SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE. (Hansard, 14 July 1924)

HL Deb 14 July 1924 vol 58 cc498-520 498

§ THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW had the following Notice on the Paper:—

§ To ask His Majesty's Government—

1. Whether it is intended by sale or otherwise to dispose of any of the plant or materials collected for the purpose of constructing Naval Works at Singapore;
2. Whether any orders for such plant or materials have been cancelled;
3. Whether, in view of the statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 18th March, he can state when His Majesty's Government intend to reconsider the question of developing the Naval Base at Singapore;

and to move for Papers.

§ The noble Marquess said: My Lords, I put down the Question which appears in my name upon the Paper mainly because of an advertisement which appeared originally in the Straits Times of Singapore on May 1, and was copied in various papers in this country, announcing that certain material which, as it appears from the advertisement, had been collected in that region for the purpose of constructing naval works, was for sale. This announcement caused no little concern in the minds of many persons in this country and in the Dominions, as was evidenced by various letters that were written to the Press. I think this uneasiness was caused mainly because it had been understood that the decision of the Government not to go forward with the extension of the naval works at Singapore had not been a final decision. There was no statement, either in this House or in another place, to the effect that the scheme had been finally abandoned, but the advertisement of material, which appears to be material of a non-perishable nature, as being for sale not unnaturally gave rise to the view that His Majesty's Government no longer thought it likely that they, or their successors, might have to reconsider the decision, and that they had consequently decided to dispose of the material.

§ An examination of the statement made by the Prime Minister in another place shows quite plainly that in his mind, on March 18, there was no finality about the decision. Indeed, he made it perfectly plain on that occasion that there were circumstances in his mind which, if they came about, might make it essential for this country to proceed with the completion of the base as originally contemplated. If the First Lord of the Admiralty will turn to column 324 of Volume 171 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of House of Commons debates he will see that the Prime Minister, on March 18, in using figurative language in which he assumes that he is facing the representative 500 of a foreign Power with which he desires to make an agreement, pictures himself as saying:— 'I come to make an agreement with you, and if I cannot get it, I will have to begin developing my base.' And then, almost half-way down column 325 of the same number of the OFFICIAL REPORT, the Prime Minister says: … if we fail— that is, if we fail in the negotiations— then we shall fail, and this nation will. unfortunately, have to go back to other considerations. These passages show quite plainly that the Prime Minister contemplated at least the possibility of failure, and in the circumstances, if the inference which I have drawn from the advertisement is sound, I cannot but think that the decision to sell any of the material collected for the purpose of constructing a base was a most unwise one.

§ I do not intend to detain the House at any length this afternoon. No one places a higher value upon the time of your Lordships' House than I, and I do not, therefore, propose to traverse at all the ground covered by the long discussion which your Lordships had, some time ago, on the general question of the advisability of constructing naval works at Singapore. It is sufficient to recall that from this side of the House it was contended, and contended, I think, with unanswerable force, that there was not the slightest reason to suppose that the cessation of work on the Singapore naval base would make the very least difference to any negotiations likely to be undertaken. But His Majesty's Government took another view. They decided to make this gesture, as it has been called, to try the experiment, and they thought it worth while to sacrifice the very corner stone of British naval policy in the Far East, in the hopes that by so doing they might make it more easy to negotiate some agreement with some foreign Power.

§ I put down the last part of my Question in the form in which it appears on the Paper because I wish, if I can, to persuade the noble Viscount opposite to reassure us on a very essential point. With many others, I deplore the decision to delay the completion of the naval base at Singapore, but I recognise that the decision has been taken. That decision 501 has been taken, I understand, subject to the condition that if the agreement which it is sought to attain is not attained then the decision will be reversed, and the base completed; but we have never been told—this is really the important point—what agreement it is which it is sought to make. We have never been told whether the negotiations have been commenced with a view to obtaining such an agreement, and we have never been told whether there has been the slightest response from any other Power in the Orient, to indicate that this immense sacrifice has been made to any good purpose whatever.

§ I desire, without another word of comment, to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty to tell the House and the country just what agreement it is that it is sought to make: when he hopes that negotiations if not already opened, may be opened; and what, in short, is to be the test of the policy of His Majesty's Government—the test by which it may be possible to say on this side of the House that we were, wrong and noble Lords opposite were right; the test, on the other hand, which may show a result which will justify those who think with me in this matter, that His Majesty's Government have by their decision not to proceed with this essential work condemned this country and this Empire to a growing impotence in a part of the world in which our interests and our duty alike make if imperative that we should be strong. I beg to ask the Questions which stand in my name, and to move for Papers.

§ THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD)
My Lords, I am extremely obliged to the noble Marquess who has put this Question for following what is a very rare practice in this House and confining his remarks to the terms of his Questions on the Paper. I will follow the terms of those Questions in my reply. I think you may take it, in the first place, that there has been no change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government laid down what their policy was. It is a policy with which you may agree or disagree, hut it is a policy which was quite clear and intelligible, and no change in that policy is indicated by the advertisement to which the noble Marquess referred, with regard to the sale of material.
502 May I first deal with the first Question? When the Government made its decision, the question, of course, arose as to what was to be done with the plant or materials which had been collected for the purpose of constructing the naval works at Singapore. The noble Marquess would, I think, in his remarks, lead your Lordships to suppose that this plant and material are entirely of a non-perishable character, but I am informed that there is no plant or material which in the climate of Singapore suffers no deterioration if it is allowed to go untended. Of course, we could have left it there, as the noble Marquess, I presume, would suggest, but we felt that if we did leave it there it might seriously deteriorate. Let me distinguish between plant and material which are distinguished in the Question. The plant, I believe, is approximately of the value of £22,000, and to that has to be added the cost of freight, making approximately £27,000. It consists of cranes, boilers, pumps, boring gear, electrical apparatus and the like. I may say, with regard to these particular items, that the Admiralty has a large stock of similar materials in hand at home in excess of requirements, and so a discretionary power was given to the officers concerned, that they might sell locally such plant as could be disposed of at a reasonable price, and the remainder was to be stored.
The cost of returning that plant to England would have been considerable, as the noble Marquess may see from the figures I have given to him of expenditure upon freight, and had it been returned it would merely have gone to swell the surplus stock at present in our hands. I may say that there is no real market in the East for such plant and materials. I am informed that recently some big company, which was engaging presumably in mining operations, was closing down its works and attempted to sell its materials in the East. It had very little success, and had to ship them home. So we are not, as a matter of fact, likely to be able to dispose of the plant in the East at what we say we must have—namely, a reasonable price. As a matter of fact, we have disposed of items of plant to the amount of £2,500, which if required at any time could easily be replaced from the stock that we possess at home. 503 Coming to materials, these consist, in the main, of water pipes and their fittings. They are of the value of about £20,000, with the addition of £4,000 for freight. We have received an offer from the Municipality of Singapore of £1,700 for some small portion, and that offer is now under consideration. Perhaps I have been able to satisfy the noble Marquess that the arrangement we have entered into is a businesslike arrangement. Stock is likely to deteriorate in that damp climate. It can be replaced in a very few weeks from home if it be necessary to replace it, and when one comes to compare a period of a few weeks, for shipping any additional plant out to Singapore, with the nine years which it was contemplated it would take to complete the Singapore development, I think it is not an unreasonable procedure which we, have adopted with regard to the plant and materials. With regard to the noble Marquess's second Question, in which he asks whether any orders for the plant and materials have been cancelled, I am informed that no orders have been cancelled.
Coming now to the third Question, the noble Marquess has given the House an accurate representation of what the Prime Minister said in another place with regard to our policy. I will adopt his quotation. I have not verified it, but I presume the noble Marquess was careful in verifying his quotations— … if we fail, we shall fail, and we shall have to go hack to other considerations. That policy still holds. If the policy of appeasement, which the Prime Minister adumbrated in another place, were to fail, we shall then have to go back to the consideration of the Singapore base. There has been no change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government with regard to that statement, which was made in both Houses on March 18.
The noble Marquess goes on to ask whether, in view of the statement by the Prime Minister, the Government intend to reconsider the question of developing the Singapore base. With regard to that, I may say that it is a very difficult problem which we have to face, and we have been exploring the situation ever since the decision was made on March 18. I may say quite frankly that even to-day there was a meeting of those who are concerned in the matter, to consider how best the 504 Prime Minister's policy might be carried into effect. In that way I hope I can satisfy the noble Marquess that we are not standing still, but that we are endeavouring to see in what manner the Prime Minister's policy can be brought to a practical conclusion. But it is certainly impossible to answer, and I think it is unreasonable to ask me now, whether I can state an exact date when His Majesty's Government intend to reconsider the question of developing the naval base at Singapore.

THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW
But approximately?

§ VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD
I do not think I can even give an approximate date. I am afraid I must state that quite definitely. We are exploring the situation, and, as soon as we have been able to make up our mind as to the method of approach with regard to this difficult question, we shall make the approaches which the Prime Minister indicated in his statement on March 18. This cannot be an approach to one party alone. The Washington Pact must, of itself, make any Conference that may take place necessarily a Conference of more than two Powers. At the Washington Conference, at which the noble Earl (Lord Balfour) was present, there were, I fancy, as many as five Powers represented. That, in itself, shows that it would be necessary to approach more than one Power with regard to the policy adumbrated by the Prime Minister.
I think that is all the reply I have to make, but I must say frankly that it is impossible at the present moment to indicate the time when His Majesty's Government intend to reconsider the question of developing the naval base at Singapore. That must depend upon conditions which are beyond the control of His Majesty's Government at the present moment. I can only add that the Government are proceeding in the matter, and that as soon as it is possible to lay any policy before Parliament I am sure they will do so.

§ VISCOUNT LONG OF WRAXALL
My Lords, when I was at the Admiralty, not very long ago, this matter was considered in the gravest and most anxious manner, and before I went to the Admiralty it was considered—as, I submit, it should have 505 been considered in this case—not only by His Majesty's Government here, but in actual council with the Governments of the Dominions overseas. It was considered in the way it ought to be, because it is an Empire question, not a question which alone concerns the British Navy, or British interests here. I concur with What the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, has said. The impression left on the minds of the majority of us after the debate in another place, and after the decision of the Government had been announced, was that the matter was not finally decided, and that the mere fact that it was not proposed to remove some of the necessary plant which had been taken to Singapore showed that it was intended to reconsider the matter at no distant date. The noble Viscount has now put the finishing touch to the whole question.
He says he cannot tell us even when the date will approach for reconsideration of the matter. All of us who are familiar with the way in which these things are treated by Governments know perfectly well that, so far as this Government are concerned, they have put the thing entirely from them, and we must regard it as a res acta, a thing settled definitely by this Government—that they are not going to proceed with this new base at Singapore. From what I have heard, ever since the so-called decision was announced in the other place, and from what I know of the proceedings which took place when I was at the Colonial Office and at the Admiralty, this will be a very severe blow to our Dominions in the East. Both Australia and New Zealand will regard it as a definite declaration by the Government here that they are not going to accept that part of their Imperial responsibility which consists in taking care that adequate arrangements are made for our defence and protection in the event of trouble arising in the Near East.
I have no means of knowing what the present state of things is in those waters. I know what it was when I was at the Colonial Office. The Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand brought us information which was not at that time, so far as I am aware, known to the Admiralty, and which certainly was not known to the Colonial Office—information as to the condition of things obtaining 506 in some of these islands in the Mid-Pacific, and it showed us that it was necessary that we should take definite steps, and before very long. So far as I know—no statement has been made to the contrary—the decision at which you definitely arrive now, the final decision, has been made without consultation with the Governments chiefly concerned.

§ VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD
May I correct the noble Viscount at once? Before the debate took place on March 18 the Governments of the Dominions had been consulted, and they were told. A White Paper was published giving the correspondence that had passed between His Majesty's Government and the Dominion Governments.

§ VISCOUNT LONG OF WRAXALL
I am well aware of that. The Governments were consulted—in other words, they were informed that it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to make this change, and they were asked if they would like to express their views. What were their views? Did the Governments in the Far East concur in the action of His Majesty's Government at that time? Did they believe, as we believed here, that the decision was one which would not be regarded as final but that it was taken in existing circumstances and would be reconsidered at no distant date? Do they agree with the decision of His Majesty's Government here that this base is to be abandoned practically for all time?

§ VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD
That is not the policy of His Majesty's Government. I said quite distinctly that the policy is exactly the same, but that that particular condition on which the Prime Minister said that the policy would be reconsidered has not arisen, because we have not yet been able to get into such touch with other foreign Governments as would enable us to say that our policy has been a failure. We are exploring the whole situation at the present moment, and, of course, as soon as we have got into touch and have had our policy either accepted or rejected, then we shall be in a position to state to the House what our policy is.

§ VISCOUNT LONG OF WRAXALL
I can only say that anything more unsatisfactory I never heard in my life. If His Majesty's 507 Government, and the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in particular, are able to derive any satisfaction or comfort from the extraordinarily vague announcement he has made to us, all I can say is that they are possessed of a very sanguine temperament. At all events, I am unable, and those who agree with me are unable, to share their views. The proposals that the late Government made were deliberately so arranged as to extend over a period of ten years, as the noble Viscount knows very well. It was not proposed to do all this work at once. He said, in the course of his remarks just now, that it was calculated that it would take ten years to complete these works. Yet we are told now, after one of those years has gone, that the Government of to-day do not even know when it is likely that they will be in a position to reconsider this matter.
The noble Viscount tells us that is not a definite turning down of the whole question. I should like very much to know what view is taken by the Governments of New Zealand and Australia upon this particular question, and whether they regard the decision of the Government as one which is likely to give them any comfort. From all I hear they take a precisely opposite view. When I talk about the Governments of the Empire being consulted I do not mean the process which has been adopted by the Government on this occasion. I do not mean telling them that it was likely to adopt a particular policy and asking them whether they had anything to say about it. I mean consulting them well in advance and listening and paying full attention to their opinions and anxieties. That is what I call consulting the other Governments of the Dominions, and I should like very much to know whether His Majesty's Government could tell us anything about the replies received from the Oversea Governments, particularly from the two Governments specially concerned in these Pacific questions, and whether His Majesty's Government have had any reply which looks as though those Governments were prepared to accept with patience and without grave misgiving and dissatisfaction the announcement that has been made to-day.
I shall be very much surprised if we do not find that they are entirely opposed to 508 the policy of His Majesty's Government and that they will regard the announcement to-day, when they read it, as making it clear that all the hopes they had (and they had some faint hopes) must now be abandoned. We may be confident that at all events for years to come this policy is to be a thing of the past, which means drifting for years. That is what my noble friend and the Government call keeping a policy still alive. It may be alive, but it is the sort of life I should not care to live.

§ THE EARL OF BALFOUR
My Lords, I am sorry that I could not be here—I was kept away by a public engagement—during the speech of my noble friend the Marquess of Linlithgow, and I certainly should not have intervened at the tail end of the debate except for some observations that fell from the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the course of that part of his speech which I was fortunate enough to hear. I do not pronounce upon the full interpretation of that speech. My noble friend who has just sat down is clear that to all intents and purposes it meant a negation of the policy which we on this side of the House have consistently recommended, and which is undoubtedly in conformity with the earnest views of all our Dominions and all our interests in that part of the world, including, I suspect, the great Dependancy which the noble Viscount knows so well—our Indian Empire.
I do not rise to try to form an estimate of what is probably quite inestimable—namely, the intentions of His Majesty's Government upon this point. I rise rather to ask what is meant by a phrase that fell more than once. I think, from the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty. He more than once talked about the, necessity of consulting certain foreign Powers in connection with this. I was, I suppose, more closely connected than any living man with all the transactions that have a bearing upon the Singapore question that took place at Washington, and I am unable to put the smallest significant meaning upon the statement as to the foreign nations that have to be consulted. Is it one, of the great naval Powers in the Pacific? Does the noble Lord refer to the great naval Powers in the Pacific?

509

§ VISCOCNT CHELMSFORD
I do not know whether the noble Earl would prefer that I should answer that at once. When the Washington Pact was entered into, I understand that the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy were all represented at the Conference which resulted in that Pact. If anything of a similar nature were to be regarded as the means of proceeding with the Prime Minister's policy it would almost necessarily be the case that those same Powers should be brought into conference again. Whether that is going to be the case or not I do not say at the moment; but I think it must almost necessarily be the case that those same Powers who were parties to that Washington Pact would again come into conference if there was any extension of that Washington Pact.

§ THE EARL OF BALFOUR
The noble Viscount really seems to suppose that the fortification or the turning into a naval base of Singapore has something to do with the other Powers who were parties to the Washington Pact. I can assure him that it has nothing whatever to do with them. You might as well consult the foreign Powers concerned as to any change you made in the fortifications of Plymouth or Portsmouth. Singapore was deliberately left outside—

§ VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD
Yes.

§ THE EARL OF BALFOUR
—and knowingly left outside that sphere of the Pacific Ocean in which, I quite agree, all the Powers the noble Viscount named are more or less concerned. Primarily, of course, it is the United States of America and Japan which are concerned with the Pacific area. The noble Viscount is right in saying that Italy and France have also quite distinctive rights, claims and interests, and I would not exclude Holland, with whom, although not a party to the Pact, we kept in touch in regard to her interests within that sphere. But all that relates to the Pacific Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean alone. I agree that if somebody looks at the map he could draw the boundaries of the Pacific Ocean along many lines differing from each other and yet all plausibly defining the area which can properly be described as the Pacific Ocean. This was not left to stray definitions. This was not a matter which was to be decided by somebody taking down a large map of 510 the Pacific Ocean and saying: "Where shall I draw the boundary on its western side?" The boundary was drawn with the utmost precision. It was drawn in a manner about which no mistake is possible. It was drawn in a manner about which every sailor—American, Japanese, French, Italian—would be absolutely agreed. The line of longitude was unmistakably drawn cm the map to exclude, and was meant to exclude, Singapore.
If that be true, why are we to bring in other nations with regard to our own private affairs more in the case of Singapore than in the case of any other of the naval bases in which, from our very position, we are so profoundly interested? It is not as if Singapore, do what you will, could be a threat to any of these nations. I am sure none of these nations has every cherished the idea for an instant that anything we could do at Singapore either was intended to be a menace, or could be an effective menace, against any of their interests. On the contrary, they know perfectly well, as your Lordships know, as the Government know, as the country know, as all our Allies and friends know, the British Fleet is one of the great securities for the peace of the world. The British Fleet can only be a security for the peace of the world if you give it the means of operating effectively. It cannot operate effectively in the Pacific unless you make Singapore a naval base, and if you exclude the Pacific from the area in which the British Fleet is effective you exclude one of the greatest instruments we possess for maintaining world peace.
I am sorry that the Government have entered upon this policy. I should almost guess that they had perhaps committed themselves to an anti-Singapore policy before they knew all the facts, and before they were in a position really to estimate what place in our system of defence Singapore possessed, and the effect the policy would produce upon our great Dependencies and self-governing communities, to whom you have not been very kind in the course of your administration. Having, unfortunately, committed themselves in ignorance to this most unhappy policy, the Government are now seeking for some method of extricating themselves from a difficulty which need never have arisen. I do not wish harshly to criticise anything that 511 they have done. I admit that they came in under difficult circumstances. I admit that perhaps anybody, merely considering with insufficient knowledge the expenditure of £11,000,000, or whatever the sum may be, on a fortified base, might be allowed to hesitate. I do not wish to make the part of the Government more difficult if there is the least hope of their doing anything to retrace the unfortunate step they have taken, and annul the unhappy impression which unquestionably has been produced on Australia and New Zealand.
If they will do that, they will not find in me at least a harsh critic, but if they are going to wait until four or five other Powers who have nothing whatever to do with the matter are consulted—well, it is a new Conference, I suppose, and Conferences are an unhappy necessity, but I should think that they were such an unhappy necessity that no Government would be anxious unnecessarily to multiply them. If that be so—and I think there is probably no one on the Bench opposite who will deny that it will be so—they are surely committing a great error when they drag into a subject which in no way concerns them our nearest Allies and our dearest friends. It is a matter solely between us and our great Dominions. I trust that what has fallen from my noble friend behind me may be unduly pessimistic, that his interpretation of the Government action may be unnecessarily harsh, and I can assure them, for my part, that if I see the smallest sign of their taking what I conceive to be the right way they shall have every assistance that I am in a position to give them.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR
My Lords, the noble Earl who has just sat down is a master of dialetical skill, and he has succeeded in diverting the discussion to a variety of points. I will make him the fullest present of this—that Singapore is wholly outside the boundary line fixed at the Washington Conference. It was carefully expressed to be outside. I think the noble Earl himself has told us that that decision was come to not only with the assent of the American representatives at the Conference but also with that of the representative of Japan itself. I make the noble Earl the fullest present of that. The boundary line laid down at the Washington Conference has nothing to do 512 with the decision to which the Government came. Nor is it our case that Australia and New Zealand are pleased with the decision to which His Majesty's Government have come. We know they are not pleased with it. We have their declarations in the correspondence which was laid before Parliament some time ago. The decision is one which affects the Empire as a whole, and one which deeply concerns the future of the Empire as a whole. If we could do so we should be only too glad to fall in with the wishes of Australia and New Zealand. But this is a vital matter to the whole Empire. It is not one to be determined merely by whether a certain place is outside the boundary line or not. It is a very much greater question than that.
It is, first: What would be the effect, upon the broad, general foreign policy of His Majesty's Government of establishing a new base in the East, which would be a base of offence, whether we wished it or not, just as much as it would be a base (or even more so) for defence? The noble Earl knows something of Singapore, He has studied it, and I have studied it closely also. What would be the result of a naval base at Singapore? We should have to keep a Fleet there. If you are merely considering what is in the interests of the British Navy and what would be the best step to make the British Navy the most effective instrument possible in the Pacific, by all means have a great naval base in the East, and I think probably Singapore is the most convenient place for it.
But we can buy that instrument at too great a price. I said just now that you could not have a naval base at Singapore which was merely defensive. It is essential that it should be a great instrument of offensive possibility. It would be something which would dominate the whole Pacific, and which would make an alteration in the strategical balance of the world. There is no getting out of that. I have worked it out on paper. You would have a base from which you could conduct the most far-reaching operations. From one point of view that may be very desirable. It would afford a complete defence to Australia and New Zealand. But it would do that and it would do other things. It would do them at a cost, and the cost would be that you could not reconcile this new position which it is suggested you should take up 513 with the broad principle of foreign policy which the King's Government is endeavouring at present to pursue. We may fail, but we are trying to make the world rather better than it is at present. A notable advance in this direction was made in the Conference at Washington, in which the noble Earl took so distinguished a part. It may never be a question of the six Powers in the Pacific; such a question may never arise. But it is a question whether you can get such international relations as will enable Singapore to be much less important than it appears to be in the minds of some people at the moment and make all these things of less account.
Let me give an illustration? A Conservative Government was in office in the year 1903, and they removed garrisons from Canada. It was a systematic policy. It was not thought necessary for us to make provision for defending Canada against the United States, or against any other enemy, and one very good reason was that there was a frontier line of four thousand miles which you could not defend in the least. The course of events has shown that that policy was wise. It was not a question as to whether it would be at any time necessary for us to take offensive measures, and whether we should take them was another question. The point was that the Conservative Government took the better way: they removed these garrisons from the frontier line, with the result that there has ever since been the best of feeling on the point between the United States and this country. That is only an illustration of the kind of thing we are dealing with here. I know it does not appeal to the noble Viscount (Lord Long). He has other ideas about foreign policy: and a different idea as to how to avert war.
Our policy is to keep up the Fleet, to make the Navy efficient. Whatever we may decide to have in our military and naval organisations they must be efficient and we shall endeavour to keep them efficient. But the proposition to develop the Singapore base is a proposition which goes far beyond keeping up efficiency. You add a new weapon which we never had before and which we may never need to have, and by which this nation may be able to impose its will in the Pacific Ocean. Our policy may fail. I know it does not commend itself to some of your Lordships, but it is the policy of the 514 Government and one which we mean to carry forward. We are trying our best to bring about peace all over the world. That does not mean that we do not intend to keep the Navy efficient, but it does mean that we do not intend to put a new weapon into our hand which may be looked upon with suspicion by others.
The noble Earl said that nobody regards the British Fleet as other than an instrument which exists for the peace of the world: it is the police of the world. That is perfectly true, but are we so destitute of imagination as to think that if we made the Fleet, in the very position and place in which it was, a powerful weapon of offence and able to dominate the whole Pacific, it would be still regarded in the same way? That is not our notion of foreign policy, and I think a complete misconception of the situation is involved in the question of the noble Marquess. How can we give any indication as to when our policy is going to succeed, or fail; or how soon it will succeed, or fail? The Question on the Paper is one which does not admit of any answer. It may be that our policy will not succeed, but we shall know sometime beforehand whether it is likely to succeed or not, and therefore be in a position to take what steps may be necessary to reverse decisions at Singapore and other parts of the world. At present we hope it will not be necessary to reverse any such decision, but an already complex and difficult situation would be accentuated if the Government at this, time gave any indication such as is suggested by the Question.

§ VISCOUNT PEEL
My Lords, I have listened with great interest to the discussion and also to the interpretation that has been put upon the observations made by the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty. I notice that the attitude of the noble Viscount opposite is entirely thrown over by the Lord Chancellor. In a few rather caustic sentences ho pushed aside entirely the idea that this was a matter to be dealt with by the Powers represented at the Conference at Washington; and I am not surprised that he did so. I was astonished to hear the observations of the noble Viscount, having myself listened to a statement by his own Prime Minister, in which the Prime Minister stated that it was perfectly clear that this matter was entirely outside the Conference at Washington. 515 The noble Viscount opposite has not properly studied the statement of his own Prime Minister. But after listening to the Lord Chancellor I have come to the conclusion that the prognostications of my noble friend, Viscount Long of Wraxall, were right.
What is the defence put forward? What does the Lord Chancellor say about this base at Singapore? He entirely threw over the idea that in the time to come something might be done to develop a base at Singapore. He attacked the proposal on principle. According to him it was a most monstrous thing to suggest that we should have what is called an offensive base from which we could threaten the Pacific. It is clear that whatever may be the result of the Conference, which we are told is going to take place, the Lord Chancellor himself is opposed to the principle of the base at Singapore. I dare say that the noble Marquess could tell your Lordships better than I can what is the precise difference between an offensive and a defensive base, because I suppose that every base that is defensive could be used for offensive purposes. But I do not quite understand what we were going to threaten. Reference has been made over and over again to the distance between the base at Singapore and Japan, and I wish to know, if the noble Viscount fears the dangers that might arise from an offensive base at Singapore, what are the Powers that are threatened. I am afraid that on the whole the noble Viscount, Lord Long, is right, and that the noble and learned Viscount and the Government are entirely opposed to any base at all.
What is the position, as suggested by the noble Earl behind me, of India and our different Possessions in the Pacific? The question—and it has been debated over and over again—was not that of having an offensive or defensive base, a base which might threaten other Powers; the question was that, if you were going to have a Navy and if that Navy was to be effective, you ought at least to make that Navy mobile and not paralyse those ships which you did keep and make it impossible to retain your position in the future, both in Indian waters and in Eastern waters. I am afraid that the Government have made their position only too plain. The speech that we have 516 heard from the noble and learned Viscount was one of pure pacificism, and, if it were followed out logically, you would have no defensive forces at all to maintain the strength and position of our Empire.

§ EARL STANHOPE
My Lords, may I make two quotations from speeches made by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack? This is not a new policy; it is a policy of waiting to see what other nations are going to do, and we have had it all before. The noble and learned Viscount made a speech almost identical in phraseology with that which he has made this evening. It was made in this House in April, 1911, and I should like to quote from it. The noble and learned Viscount said on that occasion:— So far as the rest of the world is concerned the peoples of all lands are beginning to show signs of a desire that this tremendous burden of armaments should, if possible, be diminished rather than increased. Is this, then, the time when, if you take the standard of the reasonably probable, it is desirable to take the step that we are asked to take? And if you take the standard of the logically possible what an example we should be setting to other nations at a time when, as we all hope, we are seeing a real beginning in a new movement for the world's peace. That was in 1911. What is the result of the policy of the Government of that day? I was on military duty outside your Lordships' House on November 11, 1914, the occasion of the opening of Parliament by the King. The troops that were lining the streets on that occasion had to hurry back to barracks in order to hand over their rifles and equipment to the draft which left for France that night and which I rejoined in France the next morning.
I would tell your Lordships another result. I came and made a speech in this House early in 1915 in which I drew your Lordships' attention to the terrible lack of ammunition for our Forces at the front. I did not tell your Lordships on that occasion—I could not—that one of the reasons that impelled me to make that speech was that I had recently read a memorandum signed by the Chief of the General Staff in France, just at the conclusion of the second battle of Ypres, in which he stated that it was well-known to all ranks how great was the shortage of ammunition at the beginning of the war, how ammunition was being made in a hurry to be used at the front, and that 517 ammunition made in a hurry was often defective: and the troops were asked to withstand the casualties inflicted by our own defective ammunition with the same fortitude as they withstood the casualties inflicted by the enemy.
I have not risen in order to attack the noble and learned Viscount in this matter. The noble and learned Viscount did a great deal in the reorganisation of the Army, and the nation has every right to be grateful to him for his services. But I do rise to point out that the Government of that day may very possibly, for all I know, have refused the repeated and urgent requests of the noble and learned Viscount for adequate ammunition, and that the result of the Government of that day refusing to provide that necessary equipment may have been the loss of valuable lives at the front.
I have one further quotation from a speech of the noble and learned Viscount which I should like to give your Lordships. It is from a speech which he made after the war, when the noble and learned Viscount, like many of us, had learned something from that great struggle, and it was made in the course of a debate in your Lordships' House in which the question of the Committee of Imperial Defence was being discussed. The noble and learned Viscount said this:— I may be asked, however, why, in a time of profound peace, it is necessary to ask your Lordships to entertain such a subject. … We have only to look at the newspapers every morning to see that the world is still full of explosive material. Where it may explode, and how, no one can tell. We hope that it will not explode; but if ever there was a time when the work of the Staff mind was necessary, when it was essential that there should he continuous and anxious observation of what is going on in new quarters, and study of the new problems— more difficult because they are more vague and more contingent—it is to-day. The sky is, relatively speaking, very clear at this moment. We have had experience of that before. Who can tell when the sky may become clouded? I am not asking your Lordships to contemplate making expenditure upon new naval or military forces; what I am asking you to do is at least to see that the requisite study is devoted to these contingencies lest they should possibly mature and we should find ourselves unprepared in the face of what we have not thought out. Singapore is not an increase of naval and military forces. It is because we know, from that which has been said by the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the 518 Admiralty, and from other sources, that all the experts of the Government have agreed that Singapore is necessary for the defence of our far-flung Dominions and for our trade, that we ask the Government not to allow this matter to go into a policy of drift, as the Government allowed the defences of this country to go into a policy of drift before the war, but, if they cannot get—I was going to say an immediate, but at any rate a definite—agreement with other Powers, to push, on with this very necessary provision for the defence of the Empire.

THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW
My Lords, I do not propose to detain your Lordships for more than another moment or two, but some of the observations that have fallen from the First Lord of the Admiralty and from the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack have been so astonishing as to justify me in attempting some reply. I understand that the position of the Admiralty and of the Government in the matter of the disposal of the material collected may be shortly put thus: Nothing is being done which would in any substantial degree delay the completion of the works at Singapore if the policy of His Majesty's Government comes at any time to be reversed. That, I think, is a fair statement of the position.

§ VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD
We believe so.

THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW
The noble Viscount answers that the Government believe that to be the position. I hope it is. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack appears to regard this matter in rather a different light from that in which, according to his speech in the House of Commons on March 18, the Prime Minister sees it. Apparently, the Prime Minister is conscious that the soundness or otherwise of the decision to delay the completion of the base ought to be tested soon, because in his speech I notice that he said this country has a short time, and I am afraid it is only going to be a short time, during which it can rest absolutely sure that there will be no war that will overtake it within a certain limited number of years. That is his view, and with the knowledge that the base cannot be completed, say, within ten years, I am astonished that the Prime Minister himself is able to accept 519 responsibility for a policy which, if words mean anything, has been explained to us in this House to-day as the shelving of this question for an indefinite period.
But when the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack tells us that what we are asking for in regard to the naval works at Singapore is a new weapon with which we may dominate the Pacific, it is hardly in accordance with the facts. In the first place it is not a new weapon. He knows well that, in the period before the concentration of the Fleet in the North Sea against the German menace, there was something called a Pacific squadron, and he knows that Hong Kong in those days was capable of docking our largest ships. Hong Kong is no longer capable of docking our largest ships, and all we ask for in pressing the urgency of the completion of this base, is something at Singapore which can do for modern capital ships that which Hong Kong could do for capital ships at the time of which the noble Viscount was speaking.
There is nothing new asked for, and when we are told that the base at Singapore is going to put in this country's hands a weapon capable of dominating the Pacific, I retort that the distance from Singapore to Japan is some three thousand miles, about the same as the distance of the shores of this country from those of America; and if we are to be told that the construction of naval works at this or that point on the coast of Great Britain is going to enable us to dominate the Atlantic and America, I answer that such a view takes no cognisance whatever of the limits imposed by the steaming radius of modern ships. I do not propose, having regard; to the business which still remains on the Paper, to detain you for more than a moment. I would only say this, that the result of the discussion this evening has been to make this much perfectly plain: no definite agreement is in contemplation by His Majesty's Government, as the prize to be won by the sacrifice which has been made; no negotiations have been opened, and we are not to be told when those negotiations are to be started.
I would wish to follow a good example in these matters, and say nothing about foreign policy, or about the conduct of foreign affairs by the Secretary of State, 520 the Prime Minister, which could be in any way regarded as an unfair attack upon that Minister or his policy. I have, however, in this matter of the Singapore base, an uncomfortable feeling that the country has not been treated fairly. I may be wrong, but the impression left on my mind is that this gesture is far more a gesture to the extreme supporters of the Labour party in this country than it is a gesture to this or that foreign Power. For my part I cannot understand why the Labour Government, above all Governments, should view with dislike and alarm the prospect of a powerful British Navy in the Far East. It used to be the fashion to hold out the British Empire to ridicule before the mob, as doing little more than offer comfortable jobs to statesmen in this country who went abroad and, in the enjoyment of large salaries and great positions, found the reward for services in this country.
That idea has been exploded. The people for whom His Majesty's Government claim particularly to speak—the simple folk who want to live in peace and quietness with the whole world—are the people who, above all, wish to see the British Navy able to protect them against all the world, to protect them against famine, and against those upheavals which render wretched the lives of the poorest. I believe that when the time comes it will be found that in the simplest homes in this land are the men who are the quickest to appreciate that the British Navy is an instrument of peace and good government throughout the world. I do not propose to put your Lordships to the trouble of a Division, and I am very much obliged to your Lordships for the way in which you have listened to my remarks.

§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.