§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I want, before we adjourn, to ask the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) 766 for some explanation with respect to the draft of the Instructions given to General Lord Wolseley which have been laid on the Table since our last separation. They are very remarkable Instructions, both in their origin and in their character. My memory may mislead me; but I doubt whether I have ever seen the genesis of Instructions laid bare in an official manner as they are in these documents. It is here stated that Lord Wolseley was requested to draw up his own Instructions, with the help of Sir Evelyn Baring, and they were then sent home for confirmation, and were afterwards returned to that noble and gallant Lord. Of course, the inconvenience of such a method of drawing up of Instructions is obviously manifest; for, by it, the noble Earl practically escapes, on behalf of the Government, from any responsibility for those Instructions. They are the Instructions, not of the noble Earl, or of any Member of the Government, but of Sir Evelyn Baring and Lord Wolseley and Lord Northbrook, who was not then acting in any Ministerial capacity. I feel that this is an unfortunate variation from the ordinary rule with regard to such matters; but the matter of the Instructions themselves is even more remarkable than the mode of their origin. We were told at the beginning of the year that great exertions were being made by Her Majesty's Government, and that the great expense which was being incurred was for the purpose of carrying out a policy described in the terms "A policy of rescue and retire." The rescue was directed towards the unfortunate garrisons which found themselves enclosed by a hostile population, when the Government, unfortunately, announced their intention to force the Egyptian Government to abandon the Soudan. The rescue, as I have said, applied to these garrisons; but what we know is that the last great effort made by the Government does not extend to all the garrisons, nor to anything like it. The Instructions of Her Majesty's Government are somewhat difficult to read or understand; but, as far as I can interpret them, they extend only to two individuals, one of whom there is only too much reason to believe is past the possibility of rescue now altogether. Now, the words of the Instructions at the beginning are as clear as 767 they possibly could be desired. They state that—
The primary object of the Expedition up the Valley of the Nile is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Khartoum. When that object has been secured, no further offensive operations of any kind are to be untaken.No doubt, at the end of the Instructions, there is a reference also to the possibility and the desirability of bringing away the Egyptian troops and the civil employés from Khartoum; but this, apparently, is only mentioned as a point which arises in connection with the method of carrying the primary object—the policy of abandonment—into execution. There is, however, no recall of the imperative order which is placed at the head of the Instructions—namely, that no further offensive operations of any kind are to be undertaken when once General Gordon and Colonel Stewart are in safety. It seems, therefore, that as far as offensive operations go, as far as any forcible operations are concerned, no steps are to be taken for rescuing the garrisons of Khartoum. The garrison of Kassala, also, is not to be rescued—at all events, by the adoption of offensive operations. It is to be brought about, if at all, by negotiations with the friendly tribes, and this, it is thought, can be most effectually and conveniently undertaken from Suakin and Massowah. The garrisons of Darfur and Bahr El Gazelle are summarily disposed of, with the statement that their rescue is impossible; while the rescue of Sinkat, Tokar, and Shendy has, I need not say, already become impossible, because, while the Government were delaying and thinking how their policy was to be carried out, the garrisons of these places have mostly been cruelly massacred—put to the sword. There now remains Sennaar, and with respect to it the Instructions are in these terms—The Government are not prepared to sanction an Expedition of British troops up the Blue Nile in order to insure its retreat.And nothing further is said to show that the Government intend taking any other steps to rescue the garrison there. It results from this summary of the Instructions, therefore, if I have rightly read the Instructions, that the policy of "rescue and retire" now confines itself entirely to the rescue of the two men who were sent to accomplish the rescue of the others. The declaration by the 768 Government that the Soudan was to be surrendered placed all these garrisons in imminent peril. Before that declaration was made, the Egyptian garrison of Khartoum, under Colonel Coetlogon, might have been withdrawn without difficulty; but, afterwards, difficulties, no doubt, arose. When they heard of Baker's defeat, the only measure adopted by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the internal garrisons was to send out General Gordon and Colonel Stewart to Khartoum; and now we are told that the only offensive operations that they will take will be for the purpose of remedying that wild and ill-considered step, and simply to rescue the two men who were sent on an impossible mission in February last. The whole policy of rescuing the garrisons has been abandoned by Her Majesty's Government. But that is not the worst. If they are successful in rescuing General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, they will not only fail to rescue Sennaar, but they will absolutely close the door against the garrison that is in that place; in fact, they will sign the death-warrant of the unfortunate men in that garrison, if they are faithful, just as distinctly as if they had done it in a more formal and regular way. Perhaps the noble Earl will tell me that these Instructions do not bear the exact meaning that I put upon them, and that there is something else in the policy of Her Majesty's Government than what I have indicated. For the sake of the reputation and humanity of this country, I would be glad to believe that that is so, because I am sure that the utter abandonment of these unfortunate men will leave a stain on the honour of this country which it will require many subsequent victories to remove.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I have to thank the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) for his courtesy in having given me Notice that he intended to make these observations. I should like, though, to ask him whether it has never happened to him, in the course of his official experience at the India Office or the Foreign Office, that Instructions have been drafted by the person who is to carry them out, subject, of course, to the sanction, approval, and correction of himself and the Government, and the entire responsibility of the Government who gave 769 them? These Instructions were drawn up by the noble Earl behind me (the Earl of Northbrook) and by Sir Evelyn Baring, in concurrence with Lord Wolseley. I cannot conceive a more business-like and practical way of doing what was to be done. Then these draft Instructions, before they had any validity whatever, were submitted to Her Majesty's Government, who carefully considered them, and as they did not perceive the objections to them which the noble Marquess has tried to raise, Her Majesty's Government took the whole responsibility of sanctioning these Instructions. I cannot say that the noble Marquess is more correct in his historical statements. He told your Lordships that the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar and Shendy were massacred.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI said the greater part of the garrisons, particularly as regards Shendy.
§ EARL GRANVILLEThe greater part! That is a great qualification, certainly; but even that is, I submit, not in accordance with facts, for although there was a massacre at Sinkat, there was none at Tokar, but the garrison arrived safe. That is not a very important point, perhaps; but really, when the noble Marquess makes such severe charges against the Government, a little accuracy of statement is desirable. Then the noble Marquess says that we did all the mischief by announcing that the Egyptians were to evacuate the Soudan. But the Government did not do anything of the sort. We kept the intention perfectly secret; but it was impossible not to give the advice which we did give to the Egyptian Government, and the announcement that the plans and policy of Her Majesty's Government had been formed came from Cairo, and not from us. We were absolutely innocent of any complicity in making it public. Then, again, the noble Marquess says that we have entirely abandoned our policy of the complete evacuation of all the garrisons in the Soudan. I utterly deny that that ever was our policy; but we tried to do what we could to that effect, and took a very bold measure, which was very much condemned, but which, at this moment, does not appear to be so unsuccessful as it is represented to be by noble Lords opposite, by accepting the gallant and spirited offer of General Gordon, showing 770 an extraordinary confidence in himself, which has been, I think, perfectly justified, even supposing this dreadful rumour be true. I think that the Government are in a great degree justified in the confidence which they felt in that extraordinary man being able to accomplish a policy which he himself should carry out. The noble Marquess goes on, time after time, pressing us to exercise force, sometimes at Alexandria, sometimes at Suakin, and in different ways, and then immediately after he turns round and blames us for doing that very thing. But does the noble Marquess say that the advice of the great Conservative Party is that, by military operations, we should enable every garrison in the Soudan to evacuate the position that they hold? The noble Marquess refers to Khartoum, and I do not think there is any logic in his statement that we are going to abandon the Egyptian garrison who have behaved so well to General Gordon. The Instructions to General Gordon himself on this head are positive—
You will use your best endeavours to insure the safe retreat of the Egyptian troops at Khartoum, and of the civil employés together with their wives.Surely these are Instructions which are not compatible with what the noble Marquess calls a complete abandonment of the garrison of Khartoum? Then he talks about Sennaar. Is the noble Marquess aware that to send a military expedition there would entail another year of military operations? My noble Friend near me (the Earl of Northbrook) says that Lord Wolseley perfectly understands that the policy of the Government is, that this military expedition should not be lengthened to an extreme degree, but that Lord Wolseley also perfectly understands that that policy does not prevent him from taking such possible measures as may be suitable for facilitating the retreat of that garrison.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYAm I to understand that the first part of the Instructions, which says that the primary object of the Expedition up the Nile is to bring back General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, and that no further offensive operations of any kind are to be taken—am I to understand that that is compatible with the permission to undertake offensive operations for the 771 purpose of rescuing the garrison at Khartoum?
§ THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKPerhaps I can answer that Question of the noble Marquess. I can assure him that General Gordon is not at all a likely man to leave Khartoum by himself.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYHe may.
§ THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKThe criticism of the noble Marquess involves the insulting supposition that General Gordon is a likely man to leave Khartoum by himself unaccompanied by the garrison or the people whom he wants to take away with him, and that under those circumstances Lord Wolseley will be precluded from making any efforts to relieve the garrison of Khartoum. That is an hypothesis which appears to me to be so improbable that it never occurred to me when I was a party to framing these Instructions. I assumed that General Gordon was the least likely man in the world to leave Khartoum unaccompanied, as I have said, by the garrison, or at least by that part of it which was willing to come away with him. That being so, it has never occurred to us that Lord Wolseley will be precluded from making any effort to relieve the garrison at Khartoum. As to the paragraph in the Instructions which the noble Marquess has endeavoured to separate from the first part of the contents of the document—namely, that paragraph which says—"You will use your best endeavours to insure the safe retreat of the Egyptian troops and civil employés," it appears to me to be perfectly intelligible. It appears to me to bear on the face of it directions to Lord Wolseley to use the force at his disposal for the purpose of relieving the garrison. I can assure your Lordships that the hypercriticism of the noble Marquess never occurred to Lord Wolseley when he read these Instructions. I can assure the noble Marquess that we considered the position of Sennaar very carefully. He has read these Papers with great diligence; but he has refrained from alluding to a telegram which appears among them from General Gordon, in which he says that he has given instructions to the Egpytian garrison at Sennaar to return to Khartoum; and we believed, when our Instructions were framed, that the Egyptian garrison 772 at Sennaar would have been brought back to Khartoum some time ago, in which case they would have been rescued. But I must say that, in my opinion, the English Government and English nation are not bound to spend the lives of Englishmen by sending them all through Central Africa for the purpose of relieving Egyytian garrisons—garrisons, mind you, which, from circumstances and reasons I will not further allude to, do not appear to be able to take any ordinary measures to protect themselves when they get into difficulty and danger. Therefore, my Lords, Her Majesty's Government, certainly from the first, have never undertaken to send expeditions into the Soudan in order to relieve those garrisons. The noble Earl behind me has very correctly stated that, if we had given Lord Wolesley Instructions to proceed to Sennaar, which is 200 miles from Khartoum, for the purpose of relieving the garrison there, it would probably have had the effect of delaying Her Majesty's Forces in Central Africa for another year. I do not think that is a measure which comes within the obligations of Her Majesty's Government; it is one which would hardly recommend itself to anyone who takes a reasonable view of the obligations of this country; and, what is still more important, it would be hardly consistent with the obligations to which Her Majesty's Government are bound of taking care of the lives of Her Majesty's Forces and not exposing them to undue risks. Therefore, I recommended that Lord Wolseley should be told that an expedition from Khartoum to Sennaar did not come within the view of Her Majesty's Government in despatching the forces under his command in the direction of Khartoum.
§ THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKThere is no question whatever that Lord Wolseley's Expedition is intended to rescue any of the civil employés and any members of the garrison who might wish to leave Khartoum.
THE EARL OF DUNRAVENsaid, that he was going to observe that we ought to know that General Gordon would not abandon them, and he must, therefore, express his satisfaction that the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) had stated 773 distinctly that the object of Lord Wolseley was not merely to relieve General Gordon, but also to assist the garrison of Khartoum. As to the larger question, he must confess that he had heard the speech of the noble Earl with some amount of disappointment. In the contention that we had assumed no responsibility whatever with respect to the garrisons of the Soudan—that was to say, that in compelling the Khedive to abandon the Soudan we incurred no responsibility whatever—he could not take the view of Her Majesty's Government. It seemed to him that to abandon the garrisons there would be simply atrocious. The noble Earl said that if the garrison at Sennaar had gone down to Khartoum, they would have been rescued; but that if they had not gone down to Khartoum, they would be abandoned. He also said Lord Wolseley was informed that if he did anything to rescue that garrison, he would be going beyond his Instructions, but that there was another way by which it could be relieved. When the British Forces retired, he (the Earl of Dunraven) had no doubt that the garrison in Sennaar would either have to make what terms they could for themselves, or share the fate of the other garrisons of the Soudan. That Her Majesty's Government should make no attempt whatever to rescue the garrisons of the Soudan was greatly to be regretted, and it was a question whether in that case the Khedive had not a right to call in other assistance.
LORD ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he considered that General Gordon had been most unfairly treated by the supporters of Her Majesty's Government and By Her Majesty's Government also. General Gordon went out at the request of the Government, and, since then, he had not received from them any attention whatever. Speaking of Her Majesty's Government, General Gordon said that he had in no single respect received any support whatever. And though he had been sent out with unlimited powers to do what he liked and to make recommendations to Her Majesty's Government, the few recommendations that he had made had been one and all unattended to.
§ EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that in moving the adjournment, he could not move that the House do adjourn till Thursday, because it would meet to-morrow for Judicial Business. But their 774 Lordships generally would not be required to attend before Thursday.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) has accused me of offering some insult to General Gordon. That is a formal answer that is always made from the Treasury Bench whenever I impugn their Egyptian policy. But I beg to say that, so far from being insulting to General Gordon in suggesting that he might leave Khartoum, if I remember rightly the distinct Instructions of Her Majesty's Government, sent out by telegram, were that he should leave Khartoum; and the last of the very interesting series of telegrams that we had in the spring, when communication with General Gordon was cut off, was a telegram from the noble Earl (Earl Granville), which was sent by six different routes, asking General Gordon, in angry terms, why he did not come away, and leave Khartoum. General Gordon answers, under date July 31, 1884—
Reading over your telegram of the 5th of May, 1884, you ask me 'to state cause and intention in staying at Khartoum knowing Government means to abandon Soudan,' and in answer I say I stay at Khartoum because Arabs have shut us up and will not let us out; I also add that even if the road was open the people would not let me go unless I gave them some government, or took them with me, which I could not do. No one would leave more willingly than I would if it was possible.And that is the insulting suggestion which the noble Earl said I made.