HL Deb 08 February 1867 vol 185 cc120-36
THE DUKE OF SOMERSET,

in moving for certain Returns respecting the Royal Navy, said: My Lords, I have thought it right to bring forward this Motion, because there has been, as it appears to me, a great misconception throughout the country as to the state in which the navy has been left by the late Government. I do not know whether I can ascribe that opinion to a few words which fell from the present First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir John Pakington) in another place at the end of last Session; but certainly the notion has spread until it has been stated in different parts of the country, and has been repeated for many months, that we have at the present moment no sufficient number of vessels for naval purposes, and that the country was left by the late Government without efficient protection so far as our navy is concerned, although there has been during the last six years a large expenditure devoted to that portion of the public service, amounting to between £65,000,000 and £70,000,000. Such at least has been the impression. Your Lordships will therefore see that it is desirable that no opportunity should be lost of calling for Returns showing what has really been done in the way of building ships during the six years that the late Government was in Office. As many ships, I believe, have at least been constructed during that period as during any other six years of peace. In those six years we built 140 vessels of different kinds. That is a considerable amount of shipbuilding. Not only have we done this, but it should be remembered that our path has been beset by difficulties. Great changes have taken place in construction both as regards iron and wooden ships, and much difference of opinion has existed as to the amount of plating which should be applied to the different classes of new ships. While the transition in all departments was so great, the Board of Admiralty over which I presided felt a great responsibility rested upon them in regard to the expenditure which should be incurred. On the one hand, we felt it desirable to do all we could to keep up the navy in a state of efficiency; and on the other, we recognised the folly of building a vast number of ships which might be useful at the moment, but which would certainly be superseded in the course of a few years. I think we acted wisely in not building ships faster, because ironclads are a very expensive description of vessel, and new experiments and improvements were being constantly made with reference to size, armament, and sheathing. It was almost impossible to provide a very good fleet while these experiments were proceeding, or to collect a number of vessels and bring them to act together, as we might have done if greater uniformity prevailed among them. In fact, if any opinion was to have been given on our conduct, I thought that opinion would have been that we had done too much rather than too little in the way of shipbuilding. I had not only to determine what we should do, but to judge of the probable consequences hereafter. When I first came into Office we had not a single iron-clad vessel. We now possess thirty-three, many of them pf great size. During a time of rapid progress in the art of shipbuilding it is almost impossible to construct a satisfactory fleet, because every new ship possesses improvements which render it superior to its predecessor. At the same time, it would have evinced great negligence of the true interests of the country to have adhered to the pattern of the first ship. The Warrior, for instance, was a very fine vessel at the time of its construction, but in the course of a few years it has become comparatively inferior to many others that have been since built. Neither the offensive nor the defensive qualities of that vessel are as good as we could wish. I was anxious, as far as possible, to anticipate the wants of the country a few years hence, and I think that we certainly have made considerable progress. I believe that, on the whole, there is no ground for dissatisfaction with the vessels that have been built. I have reason to believe that the opinions of the distinguished officers of the Channel fleet are favourable; and when, as at Cherbourg, the merits of our vessels have been compared with those of other nations, the general opinion was that we had no reason to be dissatisfied with the vessels we possessed. I cannot see, therefore, that there is anything to blame as far as the construction of our iron-clad ships is concerned. Then again, as regards the wooden vessels, in the early part of my administration—namely, from 1860 to 1862 or 1863—we did not know the gun which these vessels would have to carry. Unless you know what gun a vessel has to carry you are working a great deal in the dark, and it was clear that our ships would eventually carry a much larger gun than was then employed. The demands of the service, too, compelled us to repair and employ many of our old vessels, and this could only be done at a considerable cost. Upon these grounds, therefore, the number of vessels built was, I believe, as great as it should have been. I may, perhaps, now make a few observations on another point—the question of expenditure. It seems to have been supposed in many quarters that the whole of the £70,000,000 voted for the navy was applicable to the purposes of shipbuilding. Now, any such notion as that is a great misapprehension. The amount really expended in dockyards during those six years, not including vessels built by contract, would be about £10,000,000; but a great proportion of that sum has been expended in the repair and outfit of vessels already constructed. The proportion spent in building would be less certainly than half of the £10,000,000. We also built by contract vessels at an expense of about £7,000,000. This sum—namely, £7,000,000—with about £3,000,000 or £4,000,000 expended in the dockyards, would represent, I believe, the whole of our expenditure on shipbuilding. It has been charged against us that we were proceeding on a wrong principle. It must, however, be remembered that we were passing through a period of transition, when our progress had to be guided by experiment. Great praise had been lavished on vessels built in private yards, and their merits were extolled at the expense of those constructed in the Government yards. We were constantly warned that our ships as then constructed were of no use, and were told that the turret principle was the one which ought to be adopted. Reasons, of which the House is aware, induced the Admiralty to purchase a couple of turret vessels which were lying in the Mersey. Before we bought them, those by whom they were visited brought away flaming accounts of their excellent qualities—it was said that they were capable of destroying the whole fleet—but no sooner did they come into our possession than every one found fault with them. No doubt they are good vessels for coast defence; but the discomfort to the officers and men are so great that it soon became evident they were not fit vessels to send to sea. I paid them a visit, and, although the officers treated the matter with the good temper and good humour which usually characterize the officers of the navy, it was evident that there was a considerable amount of discomfort, and that if turret ships were adopted they ought not to be constructed according to that pattern. At another time we were told that we ought to imitate exactly vessels that were being built in America; and before the arrival of the Miantonomoh we were continually being asked why we did not build an impregnable vessel, whose sides should be but little above the level of the water, of great speed, carrying one or two heavy guns, and requiring but few men for her management. I was very glad when that vessel arrived at these shores, because it at once became apparent to every one conversant with the subject that it was impossible to make a crew comfortable on board such a ship. The ventilation depended entirely on the steam- engine, and the crew of the Miantonomoh were not only exposed to every discomfort, but they were liable to be smothered in the event of anything happening to the ventilating engine so as to prevent its working for a few minutes. I was informed by one of the officers on board that ship that on one occasion the engine had been stopped accidentally for a short time, and that the crew were scarcely able to breathe until it was set to work again. It was evident that it would have been impossible to send such a ship on a three years' cruise to any part of the world; and therefore vessels of this description, however well fitted for coast defence, would not be applicable to the general purposes of the British Navy. With regard to any general reduction in the expenditure upon the navy, I may remark that out of the £70,000,000 there were at least £40,000,000 expended upon objects with which no Board of Admiralty could interfere. With regard to the accounts, I can only say that I was very anxious that the most strictly accurate accounts should be kept in the dockyards. An enormous expenditure was incurred in those establishments in consequence of converting sailing vessels into steamers and wooden ships into iron-clads—the latter process involving the erection of very costly machinery for bending, planing, drilling, and otherwise working plates of iron six inches thick. I was very anxious, taking into consideration the vast and annually increasing expenditure in the dockyards, that a good system of keeping accounts should be introduced into those Departments; and accordingly in 1860 I consulted upon the matter with the late Sir Richard Bromley, who was well acquainted with the subject, and it was with his assistance that what are called "the Expense Accounts" were established, and an officer was appointed in each dockyard to audit the accounts. I believe, from what I have heard, that upon the whole the accounts are in a state of gradual improvement; and although I am not prepared to say that they may not be yet further improved, I am convinced that they are established upon a sound and good system. It was, however, objected in the House of Commons, and in the public newspapers, that our accounts were of no use, as it was not possible to ascertain from them the total cost of any particular vessel, so that the expenditure upon it might be contrasted with the price of a similar ves- sel built in a private yard. It was said that we ought to prepare a complete balance sheet like any private firm, showing the cost of each individual vessel, and that every expense in connection with each dockyard must be carried into account, and a balance struck in the same way as would be done in a private concern. I doubted whether such a system would not lead to confusion; but as the Board of Admiralty were anxious to meet the wishes of many Members of the House of Commons, we tried to do what was desired. It was necessary to take all the expenditure of each dockyard and to apportion it amongst the different vessels built or repaired there. At Portsmouth the expenditure on lectures and schools and a necessarily expensive police ran up the expense enormously, and when the accounts were placed before the House of Commons the remark was made—"Look at the enormous sums which your ships cost!" and it was alleged that ships built at Portsmouth cost a great deal more than they did in private yards. But was it fair to compare the expenses of public with those of private establishments of this kind? It was not possible to institute such a comparison without prejudicing the former. The object of our national dockyards is not merely to build ships quickly and cheaply, but to have great resources for their repair in time of war. To ensure that, you must have a large supply of machinery, a good deal of which will in time of peace be idle, and the idleness of which will prevent the manufacture being carried on economically. We were constantly told in 1863 that we ought to copy commercial men, who managed their affairs much better than we did; and one distinguished Member of the House of Commons, Sir Morton Peto, said, "Look at my firm; we have larger stores than the Admiralty. We have £17,000,000 dispersed all over the world, but we take stock constantly, and our accounts cause us no difficulty." I do not know whether the public would now repeat the advice which was then so frequently offered by the newspapers, more especially whether they would set up the example of Peto and Co. These were not the only subjects of accusation against us. Considering the smallness of the amount involved, a great deal has been said respecting the iron ballast which has been used to pave some portions of the dockyards. During the last twenty years a quantity of iron ballast has been from time to time taken out of sailing ships, and, as it was not required in steamers, the weight of whose engines obviated the necessity for ballast, it was piled up in various parts of the yards, where it occasioned a good deal of inconvenience. At Chatham a little of it was sold, but the purchaser afterwards found that it would not answer his purpose, and declined to take any more, and a similar attempt to dispose of it at Plymouth entirely failed. Long before I came into the Admiralty a quantity of this ballast had been used for paving the yards, and finding the piles of iron continually in the way, after vainly endeavouring to sell it, we continued to use it for paving as it was wanted. There is still, however, a large quantity piled up in some of the dockyards. Since it has been laid down it has proved of great service in facilitating the heavy traffic of the yards. It has, I hear, now turned out to be very valuable in a commercial point of view, and has been sold for an enormous sum. I am very glad to hear that such is the case, and all that has to be done is to take it up. I myself did not know how to sell it. Perhaps I did not know how to advertise it. Now, however, it had been admirably advertised; for when you want anything advertised you can find no better place in the world than the House of Commons in which to advertise it. I may remind the present Government that there are a number of old-fashioned cannon balls at Woolwich, which they might do well to advertise also, as, if old cast iron be so valuable, they would probably bring in a good round sum. These are samples of the accusations that have been made against the late Admiralty. I should have no fear of submitting their proceedings to the judgment of any Committee whatever, whether as regards the men or the building and repairing of ships. With regard to the subject of manning the navy, I may inform your Lordships that when the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) was last in Office, a Commission, of which Lord Hardwicke was Chairman, was appointed to take this question into consideration. When we succeeded to Office, the Board of Admiralty adopted the Report of that Commission, and dealt with many of its recommendations. We established training ships for boys, and improved in many ways the condition of the seamen, in accordance with the recommendations contained in that Report, and our measures were attended with, great success. We had no difficulty in getting boys for the navy. It was said, why did we not take the pickpockets and idle boys off the streets of London and educate them for the navy?—it was said they would make admirable sailors. Why, we did not want them. We had no difficulty in getting well-behaved lads who were educated for the purpose, and as for men, thanks to the continuance-service men and the lads for the training ships, our ships for the last four years when they have been commissioned have never had to wait for men. The training ships were established on a good system, the receiving ships were also very much improved, and the men on returning from leave went on board and remained there till they are wanted again. Of course, all this occasioned considerable expense, for the comforts of the men were increased. Then, as to the Reserve, we were told it was most important that such a body should be formed, and especially with a view to getting up a friendly feeling between the Mercantile Marine and the Royal Navy. We established the Reserve. This Reserve now contains 16,000 men, and the result certainly has been the creation of a very friendly feeling between the Mercantile Marine and the Royal Navy. Indeed, I believe that the good understanding between them was never better than at the present moment. In this respect we only carried into effect the recommendations of the Commission, and we carried out those recommendations as far as we could. We did not carry them all out, because that would have involved very considerable expense; and, considering that we were spending £5,000,000 or £6,000,000 annually upon the men for the navy and the Reserve, we did not think it advisable to go into further expense on that head. Then, as to docks and basins, we thought it quite necessary that increased docks and basins should be formed, and we added very considerably to our dock accommodation. When we came into Office there was he dock capable of receiving the Warrior. We enlarged one of the docks at Portsmouth, so as to fit it for the accommodation of that vessel. We improved and enlarged other docks both there, at Plymouth, and at other ports, and prepared a plan for the construction of new docks at Chatham and at Portsmouth, the carrying out of which would involve the expenditure of a very considerable sum of money. I had myself seen what had been done by France Toulon, by Italy, and by other Powers; and I was of opinion that we ought to lose no time in adding to our dock and basin accommodation—an opinion which was concurred in by a Committee of the House of Commons, which approved the plans submitted to it by the Board. Therefore, my Lords, I think that as regards men, and docks and basins, we did all that we ought to have done under the circumstances. It would have been unreasonable to go further, because the expenditure of those years was very large. We were obliged to increase our Estimates to meet the demands of the China war, and when we are carrying on a war at a distance of 15,000 miles it is desirable to place such a force in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief as shall enable him to bring that war to a close. That is the best economy, and we succeeded in it. I believe the great force we had in China was the means of bringing that war so speedily to a termination, and convinced the Chinese of the futility of any longer continuing the struggle against England and France. From 1860 till last year we have gone on somewhat reducing our Estimates. For my own part, I never desired to take a larger sum on the annual Estimates than necessary for the maintenance of such a force and for the construction of such vessels as were required for immediate service. While the navy is in a state of transition, I adhere to that opinion. At the same time, I am ready to admit that on this subject you must deal with matters as they are at the time, and as foreign politics may appear to require. That is a question for the Cabinet and not for the Admiralty. What the Board of Admiralty has to do is to maintain such a force as would be sufficient for the purposes required. In regard to the future, I do not expect there will be any great reduction in the Estimates unless there is a reduction of force. I can see no means of making a great reduction of expense without reducing the number of men, and as it is generally admitted that we must have a large fleet I do not imagine there will be any great reduction in the number of men. With respect to guns, I hope our three heavy guns of 6 tons, 9 tons, and 12 tons weight will prove useful and serviceable weapons wherewith to arm our vessels of war. These, my Lords, are the grounds on which I defend the policy which the late Board of Admiralty followed. I think, we went as far in shipbuilding as we were entitled to do, and as to the position of the men and the general condition of the navy, we improved both; although, like all human institutions, the navy is, no doubt, capable of still further improvement. I have not said one word on the patronage of the Admiralty, because no appointments made by me have been ever attacked. There was one appointment, indeed, to which objection was made; that was the appointment of Mr. Reed as Chief Constructor of the Navy. That appointment, of which I am ready to undertake the full responsibility, I made under circumstances that rendered it absolutely necessary. It was necessary to build vessels plated round the water-line, and capable of carrying very heavy armaments; and we asked the department of the Controller to produce lines for certain vessels with proper flotation; but they could only produce them 400 feet long. I was convinced that there must be means of obtaining shorter vessels with the necessary flotation, and I therefore resolved to bring in a new person, and charge him with their construction. I afterwards received from some of the best authorities on the subject of iron construction a report in which they expressed their approval of the skill and ability with which an iron vessel had been put together in one of our dockyards. So far I am justified in the appointment of Mr. Reed, and I hope that the present Board of Admiralty may be equally fortunate in any appointment they may make. Without detaining your Lordships further, I shall now move that there be laid before this House—

"Return of the Number of Ships added to the Royal Navy by building or purchase, stating the Tonnage of each Vessel, from the Year 1860 to 1865 inclusive."—(The Duke of Somerset.)

THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords—Considering the many observations which have been made in certain quarters on the naval administration of the noble Duke, I cannot be at all surprised that he desires to take the earliest opportunity of bringing before your Lordships the state of the navy, and submitting to your Lordships an abstract, at least, of a certain blue-covered pamphlet—with which I believe the noble Duke to be tolerably familiar—written in vindication of the policy which the noble Duke pursued at the Admiralty. Certainly, my Lords, I have no cause to complain of the course which the noble Duke has taken in the vindication—in many respects unnecessary vindication—of his administration of the navy, still less so because, in vindicating his own economical arrangements with regard to the navy, he has laid the ground for future vindication of his successors against any attack of an excess of expenditure arising from circumstances and the progress of events such as the noble Duke has detailed to your Lordships. My Lords, I regret the less my inability to follow the noble Duke through the elaborate details into which he has entered, because I am very far from sharing in the condemnation which has been passed very freely on many portions of the noble Duke's administration. On the contrary, I always believed that the noble Duke was, in the administration of his office, an active, industrious, energetic Minister. I believe, moreover, that the noble Duke brought to the administration of his office a thorough and entire honesty of intention and purpose; and I should be the last man to deny that during the course of the noble Duke's seven years' administration there were many improvements introduced into the system of the navy—improvements of which the more merit belongs to him, because during the whole of that period, as regards ships and guns, the service was in course of transition, which rendered it more difficult for him to deal with the subject; and I should not have thought it necessary to trouble your Lordships with any observations if it had not been for a single remark the noble Duke made at the commencement of his observations, in which he referred to a speech made by a right hon. Friend of mine, the present First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir John Pakington), very soon after he entered on office, with regard to the state of the Navy Reserve. I am sure the noble Duke will do my right hon. Friend the justice to say that during the whole of his administration he never met from him with any factious opposition, or anything but a cordial desire to support the measures which he introduced for the benefit of the navy, and approval of the expenditure which they rendered necessary. Very shortly after my right hon. Friend succeeded to the office of First Lord of the Admiralty a question was asked in the House of Commons as to the state of the Navy Reserve; and my right hon. Friend was obliged to say, in answer, that he regretted to state that he did not find the Navy Reserve in a satisfactory condition, or, indeed, in such a state as he had a right to find them—so much so, that the Admiralty had a difficulty in finding relief for the ships that return from foreign service. If my right hon. Friend wanted any justification for the statement it is to be found in the Report, with which the noble Duke must be more familiar than most of your Lordships. The Report is dated February, 1866; and upon this very point of the insufficiency of the Reserve the Report Btates— The same necessity for employing small vessels would, I apprehend, exist in a future war, and in peace time they are indispensable. And how do we stand? In the last two years there have been lost to the service—paddle-steamers, thirty; screw-steamers, twenty-two; and in the same period fifty-one gunboats have been removed from the navy. To replace these a very few small vessels, already on the stocks, are being completed, and seven of the Amazon class are building. In the meantime, our reserve is inadequate to supply the ordinary reliefs on foreign stations, and should an extra vessel be anywhere required we have not one disposable. The Amazon, as your Lordships will re-collect, is the unfortunate vessel which has since been destroyed by accident. That is the Report, not of a hostile Committee, of the noble Duke's first Naval Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Frederick Grey, at the commencement of the Session of 1866. Consequently, my right hon. Friend the present First Lord of the Admiralty was obliged to say, in answer to a Question put to him in the House of Commons, and not bringing the matter forward in the way of accusation, that the state of the Reserve was not satisfactory, for, according to the language of a member of the preceding Board of Admiralty, the Reserve was not sufficient for the ordinary reliefs on foreign stations, and if one extra vessel were required, there was not one disposable. My right hon. Friend did not put this forward as a charge against the noble Duke; but the Report I have referred to is a complete vindication of the statement which my right hon. Friend could not but make in giving a plain and honest answer to the Question put to him. I need not say I have no objection to furnish the noble Duke with the Returns he asks for, but I would suggest to him that there should be some slight alteration in the form of the Return. The noble Duke, in the latter part of his speech, said he wished for a Return of the number of ships added to the navy, by building or purchase, in each year from 1860 to 1865, and I propose to insert the words "in each year" in the Motion. I hope, too, that the noble Duke will carry the Return down to 1866; for, though the noble Duke is not responsible for the last half year of 1859, as the Estimates were then of his predecessors, he is responsible for the whole of 1866, for which the Estimates were brought forward by his Government. The Return in that form will give a complete detail of the whole number added in each year, and I think this alteration will be necessary in order to make it a complete Return of the state of the navy, as the noble Duke found it, and left it. It is not sufficient to make a Return of the additions made to the navy during that period; we ought to have a corresponding Return of the various vessels withdrawn, sold, lost, or otherwise disposed of within the same period. That will give exactly what the noble Duke requires. The reason why I lay stress on obtaining accounts of each separate year is because I find an extraordinary discrepancy in the amounts of the Estimates for the years in question. I confine my observations entirely to the building of vessels by contract, and I find that in the first five years of the noble Duke's administration of the navy, very large sums were taken; but it is a matter open to question whether in the last two years out of the seven of the noble Duke's administration, sufficient pains were taken by the Admiralty to keep up the stock of vessels of a description fitted for war. The variation in the Estimates is remarkable. For 1860–1 the amount for building by contract was £1,478,000; for 1861–2 it was £1,621,000; for 1862–3 it was £1,470,000; for 1863–it was £867,000; for 1864–5 it was £882,000; for 1865–6 it was £564,000; and for 1867 it was only £318,000. In these two last years the Estimates fall very far below the Estimates for building in the previous years. In 1865–6 the Estimate for an iron-clad vessel was £120,000, but no work was done in that respect, and the money was returned to the Exchequer; and out of the Estimate of £318,000 taken in the last year only £67,000 were expended for new ships. All this time foreign countries, and especially France, were rapidly increasing their navies, and we are told in the Report I have quoted that during the same period no less than fifty-two steamers and fifty-one gunboats were lost to the service. I think, therefore, it is important to see how far the Estimates of the two last years were sufficient to supply the deficiencies occasioned by the ordinary wear and tear of the service. The noble Duke says that the Estimates of the navy depend on the number of men, and that is true to a great extent. The noble Duke added that the Estimates do not depend on the First Lord of the Admiralty; and I can readily imagine that the noble Duke found that during the last years of his administration a very considerable difference of opinion prevailed between the Treasury and the Board of Admiralty with respect to the amount necessary to provide for keeping up the strength of the navy; but I should think there can be no doubt as to the desirableness of replacing the large number of ships that have been withdrawn. Having made these observations in vindication of my right hon. Friend against any supposition that he made a charge against the noble Duke, I can only say that I have listened with great satisfaction to the observations of the noble Duke, and have not the slightest objection to furnish the Returns in the form I have suggested—indeed, I think they will be of very great service.

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET

I have no objection to the addition suggested by the noble Earl in regard to the vessels which have been done away with and disposed of in various ways; but I think it is desirable to state the class to which they belonged, because a mere list of numbers, without stating the character of the ships withdrawn, would be perfectly useless. I cannot suppose for a moment that the noble Earl will argue in favour of restoring the wooden line-of-battle ships withdrawn in 1859. "We had no iron-clad fleet before that time, and therefore no comparison of numbers can afford a fair estimate of the strength of the navy at the two different periods. I presume, also, that notice will be taken, in reference to the expenditure referred to, of the vessels that have been built by contract. For my part, I have latterly wished, whenever an entirely new model is adopted, that the vessel should be constructed in a Government dockyard, for the simple reason that when a vessel is built by contract, we are absolutely bound by the specifications, and in the event of any alteration being required during the building, it is always attended not only with great expense, but with no end of delay. Within the last two years a heavy expense has been incurred in making the small changes and improvements in the class of vessels referred to by the noble Earl.

THE EARL OF DERBY

I agree with the noble Duke that a mere Return of numbers will not give the required information unless the different classes of ships are specified. I also think that the Returns should show as fully as possible not only the vessels which have been sold and otherwise lost in the service, but the alterations that have been made in the different classes of vessels. I hope the noble Duke will not think that I would object to the disposing of old and obsolete vessels. On the contrary, I am of opinion that as soon as it becomes manifest that a ship is no longer serviceable, it should be at once referred to an inspector, so as not to incur any additional or unnecessary expense in maintaining a vessel that is no longer useful.

EARL GREY

said, the last observation made by the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) induced him to express a hope that the construction of the navy was a matter in which the Government would not proceed too fast. Their Lordships must remember that in the Queen's Speech of 1859, Parliament was informed that a large Vote would be asked for the re-construction of the navy. That Vote was explained to be required in consequence of our wooden steam-ships of the line having fallen much below the required state of efficiency. In the debate that followed he (Earl Grey) ventured to protest against the proposed outlay at the time. He stated that it was already known that ships of the line built upon the system then in use would soon turn out to be useless for all the purposes of war. His remonstrance, however, was not listened to, and a considerable number of new ships were laid down at a great expense. Some of them, he believed, had never been completed at all, and some had been finished in a very different way from what was originally designed, and at an increased expense. The whole subject of naval construction was at present in such a state of transition—there was such a strong certainty that the ships of this year would not be the ships of the next five, or, perhaps, even of the next two years—that he held it to be most inexpedient to expend large sums of public money in building ships which they could not be assured would meet the exigencies of war when the time for their service really arrived. He very much doubted—and his doubts were shared by persons of far more knowledge than he could pretend to, whose attention had been carefully directed to the subject—whether our system of building iron-clads would, in the end, turn out to be a wise policy. Their Lordships were very well aware what was the custom in former days with regard to cavalry. Both men and horses were so overloaded with defensive armour that they were almost safe from the blows of an enemy—they were also almost as unable to injure him. By degrees this was seen to be a bad system; armour fell into disuse; and for knights so carefully protected that they had lost the power of offence, it was found advisable to substitute a swift and active cavalry. There seemed to be no small reason for believing that we might be falling into a similar mistake by over weighting our vessels with armour and so crippling their movements. Some of our ablest men maintained that such was the progress of science that very soon no ship we might be able to build would be able to withstand the artillery brought into play, and that it would, therefore, be expedient to proceed upon a different system. He was much inclined to believe that instead of striving at an enormous cost to build iron-plated vessels able to resist the daily increasing power of artillery, it might prove to be better to build vessels of very great speed, carrying one or two of the most powerful guns, and trust to their not being hit to their power of destroying the enemy, rather than their being able to resist their projectiles. This principle, he thought, might very probably turn out to be the correct one as regarded the construction of the navy. At all events he was sure, seeing they were as yet ignorant of what might be the improvements and discoveries made in the future in regard to naval science, that it would be neither wise nor prudent to expend too large sums of money in producing armour-plated ships beyond what were immediately wanted according to our present lights. Tears ago—so far back as the administration of Lord Melbourne—he was very much opposed to building ships of the line without steam power, being convinced that although the means then known of applying steam to the purposes of war were still so defective, it was certain that the progress of science would discover some means of using this most powerful agent in ships of war, and that therefore ships without it would be come useless. But his objections were overruled. It was urged that we were too weak as compared to other Powers in line-of-battle ships, and that more must be built. Large sums were accordingly applied in building ships of that kind, which had proved, as he had ventured to predict, utterly useless. When this became evident, the cry was that we must lose no time in building a large fleet of screw ships of the line to take the place of those that had become obsolete. As he had already mentioned, this was formally recommended to Parliament in the Speech from the Throne in the year 1859, when he again opposed this policy, pointing out that it was already evident that the use of shells must soon make the use of these large wooden ships impossible without extreme danger. In spite of his opposition, however, large sums of money—hundreds of thousands, if not millions—had been spent in building vessels which he had condemned, and which were now admitted to be useless. He must say that the responsibility of these errors rested not with the Admiralty, not even with the Government that might be in power, but with the House of Commons. Whenever there was a great mistake made in the administration, it generally arose from the pressure put upon the Government in the House of Commons, to adopt without due consideration some measure for which there might be a popular cry at the moment, and the consequence had been that there had been a great waste of the public money upon the navy. He ventured to say that if their Lordships went into a careful examination of the money that had been so wasted it would be found that a great part of it was attributable to the House of Commons.

Motion amended and agreed to.

Ordered, That there be laid before this House Return of the Number of Ships added to the Royal Navy by building or purchase, stating the Tonnage of each Vessel, in each Year from the Year 1860 to 1866 inclusive:

A similar Return of all Ships, stating their Description and Tonnage, withdrawn from the Royal Navy by Sale, Loss at Sea, or otherwise, during the same respective Years.—(The Duke of Somerset.)