HL Deb 24 March 1925 vol 60 cc655-82

LORD PARMOOR rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give information on the matters brought forward at the recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the Question that I have put upon the Paper primarily raises a matter which is much discussed at the present time—namely, the question of the Protocol—but having been asked on behalf of the Government to explain what points I desired to call attention to in my Question, I supplied them with full notes of the speech that I was going to make, and therefore they know, adequately I hope, what are the points which I am going to raise. My notes were originally given to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, whose illness I regret. I believe that the noble Viscount on the Woolsack will answer my Questions.

The Protocol is not a British document in any sense. It is an international document of wide-reaching importance, the whole basis of which is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to comply with which all signatory States have already come under binding treaty obligations. The Protocol really embodies what I will call the No-More-War, or Peace, policy, a policy in which a common measure of right and justice shall be guaranteed to all peoples alike, irrespective of the power or force which they may have at their command. In other words, it is a policy of equality for all countries, whether great or small. It was unanimously adopted as a reasonable and peaceful proposal by all the States represented at the Fifth Assembly of the League at the Geneva meeting last autumn. The present Government have rejected it root and branch, as I understand, on the wide ground that a policy based on trust and not on fear represents, tinder present conditions, an impracticable idealism. This view I think was further enforced in connection with the Navy Estimates and the speech made on Saturday by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

Sound advice, in my view, was given to this House by the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, speaking in 1918, when he made a notable speech in favour of the whole League principle. He said:— My impression is that the democracies of the world are sick of the burden of heavy armaments, and that if there were found means of reasonably assuring international peace you would find that disarmament would follow almost automatically. I think there is no doubt that that is the feeling in the world at the present time, and that to a large extent it was the basis of the unanimous approval given to the principle of the Protocol at Geneva. In fact, it was known that modern industrialism and war are really in their essence inconsistent. However, on the present occasion, as there is no question of amendment or improvement, I do not propose to discuss any matter of detail.

I think that the authority which there is behind the Protocol has not been appreciated. I have read several times the statement made by Mr. Chamberlain at Geneva, but I do not find any reference to the great weight of international authority and assent that stands behind the Protocol. It was directly initiated by the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain, acting in friendly co-operation and in respect of a common international policy. It was supported in an Assembly of exceptional authority. I do not want to dwell unduly upon this, but the speakers in favour were four actual Prime Ministers and two ex-Prime Ministers, four Foreign Secretaries and two ex-Foreign Secretaries, in addition to the leading representatives of the Latin-American Republics, a very important body in connection with the League, a ruling Prince of one of the Native States in India, and the leader of one of the great Parties in the Australian Parliament. It was after these speeches, which no doubt were all delivered in a common plea, that the resolution proposed by the Prime Minister of Great Britain and seconded by the Prime Minister of France was unanimously adopted. That is a very remarkable position in international affairs. In other words, the Geneva Protocol has a unique authority for everyone who regards the League and League policy as an essential condition in the government of modern international life.

In the case of Great Britain the Protocol denoted the culminating point of a considered policy of friendly international co-operation. It followed the success of the London Conference. And may I say here that the position of the British Delegates, of whom I had the honour to be one, has been misunderstood or misrepresented? The British Delegates were not irresponsible agents. They were the accredited representatives at the Assembly of the British Government. They acted throughout in accordance with instructions received, and were in constant communication with the Foreign Office and the Foreign Minister. If it were in accordance with principle—perhaps the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will answer this question—I wish that all these communications could be made public as part of the Papers dealing with this great question. There should be no room for mistake in a matter of this kind, because all the allegations made on the basis that the British Delegation were an irresponsible, instead of accredited, body have really no foundation whatever. The rejection of the Protocol, indeed, apart for the moment from the question of whether it is right or wrong, is the complete reversal of a carefully planned foreign policy.

Then the whole status and constitution of the Assembly of the League of Nations has not been adequately appreciated. Not only the British, but all the Delegations—and I think there were fifty-six countries originally represented—were representative Delegations, and I know that in many cases they were in direct communication with their home Governments. To the Assembly so constituted and to the Governments which they represented, the peace policy in the Protocol was not only not an unpractical idealism, but was greeted with enthusiasm as a real practical solution. Naturally, the small States were most insistent. To them the principle of the Protocol denoted the only possible basis of equality in an international community, in which right could be substituted for force as the governing principle.

There is one further misconception which I feel bound to correct. The League has no direct executive authority to interfere with the sovereignty of the constituent States—none whatever. So far as I know, no such authority has ever been claimed within the terms either of the Covenant or of the Protocol. Certain rhetorical and inaccurate statements of this character have no foundation, and should be known really to have no foundation by everyone who has studied the Covenant of the League and the basis on which the League has been established. I do not doubt—I think it has been very rightly stated by Mr. Chamberlain on behalf of the Government—that the issue raised by the statement read at Geneva is fundamental. It goes to the whole root of the League and League policy. The autocratic rejection of the Protocol will tend to imperil the whole future influence of the League. The League was founded on the basis of the influence of trust and confidence. I think trust and confidence are essential if international intercourse is to go forward on a League basis. The Protocol is rejected on the ground that a dominating influence is feared, and that we must distrust the plighted word of other countries. When I say "other countries" I presume it means the plighted word of all countries, although, on behalf of my own, I repudiate such a suggestion in the the strongest possible terms.

The speeches of the two Prime Ministers insisted throughout on the importance of a peace policy, and on the inseparable and inter-linked connection between arbitration, security, and disarmament. Of course, the whole goal of the Protocol is not perhaps properly expressed as "disarmament," but as the reduction of armaments to the level to which countries and States which are signatories of the Covenant have already undertaken to reduce them. I should like to quote a short passage from the speech of M. Herriot, the French Prime Minister, because that is sufficient without further emphasis on my part. M. Herriot said this— Arbitration, security, disarmament—the three words are, we hold, closely interconnected. Without real international solidarity we shall, we believe, never attain that international community which we passionately desire, which we are resolved to create, to perpetuate, to organise, conformably with the laws which govern life and being. Without international solidarity"—

I will ask your Lordships to mark these words— there will never be international peace. Through international solidarity alone shall we attain disarmament, which is our goal.

So much has been said about the attitude of the Dominions, to which I shall have to refer shortly, that while I am on this part of my subject I should like also to quote the opinion of Sir Robert Borden, who was the Conservative Prime Minister of Canada during the war, and the representative of Canada during the peace proceedings in Paris. He says this— I regard the Protocol as a brave and earnest attempt to bring about that general disarmament which is so necessary for the future peace of the world. The proposal to couple disarmament and compulsory arbitration, including in that expression the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, seems reasonable and feasible. I adopt those words entirely. They are admirably expressed, and represent the true view of the Protocol. He says— There is much force in the view that the two"— that is, arbitration and disarmament— must go hand in hand. Again, the whole matter may be taken as summed up in the last paragraph of the resolution proposed by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, seconded by the Prime Minister of France and accepted with enthusiasm by the whole Assembly of the League at Geneva. It is impossible for me to convey to your Lordships the enthusiasm with which this resolution was accepted and endorsed. This paragraph expressed their desire to strengthen the security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which might arise between States. Then it rightly says that the goal is disarmament—a matter to which too little attention has been paid in the criticism directed against the Protocol.

Upon that point, might I call your Lordships' attention to Article 21 of the Protocol which shows clearly what was the opinion of those who framed and supported it? The Protocol was never intended to be regarded as a document complete in itself. It was never intended to be criticised in connection with the existing condition of armaments. On the contrary, the provision I shall read makes it clear that the whole Protocol becomes null and void unless at a world conference a reduction of armaments is carried out on the basis of the obligations already undertaken by the signatory States of the Covenant in Article 8. These are the actual words— If within such period after the adoption of the plan for the reduction of armaments as shall he fixed by the said Conference"—

that is the world conference— the plan has not been carried out, the Council shall make a declaration to that effect; this declaration shall render the present Protocol null and void. I do not believe it is fair to attempt to criticise the Protocol at the present moment on the lines suggested in Mr. Chamberlain's statement. No one supported the Protocol on that basis. Everyone who supported it supported it as a document opening the gates to a general reduction of armaments, and it was especially provided that if that general reduction of armaments was not carried out the Protocol itself should become null and void.

How does this matter stand in regard to a league or society or, as Mazzini would have called it, an association of nations? I think that the Covenant of the League or society implies that the signatory States have agreed to the principle of an international community cooperating in friendly intercourse and on a peace basis. I know perfectly well—I do not shut my eyes to the fact—that this position is criticised; but I would suggest that, so far as Great Britain is concerned, and so far as all the signatories to the Covenant are concerned, they cannot overthrow that position without at the same time treating with scant respect treaty obligations of a very solemn character which they have actually undertaken. The primary duty (it is in the first paragraph of the Covenant) which we and other signatories have undertaken is this— .! to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security"— how?— by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war. This is not the expression of an idealism but of a practical duty imposed on nations undertaking treaty obligations in a solemn manner. The subsequent clauses are to carry out the obligations thus undertaken, and it is sought to carry them out in the great majority of cases by referring disputes to what might be called a third party decision so as to avoid resort to war.

Everyone who has studied such a league from the time of Grotius knows that the whole basis of what is regarded as the international community is a community which should be constituted on the same basis of law and order as has been already accepted in all civilised communities. It is not wonderful that, in order to make a regulation of this kind complete, the terms and provisions of the Covenant have been found to require adjustment. May I remind your Lordships of the provisions of Article 1 of the Protocol? It is not necessary to read more than a word or two in order to put the matter in the shortest possible manner:— The signatory States undertake to make every effort in their power to secure the introduction into the Covenant of amendments on the lines of the provisions contained in the following articles. Immediately on my return from Geneva I received a letter from the Secretariat asking me to appoint a representative of Great Britain for this purpose—the object being that by reducing the Protocol and the Covenant to one document all the misrepresentations and difficulties which have occurred might be put on one side. I suggested the appointment of one of the most highly qualified international lawyers in this country. Of course I do not mention his name. He said he was prepared to serve, and negotiations had proceeded to a certain point when the late Government fell.

No one would recognise more fully than the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack the importance of a draft of this kind showing clearly how far the Covenant would have to be amended in order to comply with the Protocol. I want to ask him whether any further advance has been made in order that this information should be obtained. It is admitted by everyone that the first adjustment in the Protocol is the universal application of a judicial or third party decision. The objective, of course, is peace. That is the reason for this provision. It is only in this way that peace can be so assured as to give that security which a country like France desires.

The real question then is, should the League forward the constitution of an international community on a peace basis as a barrier against future war? That is the design and object of the Protocol If the answer is in the affirmative, then the British Government is in the unenviable position of opposing proposals unanimously accepted at Geneva as a sufficient basis for calling a world conference on disarmament, or rather on the reduction of armaments to the level fixed by the terms of the Covenant itself. If I may use language which comes from the United States, whose attitude I think has been much misunderstood, the principle of compulsory arbitration, with disarmament, is a foothold, and the only foothold, that will raise the world out of the war morass. Criticism of the provision for compulsory arbitration in the Protocol underlies practically much of the statement prepared by Mr. Chamberlain. He says that the objection of the British Government to universal and compulsory arbitration might easily outweigh its theoretical advantages. That is a very vague and inconclusive criticism. There is much more than theoretical advantage in universal arbitration or court decision. It is a practical advantage of a far-reaching character, and of infinite importance.

It is nothing less than the relegation of questions from the realm of force to the realm of right. It places all nations, small and great, on a basis of equality, it provides for conciliation and justice, and creates a desire to do justice as well as to claim justice. It formulates means of righting wrongs between nations without resorting to the greater wrong of warfare. Through preliminary conciliation it gives a means of explaining away misunderstanding—a most important provision. It invites co-operation, in the place of controversy, and unites higher forms under the guise of an international court, and points the way to the gradual building up of a recognised system of international law. This law, if I might quote from the admirable speech given in this House by the late Lord Parker, should become the common law of nations, and provide for the same measure of peace and security among the nations as the great system of common law has provided for peace between individuals of the same nationality. And no country has been more blessed in the direction of peace and order, under the provisions of this great common law, than our country of Great Britain.

Secondly, and I can deal with this quite shortly, the Protocol was criticised on the ground that it sharpens the sanctions. I purposely use the actual words in the statement. I need not remind your Lordships how often it has been pointed out that the sanction clause in the Protocol is, in terms, limited to the sanctions mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant. If the arguments on this point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Buckmaster, and of Sir Frederick Pollock are not considered to be convincing, I can add nothing to strengthen them. The sanctions are not sharpened by the Protocol in any way. If they are sharpened at all it is by reason of another factor—namely, that unfortunately a certain number of countries have not yet become members of the League. In one sense no doubt it may be said that new responsibilities are created, but in reality they are reduced a hundredfold if the new policy is accepted. I agree with M. Briand's statement that the Protocol has erected an almost insuperable barrier to future warfare. If this is true, all minor criticisms sink into insignificance. No one disputes that security from war is the keynote of a progressive peace policy, and if this is secured under what M. Briand calls an insuperable barrier against war—and that was the general view at Geneva—then criticism such as we find on minor details carries little or no weight. You must recollect that so far as security is a matter of French national opinion—and they are the persons to judge—they have given their answer in the Assembly at Geneva. There the security offered by the Protocol was accepted by the Delegations of all the States as a sufficient basis for the summoning of a world conference on disarmament.

I often doubt whether it is necessary to go into a number of wide arguments upon this point. The security of the Protocol was only required to be sufficient to enable a world conference to be called with the assent of all the assembled nations at Geneva. The Protocol is only a step on the road to disarmament, and is there any man of any knowledge or experience in international affairs who will say for a moment that he doubts the security of the Protocol, at least so far as it is necessary to form the foundation for the calling of a world conference on disarmament? There can be, I think, but one answer to that question. I know that in discussions of this kind a retreat is often found in vague expressions, but the practical thing is this. The world conference was to be called almost at once. It was to have been called this summer; but perhaps that was too soon. But can it be suggested by any one cognisant of international affairs that the Protocol did not give security sufficient for that purpose? If the disarmament conference had failed, the Protocol itself would have become null and void.

I would wish to say one or two words especially on the question of disarmament. The initiative on disarmament under Article 8 of the Covenant is placed upon the Council of the League. I am sorry that the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, is not here to-night. He was himself the originator of an immense amount of this work, and he deserves every credit for the splendid way in which he worked in connection with the League of Nations. But after five years of constant research—five years of groping in the dark in some directions at least—a scheme was suggested which the whole Assembly was ready to adopt and accept. What is the answer? If you are to be guided by the League policy, they say, we are ready, on the basis of the Protocol, to go forward into a world conference on disarmament which, after all, is the goal of all persons who desire an ultimate peace settlement.

I do not desire to go into matters connected with another Question, as to German disarmament, which I have on the Paper, but on this point it is not only the Protocol which I should like your Lordships to bear in mind, but also two Treaty provisions to which attention must be called in order to make my point quite clear. In that part of the Treaty of Versailles which deals with German disarmament we find these words as the first heading:— In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations. Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow. There never was the idea of what I may call unilateral disarmament. The inducement to Germany to disarm was properly stated in the forefront of the clauses which deal with German disarmament as the initiation of the limitation of the armaments of all nations. And to make this quite clear—your Lordships may have it in mind, but unfortunately it is not always referred to—there was the answer given by the Allied Powers at Paris to the objections raised to the Treaty of Versailles by Germany. Consider what this means on the question of disarmament and our honour in carrying it forward? The Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out to the German Delegates that the Covenant of the League of Nations provides.! I will not read the whole of the words again—for the reduction of armaments. They recognise that the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament"— Will do what?— will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments; and they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction. Those words were spoken more than five years ago, and they must appeal to every one as an honourable obligation. For five years attempts have been made to fulfil that obligation and now, for the first time, you have a unanimous Report of the League with the Protocol as the basis for going forward in the direction of disarmament.

What has been the attitude of Great Britain? Every other country assented, and Great Britain also assented at the time, but there has been a change of Government. Is this country, not as a matter of detailed consideration, but as a root and branch objection to the Protocol to close the door, the only door which so far has been opened, to carrying out our honourable obligation, honourably undertaken, that at the first possible moment we would take our part in a scheme for the general reduction of armaments? There is one other point. Here I agree in one sense with what Mr. Chamberlain says, though I entirely disagree with the inference, that so long as you have these armaments you will have fear by one country of another. I recollect that Viscount Grey of Fallodon stated that in his view, partly as regards present fear and partly as regards future fear, he attributed the war mainly to the huge over-grown armaments in Europe. I recollect, too, that the Earl of Oxford and Asquith, speaking on the same subject in Dublin, referred to conditions in which there would be stimulated naval and military activity so that no one felt secure. And now we have Mr. Chamber- lain himself saying that many countries—I do not know to which countries he refers—are in fear of brute force, and, therefore, require brute force for their defence.

The very object of the Protocol is to get rid of that brute force. Is it to be said that brute force is an essential condition in the progress of mankind at the present moment? I do not believe any one will attempt to substantiate a statement of that kind. If it is not, it is of the utmost importance to get rid of it: if it is not, surely Great Britain should not stand in the way of carrying out an obligation honourably undertaken in the Treaty and further confirmed in the passages I have read—namely, that the disarmament of Germany was to be followed at the first possible moment by a general disarmament of other countries.

There are one or two other points, not of detail but of general consideration, on which I must say a word. I am sorry to have to do so at this late hour owing to other matters having received the attention of your Lordships. I must say a word as to the attitude of the Dominions and India towards the Protocol. It is probably known to your Lordships that the British Delegates to the Assembly were Delegates of the British Empire, a rather curious difference because to the Council they are only the Delegates of Great Britain. But, in addition to that, several of the Dominions had independent representations. Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Ireland and India were all represented by their Delegates at Geneva as accredited agents of their Governments for the time being. There was not a step we took at Geneva without consultation with them, there was not a movement in which they were not in direct touch with us, and I know perfectly well from my own experience and knowledge that they were in constant communication with their own Governments. If you are to take the opinion as it was expressed through accredited representatives at Geneva, the Dominions and India were fully in accord and expressed their accord by voting for the terms of the Protocol.

I have no doubt that, as in this country and elsewhere, there is a measure of divided opinion. But consider the case of India. The Indian representative was Lord Hardinge, an ex-Viceroy, twice head of the Foreign Office and Ambassador to Russia and at Paris. Could you have a more experienced exponent of international questions or a person more able to represent the realities of Indian opinion? He was a convinced supporter of the Protocol, and not only that, his assistance was of vital importance to the whole British Delegation. We rejoiced to have assistance of that kind; and if you were to analyse the Protocol you would find in many directions critical amendments which we introduced at the instance of the Dominions or of India. One other illustration. Australia had, as its first delegate, Sir Littleton Groom, the Attorney-General. He, as a delegate, was in constant communication with his Government and took a prominent part in forming the Protocol. He was the Chairman of the first Commission to which was delegated the most important part of the work. I do not know—I do not wish to dwell too much upon this—how many hours I spent talking over difficult questions with Sir Littleton Groom.

But how does the matter stand? If you have these Dominion and Indian representatives at Geneva, if you realise that they are acting under instructions from their Governments, as they were, if you bear in mind that they are accredited agents, not irresponsible bodies, what more can be done as regards the ascertainment of the true Dominion or Indian opinion than to be guided by them, accepting and considering all the suggestions that they make? We finally rejoiced to find that they were in accord with us and were able, at the vote, to support the whole of the Protocol. I have already referred to the opinion of Sir Robert Borden, and will not do so again, but I must add that if the Protocol were represented to the Dominions in the same light as it was represented in the statement of Mr. Chamberlain at Geneva, I cannot imagine any of them giving other than a negative answer.

There is one point upon which I want the noble and learned Viscount to give me an answer. Will he lay upon the Table, or supply publicly in whatever may be the right form, all the negotiations which have passed between the present Government and the Dominions and India upon this point? It is no good merely seeing the answer to a letter. That brings nothing to one's mind. It all depends upon what the question is that was asked and the way in which the matter was brought to their notice.

I must refer also quite shortly to one or two other points, because so much weight has been laid upon them. It is said, quite truly, that some countries are not yet members of the League. That difficulty was present to our minds and it is for that reason that disarmament was relegated to a world conference, where America and Germany and Russia would have the same weight and the same opportunity of expressing their opinions as any other countries. But I should like to say that, when what was called the Treaty of Mutual Assurance was turned down by Germany, Germany proposed a No-War policy almost in terms the same as that which is contained in the Protocol at the present moment—in principle precisely the same—and it was while we were discussing the Protocol and when we knew that this was the opinion of Germany, that Germany made advances, which unfortunately could not be brought to fruition, towards joining the League.

In the same way, take the views of America. If there are two principles which you will find advocated in America they are compulsory arbitration and disarmament. Take the opinion expressed by Mr. Taft, ex-President, or the opinions expressed on the Republican side, or the opinions of Mr. Wilson, of Mr. Davis, or of any of the very numerous religious bodies in America. The one object at which they have always aimed is a No-More-War policy based on compulsory arbitration and disarmament. I have here quotations from America, but having regard to the hour I must ask your Lordships to accept that which I have stated.

There is a further curious incident. It is said that the Protocol stereotypes conditions. There is not a word in the Protocol to support a claim of that sort. Care is taken that there shall be no stereotyping of conditions. But I can go behind a mere matter of words. I am one of those who believe that the conditions left by the so-called Peace Treaties will require revision. There are only two ways in which we can nave revision: first of all by war, which would be an unthinkable evil, and secondly by assent. If you want assent and agreement, you will get it by encouraging the spirit of assent and agreement upon which the whole arrangement proposed by the Protocol is based.

One word only concerning what is known as the Japanese Amendment. I want to make this point quite clear. It is a matter in which I took a very large personal part, in co-operation with Sir Cecil Hurst. The terms ultimately adopted were settled by him and me, and if the document is still in existence it will be found that the draft was drawn by my pencil. This is what was said by Sir Cecil Hurst himself at Geneva, and disposes for ever, I think, of the difficulties of what is called the Japanese Amendment. He said:— It is the understanding of the British Delegation in accepting this amendment"— that is the amendment actually in the Protocol at the present moment— that the text now adopted, which it is proposed to add to Article 5, safeguards the right of the Council to take such action as it may deem wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations in accordance with the existing provisions of Article 11 of the Covenant. We accept it because we believe that it does not confer new powers or functions upon either the Council or the Assembly. Those powers are already defined by the Covenant as it exists to-day and we do not add to them by this text. Everybody knows the eminence of Sir Cecil Hurst. He is also a master of language, and that language expresses our view with admirable clearness, and at the same time disposes of all the objections which were raised, either through misunderstanding or misrepresentation, to what is known as the Japanese Amendment.

We were told, directly and indirectly, by mysterious paragraphs in newspapers and by all the ordinary sources of misinformation, that the Protocol would be buried at Geneva. Well, the burial service ended in a fiasco. The Protocol lives and is to be reconsidered at the next Assembly at Geneva. Whether we are party to it or not, and whether the Assembly will go on with or without us, is a matter for future consideration. I have said more than once that there is nothing sacrosanct in the details of these provisions. On the contrary, I feel quite sure that the document is capable of amendment and improvement. But in the interests of humanity and of everything that is included in the Christian doctrine of brotherhood and fellowship, I urge that if is a fatal error at this stage to condemn the Protocol root and branch. It is an honest attempt, worked out by men who gave, perhaps I may say, twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four for some weeks to start on its course a No-War policy, backed by the unanimous acceptance of the accredited Delegations at Geneva, not acting irresponsibly—that must be put on one side entirely—but acting as the accredited agents of their Governments and carrying out the instructions with which their Governments had entrusted them.

That seems to me to be how the position stands to-day. I wish well of any proposal which may possibly found a peace policy, and lead to the result of abolishing war in the future, but I do say this, that here you have the Protocol unanimously adopted, and whatever adaptation or alteration you may desire, or whatever you may consider possible in the direction of other pacts, I believe that the fundamental propositions in the Protocol are sound, and that if we are to have normal peace in the future it can only be by the institution of an international community, between the members of which disputes shall be settled under a system of law and order and without recourse to the barbarous arbitrament of war.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, no one can complain of the action of the noble and learned Lord in bringing this Question before the House. He took an active and responsible part in the preparation of the Protocol, and it is not surprising that, when it was rejected by His Majesty's present advisers, he should be disappointed, and should take an early opportunity of explaining to Parliament the arguments which weigh with him against that rejection. The noble Lord has indulged in some wide generalities about international solidarity, and matters of that kind, with which I do not propose, to-night, to deal. The field is far too wide for me to enter upon it at this hour, and indeed I shall have somewhat to compress what I have to say about the more concrete points which the noble and learned Lord has made in his speech.

I must, however, make one preliminary observation before I endeavour to come to grips with the facts. Some parts of the speech of the noble and learned Lord appeared to mo to suggest that this country, or this Government, is in some way opposed to the principle of arbitration. If the noble and learned Lord, or any one, suggests that, I am sure there is no justification for it. This country, and indeed every Government of this country in turn, has set an example in the matter of arbitration from the day of the "Alabama." case and through subsequent years.

LORD PARMOOR

Universal arbitration!

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

And we have in that matter the best possible record of an evident desire to promote the principle of voluntary arbitration. In the second place, I think my noble friend rather suggested that we were opposed to, or at all events were obstructing, the reduction of armaments. If he suggests that, again I think he is wholly without justification. The Conference at Washington, at which the force in which this country has the greatest possible interest—I mean the Navy—was primarily concerned, and at which the British representatives, including the noble Earl, Lord Balfour—who is absent from his place to-night for a reason which we well know—took a decisive part, is fresh in the memory of all of us.

LORD PARMOOR

If I may interrupt for a moment, what I said was not what the noble and learned Lord suggested, but I was on the question of a world conference.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I was coming to that. A conference on disarmament does not depend in the least upon the adoption of the Protocol. An Article of the Covenant itself contemplates constant efforts by the League and the Council of the League for the reduction of armaments, and it is as much open to the Council to call such a conference together as it would have been if the Protocol had been adopted. It is quite true that there is an Article in the Protocol to the effect that if a conference on disarmament is held, and does not arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, the Council of the League shall declare the Protocol void, but how much simpler it is for the Council of the League first to call a conference on the reduction of armaments, and then proceed to consider whether something in the nature of a Protocol is possible.

We are represented, or at all events the Foreign Secretary is represented, as having said something at Geneva in opposition to the Covenant itself. There is no foundation for any such statement. We are bound by the Covenant. We fully adhere to it. It is not we but the noble and learned Lord and his friends who seek to alter it, and to introduce into it, by means of the Protocol, a number of clauses most of which were fully considered when the Covenant was being initiated, and deliberately rejected. Yet they are revived to-day in the hope of putting them into the Covenant. If, as the noble Lord appeared to suggest in the introduction of his speech, there was nothing in the Protocol which made any great change in the Covenant, I do not think the noble and learned Lord would be so urgent in pressing it upon our attention; but in fact I think I shall be able to show that the Protocol does make serious and substantial changes in the nature and effect of the Covenant itself.

Now let me put aside all exaggerated language and ask, as simply as I can: What was the duty of the Government, when they came into office, with regard to the Protocol? This document was, as the noble and learned Lord has said, adopted by the unanimous vote of the Fifth Assembly, but it was adopted not as an operative instrument, binding upon any Power represented at that Assembly, but as a draft or provisional document for consideration by each Government at home. In fact, I think I am right in saying that the noble Lord, and his colleagues, had instructions from the late Government not to sign the Protocol, in order that it might be open for full consideration when it came over to this country.

LORD PARMOOR

There was no question, of course, of my ever signing it, but so far as the Assembly went the acceptance was complete.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

Will the noble Lord allow me to continue? I am assuming that a general vote of the Assembly was cast for the adoption of the Protocol as a draft or provisional instrument. But, however that may he, it is quite plain that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his colleagues must have examined this document when it came home, and, if they found it unsuitable to the policy of this country, they must have rejected it, just as they examined and rejected last year the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which had, in the same manner, been adopted at Geneva. The destiny of this country depended, I think, on the Government in power, whatever it might be, taking the right course on this matter, and I think our duty was absolutely clear.

First, it was surely the duty of the Government to consult our military and naval and air experts, as to the effect which the Protocol would have upon the defence of this country and of our Empire. For, after all, in spite of the generalities of the noble Lord, we have to consider the interests and the safety of our own land. I am somewhat surprised that no such consultation took place at the time when the Protocol was being negotiated. That doubtless would have been done by the late Government, had they remained in power, before they advised the ratification of the Protocol. At all events, we did, through the Committee of Imperial Defence, consult our experts, and they all of them condemned the Protocol, and their reasoning and their representations convinced us that the effect of this document would be to diminish the effectiveness for defence of our naval and military forces and, before long, to compel an increase, and not a reduction, of those forces. Were we to disregard their advice?

Secondly, it was our duty to consult the Governments of the responsible Dominions. The noble Lord has said—and, of course, I take it as absolutely true—that the representatives of the Dominions who were present at the Assembly of the League were favourable to the adoption of the Protocol. But, after all, they had no power whatever to hind their Governments at home, and I doubt whether they had time to obtain full instructions from their Governments. At all events they, like the other delegates present, only approved the Protocol as an instrument to be submitted to the Governments of the States concerned for adoption or for rejection, as the case might be. The noble Lord says: What more could be done? Well, what more could be done was this. We could consult the Governments themselves, and we did so, and, speaking broadly, with only one exception, I think—that of the Irish Free State—all the Dominion Governments disapproved the Protocol and advised that we should not accept or ratify it. Again, were we to disregard advice and opinion of that kind?

We did more. We considered, as we were bound to consider, the Protocol itself, clause by clause. Time does not allow me to attempt a detailed criticism of the several clauses of this instrument, but I should like to call the attention of the House to a few of its features. First, Articles 2 to 6 introduced the principle of compulsory arbitration—compulsory arbitration, as the noble Lord pointed out, on all points, even on the point whether the subject-matter of a dispute was, or was not, a matter of domestic concern; compulsory arbitration either through the Permanent Court of International Justice or through arbitrators selected, in default of agreement, by the Council of the League. That principle of compulsory arbitration is new in a document of this kind, and has always been rejected, not only by this country, but by the United States, which has always been favourable to arbitration as a principle. Indeed, I think I am right in saying it was condemned only last year in this House in a speech made by the noble Lord's Leader, the noble and learned Viscount who leads the Labour Party here. I am, and I think most of us are, strongly in favour of arbitration on all points which are suitable for arbitration.

But there are some matters—matters affecting the honour and the existence of a country—which are not suitable to be dealt with in that way, and which, I believe, no great Power, except under great pressure of circumstances, would agree to submit in all cases to arbitration. I do not think it would be safe for this country to give up its freedom by-agreeing in advance to submit all disputes which may arise to the arbitration either of the Council of the League or of persons selected by that Council.

Let me refer your Lordships to Article 7 of the Protocol, which provides that in the event of a dispute between any of the Signatory States, they will not, pending arbitration, make any increase of their armaments or effectives which might modify the position established by the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments,.! nor will they take any measure of military, naval, air, industrial or economic mobilisation, nor, in general, any action of a nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more acute. Just see what that means. It means that if one Power is the aggressor and the other is in danger of attack, and if the aggressor so disposes his forces that he can make an immediate attack on the other and unprepared Power, the danger of war is there, but you forbid the attacked party, even though not the aggressor in fact, to make any preparation for defence, to move a company of troops or a ship, to get ready to resist the aggression which is threatened. Under that Article the Power whose liberty is in danger, which is liable to immediate attack, cannot move a man or a ship without becoming, under the provisions of this document, the aggressor in the dispute, and open to all the severe sanctions which are provided in it.

Take another point. Take our own Empire. Our ships are scattered over the seas. This means that if we have a dispute with any Power we cannot move a ship to the point of danger. We must leave them perhaps days or weeks away in point of time, and we cannot even take the elementary measures which, time after time, we have taken. I do not wonder that this was severely criticised by the experts whom it was our duty to consult.

Now consider the later clauses of the Protocol, especially those following Article 13. In my view the document multiplies the occasions for dispute and for the use of what are called the sanctions—sanctions which, as I think I shall be able to show in a moment, may even lead to war. In this document there are new offences—failure to arbitrate, movement of troops, and many more things which, of themselves, are treated as breaches of the Covenant and as bringing into operation these sanctions. So we would have not less but more occasions on which sanctions may be brought into operation and, when they are brought into operation, this document greatly intensifies the conflict which will arise.

The Covenant rested, not wholly but mainly, on what are called economic and financial sanctions. But even the Covenant went very far, because Article 16 provides that— Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, or XV, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and"— mark this— the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. So that we are to prevent intercourse between the Covenant-breaking State and neutral countries. The Article goes on to state— It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League. So that even the Covenant itself contemplated in terms the use of armed forces.

But the Protocol goes considerably further. Article 10 provides that:— Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor. Article 11 provides— As soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 of the present Protocol, the obligations of the said States, in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant"— I agree that refers to Article 16, including the naval and military sanctions in Article 16— will immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor. Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow. Your Lordships will see what that means in the next paragraph— In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant the signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, opening of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and sea of the attacked or threatened State. If that does not mean war against the country attacked and neutral States I do not know what war means

Take, next, Article 13 which makes the thing as clear as it can be. We are told there are none but economic sanctions in the Covenant but the terms of this Article are these— In view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant and by Article 11 of the present Protocol, the Council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from States determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant and the present Protocol. Furthermore, as soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 above, the said States may, in accordance with any agreements which they may previously have con-eluded, bring to the assistance of a particular State, which is the victim of aggression, their military, naval and air forces. I challenge contradiction of the statement that these Articles show an intention to call upon and require the signatory States to come to the assistance of the League, by means of their naval, military and air forces, and that the result of so doing must needs be to put this country, or any country signatory to the Covenant which is called upon to attack in that way, in a state of war, not only with the State which is deemed to have offended, but with all those, other neutral States which do not choose to break off intercourse with that State. I see in those Articles a great danger, a real danger that the result of them may be not peace, but war.

Remember that there are signatory States all over the world. You may have a dispute breaking out in Eastern Europe, or in the Far East, or in South America, or even between the United States, not a member of the League, and some other Power. It may be the view of the Council of the League that one of the States engaged in the dispute is wrong and the other is right, and. we shall be compelled under this Protocol to accept that decision, although we have but one seat on the Council, and by that means we may be involved in hostilities of the most serious nature. Further, that may happen without the sanction of Parliament. It is rather strange that the Party of the noble and learned Lord, which claims to be a democratic Party, should propose to enter into an undertaking the effect of which, if it is signed, would be to withdraw from Parliament the power to declare or not to declare war, as the case may be.

There is only one other article in the Protocol to which I should like to draw attention; that is Article 14, which is in these terms:— The Council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be re-established. In other words, we cannot put an end to a state of war except with the sanction of the Council of the League. I call that a monstrous provision, because it withdraws from the Government of this country and from Parliament the right to be free in making peace.

Is there not some ground here for thinking that this document, if assented to by this country, would not really ensure peace, but might be a means of bringing about war? In support of that view I would like to read what was said by M. van Karnebeek, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. In a recent speech he is reported to have said: His own preference had always been for the development of the League of Nations in such a way that the coercive element should not become the axis round which the whole system would revolve. The system of the Protocol was a move in the direction of force, and His Excellency feared that, if the League was to derive its authority from coercion, the strength and prestige which it derive from the consciousness of justice, which should be its principal foundation, might perhaps be weakened. The fact is this Protocol, as has been said, marks the parting of the ways.

I have always been a supporter of the Loague of Nations as a body which, by mediation and by peaceful means, might, time after time, prevent the breaking out of war, and I sincerely believe that in that direction it has already done excellent work. But if you are going to abandon that view of the League of Nations, and to exalt it into a body that can bring in armed forces, and by those armed forces seek to compel peace, then you are entering upon a road the end of which you cannot foresee.

If that was our view of the Protocol, it was surely right that we should not keep the other States in suspense as to the action which this country would take. It would not have been a wise and right course for us to delay any announcement, or to endeavour to tinker with an instrument which, in its essence, we felt we were bound to reject. Nor do I think it would have been any good to proceed with the appointment, to which my noble friend referred, of a member on the proposed Committee which was to amend the Covenant by reference to a document which we did not propose to accept. I am sure we did the right thing in saying at once, and clearly, that we could not approve the Protocol, and would seek some other road to attain the object. That was the view which Mr. Chamberlain took at Geneva.

I think too little attention may have been paid to the concluding sentence of the declaration which was made by the Foreign Secretary at Geneva. He pointed out, as an alternative to the adoption of the Protocol, the possibility of the conclusion, in concert with our Allies, of one of those regional arrangements which are contemplated by the Covenant itself—arrangements of a purely defensive character, entered into and worked in harmony with the League. I have no time, nor is this the occasion, on which to develop that suggestion, but I have ventured to call your Lordships' attention to what the Foreign Secretary said in that connection. For myself I cherish an earnest hope that it may be the duty of this Government not to pledge this country to police the world, but, by some prudent and well-considered step, taken nearer home and within the range of our resources, to make some progress towards establishing a feeling of real security. With regard to Papers, I have only to say that I am afraid there are no Papers which can, in accordance with precedent and the interests of the public, be laid at the present time. I hope that the noble Lord will be satisfied with my assurance on that point, and will not press for Papers.

LORD PARMOOR

My Lords, of course I will not press the Motion for the production of Papers after what the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has stated, but I should like to say one or two words in reference to what he said about the detailed provisions of the Protocol. I said at the outset that I did not propose to go into the detailed provisions and I only propose to say a word upon them at the present moment. While we were at Geneva we had a special representative sent to us from the Navy. We met the objections. Mr. Henderson, my colleague, explained more fully than I did, because he took the leading part in the Commission, why their views as regards Articles 7 and 8 were not justified. I have always felt as regards Articles 7 and 8 that, if they are capable of the interpretation which has been suggested, they ought certainly to be modified in the sense of it being made quite clear that they could not have any such interpretation.

The idea that the League, or the Council of the League, has armed forces at its disposal is quite a fallacy, if I may say so with respect to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack. It was made quite clear, I think, in what I stated that any suggestion of an executive force being at the disposal of the League or the Council of the League was a complete misunderstanding. What, in fact, is done is something very different indeed. It is this. Members of the League undertake to support the Covenant of the League in reference to which they have undertaken obligations. What is called the economic section and the military section both exist in the Covenant, and exist at the present moment. All those fears which the noble and learned Viscount has suggested are fears which arise in connection with obligations that we have already undertaken, in terms, in the provisions of the Covenant itself, and what we desired to do in the Protocol was to reduce those commitments to a minimum.

When the noble and learned Viscount says they go direct to the question of disarmament, well and good. If that could be done, I should be an ardent supporter, but I do not think it can be done. It can only be done through the medium of the League and on the terms and conditions to which the Assembly itself has assented. That, of course, is the method of the Protocol. I do not want to go into other matters, except this: that it surely is a fundamental error, having regard to the terms of the Covenant, to suggest that a scheme, the objective of which is disarmament, will increase the risk of war or the size of armaments. Those are the two points to which the noble and learned Viscount referred. I do not wish to reargue this question at this time of night. The matter has been well put by Lord Buckmaster and Sir Frederick Pollock when they said that the fears expressed are entirely unfounded. I hope it will never be thought that these difficulties, if they arise at all, arise from the Protocol. They are fundamentally existent in the conditions of the Covenant itself. I thank the Lord Chancellor for the very courteous reply he has given me, and I hope that as the matter is better understood opinion will rally strongly in favour of the Protocol.

House adjourned at twenty minutes before eight o'clock.