COMMITTEE. (Hansard, 8 June 1866)

§ LORD BELPER

rose to move the Amendment of which he had given notice, that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee. He had stated some objections to the Bill on the second reading, and he could not consider the answer which he had then received as satisfactory. The Bill proposed an important change in the constitution of the Audit Board, and the principal question which their Lordships had to consider was whether the duties of audit could be better performed by a Board as hitherto, or by a single individual as proposed by the Bill? The Lord President bad referred to the constitution of other public departments as an authority for the present measure. But it must be remembered that those departments had been constituted for executive or administrative purposes, whereas the Audit Board possessed no executive powers, but was entirely a deliberative body; and it was important that this distinction should not be overlooked. He should endeavour to show—First, that the duties of the Audit Board were such as could not be satisfactorily discharged by a single person; and second, that even were this possible, that person would not be in a position to exercise due control over other departments, and to resist the pressure which would be brought to bear upon him. He would shortly explain the nature of the duties of the Board. The examination of the public accounts was in the first instance intrusted to inspectors with the assistance of clerks, whose duty it was to ascertain—First, that there was due previous authority for making every payment; and second, that there was a proper receipt or voucher for every payment when made. But questions of some difficulty and importance often arose in the performance of these duties. There might be doubts as to the construction of the Act of Parliament containing the authority for the payment; or in cases where an ordinary voucher could not be produced, questions might arise as to the evidence of the payment which should be required; or, lastly, the payment might, on the face of it, appear to be so extravagant or improper as to require further explanation. In these, and all similar cases, the question was referred for the decision of the Board,—in ordinary cases to two of the Commis- 17 sioners; but in all questions of difficulty or importance to the whole Board. The question was then fully considered and discussed, and the decision of the Board was given in writing and was signed by the Commissioners. Under the Bill it was proposed that the whole of these duties should be transferred to one man—namely, the Auditor General; the Assistant Auditor being authorized to act only in the absence of the Auditor General. It would be for their Lordships to consider how far it would be practicable for these duties to be performed by a single officer, who would thus be deprived of the advantage of consulting with colleagues equally responsible with himself, and of hearing the question thoroughly sifted and discussed by intelligent men of different views. He was assured by those who must be best qualified to form an opinion on this subject, that it was impossible that these duties could be satisfactorily performed in such a manner. He might also refer to the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on Public Monies, which sat a few years ago, and which inquired very fully into the duties of the Board of Audit. This Committee made no recommendation for reducing the number of the Commissioners; but, on the contrary, it had been stated by the noble Lord near him (Lord Northbrook) on the second reading of the Bill, who spoke with authority as Chairman of the Committee, that in the opinion of the Committee the Board would require to be strengthened in case additional duties should be thrown upon it. If, therefore, he might thus assume that four Commissioners were not more than sufficient for the discharge of these duties at present, how were they to be satisfactorily performed by a single person? It was true that the Auditor General might get through his business by signing, after little inquiry, the papers which might be laid before him by the Inspectors; but it would be for their Lordships to consider how far it would be desirable that the decision of these important questions should be practically left to subordinate officers, who were subject to no responsibility in such matters, and who had been appointed with a view to very different duties. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that these duties could be satisfactorily performed by a single person, how could it be expected that any one man could resist the pressure that would be brought to 18 bear upon him, or could act as an effective check and control on the Treasury and other great public departments? When an important question has been fully discussed by four intelligent men, differing probably in their politics and characters of mind, they have come to a unanimous decision, which has been recorded in writing with their signatures attached to it, it must be difficult to set aside such a decision. The members of such a Board will be a check upon, and also a support to, each other in the performance of their unpopular duties. But how could any single person set himself in opposition to the Treasury on any such question? He might reasonably distrust his own opinion when he found it opposed by such an authority as the Treasury; and he would feel that it would not be likely to have weight either with Parliament or the public. If it was intended to make the Audit Department entirely subordinate to the Treasury, the Bill would, no doubt, have that effect; but if it was desired to uphold its independent jurisdiction as a check and control on the Treasury and other departments, he believed that the Bill would be an entire failure. It was obvious from the Report of the Committee on Public Monies, to which he had already referred, that that Committee had never contemplated the abolition of the Board; and he thought that he was justified in assuming that they would have been opposed to its abolition altogether. It was true that that measure had been approved by the Committee on Public Accounts, though on what grounds they had come to that conclusion did not appear. But even that Committee had never recommended a single Auditor. The Bill, as reported by that Committee, contained provisions for the appointment of two Auditors under the names of Auditor General and Assistant Auditor, who were both to hold patent offices, and to possess co-ordinate jurisdiction; but the Bill had afterwards been altered in the House of Commons so as to deprive the Assistant Auditor of all such powers, and to confine his functions to the representation of the Auditor General in his absence. It seemed strange that, when two Auditors were considered necessary for the accounts of every joint-stock company and charitable institution throughout the country, the duty of superintending the audit of the public accounts of this great nation, and of deciding all questions relating to them, should be intrusted to a single person. 19 Before he sat down he would briefly refer to other clauses of the Bill which confirmed him in his apprehension that it was intended to render the Audit Department subordinate to the Treasury. The Public Monies Committee had spoken of the Audit Board as a great Department of the State which was responsible to Parliament alone, and they had accordingly recommended that the Board should communicate with Parliament direct. But by the Bill it is expressly enacted that they shall communicate with Parliament only through the Treasury. There are also various other clauses giving the Treasury the power of directing them, and interfering with them, in the performance of their duties. He thought it right also to call their Lordships' attention to the fact that by this Bill it was proposed to unite permanently the office of Comptroller of the Exchequer with that of Auditor General. The question of the union of these two offices had been very fully considered by the Committee on Public Monies, who had come to a different conclusion. He thought, therefore, that the grounds upon which their decision was to be set aside ought to be explained. The question, however, to which he more particularly wished to call the attention of their Lordships was that of the abolition of the Board of Audit. Previously to the establishment of that Board, the subject had been fully considered by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Huskisson, and the Bill for its establishment was carried by Lord Henry Petty sixty years ago. During that time the system was admitted to have worked well, and to have been a great improvement on the previous system; and he would be sorry to see the present Board abolished unless it could be shown that a better tribunal would be substituted in its place. As it would be impossible to consider the details of such a Bill in the whole House, he proposed to refer the Bill to a Select Committee. He had been told that the alteration of the Bill by their Lordships would be inconsistent with the privileges of the House of Commons. But if that should prove to be so, and if the Bill should be found in the Committee to be liable to the objections which he had stated, he was of opinion that it would be much better to withdraw the Bill altogether, and to introduce an amended measure hereafter. In conclusion, he wished to state that he had felt great reluctance in addressing their Lordships on this subject, and that 20 he had done so only under a strong sense of duty.

§ EARL GRANVILLE

said, he fully concurred with the noble Lord as to the importance of the subject, but he thought the arguments employed by the noble Lord were insufficient to convince their Lordships of the inexpediency of adopting the course he proposed. He had it from the highest authority in their Lordships' House and in another place that there was hardly any alteration they could make in the Bill which would not involve its rejection as an interference with the privileges of the other House. The Bill dealt with the audit of Public Accounts, and that was a function which belonged peculiarly and primarily to the House of Commons, by whom the provisions of the measure had been fully discussed at each of its various stages. It had also received consideration, he believed, at the hands of the Public Monies Committee, composed of such men as Mr. Bouverie, Mr. Laing, Sir Stafford North-cote, Mr. Walpole, and other Gentlemen, who had paid great attention to the subject. He thought, therefore, that if their Lordships did deem it necessary to make any alterations in the measure, such as were likely to induce its rejection by the House of Commons, it was due to the other House that such alterations should be proposed and discussed where their opinions were heard, rather than that they should be made in a Committee upstairs, where their decisions constituted the only information afforded to the public. There could be no objection to the Report going through the Treasury, instead of going direct to the House of Commons through the Board of Audit, as it would be impossible for the Treasury to garble such a document. At all events, the matter was not of sufficient importance to be made the ground for endangering the Bill. Another question of more importance related to the proposal for the combination of the offices of the Comptroller of the Exchequer and the Board of Audit. The matter had been fully considered by the Public Monies Committee, and, with the exception of Sir George Bowyer, scarcely anybody would agree with the noble Lord behind in the strong opinions he held upon the question. The weight of authority was decidedly against the separation. The other impor- 21 tant point that was raised by the noble Lord was whether it was right that a single person, with an Assistant, should be substituted for a Board. On this subject he must repeat the opinion he had expressed on the previous evening—namely, that where it was necessary that knowledge of a special and different character should be represented at the head of a Department—such as the Admiralty or the Indian Department, a Board might possibly be desirable—though even that was a question on which different views might be entertained; but that where as in the present case the duties to be performed, although difficult, were straightforward and uniform, they would be best discharged by an individual. From his own experience, and the experience of almost all with whom he had conferred on the subject, the responsibility of the office would be much more deeply felt when thrown upon one single individual than when shared by four, five, or six persons. The noble Lord said the other day that the duties of the Audit Board had been greatly increased of late, and that, therefore, an individual would not be capable of properly discharging them. It should not, however, be forgotten that the head of the Department would be assisted by inspectors, examiners of accounts, and assistant examiners of accounts, by whom all the business would be prepared for the eye of the chief. The noble Earl (Earl Granville) said the other day that the difficult questions arising in the Department were decided by a Committee of either two or four Members of the Board; but in truth they were usually determined by a Committee of one Member of the Board. But it was quite clear that when the business was brought up to a certain stage one competent man assisted by a highly paid subordinate could easily perform all the duties that would be required of him. The noble Lord (Lord Belper) had also suggested the possibility that if an individual were substituted for the Board he might not be able to endure the pressure which would be periodically put upon him by the Treasury. The noble Lord had requested him to consult the officers of the Audit Board as to the pressure put upon that Department in getting up the Report of the Public Accounts for Parliament. He had not spoken to those officers upon the subject, but he was authorized to state that the Report was drawn up exclusively by two Gentlemen connected with the Department, one being Mr. Macaulay, who had written with so 22 much ability upon the subject of finance, and the other being Mr. Vine, who was well known to be thoroughly conversant with the subject he had to deal with. Under these circumstances, the extra pressure would not be felt by the individual at the head of the Department. The noble Lord further argued that the decisions of a Board carried more weight than did those of an individual: but surely the instances of the Courts of Law, where single Judges sat daily to decide most important judicial questions, was a sufficient answer to such an argument. The House of Commons, whatever opinions they might formerly have entertained upon the subject, were now almost unanimously in favour of the Bill, and the Committee of the House which had passed a Resolution in favour of an Amendment rather adverse to its principle had since informed the Chancellor of the Exchequer that they now desired that the Bill should proceed in its present form. It had been suggested that the Department should be under the control of two persons having equal authority; but if the business were to be properly conducted, it must be conducted by one responsible head. The Bill proposed to substitute for a Board a person of high position, who would receive a large salary, who would be responsible to Parliament for the manner in which he performed his duties, and who would hold his office for life. He appealed to their Lordships whether it was desirable to send the Bill before a Select Committee, after the opinion that had been expressed in its favour by the House of Commons.