§ EARL RUSSELLMy Lords, I rise to call your Lordships' attention to a very important treaty in reference to Luxemburg, and very important papers in conection with that treaty which have been presented to Parliament. It appears to me that there are recorded in these papers facts of great importance, for, as your Lordships are aware, a war was on the point of breaking out in Europe, but that that war has been prevented by the diplomatic efforts of the neutral Powers in a conference recently held in London, that I think it is fitting that in your Lordships' House, two or three Members of which have held the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, we should take some notice of the circumstances to which I have just alluded. I will not make any particular Motion on this subject, nor will I trespass long on the attention of your Lordships, being warned by the fact that the attendance is not now so full as it lately was, that the present moment is certainly a critical one. There were two subjects which must have engaged the attention of Her Majesty's Government in connection with this question of Luxemburg. One was, whether it was so much for the interests of this country that the peace of Europe should be preserved as to induce Her Majesty's Government to interpose its diplomatic offices; and the other was, whether, to maintain peace in Europe, we might not have to pay a higher price than the product was worth. With regard to the first question it has always appeared to me that it is the peculiar and very great interest of this country to preserve the peace of Europe. In the first place, as a commercial country it is of the greatest possible interest to us that peace should prevail. Not only would our com- 145 merce be interrupted by the blockade of ports, but many difficult questions must necessarily arise relating to our ships and commerce, which might endanger our neutrality. Again, if war had broken out between France and Prussia, there was every probability that before any long time had elapsed other questions would have arisen in which our honour was so far pledged that it would have been impossible for us not to have intervened. For these reasons I think Her Majesty's Government were quite right in deeming it their duty to offer such advice as lay in their power, with a view of preserving the peace of Europe. The question itself was one peculiarly for conference and arbitration. No one, I think, will find fault with the Prussian Government for saying that Luxemburg was by the treaty of 1839 assigned to Germany, not because there was a German Confederation, but because it was a German interest; and I find in the course of the negotiations which took place in 1839 that there was one moment when Belgium having threatened to seize Luxemburg, the German Confederation, with the consent of the Conference of London, declared their intention to send an army to Luxemburg for the purpose of defending and preserving that country to Germany. It was therefore obviously impossible for Prussia, without some advice from the neutral Powers, to accept worse terms than the German Confederation had accepted with regard to Luxemburg. On the other hand, there was, I think, a just susceptibility on the part of France at seeing Luxemburg about to be transferred from the German Confederation, which, as a body, was so inert and pacific as not to excite any apprehension, to a great military power like Prussia, from which there might, perhaps, be fear of aggression. Therefore, both in one case and in the other, there was very great need of some interposition of a friendly Power, and if possible that some terms should be agreed upon which both parties could adopt with honour. I happened this morning to be looking at some old despatches of M. Barillon in the time of Louis XIV., which are very characteristic both of that monarch and of Charles II. Louis XIV. declared his wish to seize Luxemburg, and Charles II. consented to the transaction on condition that a million of livres should be transferred to the Royal Treasury. The terms proposed at the recent Conference were, that the fortress of Luxemburg 146 should be abandoned by the Prussian troops; and, further, that the territory of Luxemburg should not only be assured to the King of the Netherlands as his property, but that its neutrality should be guaranteed, and the fortress demolished. These are conditions which were, I think, very properly supported by the present Foreign Minister, in view of the dangers which it was sought to avoid. I cannot consider that we have entered into a treaty which is likely to be infringed, or that any great danger has been incurred by our entering into an additional guarantee. I do not consider that we have entered into any new guarantee which is likely to prove onerous. I believe there is every probability that the peace of Europe will be continued. But even if Prussia and France were at war I do not think that either of them would be disposed to violate the neutrality of Luxemburg, because they would have to consider that by doing so they would provoke the interposition and hostility of the great Powers who have consented to give this guarantee. I am therefore of opinion, and I venture to state that opinion to your Lordships—in the first place, that it was most desirable to maintain the pence of Europe; and next, that we have not made too great a sacrifice to maintain that peace, and have not entered into any guarantee involving probable danger, or into any engagements that can be blamed or found fault with. I will say, and I am most happy to say, that the ability, the judgment, and the temper with which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has conducted this correspondence and the manner in which he behaved in the Conference will give to Parliament and to the country great confidence in his conduct of foreign affairs. In the next place I desire to express my satisfaction that the Government has not listened to theories which last year I was somewhat apprehensive that they might have entertained, under the name of a new foreign policy — that however great our interest might be, we were not to interfere in the affairs of foreign countries. I am happy to find, on the contrary, we have continued, in the diplomatic correspondence which has lately taken place, the great work and the great policy with respect to Luxemburg and Belgium, in which, from 1830 to 1839, Lord Palmerston displayed such extraordinary ability, and by which he obtained so important and glorious a result. These are the only observations that I feel to be necessary. 147 I am sorry to have troubled your Lordships at such length; but it seems to me that this House should take some notice of a matter of such very great consequence; and, for my part, I am ready to commit myself to an entire approbation of the policy that has been pursued.
LORD HOUGHTONsaid, that he was on the Continent at the time when the Conference met, and on all sides he heard gratitude expressed for the English intervention. That gratitude was expressed not only by persons in high position, but by others who might be considered exponents of public opinion at large; and the expressions were as earnest and deep as their Lordships could desire. The satisfaction felt at the conclusion of that Conference was real and profound, and most honourable to the character of the statesman who conducted the negotiations. He had, indeed, been somewhat amused at hearing it said on all sides, that at last our foreign policy had undergone a complete change—that England no longer abstained, as she had done, from taking part in European affairs, but had resumed her place in the councils of Europe; for, remembering the frequent charges which had been brought against his noble Friend who had just sat down, of continued meddling in the affairs of Europe, it was somewhat strange that those allegations should now be made. He did not say that in any hostility to the course which had been pursued by the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for he must admit that throughout the whole of these negotiations his noble Friend had exhibited talents equal to the distinguished position which he occupied. At the same time, it was not wise for their Lordships to conceal from themselves or the country that a serious responsibility had been undertaken. He did not think with his noble Friend (Earl Russell) that the contingency was so remote. From the geographical position of Luxemburg it was almost impossible for hostilities to break out between France and Germany, and for the integrity of Luxemburg to be absolutely preserved. These considerations formed so large a part of the Luxemburg question that they inclined both parties to be anxious for a material guarantee. When the Prussian Minister found that the feeling of the German people was so strongly roused on this question of Luxemburg that he would have had very great difficulty in carrying out what were alleged to be his own views—namely, the cession of Luxem- 148 burg to France by the King of Holland—a Committee was appointed, consisting of the ablest of the Prussian military men, to report upon the matter. He believed the report they made was to the effect that the position of Luxemburg was so important that the Prussian generals could not undertake to defend the left bank of the Rhine if the fortress of Luxemburg were in the hands of France. On the other hand, a well-founded impression existed among French strategists that the position of the fortress of Luxemburg, if occupied by a hostile force, would be most dangerous to the arms of France. Under these circumstances he believed that, though Her Majesty's Government had undertaken a very serious responsibility, they were right in so doing. They had now the satisfaction of knowing that both France and Prussia were anxious for the neutrality of Luxemburg, and he believed that in expressing their anxiety in this respect they were simply the exponents of the desire of the people of France and Prussia to avoid occasion for future hostilities. In this lay their Lordships' hope for the future well-ordering of this matter. It was evident that no French or German statesman believed that a Continental war could be undertaken without causing an amount of misery and mutual loss which could never be compensated for by any territorial gain. He was happy to say that he found that feeling prevailing in the States of both countries. With regard to the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in reference to this matter, he wished to express his entire satisfaction, and he hoped the Government would carry out what he believed to be a really sound foreign policy. He would not have us retreat from our great mission in the councils of Europe; but, whenever it was necessary to interfere, we should interfere with the full sense of our own responsibility and resources, and in the meantime talk as little as possible about non-intervention.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYI have to return to the noble Earl (Earl Russell), on behalf of myself and Colleagues, our most sincere thanks for the manner in which he has confirmed the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and also my personal thanks for the manner in which he has spoken of the conduct of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It must be gratifying to Her Majesty's Government to know that on both sides of this and the other House—and he thought that in say- 149 ing this he was entitled to add in this country and in Europe—that the course pursued with reference to the Luxemburg question has given general satisfaction; it must be much more gratifying to me personally to know that a great portion of the praise which has been bestowed upon the Government has fallen upon one to whom I am as nearly connected as to Lord Stanley. The question we had to decide was naturally difficult. As the noble Earl has said, there were two questions we had to consider—first, whether it was desirable that we should take measures to avert a war; and, secondly, whether, the peace of Europe having been secured, we have paid too great a price for it. As to the first of these points I can only say, that if any hope existed two months ago of securing a peaceful settlement of the Luxemburg question by our interference, we were not only justified in interfering, but should have been absolutely unjustifiable if we had not done everything in our power to do so. Undoubtedly, the peace of Europe was at that time threatened. The noble Earl (Earl Russell) has stated that the grounds of dispute were reasonable on both sides. On the one hand, there was a reasonable apprehension that the transfer of Luxemburg to Prussia might have been a source of menace to France; and, on the other hand, Prussia was naturally reluctant to part with a fortress which was not only valuable for defensive purposes but for offence also, and which, as it was not now under the control of the German Confederation, might be used as an instrument for preventing an inroad upon them from France. And we must recollect that the feelings of both countries were greatly excited by the extraordinary and almost unparalleled success which had so recently attended the Prussian army. On the other hand France felt that she had a dangerous neighbour in her front, and it was to be feared that the successes of Prussia would lead her people to be ambitious of still further aggression. Consequently, there was very little hope of preserving the peace of Europe if hostilities were once commenced between the two countries; and in prosecuting our anxious task of concerting with other neutral Powers to secure peace we met with serious difficulties—for we did not feel justified in entering into a Conference unless we saw some basis on which to treat. But when we had once found a basis we entered into the Conference, 150 having great hopes that the peace of Europe might be maintained. I must say that the moment France saw the danger to the peace of Europe, which she was most desirous of avoiding, she at once withdrew from her position, and disclaimed a desire to enforce the purchase of Luxemburg; and Prussia, though at first hesitating, finally assented to withdraw her garrison on the condition that the fortress should be demolished and that the territory should be declared neutral. Thus the great calamity of a European war was stayed for the time, and still stronger hopes were entertained of the ultimate success of the neutral Powers. A proposal having been made which was accepted as satisfactory to the honour of both parties, we felt that it was incumbent upon us not to shrink from any responsibility which might attach to an additional guarantee on our part if that would secure the final acceptance of the proposal—especially when we knew that if we had refused nothing could have prevented war. The collective guarantee of the neutral Powers was made a sine quâ non, and if England had refused to join, upon England would have rested the heavy responsibility of a European war. The noble Lord who last spoke (Lord Houghton) seems to think that the guarantee goes much further than it really does. I do not entirely agree with the noble Earl (Earl Russell) as to the extent of our responsibility, even supposing it to be of the character he has described. If it had been a continuance of the guarantee first given, I should think it a very serious matter, because the guarantee of the possession of Luxemburg to the King of Holland was a joint and several guarantee similar to that which was given with regard to the independence and neutrality of Belgium; it was binding individually and separately upon each of the Powers. That was the nature of the guarantee which was given with regard to Belgium and with regard to the possession of Luxemburg by the King-Duke. Now a guarantee of neutrality is very different from a guarantee of possession. If France and Prussia were to have a quarrel between themselves, and either were to violate the neutrality of Luxemburg by passing their troops through the duchy for the purpose of making war on the other, we might, if the guarantee had been individual as well as joint, have been under the necessity of preventing that violation, and the same obligation 151 would have rested upon each guarantor; but as it is we are not exposed to so serious a contingency, because the guarantee is only collective—that is to say, it is binding only upon all the Powers in their collective capacity; they all agree to maintain the neutrality of Luxemburg, but not one of those Powers is bound to fulfil the obligation alone. That is a most important difference, because the only two Powers by which the neutrality of Luxemburg is likely to be infringed are two of the parties to the collective guarantee; and therefore, if either of them violate the neutrality, the obligation on all the others would not accrue. I thought it right to point out that we had not incurred so very serious a responsibility as some have supposed; but I will say no more, except to repeat the thanks I owe to the noble Earl opposite, and express the extreme satisfaction with which I view the probable result of our interference. I refer to the prospect of long-continued peace between two Powers so formidable as France and Prussia.
§ THE EARL OF CLARENDONI cannot, my Lords, allow this discussion to close without expressing my cordial concurrence in what has fallen from my noble Friend (Earl Russell) with regard to the part which my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has taken in the conduct of this matter. No one, perhaps, in his position could have a greater personal interest in averting war, and he best performed the duties attached to his office, as I think, in not proffering the services of this country too hastily, and I think his judgment and caution in not entering into a Conference before he had a good assurance that the decision arrived at would be accepted as final by the parties concerned were remarkable. It was through the instrumentality of the Conference that France and Prussia were enabled to make those mutual concessions and sacrifices which would probably not have been made without. Now, the apprehension which has been expressed with regard to these guarantees is, I think, a perfectly just one; because such obligations are naturally viewed with fear and mistrust by the people of this country. They are sometimes lightly undertaken and are generally intended to tide over a difficulty; while there is at the same time generally a mental reservation founded on the belief that no demand will ever be made for their performance. I hope, however, that the time 152 is far distant when from motives of cynical indifference this country will hesitate to incur the smallest sacrifice which may be necessary for securing such great advantages, and I think my noble Friend was perfectly right in the course he took after weighing the infinitesimal risk which England would incur by the course which has been adopted against the certain injury which would be inflicted upon this country by war between France and Prussia. Besides, had that war broken out it would have been extremely difficult—or rather it would have been almost impossible—to make these two Powers believe that we honestly carried out the neutrality we profess, and there can be little doubt that the blame would by these two Powers have, to a great extent, been thrown upon England. With regard to the guarantee, I will go somewhat further than the noble Earl at the head of the Government, and say that if we had undertaken the same guarantee in the case of Luxemburg as we did in the case of Belgium, we should, in my opinion, have incurred an additional and very serious responsibility. I look upon our guarantee in the case of Belgium as an individual guarantee, and have always so regarded it; but this is a collective guarantee. No one of the Powers, therefore, can be called upon to take single action, even in the improbable case of any difficulty arising. I cannot help regarding this guarantee as a moral obligation, a point of honour—as an agreement which cannot be violated without dishonour by any of the signing Powers; and I believe that an agreement of that nature may be more binding than the precise terms in which a treaty is couched, for it is a characteristic of these times that when formal treaties are found inconvenient, they are disregarded. It was probably for this reason that Prussia preferred an arrangement of this kind. The Conference itself has, I think, proved in one more instance the soundness of the principle laid down at the Congress of Paris—that nations between whom any serious difficulty has arisen ought always before resorting to arms to appeal to the friendly offices of neutral States. The success in this case will, I hope, lead to a more general adhesion to that principle. In the case of Denmark the war had already commenced before a Conference was held. An armistice and a reference to the neutral Powers were agreed upon, and even in that case the result might have been an advantageous 153 one but for the conduct of Denmark herself. No one has since regretted more than Denmark that she refused the friendly advice offered to her. In the same way, too, after great preparations had been made between Austria and Prussia for a struggle, which it was generally believed would be a very protracted one, it was by Austria that the offers of mediation were rejected. War actually broke out, with what result your Lordships are all aware; and it may not be uninstructive to note that the two Powers which suffered most were those whose conduct rendered the Conferences abortive; whereas, on the other hand, by referring their differences to arbitration the monarchs of France and Prussia have not only been able to adjust their disputes in an honourable and satisfactory manner, but have shown that they are fully alive to the obligations of Sovereigns not to plunge their people unnecessarily into war, while they have, at the same time, earned for themselves the gratitude of their subjects without the assistance of any territorial aggrandizement.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI wish to say one word with regard to a difficulty which has suggested itself to my mind in the course of this discussion, and which I think may also occur to the unassisted mind of the public. I certainly agree with the greater part of what the noble Earl has said; but I cannot help thinking that the noble Earl rather over-proved his case with regard to the liability of this country, although the view which he takes of it has been entirely adopted by my noble Friend behind me. If Her Majesty's Government instead of increasing our liabilities have actually diminished them, it appears to me, as it will appear to most people, that there has been the most complete mystification of some of the most distinguished diplomatists of Europe ever heard of.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYWe have diminished our liability as regards the Duchy of Luxemburg; but this treaty does not diminish our obligations under the treaty of 1839.
§ EARL GRANVILLEStill the explanation we have heard this evening is scarcely in accordance with the interpretation generally given to a guarantee of this sort; and after the statement of the noble Earl it appears to be so utterly free from danger, that it is difficult to understand the importance which Prussia attached to it. That she did attach that importance to it is certain, else why on earth should she regard 154 it as a sine quâ non without which she was prepared to go to war with the greatest military nation in the world. And I cannot also understand, if the increase of our liability be so infinitesimal, why a Secretary of State, of so good and sagacious a mind as that possessed by the noble Lend at the head of the Foreign Department, should inform the House of Commons that the decision at which he had arrived was a more painful one to him than any previous decision which he had ever made. What could there be painful in deciding to do that which secured the peace of Europe at no cost, or at an infinitesimal cost to this country? I merely refer to this because I do not see how the public at large are to understand this explanation. Having very carefully read the papers, I believe that an undesirable increase has taken place in the liabilities of this country, and, in spite of these rather fanciful interpretations as to how far we are bound by treaties, it is possible that we may have rendered ourselves liable at some future time to practical inconvenience, or the risk of being considered unfaithful to our agreements. I have read the papers with care, and I am bound to say that I see nothing in them which I do not approve, I should be glad, however, to learn from the noble Earl at the head of the Government whether there is any truth in the report, which to my knowledge has gained considerable currency in the diplomatic circles on the Continent, that the British Government has not acted in this matter so firmly as might have appeared; that although at the beginning of the negotiations they agreed to the guarantee, they afterwards withdrew from that position, and that it was only at the last moment and under a threat of a very peculiar character, they consented to the guarantee again. He was glad to see the noble Earl shake his head authoritatively in reply to that statement. He admitted that there was nothing in the papers that justified the rumour, but it was generally credited upon the Continent.
§ THE DUKE OF CLEVELANDthought that the Government had acted quite right in accepting the responsibility of the collective guarantee; but he had heard with equal surprise and pain the attempt that had been made to fritter away that responsibility; for, if they were to accept literally the statement of the noble Earl at the head of the Government, which also had been confirmed by the noble Earl the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs, England 155 had really incurred no responsibility at all. But, in that case, it was clear that Prussia had been misled, for she had declared in express terms that nothing short of a European guarantee would reconcile her to the proposal of the Conference; and it was somewhat unexpected now to be informed by the noble Earl that no engagement carrying with it any real responsibility had been entered into. He desired to express his approbation of the labours of the Conference, and of the eminent ability with which they had been conducted by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
§ VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid, that the unfavourable opinions which he had always entertained respecting guarantees had been amply confirmed by what he had heard that evening; but at the same time he was under the impression, which seemed to be general, that whatever responsibility we had incurred was incurred upon good and sufficient grounds. If he were to enter into any argument respecting the grounds on which the outbreak of hostilities between Prussia and France was anticipated, he should feel bound to Bay that the causes alleged were neither just nor necessary; but, however insufficient these grounds, the general opinion was that hostilities were imminent, and the fact that this belief prevailed, and that it was based upon good grounds, completely justified the English Government in taking part in the Conference. He must also say that the praise was well and justly earned which had been so liberally bestowed upon the Minister by whom England was represented in that Conference. For his own part, indeed, the success of the noble Lord was no surprise to him. It was only the realization of what he had always anticipated from the noble Lord, and it was a most gratifying circumstance that, among the young men of the time who were distinguishing themselves in public life, there was at least one who showed the elements of statesmanship, and at whose hands the country might reasonably hope, in years to come, to receive eminent service. And upon one point there could be no doubt—namely, that by the prevention of the war which threatened to break out, England had conferred upon Europe an obligation of the first magnitude.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, it was of great importance, not only to England but to the Continent generally, that the 156 interpretation put by the English Government upon the engagement entered into should be accurately known. The whole difficulty and danger to avert which the Conference met, arose from the jealousy between France and the united German nation, represented by Prussia, in respect to Luxemburg—a district which, independently of its fortress, would always be a strong military position. Each of those Powers was afraid that its antagonist might seize that position. Now, in the event of a quarrel between these two Powers, and supposing that France were to invade Luxemburg, he desired to know whether or not Prussia would have the right to call upon the other Powers, parties to the guarantee, to drive France from that position? According to the interpretation given by the noble Earl at the head of the Government, no such right would exist, because, according to the noble Earl, France being one of the guaranteeing Powers, and herself creating the wrong, would release the other Powers from their engagement. But, if this were the fact, did it really amount to an engagement at all? And what was the explanation to be given of the language of Prussia as expressed in the printed correspondence on the table? Their Lordships who had read the papers would remember that our Foreign Secretary had, in the first instance, prepared the draft of a treaty not strictly in the nature of a guarantee, but rather a recognition of a moral engagement or understanding between the great Powers of Europe that Luxemburg should be neutral territory; but Count Bismarck, when he saw it, objected that it was not a guarantee, but only an implied moral engagement that each of the contracting Powers would for its own part respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. It was on this specific ground that Prussia insisted upon an European guarantee and the British Foreign Office gave way, consenting to convert the stipulation into a guarantee; but, if he rightly understood the observation of the noble Earl, the demand of Prussia had, after all, been successfully evaded, and England had taken no obligation upon her. It was obvious that, as all the great Powers were parties to the treaty, Luxemburg, if attacked at all, would be invaded by one of the guaranteeing Powers, and in that case none of the other guaranteeing Powers could be called upon to secure her neutrality. But this reduced the whole thing to a sham, and a farce; it was not a guaran- 157 tee at all, and it ought to be clearly understood, both by England and by the Continent, that we did not consider ourselves bound to interfere with the military possession of Luxemburg unless it was attacked by some Power not a party to the treaty. As such a contingency was impossible to be anticipated, he must congratulate the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office with having obtained an important object with the minimum of sacrifice; but he was of opinion that the fact should be clearly stated to the House, He did not object to such an interpretation of the force of the guarantee which the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated that he took three days to consider before assenting to. Generally speaking, guarantees were dangerous and entangling, but in such a case as this the distant and contingent danger might be well incurred in order to avoid an immediate European war.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYI do not think that Prussia would feel particularly complimented at the suggestion of the noble Duke, that the members of her diplomatic body are quite ignorant of the difference between a several and a collective guarantee. In fact the difference between these two forms of guarantee, in respect of the obligation imposed upon the co-guaranteeing Powers, is quite well understood. The reluctance which my noble relative expressed in the House of Commons, was to enter into any engagement which even in appearance threw an additional responsibility on this country; for he knew how much this country dislikes the idea of guarantees, and he shrunk from making use of that expression, lest it should arouse a hostile feeling to the proceedings of the Conference. The noble Duke is quite correct in his interpretation of the treaty, except as regards the demolition of the fortress. It is quite true that, if France were to invade the territory of Luxemburg, the other Powers, though they might be called upon to resist the invasion, would not be bound to do so. They might or might not think it proper to defend the neutrality of Luxemburg, but no individual Power could be compelled, under the treaty, to render assistance.
§ EARL RUSSELLI just rise to say that I do not put the same interpretation upon the treaty as the noble Earl does. My belief is that if France were to violate the treaty and invade the territory of Luxemburg, the other Powers who are parties 158 to the treaty would feel bound to call upon France to retire.