THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN,in rising to call attention to the system of administration of the Army, and to move "That reforms are urgently required therein," said: In bringing forward the question of Army Administration, I am, I confess, under this disadvantage—that the whole of the evidence taken by the Select Committee of the other House on the Army and Navy Estimates is not yet published. I labour also under the disadvantage that it is so dark that I cannot read the extracts I have made. If there had been any reasonable expectation that an opportunity of examining the whole evidence given before the Select Committee would have arisen later in the Session, but not too late to be of use, I would have postponed this Motion. That, however, appears to be out of the question. At the same time, I have plenty of material to go upon, for the Report of the Royal Commission, presided over by Sir James Stephen, has been published for some months, and the evidence given before the Committee on the Army Estimates, and already published, is very voluminous. Both these publications are pregnant with meaning and teem with facts, and they deal with such great issues that it would be most unfortunate if the Session were to close without some distinct assurance from the Government that they mean seriously to take in hand the question of Army Reform. It is apparent that a state of affairs exists in the War Department, as regards the framing of Estimates and the keeping of accounts, the administration and personnel of the Department and the Service generally, especially the non-effective branches of the Service and the manufacturing department, which would not be tolerated for a single moment in any private business, however great and complicated; and I feel sure that, with the Reports of the Royal Commission and the Select Committee before them, the public will feel gravely alarmed unless convinced that the Government are animated by a strong and sincere determination to address themselves vigorously to the task of searching out the defects in our system, and applying the necessary remedies to them. In calling attention to these Reports I feel that I have under- 1067 taken a heavy task. It is impossible adequately to deal with, the subject within the compass of a speech in this House. If I attempted to do so I should exhaust your Lordships and myself long before I had exhausted the subject, and therefore I do not propose to go into the matter at great length. What I want to do is to take a general view of the main points, as indicated in these Reports, in order to try and bear out my proposition that reform is urgently needed. The whole subject as unfolded before the Royal Commission and the Select Committee appeared to divide itself naturally under certain large headings, such as the system on which Estimates were prepared and presented to Parliament; the form and method under which the accounts and disbursements of that great spending Department the War Office were kept; the administration of the Department and of the Army, and the possible economies that might be made therein; and, finally, the Non-Effective Vote. Of course, questions of expense involving taxation belong principally to the other House of Parliament, and I will not trench on the province of that Assembly; but in a question of this kind every taxpayer is interested as far as economy is concerned, and not only every taxpayer but every person living in the country is vitally interested in the question of efficiency. It will, therefore, be admitted that the matter is one which lies well within the cognizance of this House. The whole position, I admit, must be looked at with a full appreciation of the fact that our Army is a Volunteer Force, and that the abolition of Purchase caused a great expense. Making, however, full allowance for those facts, I believe that there is ample proof of considerable extravagance in many Departments, and of great extravagance in other Departments, combined with inefficiency resulting from the peculiar position of the Secretary of State, from the method of administration of the War Department, and from the peculiar system of accounts which involve an absence of all proper control, and, perhaps, from a too centralized system generally. With regard to the Estimates, the first thing about them which strikes one as remarkable is that the Secretary of State explained them in his Memorandum in such a way as to make it impossible for any ordinary human 1068 being to reconcile the Memorandum with the Estimates. The Accountant General, Mr. Knox, admitted that no private person could, without enormous labour, have divided the Army Estimates in the way and under the headings adopted in the Memorandum of the Secretary of State. The fact is that, to enable anybody but a trained expert to get any inkling of the meaning of the Estimates, the Secretary of State must explain then to Parliament in a form totally different from that in which they are printed. In other words, the Estimates, while intelligible or presumed to be intelligible to the War Department, are totally unintelligible to the public. The Accountant General says that the form in which they are prepared and presented is necessary to the Department for administrative purposes—that it is necessary in order that the Department may understand and check the expenditure. That seems to me a very peculiar state of things, and one very difficult to comprehend, because what it means is that, in order that the Estimates may be intelligible and useful in the Department, it is necessary that they should be unintelligible and useless to anybody outside. What would be thought of a Railway Company that prepared its accounts and balance sheet in a form unintelligible to the shareholders, and requiring to be explained by means of some different form not recognizable as another version of the form prepared for the Directors' own use? And what would be thought if the Directors justified this state of affairs on the ground that it was necessary to prepare their accounts in this unintelligible form in order to make thorn useful to themselves? I suspect that, under such circumstances, they would hear some plain English on the subject. Now, my Lords, the Accountant General stated, also, that he did not know what form the House of Commons would desire the Estimates to take. I do not know either, and if I did it certainly would be out of place for me to give any opinion on the point; but one thing I am well aware of—that the taxpayers of the country would wish the Estimates presented in such a form as to be clear and intelligible not only to the officials and experts at the War Office, but to themselves, and certainly to the Representatives whom they send to the other House. Does the method in which 1069 the Estimates are prepared tend to economy? Judging by what I have read in these Reports, it seems to me that it certainly does not. It is admitted that the Secretary of State is the only person who can possibly economize; but it appears obvious from this evidence that he is so situated as, practically speaking, to be able to exercise very little control over the framing of the Estimates. They are framed upon no given basis. There are no fixed data on which they can be formed; nothing with which they can be compared; and tins General Brackenbury clearly pointed out. They appear, first of all, to be blocked out roughly according to the Estimates of the preceding year, a proceeding which in itself sufficiently accounts for the fact that the normal Estimates of one year become invariably the normal Estimates of another year, and that the whole tendency for a long time has been towards constant and large increases. Then, my Lords, the heads of some sub-departments make out the Estimates by what they consider they require; after which there occurs a sort of fight with the Secretary of State, which Mr. Knox fairly describes as being very heavy work indeed. Considering that the heads of these departments or sub-departments have great technical knowledge, while the Secretary of State has very little if any at all, it is very obvious that in a conflict in which the Secretary of State endeavours to defend himself and the country from the assaults of these gentlemen, he is sure to get the worst of it. As far as I can understand—and I have looked into this matter as carefully as I can—it is impossible for the Secretary of State really to have any very definite, clear, and distinct understanding of what the general requirements of the whole Service are, or what the requirements of the different sub-departments are. That fact appears to have caused in General Brackenbury's mind his idea of what, he calls having a brain over the Army, a central control, a council of some kind, presided over by a military officer of great distinction, whose duty it should be to advise the Secretary of State as to requirements of the various sub-departments of the Army, who should receive and be responsible for allotting all the money among the various branches of the Ser- 1070 vice. I do not venture any opinion whatever upon that point, or on any other of the recommendations that are made. I only wish to say that, as far as I can judge, the only mode of securing economy at present within the power of the Secretary of State is that of insisting upon curtailment of the expenditure by a round, lump sum. He cannot go into the items, but he can say that the Estimates shall not exceed a certain amount. In that way economy can be secured, and in no other way whatever. At the commencement of this Session I ventured to say in this House—
That, in order to effect retrenchment, the positive cutting down of expenses, to a certain extent, must be preliminary to any such thorough overhauling of the great Public Departments as would result in real saving of expenses, and a practical and sensible remission of the taxation of the country.The Prime Minister objected entirely to that view, and said he did not think economy could be made by cutting down the Estimates first, and examining into their items afterwards; and he added—The only method and hope for economy is by careful examination of the items of expenditure, and the objects for which they are voted.Well, if anyone will read carefully the evidence given before the Committee of the other House, and the evidence given before Sir James Stephen's Commission, they will come to the conclusion that the Secretary of State might carefully examine the items until Doomsday without the remotest chance of effecting curtailment of the expenditure. So high an authority as General Brackenbury backs me up in the opinion I expressed some time ago, his idea being that the Secretary of State should say decisively how much money Parliament will grant for the whole Military Service of the country, and that then some high military authority will look into all the items, examine carefully the requirements of the Department and its various sub-departments, and allot among them the sum so granted. His view is, therefore, that the examination of items and the allotment of money should be undertaken by officials, and that, as far as economy is concerned, the Secretary of State should do nothing, practically speaking, but decide, after consultation, on the gross amount to be given to the Service. Judging from the evidence before the 1071 Royal Commission and the Select Committee, he can exercise very little control, practically, over the expenditure of the War Office; and if he has no control, it is perfectly obvious that Parliament has very little or none at all. I spoke just now of the incomprehensible way in which the Estimates are presented. I do not want to trouble the House with many instances, but I will mention one or two. It is quite impossible for any human, being, not an expert, to tell how the money is expended, and in what sub-departments of the War Department. Between 1870 and 1887 our Estimates have increased by the enormous sum of £9,000,000. It has been a gradual and continuous increase, and yet the Accountant General admits that it would have been extremely difficult for any ordinary person to have discovered that so great an annual increase was continuously going on. That appears to me a most astounding and alarming admission—that the accounts of the Army are presented in such a form that no ordinary man, nobody who was not an expert, could possibly find out that an enormous yearly growth in the expenditure was going on.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Lord HARRIS)was understood to ask where this statement of the Accountant General was to be found?
THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN(after searching among his papers): I am afraid I cannot find the passage just now. What I meant to say was that the Estimates had increased to the extent of £9,000,000 in 17 years, and Mr. Knox admitted that no ordinary person, looking at the Estimates year by year, could ascertain that such an increase was going on. I will not, however, go further into that matter, as I cannot find the passage in the evidence. But, whether Mr. Knox made the statement or not, it is certainly very difficult for an ordinary person to find out in what particular branch of the Service money has been expended, what it has been spent upon, and whether the nation has received full value for it. It is also admitted by Mr. Knox that it is very difficult to ascertain the proportionate increase of men to pay and of pay to men. That can only be arrived at by rule of thumb. It is evident, further, that the number of men, as 1072 borne on the Vote which satisfies their pay, cannot be ascertained by an ordinary person—cannot be arrived at by anybody without immense trouble. Various items are spread over an immense number of Votes. Take one, for instance. The purchase of horses was included in the Vote for Regimental Pay. Pay-sergeants' pay was not included at all in the £45,000 for regimental accounts. The Vote for Pay does not by any means show the total coming under that head, because pay in money alone is mentioned, pay in kind not being included at all. In the case of the Vote for Divine Service precisely the same difficulty occurs. It is impossible to find out by the Vote what the whole expenditure upon Divine Service is, because large items, such as the salary of chaplains, is not included, and the £800 per year paid to the Chaplain General does not appear at all. In fact, it is necessary to look over three or four other Votes to find out approximately what the whole cost of Divine Service in the Army is. The Medical Department is precisely in the same case. There you have the astounding fact that whereas the Vote accounted for only £324,000, the total expenditure was really £704,000. I need not multiply examples. I do not think anybody will deny that, as a general rule, no Vote shows on its face what the total sum expended really is. You cannot ascertain by looking at a single Vote the total sum expended on the branch of the Service which the Vote is supposed to satisfy. This appears to me to be a very extraordinary system of book-keeping. It is impossible to find out under any one heading what the total expense to which that heading relates really is. It is, moreover, impossible to trace the money. Items are spread over different Votes, and you have to look through many of them to find out what the different items really are. It appears to me that such matters ought to be made as clear as possible to the general public—certainly to Parliament—whereas under the present system they can be understood only by men, who have had long experience, and who may be called experts in the examination of accounts. As to the general supervision of War Department finance, the Accountant General is nominally responsible under the Secretary of State for the whole; but an enormous sum, amount- 1073 ing to £8,000,000 annually, is under the Surveyor General of the Ordnance Now, the Accountant General is a permanent official, a man of great experience, who thoroughly understands the accounts with which he has to deal; but the Surveyor General of the Ordnance cannot possibly be expected to understand the finances of the Department, seeing that his is a political appointment, into which he goes probably without any knowledge of Army accounts, and which, except in rare cases, he does not retain long enough to acquire complete knowledge of so complicated and technical a subject. The fact of the matter is that the subordinates of the Surveyor General, the heads of sub-departments, such as the Clothing Factory at Pimlico, Woolwich Arsenal, the Powder Factory at Waltham, the Commissariat, the Transport, and so on, frame their own estimates, and render their own accounts, subject to no control whatever. That is a principle which seems to pervade the whole of the Estimates. What it comes to is this—that the chiefs of the great sub-departments and the commanders of districts, fortifications, &c, make a rough guess as to what they will require, and, on the understanding that they will not get near as much as they demand, ask for a great deal more than they need. That point was brought out very strongly by Colonel Duncan, Commander of the 1st Division of Artillery at Woolwich, who said—
It is the allotment of money I object to. I think if a General knew that he would be rewarded if he were a good economist in his district, there would be an enormous amount of economy brought about. At present, the General knows he will not get what he asks for, so he asks for double what he wants.That, my Lords, does not appear to be a system likely to work economically. General Brackenbury, speaking of the Heads of great Departments, such as the Commander-in-Chief, the Inspector General of Fortifications, and the Director of Artillery and Stores, speaks strongly in the same way—None of them, so far as I can judge, is responsible for economy. The only check I know upon any of us soldiers is simply the knowledge that we are not likely to get all we want; but there is no military head at the War Office who is responsible for taking those various demands for works and fortresses, for stores and guns, for men, transport, vehicles, and so on—there is, I say, no great military head at the War Office who is responsible for 1074 taking those various demands, comparing them, collating them, and seeing which can be dispensed with, and which absolutely cannot be dispensed with, with safety to the defensive scheme of the nation.That, as I said before, reveals a state of affairs not very likely to result in economy. As a matter of fact, the way in which the Estimates appear to be arrived at is a very rough one—namely, a number of gentlemen, no doubt very amiable and very estimable, but of whom, the public know nothing, prepare what Estimates they think necessary for the requirements of their own particular sub-departments, and prepare them in a way of which the country and Parliament have no cognizance whatever. They are then submitted to the Accountant General and to the Surveyor General of Ordnance, who, in their turn, submits them to the Secretary of State, who presents them to Parliament with a Memorandum detailed in such a form that no human being who has not been, in the War Office for many years can make head or tail of the matter. Under such a system, it is unreasonable to suppose that the Secretary of State can possibly form any distinct, clear, and sound judgment as to what the real requirements of the War Department are. It will be in the recollection of your Lordships that when the late Chancellor of the Exchequer resigned his Office, the question of making a reduction in the Army Estimates came prominently before Parliament and the country; and the Prime Minister, speaking on the question, said—We are not prepared to cut off a considerable lump sum from the Estimates which my right hon. Friends at the head of the Admiralty and the War Office declared to be necessary for the defence of the country.Well, my Lords, that would be a strong, and I think I might say unanswerable, argument, if it were possible to suppose that the Secretary of State could really thoroughly understand what the requirements of the Army are. But in both these Reports—that of the Royal Commission, and that of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, so far as it has already taken evidence—it is distinctly shown that there is no military sub-department, or council, or adviser who can tell the Secretary of State what is absolutely necessary and what is not, and that, practically speaking, he has no control whatever over the Esti- 1075 mates sent up by the various sub-departments. Under those circumstances, the argument that it is impossible to reduce Estimates because the Secretary of State has spoken of them as necessary is very much invalidated. I have nothing more to add about the Estimates; but I should like to say a few words on the question how expenditure can be checked and verified. In the first place, the Appropriation Accounts are not presented to Parliament until nearly two years after the time when the money is voted—a fact which in itself makes it almost impossible for Parliament to exercise any effective check over the expenditure. In the case of a great Railway Company the balance-sheet is furnished every half-year, and within a few weeks of the time at which the books are closed. Mr. Hurst, the Auditor Accountant of the Army Manufacturing Sub - Department, admits in his evidence that the accounts of the War Department are not so complicated as those of a great Railway Company, and that, practically speaking, there is no reason why the Appropriation Account should be so long delayed. Now, how are the accounts audited? Mr. Hurst, speaking about his own sub-department —the Army Manufacturing Department—admits that the Appropriation Account is prepared without any communication with the Auditors. There is a Return presented to Parliament detailing very minutely all the expenses of that sub-department; but that Return is prepared without any reference to the expense accounts as audited. It is admitted in evidence to be worthless in so far as it enables any ordinary person to verify the accounts by the Auditor, because it is impossible for anyone to make the two accounts agree— to make the audited account agree with the production account. Now, the Surveyor General's Department spends annually the enormous sum of £8,000,000, and, practically, the heads of the sub-departments appear to be their own auditors. As far as I can judge, they ask for as much money as they like, get as much as they can, prepare their accounts in their own way, and audit them themselves. In the Manufacturing Sub-Department which spends £1,600,000 a-year, Mr. Hurst is both accountant and auditor. Therefore, the accounts are kept and audited by one and the same person; 1076 and it appears that the accountant has not the least idea whether the money he accounts for is spent in the way he intended. It is quite impossible for the Surveyor General to see that his accounts are properly audited; and it is admitted by Mr. Hurst that the Director of Artillery Stores, General Alderson, not only had the spending of a large proportion of the money voted to the Surveyor General, but also audited the accounts, which were supposed to show how it had been disbursed. The method of audit is, also, subject to peculiar variations, the Royal Carriage Department, for instance, specifying all details in its audit, whereas in the case of the Royal Laboratory the accounts are audited en bloc. In some cases the audit appears to be made, not on the real accounts, but on a valuation, which may be very erroneous. For instance, it appears that stores estimated at £145,000, and which stand in the cost ledger and in the audit at that figure, realized in reality only £98,000. It appears to me, therefore, that the audit of the War Office expenditure, based, as it is in some cases, on totally erroneous figures, and, in some cases, conducted by officials employed in the very Departments in which the money is spent, must be looked upon by the public as little better than a sham. This extraordinary arrangement has not even the merit of being cheap. A double audit, under which every pay list sent up to the War Office is audited all over again, is supposed to be necessary, owing, I imagine, to the centralization of our system; but it causes an immense amount of expense without adding one atom to accuracy or efficiency. On that point Colonel Duncan says that a saving of £50,000 a-year might be made if the double audit were done away with; and, according to General Brackenbury, if it were abolished the clerical staff at the War Office, which is very large, might be diminished by one-half. One would suppose that stock-taking, which is an essential part of the business, would be conducted at the War Office in a businesslike way. On the contrary, it appears to be very spasmodic, and not done in some cases for four, five, or six years. It is based, not on actual examination of the articles in stock, but on an inspection of the books; so that it is impossible to ascertain with certainty that things for which money has been voted by Par- 1077 liament, and which have been paid for and appear all through, the accounts, really exist at all. Then, my Lords, the general conclusion which I am forced to come, after reading this evidence, is that, as far as the accounts are concerned, nobody but an expert can possibly understand them. They appear to be kept in the War Office in such a way as to combine the maximum of expense with the minimum of clearness and lucidity; and, as far as the outside public are concerned, I doubt whether the audit which takes place is, frankly speaking, anything better than a sham. It is, from the way the accounts are kept, impossible for anybody to find out what proportion the requirements of the War Office bears to the whole amount voted to the Army. It is impossible to say what is spent on the whole Army, and what is spent on any particular Department of it; it is impossible to tell what number of men we have; it is impossible to ascertain what amount of guns we have, and what they cost us; it is impossible to find out what number of small arms we have, what quantity of munitions of war we have, and what amount of material we have. I do not mean to say that is impossible for an expert in the War Office; but I should say, taking the accounts as they are presented to Parliament and known to the country, it is impossible for any ordinary man to discover what the country pays in the different parts of the Army, and what the people of this country have in the shape of material and men for what they pay. If our system was designed, as the German system is believed by General Brackenbury to be designed, to produce such an amount of darkness and ignorance as to make it impossible for the outside world to interfere in Army matters, I should say our system was admirably devised to prevent Parliament and the public putting any check on the expenditure. That is the sense in which it seems to me to be devised, and my contention thereon is amply borne out. Now, my Lords, I would like to say a few words as to the Army administration generally, and the alleged extravagance that takes place therein. First of all, I would touch upon the Non-Effective Vote. The Non-Effective Vote appears to be out of all proportion to the strength of the effective branches of the Service—a 1078 Vote which is increasing so rapidly that, as described by Colonel Duncan, it "increases so rapidly that it will one day crush us." The Non-Effective Vote is very largely swollen in consequence of the change that is made in the abolition of Purchase, and on account of our short-service system. Short service is the alternative to a huge conscripted Standing Army. It is essential to our condition and requirement. But, at the same time, the great expenditure, under the head of half-pay and pensions, is abnormally large and should be checked. The total annual cost of the retired pay and half-pay is nearly £1,300,000. Of this, no less than the enormous sum of £62,000 a-year is paid to 109 Generals, who are not employed, now, and are never likely to be. As regards education, there appears to be some difference of opinion in evidence before the Committee. With respect to Divine Service, the opinion is not so divided. There is a strong opinion expressed by Mr. Knox and Colonel Duncan that in case a reduction can be made by making use of the local clergy wherever practicable. On the Medical Service the expenditure is enormous, whether taken by itself or compared per man with the expenditure under the same head with the other Armies; but it is necessary to procure a good article. Now, it seems to me that the Medical Profession undertakes to Boycott the Army. It may, perhaps, be worth while to see whether the Army cannot retaliate a little on the Medical Profession. It must be noted, moreover, that according to Sir Thomas Crawford, Director General of the Medical Department, a sentimental grievance exists which is to be overcome by a money equivalent. If that is so, sentiment should be satisfied, and the pockets of the British taxpayer eased. There is one great fact which is applicable to all these non-effective branches of the Service, including the administration of military law, and which, indeed, applies to the Effective Service, and that is the disproportion in the pay of the higher grades of officers as compared to what is given to the lower grades of officers, non-commissioned officers, and to the rank and file of the Army. In the latter cases the pay is certainly not excessive, and compares unfavourably with what is given in the same grades of Foreign Armies. This fact stands out very strongly 1079 marked, and deserves the grave attention of the Government. There are many cases in which, according to the evidence contained in the Reports, great and unnecessary extravagance prevails in many quarters. The system of payment appears to be a crying evil. The way in which the men are paid involves an immense amount of clerical labour, and, consequently, of expense. The payment of officers, under which the Array agents receive a commission of l½ per cent, amounting altogether to £23,000 annually, for doing what an ordinary banker would do in the ordinary way of business for nothing, is scandalous. A large saving may be made in the administration of the War Office, according to high authorities, by the substitution of military for civilian clerks. The Staff of the Yeomanry costs a sum out of all proportion to the available strength of that branch of the Service; and it is alleged by General Fraser that a great saving can be effected, and in the Staff of the Militia and Volunteers also, by utilizing the services of some of the large number of officers who are at present drawing large pay for doing nothing. It will be very instructive to know, in connection with this point, what is the real condition and value of the Yeomanry, Militia, Volunteers, and Reserves, as regards mobilization. Can they at short notice be properly equipped with transport, and everything necessary to enable them to take the field? If so, it is possible to judge of what the nation got for its money. If not, it is impossible to judge. Troops are of little or no value, whatever they cost, unless they can take the field. Competent witnesses also have spoken strongly of the amount of needless correspondence about trifles, and the redundancy of Returns which our highly centralized system entails. As to the much more serious matter—the constitution of the War Office itself— Colonel Duncan expresses a very strong opinion, with what justification I cannot say; but I must admit I was not surprised at his opinion, judging by the evidence. He described it as—Quite the most irritating form of administration that exists; it is not efficient, and the expense is outrageous, practically £250,000, which is a great deal too much.On the same point General Brackenbury says— 1080The present system leads to extravagance and want of efficiency … There are a number of separate departments in the War Office working on parallel lines which never meet.He complains that there is no great military head at the War Office charged with the duty of taking demands, comparing them, collating them, and seeing whether they can be dispensed with with safety to the defensive scheme of the nation; and he adds —There is no fixed military policy; there is no fixed standard to which these things can be referred, I consider the system of having these different departments, each responsible for the efficiency of one particular branch of the Service and never brought together, is conducive to extravagance, because it is impossible for the Secretary of State or the permanent Under Secretary to check these demands, and to say which are really necessary from a military point of view, and which are not; and it leads, I think, to a want of efficiency, because there is no plan—no systematic military policy—to which all these things can he referred, which would be based on the principle of our coat being cut according to our cloth.These are very strong words, especially as coming from an officer of General Brackenbury's great experience, and occupying a high and responsible position. These are words which I hope will be taken to heart by the country, by Parliament, and by the Government. And what does the nation get for this great outlay of money? If the expenditures are too great, and the Military Services of the country perfect, but too large, the case will be bad. If our Army and defences are inadequate for our needs, and the Army Estimates very low, the case will also be bad. But the case, as it really exists, is infinitely worse, for our expenditure is extravagantly great, and the efficiency of our Army in many important branches most lamentably small. These imperfections are brought out very clearly in the Report of Sir James Stephen's Commission, for the appointment of which, according to the Report of the Commissioners, the country has largely to thank Colonel Hope. There is some danger that the cloud of condemnation which has fallen on Colonel Hope, on account of his charges of corruption, might obscure the general charges of inefficiency, which are admitted by the Commissioners to be true. It may be supposed by the public that, the charges of corruption having fallen to the ground, the charges of inefficiency fell with them. Such is not the case. In the interest of the Public Service it 1081 is a great mistake to assert that Colonel Hope has no foundation to stand upon. The Commission state that—Some matters of suspicion as to some of the inferior officers of the Ordnance Stores had been proved.The Commission admit that some cases cannot be thoroughly inquired into on account of not possessing judicial powers, and others because it is not armed with inquisitorial powers. The Commission is, no doubt, perfectly right as regards the charges of fraud, and I do not for one moment condone Colonel Hope's action in the matter; but I think that in justice, and in view of the great services rendered by him, it should be borne in mind that he is right in many of his facts, though wrong in his deductions from them, and that some of the circumstances are of a most unfortunately suspicious character. By suspicious circumstances, I mean the holding of shares in a great firm carrying out Government contracts, by officers employed in the manufacturing departments of the Government. That has been put a stop to by an Order emanating from the Secretary of State a few months ago, and a very good job, too; for the transaction, though perfectly innocent, was calculated to give rise to suspicion. We have the fact that officers employed in Her Majesty's Service were leading members of a private firm which was employed in taking other contracts and providing other Governments with munitions of war. That was stated by the War Secretary to the House of Commons some months ago. I have not got a copy of that part of the Report.
THE EARL OF DUNRAVENI have not got the papers with me; but if the noble Lord says that is not the case——
THE EARL OF DUNRAVENIf a statement that Captain Noble and Major Jones were members of a private Company has not been issued from the War Office, I would withdraw the whole statement. But if I am correct in saying that, I will continue to say that such an order has been issued; because, although I am perfectly convinced these transactions were absolutely innocent, I do not think any reasonable man can 1082 deny that it was possible they would give rise to suspicion in the country, and it is desirable that anything which would give rise to suspicion should be avoided. The other matters I wish to allude to are transactions in connection with guns. As your Lordships know, a small Committee, on which Sir William Armstrong sat, and of which Captain Noble was Secretary, authorized the Armstrong guns. Your Lordships also know that Sir William Armstrong took service under the Crown as Engineer of Rifled Ordnance; but he afterwards left that, and went back to his manufacturing department at Elswick. There he was also joined by Major Jones, who had been employed by the Government, and Captain Noble, who had been employed in a manufacturing department of the Government. There is no reason why officers who have been in Her Majesty's Service should not join private firms; and there can be no reason, except expediency, why an eminent firm making guns should not be employed under the Crown; but, at the same time, it appears to me that the transaction is colourable, and that it may give rise in the public mind to some improper ideas: and I hope in future things of that kind may be avoided. As to the result of our expenditure, it was shown before Sir James Stephen's Committee that the Armstrong guns turned out utterly useless, and that these cost the country a waste of £3,000,000. Then as to the Collingwood guns; 15 of these were made, and one, I believe, failed when it was tried, one blew its muzzle off on board the Collingwood, 13 were withdrawn to be chase-hooped, and it was doubtful whether they would ever be of much use in the service of the country. As to the cutlasses, we know that those made in 1882 turned out unfit for use. They were passed by an officer who knew nothing about the subject, and it is only now said they were discreditable. To quote the words of the Report, "this is highly discreditable, and a grave reflection on the system." We know of defective bayonets, cutlasses, and saddlery having been supplied to our troops. We learn also from the Report that some 70,000Enfield Martini rifles have been manufactured. The Committee has been sitting on that rifle for six years, and yet, after all, it is not to be adopted, for the rifle has turned out useless. As regards cart- 1083 ridges, fuses, and shrapnel shells, the I same gross carelessness and culpable ignorance or neglect are to be traced. Major Hunter, writing from Korti, March 19. 1885, said—
Of the 110 shrapnel shells, 55 were found defective, some had no bursting charges, and others had the bursting charges wet.On this General Redvers Buller wrote, March 30, 1885—These Reports (Major Hunter's) disclose an alarming state of affairs.…I am told that this sort of thing is set out at Woolwich in piece work, there is only a nominal supervision, and the supposed inspection is a sham.…in fact, the work is scamped.Lord Wolseley wrote on this to the Secretary of State for War—I have already addressed your Lordship on the subject of the carelessness shown by those responsible at home for the quality of the ammunition supplied to the troops in the field, in issuing star shells of a different calibre from that of the guns of the battery serving here. I trust the new proof contained in the enclosed papers of the culpable negligence of some branch of the department at home will lead to an inquiry into its working by a Board of selected officers of the Line, unconnected in every way with the Woolwich manufacturing or store departments, or with the administration under which they work. I write strongly because I feel strongly when I think of how the lives of gallant soldiers may have been sacrificed in the present campaign, and may beagain so sacrificed in the future, through the inexcusable carelessness of individuals in the Woolwich Arsenal, and through the unsoundness of a system under which such ammunition as that described in these enclosures could possibly have been issued for service in the field.It is no wonder Lord Wolseley wrote strongly on the subject. Nothing can be more necessary than that men should be properly armed. It is essential to the safety of our men, the success of an expedition, the security of our shores and of the Empire, that our soldiers and seamen should be properly armed. The men, fortunately for them, not being subject to the contracts of departments remain of as good material as they ever were; but the weapons with which they are armed, unfortunately, in too many cases fail. But we are told this is the fault of a system; but the system is composed of individuals, and the responsibility ought to rest upon the shoulders of those individuals. So long as the defects which occur in matters of this kind can be put down to the fault merely of our present system, so long there will be no adequate reform made. It is absolutely necessary the system should 1084 be reformed by the condition of making the men who are supposed to be responsible really responsible, and by judging of their capacity by results. The case was summed up in the Report of the Commission thus—We think the charges of inefficiency, both generally and in a variety of particular instances have been proved to a considerable extent.Anyone who reads the Blue Book will admit that the Commissioners used language inappropriately mild, and will come to the conclusion that carelessness and inefficiency are proved up to the hilt and to an alarming extent. As regards the system of the War Office, the Report condemned it—The Secretary of State and the Surveyor General of Ordnance are practically in the hands of their subordinates, and this destroys all real responsibility and all effective superintendence. The present system is directed to no definite object. It is regulated by no definite rules. It makes no regular stated provision, either for the proper supply and manufacture of warlike stores, or for enforcing the responsibility of those who fail to make them properly, or for ascertaining the fact that they are made properly.These words are very strong, and they have been before the country now for a considerable time, and I should like to know what steps have been taken to remedy defects? Looking at the evidence of the Royal Commission and of the Stephen's Commission, I should like to know whether what the Report says is true, or, if it is not entirely true, to what extent it is true; and I should like to know, if it is true, what steps will be taken to remedy this state of things? The Secretary of State is practically responsible; but then there is practically no effective Departmental superintendence over the stores which are issued; and, if that be so, I should be glad to know what steps Her Majesty's Government are taking, or intend to take, in order to remedy this state of things? With the recommendations that have been made, I have, of course, nothing to do. All I wanted to do was to substantiate my contention that reforms of the whole system in the War Office are essential. Some things are absolutely proved, and other matters are indicated. It seems to me to be proved that, making all allowances, such as that our Army is a Volunteer Army, it is proved that, contrasting our Army with that of Germany—which is supposed to be the best organized in. 1085 the world—and making full allowance for conscription, and all other factors in the case, the cost of our Army enormously exceeds that of Germany. I think it has been proved that there is no efficient Departmental control over the defective stores that are issued. It is proved that the Secretary of State is practically unable to exercise efficient control from the point of view either of efficiency or economy; and it is proved that Estimates and expenditure are prepared, accounted for, and audited in a shape which make it impossible for Parliament to exercise a proper control there. It is indicated that the larger employment of military clerks was desirable; that the expense of the Staff is out of all proportion to the effective strength of the Army, especially of the Auxiliary Forces; that our system is too centralized, and our method of pay cumbersome and extravagant; and it is asserted that great retrenchment is practicable in these directions. On July 26 the Under Secretary of State for War, speaking about Sir James Stephen's Commission's Report in so far as it related to charges of corruption, described this department as being "capable of amendment." I venture to think the words "capable of amendment" are much too weak, and are totally inadequate to describe the state of things which really exists. I hope my noble Friend will to-night give the House and the country some assurance that, in view of the evidence given before these Commissions and this Committee, Her Majesty's Government do not think that the condition of the War Office and the administration of the Army generally can be adequately described by merely saying that it is "capable of amendment." I have not gone into these matters at great length; but I think I have substantiated my case in showing that reform is urgently required. I most earnestly hope Her Majesty's Government will be able to afford their approval to the proposition. I do not expect, and no sane man could expect, such an Augean stable to be cleaned out in a short time; but I do hope the Government will do something to grapple with the evils which exist. I hope there is a distinct understanding that they do appreciate and understand the grave scandals which have been brought about, and that they are determined to seriously 1086 grapple with them. I thank your Lordships for listening to what has been a rather long statement; and I wish, before I sit down, to apologize to the House for not having at hand the quotations which my noble Friend asked for. I beg to move the Resolution which stands in my name.
§ Moved to resolve, "That reforms are urgently required in the system of administration of the Army."—(The Earl of Dunraven.)
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Lord HARRIS)said, the noble Earl had asked their Lordships to agree to a Resolution that the question of organization of the War Department was urgent, and he had based his argument upon the Report of the Royal Commission, over which Sir James Fitzjames Stephen presided, and the Report of Evidence taken before the Estimates Committee of the House of Commons. Although he did not quarrel with the noble Earl in the least for the voluminous references he had made to the evidence taken before the Estimates Committee, he would point out that that was merely a Report of Evidence, and did not include anything like all the witnesses that were to be called as representing other Departments of the War Office. The Committee itself, moreover, had come to no decision at all upon the matter under consideration, unless it were that it had recommended to the House of Commons—and the recommendation had been agreed to—that an independent audit should be made of the Ordnance Department Estimates. Seeing, therefore, that the whole evidence had not been presented, and the whole case for and against the War Department was not before the House of Commons and the county, he submitted that it would be unreasonable to ask their Lordships to give a decision upon a Resolution with which they could not be conversant until the whole case had been presented. Now, with regard to the Report of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's Commission, he would point out that it was a Commission to inquire into the system of adopting patterns and stores, and how those patterns and stores were obtained and passed into the Army; it was not appointed to inquire into the system of administration as regarded the whole War Department. 1087 There was, however, another Committee, to which to his surprise the noble Earl made no allusion—he referred to the Committee over which Lord Morley presided, and which was appointed by Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, to inquire into the organization and administration of the manufacturing department. The Report of the Committee would have been a very valuable one for the noble Earl's contention, and it really seemed to be a most important Report. It was for that Report that the Secretary of State was waiting before he could decide what changes, if any, were necessary in the system of the War Office. The Report having now come in, he should be able to tell the noble Earl presently what the Secretary of State was prepared to recommend to Parliament. With reference to his criticisms of the manner in which the Estimates were prepared and presented to Parliament, the noble Earl would admit that those now at the War Office were not responsible for the present system. If there was something wrong in the system, he admitted they would be responsible if they did not consider it, and inform the country that they thought a change was necessary. But when this very matter had not been considered by any Commission or Committee of recent years, and it was now under the consideration of the Estimates Committee of the House of Commons, it was most unreasonable to ask those holding responsible positions at the War Office to say what changes were necessary and what those changes should be before all the evidence had had been presented to that Committee. Before stating what changes were feasible, as regarded finance and the system of audit, the Secretary of State would prefer to wait until all the evidence and the Report itself were before him.
LORD HARRISobserved that if he substituted the word "reform" instead of "change" he would meet the contention of the noble Earl. Now, to go more into detail the noble Earl stated in no measured terms that the system had resulted in great extravagance and in great partiality, and he quoted the opinion of General Brackenbury. But if he gave support to General Brackenbury's 1088 idea there was this difficulty about it— that the great military head who should be responsible to see that both matériel and personnel were efficient would not be practically responsible unless he was in Parliament, and he would be unable to represent his own view, and the reason by which he supported it, to Parliament except through the mouthpiece of a Secretary of Slate. Now, he (Lord Harris) could not conceive a Secretary of State content to take a position of that kind unless some responsibility also attached to himself. The noble Earl referred to the desirability of laying down a definite plan of what we required, as regarded both matériel and personnel, for the protection of this country, the Crown Colonies, and the various parts of the Empire; but the difficulty of foreign affairs here came in, as was shown the other day on a question raised by Lord Chelmsford, and it would be exceedingly difficult for any body of men, however experienced, to say what might be the requirements of this country under conditions which were altogether obscure at present and which might never arise. What the Military Authorities ought to be prepared to do and what they were doing as quickly and surely as they could was to show the country what resources it had at hand, and what were the best means by which those resources might be thoroughly efficient. That was the work which they had taken in hand, and he hoped the Secretary of State would be able before Parliament rose to place it and the country in possession of certain parts of his mobilization scheme. He did not deny that the accounts, as at present made up, did not show as clearly as might be what was the exact cost of each department of the Service; but it would not be very difficult by means of sub-heads to show what extra charges should be applied to particular items under different sub-heads. To a certain extent that was done already, and there was no objection to giving further information by that means. At the same time, he must say he thought there was a well founded objection to any radical change in the present system. The items were, as far as possible, collected under heads which, if they did not give absolutely correct information, still gave clear information up to a certain point, and the noble Earl must remember that these Estimates 1089 had been presented year by year to the House of Commons, which had been prepared to accept them in that form. Now there was apparently an objection to that form, and it was difficult to say off-hand what the best form was. He was sure, at all events, that as far as they could the Department would meet those objections. Then the noble Earl had passed on to the Ordnance Vote, and on that he had shown some approval in speaking of General Brackenbury's idea of further decentralization. The noble Earl approved of doing away with the War Office audit altogether instead of having a double audit of the Paymaster and the War Office, but he would remind him that unless he was going to accept the audit of the Paymaster he must have a double audit somewhere. There would have in that case to be a Treasury audit almost as critical as that of the War Office, and the result would not mean economy, since while they might do away with the clerical staff now rendered necessary at the War Office, they would have to increase the staff of the Treasury. The noble Earl had made a reference to the system in use in Germany, and had contended that our system would not compare with it. For his own part, however, he was very doubtful whether the House of Commons would be prepared to deal with the Army accounts in the same way as they were dealt with in Germany. Even in the case of a great military Power like Germany, where everything had to give way to the military element, the system of accounts took two years before expenditure could be checked. When the noble Earl had gone on to speak of the relative cost of the German Army with our own, he thought it was a pity that the noble Earl had not referred to General Brackenbury's statement with regard to the system of accounts kept by each Army Corps—
Each army corps is practically its own accountant; each of these 19 army corps itself renders full account of that share of the general Budget which has been allotted to it to spend. This comes up direct to the War Office, of which the financial department is an exceedingly small one; these accounts are practically just added together and passed on as the Provisional Budget of the year to the Chancellor. This Provisional Budget is then first of all accepted always by the Legislature; those accounts are subsequently sent to the Court of Account, the 1090 Imperial Audit Office, to be audited. That takes two years. In the audit of these accounts the German Audit Office finds certain items which were not apparently authorized by the Reichstag, those being transfers from one Vote to another, an excess of expenditure upon one particular Vote; in fact, it finds many things in which the actual expenditure does not compare with the original estimate put forward. It I sends them back to the War Minister, the War Minister gives the Emperor's statement that those things were necessary; the Audit Office takes that as a sufficient voucher; they consider it as done, and pass these accounts on as passed and audited to the Reichstag: this being two or three years after the expenditure has actually taken place, the Reichstag naturally has nothing to do but to vote the money.Did the noble Earl think that the House of Commons would ever consent to an audit so superficial as that? The noble Earl had referred to the Non-Effective Vote, and he alluded in particular to certain general officers as drawing high non-effective pay, and snggested that considerable economy might be made in that direction. On that point he thought they must have further evidence before coming to a decision; but, at any rate, whether a mistake has been made or not in the system of retirement, it surely could not be contemplated that the State should break the existing contracts into which it has entered -with these and other gallant officers. It must be remembered that the present Government was not responsible for the expenses consequent on the change in the system of retirement. With regard to the Medical Department, that was now engaging the attention of his hon. Friend (Mr. Brodrick), who would consider it during the Recess. The Educational Vote should also have his best attention, and he (Lord Harris) thought economy might be effected there. With regard to the question of the Yeomanry and Volunteers, it was undoubtedly the case that the administrative part had been neglected. Owing to the patriotism of various officers corps had been raised throughout the country, and in many cases corps had been formed of one arm of the Service where another would have been more useful. That had now been checked. If mobilization I were necessary, the whole of the Yeomanry, and to a large extent the Volunteers, would be put into the field, and he hoped that the administrative departments would be found 1091 orthcoming. The noble Earl had referred to Captain Noble and Major Jones as holding shares in the Elswick Company. He was sure the noble Earl had not intended to say anything that was not absolutely correct, but if he had looked at page 53 of the Report he would have seen that the Committee considered with regard to these officers that not only were the charges unfounded, but there was no foundation to justify their having been made. With regard to the Motion of the noble Earl, he might state, that a Committee of the House of Commons was at present sitting taking evidence as to the financial system of the War Office, and until that Committee had reported it would, of course, be premature to say what reforms would be made. The Reports of the Royal Commission and of Lord Morley's Committee were, however, already before the Secretary of State, and with regard to the matters dealt with in those Reports the Secretary of State would in a few days announce to the House of Commons the changes and reforms upon which he had resolved. He hoped that the noble Earl would be satisfied with this explanation, and withdraw his Motion.
THE EARL OF DUNRAVENsaid, he thought it would have had a good effect in the country if the Government had accepted this Motion, and had thus shown that they regarded the necessity for reforms as urgent, but as they would not accept the Resolution he would withdraw it.
LORD DENMANsaid, he would never vote for such a Motion as this; he was reminded of words by Lord Houghton—
………."who can knowThat Realms and Monarchs may not sink togetherInto the deep of blessed eternity,And love and peace be all the Universe?But this was not the noble Lord's opinion, for he said—" The Sick Man might take up his crutch and conquer those who tried to spoil him." He (Lord Denman) said that our Army and Navy would have the best possible weapons, and if any fault arose in the administration, that the pluck of our soldiers and sailors would remedy it.
§ Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.