§ *LORD BRASSEY,in rising to call attention to the increased military contribution demanded by the Imperial Government from the Colony of the Straits Settlements for the maintenance of the garrison, said: My Lords, in calling the attention of your Lordships very briefly to the increased military contribution which has recently been demanded from the Colony of Singapore, my chief desire is to give to the Straits Settlements Association, on whose behalf I speak, the satisfaction of being heard by your Lordships, and of receiving from the Secretary of State an explanation of the reasons which have guided the action of the Government. As an impartial Court of Appeal for every dependency of the Crown which considers that it has a grievance, Parliament is a powerful link to bind the Empire together. I will begin with the admission that the Straits Settlements owe the prosperity which they enjoy to the protection afforded by England, the Mother Country, and may rightly, in point of principle, be called upon to contribute to the cost of Imperial defence. The grievance alleged is that the amount asked is excessive, and that the demand has been made suddenly, without previous warning or consultation. It is not necessary to dwell on the importance of Singapore as a coaling station and as a link in the chain of fortified stations which give protection to our great trade with the East. The importance of the position has been greatly enhanced by the opening of the Suez Canal and the increase in the number of steamers engaged in the trade with the East. The defences of Singapore were carefully considered by the Royal Commission on the defence of the coaling stations. The additional works recommended have been constructed by the colony at a cost of £81,000. The Imperial Government has provided the armaments. In addition to the cost of the defensive works, the Straits Settlements have paid a large military 215 contribution for the maintenance of the garrison amounting for the year 1868–9 to £59,000, and for the subsequent years to £50,445 per annum. In addition to the military contribution, the Colony of the Straits Settlements maintains a large armed police force partly for purposes of public order and partly for purposes of local defence. Up to this point the colony has cheerfully given its co-operation whenever called upon by the Home Government in matters of defence. The complaint which I have very briefly to submit arose out of the Despatch received by the colony from the Secretary of State in 1889. In that Despatch the colony was suddenly called upon to contribute £100,000 per annum out of a total military expenditure estimated at £136,000. In addition, they were to pay £60,000 for the construction of barracks; and they maintain a fine body of armed Sikh police for local defence and the maintenance of public order. The colony object to the demand which has been made on the ground that the garrison and the defences are mainly needed for the protection of stores of coal kept at Singapore for the general purposes of Imperial defence. The Straits Settlements Association complain that the charge which has been laid upon them is heavier than any which has been demanded from any other Crown Colony, and they point to the fact that while it is true their revenue is considerable, it is precarious, depending, among other sources, upon the opium farms, which are becoming less and less productive. The Governor of the Straits Settlements, under orders from home, was compelled to use official pressure to obtain the consent of the Governing Council to the payment required from the colony, but he did so under protest. In his Despatch of February, 1890, to the Secretary of State, he stated that he was wholly unable conscientiously to support the claims which Her Majesty's Government had made, and that every member of the Executive Council, in voting for the payment demanded, voted against his conscience and contrary to the views which he entertained. I hope that the Secretary of State, in his reply, may be able to announce some modification of the present demands, or at least to give explanations which will satisfy the colony 216 more fully than they are at present satisfied, and remove the sense of injustice which at present exists in regard to the demands which they are compelled to obey. In conclusion, I would say that it is scarcely possible to deal with a particular case apart from the general question of the distribution of charges for Imperial defence as between the Mother Country and the several colonies and dependencies of the Crown. It seems to me this subject calls for a full inquiry by a Committee or by a Royal Commission. Such an inquiry is desirable to establish a standard of strength at which the Navy and the naval stations should be maintained for Imperial purposes, and especially for the purpose of affording reference to our trade; and it is also desirable to determine the share of the burden which the Mother Country ought to bear in the charge for Imperial defence; to ascertain the mode in which the self-governing colonies may best cooperate, and to fix the basis on which the contributions of the Crown Colonies should be assessed. I must acknowledge that such a subject as this is too grave to be taken up at the fag-end of a fatiguing Session, but I hope it may be entertained at a later and more favourable opportunity.
*LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYMy Lords, there is one point which appears to have been lost sight of by the Straits Settlements Association, and which has not been referred to by the noble Lord in his speech, and I think it ought to be put before your Lordships; it is that since the arrangement which was come to between the Government and the Straits Settlements in 1866 for the payment of £50,000 a year, in the time of the late Earl of Carnarvon, an arrangement was made for appointing Residents in the Malay States adjoining the Settlement, thus increasing the naval and military expenses for the protection of the Straits Settlements. Troops have been required for garrisons, and, on one occasion, when the war in Perak took place, the State of Perak had to pay for it. It has been necessary to have troops in Penang, as well as at Singapore, on account of British interests and the number of British subjects in the adjoining Malay States which have been virtually annexed. The trade with Penang and Malacca has very much increased, owing to the 217 arrangements made with the Malay States. The Singapore people were the people who asked to have those arrangements made in order that they might push their commerce and trade; and thus, I think, it is only fair that a larger amount should be asked from them towards the military expenditure now necessary.
§ *THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Lord KNUTSFORD)My Lords, the noble Lord who introduced this Motion has travelled, as he himself admits, somewhat beyond the terms which are on the Paper, and which are submitted for your Lordships' consideration, and he has raised questions of great importance, but also of great difficulty and complexity. I am not prepared at the present moment to deal with these questions; nor could Her Majesty's Government arrive at any decision upon them until they are submitted in a more definite manner for their consideration. The questions, as the noble Lord has said, are too large and important to be dealt with upon a Motion of this kind, and, I may add, that to find a reasonable solution of them will tax the resources of statesmanship. The noble Lord has suggested that the whole subject of Imperial defence might be referred to a Royal Commission or to a Committee. There is no doubt that such a Commission or Committee might be of great advantage in reporting upon the whole question of Imperial defence, and in laying down principles which might guide Her Majesty's Government in deciding what contribution might be fairly looked for from any particular colony. It might, for example, report whether, and how far, the British taxpayer should be relieved from the payment of the whole naval defence of the Empire, or how far the fact of the naval expenditure being undertaken by the Mother Country should be considered in deciding what military contribution a colony should be fairly called upon to pay for the defence of that colony. But it is manifest that such a Report, unless supported by the evidence of colonial statesmen qualified and authorised to give evidence upon the question, and to explain fully the views of Colonial Governments and Legislatures, would, I fear, carry but little weight, if any, with the colonies. Nor, again, could such a 218 Report, even if supported by such evidence, be held binding on our great responsibly-governed colonies. It might be of some assistance to Her Majesty's Government as laying down general principles, and it would tend to strengthen their hands both in this country and, perhaps, in the colonies when they were seeking assistance or a larger military contribution from them, but it would not relieve the Government of the day from an inquiry into each particular case, as the amount of contribution which can fairly be demanded must depend upon the special circumstances of each case—as, for example, upon the financial position of the colony, its revenue and expenditure, its trade, the sources of taxation upon which it can rely, and other local considerations. Having made these general observations upon the point to which the noble Lord has referred, I will now turn to the Motion before the House. I listened with attention to the interesting speech of the noble Lord, but I was unable to discover in it any new argument or any new ground advanced against the decision of the Government in addition to those which have already been urged by the Governor and Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements and by the Straits Settlements Association, and which will be found in the Parliamentary Paper published last March. These arguments have been dealt with in my Despatches of December 13, 1889, and January 1, 1891, and I have, therefore, but little to add to those Despatches. At the same time, as the decision of Her Majesty's Government has been questioned, I should desire, as shortly as possible, to state to the House the general bearings of the case, the principle which has guided Her Majesty's Government in the decision at which they have arrived, the main objections, which have been urged against that decision, and our replies. Before doing so, I wish to express my regret that there has been a feeling in the colony that they have been treated somewhat harshly and discourteously in that the decision of the Government was placed before them in my first Despatch in 1889, before they had had sufficient opportunity of discussing the subject in its details. Nothing could be further from my wish than to show discourtesy to the colony, and, indeed, 219 nothing could be more impolitic, in as much as we heartily desire the assent and co-operation of the colony in the decision at which we have arrived; but the following is an explanation of the course which was taken: The principles of the case had been fully discussed in the years preceding the transfer of the colony in 1867 from the Government of India to the Imperial Government. The main arguments now adduced were not only discussed in those years, but also at subsequent periods, notably in 1871 and 1873, when my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Kimberley) was Secretary of State for the Colonies. Moreover the Government, before coming to a decision, had the advantage of the Reports of the Committee of 1871, and of the very strong Departmental Committee of 1888, before whom all the Papers and documents were laid and carefully considered, and also of the elaborate and carefully expressed opinion of Sir Frederick Dickson, Colonial Secretary of the Straits Settlements in 1888. There had been necessarily some delay in deciding this question of the increase of the military contribution, and as the year was almost at an end in which the re-settlement was to commence, and as the first considerable increase was to be made for the year 1890, it was thought desirable in the interests of the colony itself that there should be no further delay, and that the decision of the Government should be at once announced. Bat the announcement of the decision was not intended to lessen the colony's opportunities of arguing against it, and, as a matter of fact, they have very properly and fully availed themselves of their opportunities, as I am sure my noble Friend will admit, and they have been supported by the Straits Settlements Association. If the arguments that were adduced had prevailed with the Government there would have been no difficulty about altering the contribution for future years and repaying any overpayment in the years 1889 and 1890. I trust that this explanation will dispel the feeling in the colony to which I have referred, the existence of which, I have before said, I much regret. As regards the question before your Lordships, I think the noble Lord agrees with me that the question is what is the fair share 220 to be borne by the colony and the mother country respectively, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the respective interests at stake. In considering that question I would observe that, in the first place, it is not denied that the colony should pay more than it has done of late years. That obligation was recognised by the Legislative Council by a Resolution which was passed in February, 1890, and which will be found at page 20 of the Parliamentary Blue Book to which I have referred. It may also be taken as admitted that the colony should pay half of the actual cost of military defence in addition to the entire cost of barracks. That is recognized by the third Resolution of the Legislative Council of the same date. Now, in dealing with this question of what is a fair contribution to be paid by the colony, it is necessary to go back to the time when the colony was transferred in 1867 and to the understanding then arrived at. What was the chief object of the colony in asking to be transferred? It was this: The colonists wished to escape from the very heavy defence charges to which the colony was subject as part of the Indian Empire, and in all the negotiations which extended from 1858 to 1866 the Home Government steadily refused to take over the colony until they were assured that no charge would fall upon the Imperial Exchequer for either the military or civil establishments of the colony. The transfer was not desired by the Government, and was only made in the interests of the colony itself. The colony accepted the conditions, and the transfer was made. The correspondence in the Parliamentary Papers of 1862 and 1866 makes this quite clear. It is now objected—and the noble Lord has pointed out that objection—that it is unfair on the part of the Government to attempt to apply to the existing state of things the principles laid down in 1866, when Singapore was but a small colony, a mere trade depôt, whereas now it has become a port of great Imperial importance and of paramount necessity to the maintenance of the Empire. It is objected that, by the opening of the Suez Canal, Singapore, which was in 1866 a remote and unimportant colony and entirely disregarded as an Imperial military station, has now become an Imperial 221 coaling station, of primary importance to the naval, military, and commercial interests of the Empire. I have dealt with this argument in my Despatch of January 10, 1891, which is found at page 64 of the Parliamentary Paper of March, 1891, and I would venture very shortly to read to your Lordships one or two passages which afford the answer to this objection. I there pointed out that these views as to the position and unimportance of Singapore in 1866 are not in accord with the opinions expressed by the Local Authorities when discussing the proposed transfer from Indian to Imperial rule. At that time the colony, when seeking relief from the heavy naval and military charges imposed upon it by its connection with India, did not admit, what it now asserts, that Singapore was merely the chief town of a remote and unimportant colony, entirely disregarded as an Imperial military station. On the contrary, it represented that the importance of Singapore as an Imperial station was such that a large portion of the defence expenditure ought to come out of Imperial funds. The same arguments and representations were made in urging upon the Government of that day the importance of the transfer as an an Imperial station by the Singapore Chamber of Commerce; and in a resolution passed at a public meeting of the inhabitants of Singapore in 1861, it was, among other things, resolved—
That the greatly increased expenditure incurred for military purposes entailed by the expensive system of fortification now in progress, should not be borne by these Settlements, as it is undertaken for Imperial, and not local interests.And the same view was urged in a Memorial from the principal merchants in London connected with the Singapore trade in the same year. I twill be observed that the arguments now urged against charging Singapore with the cost of its garrison are identical with those used for the same purpose at the time of its transfer in 1866; and subsequently, in 1871 to 1873, the period to which I have before referred when the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Kimberley) was in office, those arguments were again brought forward, and again disposed of. Looking to this fact, then, that the arguments urged in 1861 and 1866 were 222 held insufficient, I see no reason, I confess, why similar arguments repeated now for entailing a larger charge upon this country should be held as valid. Then it is further objected that the contribution of 1866 was stated by the War Office to be fixedWith regard to the wants and means of the inhabitants of the colony,and should not be increased. It is quite true that it was so fixed in 1866, and it is also true that it was fixed upon the same principle and upon the very same lines in 1889. Those who raise this objection have omitted to mention that, in addition to the words quoted, the following words were made use of in 1866 by the War Office:—It being a sine quâ non condition of the consent of the Imperial Government to the transfer that it is to cast no additional burden on the Imperial Exchequer.Nor again has reference been made to the further stipulation that the Government could enter into no agreement, that it would not increase or decrease the garrison, if circumstances should require it. In support of the objectors' case, a Despatch of Lord Kimberley's to the War Office in 1871 has been quoted and relied upon. In it the noble Earl stated that heWould not feel justified in imposing upon the Settlements any arrangement by which they will be rendered liable to an uncertain charge over which they have no control.But that Despatch referred to a very different question. When it is looked at it will be seen that it had no reference whatever to the cost of the garrison; it dealt only with the question whether the colony should be charged each year with the actual ascertained cost of the troops for the year, or whether it should be charged with the estimated cost, taking it for a fixed period. The former plan was the plan adopted by the Indian Government, but the noble Earl (Lord Kimberley) thought—and, if I may be allowed to say, thought correctly—that it would be better that the colony should know exactly what it would have to pay for a given number of years; and the principle of payment by estimate, and not by actual ascertained cost, was adopted, as I think, very much to the advantage of the colony. The colony made a very good bargain in 1867 by the transfer. The main object was, as I 223 have said, to get rid of the heavy charge not only for the military garrison, but also for the Navy, which it sustained as long as it was connected with the Government of India. Those charges, for some years prior to the transfer, fluctuated between 1858 and 1863 from 67 to 33 per cent. of the Revenue. In 1866, the year prior to the transfer, the charges amounted to 27 per cent. of the Revenue; while in 1868, the year after the transfer, they fell to 22 per cent. of the Revenue. They were further reduced, in 1871 and 1873, to about 16 or 17 per cent. of the Revenue, and they are now still further reduced by this last re-arrangement to about 15 per cent. of the Revenue. If the colony had not been transferred from the Indian Government to Imperial rule, its present defence charges would have amounted under the Indian scale to £236,800 per year, or 32 per cent. of its Revenue; whereas the £100,000 we now ask for is only about 15 per cent. of its Revenue. Perhaps I may be allowed to direct your Lordships' attention to page 12 of the Parliamentary Paper, 1891, and to a Table there set out, from which it will be seen that in 1872 the contribution of the colony in respect of military expenditure was reduced from £59,300, at which figure it stood from 1868, to £51,595, or 17.1 per cent. of the total Revenues of the colony, and that since 1873 the contribution has been £50,145. From 1871 to 1876 the percentage of military Expenditure to Revenue, as I have said, averaged 16 or 17 per cent., and then, owing to the fall in the value of the dollar in which these contributions were unfortunately received by the War Office, and owing to the very great increase of Revenue, your Lordships will see, if you look at page 12, that the percentage dropped gradually to 6.6 per cent. in 1887. No doubt the new charge will amount to about 15 per cent.; but that, as I have before pointed out, is a less percentage than during the years from 1871 to 1876; and the question we have now to consider is whether this is an unreasonable increase considering that it is a less percentage of the Revenue than from 1871 to 1873, and an extraordinarily less percentage than when the transfer was made. In fact, looking to the increase of Revenue, every re-settlement has been 224 in favour of the colony. I have pointed out that before the transfer of the colony in 1867 the percentage was 27 per cent. of the Revenue; immediately after it fell to 22 per cent. After 1871 it was 17 per cent., and now by the new arrangement it is about 15 per cent. Her Majesty's Government adhere, and have always adhered, to the principle of 1867, upon which the transfer was made, and it is not correct to state, as I think I have seen it urged by the Association and others, that the Imperial interest in the land defence of Singapore was recognised in 1866 by the assumption of the cost of the wing of the Hong Kong regiment there. This argument is founded on a complete misapprehension. The Government never consented to assume any part of the cost of the garrison of Singapore; on the contrary, between 1861 and 1866, it distinctly and repeatedly refused to take over the colony until it could be assured that no such charge would fall upon it. In order, however, to reduce the charge to the colony, without throwing any extra burden on Imperial revenues, it determined to keep one wing of a Hong Kong regiment at Singapore on the distinct understanding that it formed no part of the garrison paid for by the colony, and that it was liable to be removed whenever required elsewhere. This arrangement, which was continued under the agreement of 1871, is no longer practicable. In these days of quick attack, the garrison of Hong Kong must be at that post and not in Singapore. It has been found necessary to keep the wing at Hong Kong, and Singapore-must, therefore, now rely entirely upon its own garrison. This arrangement, however, saved the colony about £40,000 a year for over 20 years; and it is now rather hard to urge upon us that because they have been saved that sum all those years. The action of the Government should be considered as a recognition of Imperial interest, in the land defence of the colony, and as setting aside the agreement of 1866. Nor, again, is it just to urge, as has been urged, that the principle of the original agreement was abandoned by the arrangement made in 1884, under which the Imperial Government assumed the cost of the armaments, while the colony provided the 225 works. The transaction of 1884 had no reference whatever to the cost of the colonial garrison, but related solely to the cost of special works of defence then contemplated. The Parliamentary Papers of 1884 show that the question related not to Singapore alone, but to 10 or 12 colonies. It was then felt by the Government of the day that in spite of the agreement of 1866, to which they still adhered, it would be hard, in that special matter, to treat Singapore less favourably than, or on a different footing to, other possessions. To that extent the agreement of 1866 was departed from, and the military establishments of Singapore did cast an extra burden on Imperial revenues of about £194,000. That departure from the terms on which the transfer of the colony was agreed to in 1866 is no reason, however, for still further departing from those terms, and for permanently charging Imperial revenues with an expenditure for the garrison, which the colony, on its transfer, undertook to bear. The Home Government, I may observe, undertook to bear half the cost of Aden defences at the same time that it agreed to bear the cost of Singapore armaments, but the Government of India has never argued, as Singapore does, that the Imperial Government is in consequence bound to go further and permanently assume part of the cost of the garrison. But, my Lords, putting aside, for the sake of argument, the agreement of 1867 and other past arrangements, and assuming a large Imperial interest in the defence of Singapore, the contribution now called for is not too large in proportion to the respective interests—Imperial and colonial. It is worth considering, when we are charged with "harshness and extortion," what the British taxpayer pays in respect of the defence of this colony and of the Imperial interests therein. The cost of the military garrison and works is not nearly, as your Lordships know, the total cost of the defence. The naval defence forms a most important item in this consideration, and the whole cost of that falls on this country. In many cases it is extremely difficult to make even an approximate calculation of this cost, because, as a rule, ships are not told off for the defence of a particular colony, the policy of the Admiralty 226 being against assigning any fraction of the Fleet to particular areas. It so happens, however, as is pointed out in page 65 of the Parliamentary Paper of 1891, that out of the total force on the China Station it has been found desirable, for special reasons, to assign about 4,000 tons to what is called the Straits division, of which Singapore is the headquarters, and this force is rarely absent from Malayan waters. On the basis of a division of the aggregate naval expenditure by the total effective seagoing tonnage of the Navy, the cost has been calculated at (£40 a ton for effective charge yearly, £10 a ton for non-effective charge yearly), 4,000 × £50=£200,000 per annum; and this, therefore, is the sum which the mother country may be said to spend in the naval defence of the Straits Settlements, and which it may be assumed that the colony would have to spend were it an independent State. This calculation takes no account of the cost of defending the commerce of the Straits outside Malayan waters. It will, of course, be understood that I only refer to the amount thus paid for naval defence, for the purpose of showing that the British taxpayer pays a large share of the defence, larger even than the colony would bear if it bore the whole military defence; but I would observe that the cost of the Navy is not included in the calculation of the contribution to be paid by the colony. This, however, is not all. As regards the land defences, it must be remembered that since 1877 the mother country has laid out £194,000 in armaments and works, and that as the annual military expenditure is £136,000, and the colony, under existing arrangements, only pays £100,000, the mother country pays £36,000 a year still in respect of military defence. The reasons for our making this payment for the four years ending December, 1893, are stated in my Despatch to be—Out of consideration for the colonial finances and in order to lighten the immediate pressure of an application, to the circumstances of the present time, of the original agreement upon which the colony was transferred.As Mr. Stanhope showed in the House of Commons some time ago, the charge now made for defence amounts only to 3s. 6d. per head of the population of the colony, while in the United Kingdom the corresponding charge 227 amounts to 16s. or more per head. The noble Lord referred to the works of defence, and he stated one objection that has been raised, namely, that the garrison and defences are mainly for the protection of the stores of coal at Singapore, which are kept chiefly for Imperial purposes. But in 1885, when there were rumours of war, the colony took a very different view of the situation. It was then represented to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that—The increase of trade and agriculture in the States Settlements, and the large stocks of home and foreign products, including coals, which are stored there, must be subjects of the greatest anxiety, while the colony is at present practically undefended.It will be observed that not only "the home and foreign produce, including coals," but the valuable colonial docks on which the prosperity of the colony so largely depends, are now included in the defence which is now stated to secure Imperial interests alone. Then, again, it has been argued that it is not pretended that the defences, such as they are, cover the trade and town of Singapore. I might, perhaps, leave that to my noble Friend behind me to argue, but I may state shortly that the military opinion is that the new harbour defences taken in conjunction with the battery at Tanjong Katong, which was built at the request of the colony in 1868, and which has been re-armed with breech-loading guns in order to protect the town and roadstead, afford a degree of protection which would make an attack from the sea in the last degree in probable. I will only point out one other objection which has been made. I am unwilling to take up your Lordships' time, but it is important to satisfy the colony that we have a good case. The last objection I will refer to is that which regards Penang and Malacca. It is represented that no defences are provided for these places, while their revenues have to provide the cost of defending them. But this question of defending Penang and Malacca has been inquired into several times, and the Committee of 1871 reported that Penang and Malacca are, from their position and comparatively inferior importance, scarcely liable to external attack, and they did not recommend that any special protection 228 should be provided for them beyond the general protection which would be afforded by the Navy. That recommendation has been acted upon for some 20 years without ever having been called in question, and I must say it is rather late in the day to receive this objection as a reason why the colony should not bear the cost of its Singapore garrison. I trust I have established that the contribution now called for is—first, much less, in fact, less by one-half, than the colony would have had to pay if the transfer had not been made, and if it had remained under the Indian Government; second, that it is much less than the colony could be called upon to pay if the agreement of 1867 were strictly and rigidly enforced; third, that it is a very reasonable contribution if taken in consideration with the amount paid by the mother country for the Imperial interest in the defence of the colony; fourth, that it is a reasonable contribution when compared with the revenue of the colony, as it is based on a lower percentage than upon any former re-settlement or rearrangement of this question, and is more in favour of the colony compared with the increase of their revenue; fifth, I would add that, comparing it with the other colonies whose contributions have been revised, the Straits Settlement has not been dealt with unfairly. In conclusion, I would observe that, looking to the greatly increased and increasing cost and requirements of the military and naval services, and the consequent heavy and increasing burden upon the British taxpayer, Her Majesty's Government have had to consider, and in this they are only following the example of former Governments, whether some increase of colonial contributions should not be called for. In dealing with these questions, we have, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in his Budget speech in another place, "examined the matter in no narrow and exacting spirit." We have closely examined into the revenue, expenditure, trade, and sources of taxation in each colony from which a larger contribution is looked for. We have had no desire, and I think no Government would desire, to press for an extreme contribution or to bear hardly upon the colonies; and as to the particular 229 case now before us, I trust that, after what I have said, your Lordships will be of opinion that the decision of Her Majesty's Government is reasonable, and that this colony, considering all the circumstances of the case, has not been called upon to bear more than a just contribution towards its defence.
*THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYMy Lords, I think my noble Friend behind me was quite justified in bringing this matter before this House and those who have listened to the speech of ray noble Friend opposite will, I am sure, be glad that there has been an opportunity of thoroughly explaining the course the Government have taken in this matter. I was myself so constantly engaged during the time I was in office in a controversy of a similar kind, that I entirely sympathise with my noble Friend opposite in the difficulty which I have no doubt he has had in dealing with this question. I would make only one remark upon the statement with which the noble Lord commenced, in which I do not entirely agree with him, that is in regard to Her Majesty's Government having announced their decision in, I think, 1889, without having previously consulted the colony on the subject. The noble Lord said that that was entirely justifiable, because the principles upon which that decision was based had been laid down long before. That, no doubt, is perfectly true, but, at the same time, I cannot help thinking when there was to be an application of the principles in a new state of things it would have tended to smooth matters with the colony and would have been, I think, more judicious if the colony had been communicated with beforehand. Still, that is not really a very important point, because, as the noble Lord has said, there has been ample opportunity afforded for discussion, and I have no doubt that if the colony had been able to show that demand for increased military contribution was based on a misapprehension or that a change was advisable, Her Majesty's Government would have given their consideration to the argument; and if the decision had been found one which could not be supported, notwithstanding that it had been announced beforehand, they would have reconsidered the matter, and made any modification which might have been 230 necessary. My noble Friend has gone so thoroughly into the whole question, and dealt with it so fully and clearly, that it is only necessary for me to say very little. I can remember when this subject of the arrangements to be made upon the transfer of the Straits Settlements to the control of the Imperial Government from the Indian Government was under discussion, during the short time when I was Secretary to the India Office in 1864; and I well remember how strongly the Indian Department was at that time pressed by the Straits Settlements to make the change because they thought they were unduly taxed by the arrangements they were subjected to under the Indian Government, and certainly at that time, and I have no doubt afterwards there was no desire on the part of the Government to accept the change; on the contrary they disliked it very much. My chief then was the late Sir Charles Wood (Lord Halifax). He by no means desired that this change should be made, and he would have preferred that the original arrangements should have maintained. However, the conditions then agreed upon between the colony and Her Majesty's Government have been clearly stated by the noble Lord opposite (Lord Knutsford), and they were distinctly and plainly that the colony was to bear the cost of its military defence, and the arrangements that have been mentioned by the noble Lord that Signapore was not to be dealt with as an Imperial station were exactly then as they have been since. Since that agreement was come to, in what way has the situation changed? I think it has to some extent. The noble Lord read extracts from some of these Despatches, and I cannot help reading your Lordships one passage for the purpose of showing you how the matter was represented in 1861 by the Singapore Chamber of Commerce. They say that "Singapore is from its position the key of the China-Indo and Java seas, and is the coaling depôt" for mail and other steamers. There is the whole of their contention stated in plain language. That contention was taken into consideration when the conditions were agreed to in 1866. Now, in what respect has the situation changed? As I have said, I think to some extent it has, but then that change has been recognised by the 231 action of the Government at home. What has happened is that it has been found necessary to erect expensive fortifications at Singapore in order to meet the requirements of the present day. Her Majesty's Government did not expect the colony to be charged in 1886 with an extraordinary expenditure of that kind, and they very properly made themselves responsible for a considerable portion of the former armament, which may be called the extraordinary expense so incurred. That is by no means an argument why the original agreement must be set aside, but rather an argument, it seems to me, on the other side, and it shows that Her Majesty's Government have dealt generously with the colony in respect of an expense which could not have been foreseen, and which are no doubt heavy in amount. With regard to the figures which have been arrived at by Her Majesty's Government, I am not called upon to take any responsibility. It would require a most careful examination of the whole arrangement in order to deal with them, and to enable me to say that the sum arrived at is the exact sum which I should have arrived at myself if I had been responsible; but I see no reason to question that the Government have given full and fair consideration to the arguments adduced by the colony, and have arrived at what they conceive to be a reasonable and just settlement. Therefore, I do not desire to discuss the details of the arrangement, but would rather discuss the general principles of this matter, on which I entirely agree with the noble Lord opposite. In the first place, your Lordships must remember that this country has to undertake the whole naval defence of these colonies; that is the most important part of the whole matter, because there cannot be the least doubt that the safety of Singapore depends really upon our having the command of the seas. The safety of Singapore may for a time be guaranteed by fortifications, and it is very necessary there should be some fortifications to prevent any casual attack upon the colony by which it might be seriously damaged, or perhaps ruined; but in the last resort, if we were driven off the seas, there is no doubt that, fortifications or no fortifications, Singapore would fall. It is impossible 232 to put out of consideration the great expense which this country has to go to for naval defence, and the enormous advantage which the colony derives from this naval defence, to which it contributes nothing; and I make that remark not only in regard to the Colony of Singapore, but other colonies. In all these discussions it is most unjust and unfair to this country that you should look only to the military and not take into consideration our naval expenditure. With regard to the military expenditure, that has been divided by Her Majesty's Government in a way which, looking to the whole circumstances and revenue of the colony, they think just; and I think the simple fact which the noble Lord has stated, that the cost to every person in this country amounts, I think he said, to about 16s. a year, whereas in Singapore it only amounts to 3s. 6d., must carry conviction at once to everyone's mind that we are not treating the colony with any harshness which, of course, I should be sorry that we should do. The possession of this colony is, no doubt, of immense importance from an Imperial point of view, and, so far, I think it is quite right we should have contributed towards the works which have been recently erected, and in providing their armament; but the colony, although it may be of great importance in an Imperial point of view, must also be regarded as a great emporium of trade, and the maintenance of its position of great benefit to those who live in the colony; the merchants who have business in this great emporium, and the population inhabiting it live by that trade, and it is only reasonable that they should contribute to its protection in proportion to their means. No one can suppose that if Singapore was not rendered safe by the power of this country it would be in the same position it is in now, and in addition to that, as my noble Friend Lord Stanley of Alderley remarked, the advantages of the position have been greatly increased now that we have taken the protectorate of the various Malay States extending to the Siamese frontier. That has been a matter of great interest to Singapore, and it has been done in the first instance at the cost of the Imperial Government. Unfortunately there arose war in Perak, and 233 a great part of the expense in that war was paid by Her Majesty's Government, although I rather think the colony contributed something. The whole result of the matter is this: that I think in a question of this kind you must trust very much to the Government of the day to see that justice is done. It is a matter which can only be determined by the Colonial Office in discussion with the colony, and I can see no reason to suppose that on either side of the House, or in either House of Parliament, there is any disposition to treat the colony with severity or harshness in the matter. Certainly I should entirely deprecate such a course. I think we should err, if we err at all, on the side of not exacting the uttermost farthing, and I believe we have erred on that side, because if you look at what was paid by Singapore when under the Indian Government before the transfer took place, and if you look now to the sum which is demanded from the colony with reference to the improved defence which you have given to it, I think it will be seen that the colony has not substantial reason to complain. With regard to the very important and broad question which was raised by the noble Lord behind me (Lord Brassey) and which was touched upon by the noble Lord as to whether it would be desirable to have a general inquiry upon this subject. I should not like to commit myself upon that point. I should much doubt, looking to the various and different positions which our colonies occupy all over the Globe, some under responsible Governments and some Crown Colonies, whether any general inquiry would lead to any desirable result. For instance, I do not think it is at all desirable to raise this question with regard to the Australian Colonies or Canada. The Australian Colonies have been spending large sums in defending their ports, and Canada has also a considerable military expenditure. I doubt very much whether it would be advisable to re-open this question with them at the present time. Then, as to Crown Colonies. I think some light might be thrown on the subject by an inquiry, but I would make this remark, that whatever principles you lay down, the contributions must vary from time to time, according to the necessities of the case, and the changing aspect of affairs. I 234 exceedingly doubt whether you would find it possible to lay down any hard and fast rule. My own impression is that if you laid down such a rule on the Report of a Royal Commission or Committee five or six years hence you would have to modify that rule very considerably, and you would be considered to have bound yourselves by a set of regulations which, in point of fact, were not applicable to the new circumstances in which you were placed. However, I do not wish to express any strong opinion against such an inquiry if there are questions to be decided. All I desire to say, in conclusion, is this: that I have never myself had the slightest desire that we should press unduly upon this or any other colony; but, on the other hand, I think it only just and fair to the British tax paper that we should receive a reasonable contribution from these colonies for their defence, which if of importance to us is of far greater and primary importance to them.