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Moved, That there be laid before the House—
§ THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKMy Lords, I should have assented to the Motion of the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Sidmouth) without adding any remarks, if it had not been for an attack made last Wednesday at Devonport by the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) upon Her Majesty's Government, regarding the condition of the Navy. The Correspondence between Sir Thomas Symonds and the Board of Admiralty, for which the noble Viscount has moved, refers to this particular subject, and fortunately gives me an opportunity of making some remarks on the subject. In some previous conversations in this House, I must do the noble Viscount the justice to say that he has never treated the condition of the Navy as a Party question. He expressed an opinion that the number of our armour-plated ships of war is not so great as it should be; but he directed his remarks as much to the Predecessors of the present Board of Admiralty as to us; and, in replying to them, I pointed out, what must be apparent to every- 1732 one who knows anything of the subject, that the present force of armour-plated ships of war depends, not upon the Admiralty of to-day, but upon the foresight of their Predecessors, for an armour-plated ship of war is hardly ever completed in less than five years. I said that, in my opinion, the state of the case had been much exaggerated, and that the Navy of this country undoubtedly was decidedly superior to any force that was likely to be brought against us; but I indicated that the construction of armour-plated ships of war had not, in my opinion, received the attention it deserved from our Predecessors, and that the present Board of Admiralty had, therefore, very considerably increased the rate of their construction. I supported my statement by figures, and I hoped that I had satisfied your Lordships. Therefore, it was with some surprise that I read the attack of the noble Marquess opposite at Devonport. He had been silent in this House; the attack was made when there was no opportunity for a reply, and at a place where such an attack, coming with his authority on an electioneering campaign, must, of course, tend to prejudice his opponents, and support his own Party. If the attack meant any thing, it meant this—that Conservative statesmen watched the progress of Foreign Navies, and were resolved to maintain the superiority of the British Navy; while Her Majesty's Government were neglectful of this most important duty. My Lords, I can truly say that my wish has been to remove all naval questions from the arena of Party conflict; and the fault is not mine if I have now to speak more plainly on the subject, and to show that the attack of the noble Marquess is not only devoid of foundation, but that the real cause of any apprehensions which have been felt by Sir Thomas Symonds and others regarding the present condition of our force of armour-plated ships of war, arises from the want of foresight of the Government of which the noble Marquess was a distinguished Member, and not from that of Her Majesty's present Government. I have always deprecated comparisons between our Navy afloat and that of any Foreign Power, not only because of the invidious and irritating nature of such comparisons, but because there is great difference of opinion between naval officers as to the merits of different classes of ships. The same 1733 objection, however, does not apply to the much, more simple question of a comparison between the numbers of ships laid down. An armour-plated ship cannot be built in a corner unknown to the world; and anyone who takes the pains can ascertain what ships of this kind are laid down by the French Admiralty and by ourselves. The last armour-plated ship laid down by the Board of Admiralty over which Mr. Goschen presided with great advantage to the Public Service was the Inflexible. She was laid down in February, 1874, and I may observe, as an illustration of the time which is sometimes taken to complete these large ships, that she was not finished and ready for sea till 1880. The late Government took Office in 1874, and I will give the House the names, year by year, from that time to the present, of the armour-plated ships laid down by the English and French Admiralties. In 1874 we laid down the Nelson and the Northampton; France none. In 1875 we laid down none; France two, the Fulminant and the Vengeur. In 1867 we laid down two, the Ajax and Agamemnon; France four, the Dévastation, Foudroyant, Bayard, and Turenne. In 1877 we laid down none; France three, the Amiral Duperré, Tonnant, and Furieux. In 1878 we laid down none, but purchased out of the Vote of Credit, in anticipation of war with Russia, four ships, the Neptune, Superb, Bellisle, and Orion. France laid down five, the Duguesclin, Caïman, Terrible, Indomptable, and Requin. In 1879 we laid down three, the Conqueror, Edinburgh, and Colossus; France three, the Amiral Baudin, Formidable, and Vauban. Your Lordships will observe that, during the six years of the late Government, seven armour-plated ships were laid down by us, and four bought out of the Vote of Credit, or 11 in all; while France laid down 17. In order to show that the comparison of numbers is a fair one, I will give the aggregate tonnage of the ships. The 11 English ships measure 85,000 tons, and the 17 French ships 128,000 tons. I must further observe that, when the present Government came into Office, in 1880, we found the Navy Estimates introduced, and no provision made in those Estimates to increase the rate of construction of armour-plated ships. I must supplement this statement by the remark that the activity of the French Admiralty was perfectly 1734 legitimate, and that there is no reason to assume it to have been prompted by any hostile feeling towards this country. Many of the armour-plated ships in the French Navy are built of wood, and are rapidly becoming unserviceable. The programme of the French Admiralty to replace them was openly announced, and was founded upon the Report of a Parliamentary Committee, over which M. Gambetta presided. The superiority of the British Navy, I may say, is constantly admitted in French official Reports. I have no wish, in any way, to exaggerate the state of the shipbuilding in 1880. Our previous superiority was great, and our superiority at the time was and now is decisive; but there certainly was a risk that, when the French programme was completed, the margin of our superiority might be unduly diminished. My Lords, I have now, I think, sufficiently explained the real cause of the apprehensions expressed by Sir Thomas Symonds and the noble Viscount opposite, which is that, in the six years from 1874 to 1880, much more vigorous action was taken by the French Admiralty to increase the number of armour-plated ships than was taken by the late Government. But your Lordships will, I am sure, agree with me that this retrospect is of little consequence compared to the account which I have to give of the manner in which the present Board of Admiralty have dealt with this very important part of their duty. We decided, gradually but substantially, to increase the provision made for the construction of armour-plated ships. In 1880, although, as I have before re marked, we found the Navy Estimates already introduced, we were able to make an arrangement by which the progress of the armour-plated ships on the stocks was accelerated; and in the years 1881, 1882, and 1883, we very largely increased the provision for the construction of such ships. Probably, the best way of showing this is to compare the expenditure on the hulls and machinery of such ships year by year. In 1879–80, it was £631,724; in 1880–1, it was £698,798; in 1881–2, it was £949,313; in 1882–3, it was £990,710; and in 1883–4, it was £1,240,700; or, in round numbers, the sum appropriated to armour- plated construction has been doubled. I will now give the names of the ships laid down during the last four years. 1735 In 1880, in England, the Collingwood was laid down; in France none. In 1881 we laid down the Impérieuse and Warspite; France, the Hoche. In 1882 we laid down four—the Howe, Rodney, Camperdown, and Benbow; France two —the Neptune and Marceau. In 1883 we laid down the Anson, and France the Magenta. In the four years we have laid down eight ships, and France four. In short, the facts are, that during the six years of the Conservative Government armour-plated ships were laid down by the two nations at the rate of three French to two English, including the ships purchased from the Vote of Credit; and during the last four years at the rate of two English to one French. I do not pretend to explain the reasons for the shipbuilding policy of the late Government, and I have been only forced into making the comparison by the attack made upon us by the noble Marquess at Devonport. I trust that I have proved that Her Majesty's Government are not justly open to such an attack. I should have considered myself unworthy of being at the head of the Board of Admiralty if I had not embraced the earliest opportunity of showing, in a plain and business-like manner, that Her Majesty's Government are fully sensible of their duty to watch the progress of Foreign Navies, and that we have actually taken the measures which we believe to be sufficient to insure the superiority of the Naval Forces of this country.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, the noble Earl who has just spoken (the Earl of Northbrook) has chosen to refer to what he is pleased to call my attack. It is a pity that he is not accurate. The nature of my observations was this. In the course of the luncheon at Devonport—at which I was sitting between two sailors—one my distinguished Friend behind me (Viscount Sidmouth), and the other Captain Price (the hon. and gallant Member for Devonport)—they both expressed considerable apprehension with respect to the state of the Navy; my observation, which was purely hypothetical, was that, unless Her Majesty's Government showed more wisdom in providing a sufficient Navy for the defence of these shores than they had shown in the rest of their policy; if they behaved towards the Navy—["Hear, hear!" and Ministerial laughter.) These are facts, This 1736 is what I said—[Renewed cheers and laughter]—this is actually what I said— that if they behaved towards the Navy as they have behaved towards Egypt, and had not treated it any better; in that case I thought there was very considerable ground for apprehension; and I added that I listened to the statement of my noble and hon. and gallant Friends with considerable anxiety. I will not attempt at present—I am not competent—to analyze the figures which the noble Earl has laid upon the Table. I must wait until I have obtained information from others who are more competent than I am before I can arrive at an opinion on such matters. I wish, however, to point out that, in the remarks I made, I was not comparing the action of the Conservatives with the action of the Liberal Administration. If I had done so, I should have laid myself open to the reproach which I think applies to the noble Earl, for he appears to think that, upon the question whether this country is adequately defended, it is sufficient for him to utter a very loud and a very elaborate tu quoque. It is not a question of whether the late Government did or did not provide adequately for the service of the Navy. Before we decide that question it will be necessary, not only to look into the mere figures, but into the position of the political world at the time, the precise political dangers against which it was their duty to guard, and the possible complications which it was incumbent upon them to anticipate. I have no doubt that, upon the whole, allowing for some pacific influences which affected that Government, and have now been transferred to the other side, the verdict of the country as to the conduct of the late Government will be that they did provide adequately for the defence of the country. But whether they did, or did not, it is no answer whatever to the complaint that we are not adequately protected now. Supposing it was found that we were inadequately defended, or that we were overmatched, what kind of consolation would it be to the people whose interests were jeopardized, and whose commerce was ruined, to be told that the Liberal Government had provided so many tons more than the Conservative Government had provided six years ago? My Lords, this sort of reply is no answer at all, Whether the 1737 noble Earl can show that the Navy is in a state such as the present condition of foreign affairs requires, in a state such as the prevention of all dangers which may possibly threaten our shores demands—whether he can show that, or not, I must refer now, as I referred at Devonport, to the judgment of the experts who can decide upon that matter. But I do most earnestly protest against the idea that it is any defence against the charge of insufficiently providing for the Public Service to say that some other person at some distant time failed to provide sufficiently.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYMy Lords, I do not say that what my noble Friend (the Earl of Northbrook) has said is an absolute defence, but I do say that it is a defence against the noble Marquess. I must remind your Lordships that the noble Marquess was a Member of that Administration, which, as has been shown, was largely responsible for the present state of the Navy. The late Administration did not provide for the building of a sufficient number of iron-clad ships; and the results of that neglect has been left to the present Government as a legacy, and as ships cannot be built in a day, we are bound, in consequence of that neglect, to be for some time at a disadvantage. We stand at this moment, not upon the ships which my noble Friend has laid down, but we are standing, as regards our power, only on those ships which were laid down or in course of completion or completed under the late Government. It is perfectly clear that our answer to the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Sidmouth), therefore, who complains of the comparative growth of the English Navy as compared with that of France, must necessarily be based on what the Conservative Government had done—in short, the condition of our naval power does not depend on what is being done now, but on what had been done before we came into Office. The case is absolutely clear against the noble Marquess. The noble Marquess says that his remarks were purely hypothetical; but can we conceive anyone in the position of the noble Marquess, in the circumstances, speaking as he has done at Devonport? The noble Marquess said he could not accept the official statement made by the Government; because, I suppose, he 1738 rather feared it might be inconsistent with his theory. The coble Marquess said here was a Ministry so craven and cowardly, so insensible to the honour of the country, that official statements were really not sufficient to satisfy him. But the noble Marquess cannot expect that he will blind the eyes of anyone by language of that kind. It is a kind of hypothetical insinuation which, coming from the noble Marquess who occupies a responsible position now, who has occupied a very high position in the Government before this, and who may occupy an even higher position in the next, is a very poor way for him to make an attack upon Her Majesty's Government—namely, by insinuation; and the more especially, as it now appears, that he was totally ignorant of the facts of the case. That attack, however, is of a very grave and plain character, and really means that the Government of the country have neglected the Navy. The noble Marquess now seems to feel disturbed by the facts placed before him, and says that it is an easy way of meeting his facts, to tell him that the Conservative Government neglected their duty. But my noble Friend did not confine himself to that. If he had, he might have been open to the charge brought against him by the noble Marquess—of dealing in tu quoques. My noble Friend, besides pointing out what the late Board of Admiralty had neglected, had shown what the present Board of Admiralty are doing, and has proved that, whereas the former Board had failed to keep pace with the French Navy, the present Board of Admiralty has largely exceeded the French in shipbuilding; and that, taking year by year, there has been an actual amount of ships laid down double that which was laid down in the last year of the Conservative Administration. I say, therefore, that my noble Friend's answer is complete as against the noble Marquess in showing that the late Administration, of which he was a Member, neglected their duty, and in showing the manner in which that duty has been fulfilled by the present, as compared with the late, Administration.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, that the course which had been followed by the noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook) on the present occasion, was one of the 1739 most extraordinary that he ever remembered to have been adopted in their Lordships' House. What had happened? His (the Earl of Carnarvon's) noble Friend behind him (Viscount Sidmouth) had put a Motion, and had put it in general terms. The noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty came down to the House, and, without any Notice—
§ THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKThere was Notice of the Motion.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, the Motion referred to one subject, the speech of the noble Earl to a totally different question.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he would put it to their Lordships, whether any reasonable person could have formed the least idea that this attack was going to be made on the last Government? His noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) had made a speech at Devonport upon a most important and grave subject; and what he (the Earl of Carnarvon) complained of, was not that the noble Earl should have come down and given a complete and general denial to what his noble Friend had said, but that he should, without giving any idea as to what he was going to do, make in the most general terms upon a most important and grave subject an attack on the late Government which, if it were to be answered at all would have to be got up beforehand. If the noble Earl had come down and made a general denial of the charges made against the Government of neglect, that would have been fair enough. But it was a totally different thing to come with elaborate statistics to which no reply could possibly be made, and as to which it was impossible for any of their Lordships to refer. That was a most extraordinary proceeding; but the fact was, that the late Government in one set of circumstances laid down a certain amount of shipping, and the present Government in a different set of circumstances laid down a larger amount. How that proved a case of negligence against the late Administration passed his comprehension. The real question which the House had before it was not whether more ships had been laid down by the present or the late Government; it was were we, at the present moment adequately defended in naval matters, or 1740 were we not? The old maxim was that the Navy of this country ought to be a match for the Navies of any two other countries. That old maxim was a perfectly sound one, and it had not, so far as he knew, ever been seriously disputed by any competent authority. He did not, however, believe it could be truly asserted that, at the present time, our Navy was a match for any two Navies. Indeed, he should be surprised if the noble Earl himself could get up and say so. From what he knew, it was impossible to resist n feeling of very considerable anxiety. It had been his duty to look into the strength of Foreign Navies, and from What he knew, he had no hesitation in saying that, as compared with them, our Navy was by no means of the strength and adequacy which we could desire. He would do his noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty the justice to admit that he had shown great anxiety to correct defects, and to do the best with the money that was at his command; but he should be surprised if his noble Friend could state that, as compared with foreign nations, he was entirely satisfied with the present condition of our Navy.
§ Motion agreed to.