§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI rise, for the first time, to occupy the most honourable office of Leader of this House, and to express the hope that, during the time I have the privilege to occupy that position, I may be honoured with that support from your Lordships which you have always given to the Leader of this House, and that I may not be held to fall short of the distinguished men who have preceded me. The political events of the last few days render it unnecessary that I should remind you of what 1632 you are acquainted with by the ordinary means of communication, of what has taken place "elsewhere," and especially with the correspondence which has been read in the other House of Parliament; and it is not necessary that I should add very much to the statement which was there made. There are only one or two supplementary facts which, for the understanding of our conduct in this matter, it is necessary that your Lordships should know; but upon which, being matters of a private and personal, more than of a public, interest, I shall not dwell at any unseemly length. When I was summoned by Her Majesty to Balmoral, my first representation to Her Majesty was that, owing to the peculiar legislation which had taken place, the country was in a position of a very exceptional kind—that a Bill had practically passed through both Houses of Parliament by which a Dissolution of Parliament had become impossible, and that the House of Commons was practically, therefore, without that direct responsibility to the constituencies which is an essential part of its Constitutional position. I represented to Her Majesty that, under these circumstances, it was, in my judgment, desirable that the Government, whose legislation had produced this state of things, should take charge of the management of Parliament during the abnormal interval that must transpire before the constituencies could be consulted; and I, while readily acknowledging the responsibility which rests upon any political Party that has produced a defeat of the Government in the House of Commons, was of opinion, in the wholly peculiar and abnormal position in which we stood, that the course I recommended was the wisest to pursue. Her Majesty was graciously pleased to communicate to Mr. Gladstone these opinions of mine. A telegram was sent, in which I urged him to take these circumstances earnestly into consideration, before he finally resolved upon his retirement. Her Majesty received a telegram in reply, in which Mr. Gladstone, reciting some of the events that had taken place, said that, after these events, the retiring Government was precluded from reconsidering its resignation. That was, no doubt, a very important statement, and laid a considerable responsibility upon the Conservative Party. It appeared to 1633 me, however, that, under the circumstances, it would very much assist the conduct of public affairs and the welfare of the Public Service, if the Leader of the majority of the House of Commons would give those pledges which were necessary as an assurance that, in this strange and unusual interval, the Business of Parliament should be wound up with all practicable smoothness and despatch, and that an appeal to the constituencies should take place at the earliest time. Your Lordships are aware of the correspondence which has passed, and you are aware that Mr. Gladstone declined to give specific pledges. In the last letter, however, of that correspondence his attitude was, to some extent, modified. If I might borrow a form of language which, perhaps, might be attributed to him, I should say that, although his pledges were not specific, his general pledges were specifically applied. This last letter, however, I confess did not produce at first upon my mind the impression that we were sufficiently secure from an early recurrence of difficulties and crises to make it desirable that we should undertake the duties of Office. At that stage Her Majesty spontaneously was pleased to intervene—not, I need hardly say, with the slightest partiality for one Party or another; for, throughout the whole of Her Reign, Her Majesty has maintained the most admirable and Constitutional position of impartiality between the two Parties; but simply to call my attention, in very earnest language, to the injury that was being done to the great, the highest interests of the State by the prolongation of the Ministerial crisis; and Her Majesty was pleased to add that, in her opinion, I might reasonably accept Mr. Gladstone's assurances. This testimony of Her Majesty to Mr. Gladstone's loyalty I hardly needed, because I never doubted that loyalty—I doubted the application he would make of the principle on which he acted; still, I could not but pay great deference to an opinion so expressed. What, however, pressed much more strongly upon my mind was the representation which Her Majesty was pleased to make of the evils which a prolonged interval of Ministerial suspension were likely to cause. I could not but consider that in connection with the telegrams which had passed at Balmoral, if it had been 1634 possible simply to hand back my task to the retiring Ministry and to call upon them to go on, there would have been much to be said in favour of adopting such a course in the peculiar position of public affairs—I mean the peculiar position arising out of the impossibility of a Dissolution. But that issue had been cut off by these telegrams, and I felt that if I now declined the responsibility of Office on behalf of myself and my Friends, I should be compelling Her Majesty to recur either to new Leaders or to new combinations—that a very great and long delay must necessarily intervene, and that the evil of suspense to the Public Service would probably exceed any evil which we might incur by dispensing with Mr. Gladstone's specific engagement, even if we took the most unfavourable view of the intention which his refusal to give this engagement might imply. Under these circumstances, with the unanimous consent of my Colleagues, I thought it was my duty to assume Office. With that statement I will close any further reference to a subject with regard to which, if I were to push it further, I think I might justly be accused, at a moment of considerable importance and anxiety, of thrusting personal matters into undue and inconvenient prominence. My Lords—rightly or wrongly—we considered that the balance of advantages to the Public Service would rather be consulted by our accepting Office than by our declining it. It is needless for me to dwell upon the question whether we were right or not. The history of the next four or five weeks will furnish a better commentary than any that I could offer, and I trust and earnestly hope that the result will show that we struck the balance in the right direction. My Lords, the time has not come when I can make to your Lordships any statement of the policy of Her Majesty's present Government upon the various difficult questions that lie before us. We have only just entered Office, and we have only just at this moment had access to the information upon which our policy must be based. Before many days have elapsed, it will probably be my duty to make some statement of that kind. In the meantime, I hope I may say that, in circumstances probably more difficult than those in which any other Government has acceded to Office in recent 1635 times, we may look to the kindly and considerate support of our countrymen. We believe that, in view of the state of public affairs, we shall not meet with any large number of politicians who will, of set purpose and desire, impede the progress of government. On the contrary, I am glad to say that I have received, from many moderate men who have no connection with our Party, an assurance that, during this interval, they will do their utmost to forward and smooth the progress of affairs, and enable us to carry on the Business of the country. I feel sure that, at all events, we shall enjoy the support of those out-of-doors who are outside Party strife—who desire that the Public Service should be carried on, and who wish that the interests of the Empire may not be neglected in consequence of the difficulty of arranging Parliamentary disputes and antagonisms; and whether our term of Office be long or short, I earnestly hope that our motives in approaching such a task will not be subject to misconception. Much has been said out-of-doors by some who are even mainly responsible for the position of the prospects of any Government which takes Office at the present time. I believe that distinguished men have talked of the certainty of our being swept off the face of the English constituencies from Devonshire to Cheshire. Well, my recommendation to these distinguished men is not to attempt to add to their many other claims to popular admiration any pretence to the title of prophets. There is no department of human affairs in which prophecy is more dangerous than politics. If they will look back on history, they will find that some of the Ministries which lived the longest were not those which took Office with the highest prospects of predominance or success. One of my earliest recollections of politics is the advent of Lord Palmerston's Government to power in 1855, during the time of the long frost, and I remember then that it was a popular saying that the frost would outlast the Government; but, with very little interval, Lord Palmerston was in Office for, I think, 10 years. I need not refer to the instances further back of Lord Liverpool in 1812, and of Mr. Pitt in 1784; but I deprecate all prophecies of this kind. I do not believe that it is in the power of any political organization, or of any public 1636 man, however clear-sighted, to look behind the veil which hides the Parliamentary future from our eyes. I do not think that it is our duty to- take any such probabilities into account in the course we shall pursue. We have to devote our energies to performing our duty to our country and our Queen for the time during which we are in Office, without any reference to whether it is to be long or short; and in that course I am convinced we shall have the sympathy and support of four countrymen.
EARL GEANVILLEMy Lords, the noble Marquess began his observations by making a very graceful appeal to the House to give him that support which the Leader of the House has generally received from them. I cannot resist the opening which he has just given me for saying very shortly how deeply I feel the general and cordial support I have received from my Friends while holding the position of the Leader, and at the same time the indulgence and forbearance shown to me personally by those who sit opposite to me. My Lords, I should have been very sorry if it had been considered necessary for me to make any lengthened comment upon anything which has fallen from the noble Marquess to-day, and still more if that comment should have had to be of a contentious character. The noble Marquess has made something like an apology for having accepted the command of the Queen to form a Government. It appears to me that that apology is unnecessary. The noble Marquess has, I think, followed a perfectly Constitutional course. I should be the very last person to raise any objection to what he has done; because, if I remember rightly, on almost the very last occasion in which I spoke in this House, I deprecated the existing Government being embarrassed and weakened in their dealings with Foreign Powers, but I strongly urged on those opposed to us the propriety of turning us out if they were able and willing to do so. The noble Marquess only a few weeks ago declined to announce his policy unless he was in Office. He said the urgent necessity of the moment was not to provide a policy, but to change the Government, and to turn out rulers incompetent to deal with public affairs. This declaration was followed by a Vote of Censure of a vital character, proposed 1637 and carried in the House of Commons. It appears to me, according to all the rules of Constitutional principles, the noble Marquess is perfectly entitled to the place he occupies, and that he need not apologize for accepting Office. The noble Marquess has alluded to one or two points which have induced him to do so. One was with regard to the necessity created by Mr. Gladstone's declaration that he would not form a Government. I must go into a little more detail than the noble Marquess on that subject. I think it was on the 11th of June that Mr. Gladstone was asked whether, in the case of the noble Marquess failing to form a Government, he would, with his Colleagues, be prepared to remain. He answered that the refusal or inability of Lord Salisbury would obviously change the situation. Upon that his resignation was accepted. The noble Marquess went down to Balmoral, and it was understood that he went, though not to kiss hands, to accept the duty of forming a Government. On the 13th a question was put to Mr. Gladstone by the Queen, at the instance of the noble Marquess, to which he has referred. Mr. Gladstone answered that no new circumstances had arisen since the noble Marquess was understood to announce publicly his readiness to take Office, and that acceptance of resignations was announced to Parliament yesterday. This precluded any reconsideration by the retiring Government. On the afternoon of the 22nd Sir Henry Ponsonby, whose activity, judgment, and tact in the difficult duty he had to discharge is generally recognized by the noble Marquess and ourselves, according to a note which Mr. Gladstone made at the time, stated that the Queen believed that the late Government did not wish to come back. Mr. Gladstone simply reminded him of his own previous reply, and to the statement he had made that the failure or refusal of Lord Salisbury to form a Ministry would alter the circumstances. He said he could not promise that in such a case matters would be perfectly smooth; but he did feel that in the position which he held it was his duty under such circumstances, as far as he was himself concerned, to make every effort to prevent Her Majesty being left without Advisers. As to the Queen's letter, I should like to go a little more 1638 into detail. On an inquiry from Sir Henry Ponsonby, acting under the commands of Her Majesty, Mr. Gladstone suggested that possibly a letter from the Queen to Lord Salisbury, testifying to the sincerity and loyalty of Mr. Gladstone, might re-assure the noble Marquess. The only difference which comes out in the correspondence has, I think, been fairly stated by the noble Marquess. Whereas he for a long time insisted upon specific pledges, Mr. Gladstone entirely refused to give specific pledges which he considered would compromise the liberty of the House of Commons; but in every way, and even with unusual expressions, he showed the cordiality and the sincerity of the determination of himself and his Friends not to throw anything like factious opposition in the way of the Government now forming. Mr. Gladstone certainly suggested that letter with the notion that it might re-assure the noble Marquess in regard to the sincerity of those declarations which he and his late Colleagues had made. That that letter was written is only an exemplification of what the noble Marquess has said, and what I confirm completely. I am not astonished at it, because there has been no exception in such cases from the course which the Queen pursued. That course has been, as regards both the outgoing and incoming Administrations, perfectly Constitutional, so far as I know. The noble Marquess appeals to my Friends not to occupy the position of prophets. I have not the slightest wish to do so. I am perfectly unaware of what the issue of the next General Election will be; but why he should impress on us the duty of not becoming prophets I do not know, seeing that he himself gives us a most clear prophecy, based on historical recollections and ingenious inferences, that he intends to retain his present position for the next nine or 10 years. I will not prophecy myself, but I leave to the noble Marquess all the pleasures and advantages which such self-confidence may inspire in his mind, and in that of his supporters.