HL Deb 05 December 1867 vol 190 cc578-97

Paragraph of the Queen's Speech relating to Abyssinia read—

THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords, I can assure you that my object in moving that the paragraph in the Queen's Message should be read is not in the slightest degree to limit the range which any of your Lordships may take in the discussion that may arise on the present Motion; but it is for the purpose of explaining why I do not propose to go back to any previous proceedings connected with this subject, but limit myself to a few remarks upon the Resolution to which I am about to ask your Lordships' assent. My Lords, we are invited by a communication from the Commons to endorse their concurrence in the necessity of an expedition to Abyssinia, and their readiness to co-operate with Her Majesty in her endeavour to release her subjects from captivity, and vindicate the honour of her Crown. The questions arising out of this were, in the first place, is it expedient that the expedition should be sent from India; and, if so, whether it is competent for the Government to avail themselves of any portion of the revenues of India for the purposes of that expedition; and supposing them to be competent, what proportion of the revenues of India ought in fairness to be applied in that way? A further question arises as to the mode in which Parliament should provide for the necessary expenditure; but that question will be dealt with by your Lordships when considering the Motion which stands next upon the Paper—the Income Tax Bill. The question is one which mainly belongs to the House of Commons, and though your Lordships may give a negative to that Bill, you have no power to make any Amendment on it. The first question for our consideration, then, is supposing an expedition to Abyssinia is necessary, is it expedient to send it from India? It is singular that the question as to the expediency of sending the expedition from India has never been raised in the House of Commons, but has been assumed as a matter of course. The motives, however, for so sending it are very clear. In the first place—more especially at the present time—troops can be better spared from India than from Her Majesty's forces in the United Kingdom. In the next place, the base of operations, being necessarily on the Red Sea, is much more convenient of access from India than from this country. When I say that the base of operations is necessarily on the Red Sea, I should explain that if the invasion of Abyssinia had been attempted from any other quarter it would have exposed us to much misconception and have materially increased the expense. I know that we might with much less difficulty, and undoubtedly with much more certainty, have conducted an expedition up the Nile, and I believe the Viceroy would not only have offered us no opposition, but would have been only too happy to co-operate with us. But all who know anything of Abyssinia know that any invasion from the Egyptian side would have at once combined against us all those semi-civilized and semi-Christian tribes who are at present in a state of revolt against King Theodore; for they would immediately believe we had come with the concurrence, if not in the interest, of their hereditary enemies—the inhabitants of Egypt. Apart from all other reasons, this is strong enough for making the attempt from the Red Sea, and if from the Red Sea, then from India. Another consideration in favour of starting from India, is that the troops there are better fitted to endure the climate of Abyssinia than men fresh from England. Colonel Merewether, our Resident at Aden, has expressed his firm conviction from the first that it would be absolutely necessary to adopt this course, and never thought of anything else but an expedition from India. As I have said before, the House of Commons have never entertained any question on the subject, but took it for granted that the expedition was to proceed from India. Then, my Lords, arises the question whether we are entitled to avail ourselves of the Indian revenue, subject to the consent of Parliament, for the purposes of this expedition. That question depends upon the provisions of the India Act of 1858; and although I called your Lordships' attention to this point, upon the first night of the Session, I may be permitted to notice what took place in your Lordships' House when the particular clause in question was under discussion. When the Bill left the Commons there was a clause which provided that it should not be competent for Her Majesty's Government to make use of the troops of India for any foreign service, except under specified circumstances, otherwise than with the consent of Parliament. That clause was subsequently so altered as to create some confusion, and I had the honour of moving in your Lordships' House the clause as it now stands. I at the time said the object was not to prevent Her Majesty from making the same use of Indian troops which she could make of any other troops; but to prevent the charge of a war being thrown upon the revenues of India, thus evading that constitutional control which Parliament exercises over military operations. The object, therefore, of the clause moved by me was to place the troops of India, with regard to the payment of those troops when engaged in foreign expeditions, precisely on the same footing as the ordinary troops of Her Majesty's service. But, as the noble Earl opposite remarked, a continual security exists with regard to the revenues of India, inasmuch as no sum can be expended without the consent of the Council, who are the Guardians of the Indian purse. Consequently, there is a double check upon the employment of these troops upon service foreign to India—first, the consent of the Council of India must be obtained to any such expenditure, and then the consent of Parliament. But not necessarily before the Sovereign has taken the Resolution involving the expenditure. My Lords, it is an undoubted Prerogative of the Crown to enter upon a war, subject only to the consent of Parliament as far as providing the means of paying for the troops employed is concerned; and though the withholding this consent would certainly be an effective barrier to carrying on a war, no one ever pretended that it was necessary for Parliament to be consulted previous to the declaration of war; and in like manner, as it was the intention of Parliament to place the troops of India upon the same footing as troops in England, there is no need for Parliament's consent to the Crown's dealing with them, except as to their payment. And that is the foundation of the Resolution passed by the Commons—it gives effect to the provision of the India Act. The Resolution passed in the House of Commons provides that the ordinary pay of the Indian troops employed shall be defrayed out of the revenues of India—so that India shall be charged with no expenditure which would not have arisen if this expedition had not taken place. There does not appear, in connection with the various occasions in which. Indian troops have been employed and Indian revenues have been applied towards the prosecution of our wars, any precise understanding, or any rule laid down as to the proportion India should bear under such circumstances. In the first China War, in 1839–40, India gave her troops without payment, and subsequently had to increase her forces for the purpose of replacing them, and no allowance was made by the Imperial Government for that. The present arrangement provides that India shall pay for the troops used in the expedition precisely the same amount which she would have paid had they remained in India, and not been lent for the service of the Crown; but if, in consequence of that, it should be necessary to replace those troops, or incur any additional expense, in that case the additional expense shall be borne by the Imperial Exchequer; so that no additional charge will fall upon India. In the Persian War, in 1856, India contributed the whole of the ordinary and half the extraordinary expenses. It may be said that a Persian war is much more closely connected with, the interests of India than either a China war or a war such as that in which we are about to engage, and therefore that it is not unreasonable that she should contribute a larger proportion in the first instance than she should in the two latter. In the third China War, the ordinary and extraordinary expenses were borne by England; but it should be remembered that at the time our troops were engaged in quelling the mutiny in India, and that there were very serious drains made on the Indian revenue; but even in that case, when a demand was subsequently made on the part of the Indian Government for the reimbursement of £189,000 for the ships supplied towards the expedition, that claim was disallowed, and the sum remained an extra charge on the revenues of India. The present arrangement, as your Lordships will, I think, see; is one which is much more favourable to the India revenues than any which have been adopted on previous occasions, and, as such, it has been generally recognised in the other House; for though there was a slight difference of opinion with regard to the propriety of the course which it was proposed to adopt—the numbers, on a division, being 198 in favour of the proposal of the Government, and 23 against—there was not entire unanimity even among the minority, some contending that India had been let off much too cheaply, and ought to contribute a much larger sum. I may add that in respect to vessels supplied by India all the charges for fitting them out and sending them on this expedition will be defrayed from the Imperial revenues, and no additional expense will fall upon India in consequence of this expedition. I have said there was a difference of opinion in the House of Commons as to the proportion of the expense which should fall upon the revenues of India; and though I know that it is not regular to refer to what has occurred in that House, your Lordships will, I trust, pardon the irregularity, because I wish to refer to the frank and handsome manner in which the right hon. Gentleman the late Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Gladstone) supported the proposal of the Government. I cannot help feeling that that support, coming from a quarter not very favourable—or, at all events, not very prejudiced in favour of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government—is very valuable testimony to the judgment which the Government has formed upon this matter. The language employed by the right hon. Gentleman, as reported, was— I confess that on examining this proposal it seems to me, upon the whole, to be moderate in amount, conformable to precedent, with a tendency towards greater leniency than towards greater rigour to India; to be tenable and fair in principle, and therefore one that will meet the justice and equity of the case."—[3 Hansard, cxc. 396.] Now, there has been no difference of opinion as to the propriety of sending the expedition from India, nor has there been any difference of opinion as to whether the revenue could be applied without the consent of Parliament. Clearly it could not; and the only possible question which can now arise is whether the Government have overstepped the limits of the law—for my own part I do not think they have—in incurring, or proposing to incur, expenses before those expenses have received the concurrence of Parliament? I do not think that they have laid themselves open to that charge, because, as I have before said, in the case of English troops there would be no necessity for obtaining the concurrence of Parliament previous to their employment in such an expedition; and all that we have done is to place the Indian troops in the same position, which I take to be the meaning of the Act of 1858.

Moved that this House do concur in the following Resolution, communicated by the Commons; viz., That, Her Majesty having directed a Military Expedition to be despatched against Abyssinia, consisting mainly of Troops both European and Native at present maintained out of the Revenues of India, the ordinary pay of such Troops as well as the ordinary charges of any Vessels belonging to the Government of India that may be employed in the Expedition, which would have been charged upon the Revenues of India if such Troops Or Vessels had remained in that Country or seas adjacent, shall continue to be so chargeable; provided, that if it shall become necessary to replace the Troops or Vessels so withdrawn by other European or Native Forces or Vessels, the expense of raising, maintaining, and providing such Forces or Vessels shall be repaid out of any monies which may be provided by Parliament for the Purposes of the said Expedition."—(The Earl of Derby.)

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

I entirely concur with my noble Friend in the opinion that this expedition, if sent at all, must be sent from India; and I believe that the arrangement made between the Governments of India and England with regard to the payment of expenses is a perfectly equitable one. At the same time, I cannot but regret that it should be found necessary at so early a period after the establishment of the new organization of the Indian army to send any of the troops beyond the seas. I fully admit the justice of this war. According to our views of the Law of Nations, about which the ruler of Abyssinia knows nothing, King Theodore has been guilty of its violation, and has acted not only with injustice but also with cruelty towards several of Her Majesty's subjects, one or more of them being persons accredited to Her Majesty. The war therefore is a perfectly just one. But, my Lords, what is the object of the war? It is certainly one which has never before occurred in history. A large expedition is about to be sent into an unknown and mountainous country, about four times the size of Switzerland, and very much in the same state as that country was at the time Hannibal passed the Alps, to procure the release of some of our countrymen who have been detained for a lengthened period in captivity by a sanguinary tyrant, whose passions are unchecked by any moral or religious considerations, though he appears to be fond of frequently dwelling upon the latter. My apprehension is that the expedition never can succeed in procuring the release of those prisoners. If the ruler of Abyssinia had been a rational person, the ordinary course of proceeding would have been to blockade the coast of his country, and so prevent external communication. But he is not a man of reason, and what I am afraid of is, that we shall produce upon his mind such an impression as the mind of a madman would be liable to, if an attempt were made to coerce him, and that we shall only precipitate a catastrophe such as that which occurred at Cawnpore. In considering any matter of great importance I always endeavour to satisfy myself as to what would have been the opinion of the Duke of Wellington on the subject, and this I endeavour more especially to do when the subject partakes of a military character. Not only looking to the general prudence of the Duke of Wellington, and acting on all occasions in accordance with his military principles, but particularly when I recollect the advice which was given to me by the Duke of Wellington when I was about to proceed to India, with the general direction of the expedition to the coast of China, I cannot come to any other conclusion than that he would have disapproved this expedition. The Duke's advice was, "Remember, the troops depend upon the fleet, and you must never place them in a position in which they will not have easy and secure communication with the fleet." The Duke of Wellington held, moreover, that it was never safe or justifiable to leave any army in a position in which it had not easy and secure communication with the country from which it proceeded. Every army should be in possession of all its communications. It is scarcely possible to conceive anything more unfavourable to this requirement than is to be found in such a country as Abyssinia, where for 400 miles into the interior there are neither roads nor bridges, where the paths are in many places only wide enough to permit the passage of a single mule—a country broken by ravines and water-courses which, in the rainy season, become frightful torrents—it is scarcely to be supposed that in such a country communication by a single outlet can be maintained with the sea. Perhaps I may be permitted to say a few words with respect to the measures which have been adopted by Her Majesty's Ministers with a view to the success of this expedition. I must admit there has been on this side of the sea, and also on the other, very great zeal on the part of all who have had anything to do with the fitting out of the expedition. But, at the same time, we know nothing of what has been done in India. We have on this side a very ample list of all the articles furnished to the troops; but we do not know how the deficiencies have been supplemented from India. I can therefore only look at the list of articles contributed from this country; and I venture to say there are certain things, in the first instance, absolutely necessary to be provided to insure the success of the expedition which are not included in this list. The first is a floating pier, which is absolutely necessary for the landing of the troops and stores. There is but a distance of 200 yards to be passed over; but there are no means of passing it, and neither man nor beast can be landed without a floating pier. An attempt has been made to supply it by a single steamer, making one trip a day to Annesley Bay; and there has also been an effort to make a pier of stones, but it can only be after a long time that a stone pier can be constructed. Something is said in the blue book with respect to a tramway. Either a tramway or a railway is essentially necessary from the point of debarcation to that part of the road which first touches the hills. More than that, water must be conveyed by pipes from the first place on the hills where it is to be obtained to iron tanks placed in depôts on the shore. More than that, it appears that the track of desert country between the sea and the hills is traversed by watercourses, and before the rains begin it is necessary that provision should be made to establish temporary bridges for the purpose of keeping up the communication, otherwise it will be entirely suspended. Aden, although it may provide water enough to the residents, does not supply enough to meet the demands of the troops. It is to be obtained on the eastern shores of the Red Sea, but only by sending skins, which are used for its transport. So far as I have heard, no attempt has been made to supply these. There is a strange deficiency of many other articles which are absolutely necessary to the success of this expedition. It must be in the nature of a pioneer expedition, for they will not find a single road by which they can march, still less by which they can draw artillery. To enable them to make roads they must have the means of blasting rocks, and pickaxes, spades, and axes in large numbers for cutting down wood. The number of axes furnished is only ten—one to every 2,000. The number of billhooks is only fifty, of clasp-knives only twenty-five, of turn-screws at first only six, but fifty have been added, of spades there appeared to be none, of pickaxes none, and, what is more strange, there are no ropes, no blocks to make them, and no pulleys—the ordinary and accustomed modes of raising guns up steep precipices. All these should have been provided. Then there are no hollowed trees, which are also necessary for carrying up the guns up places where they cannot go upon wheels. There are no nails, no bolts, no screws; and, strange enough, although there is a provision of warm clothing sent from here, it seems intended only for Europeans; the Natives require it still more, and unless the deficiency is supplemented from India the Natives will have none. I mention these things with regret, because I think every disposition and great zeal have been shown to supply everything that might be required for the expedition. I confess it is to me a subject of the deepest regret that it has been determined to send this expedition. I regret it, not only because I think it will be perfectly impossible for the troops to maintain their communications, but because I think it is unavoidable that we should be drawn into great and serious complications. We are told that immediately the expeditionary force obtains possession of the captives it will be their duty to withdraw from Abyssinia; but it seems to me that it will be impossible for them with honour at once to withdraw from the country. How can they do so, and leave all the Native tribes who may have assisted them to the mercy of King Theodore? I cannot understand how the feeling of this country would permit such a state of things. But I deeply regret the expedition also on other grounds. It is impossible to look at the position of Europe—at the position of this country, without feeling that the existing state of things is extremely unsatisfactory. There is scarcely any security from week to week that the peace of Europe will not be disturbed. The very last Paper laid on our table satisfies us that we do not yet sustain entirely satisfactory relations with America. In the present state of affairs I hold it to be our first duty to abstain from any movement whatever which would occupy any portion of our military or naval forces, to keep everything at hand that may in the event of necessity be required for our own security or the preservation of peace. I cannot but feel that while this army is in Abyssinia it may be considered as a hostage in the hands of other Powers. We cannot in a war maintain that army and the vast amount of tonnage and transport by which it can be supported. Our dominions are too extensive and make too great demands on our military resources, which have not kept pace with the increase of our possessions. We are paralyzing ourselves, therefore, until that armament is restored to this country. I do deeply regret that Her Majesty's Ministers, deriving no instruction from the mistakes of other Governments, have not been warned against rearing a Mexico of our own.

LORD DE ROS

said, the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) assumed that the army would go headlong into Abyssinia, without retaining its communication with the shore. Now he (Lord de Ros) had great confidence in the military skill and resources of Sir Robert Napier, nor did he apprehend any insurmountable difficulty from the circumstances to which the noble Earl had alluded. His impression was, Sir Robert Napier would form his depôts as he proceeded up the country. His advance would be very light, but his supports very heavy. His noble Friend talked about the necessity of a floating pier. Now he (Lord de Ros) remembered what the French did at Varna—in three or four days they constructed as good a pier as was necessary, and the troops were landed without difficulty. There was, in fact, no difficulty about it. As he understood, the Transport Office had adopted the system which had been employed in the Crimea of uniting large platforms upon boats, and thus making a way over which guns, stores, and troops were landed with the greatest facility. Besides, there were no large guns in this case, and there was no necessity for hollowed trees. Guns of the calibre required would be carried by mules. The mule artillery of Sardinia passed over the Alps with great facility—and, indeed, there was no difficulty with guns of that calibre. Then, as to water, Sir Robert Napier would have to do as General Bosquet did in Turkey; where there are frequent but very small water springs. What did he do? When he came to the springs, instead of carrying iron tanks he formed tanks in the earth and puddled them. The transport of water in skins was perfectly familiar in the East. The noble Earl seemed to apprehend a scarcity of turn-screws; but the fact was that every soldier had a turn-screw in his knapsack; the cavalry also carried nails. The other deficiencies noted by the noble Earl were of so trivial a nature that he could not imagine a man of Sir Robert Napier's ability could fail in taking every possible precaution. He really did not see how the Government could do more than they had done in the arrangement of this expedition. They had confided it to an able man, thoroughly conversant with its details, to whose hands the safety of the expedition might well be intrusted. So far from anticipating any disaster, if they could but succeed in getting the captives, he was perfectly certain of their getting back and maintaining our honour without any serious difficulty whatever.

EARL RUSSELL

With regard to the Resolution of the other House, in which your Lordships are asked to concur, it seems to me that this is a question in which the honour of this country is concerned, and that we could not allow these captives to remain in Abyssinia without an attempt to relieve them, unless it could be shown that the attainment of that object was utterly impracticable. That has not been shown; but, on the contrary, it appears from the information before us that the arrival of the troops at Magdala and the rescue of the captives are practicable objects. Under these circumstances, the Government would have been inexcusable if they did not make an attempt to rescue the captives. The question of the difficulties which may be experienced in the attempt is not a question on which we are able to form an opinion in this House; but I rely on the ability of the persons belonging to the Engineers and to other branches of our army, which are composed of men of resource, and I believe that they will be able to overcome all difficulties. It has been stated that if in some of the narrow passes of Abyssinia a man should be struck down by a sunstroke, or if a mule should fall down dead, the whole expedition would be stopped. Now, I happened to pass through the Pyrenees shortly after the passage of the Duke of Wellington with his army, and I saw places on the sides of the road where mules and horses had fallen down exhausted and had been thrown over the precipices, so little were their dead bodies allowed to impede the progress of the troops. In such a way are difficulties overcome by energy and skill; and I therefore do not think, that the Government will have any cause to repent of the determination they have come to. With regard to the military operations in preparation, I think that Parliament is bound to extend every consideration and forbearance to the Government, who certainly have undertaken a very difficult attempt. The noble Earl near me (the Earl of Ellenborough) has spoken of the difficulty there may be in getting out of Abyssinia when the object of the expedition shall be accomplished. No doubt, in the months of May, June, and July of the next year, the rainy reason—and we see by the travels of Sir Samuel Baker what a deluge it is—will set in; but it is to be hoped that the troops will have returned to the coast before that time. With respect to the amount of the expenditure chargeable on India, though I agree in what has been stated elsewhere with regard to precedents, yet I would observe that we must beware not to push these precedents too far, and we should have consideration for the interests of the people and the Government of India. Supposing that the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and New Zealand had undertaken to maintain and pay in those colonies a portion of the British army (two or three regiments), and that afterwards it was proposed to take the regiments away and employ them in some expedition in which the interests of the Empire at large were concerned, it may be readily supposed that the colonists would at once object to pay for them, and that their constitutional Assemblies would say, "If you take away these troops you must take the payment of them on your own Treasury." It is no reason because the people of India have no representation and no organization to express their complaints that they should be dealt more hardly with than were the people of the Cape or of Australia. I will say nothing further, as the noble Earl has not entered generally into the question; but I must express my opinion that the Government are quite right in undertaking the expedition, and I wish they may be successful.

THE EARL OF DENBIGH

said, he could not but share in the regret that this expedition had been undertaken, not because of the expense which would fall on this country, nor on the probable sacrifice of life, but because, in his view of the case, this war would be only the complement of a lamentable policy, and would add one more stone to the cairn of political crime. He believed that the gravest consequences would ensue from it, and he hoped that their Lordships would allow him a few moments in which to enunciate his opinions. If, as he believed, the detention of Mr. Rassam and his companions was owing to the culpable mismanagement of the noble Earl lately at the head of the Foreign Department, then war would be unjustifiable as well as unjust. He believed that the duty of individuals to one another was applicable to nations. A man who killed another unnecessarily or unlawfully was guilty of murder; and in the same way a war which was unjust, unnecessary, or unlawful, was a crime also; and that crime was murder, and all who were the cause of it were involved in the guilt. An unnecessary war might arise from the incapacity of a statesman from whose policy it ensued, and the guilt of murder would attach to him; hence the necessity of all statesmen looking to the first principles of justice and morality. With regard to the origin of the Abyssinian war, it appeared from the blue book that Mr. Cameron had been condemned by the Foreign Office three or four times for mixing himself up with the internal affairs of Abyssinia, with which he had no business. He (the Earl of Denbigh) asked, why then the Foreign Office did not recall him? If Mr. Cameron had been at that time recalled, we should have heard no more about the matter; but he was left there, and King Theodore, rightly or wrongly, conceived that Mr. Cameron was mixing himself with internal intrigues in that country, and therefore laid hands on him. If the King was justified in doing this, then the present war was not as justifiable as it would appear at first sight. There were other causes. The noble Earl (Earl Russell) received a letter from the King for Her Majesty, and, according to Mr. Flad, the non-answering of that letter was a great cause of irritation to the King. The noble Earl, whose policy was certainly active in dealing with other States, must needs give orders to the Consul at Jerusalem to mix himself up in the intrigues of the Abyssinians and the Copts; and he (the Earl of Denbigh) was astonished when he saw that the reason given was that the Abyssinian Church was in spiritual communion with the Church of England. It was the first time that he had heard of such a thing, and when he examined the question he found that the Abyssinian Church was closely allied to Popery. Whether Mr. Rassam was or was not a proper person to send out with Her Majesty's letter to King Theodore was a question into which he would not enter. Mr. Rassam was sent out, and his capacity was such as to entitle him to respect. He seemed to have been well received. The Emperor granted his petition, and liberated the prisoners. But confusion arose in consequence of the noble Earl writing another despatch, entirely different from that which was forwarded through Mr. Flad by our Consul General at Alexandria, and when the Emperor saw a despatch written in an entirely different sense his suspicions were awakened, and he was led in consequence to imagine that he was betrayed, and seized Mr. Rassam. If this supposition were well-founded, the noble Earl was responsible for all the events of the war. He did not blame the Government for giving their assent to the expedition, which was really forced upon them, and therefore they were entitled to claim co-operation. He considered that the question as to the lawfulness of war was one that ought not to be lost sight of. The circumstances of Europe at the present time were most peculiar and critical. They saw war waged on all sides without any attention to the rules of war. He would ask the Government to act in accordance with the old and time-honoured rules of law—of that International Law which had been so much violated. Not only had International Law been violated, but so had it been with laws human and divine. He had, he might add, heard it suggested that the noble Earl himself should be sent out as a messenger to King Theodore, inasmuch as he was likely to be the person most fitted to explain his own despatches. He could not help expressing his regret that the laws which had been laid down by Vattel, and which had commanded the sanction of all civilized nations, had been so much departed from. That great authority had laid down that unlawful war was as much murder as it was to execute a criminal without a warrant being drawn out. Previous to blood being shed a formal declaration of war ought to be made, and that declaration ought to be formally conveyed by the Sovereign making it to the other Powers. As a supporter of a Conservative Government, he wished to adhere to these laws and to see them carried out.

LORD LYVEDEN

said, he should not on that occasion enter into the question of the expediency of sending out an expedition to rescue the Abyssinian captives. Now, that it had been determined upon, he thought it was desirable that there should be no division among their Lordships as to the necessity of pursuing it with all possible energy. He assented to the proposition that what they were called upon to consider now, was first whether the expedition ought to proceed from India; and secondly, what proportion of the charge ought to be placed on Indian revenue? His own impression was that King Theodore was not the mere savage he was represented to be, for he seemed to be as well acquainted as ourselves with the contents of every newspaper which commented on the subject. It was therefore of importance that he should see that there was no want of unanimity in the British Parliament as to proceedings which should be taken against him. With respect to those proceedings themselves, some reference had been made to the danger of transferring a part of our Indian army away from India to Abyssinia. No doubt this was a matter which required very grave consideration; because it was very possible that evil consequences might result to our own possessions. So also the question as to the proportion in which the charge of the expedition should fall upon Indian revenue. The Government had put the matter upon the old point, of the necessity of keeping up our prestige in India; and the present Secretary of State for India and his predecessor in office (Viscount Cranborne), had disputed much on that point in the other House of Parliament; while on the very important point—the most important of all—the means by which the expedition was to be carried out—the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) had dwelt very strongly. One of the principal points, he might add, for the consideration of the House was, what was the real object of the war? An important paper had been laid upon their Lordships' table some days before bearing upon that point—he alluded to a letter from Lord Stanley to King Theodore, in which he stated that the only means by which the King could preserve his country from war, and his own Power from overthrow, was by delivering up to the British Commander-in-Chief "all the European prisoners." Now, it seemed to him, he must confess, somewhat strange that we should enter upon hostilities for that purpose, and he could not but think that we should be doing quite sufficient if we were to confine our demands to the release of those persons who were British subjects. Again, some of these captives were "specially recommended" to the care of the Commander-in-Chief; but although those words were familiar to him in connection with cattle shows, he could not understand why they had been used in the present instance, and they stood, he thought, in need of some explanation. He would observe that it was important that Sir Robert Napier should have ample diplomatic as well as military power. He should have authority to make a treaty, and to enforce that treaty by arms. As to the question of charging a portion of the expenditure to the Indian Exchequer, he would remind their Lordships that in the case of the Persian War the Ministry then in office, of which he had the honour to be a Member, transferred a part of the charge of that expedition to English resources. Therefore, while he protested against this being called an Indian war, he thought it only fair, under the circumstances, that a part of the expenditure for it should be borne by India. On a former occasion, the noble Earl at the head of the Government declined, and, perhaps, with reason, to give an answer to the question whether our troops should at once be withdrawn if the captives, for whose rescue we are going to war, were delivered up. He thought, however, that on the present occasion it would become the noble Earl to state what were the intentions of the Government in that respect; because if our army was to insist on the release of other persons than British subjects, we might be engaged in war for years to come on account of persons with whom we had nothing to do. On this point it would be as well to bear in mind the remarks attributed to King Theodore as to missionaries from Europe being followed invariably by diplomatic agents, and these again by battalions, and his preference for beginning with battalions.

THE EARL OF HARROWBY

said, he was surprised at the closing observations of the noble Lord who had just sat down. Having incurred so much expense, and run such risk, to send an expedition to Abyssinia, were we to be indifferent to the fate of such European captives as were not our agents? Were the missionaries to be thrown over? If such a suggestion had come from the noble Earl (the Earl of Denbigh), who, in another place, had said he was an Englishman, but more a Catholic than an Englishman, he should not have been so much astonished at it.

THE EARL OF DERBY

I believe, my Lords, from the discussion which has taken place, that there will be no difference of opinion as to acceding to my Motion; and therefore I should not have thought it necessary to offer any observations in reply, had it not been for the observations of my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough), and those of the noble Baron (Lord Lyveden), who subsequently addressed your Lordships. I must, at the same time, say that between the noble Earl and the noble Baron there seems to be some contradiction of opinion. On the one hand, the noble Baron approves the expedition, but greatly regrets that we are sending troops from India. On the other hand, my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough) regrets the expedition; but, at the same time, believes that if an expedition was to be sent, no other troops were available than Indian troops. My noble Friend is so far consistent; and as to his objections against the expedition, I think they have been answered by the speech of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Russell), who, adopting the very fair course taken by his Colleagues in the other House, states his opinion that the honour of this country would not have been satisfied if we had not entered into this war, from which very little credit is to be derived, but which we have been compelled to undertake, not only from feelings of humanity, but also for the purpose of maintaining the national honour. My noble Friend goes on to draw a gloomy picture of the difficulties which we shall have to encounter, and of the want of preparations. He prognosticates nothing but a series of failures and disasters. But, my Lords, I confess I cannot see any real ground for his apprehensions on the subject. From the first we were aware that if this expedition were decided upon we should have to expect many difficulties in carrying it out to a successful issue; but, at the same time, we did not believe those difficulties to be insurmountable. The noble Earl has drawn a very discouraging picture of the country of Abyssinia, of the dangers to be dreaded from the climate, and of the difficulties of transport; but there is no good reason to believe that when you have once reached the plateau the difficulties to be overcome are very greatly diminished. These are questions which have had to be investigated; and they have been investigated hitherto with every prospect of success. Only to-day my right hon. Friend Sir Stafford Northcote received a despatch from the surveying party which contains this statement— We have just returned from a most interesting and important reconnaissance up the pass from Koomoglee to within five miles by road from Senafé, a distance of forty-one miles. There were some very bad places in one part, but the road has been made now by the Sappers easy for passage of cavalry, infantry, mules, and camels; and it will, I think, prove the chief line of route as leading at once to a good position on the highlands of Abyssinia in the direction we have to go, and to a spot within easy reach. Further on the despatch states— The troops that have landed are, I am happy to say, in excellent health and spirits. The 3rd Light Cavalry have been losing horses from fever, but to-day on my arrival here I was glad to find the disease disappearing. It was clearly owing to the effects of the sea voyage from India, and being cooped up on board ship. With regard to the climate of Abyssinia—[The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: I never said a word about climate.] At all events, the noble Earl referred to the water supply. No doubt there is a deficiency of water at Zoula; but there is a considerable supply at some short distance from that place, at fourteen miles distance there is a large and permanent supply, and thence on there is such an abundant supply that there is no reason to think the troops will be in want of this prime necessity. The noble Earl seemed to anticipate some difficulty in the landing of the troops and stores; but every arrangement has been made to facilitate this operation. The noble Earl also spoke of what he considers to be a deficiency in the supply of hatchets, pickaxes, nails and I do not know what; but your Lordships will remember that we have given the Indian Government and Sir Robert Napier—than whom, I believe, there is no one more competent for such a command—full power to get what they may conceive to be necessary for the expedition. We have said to them, "Make your own arrangements. What you require to be supplied from this side of the water we undertake to send to you without delay." A noble Friend near me points my attention to a paragraph in the blue book which the noble Earl seems to have overlooked, comprising a letter from General Turner, Inspector General of Magazines, dated from Simla, in which he says— An ample supply of entrenching tools is required." And he goes on to say—"I propose to send 300 axes, 450 bill-hooks, 750 pickaxes, and other necessary articles, which I collect will supply one third of the force with a due proportion of blasting tools. There is an answer to my noble Friend's accusation that we have allowed the expedition to proceed without a proper supply of these articles. Then the noble Earl says our troops are about to traverse 400 miles of country, and that we must provide for keeping up our line of communication, for keeping open the passes, and supporting our advance. Why, we have taken the very precautions my noble Friend says we have not taken, and it is with that very object we are sending out so considerable a force. To prevent our communication from being cut off in traversing such a length of country a large force is necessary, and we have taken this point fully into consideration. I have taken no part in those details; but on behalf of the Departments concerned in them, I take leave to say that never in the case of any expedition has greater care been taken to supply everything necessary for the success of the operations and for the health and comfort of the troops. Throughout, this has been spoken of as a war. I trust it may not be a war at all. It is an expedition undertaken for the purpose of effecting an object which we believe ourselves called upon to undertake by every sense of honour and duty towards those persons, subjects of the Crown, who were sent out upon an official mission, and who are now detained in captivity. I am very sorry that the noble Lord opposite (Lord Lyveden) should raise the question as to any distinction between those who are subjects of the Crown and those who are not. I can only say that according to International Law we are entitled, strictly speaking, to demand the surrender of our own subjects, and that we are not entitled to demand the subjects of other Powers; yet that a discretionary power has been assigned to Sir Robert Napier—I would rather not distinctly specify here what those orders are—for it would be most lamentable if we were to find ourselves compelled to return with our own subjects, leaving in captivity the missionaries and others. We have only the right, as I have said, to demand, according to International Law, our own subjects; but I do trust and hope that Sir Robert Napier, acting under the instructions that we have forwarded, will find himself perfectly capable of rescuing from captivity the whole of those now detained by the Emperor Theodore. I am not aware that there are any other points in the discussion which it is necessary for me to notice. I can only express my satisfaction at your Lordships' unanimous concurrence in the Resolution adopted by the House of Commons.

Motion agreed to; and a Message sent to the Commons to acquaint them therewith.