HL Deb 01 May 1885 vol 297 cc1273-9
VISCOUNT BURY,

in rising to ask Her Majesty's Government, Whether, having regard to the announcement made in both Houses of Parliament on 21st April, to the effect that the Forces in the Soudan are to be henceforth considered available for service wherever they may be required, and that the Vote of Credit of £11,000,000 "does not include any provision for further offensive operations in the Soudan," they will give a distinct assurance that ample provision will be made for insuring the safety and rewarding the services of the Mudir of Dongola, and of others who have been in active alliance and armed co-operation with the British Forces in the Nile Valley, as well as of the friendly tribes who have joined the British standard at Suakin? said, that there had been a great many massacres in the Soudan, and a large number of people had perished uselessly there. Inquiries had often been made why they were there, and what they were going to do; and now, when the Nile Expedition was pronounced to be a useless failure and their troops were to be retired, when their Forces on the Red Sea were to be held disposable for future events and to go they knew not whither, the whole subject of this Soudan Expedition, in which they had been engaged so long, seemed likely to remain a matter of hopeless mystery, and he supposed they would never know either why they went there, or what object, if any, they had attained. On the 26th of February the noble Marquess behind him (the Marquess of Salisbury) moved a Resolution, one part of which was— That the policy of abandoning the whole of the Soudan after the conclusion of military operations will be dangerous to Egypt and inconsistent with the interests of the Empire. That question was debated, and a statement was made in both Houses of Parliament which most distinctly declared that the policy of the Government was not to abandon the Soudan, but their object was to overthrow the Mahdi at Khartoum. In reply to a Question put in the other House by an independent Member, the Prime Minister very warmly disavowed the construction put upon his words, that he contemplated abandoning the Soudan as soon as the Mahdi was overthrown. Nothing had changed in the Soudan. They were still confronted by the power, be it more or less, of the Mahdi; they did not know what were his objects or what his resources; and if they were bound to attack him then in Khartoum, they were equally bound to attack him now. If they did not, it was simply because the hot fit had been succeeded by a cold fit, as it had so often been before in the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and that they had, in fact, got tired of their objectless slaughter of those brave men who had been pronounced on the highest authority to be persons "rightly struggling to be free." The strange point was that throughout the whole transaction they were told that they were not at war. They had been engaged since 1880 in military operations; but they never amounted to war. Mark Twain, in one of his books, described an interview he had with a French gentleman who was about to engage in a duel, and whom he said he found immersed in a profound French calm. But he added that a French calm differed in some material particulars from an English calm, and that it induced the French gentleman to tear his hair, to foam at the mouth, and to break up the furniture. At the time of the interview he was engaged in smashing his last chair. He could not help thinking that the phase in which they had been so long involved resembled the calm in which that French gentle-man indulged. The whole policy of Her Majesty's Government in the Soudan and in Egypt seemed to have been simply to take the minimum of responsibility with regard to their dealings in that country. No doubt there was a time, after the bombardment of Alexandria, when the fortunes of Egypt remained absolutely at the disposal of England. Three courses might have been pursued. They might have allowed the Egyptian Government to make itself feared, to hang Arabi, and to establish the old form of Government. He did not say that that would have been a right course to pursue. Then they might have assumed the government of Egypt themselves, and established a strong Government on lines which would have been acceptable to the English people; and the third course—a course which Her Majesty's Government adopted—was to rule under the cover of a Native Prince, to thwart and insult him at every point, to paralyze his influence, to reduce him to a mere cipher, to do as little as possible themselves, but to do that little from behind the mask of their puppet, the Khedive; to allow the finances of Egypt to go to absolute ruin, and the Government to anarchy; to proclaim at every moment their non-responsibility for what was taking place, and then, when the Egyptians showed some signs of independent action, Her Majesty's Government turned against them suddenly with savagery and anger. This third course Her Majesty's Government pursued, and the natural result of their policy was anarchy, ruin every day more profound, and paralysis at the very heart of Egypt. Her Majesty's Ministers, it was true, amused themselves in establishing some form of representative Government in Egypt; but the domestic policy which had been so successful in this country was utterly and absolutely inapplicable on Egyptian soil. In July, 1882, there came the revolt in the Soudan, and, true to their fatal policy, Her Majesty's Government disclaimed responsibility. The Egyptians took the matter into their own bands, and announced their determination of retaking the Soudan; but Her Majesty's Government advised them not to do so. Then followed General Hicks's Expedition to restore order in the Soudan. At first Hicks had some success; but from January to May, 1883, things assumed a different character. The General was shut up in Kordofan, and in November his whole Army of 11,000 men was defeated and massacred. Upon Her Majesty's Government must rest the responsibility for that Expedition and massacre. In the same year the Earl of Dufferin's Mission was sent to Egypt, and the noble Earl recommended that certain parts of the Soudan should be resigned, and that a certain part should be held. The wise counsel of the Earl of Dufferin was never followed, and matters were left simply to drift. A month after the massacre of General Hicks there came another massacre, that of Moncrieff at Tokar, and then the Government seemed to wake up from their attitude of positive neutrality to imme- diate action for the moment. They determined to evacuate the Soudan, and they declared that the Egyptian Ministers who would not consent to the dismemberment of their country should be dismissed. In February, 1884, yet another massacre took place—Sinkat fell. Public opinion in England was certainly stirred to its depths by that event, and the immediate result was the sending out of the first Expedition of General Graham on the 12th of February. The first Expedition of General Graham to Suakin was immediately after, and consequent upon, the massacre at Sinkat; and the last Expedition of that General was immediately after, and consequent upon, the massacre of General Gordon. Two battles were fought in February and March, 1884—Teb and Tamanieb—and thousands of brave Arabs were killed. It was magnificent on both sides; but it was not war. The result of those battles was the withdrawal of General Graham as fast as possible to his ships. After that five months of inaction took place, and during that time the Government were deciding what further steps they would take. The Prime Minister, in "another place," stated that during those five months the Government were considering what was the best way of getting up the Nile to Khartoum; and he was not ashamed to say that the time was not too long in which to come to a decision upon so momentous a point. On the 23rd of April, soon after Gordon was shut up in Khartoum, Berber was invested. That investment was denied in that House, and in the other. It was said Berber was not in danger, and that the Government were without information which tended to show that relief ought to be sent. On the 10th of June another massacre of 5,000 men ensued, and Berber fell. Then came the Vote of Credit for £300,000, that miserably inadequate Vote. They now knew that £15,000,000 was the sum that had been ruthlessly spilt in the sands of the Soudan. On the 11th of February news came that Gordon had died in defence of Khartoum; so that all the gallant blood of their soldiers was spent in vain, and their gallant opponents were slain in vain, and the Relief Expedition was so much wasted energy and courage. It would have been far better never to have gone there at all. In February General Graham went out once more to Suakin to establish a route from Suakin to Berber, and to co-operate with the Nile Expedition, and join hands with Wolseley, who was on his way to Khartoum. What had been the effect of all that? One objectless battle after another. The best blood of England was sent out to die at Suakin. And they were told now that the whole of that was at an end; that their troops were wanted elsewhere; that the whole of their blood and treasure had been spent in vain; and that this Expedition had ceased. At the beginning of that time there were 10 fortified places in the Soudan; and, besides Hicks Pasha's Army, there had been massacres at Sinkat, Tokar, Teb, Tamanieb, Berber, and Khartoum, Now, Kassala still remained; and he believed that the garrison of that and Sennaar were the only garrisons which still remained unmassacred. They were going to withdraw from the Soudan; but they had had allies and friends. Among them was the Mudir of Dongola. Were they going to repeat in the Soudan what they had done elsewhere? Would the Government give some assurance that means would be adopted to prevent their Allies and friendly Arabs from suffering because they had helped them? They might have had more help if the Arabs had not feared that they would desert them. They could not by scuttling out of the Soudan get rid of their responsibility to those who had been friendly to them, nor of their responsibility in Egypt. Egypt was their road to India, and from the beginning that had been recognized. If they left Egypt to its fate, it would be at the mercy of France, and Englishmen would not like to see the highways of India in the hands of any Foreign Power. They must, therefore, remain responsible for the affairs of Egypt. If they withdrew, they must do so with their responsibility on their heads. He, therefore, trusted the Government would be able to say that they had made arrangements to protect those who had been friendly to them. The Prime Minister once wrote— The curtain has been slowly rising, and what a scene has it disclosed.…. We look hack over this tract of lethargy as over days of case purchased by dishonour; the prolonged fascination of an evil dream. They have not understood the rights and duties which inseparably attach to this country.…. They have been remiss when they ought to have been active. They have been active where they ought to have been circumspect and guarded. They have seemed to be moved too little by an intelligent appreciation of prior obligations and of the broad and deep interests of humanity, and too much by a disposition to keep out of sight what was disagreeable and might be inconvenient. These words were taken from the pamphlet on Bulgarian horrors. Worse horrors, and more directly connected with English rule, had been transacted in the countries of which he had been speaking within the last two or three years. He concluded by asking the Question of which he had given Notice.

EARL GRANVILLE

The noble Marquess opposite the Leader of the Opposition, two or three days ago, asked me whether I was prepared to make any communication with regard to the Egyptian policy of the Government? He expressed a wish that such a statement should be made, and asked me whether I could fix a day for that statement. It was a request which the noble Marquess had every right to make, and it came with very great authority from him. It was with regret I said that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, such a statement would be premature, and I declined to make it. I said it was impossible for me, at that time, to make a statement with regard to Egyptian policy. The noble Viscount who has just sat down prefaced the Question of which he had given Notice by reading to us a very long essay—an essay which appeared to me to bear a very strong family likeness to a long speech which he made when the Vote of Censure was moved—a speech which I have no doubt greatly contributed to the adverse vote which fell from your Lordships on that occasion. But in the essay to which I have just alluded the noble Viscount has not stated a single ground for supposing that it would be proper or consistent in me, having declined to answer a Question put to me by such authority as that of the noble Marquess, two days afterwards to go into a statement as to a great portion of our Egyptian policy. I am quite sure the noble Viscount, on reflection, will not be surprised at my not answering the Question he has put to me.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I am not surprised that the noble Earl opposite should feel stung by the eloquence of the speech we have heard from the noble Viscount near me. I shall not attempt to go into the lamentable history which he has so well sketched. I fully acknowledge that the noble Earl opposite is the master of the time when he will think it right, having regard to the state of public affairs, to explain the policy of the Government. I regret that there should be so much delay in the performance of that task; and I do not believe that the task will be less easy, or the result more acceptable to the people of this country, by reason of delay. The time for balancing the books must come. We must ask ourselves how much blood has been shed; how much money we have poured out on the deserts of Africa; what we have got to show for the blood of our countrymen and others that has been shed, and the money that has been thrown away; and what we have done for the reputation of England? How can we defend ourselves for the treatment of many whom we have induced to risk everything on our behalf, and whom, when the danger came, we left in the lurch? How can we defend ourselves before our countrymen for having repeated the sad story of Candahar and the Transvaal, and allowing garrison after garrison, tribe after tribe, to be defeated? My Lords, this is a terrible account which must be rendered, and the sooner it is rendered the better. At present, if the policy of the Government in Egypt is to be what it seems to be, I am afraid the opinion passed upon it will be that our friendship has been a curse to every tribe and nation, to whom it has been offered, because it has always been followed by desertion.