LORD CAMPBELL,in rising pursuant to Notice, to call attention to the precautions which appear to be desirable before Great Britain enters the approaching Conference, and to move for any recent diplomatic correspondence with Her Majesty's Government on the terms of peace between Russia and the Porte, said: My Lords, although it would not be consistent with the Usages of this House, as generally followed, or with the respect which I have always entertained for it, to submit a Motion of any kind, without a single argument in favour of it, no very long one seems to be required in this instance. The terms of 1708 peace between Russia and the Porte are not, as we are told, officially communicated, and the Government are not enabled to distribute them. There is no complaint, at least from me, upon this point. In ordinary intercourse, the necessity of seeing those terms has been perhaps, in some degree, exaggerated. It is clear that Russia will desire to retain her present acquisitions, until the European Powers intervene, in the form which so long a parturition is maturing. The principle of Uti possidetis must appear to her to sum up, if not all law, human, and Divine, at least the better part of equity and policy, at present. If the Conference is free to overrule them, the terms of peace afford but little scope for curiosity. If it is not, but one result is likely to present itself. On the other hand, from Constantinople and St. Petersburg, from Berlin and Vienna, comments have probably been made by eminent Diplomatists, as to what is going on between the two belligerents, which would do a great deal to guide opinion in this country, possibly to animate it. But we depend at this peculiar juncture on opinion for our safety. Such comments I have asked for. However, this is not a Motion to be urged upon a Government if they have no such Correspondence, or if they think it dangerous to produce it. Before proceeding further, I owe an apology to the House for venturing to trouble them at any length, with an interval so short, after the last Motion I brought forward. Nothing would induce me to adopt that course but our exceptional position. A hostile army at the gates of the capital we are entitled to defend—and much more than entitled—must alter the routine of individuals and Assemblies. It must force upon them many things they would have otherwise avoided. The Notice engages me to call attention to precautions seemingly desirable before the Conference is entered. Whether they are or not depends upon the view adopted of its function. My Lords, the approaching Conference in one striking aspect differs from all which modern history has presented. Whichever you refer to—that of Westphalia, or Utrecht, that which closed the Seven Years' war, that of Vienna, or that of 1856—this observation might be generalized. The attempt has always been to appraise the results of war, and to embody them in 1709 articles—to translate military loss and military gain into the conclusions of a settlement. Now, the function is diametrically opposite. It might be shadowed out nearly in this way. It is to prevent a superstructure of acquisition from being established on a basis of success, although a basis of that kind, as yet has always had the superstructure now to be avoided. On the other hand, this function is not beyond the range of possible success—first, because the European Powers surpass Russia when united in their force; secondly, because every one of them, if swayed by arguments of interest, or arguments of duty, would be ready to oppose her. But it will be a new, unprecedented masterpiece of diplomatic energy. Your Lordships will not readily assume that unless remarkable precautions are adopted, the world is about to see what in the lapse of time it has never been permitted to contemplate. The right of Europe to aspire to a result so different from the usual one, no doubt is incontestable. That the war was not begun in the interest of Eastern Christianity, is clear if only from this fact—that it was never sanctioned by the Patriarch of Constantinople, by the Armenian Patriarch, or by the Exarch of Bulgaria. In these venerable dignitaries Eastern Christianity has patrons more authoritative than the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) upon that bench and the late Prime Minister beyond it, however little either of the two may recognize the circumstance. If Russia was a mandatory —as at one time she asserted—the Powers who employed her are entitled to revise and to reject the work she has performed. If she was not a mandatory, she was an outlaw; and, as an outlaw, is exposed to general restraint. The clearness of the right would not, however, take away the difficulty of the function I have pointed to. By glancing at a few of the tasks which apparently devolve on the British Representative in any Conference which happens, I should hope still further to pave the way for the precautions it would be otherwise imprudent to advert to. He will have, as I contend, to maintain the Treaties of 1856 up to this point—that they should not be given up for any Russian object. Even if the Sultan quitted European Turkey altogether—a prospect upon which I do not hazard an opinion, and 1710 only mention hypothetically—it would be essential to maintain the void against a Russian tenure. It is idle to construct, as many reasoners are doing, the mental fabric of Byzantine Empires and Byzantine Federations, when you have a hostile army at San Stefano; when the occupation of Gallipoli is threatened; when villages are taken on the Bosphorus; when the Mediterranean is approached. Russia, where she is, defeats such projects altogether. The time for their discussion is summed up in an old tense, which the Phil-Hellene, no doubt, recalls with glowing admiration. It was called by the grammarians the paulo post futurum. The first task of the negotiator will be in the name of Treaties to evacuate a space, whatever creed or nationality is destined to re-occupy it. So far as ingenuity can do anything to undermine or to attenuate the Treaties of 1856, it has not been neglected. But they are not devoured yet, even by their authors. Their heirs have not succeeded in effacing them. As soon as the attack begins, on the ground of Ottoman resistance at Constantinople to what is humourously termed the "voice of Europe"—by way of proving General Ignatieff to be an eminent ventriloquist—-the unanswered despatch of the Sublime Porte on January 25th last year is summoned to the rescue. As soon as the Protocol before the war began is urged to overthrow them, the unanswered despatch of Her Majesty's Government on May 1st effectually parries the manoeuvre. As soon as it is urged that Russian arms have superseded them, the declaration which inaugurated the Black Sea Conference is summarily drawn out of the recesses which contain it. As soon as their antiquity is mentioned to their prejudice —the antiquity of 20 years—their second birth in 1871 is usefully commemorated At last the Governments of Europe are appealing to them. Like Mount Ararat, they rise above the waters of invasion. The diplomatic ark is resting on their summit. But there is a second task for the Negotiator of this country. He has on special grounds to re-establish the Protectorate of the races subject to the Porte which the Crimean War had vindicated for Great Britain. It is worth while to remark, if only for a minute, how that Protectorate escaped us. It flourished and it led to many salutary 1711 things until the resignation of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The withdrawal of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe by the Government of that time, was the first blow to its efficiency. It continued, with diminished force, under Sir Henry Bulwer, afterwards under Lord Lyons, and last of all under Sir Henry Elliot up to 1870. Then arrived the turning point, which cannot be too accurately noted. From the moment of the concessions to Prince Gortchakoff, the British Embassy was lowered indescribably in its authority at Constantinople. Simultaneously, by the misfortunes of the Franco-German War, the French Embassy was paralyzed. From that time their was no bar to Russian supremacy in the capital. The Austrian and German Embassies were both instructed to adhere to it, or favour it. The Holy Alliance could be traced in every office of Stamboul, in every station on the Bosphorus. Now, the whole case of those who would oppose my proposition —-that the Negotiator ought to re-establish our influence—is summed up in the hope that Russian power effectually replaces it. If Russian power was any check to Ottoman misgovernment from 1870 to 1875, it must have wholly passed away. But, according to the school accustomed to inveigh against the Porte, at that very period it culminated in its errors. Again, if Russian supremacy over the Porte was any check to Ottoman misgovernment, it must have passed away during the eight years the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was in vigour, and assured to Russia a preponderance which the Treaty of Kainardji has been thought—but not correctly—to have given her. On this point there is an authoritative witness who, in our various discussions, I think, has never been referred to. During that period—in 1841—the French Government, directed by the illustrious M. Guizot, sent out a Commissioner to explore the state of the Bulgarians, which had been recently disturbed. M. Blanqui was the person chosen. He rode from Belgrade to Constantinople. He drew up a Report. He published an octavo. In that volume, which I have long possessed, and have often been on the point of citing to the House, the picture which he gives of mal-administration is darker than those which here are sometimes founded upon Consular Reports, or those which out-of-doors have not a Consular Report to 1712 justify their tonour. M. Blanqui is the dormant scourge—at least, the dormant refutation—of those who hold that the ascendancy of Russia suffices for the welfare of the races subject to the Porte; and all the more because he shares their love of Eastern Christianity. On grounds of this kind, the Negotiator ought to re-establish our Protectorate. Unless he does, the agitation of the country and the language of the Foreign Office for two years will have been fruitless. The Negotiator has, besides, another task which cannot be forgotten. If it falls within the duty of Great Britain to claim a Protectorate over these races, it falls within it to uphold or to revive the Constitution recently put down. However tentative and crude, it implies a check to the despotic power which had led to their misgovernment; to the despotic power which had increased since the extinction of the Janissaries. But here the argument may seem to bring me into controversy with the reasoners—well-known to the House—who openly denounce that Constitution as illusory and mischievous. But these reasoners have never yet employed a fact, much less an argument, against it. Even if they had, the testimony of Mr. Layard on the spot might do a little to out-balance them. Their method is a wily one. It seems to check reply. It certainly economizes intellect. On every occasion they refer to the noble Marquess the former Plenipotentiary as their authority and shelter. Anyone who casually listened to them without a further source of information would suppose that the noble Marquess was the author of a folio against the Constitution they disparage, or that he had brought to bear upon it a series of invectives in the style of Junius; or set up an organ— the very thing he disapproves of—which week by week, or day by day, was laying waste its mischievous pretensions or intolerable principles. What are the facts? It really is not useless, or wholly un-amusing, to refer to them. In our Blue Books, the noble Marquess is the writer of one despatch upon the subject. I have not been contented with my own research, but engaged a friend to look all through the Papers of last year and see if he could find another. What does that despatch amount to? If I am able to interpret it, it amounts only to the temperate assertion that, although the Constitution 1713 might be irreproachable as a first attempt in a new path, it was not such an absolute security for certain definite reforms as foreign interference. The remark is wholly incontestable. All the world must see that the coercion of the Embassies—however undesirable an agency —is more certain to attain a given point they aim at than Chambers which must hear debates and then determine by majorities. To my knowledge, the founders of that Constitution do not object to the language of the noble Marquess, although, no doubt, they bitterly resent the language which is built upon it. They hold with him that at the outset the Constitution was uncertain and precarious—still more if Russia crossed the Pruth to overthrow it. On these grounds, I should contend that to revive the Constitution would be at least among the tasks of the Negotiator. If, indeed, the Protectorate of Great Britain is restored, the Constitution may be less important. So, if the Constitution is brought back, the Protectorate is not so indispensable as otherwise it would be. The two agencies conduce to the same purpose. But it will probably occur to the reflection of the House that if the Negotiator succeeds in one task, he is pretty sure to do so in the other; that, as the obstacle will be the same, so also, if he fail in one, he will be apt to fail in both of them together. The general conclusion to which I would draw the House by glancing at the function of the Conference and at the toils of the Negotiator is that, without imposing preparations from Great Britain, the whole thing is absolutely hopeless; that she ought to approach it with the obvious resolution of becoming a belligerent, unless the Conference responds to the direction she would give it. In this sense, the first precaution, I submit, resides in a single word—mobilization. As, however, the word has been employed in different senses, I define it as that which furnishes an Army with everything necessary to transport itself, whether by land or sea, from one place to another. The next precaution to be mentioned is that of despatching a conspicuous Force to Malta, with a view to the impression it would make upon the Powers of the Continent. It must appear to everyone who reasons that 20,000 soldiers there have greater diplomatic influence than 50,000 while remaining in this country. 1714 During the autumn I have twice adverted to this subject. The third precaution which suggests itself may need a little more consideration. It is to render the Militia—during a restricted period — available for foreign service, although it does not follow that they would ever be required to join it. Whether they are or not, a great political impression will be equally created. The existence of the Volunteers as a replacing Force would justify this measure, if the Volunteers received a slight improvement in efficiency by means of a detail which might not interest your Lordships. Good authorities consider it opposed to every maxim of defence and of economy to lock up two extensive Armies in the United Kingdom on the sedentary principle. That accomplished person, Mr. Windham, when Secretary for War, at the beginning of the century, explained its inconveniences. But they are greater now than at that stage of our history. If invasion was constantly at hand, while foreign expeditions scarcely had to be contemplated, the system would be sensible and practical; but when invasion is much more remote than it was in the time of Mr. Windham, while foreign expeditions may be essential to our objects, it is not easily defended. It has only grown up in its present form since 1859, when Volunteers were re-established. To grasp the question with precision, it is useful to keep one eye upon the mass of guarantees for which we are indebted to a noble Marquess opposite, the other on' the fact that since 1870 no Power has been well situated for invasion of Great Britain. The next precaution I intended to refer to very briefly is that of adopting every measure by which the Fleet would be enabled to advance into the Black Sea without the slightest insecurity when egress is desirable. What those measures are military men have pointed out to me, and they can better state them to your Lordships. But it is not to be contested that only in the Black Sea the Fleet will have the greatest weight as to the tenour of the Conference, because there it menaces Odessa and retards communication between the Prussian Armies and their basis. By the amended Articles of 1871 the Fleet may enter the Black Sea whenever it is thought desirable to send it. It would be easily 1715 admitted that nations, to be really great, must utilize whatever fortune has bestowed upon them. But there is something more to be remembered. From time to time they ought to snatch a gain out of their losses. The British Fleet commanding the Black Sea will be a better answer to the Russian manifesto of 1870 than any of the various despatches it elicited. The last precaution is one which I approach with more anxiety than any of the others. It seems to me to transcend the others in importance, because it would be nearly certain to produce them, although in itself it is neither of a naval nor a military character. To divest this precaution as long as possible of everything which bears on living individuals, it might be mentioned as a common law regarding foreign policy in our country that duality — by which I mean the action of two rival and conflicting minds —has frequently impaired, while unity— by which I mean the direction of a single mind—has always added to its excellence. During the Government of Lord Chatham it may be easily observed that the unparalleled success of foreign policy arose greatly from the fact that no one else within the Cabinet was suffered to disturb it. The same remark occurs during the early years of Mr. Pitt's Administration, before Lord Grenville occupied the Foreign Office. On the other hand, when men even so distinguished as Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, were endeavouring to guide it both together, the evils of duality were not without some illustrations—for instance, on the Danish Question in 1864, and as regards the coup d'état in France—which anyone may summon to his memory. Without building for a moment either on the impressions of society, or the assertions of the Press, but on grounds officially avowed, it may be stated that the duality in question has now reached a pitch unknown in our annals. Such grounds alone could justify the statement. As within a Cabinet no one is entitled to betray, so beyond no one can be qualified to fathom or interpret it. It belongs to the historical events of this very Session, that the First Minister considered that the Fleet ought to advance from Besika Bay into the Dardanelles, when the Secretary of State was conscientiously opposed to such a measure. At that stage neither can be censured. Each had a 1716 right to his opinion on a question so momentous. Nor am I engaged in reflecting on one, or on the other, or on both, because I point to the arraignment of duality. What followed? The Fleet advanced, and it retreated. In consequence of its retreat—this sad and overwhelming fact has been imparted to many noble Lords by a most eminent authority—the celebrated lines between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora were finally abandoned; Constantinople was at once exposed to Russian occupation. In consequence of its retreat, it had eventually to reach the neighbourhood of Constantinople, without the sanction of the Porte, in such a manner as to give that Power—with France and Austria, who are both entitled to defend if by the Treaty of April 15th, 1856—a right of war against Great Britain. My Lords, the upshot is, that duality, and not the guilt of any person you can specify, has brought about the present situation, in which the Naval Force incurs considerable hazard; in which the ally debates, the enemy advances, and the victim is in league with him; in which the Army we might have led, have supplemented, disciplined, has vanished. It is, therefore, in the name of everything valued out-of-doors, of everything sacred to the Legislature, the time to close the perilous and inadmissible duality, which never ought to have existed, and to which such grave calamities may justly be ascribed. The appointment of a new Secretary of State would do nothing to correct it. It might even seriously aggravate it. The public interest demands, excited numbers may soon imperatively call, for the concentration of the Foreign Office in the hands of the First Minister, until the present juncture is surmounted. It is wholly superficial to object that such a measure would too much increase his toils, when really it would lighten them. The greatest official toil—Prince Bismarck recently explained it in public—is the necessity to counteract another—to overrule or to persuade him. It is not by demonstrations, articles, or speeches, that this result should be effected, although, perhaps, they might contribute to it. The late Emperor of the French has been accredited, with this searching observation—"There are certain counsels which a man must owe to himself, and not to those by whom he is surrounded." The 1717 noble Earl the Secretary of State has only to revert to the course his own mind had seriously prompted. If the post is not filled up in the usual manner, in less dangerous times, when the head of the Government is less required to watch and interfere in the Department, he may usefully re-occupy it. With such a definite arrangement, no self-sacrifice is wanted. The noble Earl would rather act upon the fiat of a judicious patriotism and a sensible ambition, both together. He would not, like Curtius—of whom we heard so often in the House of Commons—leap into a gulf for the advantage of his country; but, unlike Curtius, actually leap out of one and close it up as he retires. If there is a better mode of finishing the duality which weighs upon the Empire, it ought at least to be suggested. My Lords, if these precautions were adopted, there is reason to believe from their official Press, that the German Empire would be more likely to act with us at the Conference. If they do, its proper aims are seen at once to be attainable. The precautions I have mentioned would manifestly strengthen and encourage the Hungarians, by whom alone Austria can be fixed again upon the salutary path to which in 1856 she had determined to adhere. In France, they would awaken the set of public men who are anxious to withdraw their country from unnecessary fears, unfounded calculations, and a culpable indifference to the sacrifices, the efforts, which she made' in the Crimea. Last of all, in Russia, they might lead the governing authorities at first to tremble at their spoils, and then to glance at their assurances. It is said by persons of the highest information that Russia is becoming more exorbitant; that another retrogression of the British Fleet is urged as a preliminary to the Conference. In that ease such, measures are demanded. But it is difficult to grasp the truth, and I will take the other case, advanced by some, that Russian moderation is increasing, that demands have been attenuated, and rapacity controlled. But what has led, if it exists, to such a temper? It is the renovated vigour of this country. It is the re-awakened sense of those who were deluded. It is that chloroform administered on platforms has ceased to lull and to enchain. It is that those by whom it was administered are now de- 1718 fended by constabulary force against the just resentment of the people. The aggressor falls back before Great Britain, who emerges. Is that a reason why she should withdraw herself to vain repose and fatuous security? Is it a reason for omitting one of the precautions I have brought before your Lordships? It may, however, be remarked that while these precautions are appropriate, and while the last of them is vitally essential, I have adopted an unusual course in stating them to-night with no official character to warrant the proceeding. No doubt in common' times it would have been arrogant and imprudent in a high degree to act in such a manner. My answer is, the times are painfully exceptional. So long as the duality on which I have touched at so much length continues, in the established sense there is not any Government, however gifted all the individuals who avowedly compose it. So long as a portion of the noble Lords beneath—it would be most unjust and inexact to place them in one category—are swayed by open advocates of Russia, while the numerical resources of the Party they appear to be seceding from, listen to those advocates with wonder, with regret, and incredulity, in the established sense there is not any Opposition. The Opposition has become a martial field for rival forces to contend in by alternate weeks or by alternate fortnights, with a view that each may guide the course of the Executive. If an Opposition of the regular united form was in existence, the backward movement of the Fleet would long ago have been held up to public indignation more distinctly than it has been. A Monarchy so Constitutional as ours can hardly be expected to replace at once the well-known powers which are thrown into abeyance. A natural result has been developed. Already foreign policy has been appropriated by the masses. The law of nations is defended in Hyde Park and in Trafalgar Square, because in Downing Street it is not followed as it used to be. Under these circumstances an individual may not appear to take too much upon himself, if, after years of anxious labour on the subject, he indicates a path which is not that of war or of dishonour. My Lords, there is another ground on which a mode of acting otherwise too bold admits of easy vindication. It is the series of advantages 1719 which Russia has obtained, together with the obvious insufficiency of all the constituted powers in the State to balance her diplomacy. It may be viewed without a shadow of resentment. No one who has long allowed his thoughts to be directed to these questions, can withhold reluctant admiration from a long and curious display of mental force and mental perseverance in that line, although Great Britain may have suffered from it. Soon after the Crimean War the Russian Government succeeded in uniting the Danubian Principalities against the efforts of Lord Palmerston, as a better lever of any conquest to be gradually approached, persuading her more fatuous disciples that it was designed as a barrier to lessen her temptation and to hinder her advances. After that — but not till Lord Palmerston had passed away—the Servian fortresses were virtually appropriated, with what results your Lordships easily remember. Next came the forward and defiant step of 1870, with all the triumphs which it generated. Within three years the Holy Alliance—so long extinct—was re-established at the dictate of St. Petersburg. But it was not to be a sentiment or an abstraction. Its activity commenced at once in the shape of the Commercial Treaties with the Vassal Principalities, of which the design is now proclaimed, and then was manifest to all who were not anxious to be blind to it. Without a breathing time, the Herzegovinian insurrection was set on foot—in what manner Consul Holmes has long ago explained to us. The Andrassy Note was but the prelude to the Berlin Memorandum, by which so far as diplomacy extends, Russia appropriated to her system every Power but Great Britain. In a few months—by the results of a factitious movement in Bulgaria—she lured Great Britain to Constantinople, and made her there the very echo she required. Again, Great Britain was entangled in the Protocol which seemed to be the sudden cause of the invasion, when 20 years had really been preparing it. In the meanwhile, the most imposing as well as indefatigable speaker in the other House of Parliament was engaged to agitate the masses in its favour. For the first time a Russian Party was established in the capital, not as it had been in Warsaw to annihilate, but as it had been in Vienna, to perplex 1720 and to enfeeble; as it had been in Berlin to divide a nation from its rulers; as it had been in Paris to mock by hope, and chain to insignificance. The result is now before us. It is clear not only to your Lordships, not only to the Legislature, but to every farmer, publican, and artizan in the community, that ever since the Crimean War Great Britain has been outdone and overweighted in the struggle with her adversary. At such a time, however great the risk, no politician would be entitled to withhold the faintest service he can render. It may be objected that against a Power so remarkable for subtlety and so victorious in practice, the enumerated measures will be useless; that it is too late to fortify the Conference, or deliver Europe from the clouds which seem to burst upon her. If that were so, it would be still worth while for Great Britain to escape the heart-rending reproach to which a great Republic of antiquity exposed itself, in circumstances far too similar to those in which we are descending. The House may ask to what reproach I have alluded. It is long since I have seen the original. It used to run, however, in this manner—"The aggressor has not conquered you; he has prevailed over your inertness and fatuity. You are not subdued; but you were never roused into the dignity of effort." To shelter us from that reproach, not one of the precautions mentioned can be easily dispensed with. I now submit the Motion to the House, according to the Notice.
§ Moved, That an humble Address he presented to Her Majesty for any recent diplomatic correspondence with Her Majesty's Government on the terms of peace between Russia and the Porte.—[The Lord Stratheden and Campbell.)
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I will not trespass long on the attention of your Lordships. I understood the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) to apologize to your Lordships for the postponement of this Motion from time to time. I believe, however, that your Lordships would not have required an apology even if he had postponed it sine die. The noble Lord referred to M. Guizot. Well, I remember once asking that distinguished statesman who was his most formidable opponent in the old Chamber of Deputies? He said—"M. Thiers; but if you had put the question in a different form, I should have named 1721 another person. If you had asked me who is the most difficult Member to answer? I should have named a very eminent orator and great poet, who speaks for an hour or more amid tremendous cheers, and at the end of that time I do not know what facts I have to deal with and what arguments I have to refute." Of course, I do not wish to compare myself to M. Guizot or the noble Lord to the great French poet. I am aware I run the risk of having the old joke applied to me as was applied to my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the other night, when the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) said he was not bound to provide understanding for those persons who could not understand; but yet I must confess that this evening, as on a good many previous evenings, I have been altogether unable either to construe or to understand the greater part of the noble Lord's remarks. There was one point which was tolerably clear —-namely, as to the precautions which he recommended Her Majesty's Government immediately to adopt. The first recommendation was to mobilize the Army. Well, I thought we had been assured by Her Majesty's Government that they had one division ready for work and that another would be ready shortly. Then the noble Lord said that troops ought to be sent to Malta. Why, I thought that during the last 18 months troops had been sent to Malta, until there was no longer room or barrack accommodation for more. Next the noble Lord proposed that an Act of Parliament should be passed for sending the Militia out of the country. If war should arise, such an Act might soon be passed. Then the noble Lord said Her Majesty's Government ought to enable the Fleet to go into the Black Sea. Surely these are precautions which are not quite well placed at a moment when Her Majesty's Government — and I quite believe that they are conscientious -—are trying to devise some means of entering into a friendly Congress which may settle some of the gravest questions that have arisen for a very long time. Another thing recommended by the noble Lord was that the noble Earl the First Lord of the Treasury should, in imitation of the late Duke of Wellington in the absence of Sir Robert Peel, take nearly all the princi- 1722 pal Offices of the Government into his own hands.
LORD CAMPBELLI rise to Order. What I recommended was that the noble Earl at the head of the Government should also be the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. That does not imply all the other Offices.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI understand that at any rate the noble Lord proposes that the First Minister of the Crown is to occupy two principal Offices in the Government. I have no doubt that the object of the noble Lord is, as he has assured us it is, to strengthen the hands of Her Majesty's Government in dealing with these questions; but I cannot help thinking that the course recommended by the noble Lord, instead of strengthening the Government, is calculated to make it more difficult for them to settle any really great and important questions. I do really ask your Lordships whether the noble Lord has a right to accuse the Opposition of neglect, because we do not bring forward such impractical conclusions as these?—and I ask your Lordships to dismiss what I must call such nonsense. As to whether the Secretary for Foreign Affairs—to use the classical allusion adopted by the noble Lord— should fill up the gap, not by coming in, but by going out of the Cabinet, I do not think it is for the dignity of this House to propose to discuss such speculations. The position of things is this— Her Majesty's Government have now received from both Houses of Parliament the full powers which they asked in the shape of this Vote of Credit, and they have given us the most formal assurances that they mean to support certain British interests, which they have specified; and, in addition to this, they have given us the most solemn pledges that they are doing as much as they possibly can to maintain peace between ourselves and Russia. That is a very grave duty, and it is a very great responsibility which is laid upon them. I do not know, and I do not believe that the noble Lord knows, what is the state of negotiations at this moment between this country and Russia—indeed, there are a great many things which I should like to know, which I should like to have cleared up, which I do not understand, and which I should like to have explained; but I am quite sure that it is not for the advantage of our national 1723 interests that the Opposition should be constantly asking Questions, and that Her Majesty's Government should be answering Questions at this very critical moment, just before the possible meeting of the Conference. I, therefore, venture to say these few words because I entirely dissent from the drift of the noble Lord's observations.
§ LORD HAMMONDregretted that the noble lord (Lord Campbell) should have seen fit to discuss such subjects as those he had referred to at the present time. The noble Lord had referred to the inconveniences which arose from what he called "dual administration;" but the proposed change in the Ministry was not one which their Lordships could seriously entertain. It had always been understood—at least during his official career—that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs were jointly responsible for the foreign affairs of the country—subject, of course, to the supervision of the Cabinet. With regard to the approaching Congress, the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) had defined the precautions which this country ought to take previous to entering into it. But he (Lord Hammond) scarcely thought it would be desirable for their Lordships to define the precautions which Great Britain should take before participating in the deliberations. Such a definition would be calculated to fetter the free action of Her Majesty's Government and of Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries, and might very much embarrass them in their negotiations—and, further, it would give a handle for opposing Powers at the Conference to thwart the policy of Her Majesty's Government. In his opinion, the conditions under which, as stated a few nights ago in "another place," Her Majesty's Government had agreed to enter the Conference, went as far as any conditions could safely go in the way of precaution—namely, that each State should preserve liberty to retire at any moment from the Conference—that the majority should not bind the minority— and that every Article of the Treaty between Russia and Turkey should be placed before the Conference in such a manner as that the Conference might judge whether it should be accepted or not. He thought that not only no good, but much inconvenience would result from discussing in that House the several Articles of the Treaty when 1724 Her Majesty's Government should be enabled to lay them upon the Table. Those Articles, so far as as they affected the interests of each and every one of the Powers, were reserved for the consideration of the Conference, where the several Plenipotentiaries would speak under the authority and with the responsibility of their respective Governments, and where alone the great interests at stake could be usefully and properly discussed and decided upon. Indeed, he trusted there was no intention, such as had been stated in some of the daily papers, of holding a preliminary Conference. Such a Conference could not be needed for establishing the bases on which the definitive Conference should proceed, for there was only one basis, and that had already been agreed upon by a majority, if not by all, of the Powers—namely, that every Article of the Treaty of San Stefano should be placed before the Plenipotentiaries in such a manner that they might judge whether it should be accepted or not. The only effect of an attempt to lay down in a preliminary Conference the principles upon which that basis should be acted upon would be to restrict the ground for the deliberations of the Conference by tying down the Representatives of the Powers to foregone conclusions. Whatever the conclusions at which the Conference, whether preliminary or definitive, might arrive, he trusted they would not involve the establishment of a Russian right to interfere hereafter for the protection of any part of the population of the Turkish Empire, whether severed from the direct rule of the Sultan or still remaining subject to his sway. Limited as might be the sphere in Europe in which such a right of protection might be exercised to the prejudice of the Porte, the case would be different in Asia Minor. A Russian Protectorate there would be tantamount to the establishment of Russian sovereignty from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean; for there never would be wanting a pretext for Russian interference on behalf of populations alleged, whether truly or falsely, to be groaning under Turkish maladministration. Bad and oppressive as Turkish administration might be, and grievous as might be the sufferings of Armenian and other peaceable inhabitants, there could be no doubt that much of those sufferings might be laid to the 1725 charge of the nomad population—Kurd, Bedouin, or Circassian—by which the country was systematically harried and devastated; and the Porte could not better employ those forces, for which it would no longer have occasion in the field, than in bringing those wild tribes under control. It might seem a sanguine expectation, but he thought that notwithstanding all the disasters Turkey had sustained, there was still, even beyond the limits of Europe, an opportunity to re-establish herself in general opinion. Notwithstanding all that had happened she might still rehabilitate herself if she would devote her energies to the establishment of a system of government which would tend to the happiness of her subjects and secure the country from further devastation. In the Greek population in Asia Minor subject to Turkish rule there was no want of intelligence, industry, and commercial activity, which, if admitted to take part in local government in common with the Mussulman population, would afford a sure means of developing the resources of the country and maintaining good order and tranquility within its borders. No effort should be spared to induce the Porte to act on these principles in dealing with its Asiatic Provinces; and it might be hoped that the lesson which it had now learnt of the fatal consequences of apathy and neglect of its duties to subject populations would induce it hereafter to enter upon and follow up a course' tending to uphold the Sovereignty of the Sultan in all parts of his Dominions. With reference to Greece, he would remind their Lordships that the Conference was to assemble to consider and determine how far the late Treaty between Russia and Turkey was consistent or not with the provisions of the Treaty of 1856, to which England, Austria, France, Italy, and Prussia were, with Russia and Turkey, alone parties, and that as Greece was no party to it she could have no locus standi in the Conference. Greece, however, might very well be invited to depute a Representative to Berlin, who would be prepared to plead her claims before the Conference in the event of any question arising in which the interests of Greece might be involved. And he was free to say that any such interests would deserve the most considerate attention at the Conference, not only for the sake of Greece herself, who had such 1726 large claims on the sympathy of all civilized nations, but also for the sake of Europe at large, which was deeply concerned in the extension and well-being of the Hellenic Kingdom. A somewhat parallel case might, indeed, be found in the proceedings of the Congress of Vienna of 1815. Switzerland was not represented in that Congress, but the interests of Switzerland, and those of Europe involved in them, were there discussed and provided for, and Lord Stratford de Red-cliffe, then British Minister in Switzerland, was summoned from Berne and took part in a Commission by which the arrangements for Switzerland were considered before they were finally adopted by the Congress. If such a course were followed as regarded Greece in the approaching Conference, no reasonable objection could be made to it.
THE EAR OF DUNRAYENsaid, he was aware that there existed some difference of opinion even among Members of their Lordships' House as to how far the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 had or had not been broken by Russia. The noble Lord who had just sat down (Lord Hammond) had spoken of them as "the late Treaties," and the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) the other evening said that if the Treaties had been broken they had not been broken by Russia. He (the Earl of Dunraven) could not say whether they had been infringed or not; but if they had not, it was easy to suppose that cases might occur in which certainly they would be broken. If, for example, Russia were to obstruct the entrance into the Black Sea, she would, he presumed, by assuming functions that had been deliberately delegated to another nation, be breaking the Treaty of 1856 as far as it lay in the power of any one nation to do so. If, also, Russia were to decline to submit to the signatory Powers every part and every term of the arrangement into which she had entered with Turkey, she would, he imagined, be infringing the provisions of that Treaty, and destroying it, as far as was practicable, by attacking the very principle and essence of it. Now, what he should like to know was, how far, if any one of the parties to the Treaty broke it, the other Powers who were parties to it were severally bound by the Treaty or any other arrangement subsequent to it and legitimately connected with it? Would England, for 1727 instance, if Russia refused to submit the terms of the Treaty between her and Turkey to the Congress, consider herself bound by the Declaration of Paris? That Declaration grew out of the Treaty, and was practically part and parcel of it. If England were to go to war because of an infringement of the Treaty of 1856 with Russia, would she be bound by the Declaration of Paris? It appeared to him to be monstrous that Russia should in such an event be allowed to reap the benefit of those restrictions in regard to maritime rights which were imposed upon us by that Instrument. He would remind the House—and he thought it was significant—that the Power to which Russia had taken the greatest pains to be civil—he meant the United States— was the only powerful State which had refused to sign the Declaration of Paris. There were, he might add, two points on which he wished particularly to touch, although he should have preferred waiting until the terms of peace were known. But as it was difficult to say when they would be laid before the House, and as hope deferred made the heart sick, he should be, perhaps, excused if he referred to them briefly on the present occasion. A noble Lord who addressed the House a few evenings ago spoke of the apprehensions with which the position of Russia in Armenia ought to be viewed; and it was self-evident that with the possession of so strong a position as the Quadrilateral in Asia Minor she could in that locality do anything she pleased and go wherever she liked. And in case we should have any doubts as to Russian designs in the East, she was kind enough to explain thematter clearly. Now, Russia said that to enforce order in Asia Minor, as well as to protectthe Christians against the Kurds, reforms would have to be carried out under the surveillance of a Russian Commissioner. That was plain speaking—of that declaration he who ran might understand the meaning. Turkey was asked to do under the surveillance of a Russian official that which it might be impossible for her to do; and then, when the opportunity arose, one of those Commissioners had only to report that the reforms were not being effected, and that would afford Russia a pretext for moving in any direction she might think fit. He was glad to hear the question of the admission of Greece into the 1728 Conference referred to. He hoped she would be admitted, and that her rights would be attended to—Greece had undoubted claims; and it was pitiable to see the anxiety she showed towards the end of the war; how she ran about trying to kill somebody before it should be too late, knowing very well that, under the new reign of disorder that governed Europe, the best chance she had of obtaining admission to the Conference was to knock at the door with fingers that left blood-stains behind. It appeared to him that in giving effect to her claims lay the best chance of curtailing that New Bulgaria of which their Lordships had heard so much. It was, it seemed, to extend to the Ægean, and to include the port of Kavala, which was, he believed, well adapted for a naval station and arsenal. Bulgaria was further to be occupied by a large number of Russian troops, and if the tribute which was to be exacted from Turkey was not punctually paid, Russia would have such a hold on the Province that it was needless to say it would soon become more or less Russianized. He would merely add that if Russia were to be permitted to have a naval station in the Mediterranean, our position as to the Straits would be completely changed, and our flank would, as it were, from a military point of view, be completely turned. In a commercial point of view the Straits would be as valuable to us as ever; but from a military point of view, should Russia obtain the station he had mentioned, the position would be completely reversed.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, he would not have taken any part in the discussion but for one or two remarks which had been made by the noble Earl who had just sat down. The noble Earl had alluded very fairly as to the difference of opinion which existed in that House as to whether the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 had or had not been violated by Russia or some other Power. But he then went on to say that, whatever might be their Lordships' opinion as to the beginning of these matters with regard to these Treaties, it was quite certain", that they might be violated, and would very probably be violated, by Russia; and he went on to specify cases in which there might be such an infringement of its provisions. Now, he quite concurred with the noble Earl in thinking that it was quite possible—he hoped it was not 1729 probable, nor did he believe it was—that Russia might have entered into some understanding with the Porte, the carrying into effect of which would be a violation of those great European interests which the Treaty of 1856 was intended to guard. It was conceivable that Russia might have made some stipulation with regard to the entrance of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, which was a question undoubtedly affecting European and British interests, and one to the importance of which the Government had shown that they were perfectly alive. But the noble Earl then went on to say that the Treaty of 1856 would undoubtedly be violated if Russia were to refuse to submit to the Congress the whole of the Treaty into which she had just entered with Turkey and every part of it. Now, that is an observation to which he desired to refer. He had no question to ask the Government—it seemed to him a very inconvenient time to do so. The Government had, he thought, said all that a Government were bound to say on the subject. They had told the House all—not that it wished to know, but all that it need know, of the state of affairs; and he was bound to add that he was satisfied with the language of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He (the Duke of Argyll) did not, however, understand his noble Friend, or the Representative of the Government in "another place," to have laid down the exact proposition of the noble Earl. He understood the Government to say that they had a right to know what the Treaty between Russia and Turkey was, to prevent the discussions at the Congress from being nugatory and absurd; but he did not understand them to maintain that beyond that Russia was to enter the Congress and to declare that every one of the stipulations of the Treaty was to be disposed of as the Congress thought fit. That, however, was the view the noble Earl put upon the matter, and the same view had been extensively adopted by the Press of this country. Now, he would just ask this one question—would it be reasonable to say to Russia, who had sacrificed 100,000 men in the late war, besides a very large amount of treasure, that she must enter into the Congress, and that the whole result of that war was to be disposed of by the majority of the Congress? Nobody had said that that ought to be the 1730 result; but that interpretation had been put upon language which had been used; and he desired to take the opportunity of saying that the demand was, in his opinion, one to which Russia could not reasonably be expected to assent. She had gone to an enormous expenditure of both men and money for what she considered legitimate objects, and she had a right to secure the objects for which she fought. And all he understood the Government to say was, that they insisted on being assured that there were no secret engagements in the background, and that Europe had a right to see that none of them were injurious to itself. That was a fair and legitimate demand; but it was not to be supposed that all the results of the war were to be rendered nugatory. There was a part of the speech of the noble Earl to which he wished to direct attention, and that was the language he had used with regard to Armenia. Englishmen in general were much more jealous of Russian acquisitions in Asia than in Europe; and though the Government apparently kept silence on the subject of Asia, it was evident that that part of the question excited at the present moment the most jealousy. Now, the Blue Books recently presented to Parliament, show that no part of the Turkish Empire was more abominably governed than Armenia—it was simply a chaos and a scandal. The noble Earl had said that Russia was imposing certain conditions on Turkey which she would not be able to fulfil with respect to the government of Armenia. That meant that Turkey could not fulfil the most ordinary conditions of good government. As to European Turkey, they must either themselves take the protection of the people, or suffer Russia to do so. His noble Friend behind him had ox-pressed his hopes for the future of Turkey; and certainly, it was just conceivable that, with a considerable Empire still left to her in Asia, she might, by means of her Army, if she were independent, be able to maintain order in that country. That might possibly be the ease; but it was an intolerable thing that Europe should profess herself regardless of the manner in which that great Province of Asia was governed, and should prohibit all precautions and measures tending to its good government. Some other policy ought to be suggested; but he found that when noble 1731 Lords spoke on the subject of the East, they treated that point as a thing of nought and wholly unimportant. It was not reasonable that England should take up such a position, and he only hoped that it was not held, by the Government. As for the observations of the noble Lord who had introduced the Motion, there was only one point of his speech which was new to him, though he was bound to say that one point deserved consideration. He had said that he had a Report of M. Blanqui, who had been sent by France to inquire into the condition of European Turkey in the years 1833 and 1841—according to which Report, bad as the condition of the Christian Provinces was now, it was far worse under the Russian Protectorate—the Protectorate of Russia was as useless as that of the rest of Europe. He agreed in thinking that those nominal Protectorates were no better than humbugs. Protectorates of that kind were of no value whatever; and, for his part, he was confident that the good government both of European and Asiatic Turkey was dependent on the autonomy of her Provinces under decent government. The proposition made by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury), at the Conference of Constantinople, of a European guarantee in the selection of governors would have been almost sufficient, as the appointment of good men under the sanction of the European Powers would have gone a good way to cure the evils complained of.
THE EARL OF DUNRAVENwished to say that the noble Duke had not quite appreciated the purport of his remarks. If the preliminary contained Articles that did not affect European nations other than the belligerents, there could be no necessity for discussing them; but he certainly thought that every part of the Treaty between Russia and Turkey ought to be laid before the Congress, otherwise the Congress would be unable to judge which Articles affected the rest of Europe and which did not.
THE EAR OF DERBYMy Lords, I hardly know whether your Lordships will expect or desire me to address the House, for I quite agree with the noble Lord opposite, that as matters now stand, the present is not a convenient time for a general discussion of Eastern Affairs; and, I may add, even if the moment were more suitable, I should feel considerable difficulty, remembering the 1732 conversation of the last two hours, in knowing which are the points on which an answer is expected or desired. I do not think that the noble Lord who brought forward the Motion will wish me to follow him through his long historical retrospect—especially as, with the utmost care I could give to it, I am not able to ascertain very clearly what the object of that retrospect was. The noble Lord, indeed, told us little that was new; and I am only repeating the observations of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), when I say that the points he enumerated have long since been considered by the Government. For instance, the noble Lord spoke of the state of readiness of the Army; and I only echo the statement of the noble Earl when I say that, with regard to military preparations and precautions, they are, for the most part, those which the Government on their own responsibility have long since undertaken. The noble Lord thinks that we ought to have some portion of our Army in a state of preparation; so that we may be ready in the event of necessity—in the event of any possible contingency—to act either by land or sea. I am able to state that we are in the military position suggested in that respect. The noble Lord spoke of strengthening the garrison of Malta. I cannot give the details, but the garrison was strengthened last year; and I believe there is now as large a military force at Malta as can with any convenience be accommodated there. The proposal that our Fleet should enter the Black Sea is of a very different character, and I think your Lordships will see there are strong and obvious reasons why that step cannot be taken at the present moment. I am sure, also, your Lordships will see that this is a delicate matter to be discussed. Nor will I waste the time of the House by arguing against the suggestion of the noble Lord, who told us there was no reason why the noble Earl the Prime Minister—having nothing to do in his own Department— should not take upon himself, in addition, the administration of the Foreign Office. There is no man to whom I would more willingly hand over the duties of my Department than my noble Friend; but, considering what the duties of our two Departments are, I think the proposal of the noble Lord, that they should be united, implies the official 1733 suicide of one Minister, and the physical suicide of the other. The noble Lord spoke of duality, and hinted at differences amongst the Members of the Cabinet. I wish to enter my protest, my Lords, against statements of that kind. If they are founded on anything publicly stated by Members of the Cabinet, no doubt they are perfectly fair matters of inference, and I do not object to them; but when there are no better grounds for them than club-gossip reports and stories floating about London, it is not consistent with the dignity of this House that they should be mentioned in debate. I pass from that, however, and come now to the speech of the noble Lord (Lord Hammond), who was so long connected with the Foreign Office, and whose experience in that Department is so great. The noble Lord touched upon various subjects, and, among others, that of the admission of Greece to the Congress. As a matter of fact, the question has never been raised as to the precise footing on which Greece ought to be admitted to the Congress. There is something to be said in favour of putting the Powers who have signed former Treaties affecting Turkey in a different position from those which took no part in that arrangement. What we have asked is, not that Greece shall be placed necessarily on the same footing as the other Powers, but that she should be represented in some manner, and have an opportunity of making her voice heard. The noble Duke who spoke later in the debate (the Duke of Argyll) said he would reserve his opinion on many subjects on which he had to speak until the terms of the Treaty of Peace were before your Lordships; but he also expressed a doubt as to whether we should soon have them. I believe, as I stated the other night, that they will be in the hands of the Government by Saturday next, and they shall then, with as little delay as possible, be placed in the hands of the Members of both Houses of Parliament. Then the noble Duke raised a very important question, and one to which the attention of the Government is at this moment carefully and anxiously directed, and that is, the conditions upon which England should enter into the proposed Congress. Perhaps the best course I can follow will be for me to state simply, as a matter, of fact, what are the opinions expressed by 1734 us on that subject. On the 9th of March we suggested, in a letter addressed to the Austrian Ambassador at this Court, that, whilst we had no objection to the change of place for the meeting of the Congress from Baden-Baden to Berlin, we considered it desirable that it should be understood that all the terms of the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey should be discussed in the Congress, and that no alteration of the condition of things previously established by Treaty should be held as valid until they had been considered by the Congress. There was some doubt as to the meaning of that declaration, and I repeated in a letter of the 13th that Her Majesty's Government must distinctly understand before they enter the Congress that every Article of the Treaty will be placed before that Congress— not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it might be considered which of them would require the acceptance and the concurrence of the several Powers, and which would not. Some communications passed after that expression of opinion, and we have on the part of the Russian Government the declaration that the text of the Treaty will be communicated to the Powers as soon as the ratifications are exchanged. But the further question now arises as to whether it is to be understood that all the conditions of the Treaty are to be placed before the Congress for discussion. I will not now quote to your Lordships from the Correspondence, although it will, no doubt, at no distant day, be laid before Parliament; but the question which we put is this—whether the communication by the Russian Government of the Treaty in its entirety to the Powers shall be treated as placing the whole Treaty before the Congress, in order that its relation to existing Treaties may be examined and considered by the Congress? I have one remark to offer as to the observation made by the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) on this subject. The noble Duke said it was not reasonable to expect that the Russian Government, after the great efforts and sacrifices they have made, should place before the Congress all the results they have obtained in consequence of those efforts and sacrifices, and should submit them to the decision of a majority of the Conference. My Lords, no proposal of that kind has been made by Her Majesty's 1735 Government. As a matter of fact, I believe it is the universal rule that in a Congress the matters discussed by the several Representatives are not settled by a majority of votes; no vote is taken. Therefore, there is no question of asking —what I agree with the noble Duke it might not be reasonable to demand—that Russia should submit all those results to the decision of a majority of the Congress. That we do not claim. But we do ask that all the Articles of the Treaty shall be laid for discussion, but for discussion only, before the Congress—because we conceive that in that manner only is it possible for us to decide which of the Articles do, and which do not, affect the European settlement with which we have to deal. We have a certain condition of things established by the Treaties of 1856 and 1871. That condition of things is obviously modified, to a great degree, by the changes now in progress, and the object of the Congress is to give a European sanction and recognition to the settlement that is now to be made. We contend, therefore, that we ought to have the whole of the Treaty before us to be discussed, and not a part of it only. That is the sole question which is at present at issue. I am not prepared to say what answer the Russian Government will give to our demand; but I think your Lordships will consider that the demand itself is reasonable, that it is moderate, and that without such a condition as that which we make, it would be of very little use for the Congress to meet.
LOUD CAMPBELLMy Lords, I shall not long detain the House, although, perhaps, some answer is incumbent on me. Let me congratulate my noble Friend on the left (the Earl of Dunraven) upon having once more proved that the terms of Liberal and Russian are not entirely identical. As to the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), it is satisfactory to draw from him the admission that a Russian Protectorate of Eastern Christianity has ceased to be the system which he favours. The noble Earl the late Secretary of State (Earl Granville), has revealed in somewhat extraordinary terms, his dissent from the opinions I have advocated. There is nothing to astonish in the fact of that dissent, or even that discrepancy. The noble Earl has more or- less encouraged the aggression on the Porte. I have 1736 constantly endeavoured to deprive it of its pretexts. The noble Earl has thrown a veil, so far as he could do so, over the character of the new Holy Alliance. I have done my best to drag it into light, before it was too late to counteract it. The noble Earl accepts the late Prime Minister as an oracle or an authority upon the Eastern Question. In common with an immense majority in both Houses of Parliament, confined to no one Party in the State, I repudiate him altogether as a Leader on the subject. Beyond that, the discrepancy between the noble Earl and me was manifested at a far more early stage of these remarkable transactions. When the three Powers opened their design upon the Vassal Principalities, in 1875, I repeatedly adverted to it. The noble Earl opposed all consideration of it until official Papers were produced. When, after a long delay, the Papers were before us, I originated a discussion which had an echo in the world. The noble Earl withdrew himself to Goodwood Races. On Eastern matters, after such a circumstance, your Lordships will not require me to contend at any length with such an adversary. The noble Earl the Secretary of State (the Earl of Derby) judiciously avoided too much expression of opinion on the last precaution I upheld. None at all is called for upon his part. He declared, however, that the greater part of my proposals was anticipated by the Government. What more could be desired? I am not sure whether he consented to produce the kind of Correspondence which the Motion calls for. If he declines to do so upon public grounds, I shall be ready to withdraw it.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYintimated that he would be happy to produce the Papers asked for as soon as possible, but he could not do so at the present moment.
§ Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
§ House adjourned at half past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Five o'clock.