by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. It is that there should be some link between the nationalised services of this country and the Armed Forces, so that pension rights can run from the time a ma n enters the Service to the time that he leaves the Service. It would make a tremendous difference to the outlook of a man if he were reasonably assured that he would obtain employment when he left the Service.

I will deal for a moment with the question of equipment. I should like to ask this question. Is there such a thing in this country as an Industrial General Staff? I notice that in the 1947 Report, reference was made to the Joint War Pro- duction Staff. There is no reference to that in 1948. I do not know if this body exists. Is there any body to-day which is examining how things can be produced and, above all, which things cannot be produced? Is there anyone who is seeing that all of the new types of equipment are not made in one place, as I understand was the case in 1939, when all crankshafts were produced in one street in Sheffield? At one fell swoop the entire production line could have been destroyed. I am certain that this is of the utmost importance, not only to the Royal Air Force but also to the other Services. I do not press the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, for numbers in the way of aircraft, because I do not think they matter very much. I do not press for numbers of squadrons or units. What matters in an Air Force is not the number of aircraft or the number which fly, but the number which can be kept flying, rooted, if I may say so, in the industrial strength of this country. To put it one way, the maintenance of the strength is a question of amperage rather than voltage. I realise that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain these figures, but, none the less, we are intensely interested in them.

I have one more question, to which again I do not expect an answer at the moment. What is the spares position in regard to new aircraft? Anyone who has seen the immense "graveyards" of aircraft which exist in the Middle East and elsewhere would have this lesson of spares brought home. Are ample spares being produced and maintained? I suggest that they should be at least of the order of 40 per cent. of the whole production? I do not wish to detain your Lordships longer but I would like to add this. The Government have stated—and there is no reason to doubt it—that without exception the quality of our fighters to-day is better than that of fighters in any other part of the world. But they have not stated, and they cannot state, that the same is true of our bomber aircraft, still less of our Coastal Command aircraft which are necessarily of the greatest importance in maintaining our sea communications. Neither the initial striking force nor Coastal Command aircraft are in a satisfactory position. The most that can be said is that a bomber may be in sight. With great respect, to say, three years after the war, that a bomber is in sight, when we know that it takes up to four or five years to produce such a machine, is hardly good enough.

I will add only one thing. We are to-day in a situation which is materially different from that which existed before. It is essentially a clash of philosophies and, also, not only of material but of psychological weapons. The situation we are in is one in which no declaration of war can be expected. Forces are working through hatred to promote war and thereby to produce a state of chaos that will spread like a disease. That is a situation which it is essential we should seek to prevent. I submit, therefore, that our central policy must be what the Government have stated—the preservation of peace rather than the full mobilisation for war. The lesson which we can learn is the lesson which was provided to the world by the British Navy between the years 1815 and 1914. That is the lesson which the Government must bear in mind, rather than a policy of hasty mobilisation on the outbreak of war.

5.18 p.m.

VISCOUNT HALL

My Lords, we all feel it to be most regrettable that world conditions are such that, before we have completed the run-down of the Armed Forces to peace-time strength, the deteriorating international situation requires that the measures which were announced last week by His Majesty's Government as necessary for the immediate requirements of the Armed Forces shall be taken. In my opinion, it is right that, before the end of this very short Session, this House should have the opportunity of obtaining further explanations upon that Statement. Indeed, I agree with what was said by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk—and I am not complaining—that the debate which we have had this afternoon has wandered far from that Statement. I am sure that your Lordships will sympathise with me when I tell you that my difficulty is to attempt to reply to all the questions which have been fired at me.

Ten or eleven noble Lords have taken part in this debate. I think the list which I received from the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, as a start, contained twenty-one questions. That list has been followed by others and, if record was kept of the total number of questions, it must number something like 100 to 120. I do not know how long your Lordships are prepared to sit this evening. Indeed, I am not going to pretend that it is possible for me to attempt to reply to all the questions which have been put to me. I find it difficult enough sometimes to deal with the questions of my own Department, but to-day we have had a variety of questions covering the three Defence Services, and many of those questions have been on points of detail which it is impossible to attempt to reply to without obtaining the necessary information.

The debate to-day has centred around very important matters. First, there is the question of man-power, which is absolutely vital to this question of Defence and about which some contradictory statements have been made. With the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and myself, the debate has been in the nature of a monopoly in favour of noble Lords opposite. He and I are the only two who are taking part in the debate from this side of the House. Before we deal fully with the question of man-power, I think we ought to consider whether or no the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the demobilisation of the Forces was the correct one—whether we could afford it as a nation. Whatever might be said in favour of the retention of large numbers of people in the Armed Forces, they just cannot be maintained unless there is a good industrial and economic organisation providing the wherewithal for their maintenance. That is a factor which appears to have been completely forgotten in the debate this afternoon. Not a single reference was made to the economic situation. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, complained that we were slow in demobilising Service men and women from the Army, and that for two years we did nothing. I really wish he had ascertained the facts before making a statement of that kind. Then he went on to say that he agreed with a statement which was attributed to Mr. Churchill—that to have balanced Forces in this country, the nation must maintain something like 1,500,000 men in the Services.

Let us in the first place see what is the truth about demobilisation. The total programme for demobilisation between June 18, 1945, and December 31, 1946, covered 5,000,000 people. During that period (that is, in eighteen months), no fewer than 3,800,000 persons were demobilised. Can the Government be charged with being inefficient and neglectful in relation to the question of demobilisation? Indeed, it can be said that no country in the world which was engaged in the war was so successful as this, not only in its scheme of demobilisation but also in the scheme for the absorption of the men into industry after they had been demobilised. So successful has been the reinstatement of these men that, except during the fuel crisis of two years ago, at no time during the whole of the period between the cessation of hostilities and the present have the ranks of the unemployed, or the registered unemployed, exceeded 400,000 persons. What a contrast to conditions which existed in the haphazard, inefficient system of demobilisation of the friends of noble Lords opposite, which took place from 1921 to 1924! It is true they did demobilise from the Army, but they formed another army of 2,500,000 unemployed people in this country. Some of those people had no employment from that day until the day of their death or until the outbreak of the last war. Noble Lords just cannot chide the Government for their method of demobilisation.

Then there is the question of the nation's economy. It may be said that events on the economic front have proved that the decisions of His Majesty's Government were correct, as was clearly shown by recent statements in another place made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade. We are very pleased with those results. We realise that there must be repercussions on the supply field with the strengthening of the Armed Forces. By delaying the releases in accordance with this plan, the Armed Forces will be some 80,000 stronger than they would otherwise have been at the end of this calendar year. Much has been said about the acceleration of the supply of equipment in the three Services, and the overhauling of stocks, some of which have been depleted owing to current use whilst others are obsolete and their replacement will require the services of a number of men. But we cannot build up forces of the magnitude which the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has in mind and do what the nation has been struggling to do for the last three years.

The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Blackford, referred to the cost of the Armed Forces. I will take the figures for the last two years. I do not want to be tied to these figures by £10,000,000 or so—I am speaking just from memory—but during the current year the cost of the Armed Forces, including research and supply, amounts to no less a figure than nearly £700,000,000; and during the last financial year it amounted to something like £900,000,000. In two years £1,600,000,000 has been spent upon the Services. My Lords, these are figures which must bring reality into our debate, because I feel that there has been a certain amount of unreality in some of the speeches to which we have listened this afternoon. Indeed, in the circumstances, I think it can be said, not only in relation to the announcement which was made last week regarding the suspending of demobilisation, but in relation to economic conditions, that there is scarcely a man or woman in Britain who does not recognise what has been done by the Government and who will not give their whole-hearted support.

The number of men who have to be retained in accordance with this decision is fairly substantial, but the period of retention is short and it is essential to have them, for they will greatly assist in the training of others. Much has been said this afternoon about training with which I entirely agree. It is absolutely essential to have these people. Here, again, as figures would show, the Army will benefit to a greater extent than the Royal Air Force, and the Air Force will benefit to a greater extent than the Royal Navy. But, as I have said, these men will form cadres to train men who will assist in the training of others. I know that complaints have been made about the difficulties with which the Services are confronted at the present time. But in any process of demobilisation after a great war there is bound to be a certain lack of balance, owing to the rapid outflow of skilled personnel and the slow build-up of trained cadres to take their place. Indeed, I could give an illustration relating to the Royal Navy bearing upon this, and it would apply to any large training force.

At the peak period of the war about 840,000 personnel were serving in the Navy. Over 80 per cent. were conscripts or National Service men or women. All these men and women have left the Service; indeed, a large proportion of the trained Regular serving men have left the Service. Since mention has been made this afternoon of the fact that Regular recruitment was stopped during the period of the war, I would point out that since Regular recruitment has recommenced, and in face of all that can be said about inducements to entering the Services and about conditions existing now in some of the Services, the Royal Navy has been and is at the present time recruiting twice as many men for Regular service as were recruited in any period in peace time in the past. It is these Regular recruits we want. I wish the Army and the Royal Air Force were as successful as the Royal Navy has been in this matter of Regular recruiting. But it may be said of one of those Services, at any rate, that the recruiting returns are better than they were in peace time in the past.

I agree with what was said by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, that the retention for an extra three months of the National Service men serving in the Forces on September 14 makes it impossible to honour the undertaking previously given, that all men who were serving on December 31, 1946, would be released by the end of 1948. The Government have not pretended to suggest otherwise, and they do not shirk responsibility for it. They certainly do not wish the Services to be blamed for this change of plan. Equally, they cannot accept that it is any fault of the Government's that has resulted in the pledge having to be broken. This situation has been brought about entirely as the result of changed world conditions.

The man-power plans for 1948, and the continuation of demobilisation resulting from them, were perfectly satisfactory in the light of the international situation when they were drawn up. Those plans would have enabled the Services to carry out the tasks laid upon them but for the increase in international tension, a factor outside the control of His Majesty's Government. New factors like this have laid a fresh burden on the Armed Forces, necessitating a revision of the man-power plans. It was essential, as an immediate measure, to strengthen the trained element in the Services and the only fair and effective way in which this could be done was by calling for a sacrifice in the national interest by the men best suited to do the job. It must be recognised, however, that an emergency of the kind with which we are faced at the moment demands emergency measures, and it is the Government's confident hope that the men concerned—I repeat this—will not blame the Services for what has happened, and will recognise that the undertaking given to them would have been kept had it been possible and had this emergency not arisen.

I have noticed with regret that in some of the speeches made this afternoon there has been a suggestion that the Government's plans for manning the Services have not worked out successfully in practice. I cannot accept this view. There is no doubt that the general defence plan for 1948 was working well until the recent change in international circumstances occurred. Reference has already been made to the unexpected outbreak of violence in Malaya, the demands of the Berlin airlift and the continuation of some of the occupation commitments which it had been hoped would disappear more quickly than they have done. Despite these factors, the flexibility of the Government's defence plans has enabled these emergencies to be covered without further calls on national manpower at a time when it was vital that these should be avoided. Noble Lords will be aware—and I am anxious to make this point—that the extension of National Service for a number of National Service men cannot be brought about entirely by methods of this kind. For some time a number of men have been retained beyond their normal release dates under the military necessities clause of the Act. Indeed, the Royal Navy itself has made full use of this clause.

The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, referred in particular to the B.A.O.R. The rôle of the B.A.O.R. is not now primarily strategic. It is an occupational Force designed to maintain law and order. As such, it provides, and is intended to provide, a valuable training organisation for National Service men who have completed their basic training. Indeed, during the course of the passage of the National Service Act last year, pressure was brought to bear on the Government to send quite a number of National Service men to Germany for their training; and they are used there for this purpose.

Almost every speech which has been delivered this afternoon has contained some declaration to the effect that in the opinion of the speaker no real effort has been made to lay down conditions of Regular service of the type to attract the right men to our Armed Forces. I would remind your Lordships of the new pay code settlement which was announced at the end of 1945 for men and in March, 1946, for officers. This new pay code was generally well received as an important attempt to deal with what I have always regarded as the underpayment of the Services. This settlement, which was reached soon after the end of hostilities, was intended as a long-term settlement. It was to provide rates of pay which, on the face of them, were by no means unreasonable. The Minister of Defence in another place has recently expressed the doubt whether any reasonable increase in pay will necessarily lead to a marked increase in recruiting. And indeed, in the light of the experience of recruiting, I would agree with the Minister of Defence in this matter. The Minister also pointed to the many advantages of Service life—for example, Paid leave, pensions, opportunities for promotion, and so on, which have to be taken into account in any comparison between civil and Service remuneration.

He also pointed to the difficulty of increasing Service pay, in the face of a not unlimited defence budget. As your Lordships will no doubt recall, he undertook to study with his Service colleagues all the observations made during the course of that debate—and I will go further and include observations made in the course of the debate in your Lordships' House this afternoon and in the debate which will take place in another place to-morrow—and promised that if examination showed that the existing arrangements bore hardly upon members of the Forces, steps to alleviate the position would be sympathetically considered. This examination is now proceeding and certain progress has been made. Your Lordships will realise, however, that the Service pay codes, though simplified in 1945, are still very complex and that any revision would need the most careful consideration to avoid anomalies. Nevertheless, I am confident than an announcement on the subject may be expected early in the new Session.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

Does the noble Viscount not agree that the cost of living has gone up at least 20 per cent. since then?

VISCOUNT HALL

I have not the figure in mind, but I do not think it is 20 per cent. I admit that when the new pay code was fixed, it was intended to bear relation to wages paid in industry, and it is true that there has been an increase in wages since then. I am now informed that the increase in the cost of living is 9 per cent., but I am not going to say that even that is accurate.

I have been asked by a number of noble Lords this afternoon about the progress in the provision of married quarters for Service personnel, for these, with other amenities, make for contentment. I agree that we should make a special effort to provide additional married quarters, but I need not remind your Lordships that this is no new problem for the Services. I am not excusing the situation by reminding your Lordships that even before the war, when the supply of labour and money was much easier than it is at the present time, there was already a great shortage of married quarters. Since the war, owing to the expansion of the Regular Forces and the lowering, under the revised pay code, of the ages of entitlement of married men, the demand has increased. Shortages of labour and material at home and the need to reduce expenditure overseas have inevitably limited the provision of additional married quarters. Despite all these difficulties progress is being made by new construction and by the conversion of existing buildings.

I was asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, whether I could give details of married quarters provided since the beginning of April this year. Since April 1 this year, more than 1,200 additional married quarters have been provided in the United Kingdom, by the means to which I refer, and before the end of the year 1948–49 it is hoped to provide at least another 2,500 at home and some 800 overseas. It is, of course, recognised that this is only a small instalment towards the large numbers required by the Services. As either the noble Viscount or the noble Lord, Lord Teynham said, the Service Ministers have been able to "get something out of Bevan."

A further point raised in the debate was whether there was a plan in existence in 1945 for National Service. We have heard quite a lot about planning this afternoon. The need for a regular system of National Service in peace time certainly had been considered in 1945 and a scheme had been worked out in some detail. But in the years immediately succeeding the cessation of hostilities the Government were faced with the problem of Forces of enormous size and the need for reducing them to a peace-time level. A plan was evolved in 1946 for the run-down of the Forces and was explained in the White Paper on the Call-up to the Forces for 1947–48. This was essentially and necessarily a transitional plan, and at that stage the introduction in addition of a new National Service scheme would have been an unnecessary complication. It would have been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to apply a scheme at that stage, when the problems involved in running-down the Forces in the immediate post-war period were being tackled.

Moreover, it was essential that the Government and their expert advisers should have a clear picture of what was going to happen and what would be required during the years immediately succeeding the cessation of hostilities. The Government did not, therefore, feel justified in putting forward a scheme until the Autumn of 1946. It is necessary to remember that the existing legislation dealing with the continuation of National Service has remained in existence and does not expire until the end of this year, when the 1947 legislation will come into operation. It was made clear that the Statement of last week covers those measures which, in the opinion of the Government, would meet immediate requirements and which were practicable. The long-term requirements of the Services, to which the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, referred at the end of his speech, are, of course, being reviewed.

A large part of the debate has centered around the Territorial Army and the Auxiliary Forces. So far as the Territorial Army is concerned, your Lordships are aware that plans have been made for some time past. I think everyone will admit that a considerable amount of very useful work has been put into the organisation, ready to launch the scheme for enlistment into the Territorials. The general planning has been carried out by a central recruiting committee of the War Office, presided over by a member of the Army Council. The Territorial Associations and Auxiliary Forces Associations have been represented upon this committee, which broadened out the purpose of the committee itself. The Secretary of State for War has taken a very active interest, and he has met representatives of the Associations on more than one occasion to deal with details. It can be said that all the suggestions which have been put forward by the Associations have been fully discussed; indeed, a large number of them have been adopted. I will give just two examples. The annual bounty for members of all the Auxiliary Forces was recently raised from £8 to £12, and arrangements have been made for a substantial portion of this increased bounty to be paid at the conclusion of the annual camps. Further, members of Auxiliary Forces can now receive pay and allowances for eight hours' duty or more, whereas, until recently, no emoluments of this kind were payable for less than a forty-eight hour duty.

It may well be that some suggestions made by the Territorial Associations have not been followed up. This was brought out very forcibly by the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, in his delightful, penetrating, useful and, if I may say so, successful maiden speech. It is seldom, in all my experience, that I have listened to a more informative and delightfully presented speech than that which was made by the noble Earl this afternoon. I am sure all your Lordships welcome him to this Chamber, and if he continues as he has commenced, he will be a very great asset. I am afraid I cannot deal in detail with all the points which he put about the Territorial organisation, but I can assure him that the matters will be considered. I will personally bring to the notice of the War Office, not only the points he brought out in relation to the Territorial Army, but also the matter of vehicles and particularly of tanks. I do not think the tank position is quite so bad (I am sure the noble Earl will be pleased to hear this) because there are considerable improvements in some of the new tanks which are coming out at the present time. I am sure that the War Office will be happy to give information to the noble Earl in relation to that matter. Other points which have been put in regard to the Territorial Army will, of course, be considered. I was very pleased that the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, offered his valuable experience for assisting in the recruiting campaign; indeed, I think other noble Lords this afternoon made a similar offer. I am going to make a plea that all who can should assist in this campaign, not only in regard to the Territorial Army but in relation to the other Auxiliary Services also.

I am afraid I have little to add to the Statement made last week in regard to the reorganisation of the Civil Defence Services. Matters are not quite so bad as the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, described them. It may be that he did not meet a very good public representative in the person he consulted, or who consulted him, in Scotland. I think it can be said that local authorities have been consulted, and a good deal of preliminary work has been done in relation to this question of Civil Defence. Work has been done not only in regard to organisation, but also in the preparation of legislation which may be required. I think it can be said —I cannot go any further than this—that much more will be heard about this matter in the next Session. I suppose Civil Defence can now be regarded as one of the Army's tasks, because Civil Defence is an important aspect of the old problem of home defence, which is the Army's primary task. Officers and men of the Army are now being trained in Civil Defence duties, except fire fighting. The noble Lord, Lord Hampton, raised a point in relation to Civil Defence and the Home Guard. The Civil Defence Services generally are likely to make a very heavy demand on the available manpower of the country. This is of particular importance in considering whether it will be possible to form a Home Guard. The Government are, however, fully alive to the value of the Home Guard, and its resuscitation is one of the possibilities which is now under consideration.

It is appreciated—indeed, the point has been made in the course of the debate this afternoon—that men who served in the last war are still liable for service in the event of an emergency. I was very interested in the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, in relation to the Territorial Army and Civil Defence, and in regard to the registration of persons who served during the last war. He rightly suggested that it would be possible to register a very large number of people. But it is felt that the registration of people will not provide a single further person to deal with current commitments. If the need arises, plans have been made to call up such of the 2,000,000 men or more as will be required, at the rate at which they will be needed. Moreover, if trouble comes, I do not think that public opinion would agree that the burden should fall upon many of those who had to bear almost all the burden and dangers of the last war. The question is not quite so easy as it looks, but I can assure the noble Lord that, as a result of the suggestion which he has put this afternoon, the matter will be considered.

I think I ought to make it clear that the present recruiting campaign for the Territorial Army is being extended to the other two Services. The recruitment of the Royal Air Force Auxiliary Services is, indeed, important. While the requirements of recruits for the Naval Auxiliary Forces are on a smaller scale than those of the Army or of the Royal Air Force, it is necessary to keep the importance of the Naval Reserve Services well to the front. I think it may be said, however, that in all the circumstances, and considering the commitments and the responsibilities of the Territorial Army, neither the Royal Air Force nor the Royal Navy should complain that the Army is in first, and should be given an opportunity to begin recruiting while the position of the other two Services is being considered.

So far as the R.N.V.R. is concerned, points were brought out by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and also by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to whom I would express my thanks for the keenness which he has displayed over a very long period in relation to Naval Reserves of all kinds. The R.N.V.R. now has twelve main Divisions in the centres of population round our coasts. In addition to these, and the training centres of the wireless section of the Reserve, we have recently established four R.N.V.R. air squadrons, and all our R.N.V.R. units are being equipped with the most up-to-date training gear available. I am not suggesting they have it all, but we are doing our best to give them the necessary equipment.

THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY

Does that include ships?

VISCOUNT HALL

I think it would include suitable ships. I should be quite prepared to discuss this matter with my noble friend. Although much remains to be done, we hope that it will not be long before such gear and equipment will be made available at all centres. We have already recruited 70 per cent. of our requirement of officers, and although most of the remaining vacancies are being kept open for young men as they come along, there are still a few vacancies for others. We have much further to go in regard to the recruitment of ratings, and there are vacancies in all branches. Indeed, we could maintain a very quick inrush of suitable persons into this Reserve.

The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, brought out a point dealing with the R.N.R. The future of this Reserve is a matter of some difficulty, which the Admiralty have been discussing with the Minister of Transport; the different interests are by no means easy to reconcile. On the one hand, the Navy can make good use in war time of the experienced officers and men of the Merchant Navy. On the other hand, it would clearly be of no service to the national interest to take away from the Merchant Navy large numbers of officers and men who would be required to man our merchantmen in time of war. The last two great wars have shown that the Merchant Navy is now an integral part of our fighting machine. The problem to be resolved, therefore, is a difficult one. But we are attempting to solve it. It is a question of priority of service, and it has to be regarded from that point of view.

Before I turn from the Auxiliary Forces to other matters, I should like to inform your Lordships that an announcement is likely to be made in another place tomorrow of an important new development in the Reserve policy of all three Services. This afternoon I must confine myself to the effect which this will have on the Royal Navy. It is intended to set up a new emergency Reserve consisting of men with previous service in the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, who will volunteer for immediate recall in the event of an emergency. Such volunteers will not have to undertake any training in peace. They will be screened by the Ministry of Labour, in order to ensure that they can be released from civil employment when they are required by the Royal Navy. A similar announcement will be made in relation to the other two Services. Detailed announcements of this Reserve will be made shortly.

It is about time I said something about the Royal Air Force. Statements have recently been made about revised conditions for air crews. In 1945 a scheme was introduced by the Royal Air Force and by the Royal Navy that other ranks should be trained as pilots and observers. The scheme has not been a great success. Indeed, so far as the Royal Air Force is concerned, it can be said that it has not been a success at all. During the first war we were reasonably successful in the recruitment of naval pilot personnel. Now, as the noble Lord, Lord Newall, rightly said, a change has taken place, and I feel that it is important to point out that the changes which have taken place in the Royal Air Force have also taken place in the Royal Navy. After all, the Royal Navy is increasingly becoming a flying as well as a sailing Service. Since the end of the war, the only way in which a young man could enter the Royal Navy specifically for flying duties was as a rating pilot. The Admiralty have decided to close down this scheme, and in future to enter officers for flying duties either as pilots or as observers. Young men of eighteen or nineteen will now be able to enter the Navy for a period of eight years' service as officers, at the end of which they will receive a gratuity. But I would emphasise that there will be opportunities for a number of these young men to transfer to permanent careers as naval officers, while they are serving on these short-Service commissions. I need hardly emphasise the importance which I attach to satisfactory candidates coming forward to undertake what is one of the most vital of our defence requirements.

We had a very depressing debate about the Royal Navy in the autumn of last year, but during the course of this year the plans for the building up of the Navy, after the accelerated run-down of personnel announced last autumn, have been progressing as contemplated. I would like to assure the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, that the information which was contained in the explanatory Statement as to the building up of the Fleet, will, it is hoped, be carried out to the full. These plans have been pursued with full success. Concrete evidence is immediately at hand in the Autumn Cruise of the Home Fleet to the West Indies which is to start to-morrow. This will mark the biggest and most important naval cruise and exercises since the war. It will be the first time that so large and important a unit of the Royal Navy has been to the West Indies; hitherto, only smaller sections of the Fleet have visited those waters. The cruise has a very special importance, particularly at the present time, in that, as I have already indicated, it is in effect the re-emergence of the Fleet following a period of immobilisation, and offers an excellent opportunity for sea service and training of the new ships' complements.

The operational strength of the Royal Navy was set out in my explanatory Statement on the Estimates. The ships taking part in the Autumn Cruise provide a striking illustration of the progress made since last March in putting the Home Fleet on an operational basis. As noble Lords will be aware from the announcements that have been made of the naval units taking part in the cruise, some will be bound for the West Indies and others for South Africa. The opportunity will be taken to carry out useful exercises in home waters in which H.M.S. "Illustrious" and some of the smaller ships which are not included in the cruise programme itself will be taking part. These vessels will return to home ports at the conclusion of the exercises.

During the course of the debate several noble Lords asked for fuller information in relation to units of almost all the Services—information regarding trained personnel, numbers of squadrons in the Royal Air Force, and, in fact, the same amount and kind of information as was given before the outbreak of war. I beg noble Lords not to ask the Government to give information which no other Government in the world gives at the present time. It is very difficult to obtain the slightest information concerning any of the Services beyond the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, it is clear, from records which have been obtained from enemy countries since the war, that the generous amount of information given by this country in pre-war days enabled enemy countries to fix their Services and to realise the strength of the Forces which they were against.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

In order to remove possible misapprehension, perhaps I may be allowed to say that I do not think that the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, ever asked for the publication of this information. The point he made was that in past times the Government had taken the Opposition leaders into its confidence on matters of great national importance. He did not see why this state of affairs should not continue—and I do not see either.

VISCOUNT HALL

I quite agree that the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, did not ask for publication (I think the noble Marquess was not present at the time) but there were other noble Lords who asked for the information—and I have just pointed out the difficulty. I am afraid that the difficulty arises also in the case of equipment. The noble Lord, Lord Newall, asked for information in relation to aircraft and equipment, and matters of that kind. But, if I may say so with all due respect, it really is impossible to give any detailed information in relation to any of the Services in that way.

LORD NEWALL

So far as I recollect, I specifically made no request for numbers or details. I merely asked for an assurance that steps should be taken to see that those aircraft were produced more quickly, and plans made to produce them still more quickly if and when war occurs.

VISCOUNT HALL

I think that that assurance can be given in relation not only to necessary equipment for the Royal Air Force but for the other Services as well.

I regret taking up so much of your Lordships' time, but there are just two points to which I should like to refer again. The first is in regard to the building up of the Royal Navy. On previous occasions I think the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, asked whether the Admiralty could not consider the intake of a larger number of National Service men. Notwithstanding the success of regular recruitment, we have discovered that as a result of a very large increase in wastage, brought about by discharges on health and compassionate grounds, we can take in additional National Service men this year and can consider a much larger intake during the course of next year.

Now I should like to touch on the material side, which is so important and about which questions have been asked. I think the noble Earl, Lord Howe, will realise that several of the points which he made are largely questions of detail on which it is impossible for me to obtain information to give out across the Table to-day. But the points will certainly be examined, and I am hoping that my right honourable friend the Minister of Defence will deal with quite a number of such, matters in the course of the debate which is taking place to-day in another place, and that the Secretary of State for War may cover other points in that debate. We are devoting particular attention to the refitting and repairing of smaller ships of the Navy. A certain proportion of the work in the Royal Dockyards since 1945 has been what is known as "repayment work." That "repayment work" is slowing down, and the whole of the equipment and personnel of the dockyards of the Royal Navy will be devoted to the refitting and repair of units of the Reserve Fleet. In addition to that, already quite a number of ships have been put to contract in private yards, so that we can speed up a number of these escort craft and other craft in the early stages of an emergency. I should like to point out, however, that we hope that we shall not unduly interfere with merchant ship repairs, which are so important.

In this connection the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, raised the question of the Mercantile Marine as a war potential. I agree that it is a very valuable war potential; but there are difficulties about steel. The position is not quite as bad as the noble Lord thinks it is—though I am not suggesting that shipbuilders in this country are getting all the steel they would like to have or as much as I think they ought to have. Particular attention is also being paid to the overhaul and modification of Naval aircraft in reserve, and Royal Air Force aircraft in reserve, and to increasing the output of aircraft of certain types. These are some examples of the preparations for an emergency. Other material requirements, such as stores and clothing, are being similarly dealt with. The supply measures which have been announced for the three Services are, of course, supplementary to the ordinary Service production programmes. They are primarily designed to improve the equipment situation, where necessary, and to take account of the changed circumstances. While they include the speeding up of the production of certain types of new equipment, particularly jet aircraft, they cover also the overhauling and reconditioning of all kinds of fighting vehicles for the Army, and of existing equipment and apparatus which have not been in use recently because of the progressive run-down of the Forces.

The noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, asked what steps are being taken to improve equipment supplied to the Territorial Army. Broadly, there is little differentiation between the equipment supplied to the Territorial Army and that supplied to Regular units. New equipment on trial is not given to the Territorial Army. Territorial Army units are issued with such equipment as they can store, maintain adequately and make proper use of in training. The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, asked whether the Government accepted any appreciation of the plan put forward by the Chiefs of Staff and, if so, whether they have authorised action to implement it. Noble Lords will, of course, appreciate that the Government are in daily touch with their expert advisers. Appreciations of plans prepared by the Chiefs of Staff in the light of the ever-changing world situation are constantly before the Government. They are considered in the light of other general questions.

This has been a very interesting debate. I am grateful to noble Lords for the way in which they have submitted their case. In the course of the debate, many valuable suggestions have been made. They will be studied and where it is deemed necessary that replies should be given to some of the many questions raised, those replies will be given. It may well be, however, that in the near future there will be opportunities for further debates on the various aspects of Defence, and I have no doubt that many of the points raised to-day will be repeated then.

6.22 p.m.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

My Lords, we are genuinely grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, for the trouble that he has taken in answering the many points which we put to him. We regret only that it caused a postponement by one day of his joining the Fleet. Like others of my noble friends, I hope that he will have a most successful and profitable time with the Fleet. But as I listened to the beginning of the noble Viscount's speech, it struck me that he might possibly have been re-reading Kipling's Just So stories and have come once again across the story of the crocodile who pulled the nose of the elephant child because he asked too many questions. I mention this only because I must correct the noble Viscount when he says that I asked twenty-one questions; I have looked it up and find that there were fifteen, though a large number of those questions could not possibly have an answer. However, there were three questions that I would not have left out for anything. Those were the three questions which were asked by the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, in his maiden spech which, I think I may say, was well-informed, well delivered and altogether a most successful maiden speech.

It is a temptation now to make another long speech, but I must resist it, although there are a great many points of detail in the speech made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, with which neither I nor my noble friends could possibly agree. However, at this hour of the evening, we shall have to agree to differ. As the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, says, there will be other opportunities of debating some of these Defence matters. Particularly, it may be wise and possible to arrange a debate upon the Territorial Army and the other two Auxiliary Forces to coincide with the opening of the recruiting campaign. As I said earlier, I am sure it is right that the other Forces should be associated with this campaign. I think it was not one of the things to be laid at our door that, apart from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, the only speakers in this debate have come from these Benches. An explanation at once occurs to me that no doubt other noble Lords were reserving their energies for the support of the campaign in favour of recruiting to the Auxiliary Forces, to which I am certain all Parties are committed.

As I say, there are many points on which we still do not agree with the noble Viscount opposite. In fact, we did not complain—at least, I certainly did not complain—of the rate of demobilisation. What I did say, and what I still say, is that steps were not taken quickly enough to replace the people who were demobilised or to produce a system for providing fresh Auxiliary Forces and Reserves requiring training. I must deny the allegation that I have not sufficiently in mind the needs of industry. If one is making a comparison of the numbers out of work with the numbers after the 1914–1918 war, one has to add nearly 1,000,000 to make up for the people who are to-day engaged in National Service. In the same way, I know perfectly well that the present official policy toward the Rhine Army is that it should be largely a training establishment. I was saying that in my opinion it was unwise that it should be so largely a training establishment.

I think that one of the best pieces of news that we have heard this evening is the news about the Royal Naval Special Reserve (if that is its correct title), and the forecast that something of the same sort might be done for the other Services. That leads me to the final thought in my mind, that it is impossible to weigh up this debate, from the point of view of the noble Viscount's reply, without reading the report of the debate in another place to-morrow. The whole of our case depends upon whether this was an isolated effort, or whether it was part of a bigger and more progressive plan. If it turns out to be the former, then we shall judge of what has been announced today in its proper context. If it turns out that this is really the main dish, then our views, as expressed here, are known. What we wish to see, as one noble Lord (I cannot recall which) said, is a state of affairs where our Defence Services make the best possible use of the money which can be allotted, where they are given a proper chance to produce an efficient striking force and therefore contribute to what we all desire so ardently, especially at this present time—that is, the forestalling of war. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion for Papers.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.