LORD CAMPBELLrose to call attention to the Correspondence upon Turkey; and to move—
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that Her Majesty will adopt such measures as appear to be the best calculated to prevent hostilities, to secure adherence to the Treaties of 30th March and 15th April 1856, so far as the Conference of 1871 has re-established them, and to promote the welfare of the races subject to the Ottoman Empire.Those who had followed the course of events during the last few months would have observed that the line of action taken by the European Powers did not go beyond the preservation of peace. Now, he contended that the Treaties of the 30th March and 15th April, 1856, as they were modified by the Conference of the Powers of 1871, were still binding. He had observed that during the last fortnight it had become the fashion to assert that the Tripartite Treaty of 1856 was inoperative, inasmuch as England was not obliged to interpose unless called upon by France and Austria to act. Now, it was tolerably certain that this contingency would never happen, and, therefore, it was a foregone conclusion that this Treaty was null and of no effect. But he (Lord Campbell) altogether disputed that position. Vattel had laid down a whole series of principles for deciding doubtful cases similar to that now pending; he denied that unless the other contracting parties to a Treaty called upon a third party to it to act the Treaty was void and of non-effect. He said that no single contracting party had a right to interpret a Treaty at its own pleasure; again that every interpretation that led to an absurdity was to be rejected; and again that such an interpretation as would render a Treaty null and without effect was inadmissible, and that it must be so interpreted as to give it its effect, so that it should not be vain and illusory. And Lord Palmerston had left in writing his opinion that Treaties could not be rendered null and void by such a process as that, and had 983 contended that no party to a Treaty was at liberty to make it null and void at its own pleasure, and the last principle laid down by Vattel which he should cite was, that if either of the contracting parties could and ought to have explained himself and had not done so it must be to his own damage. These principles lay at the root of the present question. Great Britain, as the most interested and the most determined Power in the Eastern Question, was entitled to address France and Austria calling upon them to join her in enforcing it. The Treaty, therefore, was in full force. If there should be no response to that appeal—or a negative response—a question would arise; but on that he would not hazard an opinion just now, as that question had not yet arisen. But if France and Austria were hopelessly incapable of interference, what followed suggested the idea that Great Britain had not exerted her proper influence in the councils of the world; but no one except in sarcasm or pleasantry would contend that feebleness of policy dissolved the strength of Treaty obligations. The remark of the noble Duke the other night, to the effect that Treaties were to be exposed to the destructive criticism of these days was one which neither Parliament nor the public would countenance. He believed that, remembering the way in which many years ago the noble Earl now at the head of the Government (the Earl of Beaconsfield) vindicated the guarantee to Schleswig, the country might rest assured that he would uphold the integrity of Treaties. It was argued by some persons that the Bulgarian atrocities had relieved this country of her engagements towards Turkey. The misapprehension on that point had perhaps subsided. Then it was said that the refusal of the Turks to adopt the recommendations of the Conference had completely put an end to those engagements. He accepted the Conference, though many persons of great sagacity condemned it. It had a tendency to put an end to the Holy Alliance by dividing or submerging that alliance; it had a tendency to accelerate the action of the Porte and to check arbitrary power, and it had prevented the occupation of any part of the Ottoman territory. It was a rainbow after a very long storm, and if it 984 did make it, extended the armistice. The Prime Minister had told the House that the refusal of the Porte was imprudent. On that point he would reserve his opinion altogether; in a few weeks we should be better able to tell. But granting, by way of hypothesis, that it was imprudent, if all the proper steps had not been taken to prevent that refusal, the responsibility would rest, not with the Porte, but with Great Britain, and our Treaty obligations were left untouched. If their Lordships referred to page 43 of the Blue Book, they would find a despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus, in which he stated that Prince Gortchakoff was of opinion that the Conference should be attended by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the respective Powers, as the sending of delegates who would have to refer to their Governments would tend to delay. That was so far back as the 15th of August. Had the counsel of Prince Gortchakoff been acted upon great results might have followed. In the first place England would have been represented at the Conference by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He need not say that he had great respect for the ability of the noble Marquess who acted as Special Plenipotentiary; but the noble Marquess was an utter stranger to the Turks, while the noble Earl was well known to them; he had their confidence during the Cretan insurrection; and, though some of his proceedings since their present troubles had displeased them as being characterized by too much caution, that confidence he still retained, and they knew that he disliked war. Then the arrangement suggested by Prince Gortchakoff would have prevented the presence of General Ignatieff at the Conference. Everybody who knew anything of these matters was aware that at Constantinople General Ignatieff was associated with various calamities to Turkey, and that so recently as May last he found it necessary to surround the Embassy with armed men and retire for a while from the Turkish capital. That General Ignatieff led the Conference to a great extent was clear from the Blue Books, and from his own valedictory speech to that assembly. The adoption of the suggestion of Prince Gortchakoff would have led to the introduction into the Conference of influences 985 likely to win concessions from the Porte, while it would have hindered the entrance into it of a man whose presence must have been a strong impediment to such concessions. In fact, it was inevitable that any Conference at which General Ignatieff took part was doomed to failure. He could not but think that for the failure of the Conference the Porte had no responsibility, and that, in consequence, the refusal of the Porte to the terms proposed by the Powers had not invalidated the Treaties. The agitation arising from the Bulgarian atrocities had led to intervention on the part of the country, which intervention was first manifested in the despatch of the 21st of September. In that despatch intervention was carried to a pitch unheard of in the annals of diplomacy. Therefore, now, if we had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey, we had the same right in respect of Portugal and Belgium. A right to interfere depended on an engagement to defend; and when the engagement to defend was given up, the right of interference would fall with it. When interference occurred the engagement to defend became more binding; and it might be said that the despatch of the 21st of September surrounded with a solid and impenetrable armour our engagement to defend. But for our Treaties we should have had no more right to interfere between Turkey and her subjects than we had to interfere with the Government of France and the Communists, or the North Americans and the Red Indians, or the Russians and Siberia. It was said—or assumed rather—that Treaties fell with the policy with which they originated, and that since the policy which we upheld by force of arms in 1854 had changed, the Treaties which were the results of that policy had come to an end. On the contrary, he maintained that every object for which in 1854 we resolved to defend the Bosphorus continued at this moment, and that in the lapse of time those objects had been further developed. Twenty years ago if Russia had become a great Mediterranean Power, there would have been still the united Navies of France and Great Britain to counteract her. It was known that at the time to which he was referring those two Navies formed one consolidated element. We were at present near a precipice of war or dishonour. 986 A few years ago we changed the depository of power in this country, and we had now a body of electors on whom taxation did not fall so generally and so heavily as it did on the electoral body created by the Act of 1832. What the sentiments of the present constituency would be in case of a war might be presumed from the feeling of the electoral body of 1832, who after the fighting in the Crimea were not willing to conclude peace with Russia as soon as the Government were. Among the masses of the people of this country there was anti-Russian feeling; but he admitted the exercise of naval and military power by this country was not desirable, and that our only course of action was to endeavour to prevent hostilities in Europe and Asia. There was an impression abroad, and especially in Russia, that the whole body of the Liberal Party in this country had become Russian partizans. The circumstances that had given rise to that feeling were so manifest that he would not trouble their Lordships by pointing them out. Of course, it was well known that the Liberals were not in power, and that there was no chance of their arriving at it; but their social and political importance gave much weight to the opinion which they were supposed to entertain on the Eastern Question. But if such an opinion was entertained, it was clear that Russia with such an element at her back might be much more disposed to engage in an aggressive policy than she otherwise might be. No doubt the impression as to the sentiment of the Liberal Party was unfounded. The history of that Party showed it to be so. In 1791 Mr. Fox opposed the Russian Armament. At the time of the second Partition of Poland in 1815, and at the time when the Holy Alliance was formed, the Liberal Party manifested strong anti-Russian tendencies. These were displayed again at the time of the Polish War in 1830, and at the time of the Russian intervention against Hungary in 1848. At last that Party determined to wage war against Russia in 1854, though Mr. Cobden, in the House of Commons, and a noble Lord now sitting on the cross benches (Earl Grey), used all their efforts to prevent that war from being undertaken. After the Crimean War, the Liberal Party being in power, Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, in 1863, united in a diplomatic combination against Russia in the in- 987 terests of Poland. Up to the time when the Bulgarian atrocities became known there had been no suspicion that the Liberal Party was on the side of Russia; but after the vague and exaggerated language which had been used since then it was no wonder that the politicians of St. Petersburg should have arrived at the conclusion—though it was one altogether unfounded—that the Party which had by development become more and more of a barrier to their aggression was suddenly gone over to the opposite extreme. The Russian politicians, no doubt, thought that Providence had intervened in their favour, and that an aggressive policy might be resumed with impunity when so great and historical a barrier to their aggressions had been removed. He ventured to think that a Motion such as that of which he had given Notice, coming from the Opposition side of the House, would tend to dissipate that illusion. He regretted that it was not in the hands of some one of more importance than himself—he should have liked to see it in the hands of such a personage as Lord Napier and Ettrick; but its adoption by the Party would give it all the weight desirable for such a Motion. He wished to refrain from criticism of the Government, for in politics, as well as art, he had always been of opinion that criticism soared and execution grovelled. But, as on a former occasion he refrained from criticism, and he consequently found himself between taunts on the one side and smouldering satisfaction on the other, he wished to refer to some parts of these proceedings as furnishing a new basis for argument for his Motion. He thought many fantastic approvals and unwarrantable charges had been brought against the Ministers. The first error which it occurred to him might be charged against them was that so far back as 1874 no efforts seemed to have been made to avert the union of the three Northern Powers which began in that autumn. Another deficiency, more than an error, in his opinion, was that during the February, March, and April of last year no exertions seemed to have been made in order to win over to our views the authorities at Berlin. A third objection he had to make came from the Blue Books. He found that in the despatches the noble Earl had used expressions which he could not but deem imprudent. The noble Earl—no doubt 988 with the best intentions—had indulged in statements that in no case was he prepared to act upon the Treaties. He could not help thinking that such language had a tendency to lure Russia into a warlike attitude. The effect of this language had been in some degree counteracted by the speech of the Prime Minister on the 9th November. The prestige of the British Government required to be increased among diplomatists if war was to be averted. He would recommend his Motion as having a tendency to give them more distinctly that prestige of which they stood in need. If war between Russia and the Porte broke out, they would have to choose between a dangerous course and a humiliating attitude, and therefore the true line of policy for this country was to prevent hostilities in Europe or in Asia, and no amount of influence from the bench below, or of the Russian party in this country ought to bar their acquiesence in the Motion. He could not deny from some of the contradictory opinions which had been expressed, that contradictory opinions existed among Members of the Government; there was a certain variation of language and expression. He might therefore be permitted to express opinions he would otherwise reserve as to the position of the country and the steps which most required to be taken on this subject. The first stage he would venture to suggest was that the excited hordes who had invaded the precincts of the Eastern Question in the interest of Russia should be driven out. They told the country that they were its concentrated intellect—he would retort upon them that they were the condensed servility and embodied madness of the country. The next step was, that the line, whatever it might be, that governed the foreign policy at the time of the Berlin Memorandum should re-establish its ascendancy in the Cabinet. His view was that it was the duty of the Government to proclaim their adherence to the Treaties so far and so long as Parliament enabled them to do it. The only basis upon which they were entitled to ask for a single shred of Ottoman reform was founded on the advantages we had secured for Turkey by the blood and treasure we had poured out like water in the Crimean War. It was with perfect confidence that he submitted his Motion to the House, and with the firm conviction that it would secure the precedence 989 of which they stood in need, the mind and disposition without which that precedence would be useless. The noble Lord concluded by moving for an Address.Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that Her Majesty will adopt such measures as appear to be the best calculated to prevent hostilities, to secure adherence to the Treaties of 30th March and 15th April 1856, so far as the Conference of 1871 has re-established them, and to promote the welfare of the races subject to the Ottoman Empire.—(The Lord Stratheden and Campbell.)
EARL GREYMy Lords, this Motion is not one which it is possible for the House to accept. It is open to this objection—that it implies that unless we express our opinion on the matter by way of an Address to Her Majesty, Her Majesty's Advisers will not take those measures with reference to the present state of affairs in the East which this House believes ought to be adopted. If the House really does entertain that opinion, and if it has so much distrust of those to whose hands the conduct of those affairs is committed, it is bound to express that opinion clearly and distinctly. If, on the contrary, it does not entertain that opinion, I am sure your Lordships will agree with me that it would be imprudent and inopportune, as being calculated to weaken the hands of the Government, for us to agree to a Motion that would bear an interpretation of that kind. For that reason, my Lords, I, for one, cannot concur in the Motion of the noble Lord. I do not intend on this occasion to follow the noble Lord in the observations he has addressed to the House—although upon some points I am much inclined to agree with him. My object in rising is to address to the House some remarks upon the general questions which the noble Lord has brought under our notice; and I wish to do so the more because, when the subject was under discussion last week, I abstained from taking any part in the debate, being painfully conscious that my powers of addressing your Lordships are not what they were. I did not think, under the circumstances, that I ought to endeavour to take part in so important a discussion. I hope, however, that I may now be permitted to avail myself of this opportunity of making a few remarks upon this subject, although I am aware that they will be both desultory and imperfect. In the first place, I cannot help saying that in the course of that debate there appeared to me to be a 990 want of appreciation of the great importance of averting the fall of the Ottoman Empire. I do not dispute the statement of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) that there has been great misgovernment in the Turkish Provinces; on the contrary, I fully concur with him on that point, although I think that there has been some exaggeration with regard to it. But bad as the present state of things there may be now, I believe that it is somewhat better than it was when we entered into the Crimean War to maintain, as we were told, the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The noble Lord who has just sat down has expressed himself satisfied with our conduct in entering into that war. I may, however, state that I entertain the very opposite opinion on that subject—that I think now as I thought then—that the war was unnecessary and therefore unjustifiable. I am of opinion that all the blood that was shed and all the treasure that was expended in the course of that memorable contest has had the effect of leaving matters in the East in a worse position than they otherwise would have been. But, although I think that the misgovernment of the Turkish Provinces may, perhaps, have been in some degree exaggerated, still I fully agree with the noble Duke that it formed quite sufficient ground to make us hail with satisfaction any change that was likely to bring about a better state of things. But, before I can consent that any particular course shall be taken towards hastening reform of the Turkish Rule, I should wish to be convinced that it is calculated to bring about the better state of things we desire to see established. Now, on examining this question carefully, it appears to me that the Turkish Empire could not be overthrown at the present time without producing more evil than we seek to remove; because from all the information that has been laid before the House and from the accounts of travellers it certainly does appear that the Provinces of European Turkey are not in a state at present in which they could govern themselves—they are divided by bitter animosities of race and religion, they are generally in a state of the grossest ignorance and darkness, there are few persons to be found possessed of wealth and education, and there is scarcely any middle class: their clergy are ignorant and cor- 991 rupt—and, in short, there exists in those Provinces at the present moment no single element of good government. I am, on the whole, of opinion that, if the Turkish rule were withdrawn, anarchy and civil war would follow, and that civil war would be followed by European war, which would in turn result in the Provinces falling into the hands of Russia. I, for one, am not of opinion that, even if the change could be peaceably effected, it would be of advantage that the power over the Provinces to which I refer should be transferred from the hands of Turks to the hands of Russians. If your Lordships compare the Turkish Government and the Russian Government in the countries subject to their respective sway I do not think you will admit—certainly, I for one am not prepared to admit—that the advantage is so clearly in favour of Russia as many persons seem inclined to imagine. Can any man, for example, conceive of tyranny more oppressive and outrageous than that which was exercised by Russia over Poland? Taking our own times, can anyone say that Russian government is in favour either of improvement, materially or of civilization, looking at the question from a social or political point of view? The concurrence of testimony is complete as to the universal corruption which pervades every branch of the Government—including the administration of justice. This corruption is as deep and general as that which prevails in Turkey. The more regular and better organized system of Russia does, no doubt, prevent those open acts of lawless violence which are too often perpetrated in Turkey; but, on the other hand, this very organization, and the principles on which it is worked, makes the Government press on its subjects with a crushing and deadening weight very adverse to real progress and enlightenment. Again, though the government of the Turk is bad in many respects, yet when by accident it falls into good hands—into the hands of a wise and honest Pasha—the general system of that government is not unfavourable to progress and enlightenment. It does not interfere with freedom of opinion—and especially with freedom of religious opinion; and that is very different from the state of matters which exists in Russia, where every endeavour is made to suppress all diversity in religious feelings. Once more—another great civilizer is commerce; 992 and your Lordships must be well aware how much more favourable are the principles of Turkey to commerce and industry than the system of Russia. Upon the whole, while I admit—as I have already indicated—that you have not in Russia those violent outbursts of abominable tyranny which occur from time to time in the Turkish dominions; yet, on the other hand, there exists in Russia a system of government which in the long run is not favourable to human advancement, and which does not hold out the same hopes for the future that the Turkish Government might do if efficient steps were taken to correct some of its worse abuses. These are the reasons which make me believe that, quite irrespective of any English interests, it is not desirable to break down the dominion and government of Turkey. And if it be not expedient at once to overturn that power, it seems to follow, as a matter of course, that it will not be wise to interfere more than we can possibly help between the Turkish Government and its subjects. As a general rule—I do not say as an absolute rule, because exceptional cases must arise—it is wrong for one nation to interfere with the domestic concerns of another, either with respect to the form of its government or the manner in which that government is administered. The principle of intervention, if once admitted, is capable of very wide and dangerous application. I am not sure that cases might not arise when it might be applied to ourselves in a manner of which we should very much complain. Your Lordships must know as a fact that the system of intervention has worked great evils in the world. It was that principle which led to the Partition of Poland; it was that principle which led to the disastrous consequences of the Coalition against France in the management of her internal concerns; it was that principle which was the main cause of the 20 years of war and bloodshed which had afflicted Europe; and it was that principle which was the cause of the evils which resulted from the interference of the Holy Alliance in Italy and Spain. These are considerations which have weighed with the wisest and best of British statesmen, and their influence is seen in the fact that those statesmen have for the most part, resisted all proposals for the interference of this country in the domestic con- 993 cerns of another nation. We invariably refused to interfere in the case of Poland, suffering from the oppression of Russia; we refused to interfere when Lombardy was oppressed by Austria; at a later date we refused to interfere in connection with the excessive tyranny of the Government of Naples and Sicily; and I believe that in all these cases the decision was a wise one. But in the present instance the Government have felt it necessary to interfere between the Porte and its revolted subjects, and I think that in doing so they have been guided by a spirit of wisdom. When it became necessary that measures should be adopted for the purpose of restoring peace in the Provinces of Turkey the Government did right in joining with the other Powers in making representations upon the subject to the Porte. But it appears to me there is one point on which explanation is required. It is this—Why was it, when Her Majesty's Government consented to lay before the Porte the proposals contained in the Andrassy Note, that nothing was also done to show the Turks that, in the event of their listening to the proposals contained in the Note, the Powers in return would agree to prevent the neighbours of the revolted Provinces from giving secret aid, and would also call upon Servia and Montenegro, then in arms against the Turkish Government, to abstain from seizing any territory by force, or taking any further steps, until time had been allowed for the opinions of the Powers and the results to which such opinions could lead had been fully made known? If that had been done there was a fair prospect that peace would have been maintained. But the intervention of Her Majesty's Government was unfortunately one-sided. They addressed the Turks only; for I cannot find any record of anything like an authoritative appeal to the Insurgents of Servia or Herzegovina to come to terms with the Porte. Well, my Lords, I come to another point on which I think that explanation is required. When the war had broken out between Servia and the Porte, in which Servia got very much the worst of it, why, I ask, was the question as to the terms of peace mixed up with another and a totally independent question—namely, as to the measures to be taken with regard to the Insurgent Provinces as a whole? I do not see 994 what Servia had to do with that question. As an exceptional case—although contrary to the general rule—it might have been fit for Europe to endeavour to intervene between the Porte and its subjects; but what claim had Servia—a vassal Province—to be consulted in any way as to what was to be done with the revolted Provinces? Consul Holmes says, in one of his despatches, that there was no connection or sympathy between Bosnia and Servia. It was impossible, he says, for two countries to have less interest in common. What claim, then, had Servia to give any opinion, or to intervene at all with regard to the terms to be granted to the revolted Provinces? If that course had not been taken, peace between Servia and the Porte might, I think, long since have been established. The Porte, impressed by the European Powers, might have conceded the status quo as asked for by the noble Earl. And if peace had been brought about, how much of the difficulties which subsequently arose might have been saved ! The renewal of the war, which had been suspended for a short time, with all the bloodshed it occasioned—all those long and complicated negotiations with regard to the armistice, which I must say were not greatly to the credit of any party connected with them—all these might have been avoided; and this once accomplished the Powers and Turkey might then have resumed the consideration of the question as to what was to be done with respect to the revolted Provinces. Well, on the 11th of September, the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary addressed a despatch to Sir Henry Elliot, in which he informed him that he had had an interview with the Russian Ambassador, and had told Count Schouvaloff the terms on which peace might be established. These terms were, as well as I remember, the status quo, speaking roughly, as regards Servia and Montenegro, and administrative government in the nature of local autonomy in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with regard to Bulgaria some measure of the same description, of which the particulars might be discussed. Now, I want to know why it was that those two questions were added to the simple question of the peace with Servia? The despatches of Consul Holmes point out in the clearest manner that Bosnia and Herzegovina were utterly incapable of 995 working any system of elective self-government, and that any attempt to introduce such a system would be a failure and do more harm than good. He said—and it was perfectly true—that what was wanted in those Provinces was a strong and enlightened despotism—that that, in the then state of things was the only practicable form of government. I do deeply regret that this unfortunate idea of establishing local autonomy was proposed. We know from the despatches that it was a condition that specially alarmed the Porte; and having seen what had happened in Wallachia and Moldavia, and with Servia itself, they might well have feared such a condition. I am a great admirer of local self-government; but experience proves that with respect to communities altogether unused to it, the central authority may be unduly weakened without giving any real security for good government to the Provinces to which the privilege is extended. It is a problem not impossible to solve—how in such a case local self-government can be established without those results being produced; but certainly it is one of great difficulty, and I must say I think it was an unfortunate time to suggest it when those Provinces were in actual insurrection, or when insurrection was barely suppressed. I remember to have heard the story—whether true or not I cannot say—of President Lincoln, who—when a proposition was made to him in the course of the Civil War in the United States—said "It is a bad time to swop horses when you are crossing a ford," and that is applicable to the present case. It was, indeed, a bad time to attempt to introduce new institutions into Provinces which were suffering from all the agitation of insurrection, actual or suppressed. The course adopted was certainly one not at all likely to be successful. My Lords, I will now venture to say a few words on the present state of things. I hope, from some words that dropped from the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary the other night that the question of peace between Servia and Turkey is in a fair way of being settled; and I do trust that the Turkish Government will endeavour to arrive at some satisfactory arrangement with regard to this Province. It was said the other night, both by the noble Earl at the head of the Government and 996 by the noble Marquess our Plenipotentiary at Constantinople, that Turkey had been guilty of extreme folly in rejecting two proposals, the refusal of which had caused the failure of the Conference.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he did not recollect that his noble Friend (the Earl of Beaconsfield) had made such a remark, and it certainly had not fallen from him. What he had said of the unwisdom of the Turkish Government was directed to their rejection of the terms of the Conference generally, and not to the rejection of these two particular proposals.
EARL GREYI am certainly under the impression that the Porte had, by rejecting those two proposals, caused the failure of the Conference. There seems little chance of Turkey changing its opinion, but I hope that the Government will consider with the other Powers whether other measures may not be suggested which may equally attain the object they have in view. Is it true that the objections of Turkey to these two peoposals are so unwise as they are said to be? I do not so regard the matter. I will ask your Lordships to consider what would have been the effect of the creation of this mixed Commission? This body would have been composed of the Representatives of the Six European Powers, and it would have interposed between the Turkish Government and its officers on the one hand, and the Turkish population on the other in matters of administration. This body would have been armed with the most extensive powers. It would have been enabled to overrule the Turkish Government on all the most essential points of administration. There was hardly an act of the Government—there was hardly a measure that the Government could have taken — that would not have been liable to be stopped and thwarted by the Commission. Was it not natural that the Turkish Government should have scruples as to the necessity of appointing a Commission armed with such powers? Would the authority thus created have been calculated to promote good government and a vigorous administration of the Turkish Provinces. These Provinces will require, form any years to come, a firm, vigorous, and consistent administration of the powers of the Government. Was that likely to have been obtained by a Board 997 or Commission representing the Six European Powers? I have always heard it said in this country that a Board is a defective machinery of government; and unless the head is supreme I am much inclined to agree in that opinion. But here we were going to have a Board composed of persons who would have been not only independent of each other, and of equal power and authority, but representing equal and jealous Powers. The result could only be that each Member of the Commission would have considered himself the Representative of the nation by which he was nominated, those nations having jarring interests and conflicting opinions with regard to Turkey. I will only ask your Lordships to consider what chance there would have been of these Provinces recovering their prosperity if they were placed under such a Government? I am old enough to remember how the Government of Greece was carried on 40 years ago, when the European Powers interfered in its behalf. It was never proposed that Greece should be governed by a mixed Commission; but the Powers of Europe—especially France, England, and Russia—endeavoured through their Ministers to direct and guide the internal and domestic administration of Greece. I believe that those three nations had a sincere and honest desire to promote the prosperity of Greece, and that all the measures they recommended were designed with that view. But, unfortunately, the views of the three countries as to what would be good for the Greeks were very different, and the consequence was that the Representatives of these Powers endeavoured to promote their views by obtaining the support of the local authorities. Three Parties were thus formed in Greece — the French, English, and Russian Party — each striving to direct the general course of the Government. As naturally happened, a state of things arose when Party spirit ran high under which every appointment to the various offices, every removal of an officer, and everything suggested to the Government of Greece was discussed, and either opposed or supported, not with reference to the interests of Greece, but with reference to its bearing on the supposed views and wishes of these Powers. Greece was literally torn to pieces by the intrigues of different Parties at that time. As a 998 Member of Lord Melbourne's Administration, I had the opportunity of closely watching the working of a system which I greatly deplored, and I believe it was very much owing to the seeds of Party spirit and of intrigue then sown that Greece did not make the progress she would otherwise have done when the yoke of Turkey was removed. My Lords, I trust that of this proposal of a Commission of national control Turkey may hear no more. My Lords, the other point which was rejected by the Porte related to the appointment of the Governors to the Provinces. With regard to the corrupt choice of the Governors and the practice of continually changing them, I think the Conference hit the real blot of Turkish administration. It is impossible to doubt that there is no one cause to which the mis-government of the Turkish Provinces is more directly owing than the corrupt choice and frequent changes of Governors. This is one of the main causes of the oppression of those who live under the rule of the Porte. A Governor who has obtained his post by corruption naturally endeavours to regain from the people under his rule the money by which he obtained his post. He knows that he may be at any moment displaced by some higher bidder, and it is quite natural that a Pasha should endeavour to screw from the people under him the largest possible amount of money in the smallest possible time. Something must be clone to correct this evil, and if what was suggested at the Conference had been accepted by the Porte, I believe it would have accomplished much good. At the same time we must not conceal from ourselves that there is no small weight in the objections to such a proposal. It is undoubtedly true that a system under which a Government could not dismiss its officers when they were disobedient, or manifested incapacity or dishonesty, would not in ordinary circumstances be found favourable to good and vigorous administration. I cannot help regretting that proposals were not submitted for improving the government of the Provinces by means less likely to provoke the opposition of Turkey. It might have been suggested to the Porte to appoint Governors who would command the confidence of the Powers, and that they should not be removed, except for misconduct, without the Powers 999 being informed of the step about to be taken. This would have involved no actual interference with the authority of the Porte. No doubt it would have been found difficult for the Porte to have found suitable men among its own subjects, but it would have been possible for the Porte to have applied to the other Powers, who would have found no difficulty in supplying men competent to govern the Provinces. I have heard it asserted that Her Majesty's Government were wrong in not showing more complete confidence in Russia, and in not acting more in concert with her; but I cannot see any ground whatever for the charge; and, perhaps, if there be ground of complaint it would be in the opposite direction. I concur most heartily with those who say we ought to join with Russia in urging upon the Porte measures for improving the government of Turkey; that we ought not to show jealousy and suspicion of Russia; and that, when she proposes measures of which we approve, we ought to give her full credit for them, and heartily join in promoting them— all that I entirely admit, and that it would not be wise or expedient to manifest jealousy or suspicion; but, at the same time, I must demur to the notion that we are to place blind confidence in any other Power. I cannot help looking back to past events. Your Lordships cannot forget there have been cases in which the British Government has received very express promises from Russia which have not afterwards been fulfilled. I do not doubt that when the Emperor of Russia expressed to our Ambassador such friendly sentiments towards us, and his desire to co-operate with us in producing a better state of things, he was speaking sincerely; but unless even Emperors are men of very unusual strength of will they may have to encounter currents of opinion and passion among their Ministers and persons employed in their armies and civil services which may prove too strong to be controlled; and in the case of an absolute, even more than in that of a Constitutional Government, it is unwise to place too much reliance on what is said by Sovereign or Minister. We must look to their acts. It is by her acts, and not by her professions, that Russia must be judged; and, during the last two years, I cannot say that my opinion 1000 of her conduct has been altogether favourable. If she had seriously desired to maintain peace and to obtain greater protection for the Christian subjects of the Porte, I cannot but believe she might have found means—not, perhaps, of preventing the insurrection, but, at all events, of preventing the aid and countenance which it received from the neighbouring Provinces, by which that insurrection was supported—I cannot but believe she might have prevented her own subjects from joining the Servian armies. I cannot help contrasting the conduct of Russia in these matters with the protest made by her in an extraordinary State paper three years ago in reference to a few foreign soldiers and officers passing through Turkey into Circassia. Your Lordships must have been astonished, as I was, on reading the despatch addressed to the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary on the 5th of September last by Sir Henry Elliot, in which he informed the noble Earl that, in the absence of the Russian Ambassador, he had had a conversation with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who protested, in warm terms, against Turkey concluding peace with Servia without the approval of the Powers, for he said it was possible the two might be satisfied with terms which the other Governments—or, at all events, his own, would not approve. It appears to me that the Chargé d'Affaires made an important revelation of the secret views and intentions of his Government which probably the Ambassador would not have been frank or indiscreet enough to have made. That revelation so made seems to me utterly inconsistent with the belief that Russia was animated by a disinterested desire for peace. I have trespassed on your Lordships longer than I intended, and I can only thank your Lordships for your attention.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, having already within the last few days twice addressed your Lordships upon this Eastern Question, I need not assure you that I would not voluntarily come forward to do so on the present occasion; but so much has been said by my noble Friend who has just sat down (Earl Grey), and by the noble Lord who introduced the discussion, inviting explanations, and in some cases calling for a defence of the past actions of the Government, that I should not be justified in refusing 1001 to accept the invitation so held out—I will not call it a challenge, for I am bound to say the comments have been made in a fair and friendly spirit. The discussion has naturally taken a very wide range, and I am afraid, therefore, I shall be somewhat desultory in my reply. In referring to the various points that have been raised I will begin by referring to the speech of the noble Earl. I am sure your Lordships will all agree with me that it would have been a matter of very great regret if the discussion had closed without our having the benefit of his long experience and of his dispassionate criticism. There was much in the speech of the noble Earl with which I agree; there was much also which I regard as matter for careful reflection and consideration; but your Lordships will understand that I naturally pass over those points in which there is an agreement between us, and advert only to those in regard to which my noble Friend criticized the action of the Government. The first of my noble Friend's criticisms is this—He asks, why did we not in the beginning of 1875 require as a condition of signing the Andrassy Note, and acceding to the policy indicated in that Note—why did we not require on the part of the States bordering on Turkey a real and effectual, and not a nominal, neutrality? My answer is, that we did so as far as it lay in our power; and I refer my noble Friend to the noble Duke who spoke the other night (the Duke of Argyll), who seemed to think we had gone a great deal too far in pressing the Austrian Government to observe on its frontiers the obligations of international law. It was along the Austrian frontier that the greatest part of the assistance was given to the insurgents in Herzegovina and Bosnia; and certainly whatever you may think of our policy, whether you think it right or wrong, it cannot be said that there was any slackness on our part in calling the attention of the Austrian Government to these breaches of international law which were being committed—I do not say, nor do I believe, with the sanction of the highest authorities—but which nevertheless were committed by the local population, and probably with the connivance of the local officials. That is my answer to the criticism of the noble Earl. If we had chosen to ask we might have 1002 obtained a declaration of the intention to observe entire neutrality; but my noble Friend is far too experienced a statesman to attach much value to declarations of that kind. With regard to the second point, on which my noble Friend considers that we have been in the wrong, he asks why, when Servia was getting the worst of the struggle, and had appealed to us for our mediation, we mixed up two separate questions —the question of the terms on which peace should be granted to Servia, and the question of the internal reforms which we wished brought about in the Insurgent Provinces. My Lords, we had to bear in mind that it was quite useless to offer terms of peace to Servia which we were aware Servia would not accept. We knew also that whether or not the Servian Government would have been willing of itself to make peace, without any stipulations on behalf of the Insurgent populations, there were those in Servia and out of it, influencing the Government at Belgrade, who would not allow such a peace to be made. I am bound to say that, considering how intimately their cause and that of the Insurgents within the Turkish Provinces were connected—considering how closely one was mixed up with the other—I do not think it very unnatural that the Servian Government should have shrunk from what might appear unfair conduct in making separate terms of peace for themselves, and throwing over those with whom they had been acting. If my noble Friend thinks that undue deference was shown to the Servians in that matter, I can only say that the Servian Government applied for admission to the Conference, and their application was refused. My noble Friend went on to refer to the question of local autonomy — "local or administrative autonomy" is the phrase employed in the despatches—and he expressed surprise that we should have consented to any propositions of that kind when we had before us despatches showing the difficulty of carrying them into effect. The phrase of "local or administrative autonomy" was not one of my devising. I did not particularly admire it; it seemed very vague. I rather protested against its use. I accepted it as it stood. I took it as I found it, and if your Lordships will read the Blue Books you will see that this ambiguous term 1003 was carefully limited and defined by certain supplementary words explaining what in our sense it meant. They were in effect that what we meant by local autonomy was a certain measure of self-government, such as would give the population some control over their own local affairs, and some security against arbitrary acts. That was a very different thing from the autonomy proposed at the beginning of these discussions, and which really meant that the Provinces in question were to be placed under an administration entirely different from that which prevailed anywhere else in Turkey. If my noble Friend's suggestion is that no kind of local self-government should be extended to the Christian population of Turkey, I am bound to say that I am ready to meet him on that point. I do not believe that with an Empire such as Turkey—an Empire so vast and so heterogeneous, including so many populations, and in some parts so little connected with the central power—I do not believe the administration can be held together except by the introduction of the principle of self-government to a considerable extent. My noble Friend then says—" Whether the thing in the abstract was right or wrong, you are wrong in doing it at the time you did." With all respect to my noble Friend's authority, I do not think that observation applies; because when people are in insurrection, when we are doing all we can to induce them to lay down their arms, it seems natural, almost indispensable, to accompany the advice with a promise, at least, of some of those reforms for which they are contending. Austria had to deal with a very formidable insurrection in Hungary, and as the result of the pacification immediately afterwards the whole system of administration in that country was changed. We ourselves had, although on a much smaller scale, an insurrection 40 years ago in Canada; and I do not think it was very long after the suppression of that insurrection, that a new order of things was introduced into Canada, the object of which was to remove the grievances complained of. My noble Friend went on to allude to the question of the International Commission that was proposed at the Conference, and he expressed great doubts of the expediency and practicability of that scheme. My noble Friend is doubt- 1004 less aware—though he did not refer to it this evening—that the plan of an International Commission was largely modified in the course of the discussions of the Conference. As first proposed, no doubt it was intended that the powers should be very large; but as the scheme finally stood, the International Commission was not one for administrative purposes, but it was a Commission for the purposes of supervision only, and in exercising its functions would possess no other powers than those which are already vested in members of the Consular body. The Commission was at first called by the French word, a Commission de Contrôle, and contrôle, as the noble Earl knows, does not signify at all the same thing as the corresponding word in English, it means supervision only; and it was introduced as a less offensive term than the almost equivalent word "surveillance." It was not proposed to be a Commission of Control in the English sense, but a Commission of Supervision. My noble Friend says there was not much probability of such a body acting in a satisfactory manner, because its members were likely to pull different ways. I am afraid that is true; but it is equally true with regard to the Ambassadors and Consuls whom you now employ. It is one inevitable inconvenience of an interference, however necessary, in the affairs of a foreign country. My noble Friend answered his own argument when he spoke of the inconvenience which arose from the different action of the various Powers in the case of Greece. They could not have shown more discretion if such a Commission as that lately proposed had existed. I quite agree with one thing which my noble Friend said as to the two great requirements of the Turkish Empire and the difficulty of meeting them—one being the difficulty of finding competent men to govern, and the other being the difficulty of providing them with security against arbitrary removal. That is a matter which the Conference did not fail to bear in mind; it was considered, and I do not think it is likely to be lost sight of hereafter. My noble Friend said he hoped we should hear nothing more of the proposal for an International Commission. I can only repeat what I said on a former occasion—that the particular scheme proposed at the Confer- 1005 ence was not an object in itself, but a means to an end. Provided we get those reforms which we consider desirable and essential, I do not apprehend we shall concern ourselves as to whether they are obtained through one kind of machinery or another. I now pass to the speech of my noble Friend who opened the discussion (Lord Campbell). He began by reference to what fell from me on a former occasion with respect to the interpretation of the Treaty of April, 1856. If I understood him aright, what he said was this—He said I contended that the Treaty of April, 1856, could have no validity unless France or Austria chose to call upon us to act upon it; and he said that everybody knew that under existing cirumstances France and Austria were not likely to invoke an action; and he then proceeded to contend that it was unreasonable to assign to a Treaty, a meaning which would render it of absolutely no effect. My answer is, that although the changed circumstances of the present time have made the Treaty of far less importance than it originally was, it does not at all follow that because you may choose to consider it for practical purposes as null and void now, therefore it was so at the time when it was entered into. I do not think he is justified in saying that, because a change of circumstances has made the Treaty as it stands at present of little value or efficacy, assuming the ordinary construction to be put upon it, therefore you are to disregard the plain meaning of the document and put on its words a construction more binding than in ordinary language they would bear. My noble Friend says that, supposing the Powers which have a right to call upon us to act, do not do so, that does not cancel your obligation. But as our obligations are only to them, if they do not choose to call upon us to fulfil what we have undertaken to do under certain circumstances, I do not see that it is for us to enter into the question of what may be their motives or the determining causes which have prevented those Powers from so calling on us. That is their affair, not ours. My noble Friend then went on to a much smaller matter, but as he mentioned it I ought perhaps to say a word on the subject. He referred to a suggestion thrown out by Prince Gortchakoff in August last for a Conference to be held, with 1006 the condition that in order to avoid the necessity of referring home for instructions it should be attended by all the Foreign Ministers in person; and my noble Friend seemed to think if we had accepted that suggestion the result of the Conference might have been very different. To that I have several answers. In the first place, I am perfectly certain—I speak with knowledge—that the suggestion so thrown out by Prince Gortchakoff would not have been accepted by some of the other Powers. In the next place, I am utterly at a loss to understand how my presence at the Conference would have been more effectual in insuring a satisfactory result than that of my noble Friend Lord Salisbury. Personally, I hold an exactly contrary opinion. But in truth the object with which the scheme was first formed could not be realized. The notion was that time would be saved, because there would be no occasion for the Ministers to refer to their Governments. But I need not tell your Lordship, that, under the system which prevails in this country, it would be impossible for any Minister for Foreign Affairs to take on himself the responsibility of deciding an important question of international policy without consulting his Colleagues who remained at home. Therefore, no time would have been saved and no advantages gained. I will not follow my noble Friend into the question of the degree of the responsibility which the Porte has incurred by breaking up the Conference. That is now a very useless consideration—the thing is done, whether it be wise or unwise. I regret it, and we have only now to endeavour to repair the mischief as best we can. I cannot agree with the proposition laid down by my noble Friend, that whatever the result of the Conference it could not affect our obligations under that Treaty. If he follows that argument out to its legitimate result, it means that if you here once bound yourself by Treaty to protect any State, you are equally bound to protect it, however unwisely that State may have acted, and though it may have put itself wholly in the wrong and been the cause of its own difficulties. I do not think that is a doctrine which my noble Friend or any one else will seriously entertain. My noble Friend went on to another proposition and said "our right to interfere 1007 ceases with the obligation to defend; "and he argued that, inasmuch as in September last, in the business of the Bulgarian massacres, we had taken on ourselves to interfere, that was an admission on our part that the duty of defence had not ceased. Now I do not care very much to argue abstract points of that kind; but I may remind my noble Friend—what I have stated on former occasions—that I consider our right of interference in the Bulgarian matter, whatever that interference might have been, was a right in no way resting on, or regulated by, Treaty. Our right turned upon this—that from that time until now we have been engaged in endeavouring to avert the imminent danger to which the Turkish Empire was exposed, and it was the moral support given to Turkey by our diplomacy that justified us in remonstrating and even protesting in the strongest language against acts which tended to make our assistance useless and our support impossible. I will not follow the 'noble Lord through the various other topics to which he adverted. The noble Lord says, if I understand him correctly, that matters are different now from what they were in former times; that we had now got a constituency which would not, to the same extent as formerly, feel the burdens of war, and upon which direct taxation would not press; and that therefore when once the nation came to engage in a war it would not be in a hurry to have it brought to a close. I am not sure that I understood what was the conclusion my noble Friend drew from that statement. For my own part I do not think that where national feelings are strongly excited material interests influence the nation to the extent supposed by my noble Friend. But if the fact be that those who are the ultimate depositories of power, once engaged in a war, do not care how long that war lasts, I think he has supplied us with the most conclusive argument to induce us to avoid, by every means we can honourably employ, so great a risk.
LORD CAMPBELLI am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl—and in fact I have several times refrained from doing so—but he has attributed to me a conclusion exactly the opposite to that which I intended to urge.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYI beg my noble Friend's pardon, then. I certainly 1008 understood his arguments in an opposite sense. Another criticism of his was, that no effort had been made to avert in 1874 the union of the Three Powers. I do not understand what means my noble Friend or anybody else would have suggested in order to avert that union. The noble Lord said that we ought to have formed an alliance with certain of the Continental Powers; but my noble Friend must remember that we in England stand in a very different position in regard to those transactions from other Governments, such as Germany or Austria or Russia. We can keep back nothing from the public—we can give no pledge—we can enter into no secret alliances—we can hold out no inducement to any State to join us except our well-known desire for peace, and our friendly intentions towards all Powers, and that, of course, is not enough to offer when you are competing with Governments who are able to hold out offers of alliances offensive and defensive. The third point of my noble Friend was this—he says, you ought not to have said that you did not mean to fight for Turkey. I persume, in saying that, the noble Lord refers to the Dispatch of May last, which has been so frequently alluded to. Well, I think that the answer to that criticism is, that if we had not held that language at the time we did, we should have put ourselves in the wrong in two ways. In the first place—and that, in my opinion, is the more important matter—we should have been open to the imputation of misleading and deceiving the Turkish Government by the expectation of assistance which we did not intend to give; and, in the second place, if we had carefully suppressed our opinion upon that vital point, when that dispatch was written in May—if we had kept all the world in the dark as to our intentions before the autumn—I am quite sure we should have heard a great deal more of that mythical change of policy which has been attributed to us. Everyone would have said, and with some show of plausibility—" It is perfectly clear from your language and your general acts in May last that you intended to fight for Turkey; but you now say that you do not intend to fight for her." My Lords, self-defence must be a consideration with a Government as with the individual, and I do not think it was unreasonable on our part to put distinctly on record what 1009 our intention was at the time when it was quite possible that a different intention might have been imputed to us. My Lords, I have now gone through all the principal points in the two speeches to which we have listened. I will, in conclusion, express my hope that my noble Friend will be content with this discussion, and will not press his Motion to a division. There is nothing in the words of the Motion to which any objection can be taken. I think, however, that if my noble Friend is seeking by it to press upon us that which we are doing already, and asking us to persevere in that course of policy which we have actually adopted—that seems to me, to say the least of it, to be superfluous. But if that is not his object, if we are to take the Motion as a warning to the Government to adopt a different course of action than that on which we are engaged, then it is a Motion to which no Government could assent and continue to retain the administration of affairs. There is another consideration which will weigh with my noble Friend—which is this, that the adoption of a Motion of this character would not have much effect unless it were accompanied by a general concurrence of opinion on the subject and unless it were come to by both branches of the Legislature. That being the case I think that any division upon this Motion would only have the effect of exhibiting the appearance of difference and disunion amongst us on this grave subject, which I am happy to think do not exist.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLMy Lords, I rise to make a few observations with reference to an accusation which the noble Earl on the cross benches (Earl Grey) has brought against me, of having used language with reference to the misgovernment of the Turkish Provinces which is open to misinterpretation on the ground that it exaggerates the effect of that misgovernment. I wish to say, emphatically, that in my opinion that language, instead of exaggerating the effect of that misgovernment, was entirely within the mark. No man who has read these Blue Books and the various Papers which have been presented to the House by Her Majesty's Government can fail to be convinced that no language can exaggerate the horrors which are weekly, daily, and hourly occurring in the Provinces under the government 1010 of Turkey. In my opinion, the attention of the country and of Parliament has been too much concentrated upon what are called the Bulgarian atrocities. Those undoubtedly were massacres on a great scale—similar to those which Turkey has in all ages had recourse to in suppressing insurrections; but the public mind is not sufficiently aware of the continual and normal oppression and persecution that goes on in these Provinces. I am quite sure that I do not desire to say anything hostile to the feelings or to the policy of Her Majesty's Government on this point, and I rejoice to hear from the noble Earl opposite so distinct and emphatic a declaration that Her Majesty's Government have still before their minds as the main objects of their policy to procure, by peaceful means, if possible, a real amelioration of the condition of the Christian Provinces of the Turkish Empire. But I wish every one of your Lordships and of those outside this House to understand that the language I have used is not exaggerated. Indeed, we have only to look at the accounts which have boon published in the Papers before us on the conduct of the Commission which has been sitting at Philippopolis to inquire into these atrocities to see in what manner the Government of Turkey will act even when put upon its good behaviour, and when it knows that the eyes of Europe are upon it. What is the account which is given us by Mr. Baring, week by week, and month by month, of the conduct of that Commission, and of the Government from which it issues? Although I came down armed with extracts from that gentleman's Report on this subject in case of such a charge as that which has been brought against me being raised, I will not now trouble your Lordships by reading them. This, however, I will say—that from the beginning of October, when that Commission first sat, until the present time the evidence of Mr. Baring is that the members of the Commission were determined, if they could, to screen the miscreants who perpetrated these outrages, and that it was only by his determined efforts that any hope could be entertained that justice would be done. And not only that—it was only through his exertions that the greatest scoundrel and villain connected with the perpetration of these atrocities was condemned to death—and 1011 his latest despatches inform us that the President and the body of the Commission were prepared to reverse that sentence; and why? Because they were afraid of the displeasure of the Porte—of the very Government which had appointed them. Look at the language used by Mr. Baring. He says it is impossible to be here even for a few weeks without seeing that the condition of the Christians in these Provinces is simply intolerable—and this is language which he uses many times over. I fee] that it would be impertinent in me to make any suggestions to Her Majesty's Government on this matter, and I much regret the exceedingly embarrassing position in which they are placed with respect to it. I have no Party feeling in this matter, and I sincerely desire to see whatever Government may be in office successful in their attempts to solve this grave question. My solemn belief, however, is that the Christian Provinces of Turkey were never in a worse condition than they are at the present moment; and I think there is danger that the sufferings of their inhabitants may be greatly aggravated by the failure of the Conference. I have read a copy of a proclamation which I am told has been issued in Bosnia, in which it is represented that the Porte has dismissed the Representatives of the Great Powers for having dared to interfere between the Turkish Government and its subjects, and requiring all the inhabitants of the district who have fled to return to their homes under the punishment of death. It is of course not possible to trace that document to its source, but I believe it to be a genuine one. I understand from the speech of the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs that it is contemplated to give the Porte twelve months' grace. I will not give any opinion upon that point; but I am doubtful whether the noble Earl can persuade the other Powers to make an experiment which the noble Marquess near him (the Marquess of Salisbury) has denounced as hopeless. I trust, however, that the Government will adopt some means by which civilized Europe may be made acquainted with what is going on in the interior of these Provinces—such as by appointing Consuls in the chief towns. As the Motion was originally placed upon the Paper it contained no allusion to the Christian 1012 subjects of Turkey. This was a case of leaving the character of Hamlet out of the play, and on re-consideration the noble Lord repaired the omission; but I would remark that in his speech he has made no allusion to that branch of the question—a branch which is in no way connected with mere statecraft, but affects the abominable and atrocious misgovernment of Turkey, which has become a scandal, a disgrace, and a danger to Europe.
LORD BURYobserved that the Motion of the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) differed materially from that of the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) which was discussed a few nights ago, and which was a direct attack on Her Majesty's Government. It had been intimated in "another place" that this was not a fitting opportunity for discussing the affairs of the East, and the discussion had been postponed in consequence of that suggestion on the part of the Government. Now, the other House having refrained from discussion on the ground that it was inopportune to discuss the question at the present moment, it was not fair to force the hand of the Government on the present occasion.
LORD CAMPBELLMy Lords, as no one else, to my regret, has risen to address the House, I am compelled to do so for a few minutes before the question is disposed of. The speech of the noble Earl on the cross benches may have, I trust, a good effect both here and elsewhere, as it shows how little the races subject to the Porte could gain by the dominion with which it is intended to replace it. The noble Earl has not given his concurrence to the Motion. He is not in the habit of giving Motions his concurrence. It is not consistent with his habits; it may be his principles to do so. Some adverse criticism upon his part ought not to disturb any one who makes a proposition to your Lordships. As to the noble Earl the Secretary of State he has not failed to see that no want of confidence whatever in the Government is implied in the Address, the terms of which he is not able to object to. It would not suit the pleasure of the House were I to go through all the series of remarks the noble Earl the Secretary of State, has made upon my former statement, but I cannot avoid saying that the leading arguments by which it was attempted to prove that if 1013 adopted, the Motion would at least reduce the prospect of hostilities have been entirely unanswered. The noble Earl considers that the view I based upon the history of the Conference, as absolving the Ottoman authorities from all responsibility for the failure which ensued, to be too minute in its foundation. It was not grandiose indeed as regards the facts alluded to, but it by no means follows that it was inconclusive upon that account. A larger and more striking vindication of the Porte might very possibly be given. But, as it must involve attack upon the propositions, the noble Marquess, the late Plenipotentiary, might feel required to defend, and his defence of which would not at all contribute to the peace of Europe at this moment, I determined to avoid it. It may be requisite to say a word on the pungent observations which the noble Duke on the bench beneath (the Duke of Argyll) has left the House after delivering. The noble Duke had nothing to advance against the Motion, but he complains much of the revision it has gone through. It is not at all irregular to revise a Motion up to the time it finally appears. It would have been competent to me to give no Notice at all until the last night when the House was sitting. But as to the surmise of the noble Duke that the phrase "to improve the welfare of the races subject to the Ottoman Empire" was only due to the inspiration of another mind, my answer is a very easy one. It is taken almost verbatim from the Motion I submitted to your Lordships on the 31st of July, when the noble Duke was altogether absent, and when his zeal upon the Eastern Question had by no means risen to the formidable height at which it is now standing. As to the Motion, I decline absolutely to withdraw it. Such a course would involve me in too much responsibility, if events take the turn it is our object to prevent, unless it is accepted, which it ought to be, the Government shall have the task of acting with regard to it. They have the fullest information. They have the strongest motives to adopt the course which is least calculated to precipitate hostilities.
§ On Question? Resolved in the Negative.
§ House adjourned at half-past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.