QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.

HL Deb 26 July 1878 vol 242 cc344-85

THE EARL OF ROSEBERY

rose, in accordance with Notice, to call attention to a Memorandum purporting to have been signed by the Marquess of Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff on May 30, 1878, and to ask, If it was the intention of the Government to lay it on the Table of the House? He regretted that the question was not in worthier hands than his. It was of importance, as bearing on a part of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, which, from the nature and scope of it, must be of paramount importance at this moment. It might be objected from the Government Bench that he had not framed his Notice in the form of a Motion. He had always observed that when noble Lords on the Opposition side ventured to call attention to important points in the policy of the Government, they were met with the statement that the Government would be quite prepared to defend their policy when it was properly challenged. Well, in the first place, with respect to the reflection which, he thought, would be found after a little to become rather monotonous, he had to say that he thought they on the Opposition side of the House must recognize the fact that they were not a majority. They were in a minority, though, he believed, a right-thinking minority. In the second place, he thought he might state that they—that he, at any rate—did not for one moment wish to call in question the policy of the Government in this matter. The policy of the Government must be most momentous in its consequences. It was, he believed, a policy such as had not at any time been submitted to Parliament during this century. But it was a policy as gloomy as it was gigantic. They knew absolutely less about it now then they did at the beginning of the Session. He humbly ventured to say that their proper course, as an Opposition, was not so much to arraign the policy of the Government, as it was to ask the Ministers to instruct them in it, in short and easy lessons. As he said before, the policy of the Government was a great one, and, being so great, there was all the greater necessity for explanation. Upon this head the Government did not appear to agree with the view he had endeavoured to express. The course they had pursued with respect to their policy, he would venture to say, was one of obscurity enlivened with sarcasm. The other day, the noble Earl (Earl Granville) the Leader of the Opposition in their Lordships' House, ventured, in a manner so conciliatory as to be almost humble, to ask for some information with regard to the last jewel which had been placed in the English Crown, and he was referred to The Ency-clopœdia Britannica. Well, they did get a little information, but it did not come from the noble Marquess at the head of the Foreign Office (the Marquess of Salisbury). The Predecessor in Office of the noble Marquess did give them some information, and did throw light on some of the transactions of the Government, for doing which he was sharply called to account by the noble Marquess, who likened him to Titus Oates. They who came to the Government asking for bread might complain that they were treated to stones, and stones thrown with no inconsiderable force. In the whole history of the negotiations there were five cardinal points—points which became salient to everybody who had studied the history of these transactions. First, there was the San Stefano Treaty; the second was the Circular of the 1st of April; the third, the alleged secret Agreement of May 30; the fourth, the secret Convention of June 4th, with Turkey; and the fifth was the Treaty signed at Berlin on the 30th of July. As to the secret Agreement between Russia and England, the only light thrown upon it was that which came from certain proceedings in a police court. Now, as regarded this Agreement, which was supposed to have been signed by the noble Marquess the Foreign Secretary and the Russian Ambassador in England, Count Shouvaloff, on the 30th of May, it would be well to recall how they came to have any cognizance of it at all. The substance of it appeared in The Globe within, he thought, three or four days after it was signed, and it was on the 14th of June, he thought, that the entire text was given in the columns of the same journal. As regarded the substance of the Agreement, a Question was put to the noble Marquess on the 3rd of June, and he replied, that— The statement in The Globe, and other statements he had seen, were wholly unauthentic, and not deserving the confidence of their Lord-ships' House."—[3 Hansard, ccxl. 1061.] On the 17th of June, the noble Duke the Lord President of the Council, who had been interpellated on the same point, said that at the earliest possible moment Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to give the fullest information to Parliament, and that the alleged Agreement which had appeared in The Globe—and he used words identical with those used in "another place" by a Member of the Government in answer to a Question, in similar terms, so that they must have been the result of some study—was "incomplete, and, therefore, incorrect." Upon the statement of the noble Duke, there was certainly a very strong case for the production of an authentic copy of the Agreement. Having got as much knowledge as they could of this Agreement, and there being no authentic denial, as he understood, of the principle of the Agreement, he must say he thought it a little hard of the Government to leave the nation in entire ignorance of the exact text of this particular document, which was a compact of so much importance that it would be difficult to over-estimate its significance. Not merely that; but if this was a "counterfeit presentment" of the real Agreement, it was even worse upon the part of the Government to leave it with them, and deny them the means of testing its accuracy. Another thing was apparent. It might be irregular for him to refer to what had transpired in "another place," but they had all heard that the Agreement was not to be laid upon the Table, because there were documents in connection with it which it would be necessary to present at the same time; but other Powers would not allow us to produce them. What he gathered from all this was, that if it had not been for the ill-advised conduct of a very subordinate clerk in the Foreign Office, who was intrusted with the copying of the Agreement, at the rate of 10d. per hour, the English public at this moment would not have the faintest conception of such an Agreement, and the key-stone of the whole purpose of the Government would be wrapped in obscurity. This was alarming in itself, as regarded the general direction and course of the policy of the Government; because, if these subterranean methods were employed as a rule, they would give the public some little dismay in regard to the progress of further negotiations. There was this further consideration, which was also alarming—namely, what were the documents that foreign Powers would not allow the Foreign Secretary to produce, and without which this important document was incomplete and incorrect? What was the nature of these docu- ments? Did they pledge this country to anything in the future? They would have known absolutely nothing, and would have been told absolutely nothing, about the document in question, if it had not been for a pure accident. Was the British Parliament to be left in total, entire, and contemptuous ignorance upon a point like this; because, if it was, it had better abdicate its office at once. Having signed this Agreement, and having signed another secret Agreement within two or three days with Turkey, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries proceeded, fortified with them, to the Congress. Now came the most extraordinary point in all the history of these negotiations, so far as they knew it. Eight days after the signature, or alleged signature, of this Agreement, in which, if the House would remember, we consented to the abandonment of Batoum and the other Russian conquests in Armenia, the Foreign Secretary addressed a despatch to our Resident Plenipotentiary at Berlin, in which he urged him to use his exertions to the utmost on behalf of Batoum. The words were so remarkable that he might be pardoned for quoting them to their Lordships. On the 8th of June, the noble Marquess wrote to Lord Odo Russell— There is no ground for believing that Russia will willingly give way in respect to Batoum, Kars, or Ardahan; and it is possible that the arguments of England urged in Congress will receive little assistance from other Powers, and will not be able to shake her resolution in this respect. Well, that was not likely under the circumstances. The noble Marquess continued in this letter of June 8th— You will not on that account abstain from earnestly pressing upon thorn and upon Russia the justice of abstaining from annexations which are unconnected with the professed object of the war, and profoundly distasteful to the populations concerned, and the expediency, in regard to the future tranquillity of Asia, of forbearing to shake so perilously the position of the Government of Turkey. In the event of the failure, in this respect, of the English Plenipotentiaries, you will be made acquainted with the course which Her Majesty's Government have decided to pursue. This meant, if it meant anything, that the noble Lord, our Ambassador at Berlin, if his arguments on behalf of Batoum and against Russian conquests in Armenia failed, he would be made acquainted with the Convention signed four days previously at Constantinople, and which, it seemed to him, ought at once to have been brought to the notice of our Representative in the German capital. Now, the great point with regard to this was, was Lord Odo Russell, when he received that communication, cognizant of the Agreement which had been signed on the 30th of May? Because what they wanted to know was this—Was Lord Odo Russell one of a company, or was he a simple actor put up to recite the arguments of Batoum, with a prompter by to keep him to his part? Either he did know of the Agreement, or he did not. If he did know of it, then it was impossible to understand the despatch of the 8th of June. If he did not know of it, the despatch was calculated to mislead him as to the course the Government had decided upon. The contest, however, was carried on, and they all knew what it led to. The result, and, indeed, the whole thing, reminded him of a passage in the Midsummer Night's Dream, which their Lordships would pardon him for recalling to their attention. Starveling, one of the actors in the drama, says—"I believe you must leave the killing out when all is done." To which Bottom the weaver, replies— Not a whit; I have a desire to make all well. Write me a prologue, and let the prologue seem to say we will do no harm with our swords; and that Pyramus is not killed indeed; and for the more better assurance that I, Pyramus, am not Pyramus, but Bottom the weaver. He did not believe this to be a laughing matter, but the quotation happened to come in with such pertinency that he could not help repeating it. As regarded the general character of the proceeding, he would say it was mysterious and mystifying. It was a proceeding, moreover, which he would take the liberty of saying was not characterized by the qualities which generally marked the course of British diplomacy. Then, on the same day, Mr. Secretary Cross addressed a despatch to the Plenipotentiaries of Her Majesty, urging them to make great exertions on behalf of Greece. He should say that the position of a Plenipotentiary who entered the Congress to struggle on behalf of Batoum, Kars, Ardahan, and Greece, must be a some- what melancholy one in the retrospect; because, when the questions came up, the Turkish positions were abandoned and Greece was ignored. Many persons in England heard with sorrow and dismay that the task of upholding Greece was left to the Plenipotentiaries of France and Italy in the Congress, for they remembered that England had lavished much blood and treasure for Greece. But, in this instance, we bade her wait, and she waited. What had been the result? No doubt the noble Marquess did speak of the affairs of Greece; but this was one of the subjects which was relegated to the influence of personal interviews, whence it had not emerged. How was all this to be explained? Why had England abandoned her ancient prerogative of supporting Greece and oppressed Nationalities on the Continent, especially those whom Turkey had trodden down? Was the explanation of this course to be found in the documents which were of a nature to complete the Agreement, of which they had had at least some foreshadowing? Would any explanation be found in those documents of this very strange proceeding? He should like to know what more was to follow. As to secret Treaties, he believed they were not unknown to this country. There was a secret Treaty in 1815, by which England, Austria, and France agreed to support the decisions of the Congress of Vienna with 500,000 men. Then there was the Treaty of the 21st of November, 1855, by which we guaranteed the position of Sweden. He did not pretend that secret understandings were unknown to us; but he believed this was the first time we had called a European Congress, with the view of discussing great Treaties, and standing forth on behalf of public law, we ourselves having, at the same time, bound ourselves in private to consent to those stipulations which we had denounced, and which we continued to denounce. He believed this to be a course which was altogether unique in the history of English diplomacy; but, of course, if he were wrong on that point, he should receive correction. He might say that it did not make him happier to feel that now that they had got the drift of the document, the Government refused to produce its precise words. There was another Convention, which was the correlative of this one, about which he wished to make one remark—the Convention of the 4th of June, 1878, by which we had made important stipulations with the Ottoman Porte. It would be in the recollection of their Lordships that the ground on which they insisted upon the Treaty of San Stefano being submitted to a European Congress was that it seriously modified the Treaties of 1856; and that, accordingly, it could not be held valid without the sanction and criticism of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties. But at the very moment we were urging that, we were making a Convention with the Ottoman Empire, which, most certainly, invaded the Treaties of 1856; and he had not heard that this new Treaty was to be submitted to a Congress, or that it was ever considered to require the sanction of a Congress. He laid these matters before their Lordships, as matters not necessarily requiring censure; but he did think they required elucidation. This country had always had one or two attributes which distinguished her from many other nations. One of these was unto her a sacred prerogative—that of standing out upon behalf of weak nations; another was that in dealing with the affairs of other countries, we were fair and straightforward; another circumstance marking our history was the openness —the almost faulty openness—of our diplomacy; another, of which we had always been proud heretofore, was the completeness of our Parliamentary control. He confessed to the fear that great doubt would now be thrown upon our possession of these attributes; and, indeed, he regretted that some of them seemed entirely to have disappeared. But he regretted more than any of these circumstances, that the Government had not seen fit to trust the Parliament, and the country; and he ventured to ask the noble Marquess whether the time had not arrived—in the words of the noble Duke, whether we had not reached the earliest possible moment — when, with regard to these transactions, he might take into his confidence the great English nation which had shown confidence in his Government, which had brought the Government an unexampled majority, and which had some claim to know the nature of those secret Conventions which must so seriously modify our career as a nation?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The noble Earl is perfectly correct in saying that this particular movement— for it is not a Motion—which he has taken this evening, is analogous to the general policy which his side of the House have thought fit to pursue during the discussion of this question. They raise objections, they introduce general debates upon particular questions or small points; but they decline to challenge the judgment of the House upon any one point upon which they arraign the conduct of the Government or of a Minister. Their excuse for doing this is that they know they are in a minority. But the complaint of the Government is, that the result of this policy is that the country does not know in how small a minority they are. The country sees debates constantly going on— the same speakers constantly re-iterating the same charges; but they do not know —what I am credibly informed—that the Opposition, which, ordinarily, is a very strong one in this House, is in this matter confined to the Front Bench, and a few devoted followers behind. I do not think, at all events, this policy is likely to have the effect of diminishing the minority of which they complain. The questions which the noble Earl has submitted to the House have a very important public bearing; but it has also one bearing that is personal to myself. The noble Earl complains of my language, when I was asked of the truth of a certain statement which had appeared in the newspapers. I had stated that the document which had appeared was un-authentic and unworthy of the confidence of this House, and the noble Earl proceeded to characterize this document which I had so described as being the substance of a document whose general authenticity was not denied. It is merely a question of fact, whether this summary was or was not an authentic summary of the document which appeared later, and of which it purported to be the substance. I described it as un-authentic simply because it was so, and because no other adjective would accurately describe its character. I shall say in a few words why I so described it, and what my justification for this description was. At that time, the main contest and controversy between ourselves and Russia in those negotiations was the extent of the military power to be given to the Sultan in the Province South of the Balkans. Russia was willing enough to acknowledge the nominal authority of the Sultan; we were willing enough to provide institutions which would secure the people from misgovernment; but the point on which we found it impossible to agree was our contention that the Sultan should have the full power of militarily defending this Province we had assigned to him. Therefore, in the understanding which we came to with the Russian Government, this point was carefully and deliberately reserved for future consideration at the Congress, the Russian Government well knowing that we were resolved to insist upon it, and that it was a point which we could not yield. As a matter of fact—I am speaking of what is concealed from no one—when we came to the Congress this matter was earnestly contested, and the negotiations at one time seemed in danger of breaking off; but at last we obtained our point, and secured the military supremacy of the Sultan in the Province South of the Balkans. It was the key-stone and essence of our policy. This summary, of which the noble Earl speaks, and which was supposed to contain the essential part of the Agreement between England and Russia, misrepresents us in regard to this important point. It represents us as giving up that point absolutely and altogether; it said we had assented that the Turkish troops should be withdrawn from the Province and should not return to it. It was in a most essential point an absolutely untrue description of the document it professed to represent. If Hamlet were represented, with the part of Hamlet left out, I should describe it as at least an unauthentic representation. For the same reason, I so described the summary of the Agreement, which left out the most essential point, aye, and the point on which the eyes of the other Powers were most intensely riveted, or which gave of that point an entirely untrue description. These are the reasons why I described it as an unauthentic document, and if I were asked the same question again, I would give the same answer. The noble Earl reproaches us very bitterly because we will not lay this document and other documents illustrating it upon the Table of the House. This is not an isolated document; on the contrary, it is part of a considerable interchange of ideas. I may relieve the noble Earl's mind as to this country being under any engagements in consequence of these documents which we will not produce. This country is under no engagements for the future except those on the Table of the House. But when the noble Earl asks us to produce these documents, he must know very well that the production of confidential documents depends not merely upon your own consent, but upon the consent of those persons whose confidence you have been enjoying, and by whose confidence you have negotiated at all. We have asked for consent to produce Papers which we think essential to illustrate the document, but that consent has been refused. The complaint which the noble Earl makes that it is at variance with the traditions of English diplomacy to have confidential communications with foreign Powers, only shows that entire unacquaintance with the inside of a Government Office which I have no doubt, in the noble Earl's case, will not last long. It is not only an essential part of the diplomacy of this country, but it must be an essential part of the diplomacy of every country to conduct negotiations which those persons with whom you communicate do not wish should be published at Charing Cross. I have only been in Office a few months; but already, many and many a time, not from one Power but from many Powers have I received communications prefaced with this condition—"You are to receive it only on condition that it does not go into a Blue Book." Our Blue Books are a perfect terror to Continental Chanceries. As far as we are concerned, we have no objection to publicity; we live in an atmosphere of publicity; and we are glad to have the criticism of those to whose authority we owe obedience; but were we to enter into negotiations with the announcement that we intended to publish everything we received and heard, the simple result would be that we should receive nothing and hear nothing. Of course, the necessity of observing reticence, which is not observed by us for our own pleasure, but is imposed on us by others, somewhat hampers me in dealing with many portions of the noble Earl's contention that this document surreptitiously obtained, throws a new light on our policy. But I think he is making a rather considerable mountain out of the very small molehill of the official Correspondence which is placed at the beginning of the Blue Book that contains the Protocols. It is the ordinary practice when Plenipotentiaries are sent out to give them instructions. For that reason Mr. Cross gave instructions to my noble Friend and myself; but I assume he is aware that was a mere formal proceeding. He does not really suppose that Mr. Cross was the sole depositary of the policy which he explained. And so with Lord Odo Russell. He knew all we had been doing; he knew all the documents that passed through the Office, and the line we intended to pursue. In the same way formal instructions were addressed to me by the Secretary of State when I went to Constantinople; but no one would suppose that those formal instructions were dictated by him. The fact is it was as a convenient way of recording what we set out to do that these formal instructions wore addressed to us. The policy was determined upon first, and then it was put down in the instructions. I think, also, that the noble Earl entirely misapprehended the bearing of the Memorandum on which he lays so much stress, which he read to the House. When we found how deep the divergence of views between this country and Russia was, at the time when the first refusal to go into the Congress was made, we came to the conclusion that an immediate entrance into Congress was not desirable. A Congress is a very good thing to bring those together who already have a tolerable similarity of views, and whose personal communications are therefore likely to increase their peaceful disposition; but a Congress is only an instrument of war when it brings together those whose opinions are hopelessly divergent. We felt at first that there was this great danger before us— that if we assembled in Congress and separated in anger, the peace of Europe would be in far greater danger than if the Congress had never met. We, therefore, came to the conclusion that it would be useless to meet until we were satisfied there was that amount of agreement between Russia and ourselves as would make a peaceful solution possible. With this view, we considered it an essential preliminary that a rough outline of agreement should be arrived at; but that agreement was not what we were to discuss, what we were to settle, or what line we were to take in Congress. The agreement was in regard to what we were to do if Congress failed to settle the differences on certain particular points. Our agreement was, for instance, with reference to Bessarabia on the one hand, and the Balkan frontier on the other, that if we could not come to an agreement with regard to them after due discussion in Congress, we should not go to war on account of them. There were other questions which were still left open, and which might have been the cause of war; but a certain number were taken and put aside. We felt it perfectly certain that Russia would not abstain from entering Bessarabia; we, on the other hand, were determined that Bulgaria should not stretch to the Ægean; and, balancing one against the other, concessions were obtained on both sides; and the points I have mentioned we said should not be the cause of war. But while we said we would not go to war for them, we did not despair of modifying the opinion of Russia in regard to some of them. On the contrary; in the first place, we knew there would be other Powers at the Congress, and that their views would have great weight; and, in the second place, we knew that, apart from the threat of war, yet, by discussion in Congress, it was possible to appeal to other motives short of war as an instrument for obtaining modifications of opinion. The error of the noble Earl is not, perhaps, so great as the opposite error—that of the Peace Party in this country, who imagine that you can get everything by arguments, and have no need to employ armaments; that you have nothing to do but put reasons before your adversary, and your adversary will yield. I am glad to see the noble Earl renounces them; but it is possible to carry the opposite view too far. The threat of going to war is not the only instrument which one nation has to use in controversy with another. I will not seek to prove this à priori, but by an instance. We said we would not go to war on certain points; but France declared she would not go to war on any point—à fortiori, if we lost all influence by this preliminary understanding, France must have been abso- lutely without influence in the Congress. But was that the case? Anyone who sat in the Congress, and saw the impatience with which the views of the French Plenipotentiaries were waited for, and the weight which was attached to them when delivered, would not for a moment fall into that error. Take another instance. Germany said that nothing would induce her to bleach the bones of a single Pomeranian soldier in Turkey; but if any one in this House should tell me that, on that account, Germany was without influence in the Congress, I can only say his political information differs considerably from mine. I can prove the same fact from the simple instance of Batoum. The noble Earl thinks it was a mere comedy, our urging any modification of the terms regarding Batoum after the adoption of the Memorandum. Notwithstanding that, it was our firm intention to endeavour to obtain a modification of the terms, and to a great extent we succeeded. We did urge in the strongest way upon Russia the importance of not inserting into the Treaty provisions which would allow her to make Batoum an armed naval station menacing the Bosphorus. I shall not venture to say what were the arguments we used to convince her, but, at all events, those arguments were used with effect; and though on the point of Batoum, Russia well knew that we would not go to war, she consented to make it a free and essentially commercial port, and, moreover, yielded a considerable portion of territory occupied by Mahomedan populations. It is ridiculous, then, to tell us that we were playing a comedy. We were doing something which was really and conclusively serious. We sought to persuade Russia to give up certain advantages; and that we were not trusting to futile arguments is proved by the fact that she yielded to this extent. Therefore, when the noble Earl tells us that this letter to Lord Odo Russell was inconsistent with the traditions of British diplomacy, I can only say it was a plain and open declaration of what we intended to do, and what we did; and, considering that the noble Earl opposite has not ventured to challenge our decision, it seems that we did it with considerable success. I will now say a few words with respect to Greece. I can only account for the noble Earl's speech by supposing that he has not read the Protocols. He said, in the first place, that we had given some promise to Greece of an increase of territory if she abstained from going to war. No such promise has ever, as far as I know, passed from the hands or lips of any British Minister. I, myself, when these rumours were put about, challenged the Greek Foreign Minister to produce any such promise, and he entirely acknowledged the freedom of the British Government in the matter. The noble Earl tells us that Mr. Cross sent us to the Congress with instructions to defend the cause of Greece, and that the cause of Greece was utterly abandoned. I am afraid the noble Earl has not even read the letter of Mr. Cross. What Mr. Cross told us was that we were to procure a hearing for Greece at the Congress, and we did so. We did it on these grounds—not for the sake of any increase of territory —a question on which we had absolutely refused to bind ourselves—but because Greece was the natural protector and representative of the Greek populations under Ottoman rule. We thought it fair that if a Slav was to sit at the Table to defend Slav interests, a Greek should be there to defend Greek interests. We were unable to obtain that representation for Greece to the fullest extent of what we wished; but we did obtain it in a considerable degree. The noble Earl tells us that we surrendered the cause of Greece entirely into the hands of Italy and France. Why, I heard my noble Friend behind me deliver at the Congress, in defence of this very cause of Greece, one of the most eloquent speeches I ever heard from him. The noble Earl might just as well tell me that the noble Earl opposite has surrendered the Leadership of the Liberal Party in this House to the noble Earl (the Earl of Rosebery), because, on this occasion, he supports his Motion, as to say that because we allowed France to make a motion, and then supported it, that therefore we surrendered the cause of Greece into the hands of France. Now, in respect to the cause of Greece, I do not wish to speak many words, because words on this matter are dangerous. Any encouragement given to reckless enterprize at this moment may renew the shedding of blood, and may, possibly, condemn to hopeless ruin a Kingdom in which we all take the deepest interest. I will only say this—that in the interests of peace between Turkey and Greece, and not with a view to any of those wild and speculative ideas which may fittingly be recorded by the philosophical historian, but which have no place in the calculation of statesmen—but with a view to peace and good relations between the two countries, we always thought it wiser that Turkey should consent to rectify a frontier which had been inconsiderately drawn, and we have always plainly spoken to Turkey on that point. The very line proposed by the French Plenipotentiary had a month before been recommended by us to the Porte; and it is, therefore, absurd to charge us with any indifference to the position of Greece or her good relations with her stronger neighbour. But we did earnestly feel that it was not our duty to urge the weak to attack the strong, unless we intended ourselves to support her. That consideration weighed deeply on the Congress. No Member of the Congress was prepared to say—"We will force the Porte to make this or that concession to Greece;" and, therefore, they felt that it was wise to use the most moderate language, and to promise only the most pacific means, lest they should be the cause of inciting the object of their solicitude to attempts which would only end in her ruin. I believe that the true friends of Greece are those that bid her trust to the development of her own resources, and to the gradual increase of her own strength, and do not encourage her to undertake adventures beyond her power.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON

There appear to me to be two main considerations involved in the question which the noble Earl (the Earl of Rosebery) has raised. The one is the secret nature of the engagement to which his remarks have been principally directed, and the other is the character and substance of the engagement itself. Now, whilst I hope to say nothing which shall depart from the temperate tone in which the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) has just spoken, I must take the liberty of demurring at once to one of the arguments he has used. My noble Friend puts it as though this transaction were a link in that ordinary chain of confidential communications which constantly pass between different Governments, and which form a recognized and an essential part of the system of our own, or any other, Foreign Office. My Lords, if it were simply one of the class of confidential communications, all that my noble Friend says would be perfectly true; but the objection is that this is not a communication to enable two Governments to arrive at an understanding, but an engagement entered into, by which Her Majesty's Government and the country are bound to a particular course of action, which was subsequently defined and embodied in the Anglo-Turkish Congress. That is abroad and an essential difference. Now, as to the secrecy of the engagement, I cannot consent to pass that by in silence. There are, no doubt, precedents for secret Treaties and engagements; but they are rare. Secret engagements are not congenial to English diplomacy; they are not resorted to except in case of extreme emergency; and I do not think the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Rosebery) was far wrong when he described them as at variance with the traditional policy and feeling of this country. In the year 1853, just before the Crimean War broke out, the Emperor Nicholas made an offer—under circumstances not altogether dissimilar to the present—to the English Government of that day. He offered Crete and Egypt under a secret engagement. Now, it happened that in turning over my papers the other day, I came upon Lord Clarendon's answer on that subject. Lord Clarendon said— England desires no territorial aggrandisement, and would be no party to approving an engagement from which she derived any such benefit. England would be no party to any understanding that was kept secret from the other Powers. I apprehend that answer was conformable to all the traditions of English policy, and in accordance with the general feeling and temper of the country. It is, therefore, perfectly clear—and it will be admitted by Her Majesty's Government themselves—that in this matter they have taken an unusual course; and taking the broadest view of the question —because I prefer to take a broad rather than a technical view—the justification, if any justification there be, is to be found in the results. That is unquestionably the way in which the matter is to be viewed in this country. But if you look to these results, you must clearly consider them under two aspects—first, whether the provisions of this engagement, subsequently carried out and embodied, as they are, in the Treaty, are likely to lead to a permanent settlement of this question; and, secondly, whether the obligations we have accepted under that engagement are such as this country can safely or oven prudently accept. Now, as to how far this engagement has in it the elements of stability, I would invite your Lordships, first of all, to look at the position in which Turkey is left at this moment. My Lords, Turkey is not partitioned, but Turkey is re-distributed; because we are told on high authority that there is a difference between a partition and a redistribution—re-distributed amongst a variety of European Powers. It is re-distributed amongst a variety of European Powers — Russia, Austria, Montenegro, Servia, and, finally, this country. In other words, the area of Turkey is greatly contracted by this arrangement, and she is left helpless, so far as self-defence is concerned, yet very dangerous as a Power, should she fall into the hands of a powerful and unscrupulous enemy. But what are the feelings with which the different Governments of Europe which sat around the Congress Table have risen from it; for upon those feelings it depends, in a great measure, whether this arrangement is permanent or not? The answer, I think, is very easy. On the one hand, Russia has got pretty nearly all she desired; on the other, whilst you have acquiesced in those concessions, the seeds of ill-will have been deeply sown between this country and Russia, and an irreconcilable barrier to the friendship of two nations, to endure, perhaps, for a generation or more, has been erected. And what of Greece? My noble Friend says that nothing more could have been done for Greece than was done, and he repudiates any idea of abandonment, on our part, at the Congress. I do not care now to urge that; but it is an incontestable fact that Greece declares, with almost one voice, that she had been encouraged, and that she has now been betrayed; and it is a curious and not very edifying fact, that whilst Greece, on the one hand, desired Crete, we, on the other hand, have taken Cyprus. Then comes a ease which my noble Friend very wisely avoided—the view which France and Italy take of recent transactions. Can anyone doubt what the irritation in France was when the first news of the engagement became public? Does anyone doubt what the feelings of Italy are at this moment—the strong feelings which have been conjured up by the knowledge of the secret course of action we have taken? And yet these two countries, France and Italy, are obviously interested in any future complications that may arise, as the two maritime Powers, of all others, must have a voice in the disposition of affairs, whatever they may be. In connection with this, may it not be worth while to remember what happened in 1830? In that year, after the famous march of Diebitch to Adrianople, the collapse of the Turkish resistance—events not very unlike those which we have witnessed ourselves during the last few months— the Treaty of Adrianople was concluded; but, in the following year, France acquired, or it may be said seized, Algiers. Immediately after followed that tremendous war which shook the whole of the Turkish Empire to its foundations, and which brought Russia to the banks of the Bosphorus, not as an enemy, but, as my noble Friend would probably say, in the much more dangerous guise of a friend and supporter. Therefore, it comes to this— that every one of the Great Powers, with the exception of Austria, who has obtained all she has desired, and Germany, who declared that not the bones of a single Pomeranian should be allowed to bleach in Turkey—every single Power that sat around the Congress Table has risen from it with feelings of discontent and dissatisfaction. Therefore it is not too much to presume that there are small hopes of the permanence and stability of an arrangement concluded under auspices such as those. But now, my Lords, I turn to what is, after all, far more important to us than any other part of this question—namely, the obligations to Turkey which we have accepted by this engagement. My Lords, when I first read that agreement in the daily papers, I was greatly alarmed at the clause—the 11th, I think it is— in which England charges herself, in a special degree and manner, with the supervision of the Asiatic dominions of the Porte; but although, when the Congress was decided on, I, like many others, knew it was inconvenient for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to be absent, I acquiesced in that inconvenience, and waited for the explanation which had been promised. Since then information has oozed out drop by drop, not, I may say, from Her Majesty's Government, but in the public newspapers, on which we have depended. When the noble Earl at the head of the Government made his speech the other night, I thought then there would be some endeavour to enlighten us; but, as I listened with the utmost attention, the darkness grew only darker, for there was a total absence of any real explanation. Something, it is true, was said on both sides of the House in regard to India and Indian procedure in dealing with Native Courts and Governments; but I would beg the House to remember there is no real analogy whatever between the state of things in India and the state of things to be introduced into Asia Minor, and for this reason. In India the whole power of England is backed by an enormous and visible Army; but in this case you have nothing of the kind; and the point on which I and every Member of this House desires explanation is, what if these obligations are really undertaken, what are the powers you have taken from the Sultan of Turkey to enable you to see that those reforms on which everything depends are carried out? By this Treaty you guarantee the Eastern frontier of Turkey on condition that she makes certain reforms. Those reforms are absolutely essential. There can be no sound administration unless there be a sound system of finance, and there can be no sound system of finance unless there are great reforms. Therefore, I would again ask, what powers have you taken from the Sultan? There is an error current at this moment, that if the Sultan's Government does not fulfil its part of the agreement in regard to these reforms, then we may retire from the protectorate; but I apprehend that that is a misinterpretation of the bargain—it certainly is not a construction which is consistent with the wording of the despatch of my noble Friend the noble Marquess, when he speaks of our having the right to "insist" on the reforms—and that we are really bound, whether Turkey makes these reforms or not, by the obligations we have undertaken. Therefore it is necessary more than ever that we should understand what those powers are which we have taken from the Sultan. But is there a reasonable chance that Turkey will ever reform her institutions herself? The whole history of Turkey is against it. In 1839, and again in 1856, at the close of the Crimean War, when there was every reason and inducement for the Turkish Government to exert themselves, and redeem their promises, they failed. Therefore, so far as the Turkish Government is concerned, it appears to me that you have bound yourselves to a covenant of unlimited liability with an insolvent partner, to whom you pledge, under all circumstances, favourable or unfavourable, your money, credit, blood, and the whole force of the country. Failing, then, these reforms, what is the nature of the task which you have undertaken? I doubt whether many of us have endeavoured even to express or depict that responsibility to ourselves. You have a country where the Exchequer is empty, where the towns are in a state of ruin, where whole districts are devastated by chronic warfare, and where the governing classes live by grinding out the last piastre from the subject-classes. You have to reform all that—to create a new system of law, to build up a new system of finance, and to organize a new Executive. All that, if Turkey fails to do it, falls on your shoulders, and you have to accomplish that colossal task in the full face of Europe, surrounded by international jealousies and intrigues. That is one of the most gigantic tasks which a nation in its senses ever accepted; and if you consider any of the ordinary details that must arise, I am at a loss to understand how they are to be grappled with. A large part of Asiatic Turkey is, I may say, in a state of chronic warfare; and the Turkish Government has long been powerless to enforce order. Supposing you have another fanatical outbreak, such as occurred at Damascus 16 years ago, or at Salonica two or three years ago — you can only subdue such an outbreak by military force. Turkey has no military force available, and, therefore, you must do it under your obligation. Take another point of detail. Slavery, which has been mentioned in this House once or twice in connection with this question, is the law of the land throughout Asia Minor. There is not a householder who is not wedded to the system of domestic slavery. But whenever England has asserted her dominion or given her protection, slavery has ceased to exist, the two things being incompatible. Two years ago, on the African Coast, we had a Protectorate in which slavery was found to exist, and that had to be abolished—but it had to be abolished with every precaution—with the presence of troops in the territory which could be employed at any and every point with the certainty of success. None of these things, whether as regards troops or geographical conditions, exist in the country in respect of which we have undertaken these engagements. But it is said that, by the possession of Cyprus, you will be able to watch over and control the government of Asiatic Turkey. There never was so idle a dream. If you intend to redeem the engagements which I maintain you have taken under this Convention in the first instance, and have since ratified by Treaty, you cannot remain at Cyprus or anywhere else. You will be compelled to land on the mainland. You will be compelled to use English agents. You will be compelled to make use of no small number of troops—and British troops, too. Remember what occurred 15 or 16 years ago in the Lebanon, when the French had to land, if I mistake not, some 20,000 men; and so, if you mean to be successful, you will have to adopt the same course in Asia Minor; and Indian troops will not answer your purpose, because Indian troops, however good, cannot be trusted by themselves— a certain complement of English troops is absolutely necessary. What does all this mean? Not only enormous moral and political responsibility, but also a colossal expenditure. It is a matter for very grave anxiety when a nation finds, in consequence of such engagements, its expenditure standing at the rate of a war expenditure in time of peace. Nor even is this all; because, as you cannot stop in Cyprus, so you cannot stop in Asia Minor. Those who know anything of the subject know that if you intend fully to fulfil your obligations, you must govern from Constantinople. But you will then find that your policy embraces a- European as well as Asiatic Protec- torate, and that you become, whether you like it or no, mixed up at once in all those intrigues and factions of the Palace which revolve around the Sultan. If the Sultan is a strong man, he will resist your dictation; if he is a puppet, the danger will be no less. There must be many who remember the deposition of the King of Delhi; and those who entertain so great a respect for Mahomedan feeling will do well to remember what Mahomedan countries will think when, for the second time, they see a Monarch in whom the faith and nominal sovereignty of Islam centre, dethroned by an English Army. I will not take advantage of this opportunity to go further into this matter. I have dealt with it broadly—for the discussion this evening has been broad. There is much more that I would gladly say; but I have said enough to place on record, in the most distinct manner—as I desire to do—my own deep regret, disappointment, and disapproval, of the terms of this engagement and of the Treaty of Berlin. Time will show who is right in this matter. Those who hold the views I do may very well be content, I think, to await their justification. I am satisfied myself that when the excitement of the present moment has gone by, when the glamour which now bewitches men's minds has passed away, when they open their eyes to the sober reality of this question, they will find themselves confronted with this most terrible and painful dilemma—either to carry through an almost hopelessly impracticable obligation, or to retreat from it at the expense of national credit and honour.

THE EARL OF MORLEY

observed, that although there was no direct issue before the House, the discussion would have been justified by the speech of the Foreign Secretary alone, which possessed many points of interest. That speech, however, was characterized all through by the noble Marquess answering questions which had not been asked, and dealing with difficulties which had not been raised. The noble Marquess, he thought, had justly defended his statement that the summary of the Anglo-Russian Agreement published by The Globe was unauthentic; but it would have been interesting if he had gone on to justify his assertion that it was not worthy of their Lordships' confidence.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Does the noble Earl mean to say an un-authentic document can be worthy of confidence?

THE EARL OF MORLEY

It appeared to me that the noble Marquess's explanation of its unauthentic character was not inconsistent with its being worthy of confidence. I understood him to say it was unauthentic because it was not published on proper authority.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The noble Earl must have misunderstood mo. I said it was unauthentic, because, in the most essential point—a point of the greatest possible moment— it was an untrue account.

THE EARL OF MORLEY

accepted the explanation; but, at the same time, he thought the words used by the noble Marquess, when questioned about the statement in The Globe, conveyed to him and other noble Lords a meaning which he could not have intended to convey. The noble Marquess had never explained why it was that when the full text of the Treaty had been published, it was described as incomplete, and, therefore, inaccurate. He understood now that the Government were unwilling to produce it, because they could not produce other Papers which they considered right to be added to it. That, however, was not a valid objection. If the document was confessed now to be accurate, why not formally produce it? If, in some degree, it was incomplete and inaccurate, why not produce the genuine Agreement? The other documents alluded to might be important, but they could not affect what was contained within the four corners of the Agreement. The noble Marquess had assumed that the noble Earl (the Earl of Rosebery) had stated it to be contrary to the traditions of our diplomacy to enter into confidential communications with other Powers. He had not understood his noble Friend to assert anything of the kind. On the other hand, his noble Friend had admitted that secret Treaties might have their place in diplomatic transactions; but the noble Marquess must surely admit that this Anglo-Russian Agreement had now passed out of the region of confidential communications? In regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention and the Berlin Congress, although he was not dissatisfied with the results as far as Europe was concerned, but the Opposition would be wanting in their duty if they did not inquire into the modes by which those results had been attained. When the noble Marquess succeeded to the post of Foreign Secretary, he wrote a despatch explaining that England declined to go into Congress because Russia wished to reserve to herself the right of accepting or not the discussion of certain questions. That appeared to him to be a fair ground on which to base our refusal. The noble Marquess, in his despatch, went on to quote the Declaration of 1871, that it was an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power could liberate itself from its Treaty engagements without the consent of the other Powers. Now, it was on the 1st of April that the despatch of the noble Marquess was written, and, with the exception of an occasional answer in reply to a Question addressed to the Government, they heard no more of what was going on till the end of May, when it was triumphantly announced that a Congress was to be held at Berlin. The Government, it was stated or inferred, had gained a diplomatic triumph, Russia had consented to all our demands, and she had agreed to place every clause of the Treaty of San Stefano before the assembled Congress. But if they were under that impression, he should say, with due deference to the House, that they were under a false impression. Had it not been for the "pure accident" alluded to more than once that night, there would have been nothing official or unofficial to show that this secret Agreement with Russia had any existence at all. More than once the despatch to Lord Odo Russell had been alluded to; and, of course, it was well known that Plenipotentiaries had fuller instructions and more accurate knowledge than was contained within the four corners of their official instructions; but he thought they had a right to complain on this head, because this set of instructions, and the final Protocols, gave a false impression to the nation of the position held by our Plenipotentiaries in the Congress with regard to Russia. At least, that impression was false with regard to the points which Russia retained her right to withdraw from the cognizance of the Congress. They might fairly assume that the secret Treaty, to which the noble Earl (the Earl of Rosebery) had called attention was a practical surrender of the points with which it dealt to Russia, a waiver of our rights, and that we entered the Congress with a foregone conclusion. Without the light of this secret Treaty, it would seem that the Congress yielded to Russian views on those points where we were most committed to resistance; whereas we had, by our secret Agreement, really conceded those points before the Congress was opened. The difference between the despatch of the 8th of June and the secret Agreement of May 30th was that while the first, couched in the form of instructions to Lord Odo Russell, was always intended to be published, the latter was not to have seen the light, and would not have seen the light, if it had not been for the misconduct of a copying clerk. He thought noble Lords opposite could not deny that, without the knowledge the public possessed of this secret understanding, their impression of the position of England before the Congress would have been false and misleading. He was justified in saying that without this Anglo - Russian Agreement, their Papers were "incomplete, and, therefore, inaccurate." He was also, he thought, justified in saying that this secret Treaty established a precedent that might, in the future, lead to painful and dangerous consequences. What did we do by this Treaty? We bound ourselves, said the noble Marquess, merely to an agreement upon points about which we would not go to war. No doubt, the noble Marquess knew more of it than they did; but it seemed to him that the words of this Treaty carried a great deal more meaning, and that, in consenting not to contest the desire of Russia to occupy the port of Batoum, we begged the whole question whether Russia was up to that time retaining the right she claimed to withdraw certain points from the discussion, or, at least, the determination, of the Congress. He did not quite follow the arguments as to the last Convention of a secret character—that with Turkey. It appeared to him that we had been sacrificing what the noble Earl the Prime Minister described as the "independence and integrity" of the Ottoman Empire, by taking Cyprus. And while we had been doing this, we were, at the same time, placing ourselves in one of the most difficult positions ever occupied by this country. Not merely had we gained nothing, but we had gone in a precisely opposite direction. Regarding the condition of Turkey, the noble Earl the Prime Minister became anxious to strengthen her Empire by concentrating her power, and by depriving her of territory. But this method of strengthening the Ottoman Empire had necessitated the enlargement of our borders, and given us elements of weakness with which we had hitherto been unfamiliar, by making us vulnerable to attack where we had never before been accessible to it. This was the most important point of all, because it transferred the initiative power from England to Russia—it made us in emergencies a defending, instead of an aggressive, Power. We had dealt with the frontier lines of the Powers recently engaged in war, and with what result? We were now placed close to the Russian lines and the base of Russian operations; and for this danger we had gained absolutely and entirely nothing but an enormous responsibility, and the vast expense which this responsibility would involve. He should like, before sitting down, to ask another Question, and that was, whether the noble Marquess would be able to give them any more information about this important Treaty with Turkey? Its meaning had been much questioned. They had been told its main condition was in the promise and the undertaking of the Porte to improve. On the other hand, they had been told that England was to be responsible—entirely and alone —for the good government of Asia Minor. In the one case, he confessed he did not see how this Treaty was more likely to have good results than the Treaty of Paris, or how the reforms contemplated by it could be more efficiently carried out than by that Treaty. In the other case, how great was the responsibility which had been laid upon the nation—not merely behind the backs of other nations, but behind its own; for neither Parliament nor the people had ever received the faintest intimation of what was to be done. Could we, when the honour of the nation was pledged, withdraw from the pledge? Parliament and the nation would support the course to which in honour we were bound; but he ventured to think that these Treaties, agreed upon behind the back of our own and other nations, would, as the noble Earl who brought this matter forward had pointed out, impair the character for candour and openness which had hitherto distinguished English diplomacy, and would create a precedent very dangerous in its results. It was a new reproach in our history that we were engaged in forming secret Treaties upon points upon which we and the European nations were actually assembled in Congress, and that, when a Congress was summoned to deal with the great interests of Europe, we, at the same time, separately and secretly arranged with other individual Powers some of the most important points which were to be discussed collectively. But, ill addition to this, the Government had now set up a grave and dangerous precedent for involving the nation in enormous risks and responsibilites, and in a vast expenditure of money, without giving the nation an opportunity of expressing or of forming an opinion upon the subject.

THE MARQUESS OF BATH

rose with reluctance to speak on the subject before their Lordships, because it was not a pleasant task to call in question the conduct of the Government and the Party he had so long supported, still less to question the conduct of his noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But he could not avoid expressing the astonishment with which he heard the statement of his noble Friend that evening, when he justified the Memorandum agreed upon between himself and Count Schouvaloff. His noble Friend told them that until some agreement was come to between the Powers assembled in Congress, there was very little prospect of any good result from the Congress—that it was necessary that some sort of agreement should be come to between them in order that success might eventually crown their efforts. Now, he was extremely struck when the noble Earl the late Foreign Secretary—in his speech, he believed it was, in quitting Office—told them that, in his view, the Congress was more likely to be useful as a means of registering foregone conclusions, than as sharing in the discussion of events in reference to which it was necessary that some course should be decided upon. It struck him that in that statement the noble Earl laid down a policy entirely apart and distinct from that of Her Majesty's Government. But what had been the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the spring, when this country and Europe were kept on the tenter hooks, ignorant whether, and when, and why, we were to be dragged into war. They were told, at that time, that the language of Her Majesty's Government was clear, decided, unmistakable. They were told, then, that the Government were the advocates of the liberties and the public law of Europe; and they were told that the Government would consent to no alteration of the state of things previously established by Treaty, without the consent of all the Signatories to the Treaty. They were further told that the Government would not be parties to any private agreement, and the Government took credit, and great credit, to themselves for having perpetually and consistently repudiated all suggestion of partition, requiring that the Treaty of San Stefano should be discussed in Congress in its entirety, and objecting most strongly to any secret arrangement. Now, what had the Government done? They who objected to partition were parties to partition, which they called a re-distribution. They required that the Treaty of San Stefano should be discussed in its entirety, and they brought to its consideration two separate Conventions, by one of which different parts of the Treaty of San Stefano were essentially effected—two separate Conventions, one of which yielded a particular part of the Treaty, and the other dealt with interests, certainly not affected by the Treaty, but very much affecting foreign Powers assembled at the Congress. They who required the submission of the -whole Treaty to the Powers of Europe, who came forward as the defenders of the public law and the liberties of Europe, behind the back of Europe, and behind the back of Parliament, made separate Conventions, one of which disregarded the decisions of the Congress, and the other of which dealt with matters which the Government themselves claimed should alone be dealt with by a European Congress. His noble Friend, in one of his despatches, proceeded to justify the conduct of the Government, presuming that complaints had been made against it, and that those complaints had generally proceeded from foreign countries. His noble Friend also attempted to justify the proceedings of the Government at the Congress, and particularly to show that they were not altogether at variance with his deliberate Circular of the 1st of April. He ventured to say that what his noble Friend had to justify was not so much the proceedings of the Government in the Congress, as the Circular he had issued. The charge against the Government was that outside the Congress, and not in the Congress, they had been false to their own professions, and untrue to the principles they themselves laid down. Now, how had their proceedings been received in Europe? Why, they had been received either with nonchalance, or with what he could only call silent contempt. Germany merely asked why we had waited hitherto. Russia was only too delighted with a portion of our proceedings which justified, not everything that Russia had done, but justified everything that the Government had charged her with doing. We had ourselves been committing the very offences which, as it seemed to him, in many respects unjustly, we had imputed to Russia. Then, look at France and Italy. Italy was discontented; France, bleeding at every pore, prostrated, and with no object but to recover herself from the losses of a great war—France, with nothing left her but the sentiment of her own dignity and the consciousness of her own honour, had no wish to enter the Congress. She did not in any manner whatever put herself forward; but she was drawn into the Congress, on the ground that we were advocating the public law and the liberties of Europe, and that no territory should be dealt with which was not affected by the Treaty of San Stefano— Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Places, being included in the reservation. France, having no desire to enter into Congress at all, stipulated that no territory, not affected by the Treaty of San Stefano, should be touched by the Congress, and she especially excepted from its consideration Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Places. They did not deal in Congress with any territory that France stipulated should be left alone; but, behind France's back, England took Cyprus, which was not affected by the Treaty of San Stefano. The real importance of that Island was not that it gave a point d' appui for action in Asia Minor, for it must be ultimately from Constantinople that any action in Asia Minor must be taken. The real importance of Cyprus was that it dominated Syria. He could not find language in which to describe the sentiment which such action as this raised in his mind. The noble Marquess issued his Circular; he tore up the Treaty of San Stefano into shreds; he repudiated it; he said—"I have nothing to do with your Treaty; I object to the Treaty in its entirety; I object to it in all its details." Yet he agreed to a Memorandum which re-enacted this repudiated Treaty with certain alterations—no doubt, some important alterations; but still he re-enacted the Treaty. Then he went to the Congress, and there they found him wrangling over every detail to get out of the engagements to which he and his Colleagues had assented. They had had all sorts of declarations from the Government, and all sorts of modest descriptions from their own lips of their intentions and aims. The Government had declared it was their intention to uphold the honour and interests of this country—a country with possessions in every quarter of the globe and in every sea; that they would perform their duty to their Queen and their country; that they had but one regard, and that was for the honour of England. These were wide words. But they were told, when the Government went into more detail, that the Prime Minister upheld the integrity and independence of Turkey—the status quo before the war; but what had they done? They had signed at the Congress a Treaty whereby very nearly as much territory was taken from Turkey as was even proposed to be taken by the Treaty of San Stefano. Her Majesty's Government declared that they would uphold the liberties of Europe; but they had since entirely thrown over the liberties of Europe. If there was any meaning in the words, it was that they would oppose the one Power whose influence was likely to preponderate over the others. What was the result? They found the one Power, which might be a menace to the liberty of Europe, re-established more completely in its supremacy. They were told that the settlement was to be final, and that peace was to be perfectly secured. If the condition of things was looked at, it would be seen that there was no finality anywhere. Peace was not finally or perfectly secured. On the shortest possible notice fresh disturbances and difficulties might be expected. Looking at the question from every point of view, they found nobody satisfied—nobody contented—no attempt being made to encourage the development of the freedom of the people, in whose contentment alone could any permanent security be found. It was a part of the Ministerial policy to check Russia. He had made no secret of the fact that he had entirely sympathized with the objects with which Russia began this war; and he had also held that the Russian demands at its conclusion were fair and reasonable. But what had Her Majesty's Government, which thought otherwise, done? They had conceded to Russia all practically that he had ever thought she could possibly hope to attain. They had conceded to Russia all she had any right to expect. If Russia, as they represented, was an aggressive and ambitious Power, they had given her the means of aggression and of developing her ambition in the future. Having made these large concessions to Russia, one would have expected it to be done in such a way as to entitle England to the gratitude of Russia. Nothing of the kind. The language in the published despatches was so contrary to the ordinary language of diplomacy; the language of the Government's supporters out-of-doors, the language of some of their own Members, the language of that portion of the Press known to write in their interests, had been from the first so offensive to Russia that instead of having gained what this country was entitled to expect — the gratitude of Russia—they had created a feeling of hatred which would probably last to the end of this generation. A kind of evil fortune seemed to have attended the action of the Government. Every cause they opposed prospered, and to every cause they took up some misfortune happened. The Government had opposed Russia; they had opposed the development of the Slav race; and they had checked it to a certain extent; but they had left it a great deal better off than any other race, and in a position, at no distant period, to acquire fresh power and influence. They took up the cause of Turkey, and what was the consequence? Turkey had been dragged into this most fatal war, and had lost a great portion of her Dominions. He had alluded to the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. He had pointed out how the first had suffered, and he would now point out how Turkey's independence was gone, and by no one's act so much as by the act of Her Majesty's Government. The Treaty of Berlin, which gave to all the Powers the right to see to the carrying out of its stipulations by the Porte in the Turkish Provinces in Europe, was a blow to the independence of Turkey; but the Convention by which this country took from Turkey pledges for the future good government of its subjects in Asia Minor, and by which this country took upon herself the sole right to see them carried out, was a still greater blow to the independence of Turkey, however valuable it might be to Turkey's Asiatic subjects. Then, as to Greece, the noble Marquess had spoken about the question so far as Greece was concerned; but it was really very difficult to understand the position the Government occupied in this matter. He did not assert that when the war was going on any promises were made to the Greeks that they would obtain an increase of territory at its conclusion; but the Greeks were perpetually told that their claims would be considered when the settlement came to be made, and pressure, both diplomatic and otherwise, was brought to bear upon that country to prevent it taking part in the war. He ventured to say that if, after the fall of Plevna, the Greek Army had advanced into the Turkish territory, it would have contributed more than anything, at that moment, to the falling to pieces of that Empire. We were not done with the Greeks yet. When the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, the noble Marquess exclaimed against the neglect of the Greeks, and seemed to feel a great horror at the Greeks being subjected to the rule of the Slavs. It was very difficult to predict what might have occurred had the Greeks joined in the war, or had they remained, as the Treaty of San Stefano designed, in some measure under the rule of the Slavs; but he ventured to say there were no Greeks who would not infinitely rather be left permanently under the rule of the Slavs than permanently under the rule of the Turks. The only reason why the Greeks were ready to applaud the declaration of the English Government that they were not to be subjected to the Slavs was the hope that they would get their freedom. But now they found themselves subjected to the old tyranny against which, whenever they had had a chance, they had protested. They were told by the Prime Minister that they had a future; but they also heard from the noble Marquess that their only future was in the fancy of poets, of enthusiasts, and of philosophic historians. He (the Marquess of Bath) ventured to think that his noble Friend was entirely incorrect; that the Greeks had a great future, and a future for which they might not have long to wait. He wished to protest against the kind of cold-bloodedness with which the noble Marquess contemplated the possibility of a war between Turkey and Greece, as the result of an attempt on the part of Greece to obtain some measure of liberty and security of life and property for men of the same race and creed on their Northern frontier—the cold-bloodedness with which he contemplated the possibility of the country being devastated by Turkish armies and bombarded by Turkish fleets, when he knew that the slightest possible exercise of power on the part of the English Government would prevent anything of the kind occurring. He would like to ask what England had gained by the action of Her Majesty's Government? It had gained a Protectorate it could not enforce, and it had obtained pledges which the Government knew beforehand could not and would not be kept. For these ends we had lost our ancient alliances, and we had also lost the respect of Europe. The noble Earl the Prime Minister had told them on one occasion, amid the sympathetic cheers of his auditors, at a dinner in the Mansion House, that England was prepared to fight not one, not two, but three campaigns at any time. If the Government were to come forward now and say they were ready to fight not one, or two, or three campaigns, if they thought the interests and the honour of the country were involved, or that the question was sufficiently serious to justify the power of this country being exercised in the cause, he should have not a word to say against it. But in the Protocol which they had read, and in the speeches that they had heard, what did they learn? They were informed that Ministers, in order to avoid war, had assented to proposals of which they disapproved. It was put on record that though English Ministers objected to such and such a course, they did not object to it to the extent of going to war to oppose it. A great deal of the excitement and agitation we had had in the country had been caused very much by the wish to exalt particular Members of the Administration, and to draw unfavourable contrasts between their spirited policy and that of their Predecessors; but he should like to draw the attention of the House to the difference between the conduct of the English Government in the year 1871, and the conduct of the English Government in the year 1878. In the year 1871 there was a proposal on the part of Russia which involved a departure from the Treaty of 1856. There were no public meetings; there were no speeches at the Mansion House; there were no declarations that a particular Minister, whether he was the Premier or the Foreign Secretary, was the only man capable of upholding the honour and interests of this country; and they had no brilliant perorations in that House about the glory of England and the duties to Europe that devolved upon her. Yet there was obtained from Russia a Declaration in accordance with the view of England that no Power could release itself from the obligations imposed upon it by Treaty without the consent of all the Powers that were parties to that Treaty. But, on the present occasion, this country was placed in a most extraordinary position. By the action of the late Government the sacred-ness of Treaties was upheld; by the action of the present Government it had been trampled upon and destroyed. He did not know whether any of their Lordships had read through the Protocols lately published; but if they had they would have seen a most extraordinary document—the most extraordinary, indeed, that he had ever heard of an English Minister having anything to do with. It was at page 270— Considering that the Treaty of Berlin will modify an important part of the arrangements sanctioned by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and that the interpretation of Article 2 of the Treaty of London, which is dependent on the Treaty of Paris, may thus become a matter of dispute, I declare on behalf of England that the obliga- tions of Her Britannic Majesty relating to the closing of the Straits do not go further than an engagement with the Sultan to respect in this matter His Majesty's independent determinations in conformity with the spirit of existing Treaties. It might be possible to explain this; but it seemed to him that either this document had no meaning at all, or it was a simple declaration on the part of the English Government that they would not be bound by the Treaties. In view of this repudiation of the Treaties, Count Schouvaloff demanded, as they would see at page 277 of a Declaration on the part of the Russian Government— The Plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able to explain the meaning of the proposition of the second Plenipotentiary of Great Britain respecting the closing of the Straits, restrict themselves to a demand on their part for the insertion in the Protocol the observation that in their opinion the principle of the closing of the Straits is an European principle obligatory on all the Powers, and that the stipulations confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin are binding upon the part of all the Powers in accordance with the spirit of existing Treaties. Here they had England repudiating Treaties—the ink of her signature to one of them being hardly dry—and Russia standing forth as the advocate and supporter of Treaties. Was that a creditable position to be placed in by the Government? He believed the action of the Government merited the strongest condemnation. What had they done? They had in every way that they could opposed the freedom and development of rising peoples. They had been niggardly to small States. They had taken a little themselves; they had allowed Russia to take more; they had left Austria to take a great deal— Austria, a Power that had been hated by every nation she had ever ruled, that never quitted a campaign except under circumstances of defeat, that never made a peace except by sacrificing her Allies. This was the broken reed, an alliance with whom the policy of this country depended.

LORD HAMMOND

said, he had waited in vain to hear from the Government any satisfactory vindication of their conduct with reference to the Memorandum to which attention had been called by the noble Earl who had opened the discussion with so much ability. But while noble Lords on the Opposition side, and two noble Lords below the Gangway on the other side, had addressed the House, no one but the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had spoken on behalf of the Government. Irrespective of the manner in which it had been made public, it was to his mind a matter of satisfaction that the official secrecy with which even now it was proposed to enshroud the Schouvaloff-Salisbury Agreement had been baffled. They might accept the treason, though they condemned the traitor. The reasons of the Government for objecting to lay that Agreement before Parliament could not be accepted as satisfactory and sufficient. It was a document complete in itself, involving most important political engagements on the part of this country with a foreign Power, and it had led to other onerous and important engagements on the part of England, some of which had already been discussed in their Lordships' House, and others were about to be discussed in both Houses a few days hence. It needed no Correspondence with foreign Governments to elucidate or explain. The general authenticity of the document had been confirmed on oath in the Bow Street Police Court; and, although the revelation of its existence in the columns of The Globe might have caused some surprise—not to speak of any other feeling—in the minds of the Plenipotentiaries at Berlin, yet it was difficult to understand on what grounds any foreign Government could now object to its being officially communicated to the British Parliament in the customary manner. It was certainly satisfactory to receive from the noble Marquess, who he was sorry to see had left the House, the assurance that there existed no other engagements than those the House was acquainted with; and it might be assumed that it might be neither convenient nor agreeable to Her Majesty's Government to publish Correspondence with foreign Powers respecting the Agreement. But it was not asked of them to produce confidential Correspondence, but merely the Agreement which was the result of that Correspondence. The Agreement was, however, before the public, certified as to its general correctness by the oath of the persons through whose hands it had passed; and Parliament and the country were as free now to criticize and pass judgment on it as if it had been laid on the Table of the House; and their Lordships were at liberty to consider whether it was right, or according to practice, that Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries should appear in Congress as the advocates of measures which ostensibly all the Powers were free to reject or to adopt; but in regard to which they had already agreed with the Power whose proceedings and demands were to be reviewed as to the extent to which British advocacy might be carried.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, there is nothing so dull as a monologue, and as I think this discussion has lasted long enough, I am not inclined to prolong it to the annoyance of your Lordships. The noble Earl who opened this discussion in such an admirable speech (the Earl of Rosebery), threw a fly, which was immediately swallowed by the noble Marquess. The noble Marquess, who, amidst the enthusiastic cheers of his supporters, was so indignant the other night with Lord Derby for leaving the House for five minutes, has not thought it respectful, on this important question of foreign policy, to wait to hear what might be said in answer to his own speech. The noble Marquess, I say, rose to the fly thrown by my noble Friend in the most speedy manner. The noble Earl said, he was sure he would be met with this reply— ''Why don't you make a Motion—why don't you divide?"—and curiously enough the noble Marquess repeated that observation almost word for word. The same argument has been used by Lord Beaconsfield—I am in Order in using the names of noble Lords who have gone away— in advising and warning us on this subject; but allow me to say, in regard to this question of making Motions and dividing, that the point the Opposition has always held is this—that we will maintain our own freedom of action, and will not be governed by the injunction and advice of those who are opposed to us. I do not say that within the last two years there has not been strong temptation indeed to make Motion in this House; but in what we have done, I claim a conscientious desire to cause as little embarrassment to the Government as possible, and to ventilate these great questions in the manner peculiar to your Lordships' House without unnecessarily running our heads against a large and mechanical majority, which always has the effect to a certain extent of closing discussion. We have been advised, both by Lord Beaconsfield. and Lord Salisbury, to divide; and Lord Beaconsfield showed that it was very wrong of us not to do so. He advised. us to do it in our own interests. Now, it has always been my habit in life when people volunteer advice or try to force advice upon me, to ask myself two things —first, whether they are competent to give advice, and then, whether they have any particular object in offering it. On these two grounds, I do not consider that Lord Beaconsfield is the best adviser as to the course we should pursue. Lord Beaconsfield—

THE EARL OF REDESDALE

Order, order!

EARL GRANVILLE

I have a perfect right, in the absence of the noble Lord, to call him by name.

THE EARL OF REDESDALE

The general practice of the House, when speaking of a noble Lord who is absent, is to call him by his name when speaking of him for the first time; but afterwards to refer to him in another way.

EARL GRANVILLE

Since I have been in the House it has been the invariable practice to refer to a noble Lord by name, when he is absent.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON

Hear, hear!

THE EARL OF REDESDALE

You may refer by name, but you must not go on repeating it.

EARL GRANVILLE

Does the noble Earl mean to invent a new Rule for this debate?

THE EARL OF REDESDALE

It is not a new Rule.

EARL GRANVILLE

The noble Earl will excuse me for saying again that I am not out of Order. The noble Earl may invent Rules, but I am not obliged to conform to them. There are two things which I want to consider, and one is, how far the Prime Minister was the best adviser I could have, even if he meant no good. He said to us—"Your nerves are so delicate that you will never turn your minorities into majorities if you go on in this way." Now, my recollection is that that the noble Earl led the Conservative Party in the House of Commons for 25 years before he got a majority at all; and that is not very encouraging to a more than Sexagenarian like myself, supposed to be pining for Office. But for the first half of the 25 years, the noble Earl was constantly making and supporting Motions and dividing, to the great injury of his Party. Now, although since he has been in Government, he has been trying to lay down the principle that you approve a policy if you do not challenge it, yet during the past eight years—the period in which he was supposed to be accumulating his policy—he carefully abstained from making any Motion on the foreign policy of the Government he was so constantly blaming. Therefore, I deny that the noble Earl is competent to give me any advice on the point. Now, upon the general question before us. So far as I can make out, we are without any answer to the inquiry why we are not to have this Secret Memorandum laid upon the Table. All we are told is that there are certain despatches connected with the Memorandum which one foreign Government objects to have produced. Now, I quite agree that in secret communications between different Governments any one of those Governments is bound in honour not to publish such communications without the consent of the others; but this Memorandum, about which we are talking, is to all intents and purposes public. And here I would like to say a few words as to how it became public. Some time ago I asked the noble Duke the Lord President of the Council a Question on that subject, and he declined to give an answer as legal proceedings were then pending. Well, those legal questions being over, the Question was repeated last week in "another place"—and what was the answer? That the document was intrusted to this man, who had only been in the Office a year, who did not belong to the Establishment at all, for the sake of despatch. There is a noble Lord behind me (Lord Hammond) who knows more about the Foreign Office than any man in this country, and I should like to know whether he understands those reasons? When I went into the Foreign Office as Under Secretary in 1837—and I have been connected with it at intervals of 20 years since that time—I found there absolute confidence in all Departments, and a really wondrous power of getting through work in great emergencies. It was made a special point of honour with the officials that nothing which took place should be revealed; and I appeal to the noble Lord (Lord Hammond) to say whether, during his experience, that confidence was ever misplaced? Now, of course, I do not know how that Memorandum got into the Treaty Office —in my time, it was not the place to which it belonged; but I am told that it was considered to be of such special secrecy that instructions were given that the Foreign Office should not be trusted with it. The result of this wondrous secrecy was what we all know. Now, I should like to ask the question that was so forcibly put by the noble Earl who opened this discussion—where should we have been if it had not been for the immoral, surreptitious act of this 10d. an-hour clerk in the Foreign Office? We should have been absolute dupes. We should have read the instructions to Lord Odo Russell; we should have read the Protocols and the various despatches that were sent and received from time to time; but we should have been perfect dupes as to the manner in which Her Majesty's Government had proceeded in this matter. The other day I frankly confessed that I did not myself see any objection to coming to such an understanding with Russia as would enable the Congress to meet with the prospect of a happy issue, provided always that it was done in a perfectly open manner. But what I did object to was the arrangement, on the understanding of the comedy which was to be played when we got into the Congress. I fail to see in the Protocols the slightest proof of a greal deal of this transaction. In regard to Batoum, as I pointed out the other day, there appeared to have been no protest at all against its acquisition by Russia. Prince Gortchakoff announced that it would be made a free port, and the Prime Minister accepted that arrangement. I want to know whether the House is never to have this Secret Memorandum, or whether it is really to be presented in accordance with the pledge given, as I understood, on the part of the Government a few weeks ago? I consider that the House is entitled to ask for its production. The noble Marquess has! twitted us with not bringing forward a Resolution and going to a division; because, he said, we have no supporters except on the front Opposition Bench. This, however, is a very unhappy occasion for such a taunt to be indulged in; because, until I myself rose, this debate had been exclusively conducted by noble Lords on the other side, and by Peers on this side not sitting on the front Bench of the Opposition, who have spoken against the Government. I think, under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Ministers might have condescended to take a little more part in the discussion. The fact is that it is difficult for them to do so; because two different accounts have been given of their policy—one to suit the cautious, and the other to suit the energetic—and it is very difficult to walk, as on the edge of a razor, between those two. It would seem that the real policy of the Government is now to be as unmeaning as possible. Since the declaration of the noble Earl at the head of the Government, that the Sovereignty of the Sultan is to be strictly respected, I am inclined to believe that all we are going to do for the future in regard to reforms is to trust to the promises of the Sultan—promises made in 1839, and repeated again in 1856. We are told there is great consolation in this, inasmuch as if the Sultan does not fulfil his promises, we shall be, by the terms of the Convention, entirely absolved from the engagements which we have entered into with him. But I want to know what our position would really be? Supposing that two, three, or four years hence we shall decide that the reforms have not been carried out to our satisfaction, we may then cancel the Convention; but if we do so, what, then, will be our position? It is a very different thing to cancel a Convention after it has existed for three years, and to avoid entering into it at all. Shall we, in such a case, cancel the Convention, thus giving a sort of invitation to Russia, or shall we forcibly interfere with the Sultan's authority? It appears to me that, in their desire for something like a display of fireworks in connection with the Treaty, the Government have made up their minds to avoid what they deem inconvenient discussion; but I insist that the country have a right to expect some answer to the questions which have been raised.

NAVAL DISCIPLINE AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.]

A Bill for explaining certain words contained in section forty-six of the Naval Discipline Act, 1866—Was presented by The Lord ELPHINSTONE; read 1^a. (No. 175.)

House adjourned at half past Eight o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.