THE CHANNEL ISLANDS.

HL Deb 09 July 1940 vol 116 cc835-54

5.34 p.m.

LORD PORTSEA rose to call attention to the financial position of persons evacuated from Jersey and Guernsey whose money and bonds were deposited in the banks of those islands and transferred to the head offices of those banks in London, but who are at present unable to draw on those moneys; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, before I move for Papers, perhaps I ought very briefly to explain the matter to your Lordships' House. The islands mentioned in my question have, up to this, always defended themselves, and have done so for many centuries, although they are in the jaws of a very powerful nation which has generally been hostile to us. Very frequent attacks have been made on them. The island that interests me more than the rest of the archipelago is Jersey. Jersey has never been occupied by a foe except in the case of Cromwell, who sent Admiral Blake and 81 ships and 5,000 men to subdue it. It was only after a great fight and many weeks that the island commander surrendered on the most honourable terms possible. This gave the islanders an idea, which is one that is, fortunately, difficult to shake, that they could, with assistance, at any rate, defend their land. They had in those days, and even in my day, a Militia in which service was universal, obligatory, and unpaid, between the ages of 16 and 65. I am one of those who served at the age of 16, though I regret I cannot now pass myself off as being under 65.

Their drill, if it would not have altogether satisfied the Brigade of Guards, would, at any rate, have reached the standard of a well-known person, and that is Brother Boer, because they were all trained in the use of a rifle, and there were 3,500 of them. They believed they were safe, and they sent all their young men to the war, just as they did in 1914. This morning we were much relieved to read the gracious words of His Majesty, and we derive a great deal of comfort from these words and from that promise. It is a promise that I can say no effort of ours will fail to supplement with all that we have and hold.

The islanders, as I say, thought themselves safe, and, protected by even a small portion of the greatest Fleet in the world, they believed they could have held the islands because, they said, "If we—England—cannot defend these islands, how can the Germans hold them?" That is a difficult question to answer. Guernsey is further away from the French coast than Hythe or Dover, but one of the reasons given for the evacuation is that they were only a few miles from France. That kind of reason or excuse did not satisfy the islanders. They paid no attention to it. They gave their money and their men to the war. One islander, a rich man, has given £125,000 of his own money to the British Government—not lent it, but given it. They have given their all in blood and treasure. Troops were poured into Jersey from France, and two days later they were all evacuated. The policy was reversed, and the chance was given—and it was only a chance because there were very few ships—of the population being evacuated. I am glad to say there were very few islanders, comparatively, who were prepared to leave their country at the mercy of the Germans.

The islanders at once understood the full meaning of demilitarisation. They found it was a very near relative of abandonment, a breaking of ties that were more than 800 years old, a breaking of ties with the Crown of over a thousand years. Then the people more or less grew alarmed. They went to the local branches of the five great London banks. These London banks in Jersey accepted the bonds and the money of the islanders, telling them that they would be safer deposited in London, and that money and these bonds are in London now. My question and my trouble is largely this. Now all who fled from the island and all who stayed in the island find that they cannot withdraw these bonds and cannot draw on that money, and the reason given them is that the territory from which they came is in the hands of the enemy. What are these poor people to do? It is no fault of theirs. In the case of the poorer people, there is no "dole," there are no guardians, and they must beg from the Public Assistance Committee. The others who have placed their trust in this country, in their own kinsmen, what can they do? They have literally no money, and they cannot get any very great credit.

These people are penniless in the midst of plenty, and plenty which is available in the banks that have accepted their money and their bonds. But the Government apparently—and I have it on the best authority—say that these moneys shall not be drawn on and these bonds shall not be withdrawn because they came from a country which is now in the occupation of His Majesty's enemies. Well, I think, and it seems reasonable to think, that something can be done for these poor people who have trusted us, who have trusted the great nation that we represent, and I ask the Government—and I think the Government can, in some way or another—to help these people to get at any rate a percentage of the money which they have trusted to the London banks and to the honour of England. I beg to move.

5.42 p.m.

THE LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER

My Lords, I do not happen to have the close personal connection with these islands which is possessed by the noble Lord who has just addressed you, but these islands have been for 400 years in the diocese of Winchester. I believe they were originally put in that diocese because at that time the Bishop of Winchester, as Chancellor, was in command of the Fleet. Unfortunately the Bishops did not visit these islands for about 300 years.

LORD PORTSEA

IS it permissible to interrupt? The islands were in the Diocese of Dol and Coutance and when the islands became Protestant, Church of England, they had to change.

THE LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER

I think the House probably would not be interested if I went into mediaeval history to that extent, but I have visited these islands frequently. I have been over twice this year and should have gone over again next week, so I am anxious to support the noble Lord in the appeal which he has made to the Government. The evacuation and the demilitarisation of the islands came as a tremendous blow to the islanders. It was followed by very considerable evacuation. The island of Alderney was completely evacuated. From Guernsey about 20,000 or 25,000 left out of a population of, I think, 45,000, and from Jersey about 5,000 or 6,000 left out of the population of, I suppose, 50,000. I have not the exact figures, but the evacuation has been on a large scale, and it has meant that those who have left have found themselves in a condition which can be described as penniless. I am not thinking only of those who have bonds and credits in various banks. There are a large number, I suppose the majority of those who have left the islands, who have no money in any bank, who have lived for years, or all their lives in these islands as their forefathers before them did, and they find themselves suddenly uprooted and here, in what is for them a strange land, penniless. It has been a very great trial to them, and I do hope that the Government will do everything in their power to help these people. Many of them are farmers of very great specialised experience, and I understand that at this moment a large number of these are in big towns. I hope it will be possible to find work for some of them on the land where they can be most profitably employed, but wherever they go I do hope these people will not be treated as aliens but will be welcomed as our own fellow-citizens who are passing through a time of terrible trial and stress.

There is just one other point I should like to make. I hope that it may be possible for the Government some time to give us some information about the people who are left in the islands. I know it would be unreasonable to ask for this at the present moment, for all communications have been cut, but there is very great anxiety. I have had scores and scores of letters from all parts of England during these last few days from relations and friends asking me what has happened to the people in these islands. They know that I am the Bishop, and they imagine that in some way or other I am able to obtain information for them, but, of course, it is quite out of the question for me to do so. Sooner or later I hope the Government may be able to make some general statement about the condition of the people in the islands, and that they will do that whenever it is possible to do so. I am quite certain of this, that during all times the islanders will be loyal to the Crown, and I take comfort in thinking that they have some men of first-rate ability who are remaining at their posts and who are in charge of the islands and will do everything that is possible for the islanders. I think we can look forward with confidence to the day when these islands, with the rest of Europe, will regain their freedom.

5.48 p.m.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, I did not know that the noble Lord, Lord Portsea, was going to touch on these strategical aspects of this lamentable affair. I have not, therefore, had an opportunity of discussing with my noble friends the attitude we ought to take and I am speaking entirely for myself. I would like very respectfully to support what my noble friend Lord Portsea has said with regard to help being given to the successfully evacuated islanders, and if I might I would respectfully support the plea of the right reverend Prelate, the Lord Bishop of Winchester, who has just spoken. I hope that we will take all the steps we can to do what we can for the people who are left in the islands. The right reverend Prelate spoke of these skilled farmers who have reached this country. If he will take his episcopalian motor car a drive along the Western Avenue, which is one way of getting to his diocese, he will see hundreds of acres of absolutely idle land which has been bought up by speculators for building purposes, has not been so used and is growing thistles to-day. I drove along it yesterday and was horrified at what I saw.

With regard to the question of the evacuation of the Channel Islands it is only a very few weeks ago that we passed with acclamation through your Lordships' House a Bill dealing with the defence of the islands and tributes were paid to the great services rendered to the Empire by those gallant seafaring people. Now they have been evacuated and abandoned to the enemy. We are living in times of great events. In ordinary times the abandonment of the Channel Islands would not have passed without challenge. There have been in recent times two extraordinary evacuations. One was the evacuation of Narvik after 26,000 British, French, Polish and Norwegian troops had fought for weeks to overcome a German garrison of some 3,000 under most difficult conditions. Narvik was then evacuated almost immediately under most extraordinary circumstances. The other is this evacuation of the Channel Islands. I cannot believe that your Lordships' House will allow these two evacuations to pass unchallenged. I find myself in a most difficult position. With others of your Lordships I am pledged to support the present Government in the prosecution of the war and I intend to do that, but when this sort of event occurs I become most uneasy. I throw out this suggestion for your Lordships' consideration. Would it not be possible for us to have some committee of inquiry into these events? After the Dardanelles evacuation there was a Select Committee, I think I am right in saying, which sat in secret and took evidence in secret. I would like to see a Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament appointed to look into these things.

I am really not satisfied. This is not a question of the higher command only. I can quite see what happened. Their attention was taken up by the tremendous events in France, by the question of the French Fleet and by other events. But there are certain explanations required. Would it not have been better to have moved a little more quickly in regard to the Channel Islands, to take away the helpless people, but to leave the fighting men, reinforce them and let them stand a siege? I do not know the answer. But I do know that the abandonment, without firing a shot, of a fief of the Crown held for 800 years as part of His Majesty's Dominions does really require explanation. I warn the Government—and I ask my noble friends who represent the Government here to take note—that if other episodes of this kind happen, Parliament will not be silent. We are fighting for our lives and we intend to do our duty, but this episode following on the evacuation of Narvik has disturbed many of us.

5.52 p.m.

LoRD MOTTISTONE

My Lords, I desire to support the suggestion made that due care should be taken of the Channel Islanders for two reasons, one domestic and one military. The domestic reason is that as Chairman of the National Savings Committee I have visited the Channel Islands. The Channel Islanders have contributed a large amount of savings, so I know something of the islanders in that respect. It is to me unthinkable that they should be treated in any other way than with quite exceptional consideration, and I trust it will be realised that they are placed in a predicament in which no other part of the Empire has been placed owing to mysterious strategical considerations which we need not inquire into—I think that is the way to put it.

The Channel Islanders are our chosen children in every matter. I ventured to ask the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, the other day, whether he would give an assurance that nothing of the sort should ever occur again and he gave that assurance. But believe me, it did indeed come as a shock to every man I have spoken to, and to every woman too, that without firing a shot—that is what hurts, without firing a shot!—we surrendered a place where the flag of Britain has flown for 800 years. It is peculiarly cruel because these people rightly say that they are the oldest of us all. I have sat at a table with the High Bailiff when he proposed, solemnly, first the health of the Duke of Normandy, and then the health of Jersey's oldest Colony. That is indeed historically an accurate description. William of Normandy annexed this country when he was already Lord of Jersey. That we should have surrendered without firing a shot a place of such traditions is to me a mysterious thing. We have acquiesced because we presumed there must be some mysterious reason for this extraordinary happening, but for my part I cannot imagine what possible justification there can be for surrendering part of our possessions without firing a shot.

Since I last addressed your Lordships I have spoken to a distinguished officer who won the Victoria Cross in the last war. He said, sadly, "To think that we sacrificed, more than once, 10,000 men to save one line of trenches in France and yet did not fire a shot to save the Channel Islands." I do not want the Government to think that this does not matter, for it matters enormously. I do not know whether it would be wise to adopt the proposal of the noble Lord, to have a Committee sitting in secret to inquire why these things should happen, or whether we should pursue some other course, but I am sure of this, that the sooner His Majesty's Government say that this mysterious happening was due to causes which will probably not occur elsewhere, is unique and that never again will such a thing happen, the better it will be for all concerned.

5.58 p.m.

THE EARL OF RADNOR

My Lords, I am rather glad that the two noble Lords who have spoken from the opposite Benches have spoken as they did, because they have strayed so far from the substance of the Motion that any humbler efforts on my part in the same direction may be excused. My interest in the Channel Islands is far narrower than those of the other speakers. They lie in the fact that I have under my command, in my battery, 60 or 70 Channel Islanders between the ages of 30 and 50 who voluntarily enlisted early in the war. Another battery is composed almost entirely of Channel Islanders. Of course the evacuation of the islands has caused them the very greatest distress of mind. In many cases, in fact in practically every case, they are extremely worried about the condition of their dependants, whether they are now in this country or whether they remained in the islands. So far as I know the facts of the case, the method by which demilitarisation and evacuation of the Channel Islands was effected by His Majesty's Government was the one best calculated to produce alarm and despondency. There are many prosecutions going on in this country for that reason. I have seen nothing in newspapers comparable to what has been done in the Channel Islands to cause alarm and despondency to the people concerned.

The noble Lord, Lord Portsea, mentioned the fact that at one moment the islands were militarised and then they were as quickly demilitarised. That showed a certain indecision and led to a certain delay in carrying out the evacuation. When the islands were demilitarised an announcement was made, I believe at six o'clock in the evening, that a voluntary evacuation would take place and that those who wished to be evacuated had to register by nine o'clock the same evening. If anything was calculated to cause consternation among a population of something like 90,000 people, that was bound to do so. There was a seething mass, I believe, outside the various offices where you could register for evacuation, and naturally the wildest rumours and everything which goes with such disorder. The voluntary evacuation was conducted in that great hurry; it lasted, as far as I can ascertain, for about two days. Very little explanation was given to any of the people concerned. Parents were told that they would not necessarily be allowed to go with their children, wives—the wives of the men under my command—that they would be separated and be a long way from their husbands. Time was very short, and they were in fact separated from the only persons whom they could consult on whether they should evacuate or not.

At the end of two days, voluntary evacuation finished, and the railway companies were asked by the Government to carry on, and did carry on, a commercial service thereafter at a risk which ultimately involved the fact that most of their staff in the islands are still there. But the people with whom I am concerned, when they had their second thought and decided to evacuate, could not afford the fare back to England. An instance was brought to my notice of a woman with three children whom it would have cost £4 to come to this country. All that she had to live on was the family allowance which she received because her husband was serving in the Army. It was not fair on that woman, first of all to make her take a hurried decision, and secondly, when she failed to do so, to expect her to pay the fare back. Perhaps that is an indictment of the Government, and I may be accused in my turn of causing alarm and despondency; but I cannot see that these facts are going to help the enemy in any way, and my statement of them may stir the Government to take some steps to rectify the wrong that they have done by their unnecessarily hasty action.

To come to the immediate problem dealt with in the Motion before your Lordships' House, that of the finance of these people: so far as those in whom I am immediately interested are concerned—the wives and dependants of those who are in this country—they should reasonably be all right, because their family allowances and dependants' allowances can be paid to them. But they have this difficulty in front of them: they have to find lodgings somewhere in this country and lodging is not too easy to find and is often very expensive. I know of one woman who is now paying 23s. a week board and lodging and her family allowance amounts only to 27s. a week, so she has 4s. for all purposes other than merely living. That problem should, I think, be carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, as well as the more immediate problem of the conditions under which they are living to-day. It is credibly reported to me that there are twenty-seven or more living all together, higgledy-piggledy, in either a church hall or a church—I am not certain which—in Glasgow, with no proper conveniences of any sort or any privacy.

But the other problem is that of the wives and families of those left in Jersey and Guernsey to-day. The majority of those unfortunate people with whom I am concerned are dependent entirely on the money they get from their family and dependants' allowances. That is, of course, cut off, and what they are going to live on nobody knows. They have no resources themselves; they are dependent, presumably, on the charity of those who occupy the islands to-day—that is, the Germans. I do not know that I have great faith in their charity, but I can recognise that there are very grave difficulties, and it is presumably almost impossible to send money to these people and ensure that they live, or at least are kept from complete want. I might add that another thing which is worrying the men who are serving their country—I want your Lordships to remember that: serving their country voluntarily—is what is going to happen in the winter. Those islands are dependent for a great many necessities of life on supplies from outside, and there will not, unless their German masters so wish, be even the necessities of life available, even if they have the money to pay for them. Their position is very serious. I must say once again that I feel that considerable blame is to be laid on the Government for not explaining the situation to these people and, if it were possible, making the evacuation compulsory, whether they wished it or not, so that they should not have been left in the really dreadful condition in which they are now.

I recognise the difficulties. I do not quarrel with the decision to evacuate the islands, because, contrary to what was said by the noble Lords opposite, I think that in these days of air warfare they were probably indefensible, and even if they had been defensible, the destruction of life and property would have been such as to devastate the islands completely. But I do beg His Majesty's Government to take note of the right reverend Prelate's appeal to try everything they can to get news of these people. Any news, even bad news, is better than nothing.

LORD STRABOLGI

Would the noble Earl permit me to interrupt? Is he aware that what he is saying now about evacuating because of the air menace would justify us in evacuating Malta or Chatham?

THE EARL OF RADNOR

I fancy it is rather difficult to answer that question.

LORD STRABOLGI

Very difficult; exactly!

THE EARL OF RADNOR

I fancy that Malta is rather better defended than the islands and has rather more in the way of shelter for the people. As to evacuating Chatham, you may say that of the whole of England; but surely you do not want to disperse our Forces by defending an almost indefensible area which has from our point of view great sentimental value but, I should imagine, extraordinarily little strategical value. I do not want to enter into a strategical argument, however. I am not capable of doing so, and it is outside this Motion. But I do appeal to His Majesty's Government, first of all to try to get some news of these people, however meagre, and of conditions in the islands; and also to give us something which we can pass on to these men and women in this country, so that we can try to give them some comfort in their very great distress of mind.

6.9 p.m.

LORD WARDINGTON

My Lords, I beg to support the appeal of the Earl of Radnor, and shall not wander into any questions of strategy, military or naval, about which I know nothing. The noble Lord who moved this Motion pointed out that what he had to say was in relation to the financial condition of the people who have been affected by the overrunning of the islands by the Germans. He referred to the banking actions which have taken place, or might take place. I am not authorised to speak on behalf of the banks as a whole. All the "Big Five" banks have branches in Guernsey and Jersey, and I think in some cases in Alderney. They have the greatest sympathy with their clients in the hardships to which they have been subjected owing to the occupation of the islands by Germany, and they would like to minimise those hardships as far as they possibly can. The position is very complicated and difficult. It would have been a good deal more difficult and more complicated if the banks had not taken some precautionary measures before the actual occupation. In fact, they have had duplicate records of the accounts of their customers kept on the mainland, and in a short time it is to be hoped that those accounts will be reconstituted and that we may have some fairly up-to-date information as to the position of each one. Noble Lords will easily understand that both banks and customers would have been put in a very difficult position if an unknown man could present himself at a bank with the statement—which he could not confirm in any way—that he was a customer with a large sum of money standing to his credit in Guernsey or Jersey, and that he would like to draw some of it out, when the bank had no information as to his identity and no specimen of his signature. Those difficulties have been foreseen, and I hope that in a short time the accounts of these people will be fairly fully reconstituted.

There are, however, considerable difficulties of a legal nature. Under the Trading with the Enemy (Custodian) Order all residents still in the Channel Islands, including companies constituted in the islands for carrying on business there, are to be regarded as enemies within the Trading with the Enemy Act; and of course banks, like everyone else, have to obey the law. So far as residents who are still in the islands are concerned, there is no means of communicating or dealing with them in any way. Those who are affected by this very unfortunate happening can be divided into three categories. There are, first of all, those who are still resident in the islands, about whom we have very little news and for whom we really cannot do anything, even if their banking accounts have been transferred to the mainland. The only point of hope that I have for them, as far as banking is concerned, is that the Trading-with-the-Enemy branch have authorised the collection by bankers on this side of cheques and sight drafts in their hands drawn by non-enemies and payable for the benefit of persons, firms and companies in the Channel Islands, provided that the proceeds thereof will be retained by the Custodian of Enemy Property for their benefit. That is very cold comfort to them!

The conditions in the islands are matters of conjecture. I have seen a copy to-day of a Proclamation by the German Commandant which appeared in the Guernsey paper on July 1. That set forth the various regulations. No one was to be allowed out after eleven o'clock at night or before six o'clock in the morning. If any trouble arose in the island there was a threat that it would be bombed. The sale and consumption of spirits were not to be allowed. All rifles, revolvers, shotguns and ammunition were to be declared and handed over. No boat was allowed to leave without permission. The sale of motor spirit was prohibited except for doctors and for essential purposes after permission had been obtained. The previous black-out in the island was to be continued as before. And—this is a point which specially concerns what I want to say—banks and shops were to be kept open; and to continue to function. Under what conditions that can be done, I do not know. As your Lordships may know, the currency in the islands has been sterling, and Guernsey has issued its own notes with a sterling denomination. Whether a new mark currency is going to be established, and what the relation between that mark currency and the old currency will be in the future, I have no means of knowing.

The second category of those concerned in this catastrophe consists of those who escaped from the islands but who have left their houses and all their non-transferable possessions there, and whose banking accounts have not been transferred from the islands to this country. The great bulk of their securities, investments and documents of that kind—not big safe-custody boxes of plate, and so on—have been transferred. In the case of these people, who have themselves escaped but whose accounts are still in the islands, it is only a matter of time—I hope a short time—before their banking accounts are reconstituted; and, as we have their specimen signatures and records in regard to them, we hope that they will be able to draw on their accounts in the ordinary, normal course of business in the future. In the meantime, in order to meet their special difficulties, we have been buying Guernsey notes and have given them currency notes which are legal tender here, and we have been making them small advances to help them to carry on for the moment. That, of course, cannot be a permanent arrangement; but, as I say, I hope that in a short time their accounts will be largely reconstituted, that all these securities which have been transferred will be gone through and sorted out, and that we shall be able to let them deal with those securities, if they like, subject, of course, to the Defence Regulations in regard to such matters. One point there is that if their securities are in foreign currencies the Government have the power to commandeer them. Subject, however, to any legal restrictions of that kind, the securities will be at their disposal.

Then the last category consists of those who are resident in this country and who have their accounts transferred here. That presents the simplest problem of the three. I hope, that as time goes on, the difficulties from which they are suffering at present will be largely overcome. But I do not know anything about all those poor people who have no banking accounts, who have no local money, have indeed nothing except what they stand up in. What their plight is I grieve to think. I have great sympathy therefore with the noble Lord who moved this Motion, and if anything can possibly be done for these people I shall be as grateful as all the rest of your Lordships.

6.21 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, any of your Lordships who were present when my noble friend Lord Portsea made his speech at the beginning of this debate must I am sure have felt, as I felt, deeply and sincerely moved by what he said. He was speaking as one with very special associations with these islands, and it occurred to me that what he said was bound to stir in all hearts a very great deal of sympathy and interest. I have become myself by degrees accustomed to the practice of your Lordships' House, and it is not a matter of surprise that the debate should branch out and range over some matters which are certainly not within the terms of the Motion. Of course, I do not offer a word of criticism on that account. But still it is just as well that your Lordships should be reminded that what my noble friend Lord Portsea wished to do was to call attention to the financial position of persons evacuated from Jersey and Guernsey, and to ask some questions on that subject, and it was, I apprehend, because that was the nature of the question which he wished to raise that I was entrusted with the task of saying a few words for the Government at the end of the debate. I think the noble Lord may have gathered a considerable measure of comfort, and certainly much useful information, from the speech that has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Wardington—a most practical speech, dealing with the very matters which he wished to have ventilated.

But in the course of the debate we have had speeches dealing with the strategic and tactical questions raised by this lamentable event, and also, from the noble Earl opposite, some observations both on the manner of the evacuation and on the sad lot of the people whose cases have specially come before him. As regards the strategic question, I certainly should not regard this as a suitable occasion on which to have it discussed. I gathered from the noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench that in his view, speaking as a student of strategy and military tactics, the evacuation of the Channel Islands is strictly parallel to the evacuation of Malta or the evacuation of Chatham. I can only say, with my less instructed mind on the subject, that I should have thought that, strategically speaking, there could hardly be a more obvious difference.

LORD STRABOLGI

Will the noble and learned Viscount forgive me? I hope he will not father on me arguments that I have not used in some remarks made in an interruption to another noble Lord.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am not fathering anything on anybody. I merely make an observation urbi et orbi. Malta, as I apprehend, is one of the strongest fortresses in the British Empire. Chatham is, I suppose, one of the best defended places—certainly ought to be—both from air attack and from other attack, in the British Isles. Unfortunately the Channel Islands are not at all in a comparable position from a defensive point of view. I was a little surprised at the observations made by my noble and gallant friend Lord Mottistone, because I gathered that he also felt greatly troubled and deeply concerned that the authorities should have thought it necessary not to maintain the defence of these unfortunately situated islands. The noble Lord mentioned this matter in the debate a few days ago and drew on his great experience of the War Office in past time. He said: I know very well from my own service as Secretary of State that the Channel Islands stand in a peculiar position, tactically and strategically, because they are practically a part of the French continent. We never, in those days"— that is, when he was Secretary of State— nor have we in these days, envisaged the fortification of the Channel Islands as an outpost. They are right under the guns of part of France.… It may be that that is his view to-day, but at any rate he surprised me. But I do not really think that this strategical problem can be thrashed out in a debate in this House this evening.

I apprehend humbly, though I have no claim to be a strategist, that the collapse of the French Army and the subsequent withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force from Northern France may possibly have made a good deal of difference, strategically speaking. I apprehend that, with the French coast in German hands, with Coutances, Avranches and St. Malo and all those little ports in that corner of France, the peculiar geographical position of the islands at least raises a very serious question as to whether it is not necessary to recognise that it would be a wholly uneconomic use of our military forces to endeavour to supplement the small garrison there. But it is not for me to say. It is undoubtedly a proper subject to raise on a proper occasion, and no doubt if it were duly raised the authorities would be those who represent the War Office and the War Cabinet rather than myself.

I was very much impressed also with the observations made by the noble Earl, who felt that the way in which the evacuation had taken place was in some respects unfortunate. It may be so; I do not wish to do more than furnish the House with such information as I can give. Of course there can be no question that the British Government were facing a sudden collapse which had never been assumed as possible—namely, the collapse of this magnificent French Army, the sudden surrender on the part of a great democratic Power, our Ally through all this business up till now, which completely overwhelmed and overturned the calculations which had been made beforehand. For my part I will surrender to nobody in my concern for the case of these ancient islands, these Iles Normandes as they were called. At the same time, I think it only reasonable that we should recognise, all of us, what was the overwhelming character of the problems which faced His Majesty's Government at that moment.

My noble friend Lord Mottistone reminded the House how in the earlier debate he had raised the question whether this lamentable and distressing event of withdrawal should be regarded as an isolated case and entirely by itself, or whether it could possibly betoken the beginning of a policy. I am glad that the noble Lord referred to that, because he will recall the answer he then received. He did not get a qualified answer—he got an absolute answer, and I repeat it now. This incident, lamentable and distressing as it undoubtedly is, is a totally isolated case. It is due, rightly or wrongly, to the geographical position of these islands near to the shores of France.

LORD STRABOLGI

That is what gives them their value.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I must leave the noble Lord to argue the high points of strategy with those who are equal to the matter; but your Lordships will realise that the British Government are also advised by competent stategists. This does not, therefore, form any sort of precedent for any part of the United Kingdom. As the Leader of the House observed in a recent debate, His Majesty's Government have not the least intention of abandoning any possession in any part of His Majesty's Dominions, because here we are fighting for our own fortress and our own homes, and we will carry that through, whatever befall, until we have vanquished the foe.

Now I must refer to the matter which really started this debate. It is not a mere form of words to say that we feel sympathetically for the state in which these gallant and loyal islanders find themselves. It is a deeply and sincerely felt sentiment, and it is right I should remind the House of how His Majesty the King expressed this sentiment in the message he sent to the two Bailiffs yesterday. His Majesty sent this message to the Bailiffs of Guernsey and Jersey: For strategic reasons it has been found necessary to withdraw the armed forces from the Channel Islands. I deeply regret this necessity, and I wish to assure my people in the islands that in taking this decision my Government have not been unmindful of their position. It is in their interest that this step should be taken in present circumstances. The long association of the islands with the Crown and the long service the people of the islands have rendered to my ancestors and myself are guarantees that the link between us will remain unbroken, and I know that my people in the islands will look forward with the same confidence as I do to the day when the resolute fortitude with which we face our present difficulties will reap the reward of victory. May I just say one or two words on the specific financial matter the noble Lord raised in his Motion? I have had inquiries made, and am glad to find that what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Wardington, confirms the information given to me. Perhaps I can state the position in a slightly different way. As regards joint stock banks, I understand that these banks in this country are treating the deposits which were made in their Channel Islands branches, and which belong to persons who have come here from the Channel Islands, as accounts which have been transferred to this country. That is the principle. Although an islander may have banked in a branch in Jersey, when he comes here his bank will do its best—and Lord Wardington has described the method already adopted—to see to it that he has an account here. That is a very valuable arrangement. The result is, as the House will see, that depositors should have little difficulty in being able to draw their money. Of course, as Lord Wardington pointed out, in the case of credit balances on current accounts, it will be necessary to satisfy the banks that the person who makes the claim is the person entitled to the money, and to satisfy them also that the credit balance has not been already drawn upon before the claim is made. These are mechanical difficulties which arise out of the evacuation. The main thing is that bank accounts which would normally be regarded as solely for the islands are being treated by the joint stock banks as bank accounts in this country and are being drawn upon as far as islanders who have come here are concerned.

In the case of securities, where securities were deposited for safe keeping and the local branch has been able to bring them away—and that is so in a great many cases—there should be no difficulty in the true owners of these securities making good their claims, although here again satisfactory proof of ownership may be necessary. The main thing is that banks in this country which have branches in the Channel Islands are prepared to treat refugees from the islands who have come over here as their customers in this country. Such difficulties as remain must be met as best they can in view of the necessity of proof and the like.

I should add a word, if I may, not about ordinary banks but about savings banks—a very important subject. Similar arrangements are, I am informed, being made to enable depositors in the Jersey and Guernsey Savings Banks who are now in this country to draw on their deposit accounts and to deal with the Government Securities Section of the Post Office Register kept at those banks so long as the depositors are in this country and so long as they have brought with them, as they probably have, their passbooks and other evidence of title. This applies both to trustee savings banks and to accounts in the Post office Savings Bank. I may add that an Order in Council is being made which will clear up this position as far as Jersey and Guernsey Trustee Savings Bank are concerned. The proposed regulation will enable the National Debt Commissioners to make arrangements with the Trustee Savings Banks in this country to conduct business, in effect, as agents of the Channel Islands Banks. No special arrangements are, of course, necessary in the case of Post Office Savings Bank depositors, because the Post Office Saving Bank is situated in this country and can operate through any of its branches. I hope this detailed information may give some measure of comfort to those deeply concerned with the practical side of this matter, and I wish to assure my noble friend Lord Portsea and everyone in the House that we shall continue to do, in co-operation with the banks in this country, everything that can be done to solve the difficulties which have arisen.

I should like, if I may be allowed, to add two or three words on this very moving as well as distressing occasion. I share most completely, as do all your Lordships, the feeling of concern and distress that there should have been this withdrawal from these islands. After all, they are not only possessions of the British Crown, but they are actually older than the Battle of Hastings itself. "1066 and all that" came after the time when these islands first became attached to the ancestors of the King, and throughout all that time they have shown themselves not only industrious but chivalrous. They have contributed, both in peace and in war, most significantly to the service and to the strength of our country. I am glad to recall that at this moment, as I understand, the two Bailiffs—the Bailiff of Jersey, Mr. Alexander Moncrieff Coutanche, and the Bailiff of Guernsey, Mr. Victor Gosselin Carey—are continuing to carry on in the islands, to the best of their power, the civil administration for which they are responsible. I think it is a splendid tribute to the courage and loyalty of this distressed people. If it be the case that, by withdrawing the small garrison from these islands these people are saved, as I think they may be, very terrible and continuous bombardment from the air, I think people of that spirit and courage will regard that as a small compensation for the loss and distress which they feel at this temporary separation from their homes. I venture humbly to echo the words of His Majesty, repeated as they have been by many of your Lordships to-day, and I trust the day is not far distant when, by persevering in our purpose, as we are determined come what may, we may have among our triumphs the supreme satisfaction of seeing these good people returned to their homes.

LORD PORTSEA

My Lords, I beg to withdraw the Motion which stands in my name, and, if I may, to offer my thanks to the Lord Chancellor for his most sympathetic and kind reply, which we will feel very much in our islands.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

House adjourned at eighteen minutes before seven o'clock.