§ VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEMy Lords, it is with much sincere reluctance that I come forward to redeem the pledge which I gave in laying on your Lordships' Table the Notice of my present Motion. At this late period of the Session, when several important Bills remain to be discussed, I feel extremely unwilling to solicit your Lordships' attention even for a brief space on a question of foreign interest. But if I venture, nevertheless, to do so, I hope your Lordships will appreciate the sense of duty which makes me overstep every other consideration. Had those outrageous murders, which have raised so loud a cry of horror and indignation throughout the length and breadth of the land, been perpetrated in any country but Greece, I should not, my Lords, have troubled you with the Motion, which I am now prepared to submit to your Lordships. I have no complaint to make, no mistrust to express of Her Majesty's Government. They and their agents abroad appear to have exerted their best energies to obtain the punishment of the murderers and the discovery of their secret accomplices. This just acknowledgment is more particularly due to the memory of that distinguished Minister who has been called away so suddenly from among us, whose loss is indeed supplied by a hopeful reliance on his noble successor, but over whom we must still throw back our regrets in the recollection of those efficient and attractive qualities by which he refreshed the lustre of an historic title and justified the sorrow of his numerous friends.
There is happily no reason for me to distress your Lordships by going again in detail over the scene of crime and blood. The particulars of the outrage and its attendant complications were fully, ably, and impressively stated on a former occasion by the noble Earl on the Bench behind me, and ample justice has been done to the exemplary conduct of its victims under so awful a visitation. I cannot, however, disguise the impressions left upon my mind by a perusal of the official documents laid upon your Lordships' Table. To use the mildest language, there is no denying that the Greek Ministers exhibited a culpable 6 degree of carelessness in the outset, that secret intrigues were employed to render the brigands intractable, and, finally, that gross mismanagement, however unintended, brought to its fatal point the impending catastrophe.
What we have now to deal with is that system of organized crime but too well known under the name of Brigandage. I need not remind your Lordships that wherever that evil exists, the country, in proportion to its prevalence there, suffers more or less in all the main sources of national prosperity. The land is neglected; industry is checked; and the people are degraded in their habits and moral temperament. Italy, Spain, Hungary, and Turkey, as well as Greece, continue to give evidence of this truth, and great would be the benefit accruing to those countries if their respective Governments could be induced to combine their measures by mutual agreement for the extirpation of a canker at once so vile and so destructive. In Greece the baneful practice has long taken root, and spread its branches to a frightful extent. The late disgusting murders were its legitimate offspring. It has a character peculiar to itself, and dates from the earliest period of Grecian life. The poets and historians of Greece bear witness to its antiquity, and to the evil effects it produced, whether as piracy at sea, or as banded robbery on shore. Unfortunately the geographical configuration of Greece, whether insular or continental, comes in aid of the traditional habits of its people. Long mountainous ridges in the one case, and rocky islands separated by narrow seas in the other, nourish the spirit of adventure, and while they supply motives for a life of spoliation, oppose a barrier to the pursuit of avenging justice. The northern highlands of Greece are, moreover, connected with similar mountains in Turkey. The inhabitants on both sides of the frontier are generally few and scattered. For the most part they are shepherds, and whether the flocks they tend are their own, or only consigned to their care, they lead a wandering life, directed in their movements by the seasons, or by their access to localities abounding in pasture. Would that they were as innocent as their flocks! Unhappily, they not only supply the brigands with intelligence, and occasionally with food, but also from time to time they serve them 7 selves to recruit the plundering bands, as appeared to demonstration from the late trials at Athens. It is their practice to send milk for sale to the towns, and the carriers, whom they employ for that purpose, are the channels of communication between the brigands and their secret accomplices. The owners of the pasture lands have also a motive for being on friendly terms with the robbers. Their farms not unfrequently lie in exposed situations, and in order to save their property from dangerous visits they connive at acts of depredation, and sometimes go so far as to play into the hands of those who commit them.
Worse, my Lords, even than this fellowship of crime is the political corruption which arises from the same source. The return of a candidate for election as a Deputy is rendered uncertain by the progress of some opponent in obtaining promises. The case is urgent. What is to be done? The frightened candidate happens to have means of communication with some band of freebooters quartered in the neighbourhood. He applies for their assistance; they assail his rival and his rival's supporters with threatening letters, and sometimes proceed even to a partial execution of their menace. The candidate, converted by their agency into an elected Deputy, is bound to treat them with gratitude. He gives his support to some Minister, and that Minister is bound in turn to listen to the suggestions of his friend, who employs his influence, as the case may be, to save or to serve the brigands at a pinch. The Deputy may also be a magistrate, and in that case the current of justice is more immediately distorted on behalf of crime. The disastrous consequences of this vast network of plunder, bloodshed, corruption, and political intrigue may be easily conceived, at the same time that the practice in its full extent reflects a strong light on those suspicious inadvertencies which, as your Lordships may remember, formed the worst part of the late transactions in Greece. The development of the natural resources of the country is neglected; the mass of its inhabitants, perverted by evil examples, discouraged by a sense of insecurity, and enervated by terror, recede from every wholesome exertion; and the administration of the Government is tainted to its very core with false ideas which re-act with pa- 8 ralyzing force alike on the land and on its population.
When the late King Otho, on the termination of his minority, mounted the Throne of Greece, he found himself in front of two parties, each pretending, on grounds of its own, to an ascendancy in the conduct of public affairs. The one was composed, with few exceptions, of Greeks from Constantinople and the Ionian Islands, intermingled with Native proprietors from the Morea and Archipelago Islands, who had taken a lead in the insurrectionary Administrations and Legislatures during their struggle for independence; the other, of those who pretended to be descendants of the real offspring of the soil, mountaineers of Northern Greece, men of those regions which had contributed the largest amount of muscle and hardihood to the war with Turkey, belonging by nature to the military class, fond of action, and sympathizing with freebooters, even when they were not members themselves of some pillaging, cut-throat band. The young Sovereign, whatever may have been his motive, favoured this latter division of his people. It may be that he shrank from the restraints of a constitutional form of government, to which the former party were inclined, or sought to flatter the national vanity by taking up the Grande Ideè, as it was called, and together with it the class which adopted it as their watch-word and party cry. He were the fustanelle himself; he showed a greater preference for Colletti, the Albanian, than for Mauvocordato, the constitutional leader, and treated the freebooters with a degree of leniency which at once encouraged both their criminal trade, and the lawless policy of which they were thought by many to be the eventual instruments. From this mistaken policy, my Lords, as from a fountain head came forth a stream of evils affecting both the internal condition and the foreign relations of Greece. From the very beginning there was a signal want of economy little suited to the financial means of the country. Too large a portion of the revenue was laid out upon troops and diplomacy. At a later period fruitless expeditions, and the pay of Deputies and Senators weighed heavily on the revenue. Agriculture was left to take care of itself. The national lands were 9 allowed to remain unproductive. No public works were undertaken. Roads, drainage, mines, manufactures, one and all were neglected. When the King's hands were forced, and a representative form of Government was established, place-hunting, party intrigues, and corruption in various shapes became the order of the day. Your Lordships need hardly be told that the foreign policy of Greece corresponded to this state of things at home. International Law commanded no respect. Hostility to the Turkish Empire was a constant principle of action. The interest of foreign loans was paid irregularly, or not at all. The employment of foreign capital, so much needed in Greece, became an impossibility. Such were the results of the Grande Ideè and its ally, Brigandage, under the protection, though certainly not with the approval, of the Protecting Powers.
Everyone knows that Greece owed its existence as a separate kingdom to the united efforts of England, France, and Russia, who took the new State into their protection, and who continue even now to be the acknowledged guardians of its independence. The Greeks are indebted to them not only for national existence, but also for the extent of territory they possess, the security they enjoy, and even for a portion of their annual expenditure. More than 40 years have elapsed since the three Protecting Powers agreed, by a formal Convention, to interfere between the Sultan and his insurgent Christian subjects. Be assured, my Lords, that their motives for this alliance were pure and laudable. Humanity called upon them to put limits to a struggle which threatened the utter destruction of the weaker party. A wise policy suggested their joint interference, even for the interests of Turkey. A danger, which hung over the peace of Europe, could only be averted by their united efforts. The trade of the Levant stood greatly in need of shelter from the disturbances of war and the assaults of piracy. Your Lordships may remember that the settlement, which was proposed at first in a friendly form and on moderate terms, assumed in the end a coercive character and a more extended range. The battle of Navarino, the withdrawal of the Ambassadors and Consuls from Turkey, the declaration of war by Russia, and the appearance of a French army in 10 the Morea overcame, as well they might, the objections of the Porte. Turkey was forced into compliance, and left without defence from the annoyances of a petty but vexatious neighbour. Greece was established at the expense of Turkey and guaranteed, in effect even to misconduct, by the Allied Powers. The consequences, which were to be expected, soon became apparent. The Porte, in its intercourse with the Greek Government, was frequently treated with insult and provocation; its complaints were met with chicanery; its efforts to establish a better understanding with its former subjects were generally evaded; its provinces bordering on Greece were disquieted, and sometimes even assailed; and, finally, when the Cretan insurrection broke out, the Greeks did everything short of open war to assist the insurgents and prevent an amicable arrangement. The Allies themselves, my Lords, had much to endure. Their counsels were disregarded, the interest of their loans unpaid, their protection abused, their very names brought into discredit. Twice was England obliged to send a squadron to the Piræus in order to obtain redress. Such was the conduct of Greece during the Crimean War that it became necessary for French and English troops to occupy a part of Attica. The lawless operations of Greece respecting Crete threatened to re-open the Eastern Question, and a Conference of European Powers could alone extinguish the nascent flames.
These circumstances are more than sufficient to show that the Protecting Powers have other duties to perform as well as that of guarding the independence and territory of Greece. Turkey is entitled to require that their protection should not be used to shelter the Greeks, and secure their impunity, when they violate the Law of Nations, and stir and throw fresh fuel on the fire which consumes her Empire. Europe, also, has reason to expect that the principal members of her family should not allow their benevolence to be turned into an instrument of general alarm, embarrassment, and injustice. Your Lordships will perceive that, at least in this instance, the existence of a duty carries with it a distinct right of action. The Protecting Powers, when they gave their guaranty to Greece could only have meant to defend the territorial independ- 11 ence of that State against any unjust and unprovoked encroachment. It is nothing less than monstrous to suppose that Greece could ever be at liberty to assail or injure other countries, without provocation on their part, and with an exemption from consequences on her own supplied by the power of her Protectors. It is evident that, in every view of justice, the latter have no alternative but that of either leaving their ward to the responsibilities of international usage, or enforcing the necessary restraints by their own authority. If they were to decide on withdrawing their protection entirely from Greece, they would only exercise a legitimate discretion. The conduct of Greece has been such as fully to justify a decision to that effect, and even in making it the Allies would have to put up with some disadvantages, and to incur expenses fairly attributable to the same cause. In order to act with consistency, they would be obliged to withdraw their diplomatic representatives from Athens, and the apprehension of increased disorder in the waters of Greece, as well as in Greece itself, would probably require an increase of their naval forces in that region. But if they saw reason to prefer the severer branch of the alternative, their interference would not of necessity take an unfriendly form, and they might abstain from acting otherwise so long as the requisite efficiency of their measures would permit. Supposing even that their method of proceeding should, from necessity, become decidedly imperative, it cannot be doubted that their ultimate purpose would, nevertheless, continue to have a friendly and benevolent character. Your Lordships may presume that the three Powers would, of course, invest their agreement, as at first with the formality of a regular Convention. If the Greeks themselves should consent to be parties to it, so much the better; at all events, it would probably be thought desirable to make them the offer.
Greece is by no means incapable of much progressive improvement; but her misfortune is, that the elements of progress have been thrown systematically into the shade. The business of a friendly Power, when interfering authoritatively, would be to bring those elements into life, and to employ them in the right direction. Proprietors, farmers, and labourers would surely, for the most part, 12 hail with joy the suppression of a system which casts a gloom over their natural pursuits, and lays them open to frequent alarms, to occasional pillage, and to a constant sense of insecurity. Among the more educated classes, who figure in public life and are candidates for office either at the seat of Government or in the provinces, there must be many individuals susceptible of moral improvement, and capable of appreciating its advantages in the conduct of public affairs. But they have need of example, support, and encouragement, the inspirations of which must come for a time from without, and suggest, if not prescribe, to those in authority ideas of steadiness, impartiality, and moral principle. The youthful King has recently displayed such noble and generous qualities that the Allies might reasonably look to his concurrence for introducing a better state of things among his subjects, with due consideration for the future independence and welfare of the country. England, entitled by her position as chief mourner in the late calamity, would naturally take the lead, and I know not why she should mistrust the sympathies of France and Russia, her associates in the Protection. France, on former occasions, has acted with much generosity and perfect good-faith. Russia, though liable, in some respects, to being swayed by special views, would hardly like to abandon the field to the two Western Powers, acting conjointly and apart from her. Italy having had its share in the late calamity cannot but take an interest in our remedial measures. From Austria and Prussia, we could only desire a moral countenance, and that would hardly be refused.
With respect to the mode of proceeding, and the means of giving it effect, your Lordships are aware that they lie entirely in the domain of Government. It would be mere presumption for me to do more than shadow out the most obvious suggestions. The presence of a naval force is the first to occur. It need not be large. As a similar occupation to that which took place at the Piræus during the Crimean War might become necessary, the Powers would, no doubt, provide in time for such a contingency. To insure what may be termed indispensable—namely, a firm adherence to certain principles of government on the part of the Ministry, the Protecting 13 Powers would probably require the admission of a foreign element into its counsels. Portugal affords a precedent for this expedient. During our Peninsular campaigns the British Ambassador for the time being was received as a member of the administration at Lisbon. The permanent suppression of Brigandage would naturally head the list of reforms. Roads, military stations, movable detachments of the army, indispensable for that purpose, would require the application of considerable funds. Might it not be worth while for the Allies to further these operations by a moderate aid in money? Would it not also be desirable to make the Turkish Government a party to the scheme, in so far as measures of police and military force are concerned? Interference of this kind, however friendly in manner and intention, would, no doubt, jar upon the national feeling in Greece; and for this reason, to say nothing of other considerations, it would be well to limit its duration. Much might be effected in five or ten years, and nothing short of absolute necessity should be allowed to extend the provisional state beyond that term. I venture to think that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would meet his share of the expense without alarm or difficulty. In short, there is little doubt that the trouble would be greater than the cost under any presumable circumstances.
My Lords, I have strained your indulgence more than I intended in the outset; but I hope your Lordships will excuse me if I add a few more words—a very few—before I sit down. I feel that although I have tried to preserve a tone and spirit of moderation, I have, in substance, arraigned a Government; I have brought the Government of Greece before the bar of public opinion. This, my Lords, is no light matter; and Greece being the country concerned, it has cost me much to perform so painful a duty. It is, indeed, a duty to me, because I took so large a part in those transactions which led to the establishment of Hellenic independence. The discharge of that duty is painful to my feelings on more than one account. I have contracted a deep and abiding reverence for the literature of ancient Greece from the nature of my education and its place, the Royal and truly national seminary of Eton. I would not disguise the 14 strong and cordial sympathies which I entertain for that people, degenerate as they may be, who claim descent from the most illustrious race of antiquity, who continue to breathe the pure atmosphere which inspired the best of that race, and who, after centuries of Turkish bondage, rose bravely from their degradation, and dashed their fetters at every risk against the teeth of their fanatical oppressors. Even to this hour I retain a large portion of my early affection for them; nor have I yet ceased to hope that they may in time justify the partiality of their friends, and, together with the names, retain some traces of their ancestral worth. I submit, in conclusion, to your Lordships, with becoming deference, that I have presented a fair title to your acceptance of the Motion which I have now the honour to propose. That Motion consists of four parts. The first two are simple matters of course, or nearly so, grounded on positive facts. The third I conceive to be more than warranted by official documents and other respectable authorities. With regard to the fourth, I feel assured that your Lordships will go with me in desiring to remove those causes which lie at the root of Hellenic Brigandage, with all its attendant miseries, and in recognizing those paramount obligations which virtually rest on the Protecting Powers. I have endeavoured to show the nature of the mischief and the duty of redressing it. I have, moreover, pointed to the means of accomplishing that object, and to the right of employing those means, and also to the hazardous consequences of neglecting an opportunity which ought never to recur. The final decision must, indeed, remain with Her Majesty's Government; but the proposed declaration of your Lordships' sentiments could hardly fail to strengthen their hands, and to give additional weight to those very urgent considerations which cannot be overlooked with prudence or consistency. I repeat that there is but one alternative: we must either interfere effectively, or withdraw altogether. I would ask whether the Greeks can possibly, can safely be left, as heretofore, to pursue their wild notions, dishonest and pernicious as they often are, under the shadow and shelter of the Protecting Powers?
In pressing this matter on your Lordships' attention, I have performed most 15 reluctantly, and, I fear, most imperfectly, a delicate and onerous task. Supported by your Lordships, I may look with some degree of confidence to the eventual result; and if I should have the misfortune to come from a Division with scanty following, or even with none at all, I shall at least carry with me the humble consolation of having done my best, as an unworthy Member of this noble House, to extract enduring good from a passing calamity. I pretend to no exceptional merit for this endeavour. We must all have at heart to preserve our country from discreditable indifference, the peace of Europe from continual alarms, and Greece itself, which we have undertaken to protect, from the effects of a perverse and ruinous misgovernment. Allow me to add that, in thus appealing to your Lordships' judgment, I speak to the nation—nay, even to the world at large.
§ Moved, "That an humble address be presented to Her Majesty to assure Her Majesty that the House continues to regard with the deepest grief and horror the late atrocious murders perpetrated near Athens by a band of organized brigands on the persons of several of Her Majesty's subjects, including the Secretary of Her Majesty's Legation; to thank Her Majesty for the ample and early accounts thereof which it has pleased Her Majesty to communicate to the House; to submit whether there be not grounds for apprehending that the lives of the lamented victims were mainly sacrificed to parties acting more or less in secret understanding with the brigands; and to express an earnest hope that such further steps as Her Majesty may please to take with reference to these matters will be directed not only to the immediate suppression of brigandage in Greece but more especially to the removal of its real causes, be they what they may, in discharge of the obligations virtually contracted by Her Majesty and Her Majesty's Allies as the constituted protectors of that kingdom."—(The Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.)
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I venture to think it was hardly necessary for the noble Viscount to remind me of the conduct of the late Lord Clarendon, for I cannot but feel that I am standing on the very spot whence a few weeks ago he spoke to your Lordships in so straightforward, so sagacious, and so earnest a manner that I believe he commanded the assent of every Peer in this House. My Lords, there are two points in regard to this subject which are closely connected, but which, in my opinion, it is necessary to keep distinct from each other. First of all there is the question into which the noble Viscount has chiefly 16 gone—namely, as to the general state of Greece and the duties of the Protecting Powers towards that country; and, secondly, there is the sad outrage which affected public opinion in this country and throughout Europe more deeply, I think, than any incident that has happened of late years. Now it would, in my judgment, be a very great mistake on the part of the Government and of the country to mix up these two questions. With regard to the first—the Government of Greece—it is clearly a question which must be considered in concert with the Protecting Powers, for it is one in which all the Powers of Europe must take a deep interest. With regard, however, to the second question—although we have the sympathy of all the countries of Europe, and the active co-operation of some, yet we are the parties primarily interested in it. I think it is not desirable to go into the first question at the present time, and therefore I shall only allude to one casual remark made by the noble Viscount, who, at one point of his speech, stated that he saw by the faces of the occupants of the Treasury Bench, that they had made up their minds to do nothing. I cannot conceive how that idea came into the noble Viscount's head, unless it was in consequence of my mentioning to him at that stage of his speech that I was sorry he had not arrived at more definite suggestions; and I am bound to say that afterwards four or five suggestions were made by the noble Viscount. With regard to the sad outrage so eloquently described by the noble Viscount there is very, very little for me to add to the speech made by the late Lord Clarendon. The principal facts are these—First of all the Greek Government yielded the opposition they originally made to the presence of legal agents on the part of Lord Clarendon—and I have every reason to believe that everyone must have been struck with the determination, sagacity, and ability which those agents have shown up to the present time. The other point is the conviction and execution of those wretched brigands who were actually concerned in the outrage. One has been reprieved for a time, possibly with a view to further the ends of justice in a larger way—the others have been executed. Lastly there remains that most important part of the inquiry—with regard to the possible participa- 17 tion of more highly educated and more powerful persons than those immediately connected with the brigands. As your Lordships will readily imagine, I can have taken very little part during the few days I have been in Office with regard to this affair. The only thing I have done is this — A rumour having reached us that the present Prime Minister of Greece was about to resign, I instructed Mr. Erskine that it was not our policy to interfere with regard to persons, but that we had a fixed determination that it was our right and our duty to insist upon the fullest and most complete inquiry that could be brought to bear upon the incidents I have already alluded to; and that, whatever Ministry or persons the King might think fit to maintain in Office or to summon to his counsels, who should be determined bonâ fide to meet that requirement on our part, that Ministry should receive the warmest sympathy on the part of Her Majesty's Government. I believe that language of an almost identical character has been used by the Italian and French Governments on this point. The Resolution of the noble Viscount (Viscount Stratford do Redcliffe) contains some expressions which it would have been desirable not to have introduced. I do not think it is a desirable thing for the House to address the Crown in several sentences of this kind unless there is a practical object to which such Address relates. Notice of this Motion was given without any previous communication with Lord Clarendon, who was of opinion that it was not a desirable Motion for the House to adopt. I entirely agree with him; but I am bound to say that the matter stands now in a different position to that which it occupied when the Notice was first placed on the Paper. I believe I may now say, without fear of contradiction, that your Lordships all had confidence in the experience and ability of the man who then presided over the Foreign Office. My position is a very different one, and your Lordships may, perhaps, think you would give me strength by conveying some preliminary reproof to me in order to keep me up to the duty I owe to the Crown and the country. Still, I think that Her Majesty's Government are acquainted with the feeling of the country, that they know what their duty is, and that they are sufficiently imbued with the views of 18 Lord Clarendon on this matter. Here I must state that my lamented Friend's end was accelerated by the indignation he felt at this outrage, the sympathy he entertained for the victims who had fallen, and for the friends and families who mourn their loss; and that his appreciation of the just resentment of the country, and his anxiety to carry on the inquiry to a proper end and to demand whatever might be a just and due reparation, with a firmness and in a manner becoming a great nation like ours, was one cause which hastened the loss which we all so much deplore. Being under such inspiration, I trust that, although I may carry out his work most imperfectly, your Lordships will not, until I am found wanting, impose on me a Motion like the present, which, I think, would in some degree weaken instead of strengthening me in the eyes of Europe.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONAs your Lordships were so good as to hear me speak on this subject at great length on a former occasion, I shall not travel over any of the ground which I went over then. At the same time, I can hardly allow the Motion which my noble Friend (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) has made on this important subject to be put without making a few remarks. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs very rightly divided the question into two parts—namely, that which concerns the massacre of the captives, and that which relates in a more abstract sense to the Motion which had been made by my noble Friend. As I have already said, I will not travel over the grounds of the previous discussion; and yet I do think it right to state on my own part that, after a careful study of all the Papers since issued, and after mastering as far as I could all the criticisms which have appeared elsewhere on the subject, I do unhesitatingly reaffirm the conclusions I expressed in the previous debate. These I have seen nothing to shake. Those who suffered at the hands of the brigands were betrayed by false assertions of the Greek Government as to their safety; and I do affim still that the movement of the troops, in violation of the solemn promise and engagement of the Greek Government, to which promise was added the word of the English Minister, was the immediate cause of these murders. Nay I go further, and say again that there is not a word in the 19 published correspondence which in any degree removes the suspicion attaching to the conduct and motives of the Greek Government. They still have to give every explanation which was demanded of them two months ago. More than that, I must express my dissent from my noble Friend when he stated his belief in unqualified terms, that whatever could be done had been done — my own estimate, taken from a somewhat different point of view, is that nothing has been done. There have been the executions of a few brigands or peasants, but they were a mere fraction of the band, which, according to the last details, had doubled or trebled in numbers since the murders, and are now extending themselves over other parts of Greece. It is true there was a trial, and I am glad to hear that the English agents employed at that trial were sagacious; but certainly if you study the details of the trial, as printed in the Parliamentary Paper, you will find no record of any action on the part of the British agents; while, as far as the Greek Judges and Court were concerned, I venture to express my opinion that the trial reads almost like a farce. There is nothing in these statements which in any degree removes the suspicions previously entertained—nothing that goes to the bottom of the matter and sifts out the guilty individuals. Lastly, the gentleman who showed more courage, decision, energy, and sagacity than any other was Mr. Noel, whose life at this moment can hardly be said to be quite secure. I have no interest in him whatever except what arises from the gratitude I feel for all that he did to save the lives of the prisoners, and I call with confidence on my noble Friend (Earl Granville) not to relax in any degree the pressure which Lord Clarendon thought it his duty to put upon the Greek Government. Let me now say a few words upon the second part of the Motion. It seems to me a misfortune that there should have been such a slight discussion on this subject. My noble Friend (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) represents very much of the enthusiasm which existed 40 years ago, when Greece was formed into a kingdom. We can recall the enthusiasm, the expenditure of money, and the sacrifice of our traditional policy which were readily offered to secure the emancipation of the Greek na- 20 tion. I agree with him that the expenditure of money and the sacrifices we made, in accordance with the policy of that day, was not too great a price for the object in view; England was quite justified in the course she took upon that occasion. It is time now to reconsider the results of the policy then laid down. It would be impossible, without trespassing at too great a length, to draw anything like an adequate picture of the present state of Greece; but I should like to call attention to one or two main points connected with the financial and commercial condition of the country. At this moment Greece has no less than three National Debts. There is the debt guaranteed by the Protecting Powers at the time the independence of Greece was established, on account of which only one payment for interest has been made since 1843; there is the Bavarian Debt, contracted somewhere about the same time, and since 1837 no interest has been paid upon that; and the third debt is represented by the Greek Bonds. Upon these all payment has been suspended for some time, and arguments in favour of repudiation most questionable in character have been adduced to the utter destruction of Greek credit. In 1857, at the close of the Crimean War, a Commission was appointed by the Protecting Powers, really for the purpose of inquiring into the social condition of the country. That Commission made a most searching investigation, and I would ask my noble Friend to see whether, considering the grave matters now pending, it would not be desirable to lay some of the Papers arising out of that inquiry before the House. One or two of them have been printed, and through them we know that the Commission made some allegations to the effect that it was stated there was ample money in the Treasury to pay the interest on the debt, and that one year afterwards, as a matter of fact, the Greeks did find the money to pay the debt. Since then the country has been in a state of insolvency. All the recommendations of that Commission were most admirably adapted for the improvement of the country, but they have all been alike treated with neglect. As regards trade it languishes within the limits of Greece, and no less than two-thirds of the population are self-constituted exiles, and have sought refuge in those Turkish 21 towns which have been the occasion of so much contempt on the part of the Greeks. Agriculture is very much what it was; and all speculative schemes have to contend against the vacillating policy of the Government. I remember the case of a French company who, two years ago, were working a silver mine. Every attempt was made to disgust and frighten them away, until at last they were suddenly called upon to pay an export duty, which amounted to 60 per cent of the total cost of production. Another company engaged in sinking for pitch had their wells filled up with stones, and could get no redress. Every sort of speculation is looked upon as injurious to the native population, and enterprise is therefore driven out of the country. It is perfectly certain that Brigandage is in a great degree the cause of this; it is time, also, that both the geography and history of the country have fostered Brigandage; but it must be remembered that Brigandage has grown of late in dimensions and atrocity. In former years it was supported by the Court, and certainly in the present day by the governing classes. It is undesirable to mention names; but I believe the account given of Brigandage by a very able French writer, though veiled under the form of romance, is strictly true as regards Greece. One special evil of Brigandage is this—that for many years past political persons and parties in Greece have made use of brigands as agents; as instruments to carry out their own selfish and personal ends. Even within the last few months the brigands have been employed in determining the municipal elections. The Minister looks to the Deputy, the Deputy looks to the local major, and the local mayor has recourse to the brigands to turn the votes and secure the election. The police are perfectly helpless in such a case, and the burden really falls on the peasant, who is exposed on one side to the oppression of the brigands, and on the other to the action of the troops when, in times of panic, they are sent in pursuit of the brigands. No class suffered more severely under the present state of things than the Greek peasant. I will now call the attention of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) to a subject which, from what I hear, calls for attention. I cannot say whether it be true or not; but it has been repeatedly stated of late 22 by the Greek newspapers that torture is freely used by the police on the peasants to procure evidence. Two or three weeks since I saw an article in one of the chief papers on this subject, stating that, even with regard to these massacres, some witnesses who could have given unfavourable testimony were exposed to torture. These statements thus publicly made and practically remaining uncontradicted, form a subject of the gravest importance. I fear that matters have grown worse rather than better; and I am afraid that the Constitution given to it, of which my noble Friend (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) has spoken, made a great mistake in sweeping away the native aristocracy, which, although it may have been oppressive in some cases, at all events contained within it elements of security which any wise Government would have retained; the next Constitution, as your Lordships know, came to nothing; and the last has established in Greece what may be regarded as pure democracy. Greece is the very Utopia of democracies. She enjoys universal suffrage, vote by ballot, and every institution that the purest democrat can desire. Nevertheless, upon the authority of every person qualified to speak upon the subject, we are told that the inhabitants possess no constitutional liberty whatever. There are no roads to facilitate communication for purposes of trade; there is no justice which can be administered equally between persons of all classes; there is no coinage, there is no money in the Treasury—in fact, there is nothing which constitutes civilized government. There is one thing for which we must give the Greek nation credit, and that is their strong love for education. That is the one redeeming feature of the picture. But even education, instead of being a blessing to the country, takes the form of a vicious circle in that country, and for this reason—because most of the young men being educated to pass the necessary competitive examination before they could obtain public appointments, these public appointments, by being kept constantly before their eyes, become the first and sole object of every Greek mind; and the result is that the candidates, most of whom are brought up upon insufficient means, in the form of a hungry army of paupers, flock to Athens in order to gain there public places, which they obtain 23 frequently by corrupt means. It has been said, upon the testimony of Sir Thomas Wyse, that the law of Greece is made for the strong and the rich, and not for the weak and the poor. It is perfectly true that the profession of the law is well represented in that country, for by a recent Return I see that the proportion of lawyers is one to every 3,000 of the population. Then, again, there is a superabundance of Government officials, the proportion being one to every 50 of the population. These are conclusions to which we are driven by the sheer logic of facts. The noble Lord who introduced the subject (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) alluded to the Ionian Islands. I am not going to say one I word as to whether we were right or wrong in handing over those Islands to he Greek Government, but one thing is quite certain—namely, that we gave up those islands in a state of good government and good order. If your Lord-ships will turn to a Parliamentary Paper upon the subject, published about two years ago, you will find that such was the state of misgovernment that succeeded that transfer that the Judges had resigned in a body, the roads were overgrown with grass, from want of traffic occasioned by the stagnation of trade, and a general state of chaos prevailed. This is but a very faint picture of the internal affairs of Greece. If we look abroad as regards the country, we shall find the state of things described by the noble Lord. These unfortunate people are so absorbed in the hope of reviving the Byzantine Empire, that they starve the present for the purpose of endeavouring to secure the grandeur of the future. All attempts which have been made to convince them how utterly futile such a hope is have been ineffectual. The Emperor Nicholas, just before the commencement of the Crimean War, emphatically declared that he would not be a party to the restoration of the Byzantine Empire, but that declaration failed to open the eyes of the Greeks to the folly of keeping this object perpetually before them. The truth is, they are consumed by this idea, and they are misled by the mischievous notion that nothing they can do will induce Europe to check or to interfere with them; and it is this unfortunate idea which lies at the root of all the breaches of International Law that have been laid 24 to their charge. It is the prevalence of this idea which accounts for the outbreaks which occurred in 1854, when we were compelled to send troops to the country to restrain them. The noble Viscount made various suggestions for our future conduct with respect to that country to which the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has objected. Upon this point I will merely say that it is always easy to object to proposals of such a nature, because they are only put forward under exceptional circumstances; but the question before us now is, whether we are not contributing by our influence to support what I may say is the most immoral Government in Europe. It may be impossible that we should interfere in the manner suggested by the noble Viscount, and it is equally impossible that we should withdraw our Minister from Greece. If, however, we cannot enforce the obligations which that country owes to Europe, I say in Heaven's name lot us no longer submit to the responsibility under which we now rest—let us withdraw from the Protectorate we are now supposed to exercise—let us wash our hands of the whole matter, let us be altogether free from any connection with these acts of infamy, which are continually occurring, and over which we can exercise no control. I know very well that it has been said that Her Majesty's Government ought not to take any action in the matter, lest by so doing they may precipitate what is termed "the Eastern Question." I think that we should have no fear of such a result. I do not think it would be to the credit of the Government of this country, if after all that has been said and done recently the matter were permitted to end here—some practical result ought to follow. I regret that no action has been taken with reference to this subject. I do not say that in reproach to those who now hold the reins of Office, because I believe that had Lord Clarendon's life been spared, his sympathies were so deeply interested, that he would not have permitted the matter to end without some practical result being achieved. I understand the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary to accept fully the responsibility that attaches to his official position, and to pledge himself and the Government that no efforts shall be wanting on their part to bring about a solution of this diffi 25 culty, honourable to this country, and to exact retribution for the blood of our countrymen, and for the indignities that have been passed upon this country.
§ EARL RUSSELLMy Lords, there is no one who at this crisis does not lament with deep seriousness the removal of the distinguished Minister who so lately directed our foreign affairs—whose knowledge upon these questions, and in particular of that now before your Lordships, was so wide and accurate: and I may say that there is a general feeling in the public mind that the Seals of the Foreign Office could not have been placed in better hands than in the hands of my noble Friend. To say nothing of generosity, taking into consideration the short time my noble Friend has been in Office, I do not think it would be wise to impose any restraint upon a Minister who is charged with such responsibilities, and who personally commands so much confidence in your Lordships' House and with the public. The subject all will admit is full of difficulties and intricacies, and I think it most undesirable that we should, at such a time, fetter the discretion of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It seems to me most prudent to leave the noble Earl full power to use his own discretion in the matter, and complete liberty of action in reference to it. Now, as to the subject itself, it appears to me that my noble Friend (Earl Granville) has done all that could be expected at this moment in insisting, as he has insisted, that there should be a full, complete, and thorough inquiry in respect of those murders. For my part, having heard the speech made on a former occasion by the noble Earl who has just sat down (the Earl of Carnarvon), I must say I thought he made good his assertions, and that they are borne out by what was said on the part of Her Majesty's Government. I have recently road an anonymous pamphlet which professes to give the cause of these murders; but I think a more lame defence of the Greek Government and a more total failure to make good the allegations of the writer I have never known. It seems to me very clear that if the Greek Government had earnestly intended to save those English gentlemen from being the victims of the brigands, they should have pursued one of two courses—they should either have given orders that the soldiers were not to 26 fire on the brigands, or they should have surrounded them with a force so considerable as would have made it impossible for them to escape. As there were, I believe, 13,000 troops at Athens then, the latter course would have been quite practicable. But it is obvious that the course taken by the Greek Government was quite as sure to bring about the murder of these English gentlemen as if the troops themselves had been directed to fire on the captives. This is amply proved. But there is something further to consider—namely, to what points my noble Friend should direct the attention of those who are to conduct the inquiry which is to take place. I remember that after the last debate I told my noble Friend Lord Clarendon that the charge which had been made against the Greek Government was a still more heavy charge than any that the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) has attempted to make good. It was said then, and has since been repeated, that the charge made against the Greek Government is this—that while they said they could not think of violating the Constitution of Greece by taking the course they were asked to take in respect of those brigands who held the captives, so far from observing all the articles of that Constitution, they allowed brigands of the worst character—men who had committed murder over and over again, and who ought to have been regarded as infamous criminals—to go to Crete, when they ought either to have been executed or kept in prison. That charge has been made by a captain of the British Navy who is now in the service of Turkey (Captain Hobart), and it was repeated by my noble Friend. I cannot conceive a graver charge being made against a Government. I think, therefore, my noble Friend should direct the attention of those who are to conduct the inquiry to an investigation of this question—whether any persons who had been convicted in former years were allowed to swell the ranks of the insurgents in Crete. I can quite understand that a strong sympathy with the insurgents in Crete should be felt in Greece; but it is one thing that the Cretans should rise to vindicate their independence of Turkey, and quite another that brigands and felons should be sent to make war on Turkey in Crete on pretence of their being Cretan patriots. If the accusation 27 to which I have just alluded be well founded, there can be no other conclusion drawn from the facts themselves than this—that the Greek Government are ready to violate the Constitution of their country when there is a question of raising an insurrection against a friendly State, but that they are not willing to infringe on the articles of that Constitution with the view of saving the lives of English gentlemen, captives in the hands of Greek brigands, even if their lives are only to be saved by that means. Captain Hobart alleges a number of cases in which criminals such as those to whom I have referred were allowed to go to Crete to join in the insurrection. Now, if this allegation be proved, after impartial inquiry, I cannot imagine how it would be consistent with the dignity of Her Majesty's Government to retain a representative of this country at the Court of Athens, and that in the end you would be obliged to withdraw from the guarantee you have given with respect to Greece. If the inquiry be full and impartial, and if it result in proof of that allegation, matters cannot remain as they are; but whether my noble Friend (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) ought to press his Motion is another question. As to the latter part of his Motion, I think it calls on Her Majesty's Government to do what it may not be in their power to accomplish. I remember talking to the representative of a foreign Power who had had some experience in Greece. He told me he admired the talent of the Greeks; but a people more low in point of morality he had never been acquainted with. It is, perhaps, asking too much of Her Majesty's Government to bring about a change in the morals of a whole people, and were my noble Friend to attempt it I think he would find it beyond his powers. Even if things be as bad in this regard as is stated, it should be remembered that a future time may witness a different state of things. It must be remembered that the Highlands of Scotland in 1690 and 1756 were very different from the Highlands of Scotland in the present day. I do not know that in 1690 any English Secretary of State could have been expected to remove the causes of the discontent which then existed in the Highlands. I wish to put it to my noble Friend whether, after the statement of my noble Friend the Secre 28 tary for Foreign Affairs, he really wishes to press his Motion. My noble Friend (Earl Granville) has pledged himself that an inquiry shall be instituted. The honour of the country is deeply involved in this matter; but I think it would be much better if my Friend the noble Viscount would leave the conduct of this business in the hands of my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, reserving the right to avail himself of a future opportunity for adopting any course which circumstances may appear to him to render necessary.
§ VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE, in reply to a request that he would not press his Motion to a Division, said, if he was to understand from the language held by his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary that he (Earl Granville) would not exclude from his consideration any mode of action which might be called for by the result of the inquiry, he would not be disposed to press his Motion. He trusted that if the result of inquiry should be such as to justify and call for the interference indicated in his Motion, that mode of action would not be excluded from the consideration of the Government. He should be glad to obtain an assurance on that point from the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary.
§ EARL GRANVILLEWhat I stated was, that we meant to insist upon a full and complete inquiry into the circumstances of the particular outrage on the English prisoners; and that, with regard to the other and larger questions, we were prepared to consider them in concert with the European Powers.
§ VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid, that, in consequence of that explanation, he should withdraw his Motion.
§ Motion (by Leave of the House) withdrawn.