THE DUTCH CONVOY.

HL Deb 16 July 1918 vol 30 cc898-915

LORD BERESFORD had the following Question on the Paper—

To ask His Majesty's Government for further particulars relative to the abandonment of the right of search at sea in connection with the Dutch convoy sailings to the East Indies.

Has the new arrangement been agreed to by the Allies of the British Government.

Do the Government still adhere to the words of the Foreign Office telegram of April 25, 1918.

Is the Declaration of London regarded as in any way binding with reference to the "Right of Convoy" for a Neutral Power.

Is the proposed convoy accompanied by armed vessels or vessel; and if so, can the orders given to the commanding officers be communicated to this House; and to move for Papers.

The noble and gallant Lord said: My Lords, I want to draw your Lordships' attention to what I may describe as one of the most amazing documents ever presented to Parliament. It is contradictory, it is not clear, it is confused, and worse than all it really is a document which would affect our sea power in the future. I refer to a White Paper called "Correspondence respecting the Despatch of a Dutch Convoy to the East Indies." What that Paper conveys to the mind is that the British Government gave way to the Dutch Government after a threat of resistance by force on the part of the Dutch Government if we enforced our right to visit and search ships at sea. I think this Paper demands very careful examination. This right of search we have had for centuries, as the Foreign Secretary called attention to in the Paper, and this right is supported by International Law. I say that this Paper contains action unparalleled in all the traditions of our long sea history.

The Foreign Office appears to have given way to pressure, as it has-on many occasions, and its communications vary and sometimes are contradictory, provided we allow that the Minister of Blockade is under the control of the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office really, with great respect, has been playing with war ever since the war began, under the plea of the tactful handling of difficulties. When they get to tactful handling they generally create a great many more difficulties which they have to make the best of. They always seem to decide against us and in favour of neutrals and of our enemies. There are many cases which have become public in which public pressure has forced the Foreign Office to act, but when public opinion is in front of the Government the Government are always too late. In the first two years of the war the Foreign Office allowed neutrals to carry immense volumes of trade to the enemy, and, although the people expostulated, an effective blockade was not put on. I was up in the North and saw four vessels laden with hematite ore which were detained by the senior medical officer against orders on the ground that they were going to Rotterdam where the cargo would be discharged into lighters and taken straight to Germany, but in the end he was ordered to send these vessels on. The same thing has occurred again and again, and those of us who are seamen and who know how to carry out work at sea have been horrified many times during the war at the action of the Foreign Office over and above that of the Admiralty.

I want to know what the Allies say about this right of convoy and the action of the Dutch Government in having broken International Law. Have the United States and Japan agreed to the abrogation of International Law? Have they ever been consulted? If the Dutch have nothing to conceal why should they put forward so arrogant a demand, accompanied by a threat, that these vessels should not be visited? They say that their vessels are to go free from the right of search which every other neutral is forced to comply with. There is no precedent for this case in any naval war which has ever been waged. What reply are the Government going to make to Denmark, Norway and Sweden should they make similar demands accompanied by similar threats? I do not see how they can do anything else but what they have done in the case of the Netherlands.

I see that in Sir Walter Townley's Despatch of May 4 it is stated that— The naval attache was told that this information had been communicated to the Governments interested. Why did not the Minister communicate this information, not leave it to the naval attaché? The whole thing seems to me to be confused and dangerous to this country. I see that the Minister of Blockade, in a Memorandiun of June 7, 1918, mentions that the waiving of our right might risk an international complication of the utmost gravity. I think that international complication is very likely to occur unless we know what these other neutral nations say with regard to what our Government is doing in connection with the Dutch nation. I should like it to be observed that M. van Swinderen never refers to the other nations at all in his Despatch, and we know, with regard to whether communications were made to the other Governments, what the naval attaché told Sir Walter Townley. But M. van Swinderen does say on page 10, with reference to the British Government's objection to the right of convoy— This point of International Law can he left out of account in the present case. This is a most extraordinary way of breaking International Law, and I want to know what are the views of the Allies with regard to this very naive proposal.

With regard to the third Question, the White Paper contains contradictions and inconsistencies which appear to me to be quite inexplicable. The Foreign Office and the Blockade Ministry appear to be separate Departments, nominally working together. They send separate Despatches and the Blockade Department send secret correspondence. If your Lordships will allow me I will read the letter of April 25 of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he says— You should let the Netherlands Government know that His Majesty's Government of course do not recognise the right of convoy,' and that they will exercise the belligerent rights of visit and search of merchant vessels should the Netherlands Government carry out their proposal. Nothing could be more straight, or more strong, or more clear than that—that the Foreign Secretary was determined that we should maintain our rights at sea.

Then I turn to another letter of June 7, in which I find that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says, in corroboration of the telegram I have already read— … the British Government thought it right to lose no time in warning the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs that they would he 'unable to recognise any claim for the immunity from visit and search of ships sailing under neutral convoy. There again is a clear and definite statement based upon International Law. The Foreign Secretary also says— It was therefore with considerable surprise that I received on the 31st ultimo, by telegraph from Sir W. Townley, a translation of an official notice published in the Dutch press that morning by the Ministry of Marine at The Hague, announcing among other things that ' the commander of the convoy would not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships.' Those words convey a distinct threat. The Foreign Secretary goes on to say— In the face of this announcement, so made, His Majesty's Government feel compelled to reiterate in the most formal manner that the right of visit and search which Great Britain, whether she was a neutral or a belligerent, has, in conformity with the rules of international Law, consistently upheld for centuries, is not one which she can abandon. Then he adds— As the Netherlands Government is well aware, the claim that immunity from search is conferred on neutral merchant vessels by the fact of their sailing under the convoy of a man-of-war flying the national flag has never been conceded by this country. By the course, therefore, which they are now pursuing, they do in fact demand that Great Britain shall abdicate her belligerent right to stop contraband trade by the regulated exercise of naval force, and, in the middle of a gloat war, abandon the allied blockade. This is a demand to which Great Britain could not possibly accede. I have read these telegrams which are clear, decided, firm, and quite understandable. But I turn to the same Paper, and, to my amazement, find that on the same date—June 7—the Minister of Blockade sends a Despatch, which he is empowered to do by the Foreign Secretary, in which, while agreeing entirely with the drastic remarks of the Foreign Office, conveyed on April 25, he gives way entirely to the Netherlands Government on account of their public announcement. What really happened is this. The Netherlands Government determined to send this convoy and they determined to send an armed escort. They, apparently, knew it was against International Law, and they published this in the newspapers. As they had published it in the newspapers our Government gave in to them, and, as I shall show directly, gave into them as an act of courtesy. If a man hits me on the point of the nose I certainly do not give in to him as an act of courtesy. So far as the Government go with regard to this convoy, we have had a very severe blow on the nose.

I wish to read to your Lordships another statement of the Minister of Blockade. He says— His Majesty's Government, whilst sincerely regretting that the Netherlands authorities should have adopted a course which appears to them to have been licking both in courtesy and in prudence— I do not know about "prudence," because the Netherlands Government carried their point by what they did— are anxious, nevertheless, to take into account the de facto situation in which the Netherlands Government have now placed themselves by their own public announcement. Therefore, because the Netherlands Government made this announcement, accompanied by a threat, our Government are going to recognise it, and say—" Although we object altogether to what you have done, which is entirely against International Law, and although you have challenged a right which we have held for centuries, still, as you have placed yourselves in an unfortunate position, we are going to let you do what you suggest." I say that this is perfectly monstrous, and shows incredible weakness on our side.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs repudiated Articles 61 and 62 of the Declaration of Landon. Sir Walter Townley points out that the Netherlands Minister of Marine, speaking in the First Chamber of the States-General, said— As the honourable deputy is aware, this right of convoying was never really generally recognised before the Declaration of London. Your Lordships threw out the Declaration of London when you threw out the Naval Prize Bill. It was an infamous Declaration as far as our sea-power went. The Foreign Office evidently recognises that it is dead. The Declaration of London, by those Articles 61 and 62 which I have mentioned, did allow the right of convoy. When we come to the Minister of Blockade he acts as if the Declaration of London was in force as International Law. As your Lordships remember, the House of Lords threw it out. If your Lordships had not thrown out that Naval Prize Bill, and we had gone to war with the Declaration of London in force, we could not possibly have won it.

Several NOBLE LORDS

Hear, hear.

LORD BERESFORD

That is true, because we are an honourable nation. If we had passed that Declaration into law it would have handicapped our fleet to such an extent that I maintain we could not have won the war. We could not have treated it as a "scrap of paper," although it was perfectly apparent that it was deadly opposed to our interests and entirely in favour of the enemy. According to the reading of this Paper, although the Foreign Office repudiates the Declaration of London, the Ministry of Blockade does not. That Paper shows a confusion of thought. If this is the way in which we are going on with the war we shall lose it.

I want to ask some pertinent questions with regard to the differences of opinion which are so prejudicial to our interests. What really happened was this. When the Declaration of London passed the House of Commons the Government had the idea that it would pass the House of Lords—but it did not—and they began negotiations with Holland. By the mercy of Providence your Lordships threw the Bill out, and the Government were in this fix, that they had begun these negotiations with Holland although the Declaration of London had never passed into law in this country, and that is the position they are in now. On August 8, 1914, the Government of this country were negotiating under an Order in Council because they thought that the Declaration of London would pass into law, the House of Commons having passed it. I object altogether to this system of government. We are governed by Committees on the one hand and by Orders in Council on the other, and it is a dangerous state of affairs, more particularly when we are at war. These things should come before Parliament and be decided in the broad public light of day.

The Minister of Blockade is still, apparently, acting on this pernicious Declaration of London. He reiterates, as your Lordships will see in the Paper, that the right of visit and search should be maintained in the strongest manner, almost as strong as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he says that this right cannot be abandoned. Then he writes a Despatch in which he absolutely abandons it. And under what? Evidently under the menace of an armed convoy. That is what I particularly object to, and I think the country will object. We want to keep Holland our friend, but this is not the way to show frienship. Surely the action of the Foreign Office and the Minister of Blockade on this occasion is most reprehensible and not according to British tradition. You will find on page 7 of the White Paper, in a communication from Sir W. Townley to Mr. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, the following— It is obvious that the convoy commandant would not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships. That is a threat, and it is a threat that moved the Minister of Blockade to act as he has done. The Minister of Blockade says also that the matter is "wholly exceptional." On page 9 of the White Paper he says— Bat it for these motives and in these circumstances His Majesty's Government are to waive their right of search in this particular case, as a act of courtesy, they must lay stress on the altogether exceptional nature of such a concession, which must not be treated as a precedent for similar concessions in future, nor held to commit His Majesty's Government in any way to the abandonment of their just claims on other occasions. They have forfeited their just claims; and how on earth are we to know that these circumstances will not occur again? I think they are certain to occur again, and if made under the same threat our Foreign Office, or Minister of Blockade, will give way again.

I want to impress on your Lordships that this action will practically nullify the whole of the blockade. It is going against our traditional rights at sea which, as the Foreign Secretary himself has said, we have acted on for centuries. The broad fact remains that the British Government have surrendered our sea rights, after asserting them in the most determined manner, and by so doing have weakened our maritime power and created a precedent. Nobody can deny this, and it is done after the unmistakable threat of the Netherlands Government. The world, certainly, must think we have abrogated our sea right under the threat of armed resistance. They cannot think anything else if they read this White Paper. An armed escort with this convoy is a direct challenge to the British Government and their rights at sea. The Government say to the Netherlands Government, "We will not prevent your doing it, but we do not recognise your right." This is really what they have said; and this is the way in which we are sacrificing our sea power.

I ask whether these merchant ships are Dutch or German, or whether they are partly owned by Germans. We know that before the war a large number of these ships, probably two-thirds of them, were in German hands, and I should like to know whether they are wholly Dutch or partly German, and if so how much is German. No innocent vessel would have the slightest thing to fear from being searched, but Holland evidently does not believe our word relative to innocent vessels being passed on, and in spite of our pledge they are sending an armed escort. This is not the way friends should act, and it will cause countless and innumerable difficulties not only during the war but after the war.

I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to another point, which I have also brought before the public, in the other House of Parliament. The Foreign Office is presided over by a Secretary of State. That is perfectly right. The War Office is presided over by a Secretary of State, and other Departments of the Government have a Secretary of State. The Government have just created an Air Ministry presided over by a Secretary of State. But the most important Department of all—the Admiralty—is not presided over by a Secretary of State, and in big affairs the First Lord often has to represent matters though a Secretary of State. I remember when I was at the Admiralty in 1885 there was the question of a stoker who performed a most heroic act in the stokehold. A steam pipe burst and he managed to turn off the throttle valve, saving the ship and the men. In war time he would have got, or have been recommended for, the Victoria Cross, but he was recommended by the Admiralty for the Albert medal, and the recommendation had to go through the Board of Trade. Some clerk there wrote to the Admiralty and said, "We do not consider that this act merits the Albert medal." The Admiralty wrote back and said, "We are the proper people to know whether it merits the medal or not." The Board of Trade objected, and the man never got anything. That position, however, was altered. Really Admiralty business that has to go before the Sovereign, much of it, has to go through a Secretary of State, because the First Lord is not a Secretary of State. I hope shortly to bring a Motion before your Lordships' House to the effect that the First Lord should be made a Secretary of State. He is now in a subordinate position, and that is not good or the Service or for the country.

The Foreign Office also have interfered with the Navy and Admiralty all through the war. The Navy brings in a ship to the three mile limit—it is really incredible, but that ship when brought in is under the control and orders of the Foreign Office and not of the Admiralty. For goodness sake make your policy in the Cabinet—that is your business; but it is not your business to interfere with the soldier or sailor as to how he shall carry it out. The reason we have lost an immense amount of time, many opportunities, and had so many catastrophes in this war, is that the politician, who should frame policy, will interfere with the executive, as they have done so many times. I desire to know, if the Government can tell me, who was responsible for these statements in this remarkable White Paper. We cannot succeed if we continue upon such methods.

With your Lordships' permission, I should like to summarise the case in this way. The Dutch Government make a proposal—it is really more than a proposal, it is a decision—that they are going to send an armed convoy without reference to other nations, to us, or to International Law or the traditional rights of the sea. They published this decision. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the strongest way possible, as we see in the White Paper, said that we should pay no attention to this decision, and that we were determined to maintain our right of visit and search. On the same day, June 7, the Blockade Minister is empowered by the Foreign Office to make what is called a confidential verbal Report, which is put in this Paper and which is diametrically and entirely opposed to the words used by the Foreign Secretary with respect to this breach of International Law. That sort of thing requires explanation. I do not suppose that anybody has yet been able to read that Paper, but if this sort of thing is to go on we shall hamper ourselves most materially in the war by raising difficulties which would not exist if we adhered to International Law. When we drive a great wedge like this into International Law and allow one Power to do something adverse to our interest, and adverse to the rules of the sea in war, we are opening the door in a perilous manner. Although I do not intend to divide the House on this occasion, I hone to bring forward the matter again, and to ask that these things shall cease, and that we shall not have this divergence of opinion without the clearest reason being given for it. I shall also ask your Lordships to consider the question whether the time has not arrived for making the First Lord of the Admiralty a Secretary of State.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD FINLAY)

My Lords, my noble and gallant friend has used many hard terms with regard to the Foreign Office and the distinguished man who is at its head. I hope, if my noble and gallant friend will give me his attention, to be able to satisfy him that his epithets were wholly inapplicable.

LORD BERESFORD

They were not personal; they were directed to what he did.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not suppose for a moment that my noble and gallant friend would make any personal attack, but what I protest against in the most emphatic manner is attributing to the Foreign Office and to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs action which is the action of the Government as a whole, and attacking the Foreign Office and its head as if it were due to their default and their neglect of duty that things have occurred for which the Government as a whole is responsible. I hope to satisfy my noble and gallant friend that the apprehensions to which he has given such lively expression are altogether unfounded, and to convince him that he may rest in his bed in peace with no idea that International Law has been abrogated or will be abrogated.

I propose to make a statement to the House upon the whole question connected with the Dutch convoy. I regret that the hour is so late, but I hope that your Lordships will bear with me, because the time has come when the misconceptions which have been circulated in regard to this matter of the convoy must be dealt with. I do not think that those misconceptions have ever been more forcibly embodied than in the speech to which the House has just listened. I shall make a consecutive statement, but in the course of it your Lordships may find that I answer every one of the questions put by my noble and gallant friend in the order, I think, in which he put them.

The essential facts about this convoy are as follows. As appears from the White Paper which is before your Lordships, the Netherlands Minister of Marine on April 16 announced that the Government would send a convoy of Government passengers and goods to the Netherlands East Indies. On April 29 the Netherlands Minister informed the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the composition of the proposed convoy. The particulars are set out in the Note of the Netherlands Minister of that date—No. 3 in the White Paper—and the names of the vessels are given at the end of the communiqué of May 31, which also appears in the White Paper. The vessels were as follows. First, Her Majesty's ship "Hertog Hendrik" accompanied by a coal boat requisitioned for that purpose for the purpose of bunkering during the voyage. Second, a Netherlands merchant ship transformed into a man-of-war according to the rules of the 7th Convention, 1917, for the transport of military men to the Dutch East Indies, having for cargo military stores. Third, a Netherlands merchant ship requisitioned by the Netherlands Government, under convoy of the man-of-war mentioned under head one, for the transport of Government passengers with their families, and having for cargo exclusively goods of the Netherlands Government destined for the Government of the Dutch East Indies. It is, therefore, clear that the convoy, apart from the coal boat, consisted of one merchant vessel which was under the control of the Dutch Government, and was used for the transport of Government passengers and Government cargo only. The other two vessels were men-of-war which are not in practice subjected to visit and search.

On April 25 the Foreign Office had intimated through Sir Walter Townley, His Majesty's Minister at The Hague, that His Majesty's Government did not recognise the right of convoy, and that they would exercise the right of visit and search. This was communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 26, who, as H.M. Government were informed by telegram on May 13, made no demur, but no answer was received. On May 31 there was published at The Hague an official communiqué by the then Minister of Marine, in which it was stated as follows— The warships will therefore only carry naval personnel and war supplies, and the merchant ships only Government passengers with their families and Government goods. It is not intended to institute under protection of warships commercial intercourse which, without such pro- tection, would not be permitted by the belligerents according to their views of commercial liberty of neutrals. No mail will be carried. It is obvious that convoy commandant will not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships. Thereupon Mr. Balfour sent a Note of June 7 to the Netherlands Minister again asserting the right of visit and search, and on the same day a verbal communication was made to the Netherlands Minister in London, which is set out in the White Paper, and which is so important that I propose, with your Lordships' permission, to read to the House the most essential part of it. Your Lordships will find the passage which I am now quoting on page 9 of the White Paper beginning at the third paragraph of that page— His Majesty's Government, whilst sincerely regretting that the Netherlands authorities should have adopted a course which appears to them to have been lacking both in courtesy and in prudence, are anxious, nevertheless, to take into account the de fac[...]o situation in which the Netherlands Government have now placed themselves by their own public announcement. His Majesty's Government cannot consent to any abatement of the right which they claim to search vessels under neutral convoy. The repression of contraband and the enforcement of blockade lie, by international law, with the belligerent alone and not with the neutral; and this fundamental principle Great Britain is quite determined to uphold with all the force at her command. It is important that the Netherlands Government should be under no misapprehension on this point. If, however, the intention underlying the presentation of M. van Swinderen's note of the 29th April, and of communications in the same sense since made by M. Loudon to Sir W. Townley, was merely to suggest that a friendly arrangement might be arrived at between the two Governments under which such satisfaction would be given to legitimate belligerent requirements as would justify the British Government in dispensing on the present occasion with the formal exercise of their right of search, His Majesty's Government will not refuse to consider such suggestion. They desire, by adopting this conciliatory attitude, to give further practical evidence of their constant anxiety to maintain their relations with the Netherlands Government on the most amicable footing, and to show how far they are in fact willing to go out of their way in order to save the susceptibilities which the Dutch official announcement was calculated to arouse, and so to prevent the action of the Netherlands Government from definitely creating a situation gravely imperilling the friendly relations between the two countries. But if for these motives and in these circumstances His Majesty's Government are to waive their right of search in this particular case, as an act of courtesy, they must lay stress on the altogether exceptional nature of such a concession, which must not be treated as a precedent for similar concessions in future, nor held to commit His Majesty's Government in any way to the abandonment of their just claims on other occasions. On this clear understanding His Majesty's Government are ready to state the conditions on which the convoy composed of the ships whose names have been notified might be allowed to pass without interference through the British patrols on the intended journey from Rotterdam or Amsterdam to the Dutch East Indies. These conditions will be found to conform substantially with the suggestions put forward by the Netherlands Government themselves, and should therefore meet with their ready acceptance. The conditions follow, and this is really the most vital document in the White Paper—

1. "(a) A detailed list of all passengers sailing in the convoy, to be furnished to His Majesty's Government, none but Dutch Government officials and their families being allowed to proceed.
2. "(b) Full particulars of the cargo on board any merchant vessel sailing in the convoy to be supplied in the same way as is now done by the Netherlands Oversea Trust in respect of ships under their control.
3. "(c) The Netherlands Government to give a formal guarantee that no goods shipped in the convoy are either wholly or in part of enemy origin.
4. "(d) The slops sailing under the Dutch naval flag, including the converted liner, not to carry any civilian passengers, nor any goods or articles other than warlike stores destined for the colonial authorities or forces, of which complete lists should be furnished.
5. "(e) No mails, correspondence, private papers, printed matter, or patrols to be carried by any ship in the convoy (except official despatches of the Dutch Government).
6. "(f) The convoy not to sail until the above stipulated particulars and undertakings have been furnished and have been found satisfactory by the British authorities."

These conditions were accepted in their entirety by the Netherlands Government.

It will be observed that the second of these conditions was that full particulars of the goods should be supplied, as is now done by the Netherlands Overseas Trust in respect of ships under their control. It must never be forgotten that an effective search of vessels at sea is, under present conditions, impossible. For that purpose it is necessary that the vessel should be brought into port, and even there the process takes a long time. Put shortly the reasons why effective search at sea is impossible are the size of the vessels now used; the fact that the information contained in ships' papers must be supplemented by further information which is recorded in this country concerning consignors and consignees; and the danger of attack by Rib-marines while the vessels searched and those searching are stopped for the purpose. For these reasons the practice has been adopted with the Netherlands Overseas Trust of having the manifest and lists of passengers transmitted to London for examination before the vessel sails. This "advance booking," as it is called, is really the most effective way by far in which our naval control can be exercised, and it has, in practice, been found to be very effectual for the purpose of controlling shipments. With regard to the convoy now in question, His Majesty's Government is in a much better position with reference to the power of control than if we had chosen to rely solely on the exercise of the right of visit and search.

There is another consideration which His Majesty's Government were bound to take into account. They have no desire to criticise the motives which may have prompted the public statement in the communiqué of May 31, "It is obvious that convoy commandant will not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships." It may have been prompted by a belief that such a statement would be grateful to public opinion in Holland, a country which is justly proud of the part which her Navy has played in history. His Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that any sinister design lay behind this statement. After such an announcement had been made it is obvious that to have stopped the convoy would have provoked a crisis of the most acute kind in the relations of this country with the Netherlands. We believe that that country and its Government are inspired by friendly sentiments towards Great Britain, and Great Britain has certainly no desire to quarrel with them. If the interests of Great Britain demanded it, we should not hesitate to put into practice the right of visit and search which we have steadily asserted for centuries. But the arrangement which was made gave us all, and more than all, we could have got by insisting on the exercise of these rights in all their rigour.

As regards the exercise of the right in future cases, if they should ever occur, this has been completely safeguarded. To have taken up an unbending attitude on this occasion might have led to consequences which would be deplored by every one. The decision taken was arrived at by the War Cabinet after the most careful consideration of all the circum- stances. The decision was that of the Government, and it would be a mistake to treat it as if the matter had been merely departmental.

My noble and gallant friend Lord Beresford, in his second Question, has asked whether the new arrangement had been agreed to by the Allies with the British Government. The correspondence was unofficially communicated to the Governments of the United States, of France, and of Italy, and His Majesty's Government understand that they welcomed the amicable arrangement which was arrived at. It must be remembered that the position was a little complicated by the fact that these Governments have in the past been opposed to the exercise of the right to visit and search vessels under convoy.

LORD BERESFORD

What does the noble and learned Lord mean by "in the past"? Does that mean since the war?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

It is within your Lordships' knowledge that the position of Great Britain with regard to the right to visit and search vessels under convoy is one which has been repeatedly stated by the British Government, but the Governments of other countries have held different views on the matter.

LORD BERESFORD

I only wanted to know whether it was during the war.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am speaking of the historical fact which is well known. The position taken up by this country, although we believe it to be absolutely right, has not been shared in the past by those who are now on the most friendly terms with us. That had to be taken into account in dealing with the situation.

The noble and gallant Lord's third Question relates to the telegram of April 25. His Majesty's Government adhere to the statement in their telegram of April 25 that they do not recognise "the right of convoy." Their waiver on this occasion of the belligerent right to visit and search has been prompted, not by any weakening on this subject, but by the special considerations to which I have adverted.

The fourth Question relates to the Declaration of London. The Declaration of London is not regarded as in any way whatever binding with reference to the right of convoy for a neutral, nor, indeed, for any other purpose.

LORD BERESFORD

Hear, hear.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

That Declaration was, as my noble and gallant friend has said, never ratified, and although it was partially recognised for the time by Orders in Council subject to certain limitations, I may remind the House that the Declaration of London Order in Council No. 2 of 1914, and all Orders amending it, were withdrawn by Order in Council of July 7, 1916. So that we are absolutely free from the trammels of the Declaration of London.

My noble and gallant friend's fifth Question was as to particulars of the vessels, and instructions to the officers in command. I have already given particulars of the vessels forming the convoy. His Majesty's Government had no information as to the orders given to the commanding officers beyond what is conveyed in the communiqué of May 31, which I have already quoted. I may add that, as the convoy was bound for the Dutch East Indies, no question as to enemy destination of any of the cargo could arise. The precautions taken on this occasion have enabled His Majesty's Government to satisfy themselves that there was nothing wrong with this convoy.

The noble and gallant Admiral has put five questions to me, which I have specifically answered. Perhaps he will allow me to submit one for his consideration. If we had refused the offer of a friendly settlement and insisted on carrying out visit and search of the solitary merchant vessel which was conveyed, what does he suppose we should have found? I am sure that he does not suppose that we should have found that the Netherlands Government had misled us. The conditions which we had enforced enabled us to satisfy ourselves that there was nothing wrong. There is really nothing whatever to suggest that goods or passengers have been carried on this merchantman on some nefarious errand, what, where, and how, nobody can divine. On the whole, I submit to your Lordships, better judgment that the. attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government in this matter has combined, with a due regard for the susceptibilities of a friendly neutral. complete security that neither cargo nor passengers open to any objection should be carried, and an unqualified assertion of the historic position of Great Britain on the subject of convoy.

LORD BERESFORD

My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for answering my Questions categorically, but I think your Lordships must agree that the attitude adopted by the Netherlands Government with regard to this question was unfortunate. Why send men-of-war at all? That has not been cleared up by the noble and. learned Lord. It was published that these men-of-war would not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ship; they naturally would not tolerate any examination of themselves. I think that the misconceptions to which tie noble and learned Lord referred were justified. He has cleared up some of them, but I still deplore the way in which this thing was done. It was a way likely to make a difficulty and to break our friendship with Holland for the Dutch Government to publish a threat of what they were going to do. The Foreign Office were so astonished that they called attention to the want of prudence and courtesy. The thing might have been done in a different way; and the Netherlands Government are to blame for what they did. I am sure that everybody in this House wants to remain friendly with the Dutch, but this is not the way to make friendship; and I will that our Government have got out of a very grave difficulty somewhat cleverly.

My noble and learned friend spoke of the Declaration of London, and I was very glad that he made a definite pronouncement that this Declaration is dead, because it has sometime, been referred to as extant. I hope we shall never hear of the Declaration of London again. My noble and learned friend also referred to effective search at sea. Circumstances, of course, have altered now that we have great oceangoing liners, and search at sea is more difficult than it was, more particularly with under-water warfare. But the old right of search at sea was hardly ever observed. What happened was that if the weather was rough and a boat could not go from the man-of-war to undertake the search, the merchant ship was ordered to heave, to and they waited until the wind went down, and a prize crew was put on board to take her into port. It was rare to search and to condemn a ship at sea.

I want to point out once more that it was not our Government who provoked the crisis; it was the Netherlands Government. However, we have got out of the difficulty, and I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord for the explanations he has given in answer to my Questions. But I still say that the way this was done, and the Papers being so contradictory, gave rise to what are called misconceptions, which in my view are due to the perfectly contradictory and disquieting particulars contained in the White Paper that has been issued.