HL Deb 05 February 1878 vol 237 cc1026-35
THE EARL OF AIRLIE,

in calling attention to the Correspondence respecting overtures for peace and the affairs of Turkey (Nos. 2. and 3., 1878), disclaimed any intention of making either a personal attack upon the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs or a Party one upon the Government. If he felt it his duty to attack the Government the noble Earl was the last Mem- bar of it whose conduct he should think of impugning, inasmuch as he had exhibited a great amount of discretion in maintaining the neutrality of the country during a very critical period, and had rendered good service in throwing cold water over the too zealous friends of Turkey. A Party fight was a very good thing at the proper time; but he did not consider the moment when they were about to commence difficult negotiations by any means an appropriate period for attacking the Government. At the same time, he thought that in the Papers which had been presented to Parliament on the affairs of Turkey there were many things that called for explanation, if not for criticism. Referring to the two diplomatic Papers which were a subject of discussion in their Lordships' House on the previous evening—namely, the despatch of May 6, and the Memorandum of December 13, 1877—he expressed his opinion that in the latter Her Majesty's Government went further than they had gone in the former. In his despatch to Count Schouvaloff of the 6th of May—which had been designated the chart of the policy of the Government—the Secretary for Foreign Affairs said— The vast importance of Constantinople, whether in a military, a political, or a commercial point of view, is too well understood to require explanation. It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to point out that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to witness with indifference the passing into other hands than those of its present possessors of a capital holding' so peculiar a position. On May 18 Prince Gortchakoff replied in these terms— As far as concerns Constantinople, without being able to prejudge the course or issue of the war, the Imperial Cabinet repeats that the acquisition of that capital is excluded from the views of His Majesty the Emperor. They recognize that in any case the future of Constantinople is a question of common interest which cannot he settled otherwise than by a general understanding, and that if the possession of that city were to he put in question it could not he allowed to belong to any of the European Powers. So the matter rested for more than six months; but on December 13 the Foreign Secretary communicated to Count Schouvaloff a Memorandum, in which, after referring to the previous Correspondence as to Constantinople, he went on to say— While appreciating the courtesy and friendly character of this answer, Her Majesty's Government feel that it does not sufficiently meet the dangers against which they desire to guard. They are strongly of opinion?— an opinion which the course of events tends still more to confirm—that the occupation of Constantinople by the Russian forces, even though it should be of a temporary character and for military purposes only, would be an event which it would be most advisable to avoid. They cannot conceal from themselves that if such an occupation appeared imminent public feeling in this country, founded on a just appreciation of the consequences to be apprehended, might call for measures of precaution on the part of Great Britain from which they have hitherto felt themselves justified in abstaining. After expressing an earnest hope that no attempt would be made to occupy Constantinople, he proceeded— In the contrary event Her Majesty's Government must hold themselves free to take whatever course may appear to them necessary for the protection of British interests. On the previous evening the noble Earl stated what appeared to him to be the objections to a temporary military occupation of Constantinople. What he (the Earl of Airlie) wished to point out was that there was a wide difference between the two despatches, though he was bound to admit that there was considerable force in the reasons which the Foreign Secretary assigned for the advance in the position assumed by the Government in December. The possession or occupation of Constantinople was an English interest, no doubt, but it was also a European one; and he hoped that whatever was done England would not act alone, but in concert with the other Powers. There was great danger, if we took separate action in all cases where English interests were concerned, the "intelligent foreigner" would leave us to get the chestnuts out of the fire, and take care not to blister his own fingers. The noble Earl the Prime Minister, on the first night of the Session, seemed to boast of the isolation of this country, and to think our position in that respect a satisfactory one; but a policy of isolation could not be rendered effective by a Vote of Credit which was first said to be required because an armistice was not signed, and then because it was signed. The next point to which he wished to direct attention was what appeared to him to have been the delay which had occurred in the communication by Her Majesty's Government to the Porte of the willingness of Russia to treat for peace. On the 29th of December the noble Earl received a communication to that effect; but it was not till the 4th of January—six days afterwards—that any communication was made on the subject either to the Porte or to St. Petersburg; and then some modification in the terms on which the armistice should be granted was proposed. It seemed to him that Her Majesty's Government had in this instance departed from the position of the friend of both parties, and to have taken a side, sat in judgment on the terms, and re-appeared as the friend of Turkey. This was not consistent with the position the Government occupied before, of merely transmitting the communications between the Porte and the Russian Government. With regard to the conditions of peace, the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), on December 14, 1877, informed Mr. Layard that the Turkish Ambassador had read to him a telegram expressing the thanks of the Porte for the assurance that whenever negotiations were set on foot, Her Majesty's Government would do what lay in their power to obtain favourable terms for Turkey; but on the 25th of December the Earl of Derby, writing again to Mr. Layard, referred to that assurance in still stronger terms. He said that— On the 28th of July last Her Majesty's Government authorized you confidentially to sound the Sultan on the subject of possible terms of peace, and to state that, should His Majesty be disposed to open negotiations, he might rely upon the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government, which would be exerted with a view to obtain for him the most favourable terms possible. This almost amounted to a pledge that Her Majesty's Government would use its office to render the conditions less favourable for the Christian Provinces. There was another point to which he wished to allude—namely, the state of Epirus. In the Reports of Consul Stuart it was stated that— The Christians here still suffer, and now in an increased degree, all the hardships set forth in the Consular Reports published in 1867 on the condition of the Christians in Turkey. As to inequality in the eye of the law, Consul Stuart stated— Notwithstanding the alleged reforms about which so much has been said and written, this inequality was never more strikingly and openly illustrated than it is at present in the daily practice of the so-called Courts of Justice. The rights of Christians when opposed to the claims of Mussulmans are, in contempt of law and equity, utterly ignored. This would seem to be the case chiefly in the matter of landed property, with regard to which an opinion widely prevails that a systematic policy is at work to withdraw the possession of it whenever an opportunity can he found from Christians and to vest it in the hands of Mussulmans. This was stated by Consul Stuart as to evidence— The old grievance about Christian evidence is still there. From the Mekhemé such evidence is excluded. In the other courts it is ostensibly received; but how is it treated when opposed to a Mussulman? The Christian witness is subjected to severe and harassing cross-examination, and if he makes the least slip he is rejected with contumely as false. On the other hand, the simple statement of the Mussulman is accepted without question or remark as true. Hence the equality of Christian and Mussulman evidence is a mere catchword and has never been anything else. It was further stated in the Report of the Consul that— Acts of violence towards Christians and of spoliation are not unfrequently heard of. Such acts would in other countries be set down simply as crimes and misdemeanours. Hero they acquire another character. From the fact of being committed by Mussulmans on Christians they are almost connived at by the Government authorities, whereas the same authorities are but too quick in punishing with severity a Christian accused—I do not say convicted—of violence towards a Mussulman. As to taxation, Consul Stuart observed— In the matter of taxes the last farthing is wrung from the Christian; time and indulgence are granted to the Mussulman. Then as to the decline of population, the population of Epirus is estimated by Mr. Stuart to have declined from 350,000 in 1861 to 270,000 in 1873."At the same time poverty and misery are frightfully on the increase." As to the cause of this state of things, Consul Stuart said— But in point of fact this principle (of equality between Mussulmans and Christians) is Utterly inadmissable under a Mussulman Government, because it is directly opposed to the precepts of the Koran. Whatever the Koran enjoins the Mussulman must, come of it what may, adhere to. And, though few Mussulmans can read the Koran, they are all taught that it is the charter of a religion which raises them above all other men, while it holds out to them, if not in this life in the next, the boundless enjoyment of all that human flesh in its wildest imaginings can desire. Believing with fervid devotion in that extraordinary hook, their habits of thought, feeling, reasoning, and action, their whole life—moral, social, and political—are moulded to its doctrines. Consul Stuart then proceeded to point out how the Hatt Humayoun of 1856 had been made inoperative through the opposition of the Ulemas. The noble Earl the Foreign Secretary long ago expressed his opinion that, while the Mahomedan populations of the Provinces of Turkey were decreasing, the Christian populations of those Provinces were of importance, and that, as a matter of policy as well as humanity, we ought to conciliate the goodwill of the latter. Nothing now was heard of Epirus, Thessaly, or Crete; but though there appeared to have been a wide divergence between the opinion of the noble Earl and some of his Colleagues on the course which should be pursued in reference to the Eastern Question, he hoped the noble Earl would be able to carry into effect his good intentions with reference to the Greek Provinces, and that England would use her influence in favour of all the Christian subjects of Turkey.

THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords, the criticisms of my noble Friend have been conveyed in such courteous language that I do not feel as if I have had a very difficult task imposed on me in giving the explanation he desires. I will not waste your Lordships' time with any general remarks, but go straight to the points to which he has referred. The first criticism of my noble Friend is that there is a discrepancy between the despatch of May last and the Memorandum placed in the hands of the Russian Ambassador in December last with reference to the occupation of Constantinople. Now, I deny that there is any discrepancy or divergence between those two documents. They relate, as my noble Friend will see on examining them, to entirely different questions. The despatch of May last states the grounds of English neutrality, and mentions as one of those acts which would cause us to depart from our neutrality the taking possession of Constantinople. The words were that we could not with indifference see it pass into other hands. In the Memorandum of December there was no question of the permanent acquisi- tion of Constantinople, but there was a question of the temporary military occupation of that city. In the one case we were dealing with the results of the war; in the other we were dealing with what might be an operation of the war. Consequently, we treated them in a different manner. We have always said that we should consider the permanent acquisition of Constantinople by the Russians as a casus belli; but as to its temporary military occupation we have only warned Russia —no doubt in a very earnest manner— that such a step was one calculated to produce unfriendly relations, and likely to bring about complications and difficulties of various kinds. I do not think, for my own part, that it is very desirable, or even that it is possible, to preserve precise identity of expression in diplomatic correspondence extending over many months; and if we had put the case a little more strongly at one time than at another I should not think that was a matter which needed much apology. But, in point of fact, we have not done so, because, as I have already said, the two documents relate to quite different questions. Then my noble Friend goes on to say that he hopes we are not acting alone, and he adds a warning against England taking upon herself in an isolated manner a duty which devolves on the whole of Europe, and the performance of which should be shared by all the Powers. In that warning I entirely agree. I agree also in what my noble Friend has hinted—that some of those cities in foreign countries who taunt us with inaction, and talk about the decay of our influence, are prompted by a feeling natural to foreign Cabinets that we should undertake that which is quite as much the work of other people as ourselves. Whether we are isolated or not is a matter which the course of the Conference will show. For my part, I am tolerably confident that in the Conference we shall not occupy an isolated position. When my noble Friend refers to the speech of my noble Friend the First Lord of the Treasury and says that he rather boasted of our being isolated, I think my noble Friend (the Earl of Airlie) mistook for matter of fact what was meant in an ironical sense. What my noble Friend, I understand, did say was that, so far from our being isolated, he considered we exer- cised great influence in European councils. The next question which my noble Friend asks is why there was a delay of six days—from the 29th of December to the 4th of January—in communicating to the Porte the willingness of the Russian Government to treat? My Lords, that is a question easily answered. The matter in hand was not simply the transmission of a message from one Power to another. Our good offices were asked. We had uniformly expressed our readiness to offer them, and we had to consider whether, in transmitting the Message of the Russian Government, we should take upon ourselves the responsibility of transmitting it as it stood, accompanied or unaccompanied by the advice that Turkey should accept it, whether we should press upon the Russian Government to modify its terms in any respect before we presented them to the Porte. That was a matter of so much importance and difficulty that I did not feel myself justified in acting without the sanction of my Colleagues. I had to wait for a Cabinet Council to be summoned, and it being Christmas week some delay occurred. But, as my noble Friend will see, that delay was of no practical importance whatever, because when we did make our communication, and the Porte, in consequence, communicated to its commanders in the field the intention of the Russian Government, it was found that the Russian commanders had received no corresponding instructions, the orders to them having been sent by messengers instead of by telegraph. As a fact, the Turkish commanders received the information considerably earlier than the Russian commanders; and, therefore, no inconvenience arose from the short delay on our part, reasonable and necessary as it was. If the Turkish Government had had this communication six days earlier, the only difference would have been that they would have been six days longer in waiting for a similar communication from the Russian Government. My Lords, my noble Friend comments on a sort of pledge, as he says, which we gave to obtain the most favourable terms possible for Turkey. I am not sure that I understand my noble Friend rightly, but he seemed to find fault with that, and draw a distinction between the most favourable terms for the Sultan and the most favourable terms for the Turkish Empire. I do not know whether my noble Friend is aware, but I think your Lordships are aware, that in diplomatic language the one phrase is absolutely identical with the other. Whether we speak of the Government of a country or of the Sovereign of a country, we mean exactly the same thing; and it would be straining the construction of our language to say that the most favourable terms for the Sultan would necessarily be the most unfavourable terms for the Turkish population at large. I will put an imaginary case. Suppose we had been successful in mediation — supposing Russia had demanded an enormous war indemnity, and that we had succeeded in reducing it one half; does my noble Friend mean to say that would have been against the interests of the subjects of the Sultan? I apprehend that in such a case the exercise of our influence would have been as much for the benefit of the subjects of the Sultan as for the Sultan himself. So, again, if the terms of peace demanded of Turkey involved a cession of territory, and we succeeded in obtaining a modification of those terms, should we not have done quite as much for the Turkish people as for the Sovereign? It is idle to speak as if the interests of the Sultan and those of his subjects were always and necessarily opposed. There is only one other point to which my noble Friend alluded. He called attention to the state of things in Epirus and Thessaly, and he spoke of the different manner in which those Greek Provinces are proposed to be dealt with in the Russian plan, as compared with the Slav Provinces. I am sure your Lordships will understand me when I say that I do not think the time has come to discuss a scheme which is not before us in all its details, and which must be a subject of the most careful examination before it can be discussed with advantage. I agree with my noble Friend when he says that one Christian Province of Turkey is entitled to the same privileges as another; but how far that abstract principle is capable of being applied is a question to be regulated, not by general theory or speculation, but by the circumstances of the case when we come to deal with it practically hereafter. I shall not trouble your Lordships with any further explanation to-night; because I think those which I have referred to are the only points to which my noble Friend's observations were directed.