§ VISCOUNT BRYCEMy Lords, I rise to ask the Lord President of the Council whether he can give the House any information regarding recent military events in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf, and regarding the present political situation in Persia. It will have occurred to many of your Lordships that it would be desirable before the present session of Parliament comes to an end that this House should have some more information than it possesses with regard to what has been passing in that very obscure theatre of war—for recent events there practically amount to war—which is within Persian territory. We have had very little intelligence concerning that, and the intelligence which we have received has been very vague.
Your Lordships will remember that very soon after the Turks entered into the general war they despatched a considerable force to the frontiers of Persia, with the intention, apparently, of dragging Persia into the conflict. That force was repulsed by a Russian movement, and the only 521 tangible result of it was a massacre in which a large number of Syrian Nestorian and Armenian Christians perished. The second attempt; has been much more recent, and has been made apparently by some German agents animated by that spirit of restless malevolence which appears to pervade their agents wherever they are. This also is an attempt to draw Persia into the circle of the war, just as a fire in a city catches upon one house after another until at last it involves a large area. Here the attempt seems to have been made by organised bands of robbers, partly drawn from the wild tribes who inhabit the Persian mountains, partly from the unpaid rank and file of the gendarmerie, and partly by turning to account gendarmerie officers. At any other time this would be the most surprising part of the transaction, but in days when we are accustomed to see diplomatists forging passports and fostering plots for the blowing up of manufactories it is not wonderful that officers of a gendarmerie should put themselves at the head of bands of robbers. This movement seems to have been organised, if the reports be true, by the Prince of Reuss, whose name one sees with regret in this connection because he belongs to one of the most ancient and famous houses in Germany, if not, indeed, in Europe.
But for us the most interesting question that arises is what is the connection, if there be a connection, between these gendarmerie officers and the Swedish officers who were placed in charge of the Persian gendarmerie some years ago, a good while before the outbreak of war. I understand that the regular Swedish gendarmerie officers returned soon after the outbreak of war to Sweden and are not involved in these proceedings, but I hope that His Majesty's Government will be able to give us a positive assurance on that subject.
Apparently these bands, from whatever quarters drawn, have succeeded in introducing complete anarchy in Central and Southern Persia. They seem to have seized Shiraz, and, as I understand, they are also masters of Ispahan, and have only been repulsed from the vicinity of Teheran by a considerable Russian force. In these circumstances the situation is one which clearly calls for action as drastic as His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government have it in their power to carry through. I can well understand that the difficulties may be 522 very great. Central Persia at this moment is half arid desert and half snow. There are mountain ranges across which operations would be very difficult, and I suppose that the forces at the disposal of the Persian Government which can be relied upon must be very small. However, if ever there was a situation which justified strong action it surely is this. Perfectly lawless attempts have been made to overthrow all government in Persia, and the only result of this can be further injury to the peaceful population of Persia as well as to ourselves and to the influence of the Allies in that country. In the East, as your Lordship know, there is nothing that tells like a display of force, and here a display of force would be especially valuable because it would react to the West upon the Arabs and to the East as far as the frontier of the Pathan and Beluchi tribes. Your Lordships are aware that a very active pan-Islamic propaganda has been carried on for some time past among the Arab tribes and all over the East as far as India itself, and one of the most decisive blows we could give to such a propaganda as that is would be to show that where we are threatened, as we are in Persia, we are able to strike back with vigour, though I suppose that would hardly be possible before the spring at the earliest.
I do not venture to ask His Majesty's Government to make any further declaration of policy than they may think desirable at this moment, and, of course, it must be obvious to us all that one cannot at this stage of the war enter profitably upon a consideration of what ought to be done when the war comes to a close. Nevertheless, there is one remark which I will venture to make with regard to the status and position of Persia. The Persian nation is, I suppose I may say, excluding China and Japan, the oldest nation in the world. From the earliest period of authentic history it has maintained an individuality and continued existence down to now. It is also a nation unique in this, that twice great Empires of which it was the head were ruined and submerged, and twice the Persian nation emerged from that catastrophe and again became a great conquering Power. The fall of the Empire of Cyrus and Darius, overthrown by Alexander the Great, reduced the Persian people to political insignificance, and they remained in obscurity till early in the third century after Christ they became 523 again a ruling race, and the heads of an Empire so great that for five centuries it was one of the two great Powers of the world and sometimes proved itself more than a match in war for the Roman Empire. After the fall of this Sassanian dominion before the conquering Arabs in the days of their first Khalifs Persia was again submerged, till in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it recovered itself once more and became again, under monarchs like Shah Abbas and Nadir Shah, a great conquering Power. The Persian nation has still a great deal that commends it to our interest.
I speak with deference in the presence of the noble Earl, Lord Curzon, who is much more familiar with Persia than I am, but I think he will not disagree with me when I say that even now the Persian people leaves upon one who sees them the impression of a highly intelligent race, a race that has retained some of that intellectual quality which enabled it in previous centuries to give great poets to the world, and which even in our own time has enabled it to be the source of remarkable religious movements. It is impossible not to feel some sympathy and some interest for a people who have done so much in the world, and who, even if politically they have become decrepit, still retain some sparks of a finer intellectual life than belongs to their neighbours. They have produced something, and the Turks have never produced anything. I do not know that one can do more at this moment than venture to express the hope that when this war comes to an end His Majesty's Government and the other Allied Powers will feel that a measure of consideration ought to be shown to the Persian nation. You remember the lines of our great poet—
Men are we, and must grieve when even the shadeOf that which once was great has passed away.Some such sympathy as that we may reasonably feel for a people who have done so much in the world as the Persians once have done; and I will therefore express the hope that, in the steps that will have to be taken to restore order in Persia after the expulsion of these pernicious foreign elements which now are endeavouring to destroy what prosperity and order is left in it, it will be found possible to deal tenderly with the fabric, frail as it is, of the Persian monarchy, and to show some regard for the national feeling of an ancient people.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE)My Lords, it is some weeks since my noble friend placed this Notice on the Paper, and at that time the military operations which were undertaken in Mesopotamia were in closer proximity to the Persian Gulf than they now are. I was not, therefore, quite certain whether my noble friend desired to include in his Question some reference to those military operations. He has not done so, and I therefore do not propose to give any detailed account of what has occurred there. But since this opportunity offers I desire to make one or two observations upon them, because certain misapprehensions have appeared of late in the Press, in view of which it is desirable to make a short explanation.
Without spending any time in describing the events in Mesopotamia since Basra was occupied rather more than a year ago, and without describing the operations which took place on the Euphrates or even those more recent operations since we started to advance up the Tigris last June, I may remind the House that it is now more than two months since Kut-el-Amara was taken after a brilliant feat of arms by the British force. That victory took place on September 29. It was not until the 22nd of last month that the next important fight took place, that with which the minds of the public have been much occupied since—the great engagement which took place at Ctesiphon, when a large Turkish force, said to consist of not less than four divisions, was defeated by the force under General Townshend. Since then, as we know, it has been necessary to withdraw General Townshend's force further down the river to Kut-el-Amara, which it has now reached.
The two misapprehensions which have been prevalent and on which I desire to say a word are these. Some free comment has been made on the impropriety of advancing to take a great city like Baghdad with only a single division—General Townshend's division as it was called. That is a misapprehension. The force under General Townshend, the composition of which I am naturally not disposed to state, was considerably larger than the division of which he is the actual commander. It comprised additional troops, both infantry and cavalry, and was considered by the competent authorities to be sufficient in numbers for the task which it had to 525 perform. That, my Lords, brings me to the second misapprehension. It seems to have been concluded, judging by what I have seen in the newspapers, that this was, or at any rate may have been, a rash military venture, perhaps undertaken by the General who commanded it on his own initiative and not properly thought out, and perhaps not even fully authorised. That is a complete error.
This advance to Baghdad was contemplated some months ago, and a sufficient force was collected to carry out the object. The whole proceedings were carefully thought out by the Commanderin-Chief in Mesopotamia, Sir John Nixon, an officer who has already deservedly earned the confidence of his military superiors and of the country, and they were entrusted to General Townshend, who has also gained the confidence of his superiors. It was clear to everybody that the early capture of Baghdad, if it could be effected, would be a great stroke in the war, not merely as a military move, but from the political results which would follow. It was therefore well worth undertaking with a proper force, but it certainly was not an adventure which ought to have been risked, as an adventure sometimes has to be risked, with a force of dubious strength for the purpose, or in defiance of the accepted canons of strategy. No such suggestion or imputation is possible. The force which was set apart for the purpose was by universal competent military opinion considered to be sufficient for it. No charge whatever can be brought against the leading of the troops, either the higher leading or the conduct of the commands generally; and it is evident that the troops behaved splendidly. The task, however, proved to be a heavier one than was anticipated owing to the greatly superior forces of the enemy and their powerful armament of artillery; and it cannot be questioned that the course which was taken—the determination not to attempt to pursue such advantage as had been gained in the actual fight in the neighbourhood of Ctesiphon, but to retire to a strong position lower down the river—was the wise course, and one which ought to be generally approved.
I pass to the matters more immediately concerned with the speech of my noble friend. He dwelt at some length on the remarkable activity which has been shown of late by German and by Turkish agents 526 in Persia; and he added, what is also the fact, that this skilful and unscrupulous propaganda has been carried on also in Afghanistan, right up to our frontier, and also in such parts of Arabia as would admit those who are prepared to pursue it. It is evident that the German agents and the agents of the Committee at Constantinople have both proved skilful at this work. They have shown themselves to be kindred spirits alike in principle and in the practice which they have pursued. The object and intention of these agents has been to force Persia into the conflict on the side of the Central Powers and against the Entente. Bribery has been freely used on a most lavish scale. It cannot, I think, be disputed that the Germans take the palm for the lavish use of gold in such countries as Persia for the purposes of bribery, because it must be remembered that in such a country bribery has to be conducted with actual cash and not merely by permitting the use of credit, and also by the ingenious employment of the most dangerous agents that can be found. It must also be remembered that this propaganda has been distinctly and definitely opposed to Christianity, involving an appeal to the most fanatical elements in Persia. There, again, we certainly do take second place. Our treatment of Islam has been one of giving absolutely free and fair play to the exercise of that faith, but we have never attempted to pretend adhesion to it. But in the case of this propaganda there has been a free 'use of pretended conversions to the faith of Islam. Our appeal is made, and always has been made, to the rational majority of the Moslem world; these appeals are made to the most ignorant and bigoted members of it.
The next stage in the proceedings was the arrival in Persia of armed parties, composed largely of Germans, some presumably German officers, perhaps more German riff-raft, assisted by a number of Turks, and forming an obvious nucleus for the bodies of brigands and outlaws who are only, as we know, too numerous in Persia. Then proceeded a campaign of attempted assassination. The Russian bank manager was assassinated at Ispahan; the British Vice-Consul was murdered at Shiraz; two British officers were killed at Bushire in a foray inspired from the same source. At Ispahan, later, our Consul was attacked and one of his Indian 527 orderlies was killed. These crimes were carried out by hired bravoes of the Germans and Austrians who had penetrated into Persia. Among these were a number of escaped prisoners, men who had been taken prisoners by the Russians and had been interned at various places in the Caucasus, from which they had escaped; and these naturally constituted one of the most formidable elements of the invasion. It was evident—it had been evident for some time while all this was going on—that the position of Persia as a neutral State was seriously threatened by these events, and that being so a new Government was formed at Teheran, containing some stronger elements than that which had preceded it—several men who were determined that if they were able to bring it about order should be restored and maintained. As soon as that new Government was formed, or very soon after, the German Minister and the Turkish Ambassador fled from Teheran to a place some sixty or seventy miles to the South, where they joined these turbulent elements of which I have spoken.
In the meantime, as my noble friend has pointed out, German intrigue had been busy with the force of gendarmerie which had been raised originally under Swedish officers. It was, of course, necessary when that body was formed that it should be officered by men from a neutral country, neutral in the sense of not being specially or immediately concerned in Persian affairs or suspected of any ambition to become so. If either German, or French, or Russian, or British officers had been selected for the purpose, it is evident that their association with their own country would have made them suspect from one point of view or another; consequently, Swedish officers were chosen. I desire, after what fell from my noble friend, to make it clear what is the position of the Swedish Government with regard to these men. Those Swedish soldiers who have taken service under the Persian Government have been, some of them, under a certain degree of control by their own Government, being, as I presume, entitled to pensions. Over those it is only fair to state that the Swedish Government in the most correct manner has always endeavoured to exercise a sound influence, and to prevent them from engaging in any unneutral act. Some of the other Swedes have not been even to that small extent under the control of their own Government, and it 528 is, perhaps, therefore scarcely fair to the Government of Sweden to speak in general terms of Swedish officers, because that seems to imply that all these gendarmerie officers are officers in the Swedish Army, which is by no means the case. It is also right to mention that although the greater number of the gendarmerie revolted as I have described, there have been some cases, one case in particular, where the gendarmerie have remained loyal to the Persian Government and have interfered to prevent riot and to save life.
Then a serious event happened at Shiraz, where the British Consul and some representatives of the British colony were seized and carried off to Borasjun, about half way to Bushire, with the presumed intention of treating them as hostages and putting pressure on the British Government through their means. So far as we know they have been well treated, but needless to say the capture of a prominent British representative in such a manner is a grave fact, which demands serious action when it can be undertaken on our part. Then at Hamadan and at Sultana-bad our Consular representatives ran similar danger, but in both of those cases, I am glad to say, they were able to escape. But it is not only on the Western side of Persia that this riotous and disturbing condition of things has obtained. At Yezd, in the centre of Persia, and further East at Kerman, a grave state of affairs exists, for there is profuse disorder and defiance of the authority of the Persian Government.
We believe that it is the genuine desire of the present Persian Government to restore order so far as they can throughout the land, and it is in order to assist them to do this that Russian troops were moved in considerable numbers nearer to Teheran, which was itself quite visibly threatened by the same agents who have created disturbances elsewhere. We all know—and there is no reason to be surprised at the fact—that in ordinary times the Persians have regarded with great disfavour the approach of foreign troops to their capital, even for the purpose of restoring order when breaches of order have taken place. Even in ordinary times in Persia the maintenance of order, even in the neighbourhood of the capital, without some form of foreign intervention has from time to time been found exceedingly difficult. That was the origin of the 529 creation of this Swedish gendarmerie, and earlier of the force known as Persian Cossacks—that is to say, composed of Persians armed and dressed in the fashion of Cossacks, and officered by a certain proportion of Russian officers. It must be remembered, too, that of late in Northern Persia there always have been a certain number of Russian troops, because. it has been believed by the Russian Government that their presence alone secures the maintenance in a certain degree of Russian interests and of order in that particular district. One is glad to consider, my Lords, that in the main, though there may have been some few of what are called the advanced school in Persia who have been seduced into joining in these German-fomented disturbances because they have been told that the Nationalist Party in Persia is favoured thereby, yet that belief does not seem to have gone very far or to have sunk very deep. And perhaps that is not altogether surprising, because it is almost too bad a joke or too good a joke to associate German domination in a country like Persia with the idea of freedom or extended political rights. The Persian Government are quite well aware that they cannot stand alone, and are wise enough to see that, if they cannot stand alone, it is a more hopeful prospect for them to obtain the support of Great Britain and of Russia rather than that of Germany and of Turkey.
With regard to what fell from my noble friend in the concluding passages of his speech, it is quite safe to say that the presence of the Russian troops in Northern Persia, just as the presence of British troops at Bushire, is designed to support the independent existence of Persia. It is to our interest to maintain and secure that independence. Our present action may be taken to be a continued effort for the maintenance of Persian independence. We have already, as the House well knows, afforded not a little material help to Persia in the shape of advances of money, and under proper guarantees we should be prepared to continue that assistance. We should also be prepared to assist Persia in securing her own defence, and in the creation and maintenance of a force for home defence less liable to be carried away by foreign interference than the gendarmerie which has unhappily, in most districts, proved to be an easy prey to foreign intrigue. That, I think, is as much as I can tell my noble friend at this moment.
530 It has always to be remembered, in making a statement of this kind, that the fluctuations of events in such a country as Persia are so frequent and occur so rapidly that a statement which is made on one day may be altogether incomplete in the course of a week or even of a few days; but I do not think that there is any need in the midst of all these troubles and disturbances to despair of the future of Persia. We are all of us tempted to feel a sincere sympathy with the young Sovereign, who has been called at a very. early age to the difficult occupation of the Persian Throne. This would be a time of stress and difficulty for the strongest of grown rulers, and it is, therefore, infinitely more so for one of his age. We can only hope that he may rule later on over a well-governed country, and that he may develop such qualities as are necessary for the establishment of a successful Oriental sovereignty
§ LORD SYDENHAMMy Lords, may I say a few words on the military aspect of the operations in Mesopotamia, to which the noble Viscount alluded very slightly and as to which the noble Marquess has given us some rather interesting particulars? A short time before we made the advance to Ctesiphon a very remarkable communiqué was issued through the German wireless system to the effect that Baghdad was already practically lost, and it seemed intended to prepare public opinion in Turkey, Austria, and Germany for a reverse which was near at hand. To my mind that communiqué seemed highly suspicious, and I do not know whether His Majesty's Government regarded it in that light. It was very unusual that the Germans should announce a coming reverse. That has not been at all in accordance with their ordinary conduct. Was that telegram intended to lure our forces on to meet the much larger forces which were being prepared by the enemy at Baghdad? I suppose we shall probably never have an answer to that question.
When Kut-el-Amara was occupied on September 29 after a finely-fought action, many of us were beginning to be rather anxious as to the future of the operations so far away from our sea base; but I think we all assumed that no advance would be made until large reinforcements had been brought up from Basra. The noble Marquess has told us that carte blanche was given to the General com 531 manding to go on if he thought his forces were sufficient for occupying Baghdad. I will not for a moment presume to criticise his decision, because I do not know the information upon which the Government relied; but clearly that decision was the cause of the reverse which we have endured. What happened is quite evident, and it has happened before in our history. The British General, brave as our Generals are, underestimated his enemy; he acted on information, very likely from German sources, which was decidedly false; and it may be that the German plan of luring him on to Baghdad succeeded.
But there is a bright spot in this dark picture to which the noble Marquess has alluded—namely, that General Townshend, in his action at Ctesiphon, fought against a force which must have been twice, and probably was three times, as large as his own. He inflicted very serious losses upon that largely superior force, and captured and brought back about 1,600 prisoners. That was a very fine feat of arms. And we must also remember that the comparatively small force which won this considerable victory was largely composed of Indian troops who had already been away from their homes for more than a year, who had endured the extreme stress of a whole summer in Mesopotamia, and yet who at the end of that summer fought as they did. No tribute seems to me too strong to pay to these men. I think that General Townshend, finding in front of him even further reinforcements of the Turks, was most wise in making his retirement as quickly and promptly as he did, and in doing so I think he saved his force from a great and growing danger.
I hope we may assume that at Kut-el-Amara this force is secure, and that reinforcements are being hurried to it as quickly as possible from Basra. Some day, I suppose, we shall know the reasons that prompted the plan of a rush so far from our base in order to seize Baghdad. The reasons, the noble Marquess has said, were both military and political. I can understand the political reasons, but I utterly fail to understand what the military reasons were. I hope that no further advance will take place unless a reasonable certainty of victory lies before us. We are face to face with an unpleasant failure; but we all like to think that, failure though it was, from the point of view of our fighting men it was a glorious failure.