HL Deb 26 February 1884 vol 285 cc7-17
THE EARL OF WEMYSS

, in rising to call attention to the reported order to General Graham to advance from Trinkitat; and to ask Her Majesty's Government, What policy they intend to pursue in that portion of the Soudan, said, that in consequence of the report that reached this country yesterday to the effect that General Graham had received orders to advance, he had been in hopes that a Question on that subject would have been put the day before by the Leader of the Opposition, but an accident had caused the absence of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury); and it was only on the spur of the moment, at the rising of the House, that he (the Earl of Wemyss) ventured to give the Notice which was on the Paper. At the same time, he proposed showing that the Expeditionary Force was ill-equipped with horses and Artillery, and imperfectly supplied with commissariat and means of transport, and therefore unable to undertake any considerable or lengthened operations. Knowing this, it was desirable that they should know exactly what the order was that had been given to him. Tokar no longer awaited relief, for its garrison had gone over to Osman Digna. It was, therefore, hardly a sufficient reason for the advance of General Graham's force that the unhappy soldiers who had fallen in the war still awaited burial. Perhaps the reason of the advance was that the Government hoped, by a successful engagement with Osman Digna, to restore our prestige, which had suffered so greatly of late. The only reason that appeared now to remain for his expedition was, that Her Majesty's Government had in the earlier part of these events been dilatory and negative, and that now they were over-active and rather inclined to be rash than otherwise. If it were not for what had occurred the previous night in "another place," when it was stated by the Prime Minister and the Marquess of Hartington that their policy was clear and distinct—that it was to defend Suakim and the borders of the Red Sea; that they had given a discretion to General Graham in carrying out that policy; and that it would be injurious to the Empire if the Government were pressed at that time to state more fully what their plans were, he should have pressed the Government to declare distinctly and definitely what their policy was in that part of the world. But, though not pressing for that information, he did ask for a distinct assurance on the part of the Government that, whatever their policy and intentions might be, they would not shelter themselves behind the discretionary powers they had given to General Graham. He trusted that it was clear in their own minds what General Graham's duty was, and that that duty having been clearly defined, they would give him everything that, was requisite and necessary to enable him to give full effect to the policy and intentions of the Government. In conclusion he would express an earnest wish that General Graham might be successful, and that we might not have to deplore another disaster like those which marked the path of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt like milestones.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH

said, that, in his opinion, it was fitting that Her Majesty's Government should also give some information as to the state of insubordination reported to have existed for the last 48 hours amongst the Egyptian coloured troops at Suakin.

THE MARQUESS OF HUNTLY

said, that he had only returned from the East within the last 48 hours, and he wished to protest against the ill-advised words which were frequently used in this country, such as had fallen from the noble Earl (the Earl of Wemyss) about an ill-armed and ill-equipped force being sent to the Soudan. Some 10 days ago he was in Cettinge, and he could assure their Lordships that the fall of Sinkat was known there as soon as it was in London. In fact, there was no part of Europe and Northern Africa where it was not equally so. That noble Lords should have expressed their opinions so freely as to the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government was creating the greatest mischief in the Mussulman world. We had no idea in this country how the opinions of politicians in this country were discussed abroad. He saw the Governor of one part of Albania when the news of a recent disaster arrived, and so excited were the people that the Constantinople Government sent an order to all Englishmen to leave the country at once. The feeling on the subject was intensified by the telegraphic news which came from this country as to the expression of opinion here. Noble Lords were only hampering the Government, and were doing no good whatever to their country, when they talked of ill-armed and ill-equipped forces. He did not believe the Mussulmans themselves thought the Mahdi's force was going to become a great power; but his importance was increased in the minds of Mussulmans by English politicians speaking in that way. They were simply making a mountain out of a molehill by investing him with such unwarranted importance. If they would but stop the cacoëthes loquendi, which at present troubled the people of this country, and trust the assurances given by Her Majesty's Government as to the course they were determined to pursue, they would act much more wisely, and a great deal of possible mischief might be averted. No stronger assurances could be given than had been given by Mr. Gladstone and the Marquess of Hartington in "another place," that they would carry out a firm policy. Those assurances were, or ought to be, enough to satisfy any reasonable person, and he would entreat noble Lords not to pursue a course which could only hamper Her Majesty's Government, and not to give utterance to insinuations which would be telegraphed abroad and would do mischief.

LORD LAMINGTON

said, he should be glad if the Government would take that opportunity of clearly defining what was the position of the Government in the Soudan; and whether the Sultan had been consulted on the steps that had been taken.

EARL GRANVILLE

I am glad to hear from the noble Earl on the Cross Benches (the Earl of Wemyss) that it was only on the impulse of the moment he gave Notice of the Question which he put on the Paper last night. My noble Friend, though not a soldier, has yet, in a manner most creditable to him, paid considerable attention to military matters; and I should have thought that that attention would have been sufficient to have told him that it is not desirable to ask the Government for details of military operations still going on. I am glad that he has not put any particular Question after what occurred last night. Had he done so, I should have felt it my duty not to take upon myself the responsibility of deviating from the course which my Colleagues have taken in "another place," with the full concurrence of the Conservative Party, and have stated distinctly that it would be premature to enter on any discussion of these military matters. The noble Earl has expressed a hope that we shall not hide our responsibility behind General Graham. There is no question of hiding our responsibility. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) has stated in "another place," in answer to certain Questions, that, while he has given General Graham decided instructions as to what he may do, and what he may not do, he has yet given him a large discretion in regard to the particular object we have in view. I cannot conceive anything wiser than that; nor can I conceive that the noble Earl meant that we, in this country, were to dictate to General Graham, who, with his knowledge of the locality, is in a far better position than we are to say what it is best to do.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I have to apologize to my noble Friend on the Cross Benches (the Earl of Wemyss) for not asking the Question which stood on the Paper in my name last evening. I concur with him that it is not desirable to repeat it now, for the reasons he has given, and those advanced by the noble Earl opposite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But I cannot concur with the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Huntly) in the observations he has made. We are too much interested in the course of events at this juncture to be called upon to listen to a lecture against the cacoëthes loquendi. But I would point out to the noble Marquess that we are between two fires. We are in this difficulty. If we, the Opposition, take notice of public events, and express our opinion upon them, we are subject to the censure of the noble Marquess himself; but if we do not take notice of them, as in the case of the Soudan last year, because we think the time not suitable, we come under the severe censure of the Marquess of Hartington in "another place," who will lose no opportunity to point out that we share the responsibility of the Government, because we did not condemn them at the moment. I do not see how we are to escape from that position. The truth is that, though unwilling to discuss the military matter, I cannot admit the truth of what the noble Marquess has said—that the cause of our troubles and disasters in Egypt has been due to our criticism of Her Majesty's Government. My opinion is, that the disasters which have occurred are, in the main, due to the want of ordinary prudence and fore-Sight on the part of the Government, and are more likely to have effect on the mind of the Mussulmans than any comments of Parliament when telegraphed out; and, therefore, the warning of the noble Lord on the Cross Benches did not go beyond the line of strict prudence, looking at what we have recently witnessed. As to the warnings given by the noble Marquess, I do not think they need to be addressed to us. We have really cause to warn Her Majesty's Government against that frugal optimism which has already brought so much discredit and difficulty on our policy, and BE much dishonour—if not upon our own arms, upon the arms of an Ally so closely related to us and so much in our hands that what touches his honour reflects upon ours. We hope that Her Majesty's Government will not maintain that exceedingly cheerful estimate of affairs which induced them to imagine that General Hicks was perfectly safe and quite certain to succeed when General Hicks and Sir Edward Malet were telling them to the contrary——

EARL GRANVILLE

Did Her Majesty's Government ever express any opinion of that kind on the subject?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Well, if Her Majesty's Government did not believe that General Hicks was safe, their guilt and their responsibility exceeds anything I could have imagined, because then, by their omission, they deliberately consigned to a cruel death an officer who was one of Her Majesty's subjects, and the troops of our own Ally under his command, and brought about these wars which had plunged them into all the disasters and perplexities that have occurred. Up to the present, we have not ventured to assume that they knew that General Hicks was going on a grave and desperate enterprize.

EARL GRANVILLE

I really must interrupt the noble Marquess. When the noble Marquess accuses the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, let him confine himself to something they have said, and not assume that they said one thing now and then another.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I shall certainly assume that they said first one thing and then another, because it is what they invariably do. I think, if the noble Earl will review his own speeches and those of his Colleagues, he will find that during the late debates they said that Her Majesty's Government had no reason to believe that General Hicks's expedition would meet with the fate that it did, or that General Baker's expedition would meet with the fate which befell it. That was the very kernel of their defence. They followed the movements of those two officers with an uncalculating optimism; they declined to look facts in the face, or believe the reports received from their own trusted agents; and the result was—I will give it no harsher name—the slaughter of gallant men and the terrible disasters, resulting in the massacre of women and children, which startled and appalled this country. I think, then, we have the right to warn the Government against a repetition of the sanguine and careless policy they have pursued, against such fallacious estimates, and such feeble preparations. I do not know what they now intend to do—I do not know what policy they are pursuing; but if any expedition is to be undertaken on the Bed Sea by the forces we have, for Heaven's sake let the force itself be adequate in number and fully armed and equipped. Let it be able to do what it would no doubt wish to do—its duty as British officers and British soldiers. I do not wish to press Her Majesty's Government to give any explanation that may be unnecessary from their point of view. I rise rather to reply to the censure addressed to my noble Friend on the Cross Benches (the Earl of Wemyss); but I cannot conclude without saying how grave I feel in this juncture. The mistake in the policy of Her Majesty's Government, from beginning to end, is that they have underrated the force of Mussulman sentiment and the danger of Mussulman fanaticism, and that they have not taken the proper and obvious course of avoiding that danger. And now, in the surrender of Tokar, and the preference of Egyptians rather to yield to a nominal enemy, the Mussulman, rather than receive the succour of nominal friends, the Christians, we only see a more emphatic testimony to the gravity and depth of those far worse dangers than any that have hitherto presented themselves, which are visible to every Continental critic and every Continental Power, and which have led, and may yet lead, Her Majesty's Government to further disaster and disgrace.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

My Lords, the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury), throughout the observations he has made, has raised the question whether Her Majesty's Government are as responsible for the expedition of General Hicks as it is for the expedition of General Graham. The noble Marquess places the two expeditions on the same ground. Now, I admit, of course, that it is an arguable matter, whether or not the Government ought to have interfered to prevent the expedition of Hicks Pasha. Noble Lords on that side entertain one opinion, and we another; but, at all events, we determined that we would not be responsible for it. Although the noble Marquess has attempted to throw a certain amount of discredit on the Government in connection with the expedition of Hicks Pasha, I would point out that that is a very different case to the responsibility which was undoubtedly incurred when a British expedition, composed of British soldiers, was despatched by the Government to Suakin. To assume that because the Egyptian Government had not made preparations, and that that want of preparation ended in the defeat of Hicks Pasha, therefore Her Majesty's Government are to be warned that they are not to be so careless with regard to the British expedition, is as audacious an attempt to prejudice the operations of the Government and to disparage their policy as ever I have heard in this House. Let us, at all events, so far as may be, limit the discussion to the real facts of the case, which, I admit, are sufficiently grave. We have determined to maintain our policy of defending the ports in the Red Sea, and we have taken measures in that direction. Of course, I cannot state the particular course which the General on the spot will take. He is responsible in the matter, and there is no doubt that he will discharge the duties entrusted to him admirably. The noble Marquess cannot diminish the difficulty of the position by the attacks he has made; and I am perfectly free to admit, at the same time, that we should not escape from our responsibility, or in any way seek to diminish the gravity of the situation. We are perfectly well aware of the position we hold in Egypt, and we know that the general feeling of the Mussulman world must necessarily be affected by what has taken place—we are quite aware of the responsibility which falls upon us, and all I can say is that I hope we shall discharge that responsibility in a manner satisfactory to Parliament and to the country.

THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN

said, that the Government maintained that they were not responsible for the expeditions of General Hicks and Baker Pasha; but he (the Earl of Dunraven) did not think it was easy for them to disclaim that responsibility, for they must have known all the circumstances of the case, and they were responsible to the extent that they permitted the expeditions to go forward. He was speaking from memory, but his own impression was that Her Majesty's Government had stated that they had no good reason to suppose that General Baker and Hicks Pasha would not be successful.

EARL GRANVILLE

The words used by the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) were that the Government were quite certain of success.

THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN

said, Her Majesty's Government were masters of the country, and it certainly was their duty to take every reasonable precaution to ensure success. It had been stated for the last week or more, and there could be no doubt whatever of the fact, that the British Force at Suakin was badly equipped, and that it was wholly without Artillery, and badly off for transport and hospital arrangements.

THE MARQUESS OF HUNTLY

On what authority does the noble Earl say that?

THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN

said, he had seen such statements in the newspapers; and, if they were not true, he hoped the Government would distinctly contradict them. If it was properly equipped, and the men had their horses and the Artillery their guns, and the transport and hospital arrangements were efficient, he should be only too glad to have the assurance of Her Majesty's Government on that point. He did not desire to ask the Government for the instructions given to the General in the field. That would be a very imprudent course; but the Government, he thought, should give some answer to the Question of his noble Friend (the Earl of Wemyss), and furnish some indication as to what policy they intended to pursue in the Soudan, because at present matters were so complicated that they did not know whether they were at war at all, or who they were at war with. He wished to know what enemy we were fighting now—whether we were fighting the Mahdi in one place and making terms with him in another, and what steps were being taken as regarded the Suzerainty of the Porte?

THE EARL OF MORLEY

said, he was compelled to protest, in the strongest possible way, against the idea that the Government must be held responsible for what appeared in every newspaper report. Every night noble Lords on the Cross Benches attacked the Government with reference to certain reports as to the bad condition of the force; but they possessed no evidence in support of those attacks. So far as he (the Earl of Morley) was concerned, he entirely denied the accuracy of those reports. The force had been sent out in a rapid way, and everything had been done to give it the equipment and transport necessary for the limited operations which it would have to undertake. By limited operations he meant, of course, that it was not intended that the force should make a long expedition into the deserts. He believed that, as far as it was possible, the force up to the present time had been properly equipped; and when the noble Earl on the Cross Benches (the Earl of Wemyss) complained of the absence of guns, he might say that he had given the noble Earl every answer he had required. He had stated that there were 10 camel guns with the force, and he had given reasons why it was not thought desirable to have others sent. It was not necessary that he should repeat the information which he gave their Lordships on a former occasion. He thought it was not fair that the Government should have to come down to the House every day to answer questions founded upon statements in the newspapers as to the condition of the force.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE

said, he did not think that the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Morley) should attempt to shelter the Government from the charges which had been made by throwing doubt on the accuracy of newspaper Correspondents. He (the Earl of Hardwicke) doubted whether, throughout these transactions, the accounts sent to this country by the newspaper Correspondents had been far wrong. He would leave their Lordships to judge whether they had been wrongfully or rightly assailed; but, for his own part, he thought the country was much indebted to them, for if it had not been for the information which they sent home the people would have been kept considerably in the dark as to the general management by the Government of their proceedings in Egypt. For 18 months everything the Government had done had turned out a failure, and the present failure seemed likely to come in a severer form than they anticipated. It was no use for the Government to endeavour to check the natural feelings of the people, and of the Members of their Lordships' House, who had a right to know, in a very decided manner, what the Government intended to do. Many of their Lordships felt that they did not receive that just and due consideration at the hands of the Government which they ought to receive. When they asked grave questions they were put off with such "blarney" as "Are you going to believe what is said in the newspapers?" That was not the way in which they were treated with regard to another matter, when certain Members of the present Government were in the habit of "bullyragging" the late Conservative Ministry. This House was strongly representative of the feelings of the people, and their Lordships ought to express clearly to the Government the things they daily heard. The Members of the Government seemed to live in a fool's paradise; but they might rest assured that the cohesion of their great majority in the other House would not save them from the certain punishment that would await them if any disaster happened to General Graham.

EARL GRANVILLE

moved, "That this House do now adjourn."

Motion agreed to.

House adjourned at half past Five o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Twelve o'clock.