THIRD READING. (Hansard, 22 June 1874)

LORD DENMAN

moved that the Bill be read a third time that day three 218 months. The attack upon the appellate jurisdiction of their Lordships was founded upon misrepresentation, exaggeration, and prejudice. It was stated that the House took no interest in the questions that were brought before it—that a Committee was appointed consisting of Members of that House, no one of whom felt any interest in the business, and that there was so much difference of opinion that they could not feel themselves justified in coming to a decision upon many questions. The opinion of noble Lords in 1823 was very different. Earl Grosvenor, though he objected to a clause in a Bill for enforcing the attendance of Peers, thought it would be worth while to see if a voluntary attendance could not be secured. His Lordship did not wish that any Peer should hear only part of a cause, and highly estimated the opinion and vote of the Lord Chancellor, though not valuing the mere legal opinion of a proposed Deputy Speaker. Lord Erskine said, he was well satisfied with the manner in which the judicial business of that House was conducted. Lord Melville said, that the Act of Union essentially recognized the right of appeal from Scotland to their Lordships' House. Lord Holland did not admit the defect imputed to the constitution of the House, and added that imputations on the negligence of noble Lords had been thrown out—by a Committee which had recommended a Deputy Speaker for Scotch appeals—which their Lordships did not deserve. Lord Colchester said, that Stare super antiquas vias was a safe principle upon most cases of policy, but upon none more than those which concern the accustomed forms of administering justice. Lord Ellenborough (Lord Chief Justice) said, there was nothing to prevent the Peers who should hear the first part (of a case) from remaining till the case was concluded. The Earl of Carnarvon objected to part of a case only being heard by those who might have to decide upon the whole. Lord Holland, on the clause for enforcing attendance being put, thought it would be better to leave the attendance to the honour and sense of duty of their Lordships. There had been a dread that appeals might be 12 years before they were decided, but Lord Gifford being created an hereditary Peer, cleared off all arrears in two years. As to rules of Procedure, in 1852 every change 219 of that date was put into the Act. But what were their Lordships going to do? They were going to institute a new system, and there was nothing about it to really claim the confidence of the country. In the Act which it was attempted to amend there was a provision that all Rules made to supplement the Act should he laid on the Tables of the Houses of Parliament whilst Parliament was sitting, and remain there for 40 days in the same way as schemes for schools had been subjected to the consideration of Parliament; but he found that in "another place" Her Majesty's Attorney General had denied that there was any necessity for delaying the operation of those Rules. He was certain that their Lordships had not considered their position. He contended that if they once did away with the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords, they would have no more connection with those noble and learned Lords of great experience who at present assisted them. He was quite certain that the Lord Chancellor, with the advice of Judges, when needed, and the concurrence of Peers, was capable of carrying on the cases, and deciding when any difficulty arose, and it was certainly not the time for their Lordships to give up their right of sitting on appeals. Vice Chancellor Stuart had said, in evidence before a Commission, that there was no case in which their Lordships would be incapable of administration. He (Lord Denman) would be surprised and delighted to find that the same opposition had been offered in "another place," as in times past, and he thought their Lordships should assert their own rights and privileges of doing good to their fellow creatures. A noble Duke not present (the Duke of Devonshire) had been reported as saying at a public dinner, in returning thanks for the toast of the House of Lords, that never in future history would the House of Lords play so distinguished a part as in times past; but he (Lord Denman) ventured to say that if their Lordships gave up their judicial duties, no decision of a Committee of their Lordships would be respected; they would even be considered incapable of assisting in making laws which they could not interpret. Lord Shaftesbury had well said, in 1675— My Lords, would you be in favour with the King? 'Tis a very ill way to it to put your-selves 220 out of a future capacity to be considerable in his service. I do not find in story or in modem experience but that 'tis better, and a man is much more regarded that is still in a capacity and opportunity to serve, than he that has deprived himself of all for his Prince's service. And I therefore declare, that I will serve my Prince as a Peer, but will not destroy the Peerage to serve him. Lord Lyndhurst had said— Look to this House; it was to the discharge of its judicial functions that it owed the character it had so long and he trusted would ever maintain. It was of the utmost importance that it should maintain that high station in the confidence of suitors, the profession, and the country in which it had so long stood. He (Lord Denman) was quite sure there ought to be a House of Peers with a Chancellor at its head, having jurisdiction in all cases as before, and if this Bill passed, even if the parties interested on both sides should wish to have the decision of their Lordships' House, it would be impossible. The noble Lord concluded by moving his Amendment.