§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I rise, in discharge of the promise I made last week, to state to your Lordships the views of the Government on the subject 1485 of the Egyptian Question; and, for the purpose of putting myself in Order, I shall conclude with a Motion for the production of further Papers on the question. I have already more than once stated the complications of this question, and I feel that those complications, while certainly adding to the difficulty of dealing with it in action, make it this evening more difficult for me to make the statement exactly as I should wish to state it to your Lordships. In making this statement, therefore, I can only trust to your Lordships' indulgence, which has never yet failed me; and it appears to me that what I had best do for the convenience of your Lordships is to condense, as much as I can, what remarks I have to make, by stating what is the position of the question at the present moment, and to give your Lordships, as far as possible, the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the policy which they have thought tit to adopt. At the beginning of last year Egypt appeared to be at peace, and in the enjoyment of progress and prosperity; but in the month of February several military riots occurred on account of the arrest of some officers by the orders of the Minister of War, and the result was that the Khedive, having no military force to oppose to the military faction, submitted to what was imposed upon him. I will not trouble your Lordships by going into any detail on the different outbreaks which occurred in September, in November, in December, and in April of this year. Let it suffice to say that these outbreaks were followed by increased military expenditure, by disorganization, and the relaxation of discipline by illegal acts against the Khedive, against the Notables, and against individuals, and by an assumption of military authority on the part of Arabi Bey, the War Minister. I think it was in October the Sultan sent a Commission to Egypt, without previous communication with France or England, or any other Power, and things appeared to be settling down. At the same time, France and England had each an ironclad at Alexandria. I then took occasion to explain to the Turkish Ambassador in London the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Egypt—a policy which I have so often had the opportunity of stating to your Lordships. In the month of November, 1486 at greater length, I stated that policy in a despatch to Sir Edward Malet—a despatch which had the singular good fortune of being generally approved both at home and abroad. In January—or I think it was at the end of December—M. Gambetta proposed that we should join with France in a Dual Note on the fame lines as my despatch of November, but possibly more accentuated as to its terms by the fact of its being drafted by a Southern and more eloquent pen. I was told the other day by a noble Friend that if, at that time, we had agreed to the proposition of M. Gambetta to use immediate force, the subsequent difficulties would have been averted. My Lords, whether the employment of immediate force would have had that result is a matter of opinion. I wish to point out that M. Gambetta never made any proposal to employ military force to us, and that he adopted for himself the reserve which I had stated with regard to the time and the mode of action to be used. But supposing for a moment we had made that proposition, and that M. Gambetta had accepted it, in what a position should we have found ourselves? Two or three days later, M. Gambetta was succeeded in Office by M. de Freycinet; and M. de Freycinet believed, I am bound to say I think with justice, that France was at that time disinclined to take any action of the sort. What we did then was to propose to M. Gambetta to communicate with the other Powers, and that proposal was accepted by M. de Freycinet. We made a proposal which was unanimously received by the other Powers. Confidential communications immediately began as to the extent to which we could extend the attributes of the Notables without trenching upon international agreements. A resolution was come to. That resolution, however, was not acted upon, in consequence of the unstable position of the Egyptian Ministry. Matters then got more serious, and on the 11th of May—I remember the date, because it happens to be my birthday—I received a telegram from Lord Lyons, informing me that M. de Freycinet had asked the French Consul in Egypt whether it was not desirable that France should send a sufficient naval force to Alexandria. I stated that Her Majesty's Government, for their part, were ready to send two iron-clads to 1487 Egypt, and to inform the other Powers of the fact, in order that they might join if they thought proper. Then came a telegram from M. de Freycinet, proposing that three French and three English vessels should be sent with three more of each nationality to follow, and to that we agreed. We sent three vessels, and afterwards, in consequence of the alarming representations made by Mr. Cookson on behalf of the residents in Alexandria, we ordered up three more to join those that were already there. Now, my Lords, it is my firm conviction that if, in this condition of things in Egypt, with a danger hanging over our own and other European subjects, we had not sent more vessels of war to Alexandria, we should have been open to, and should have met with, the severest blame. I put aside the question of the moral support the squadron gave to the Khedive. The protection of our own subjects was an imperative duty, and I believe that the lives of hundreds of British subjects, besides other Europeans, have been saved by the presence at Alexandria of our ironclads. I believe, I may add, that the Khedive himself would not at this moment have been de jure Ruler of Egypt, and would probably even now not have been alive, if it had not been for the action on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Several questions have been raised with regard to the presence of the Fleet at Alexandria. News came to this country that disquiet prevailed, and, after some time, the Admiral telegraphed that the town was entirely in the power of the rebels, and that they were raising earthworks abreast of the Invincible, which was the first ship sent out. Complaint has been made that we did not immediately order the Admiral to prevent such operations, and I can understand that such a complaint should have been made. But we did not act with precipitation in the matter, and it was lucky we did not, because it is agreed, both by English and Egyptian authorities, that if we had done so the massacre of English subjects in Egypt would have been of a frightful character. Things went on, and a very sudden street riot and massacre occurred. I believed it owed its origin to accident; but there is evidence, which appears to us to be trustworthy, that the massacre had been to some extent prepared and encouraged by the leaders of the military 1488 faction. Here, again, Admiral Seymour was complained of for not having lauded men immediately; but I believe it is now universally acknowledged that to have done so would have been a fatal error. That massacre, the loss of precious English lives, the maltreating and insulting of our Consular authorities, made a great difference in the position we were then holding. That injury and that insult, the interests we had, and the necessity for reparation, were subjects which came before us, as entirely altering the state of affairs. At the beginning of July—I think it was on the 1st—we heard from Admiral Seymour that the outside earthworks were still in progress, and we immediately ordered him to take measures to prevent their continuance. Here, again, care was taken with regard to the lives of our fellow-subjects. A great proportion of the English people in Egypt had already withdrawn, and excellent arrangements were made for the withdrawal of those who remained. Ample information was given to the authorities of England and of other nationalities as to the withdrawal of their subjects; and when these were removed out of danger, and it was found that the earthworks and forts were still being constructed, it was necessary to take other steps, and accordingly a summons was sent to the rebels, their obedience to which would have prevented the necessity for our taking action. The result was the bombardment of Alexandria. The action, in which the rebels certainly showed very great courage, lasted 10 hours, and abundantly proved the valour of our officers and men, and, I will add, the value of the matériel of Her Majesty's Navy. My Lords, after that, one of the greatest crimes in modern history occurred. The rebel army, in going away, not only twice made a fraudulent use of the flag of truce, but they released the convicts and encouraged incendiarism and massacre of the inhabitants of Alexandria, and this without any prospect of such action being injurious to the military strength of those whom they were opposing. This has been succeeded by an equally cruel and criminal attempt—an attempt which I have reason to hope will not be successful—to destroy by thirst the whole population of Alexandria, again without any chance of inflicting injury on the sailors and soldiers 1489 of those whom they were opposing. I have carefully omitted what, otherwise, it might be interesting to your Lordships to know, in order, as much as possible, to keep in regular order what I have to say. As to the bombardment, I believe there never was a more legitimate act than the attempt on the part of the English Fleet to destroy that which endangered every day more and more the safety of our ships and the lives of those who occupied them. The question has been raised as to the compatibility of that act with our obligation towards other Powers, in connection with the Conference we have entered into with them. You are aware that the proceedings of the Conference have been kept secret by the desire of the Powers; but I may state what are the facts with regard to certain declarations in the Conference which have been more or less found in the papers, and been the subject of some questions in Parliament. Well, my Lords, at the third meeting of the Conference, the Italian Ambassador proposed an agreement that no Power should take isolated action until the close of the Conference, and that proposition was agreed to, with a reservation as to the occurrence of force majeure. At the next meeting of the Conference, Lord Dufferin, in the most distinct terms, stated that Her Majesty's Government understood, by the term force majeure, any danger to the Suez Canal, and any catastrophe, or sudden danger to any of our special interests, and the Conference accepted that declaration. Complaint has further been made that Admiral Seymour did not land men in order to prevent the frightful massacres and fires going on in Alexandria. Now, I believe that to have landed 1,000 or 2,000 men in a town occupied by a regular force, estimated at from between 10,000 to 15,000 men, entrenched behind earthworks and in fortresses, would have been contrary to all the rules of prudence and of military practice. Then, doubtless, will come the rejoinder—"How was it that Admiral Seymour had not a really adequate force?" I venture to remind noble Lords, however, that we have all along held, and never disputed, and it has been held by those before us, that, although we had a special interest in Egypt, we did not wish, and never have wished, to exclude all the other European Powers from having a voice in the conduct of 1490 affairs which concerned Egypt itself. I rely on these principles, which I believe to be actually sound so far as principle is concerned, and still more as far as political expediency is concerned in those communications. I say that when the French Government proposed to us to go into the Conference we acceded to that proposal. It is quite true that Conferences move slowly, but they do not move so slowly as separate communications with individual Powers in six different capitals. That being the case, if we had sent a large force to Egypt at the commencement, at the very moment that, at our invitation, the Conference was beginning to sit, for the purpose of really by ourselves settling the Egyptian Question, I say that it would have been an act of absolute self-contradiction; it would have been something of an outrage to the Powers, and a positive invitation to France and the whole of Europe to put themselves in somewhat of a hostile attitude to us. I will even go further. I will say that, supposing we had, rightly or wrongly, a large force there, is it really possible that Her Majesty's Government, or that Admiral Seymour would have contemplated that the de facto Egyptian Government, with a disciplined army, would have proceeded to such atrocities as I have described, with the view of inflicting any harm on those who were attacking them? I am not a military or naval man; but if we had sent an Army I should have supposed we should have sent it to protect the Suez Canal; or if we had determined to make a hostile move by landing troops against the rebels, I should have thought we should have landed them at Aboukir Bay to cut off their retreat; and if so, how could those men in the slightest degree, acting as a police, have prevented the burning and massacres in Alexandria? My Lords, in what I have said I have not dwelt so much as your Lordships might have expected on Turkey, and I frankly admit that, even at this hour, I am not sufficiently acquainted with the policy which has been adopted in the past by Turkey, or with the policy which she intends for the future to adopt, so as to be able to speak with perfect confidence on the matter. We have always felt that of all interventions, the intervention of the Sovereign of the country was the least objectionable; but you cannot always wait; there are moments when you must 1491 take time by the forelock, and not wait for others to do so, and I very much regret that Turkey has taken no advantage of what appears to me to have been a golden opportunity of establishing her own authority, and that of the Khedive, over Egypt on a firm basis. My Lords, I am now glad that the Sultan has consented to the despatch of a Representative to the Conference. That, I think, may be looked upon as an acknowledgment that he owes his Sovereignty in Egypt to the valour and success of British arms, and that it is impossible to exclude Europe altogether from taking some interest in the affairs of that country. Your Lordships are aware of certain despatches and instructions which wore given to Lord Dufferin on entering the Conference with respect to the despatch of troops to Egypt, and with respect to some proposals in regard to the Suez Canal, which I will allude to later. I am sorry to say that while the Sultan has agreed to enter the Conference, we are entirely without any answer, up to the present time, as to the second part of the application, whether he will employ troops or not. There is another matter on which I have not dwelt, and on which I do not intend to dwell. It is with regard to certain difficulties which have existed between ourselves and France during the last two months as to details. We regret that there was any difference at first. We think time might have been saved if we could have been left to think alike. The French Government during the time have been charged by some of their opponents with being the dupes of what may almost be described as the Machiavellian policy of Her Majesty's Government, while we, on our side, have been accused of undue subserviency to France. It was plainly hinted that we had parted company with her at a very earlier period. This is a very grave matter. France is a great country, our nearest neighbour, and our relations, commercial, social, and political, have been strengthened during the last 50 years, notwithstanding some small occasional difficulties. We meet France in every part of the world; and if we acted apart from Franco, not only on the general questions, but with regard to Egypt itself, it would have been, I believe, an error of a very vital description. I think, in fact, that one of the chief encouragements to Arabi Bey has 1492 been his belief that France and England were entirely separated in their national views with regard to this matter. We have been in communication with France on one subject, which will interest your Lordships to an extreme degree, during the last month—I refer to the Suez Canal. The result of these communications was the Note to which I have already alluded, and which has been communicated from the Conference. There has been no answer to that Note; and I apprehend that, practically, Europe does not wish to give an exact formal mandate, however much it favours the idea which is proposed by it; and I am happy to say that England and France are perfectly agreed as to the most important measure, perhaps, of all—that of taking charge of the safety of the Suez Canal; and we trust that those efforts will be accompanied by our Friend and Ally, the Italian Nation. I think, perhaps, this will be a convenient moment to answer a Question put to mo by the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) on Friday. He asked me how it was possible that we should refer questions to the Conference with regard to the Suez Canal—questions which Her Majesty's Government asserted wore entirely beyond the limits of the Conference to touch. I am not sure that I remember saying that.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI said that Mr. Gladstone had so stated the case.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI am not quite sure how the matter arose; I think, however, the noble Marquess is correct. But I believe the statement was made by Sir Charles W. Dilke, in answer to some Question put without Notice, with respect to the neutralization of the Canal, and was entirely outside the Question originally put. In some answer, also, given in reply to one of those numerous and unpremeditated Questions put without Notice, sometimes even by ex-official Members, Mr. Gladstone may likewise have made a statement to the same effect. But he took an early opportunity of saying, in he most precise terms, that it was the neutralization of the Canal that was excluded from the Conference, and that it was perfectly impossible to separate the question of the Suez Canal from the whole Egyptian Question. I think we are right. I think that, although we have a predominant interest 1493 in Egypt and the Canal, interests both military and commercial, we have no right to say that no other nations have rights there also, varying in character and degree. I myself have had to lay down principles not newly invented, but repeated by successive Governments, with regard to another Canal in a different part of the world. How is it possible for us to be consistent, if we lay down one principle in one part of the world and another in another? Our principle is absence of monopoly, absence of special privilege; and whatever interest we have in the Canal, military or commercial, consists in its passage being perfectly secure and perfectly free. I now come to the question which has been called the Egyptian Question proper. My Lords, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, in the present state of Egypt, force must be applied. The question is how that force should be applied, and by whom. I have said that, in our opinion, the least objectionable way of applying force would have been by the Sovereign; but there are things which do not admit of indefinite delay. Short of that, we have always been desirous of securing the co-operation of other Powers in the matter, and, above all, that of France. I have told your Lordships with great satisfaction, a satisfaction in which I believe you share, that at this moment Franco is cordially engaged with us in protecting the Suez Canal from danger. With regard to the further question of the advance into the interior, we have no final or official response from France; but we believe that she is not inclined to extend her cooperation in that direction; but she has, however, stated her entire want of objection to our taking that course. With regard to the other principal Powers of Europe, although, as I have said, they do not wish to give formal mandates upon the matter, I have no hesitation in saying that, in any course that we may take with regard to establishing order in Egypt, we shall have their good will, their good wishes, I might almost say their moral support. That is satisfactory, as showing their confidence in our loyalty and good faith. I am not at all sure, however, that that confidence would have been felt either by France or by the other Powers if, three or four months ago, by a precipitate course, we had taken sole action upon ourselves. 1494 At this moment, however, Europe is entirely prepared for such a contingency. This feeling on the part of Europe, as I have said, is complimentary to our loyalty and our good faith; but not the less does it leave upon us an immense burden and a great responsibility. I trust that that burden and that responsibility may be diminished; but I also believe that your Lordships, and the House of Commons, and the country at large, do not wish that we should shrink from the fulfilment of the obligation. My Lords, the noble Viscount behind me (Viscount Enfield) has, tonight, given your Lordships Notice of the sanction which it is proposed to obtain from Parliament to the employment of Indian troops outside the limits of our great Dependency. Mr. Gladstone this evening will ask the House of Commons to give a Vote of Credit of £2,300,000 for the purposes of that policy. Seventeen thousand five hundred troops will come under that Vote of Credit, and go to the Mediterranean—that is, putting out of the question 3,700 men of the garrison corps of different descriptions, and 3,100 men who, as a Reserve, will sail later. I will only add the expression of my fervent hope that the operations which, I have hardly any doubt, will be sanctioned by Parliament, will lead to the restoration of order and tranquillity in Egypt, to the maintenance of the authority of the Khedive, and to the development, in a prudent and judicious manner, of the liberties of the Egyptian people, when once they are free from the military tyranny which is now exercised over them.
§ Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Egypt."—(The Earl Granville.)
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, that after all the despatches and telegrams they had had on the question, and whereas all through the business that had led to recent events England had been playing into the hands of everybody else, without anything effectual being done, now that, at the last moment, serious steps had to be taken, this country was called upon to take them by herself, the result being that they were at last landed in a serious war. He would only go back to the month of September last, the time when Arabi Bey made his demand on the Khedive, and 1495 used his power to control His Highness. From that time until November, they had taken very few active measures with regard to Egypt, although the dangers now upon us were then looming in the distance. On the 23rd November, he (the Duke of Somerset) asked his noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what was going on in Egypt; and the reply was that things were in a disturbed state; but he hoped that with a little care and management greater evils would be avoided. But how had they been avoided? M. Gambetta, then Prime Minister in France, said that, not only must they use force for the solution of the problem, but they must consider how that force should be applied. His noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs met that by stating that the only force used would be moral force; but it was to be remembered that moral force on such occasions was of but little service unless physical force was behind.
§ EARL GRANVILLEsaid, his noble Friend (the Duke of Somerset) was not giving a correct representation of the effect of the communications that had taken place on the subject.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETwould ask, what had Her Majesty's Government done? In December the Government said they would consider what course should be pursued; but they did absolutely nothing. All Europe was alarmed, as well as Turkey, by the Dual Note; but that was explained away by the declaration that they did not intend any exertion of material force.
§ EARL GRANVILLEThat is not so.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, that he could not see of what possible use the Note could be without that moral force. The English and French Governments had been three or four months in correspondence on that question; and, no doubt, there was one communication bearing on active intervention, because his noble Friend suggested that the Sultan might be asked to send a Turkish General to Egypt, that an English General and a French General might also be sent, that the three might act together; but they were never to act unless they were all to agree on some point. In fact, the whole thing seemed to him to be quite an absurdity. Again, while they were discussing the question of moral intervention, Sir Edward Malet wrote that 1496 armed intervention had become a necessity, and that the only way of obtaining these demands was by force. Even then, when the Government were so advised, they proceeded on the lines of exercising that force through the Porte, and with what result? The Sultan sent Dervish Pacha, who at once put himself into the hands of Arabi, and at the pre-sent time absolutely nothing had been done; and it became clear that, if we meant anything real to be done, we must do it ourselves. The Conference was summoned, and the Fleet was ordered to the waters of Alexandria, where it remained for one month before it was given anything to do; and all that time, as was said, its presence was exciting the population, and creating bad feeling towards the Europeans. What was the use of sending the Fleet so long before it was intended to act? It was stated that it was to be kept there until the authority of the Khedive was restored. Unfortunately, however, they had people intriguing against them on every side. They had now got into a great war, the end of which he could not see, as it was reported that a holy war had been proclaimed amongst the Mahomedans of Asia, and in such a war British interests were certain to be imperilled, if they did not severely suffer. The Indian troops should have been sent long ago. In his opinion, it was most unfortunate that the Government had boon acting as they had done without a policy. Their policy, if it could be called a policy, was one of vacillation and delay. This matter would very soon have been brought to a conclusion by Lord Palmerston, for he would have had none of the vacillating or doubtful policy which had led to the present state of affairs. The whole course of events which had led up to this position seemed to him to be unfortunate. First of all, they took Cyprus, which was followed by the acquisition by France of Tunis, and all this after Mr. Gladstone had been talking of driving out the Turk "bag and baggage;" but it seemed that England had been turned out bag and baggage instead. This country had succeeded in exciting the fanaticism of the Mahomedan population throughout Egypt; and it certainly seemed, so far, as if there was a great movement among the Mahomedans in favour of the success of Arabi. The Government had 1497 throughout the whole of these transactions been too slow and dilatory.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, any person rising after the speech of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) to discuss the policy of the Government at so grave a conjuncture of public affairs as this necessarily labours under two difficulties—that if, on the one hand, he passes by a policy to which he objects, and, of which he disapproves, he may afterwards be held to have accepted it; and that, on the other hand, no one in the present state of affairs possesses the freedom of speech which he would otherwise enjoy. It is, however, the first duty of every man who joins in these discussions to assure the Government that, whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the means by which the present crisis has been reached, at all events, now that the lot of England has been cast and the honour of England has been engaged, all Parties will combine as one man to assist the Government in extricating the country from the difficulties in which it now finds itself. I wish to make that statement, and I hope it may be held to govern anything which, further on, I may have to say. I do not feel that I can pass by the despatch of the noble Earl, or what he has just said, without some criticism; but I can assure him that that criticism must not be held to imply a lukewarmness to assist in any military operations which the Government may think necessary. The noble Earl omitted to refer in his speech to two errors which I think he has fallen into in his despatch. There is in that document a reference to the policy of the previous Government, which seems like an attempt to make them responsible for the relations in which this Government stood towards France, and by a reference to the Egyptian Control to suggest that the miscarriage of that Control was the origin of the difficulty in which we find ourselves now. The noble Earl, I thought, in his speech held much sounder views than those expressed in his despatch. He discouraged them, and dwelt with emphasis, from which I will detract nothing, upon the importance—I will not say the necessity—but the great importance, at this grave moment, of carrying France with us in any operations we might desire to undertake in Egypt. That importance is very evident at the 1498 present time, and it was equally evident three, four, five, or even 10 years ago. For a long time past the two separate interests of these two great countries, which were imperative upon both of them—and of which it is hard to say which is predominant over the other—have imposed upon both of them, as a condition of their separate success, the necessity of sparing no effort to attain to an harmonious solution of the problem which is in itself difficult. But in his despatch the noble Earl seems to indicate that the idea of co-operating with France originated at the Congress of Berlin. That is an entire mistake. It has existed for many years. The co-operation of the two countries took an efficient and emphatic form at the time that Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert went out to Egypt, and the Khedive pronounced that decree instituting the Control, which he brought diplomatically to the notice of the two Governments. From that time to the present, there has been on the part of the two Governments a constant effort at harmonious co-operation, and nothing was done at Berlin to increase, much less to diminish, that co-operation. No kind of obligation or engagement was entered into then, or at any time during the tenure of Office of the late Government, which has imposed upon this country the duty of co-operating with France a moment further than the interests of this country would dictate. I think the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) informed the French Government that England would not occupy any territory in Egypt, and that assurance was repeated at Berlin by me; but beyond that assurance there was no engagement of any kind. We were two travellers walking to the same destination, and therefore pursuing the same route. So long as our destination was the same, our paths would be parallel, our action would be combined; but there was absolutely nothing to bind either one or the other in case, at any moment, evidence should arise to show that their interests had become divergent. It is necessary to say this much, in consequence of the words which the noble Earl has introduced into the beginning of his despatch. I would say a few words also about the Control in Egypt. I think the character of this Control has been singularly misapprehended. The Control, as Mr. Goschen established it in 1876, was not a sudden 1499 and uncalled-for interference with the internal affairs of another country; it was the result of an interference), going considerably further back, of a much larger character, and for which I believe both Parties of the State were responsible. It was the inevitable result of the establishment of the mixed tribunals. These were established to decide all disputes, not only between Egyptians and Europeans, but between Europeans and the Egyptian Government itself. There was no debtor so hopelessly involved as the Egyptian Government, and decrees were made against that Government, with the sanction and diplomatic protection of Europe; they even went so far as to seize all the Crown Lands of the Khedive, and to levy execution on the furniture in the Palaces themselves. The Khedive resisted the execution of these decrees, and the Powers were placed in this position—that while the Courts had authority to enforce decrees against Egyptian subjects, the Khedive was resisting their decrees in respect of his own debts. If we had been inclined to accept this situation, the other Powers wore not, and we found that the German Government and all the Powers were disposed to insist that the Khedive should render obedience to the decisions of these tribunals, which had been set up by Europe. You were, therefore, in this position—that you were compelled diplomatically to enforce decrees against a debtor whom you could not sell up, and there was nothing for it but to appoint—if I may use the language of the English Law—what is known in the Court of Chancery as a receiver. The Controllers were really nothing else but receivers in Chancery, and they possessed certain powers for the collection of Revenues and the satisfaction of claims which International Tribunals had ordered, and which we had a diplomatic right to enforce. That was settled in 1876, long before the Berlin Conference, when Control was instituted by the Khedive, under the direction of Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert, and communicated to the Powers. In 1879 we revived that Control, which had been interrupted by the events which preceded the fall of Ismail Pasha; but we revived it with the clearly expressed intention that it should not be made the pretext for any interference with the administrative affairs of the 1500 Egyptian Government, and we revived it with a consequent alteration—that the Controllers should not have the power which, under Mr. Goschen's scheme, they possessed of administrative interference in the affairs of Egypt. Since that time the Controllers have had no authority whatever but to inspect, to advise, and to report. Much has been said about the Control since; but I have not been able to trace in the Papers that their action has had anything to do with the events which have led to the state of things which the noble Earl has depicted to us to-day. It is quite true that Arabi, among his many other faults, was extravagant with money, and that his proceedings would ultimately have interfered with the matters which the Control was appointed to supervise; but that was a matter of account—a debtor and creditor question—which would, no doubt, have sooner or later been settled in some way; but which, certainly, was not of the kind to require such drastic remedies as the iron-clads and Shrapnell shells that have been brought to bear. I have a strong conviction that the introduction of the Control into the despatch of the noble Earl is due to a mistaken estimate of the real bearing of these transactions, and of the fact that the Control has nothing whatever to do with the difficulties in which we now find ourselves. But by the side of the Control there was another Representative of the Powers. There were the agents, the regular diplomatic agents, representing the authority of the Powers, constantly influencing the Egyptian Government, and advancing every year in the amount of authority which they claimed over the individual acts of the Government in all the details of its administration; and it is the agents—it is the power and the influence of the agents which have recently come to grief. The truth is—I am not blaming the Government, but only trying to ascertain the real facts of the case—the truth is, the tendency more and more in Egypt, apart from all financial questions, or questions of Control, has been to establish a Protectorate—a Protectorate of the two Powers, administered not by the Controllers, but by the agents. I do not blame that Protectorate. I do not know, but I think it has advanced considerably since the late Government had 1501 anything to do with public affairs; but I do not, on that account, venture to cast any blame on the present Government, because, little as the Papers before us show the grounds for the intrusion of English and French advice in Egyptian political and administrative affairs, still everybody must know that there is a mass of facts underneath the Papers which no Minister will or can reveal, but which must have had much to do in guiding the judgment of the Government with regard to the course of events. There is no doubt it is the question arising from this Protectorate which is now at issue—and a bloody issue—between us and the Egyptians; if we ask ourselves now, after these events—after the bombardment of Alexandria, and the production of a state of things in which Alexandria is burnt, the Khedive a fugitive in our hands, and the whole of the Egyptian population risen with a turbulent soldier against us; if we ask ourselves what is it that we have a right to ask of the Egyptian Government which we have not got, we should be puzzled to answer the question. For my own part, I have not a notion how it is to be answered. Again, if you look at the Papers, the state of things which immediately preceded the final crisis of May 25, furnishes you with no clue as to the demands which this country had, internationally, a right to address to a Dependency of Turkey, and on the refusal of which you proceeded to these extremities. The determining cause of the crisis was the trial of the Circassian officers. I have no doubt that the Circassian officers were innocent, and their leader an injured and calumniated man; but that is not a matter in which we should usually interfere between an Eastern Sovereign and his subjects. There are, beyond doubt, numbers of injured and calumniated men suffering the last penalties of the law at the hands of their exasperated Sovereigns in every degree of longitude from Morocco to China. We do not usually interfere in those cases; but, so far as reading the Papers goes, I will venture to say that any man wholly unacquainted with politics of this kind, upon reading those Papers, would say that the ground for which the Fleet was sent, and upon which, when the Fleet came, the Agents of France and England sent the summary demand for the dismissal 1502 of the Prime Minister, was that the Circassians had been condemned, and that, with the advice of the Foreign Agents, the Khedive had pardoned them, and the Ministry was at issue with the Khedive upon that pardon. These are grave matters. It may be that the Ministers are entirely wrong and the Khedive entirely right; but these are not of themselves usually grounds for international interference. I have simply noticed it, because, as the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Somerset) observes, we are at the beginning of a great war. It is impossible to see where it will lead, and I want, as we pass along, to summarize the documents, so far as they are presented to us, in order to ascertain what is the real state of affairs. But in doing so I desire to repeat my protest that I think it is very premature to condemn Her Majesty's Government at this point, because we should bear in mind, in dealing with foreign affairs, that no Minister for Foreign Affairs, however much disposed he may be to afford information, can possibly tell us all that he knows of what has passed at the Council tables of Europe; and therefore it is impossible he can lay before us a full explanation of all the measures he has thought it necessary to advise. Passing from the causes of these affairs, however, I must say that when we come to the modus operandi I feel myself more at liberty to criticize adversely the action of the noble Earl and his Colleagues. I will admit that it was necessary, forcibly or otherwise, to interfere in Egypt; that it was necessary to establish that quasi-Protectorate; and that it was necessary to press upon the Khedive to take the advice we gave to him, and to sustain him if taking' that advice brought him in danger of suffering harm. But, then, what were the means we ought to have adopted? There were two modes of going to work in dealing with the Government of Egypt. You might have used moral force first, or you might have made use of material force. Your only mode of acting by moral force upon a Mussulman population is by means of the hearty cooperation of the Sultan of Turkey. But you took the best means of alienating that hearty co-operation. If you had gone to him from the first, and taken him into your councils, and made him the instrument of what you desired, and 1503 indicated from the first that you wished to take no step without his concurrence and co-operation, there might have been objections to such a plan; but, at least, you would have had him heartily with you. But, instead of that, you have done these three things, which must, in themselves, have resulted in setting any Sultan of Turkey in opposition to you. Against his earnest protest you sent the Fleet into one of his ports; that of itself was a strong measure, and not likely to conciliate his good will. Against his earnest protest you sot up a Conference of six other Powers in his capital, to deal with the events arising in his own Dominions. That was not likely to conciliate him, or to induce him to act as your agent; but there was another matter, which seems to me to be a more fundamental mistake in the action the Government have taken. We have had a good deal of conflict over the words "European Concert." In a matter not concerning a Mussulman people, if Her Majesty's Government like the words "European Concert," it is a luxury which I certainly would not wish to deny them. I believe it is rather a phantasm; but, be it true or false, no harm could come of it. Whether a pretence or a reality, when you came to deal with a Mussulman people, the European Concert means Christianity against Islam. It means something very like a crusade. It means something very like saying—"The six European Powers, which constitute the European Concert, are Christian; while the Power against which they are acting and the people against whom they are acting are Mussulman;" and the parading of this European Concert as the principle of your action—the bringing forward on every opportunity of this combination of six Christian Powers to effect some particular thing in Mussulman territory—inevitably has the effect of impressing on the minds of Mussulmans, and especially of fanatical Mussulmans, that these enterprizes are undertaken by Christians against the interests of Islam. I do not say that the Sultan was under that delusion. He is a sagacious and well-informed Sovereign; but by this error you applied to him the pressure of a public opinion to which he is essentially sensitive. You placed him under the influence of the Mollahs and the Sheikhs, and of all the various Mussul- 1504 man leaders in the different parts of his Dominions who take a keen and active interest in the fortunes of Islam; and you made it almost impossible for him to go heartily with you, lest he should sacrifice that which is really the only title to his Throne—the only guarantee of his power which the events of modern history have left to him. I do not think that we in this part of the world sufficiently consider the very peculiar position of the Sultan of Turkey. His power does not rest upon the strength of any aristocratic combination, or of any democratic institution, or of any long traditional submission of any organized body to his rule. His power—and it is an enormous power, for it is not merely a political power, but a power appealing to the passions, to the devotion, to the self-sacrifice of all his subjects—his power rests upon this, that he is the Caliph and the Representative of the House of Othman, and that he does in his person represent before the world the interests of all those who believe in Mahomet. I shall not be accused, I hope, of wishing to derogate from the claims of Christianity; but, in all political matters, which are matters ultimately settled by force, nothing to my mind can be more dangerous than the adoption of any course of conduct of which the issue shall be to set Christianity collectively against Islam. Nothing is more likely to end in one of those appalling struggles, before the horror of which all differences of religion disappear. In dealing with the matter, the Government seem all along, even at the last moment, to have entertained the hope that they could use the moral force of the Sultan over the Mussulmans of Egypt; but they took every step which ingenuity could conceive, not only to set the Sultan personally as a Sultan against them, but to irritate every Mussulman who looks to the Sultan as the Caliph and the defender of his faith and interest. Now comes the other alternative, the alternative of force—how have the Government dealt with that? In applying force there is one precaution to be observed—that you should never threaten what you cannot, if need be, immediately perform. As to the noble Earl's denial, as I understood it, to the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset), that he had undertaken not to give material support to the Khedive, if it was not that, it was 1505 something very like it. It certainly introduced to us one of the most remarkable contradictions, or contrasts, let us say, between two simultaneous political assertions that I have ever seen. To the Khedive, Sir Edward Malet, on behalf of the Government, said this on the 9th of January—
The two Governments being closely associated in their resolve to guard, by their united efforts, against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their formal intention in this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them.The day after the orders wore sent off, the following despatch came from the Foreign Office:—I told Musurus Pasha that there was no change in our views as to the position in regard to Egypt and its Ruler; and that it was not true, as reported in the newspapers, that the French Government have proposed to us, or that we had agreed, to promise the Khedive material support.Now, what did this promise given to the Khedive on the 9th of January mean, if it did not mean material support? What did the Government mean when they said that the dangers to the Government of the Khedive would find England and France united to oppose them? Did they mean Notes, or Proclamations, or moral sentiments, or speeches, or despatches? Anybody would suppose, when a man tells you that he will oppose the dangers with which you are threatened, that he would give you material support; and, with that promise before us, it is inconceivable what the noble Earl could have meant by assuring Musurus Pasha that the views of Her Majesty's Government had not changed; and, at the same time, that he had not promised the Khedive material support. But that seems to be the key to the errors which the Government have pursued in dealing forcibly with this question. They had no force at hand. What their dislike to sending sufficient force was I do not know—whether it was a feeling that Cyprus was the proper place to assemble a force, and whether they had some dislike to employ Cyprus, were matters which had weight in their councils I do not know; or whether a feeling that material support must 1506 necessarily in the main come from the Indian Army, with a recollection of the language in which they had formerly described the employment of Indian troops, deterring them from so employing them, had anything to do with their decision, it is impossible to say. But it remains the fact that they had promised help to the Khedive, without having at hand any material force to carry out their promise. Well, the same thing happened on the 25th of May. Their agents said they would require the resignation of Arabi Pasha and his friends, and they said they did so on behalf of their Governments, and that they were prepared to exact the fulfilment of that requirement. Yet there was no force at hand that was capable of exacting that fulfilment. There was nothing but the Fleet, which turned out to be capable of bombarding Alexandria, and produced a state of things which resulted in the burning: of Alexandria; but it was not capable of procuring the resignation of Arabi Pasha. The same difficulty, the same hesitation, appears to have governed Her Majesty's Administration in their last great action—namely, the bombardment of Alexandria. The bombardment in itself, although a very forcible threat, was really nothing more than a threat. It was a very terrible thing to the forts and to those who were in them; but it would exercise no immediate result on the fortunes of Arabi, whom the Government undertook to displace. It only had a meaning and a reality, if they were prepared to land troops immediately to carry it out. The noble Earl told us it was impossible for him to foresee that Arabi would do anything so dreadful as to let the convicts out of gaol to burn Alexandria. I must say that a policy which is based on a sanguine estimate of Arabi's moral qualities is a policy likely to fail. I cannot admire those optimist views of the excellence of everybody, or admit that a man who by force had risen to the principal place, and had been able to drive out his Sovereign, was likely to shrink from the burning of a town, if it could help him to obtain his aims. The noble Earl has sketched to us, in indistinct terms only, the policy which he proposes to use, and the objects which he intends to attain. His language is too indistinct to invite criticism, and I prefer to wait until that policy is 1507 completed before venturing to criticize that of whose nature I am not fully informed. But I confess I heard, with some alarm, the statement that Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Franco were agreed as to the duty of guarding the Suez Canal. The object of guarding the Suez Canal is, doubtless, to keep it open, and one Power would be as effective to keep it open as two; and I cannot help feeling that, if events should ever happen which would make it a necessity for Franco to close the Canal, while it is always the interest of England to keep it open, that Canal guarded by England and France, each acting in opposite directions, will not materially advance the interests of this country. But then, again, the noble Earl assured us that we possessed the moral support of Germany and Italy. I cannot help remembering that the noble Earl is of a sanguine disposition. I cannot help remembering that he assured us that the consent of the Sultan had been obtained to the holding of a Conference at Constantinople, but that turned out to be a mistake; or that his Representative in the other House of Parliament thought that we had the assurance of the German Government that they considered the bombardment of Alexandria legitimate, but that, too, turned out to be a mistake. Sir Charles W. Dilke was also confident that Austria had expressed a similar opinion, but that also turned out to be a mistake.
§ EARL GRANVILLENo.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYDid Austria regard it as legitimate?
§ EARL GRANVILLEWe formed our opinion on an account by Sir Henry Elliot of his conversation with Count Kalnoky, and Count Kalnoky does not deny the accuracy of the account.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI had formed a different opinion from the noble Earl; but I have no doubt he is correct. I fear, however, that the natural optimism of his mind leads him to believe that he has the moral support of Germany and Austria in the invasion of Egypt. But I will not criticize further the view which is taken by the noble Earl of his policy. One point, one phrase came out in it which I heard with extreme satisfaction, and that is where he announced his intention of restoring the Khedive, and therefore giving refutation to any insinuation that negotiations 1508 are going on for the purpose of substituting any other Khedive for the present Khedive. Such conduct as that of appointing another Ruler over Egypt would not, by any means, be consistent with the honour of this country. I will urge upon the noble Earl that, in pursuing the line of policy laid out before him, he should avoid what appears to me, as to the noble Duke, the vacillation and the hesitation which has marked his policy hitherto. If he should employ diplomacy, he should make certain of the concurrence of those Powers upon whoso co-operation his diplomacy will depend; if he employs force, he should give force a fair chance, and take care, by the employment of ample, nay of abundant, resources, that, in acting against a feeble enemy, the honour of England suffers no stain.
§ THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKMy Lords, I do not think Her Majesty's Government have any right to complain of the manner in which the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) has made his observations. The noble Marquess has expressed his concurrence in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that it is of importance to maintain the French alliance with regard to the affairs of Egypt. He has also given explanations of the conduct of Egyptian affairs by the late Government, which I will not discuss, excepting to observe that I was somewhat surprised at the statement of the noble Marquess, that nothing was done at or after the Congress of Berlin to bind England and Franco together about Egypt. The main contention, as I understand, of the noble Marquess's speech was this—that if we intended to use only moral force in Egypt, we have not used that moral force in the way we ought to have done; and, secondly, that if we had decided to use material force, we had not used that material force in the manner in which we ought to have done. As to the use of moral force, the noble Marquess objected to the sending of Her Majesty's ships to Alexandria at the time they were so sent. I confess that, after what has fallen from the noble Earl behind me (Earl Granville), I am surprised any such objection was raised; because, looking at the circumstances as they are now, I should like to ask the noble Marquess what would have occurred supposing that Fleet had 1509 not been sent? I differ altogether from the opinion of the noble Marquess that the sending of that Fleet was wrong. I maintain that the sending of those ships had a very material effect upon the condition of affairs in Egypt then, and up to the present time. Arabi Pasha had 1,500 troops in Alexandria before the 11th of July; and now, from the last accounts, he had not with him more than 5,000 Regular troops. The noble Marquess then objected to the reference of the Egyptian Question to the Conference, and to the endeavours of Her Majesty's Government to obtain the general concurrence of the Great Powers of Europe. It appeared to Her Majesty's Government to be of great advantage that the European Powers should be consulted, and that they should, if possible, be unanimous with reference to Egypt. The argument of the noble Marquess in respect to Mahomedan fanaticism is an exceedingly fine-drawn one. It cannot, surely, for one moment be supposed that Mahomedan fanaticism would be excited by a contest with a combination of Christian nations, and that it would not be excited by a contest with one. Then the noble Marquess has said that we ought not to have threatened without being prepared immediately to act. The fallacy of that doctrine rests in the word immediately. It would make it impossible for a nation to express its determination to act under certain circumstances unless ready at a moment's notice. The policy of Her Majesty's Government has been from the first to assure the Khedive of their support, but to act with the greatest deliberation, to try every reasonable expedient before resorting to force, and to enlist the sympathy and support of other nations by showing that they were actuated by no individual or selfish motives. There has, it seems to me, been no inconsistency between the language held at one date and another by the noble Earl behind me. We have done no more and no less than we all along said we should do—namely, support the Khedive, and insist upon the demands made by our agents. We never said or implied that we should not support the Khedive, if the necessity arose. The noble Marquess and the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) have contrasted the language we used to the Khedive in January with the assurance given to the Porte, that 1510 there was no understanding between France and England to intervene by force of arms in the Khedive's support; but it is clear from the Papers laid on the Table that at that time it was the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that if an intervention by arms was necessary it should be an intervention by the Porte. Any other action than that which we have taken would have been inconsistent with the firm intention of Her Majesty's Government to deal patiently, but firmly, with the Egyptian difficulty, and to bring to bear upon it all possible moral force from without. I do not know whether noble Lords opposite contend that before undertaking the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria we ought to have had a military force in readiness to land. That course would clearly have been inconsistent with the attitude of this country towards the Conference. If we had organized a great military expedition we should have excited the suspicions of the other Powers, and we should have been told—"You are dealing with an affair which you referred to the Conference; you are not acting in good faith towards us." There is an idea prevalent that a military expedition undertaken at once would have averted the occurrences at Alexandria which we all deplore. But what would have been the obvious procedure of such a combination? One need only took at the map to see. A strong force landed in the Bay of Aboukir might, of course, have defeated Arabi Pasha, if he had chosen to encounter it; but it stands to reason that Arabi Pasha would not have remained at Alexandria; he would have retreated upon Cairo, and the resnlt would probably have been not less deplorable than the destruction of Alexandria itself. The noble Marquess asked Her Majesty's Government whether they trusted in Arabi Pasha? I shall have to explain afterwards the reasons we had for having no confidence in Arabi Pasha. I will only say now that the pillage of a town by the Regular soldiers in it was a calamity which we could not by any possibility have prevented, and that no force collected on the outside could have prevented those abominable acts committed by the Egyptian soldiers upon their fellow-countrymen. I will now touch upon the earlier part of the noble Marquess's speech, in which he, with 1511 great success, defended the action of the Control. One of the gentlemen who filled that office is a relative of my own, and I should be the last man to throw a doubt upon the value of the services which the Controllers have rendered. Major Evelyn Baring and Sir Auckland Colvin have not only exercised a most salutary influence over the finances of Egypt; but I know from the Papers which have been presented to your Lordships that the improvements which, by their advice, were effected in the internal affairs of Egypt were most beneficial to that country; and it is only by reason of the action of this miserable Military Party, or insurrection or revolt—whichever you may choose to call it—that the country is prevented from reaping the full benefit of those improvements. But while I heartily agree with the noble Marquess in praising the Control, I entirely differ from his theory that while the Control is free from all blame, the Protectorate is in some degree responsible for the misfortunes that have befallen that country. Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to state, very shortly, my theory as to how the present state of affairs has been brought about in Egypt—a theory which I believe is conclusively proved by the Papers which have been laid before Parliament. In my opinion, that state of affairs is due, not to the action of the British and French Agents in Egypt, or to that of the Egyptian people, but to that of a military insurrection, inaugurated by men who have carried out their designs with considerable skill and ability. In February, 1881, the first military outbreak took place, in which Arabi Pasha, then Arabi Bey, took part, and it was followed by an immediate additional charge of £50,000 on the Egyptian Revenue for the Army. The next time we hear of the military revolt is in September, 1881, and of that revolt Arabi Pasha was chief. He himself admitted that that revolt was a matter connected entirely with the administration of the Army, arising out of certain officers having been passed over in consequence, as he alleged, of the intrigues of others. It is not unusual for those who are engaged in intrigues themselves to accuse others of entering into them. What was the result of that revolt? Why, the Ministry was upset. Cherif Pasha, following out a practice which is more suitable 1512 to this country than to Egypt, made an attempt to conciliate Arabi Pasha by putting him into office, and he was created Under Secretary for War. The attempt in his case, however, was not so successful as it has sometimes been in (his country, and Arabi Pasha shortly afterwards set himself up as a virtual dictator, with the result that the expenses of the Army were increased by £290,000 per annum. The next occurrence of interest, as showing the real aim of Arabi Pasha, was that he forced the Khedive to promote officers in his interest. At that time, Arabi Pasha pretended to be acting with the National Party of Egypt; but it is clear that he was merely using that Party as an engine for establishing a military despotism. At that very time Arabi Pasha was a rebel, not only against the Khedive, but against the Sultan, because he said that if the latter ventured to send a Commissioner he would be opposed by force, while he had arranged to depose the Khedive, and to set up somebody else in his stead. From that time the supremacy of the Military Party in Egypt has been complete. On the 27th of May Arabi's creatures in Alexandria were placed in Office; and, subject to some little change which took place upon the intervention of the Sultan, he has since been absolute Ruler of that country. I have already said that he has excited the fanatical feeling of the Native population, and that, during the whole of this time, the real interests of the people have been entirely neglected, and the good advice of the Controllers disregarded. Is that the opinion only of the British Government? I think, at any rate, it is distinctly the opinion of the Conference; because, in their Note to the Porte, they invite the Sultan to use force in order to put an end to the anarchy which is desolating Egypt. The Powers, therefore, have arrived at the same conclusion as Her Majesty's Government. Something has been said with respect to the Egyptian people. Do not let your Lordships suppose that the people of Egypt are in any way consenting parties to Arabi's usurpation. The people of Egypt, like all Eastern nations, are an industrious and hardworking people, who desire to live at home quietly by the fruits of their labour, and they have been forced by Arabi into joining the Army, and by 1513 his usurpation have been prevented from performing their usual avocations. These reasons, and the explanation I have given, will answer, I hope, the apprehensions expressed by the noble Marquess with respect to the Mahomedan religion and the antipathy of its followers to Christianity, and the excitement which may be apprehended among our Mahomedan subjects in India. This is merely the case of a military adventurer—a case well known in India in old days. The question of creeds is not at all involved in it. In India, and particularly in Rajpootana—now, perhaps, one of the most prosperous States in India—Provinces were exposed to the ravages of adventurers like Arabi Bey, who committed just such atrocities as have been perpetrated at Alexandria. I say that the whole circumstances of Arabi Bey already alluded to show that he is one of the class I have mentioned as frequently found in the history of India. The manner in which he has behaved strongly resembles that of the Rajpootana adventurer, Ameer Khan, who lived about 100 years ago. The British Government in those days was very slow in interfering; but at last it did interfere, and in 1817 peace was restored. When I visited that country, during my residence in India, I found the memory of those scenes fresh in the minds of the people. The people of Rajpootana at that time did not think that the British Government, in waging war against Ameer Khan, were warring against Mahomedanism; they merely desired that the innocent people of the country should be allowed to exercise their lawful callings without molestation; and I think that the same feeling which penetrated the minds of the people of Rajpootana in 1817 will penetrate the minds of the people of Egypt at the present day, and, that they will be thankful to be relieved from a military despotism, which is the real cause that has compelled the British Government to have recourse to force.
§ VISCOUNT CRANBROOKMy Lords, I think your Lordships must be a little surprised at the satisfaction which has been expressed by the noble Earl who has just sat down (the Earl of North-brook) at all that has passed, and a little surprised also at the fact that the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville) has got 1514 together a Conference of the Great Powers and invited French and Italian co-operation, in order that we may, as it appears from the view of the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook), deal with a small force of 5,000 men. But it strikes me that the noble Earl, as well as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, is now labouring under the same kind of delusion, in minimizing the difficulty which now exists, which the latter previously was subject to; and I cannot help thinking that he never seems to have given the early part of these proceedings the importance they deserve. His chief anxiety seems to have been to remain in complete accord with France. He was anxious to be in complete accord with France when M. Gambetta, who wished for united and immediate action, was in power; and I do not think anyone will deny that the Government at that time, in its desire to maintain a united action, must in honour have been prepared for some kind of immediate action with Franco. Then the German Ambassador made the suggestion for a Conference, for which it was then said there was no occasion; and yet, at that very time, the plot was in progress against the Khedive, and it was known that Arabi Bey was accumulating forces to support his position. A few days later we find the noble Earl anxious to be in complete accord with M. de Freycinet, who had adopted a totally different policy. Then, my Lords, with regard to this Conference. No doubt it is now praised as admirable; but it was suggested in the month of February, and then the noble Earl thought that it would be giving the matter an importance which it did not deserve. Now, the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) thinks we have only to deal with the military adventurer. I hope it will be so. But this adventurer has represented the people and the de facto Government of Egypt for some time past, and when it is said you must separate the people from Arabi, you cannot separate them in that way, or dispose of the matter so easily. Today it is perfectly clear that the Government come before us asking for a considerable body of troops; we must, therefore, suppose that a very serious question is before us, and that great British interests are at stake. "British interests"—ah! I cannot help stopping for a moment when I think of what has been 1515 said about that plirase—I remember once when I mentioned "British interests" I was told that I was preaching a gospel of selfishness. But what is it but British interests for which the Government are now plunging us into war? There was a time when that expression could not be used without severe criticism, as it now is, in public Papers and documents which receive my noble Friend's assent. I should have been quite contented to have allowed the debate to close with the temperate speech of my noble Friend opposite (the Duke of Somerset), had not the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) thought proper to enter into a variety of other irrelevant topics to which reference must be made. The noble Earl admits that the Control has been exercised with the greatest advantage in Egypt; but what has happened there with respect to it? The union of England and Franco in the Control was intended to secure an administrative power for certain special objects; but what the noble Earl said with respect to it gave it a much larger scope. The Government, he says, inherited from their Predecessors the Joint Control, and that is correct; but with respect to what my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) said about a Protectorate, he did not state that there was an acknowledged and avowed Protectorate, but that there was a quasi-Protectorate; and I defy any man to go through these Papers without seeing that the Consuls of England and France, and officials of other Powers, were continually using influence with the Khedive to induce him to do this thing and that thing. But this preceded, as well as accompanied, the Control of Finance. When you read that long list of European employés in Egypt, and when you see that country handed over, as is alleged, to a swarm—I must not say of locusts, but of officials who are supposed to be sucking out the life-blood of the people—this, I think, at least shows that the military adventurer who has got hold of the Army has material to work upon with the people and with the Government of Egypt; he has got hold of points which he can press on the people, and he can say to them—"Look at that great array of Europeans feeding upon you and living upon your industry." He can, in the same way, turn to the Native officials 1516 of the Egyptian Government and say—"Look how you are excluded by this enormous number of highly-paid Europeans;" and he can further say—"I am the representative of your party, the representative of Islamism." How long such appeals may influence the people's mind, and to what extent, is another thing; but that he does employ them, and that they have some degree of effect, is certain. No one knows better than the noble Earl the extent of Arabian fanaticism, and the influence that is exercised by those who are at the head of the Mahomedan faith in Arabia, and how in a moment you may see a feud break out between Turkish Islamism and Arabian Islamism. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has drifted on in this difficulty, hoping that something might happen that would bring it to a termination, never realizing the full extent of it, and yet seeing that a time might come when he might be obliged to intervene. I think he said he would not intervene until there was a state of anarchy. Sir Auckland Colvin, on the 16th of March, told him that there was anarchy; that there was in Egypt practically no Government, and that everything was at the mercy of the Military Party. It was obvious that there then was something exceedingly pressing and calling for immediate action. Sir Auckland Colvin said that any casual incident might bring on the worst consequences. What, then, was the duty of the Government? My noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) has been attacked for saying that threats should never be used unless they are intended to be followed by immediate action. What, however, my noble Friend said was, that threats should never be used without your being in a position to act, or without the power of immediate action. He then compared the conduct of the Government with what they even professed to do, and he said—"When you come to your performance you are not in a position to do that which you undertook." You undertook to protect the Khedive. In what way did you protect either the Khedive or his authority by the bombardment? You endangered his life. You were told by Sir Edward Malet and Mr. Cookson that there was the greatest danger of an outbreak at Alexandria. That has hap- 1517 pened. You were told by the Khedive that if you sent ships or resorted to force there would in all probability be a conflagration throughout the country. What did you do? You sent ships to Alexandria to prevent or put down revolution, which was then actually going on at Cairo. That was a curious as well as a most imperfect method of proceeding. And I say, further, that when the ships went to Egyptian waters to protect the Khedive and the lives of Europeans, they should have been in a position to do so to a greater extent than they did. I do not blame Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour; far from it. He was not able to land a force sufficient for the purpose, for it was clearly proved by the Papers that he had not 300 men to send; but when you had determined to take your great step and to show the force and power of England, it ought not to have been confined merely to the blowing down of the forts, because the consequences that ensued were almost inevitable. If you supposed that you were going to drive Arabi from power by the course you were taking, you were certainly abandoning Alexandria to the mob; there was no protection left. Had you, then, left yourselves, as is pretended by your Self-denying Protocol, without the power of landing troops to save the lives of these people? Then, in whose name, under Heaven, and by what authority did you land troops so soon afterwards? You had received no commission from the Conference then. You landed them in the name of humanity and to stop outrages; and if you had had more force to do it sooner, you would have at once vindicated the cause of humanity and the power of England, and done much towards re-establishing that prestige which has been so greatly shaken. I do not so much blame the noble Earl opposite; but I blame others who filled the air with voices about the impossibility of war occurring and force being used under their rule, and who said everything they could against those who would uphold the Imperial power of this country. When you had the Chief of the present Government speaking, at a comparatively recent period, of the Ottoman Empire as a fabric of iniquity, how could it be supposed that the Sultan would receive at once and readily his attempts to persuade him to act on his behalf? The Sultan might have answered 1518 very much in the language of the great dramatist—"Fair Sir, you spit on me on Wednesday last; on such a day you called me dog; and for these courtesies am I to render you assistance?" That is how the Head of the Government has treated Turkey. It is almost a Nemesis in itself. He goes to the Power which he has thus outraged and disdained, and sues it to get us out of the difficulty into which his own weakness and vacillation and his want of trust in his own country have brought us. Sir Edward Malet, writing on the 25th of May, said that the present situation has boon brought about by the Ministers and the people of Egypt persisting in the belief that the Western Powers will not despatch troops; and he added that if Turkey would say that she would send troops, without even landing them, he believed that all the difficulty would be brought to an end. I sympathize with my noble Friend behind me in feeling that, when naval and military operations are begun, the hearts of Englishmen should beat in unison, and that their action should not belie their feelings; and, so far as I am concerned, the last thing I would do would be to impede in any way the action of the Government in bringing this business to a termination. But I should, on the other hand, belie my feelings if I did not say to the Government that their conduct in Opposition, and since they came into Office, has been such as to lead people to suppose that they were not ready to vindicate the honour of England; that they were using mere words which they did not mean to carry out when they talked of united action and of warding off danger from the Khedive; that they have condemned others for preparing to use force when they meant to use it, but they themselves, after all, are now obliged to use force, having tried not to use it; and I would commend to the attention of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby), who has just entered the House, and who left his Party because of their "glory and gunpowder" policy, the serious pass to which things have been brought under the policy of disgrace and gunpowder on the part of the present Government, to which he gives his support.
LORD HOUGHTONsaid, that, in his opinion, if the noble Marquess opposite 1519 (the Marquess of Salisbury) had not spoken of the attempted "Protectorate" of England and France as having been a powerful motive in the mind of the Party in Egypt which had raised that fearful insurrection, it would be well for him, either now or at some other time, to explain away that phrase. If the noble Marquess had reason to believe that the agents of the English and French Governments had attempted to exercise any further authority than they were commissioned by their respective Governments to exercise, he entirely differed from him, and could assure him, from some observation, that that was not the case. If, again, the noble Marquess thought the Governments of England and France were exercising interference in the government of Egypt in a manner distasteful either to the Ruler or the people of that country, he was equally wrong. That England and France, through their Representatives, did give salutary advice to the Ruler of Egypt was perfectly true, and that advice was in all cases kindly received, and in many cases followed. The Representatives of the two Powers had pressed on the Khedive most strongly the danger of allowing the Military Party to attain the predominance and power it was attaining; and, in that sense, they really anticipated the events which had occurred. If their Lordships could see the confidential communications of those Representatives to their respective Governments, he should not be surprised if it were found that they had expressed themselves even more powerfully on that subject confidentially than they had done in the printed Papers. Anyone who happened to be in Egypt at the time knew that the growth of the Military Party was a very painful consideration. The attempt to identify the growth of that party with the growth of a national feeling was very ingenious, and also very successful in Europe, but not in Egypt itself. It was notorious that when the Council of the Notables assembled they acted under the terrorism of the Military Party, and made no secret of the fact that they had no ill-will to the limited interference, through the Control or otherwise, of England and France, but that they believed it had been exercised beneficially for Egypt. He was glad that the present debate had been mainly confined to the consideration of the existing state of affairs, without reference to 1520 future policy, whether that of a Protectorate or any other. At the same time, they had a full right to demand of the Government—whatever might be their belief as to the best administration for Egypt, or as to the permanent settlement of that question—that they should direct their attention exclusively to the practical work which they had undertaken, and that its success should not be endangered by the application of any theories about a Protectorate, or as to any interference by England, either in one sense or the other.
§ LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, that the principal cause of the difficulties which had arisen in Egypt was the weakness of Her Majesty's Government last year in not having insisted on the observance of Treaty obligations by the French with regard to Tunis. The manner in which the solemn assurances of the French Government respecting Tunis had been set aside and broken ought to have opened the eyes of Her Majesty's Government and prevented their being again led astray by the French in Egypt. Her Majesty's Government were also to blame for the apparent duplicity with which they had invited the Sultan to intervene in Egypt; while, as it now appeared from the statements made to the French Chamber, they were promising France so to limit and restrict the employment of the Ottoman Forces, that the Porte could not intervene consistently with its dignity and interests. As to the bombardment, Mr. Gladstone had endeavoured to justify its having taken place without a declaration of war by citing Navarino as a precedent; but the attack on the Turkish Fleet by the three combined Fleets had invariably been treated as a crime, and also as a blunder in what concerned England. The plea of self-defence was disproved by the result; for if the ships had not been withdrawn from the earthworks they might have waited till they themselves were attacked; and if the Government chose to disregard the Law of Nations, they should not have allowed their impatience to have brought so much danger upon the Europeans in Alexandria—a danger which was evident, even if they had not been fully warned of it. It was inconceivable that the Admiral should have persisted in bombarding Alexandria, after the offer to dismount the guns, which he said was too late, 1521 unless he had received very pressing instructions from Her Majesty's Government; and such instructions were not easily to be explained, except by the natural desire of Her Majesty's Government to remove the blot caused by Majuba Hill, in view of the probably imminent General Election. He maintained, therefore, that the proceeding was not justified by any reasonable fear of attack. He also failed to understand by what right Her Majesty's Forces had been engaged in shooting people for plunder, seeing that they did not represent the Government of the country. After the sacrifices made by the Prime Minister to avoid blood-guiltiness, no one could be expected to believe that his Government, containing Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain, would carry out a threat of bombardment without any declaration of war, and the use of shells, which had caused so much destruction of life in the city beyond the forts, so much destruction of the property of the subjects of other European States, and, as the event had shown, so much loss of life amongst Europeans who had no part in the French and English quarrel with the Egyptians.
§ EARL GRANVILLE, in reply, said: My Lords, in making my statement, I asked for the indulgence of the House, and that indulgence has been extended to me in the course of the debate. I trembled, however, when my noble Friend the noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) got up, though I know it is perfectly impossible to be angry with an old personal and political Friend. I cannot, however, help saying that to-day he has uttered only a quantity of detached sentences without any context, and ended by a complaint that it was wrong not to use every effort to secure peace. That is a complaint which does not affect us much, and, therefore, I think it should not stand against us. With regard to the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury), he began, in the most unreserved manner, by stating his determination to support the Government; but then he proceeded to make criticisms on the conduct of the Government. I, however, have no complaint to make as to what fell from the noble Marquess in that respect, who certainly criticized our conduct in a fair and moderate spirit, although I should like to say one or two words as to what he said, in order to 1522 avoid misconception. The noble Viscount (Viscount Cranbrook) said he desired to support Her Majesty's Government; but I can only say that, if he really wished to do so, he has very peculiar views indeed of supporting a Government in times of national difficulty. I was anxious to act in a cordial manner with the French Government; but the noble Viscount will observe that we differed upon two important questions. The noble Viscount also held forth about the loss of prestige that would take place from what we have done. I am not in the least aware what that loss of prestige is, or how it has been caused; but I must say that when he goes on to remark that it is believed that the Liberal Party are unable to assert themselves in the interests of this country, I would ask, if that belief is held abroad, whether it is not to be attributed to the complaints and representations of the Conservative Party, rather than to the sentiments and feelings of the Liberal Party themselves? For my own part, I deny that the feelings and sentiments of the Liberal Party justify any such idea. The noble Marquess dwelt much on the way in which Her Majesty's Government have behaved towards the Sultan; but he did not, like the noble Viscount, declare that we had sued for peace from Turkey.
§ VISCOUNT CRANBROOKI said that you had sued for assistance, not for peace.
§ EARL GRANVILLEWhile the noble Viscount thought that was unfair, the noble Marquess considered it a very desirable thing to do, though the Government had not done it in a very conciliatory manner. I believe that it would have been of immense benefit to the Sultan, and to Egypt, if the Sultan had been able to make up his mind to take the necessary steps to assert his own authority. Then, the noble Viscount hardly strengthened us in our position by the way in which he questioned our cause of quarrel in Egypt. There was one point in the speech of the noble Marquess in which I am very much inclined to agree with him, and that is that we ought not to try to interfere too much politically in the affairs of Egypt, I was delighted to hear him defend the Control; but I could not concur with the noble Marquoss in the justice of his accusation, when he hinted that the political inter- 1523 ference of the present Government had grown up from the financial interference of their Predecessors only, and not from their political interference. I believe that the Controllers did not, in the slightest degree, pass beyond the attributes. They were put forward owing to the fact that successive Ministers in Egypt, in trying to resist the extortionate demands of the Army, had endeavoured to put the Controllers in the background. On the other hand, I cannot admit that the late Government entirely abstained from political interference in Egypt. The very constitution of these Controllers has a political element in it. It was perfectly impossible to put forward two men with the right of a consultative vote in the Council of Ministers, with a right to investigate everything that went on in the country, to communicate with all authorities, and to report, without giving them a great deal of political interference. It was impossible to exclude from finance such subjects as the Army, the administration of justice, and the education of the people, and it was quite clear that that had in it a very strong element of political power. There is one point, in conclusion, on which I wish to lay very great stress. What I protest against is that, by some of his observations, the noble Marquess gave rise to the impression that we were trying to establish something like a revival of the Crusades—an opposition of the Christian against the Mahomedan.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThat is not what I suggested.
§ EARL GRANVILLEHowever that may be, I assert that there is no question of Mahomedanism in the matter. We shall act in support of the legal authorities, being Mahomedans, against certain other Mahomedans who are rebelling against those Mahomedan authorities. That is the position which Her Majesty's Government take up, and which I think it is most important should be known.
§ Motion agreed to.