HL Deb 23 July 1866 vol 184 cc1269-74
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE

said, he wished to ask a question of his noble Friend at the head of the Government on a subject on which it was necessary that Parliament and the country should be accurately informed—he wished to ask his noble Friend, What steps the Government had taken in reference to any negotiations with or any propositions made to any of the belligerent Powers, either as to a cessation of hostilities, or as to preliminaries of terms of peace. He gathered from the speech of the noble Earl on Friday night last, that the Government had acted in entire conformity with the announcement they had made of their policy not to interfere so as in any way to compromise this country, or to pledge themselves to any propositions whatever, unless they had reason to think that the propositions would be acceptable to the belligerent Powers, and would lead to the establishment of peace. Upon reading the speech made by the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on Friday night, he understood that speech also to indicate the line of policy which had been announced by the noble Earl. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) said— The sole diplomatic act they have taken—and it was almost the first they had to perform—was that of supporting at Florence and Berlin the proposition for a temporary cessation of hostilities. It seemed to us that to support that was on our part simply an act of humanity and common sense. He did not gather from the reading of those words nor from anything said by the noble Earl that the British Government had given any opinion as to the terms upon which peace was to be concluded. He understood that that question was left entirely open. But it appeared that the noble Earl the late Foreign Secretary (Earl Russell), speaking on Saturday night at the dinner by which the Cobden Club was inaugurated, expressed regret that the British Government should have been a party to terms which he considered were offensive to the Italian people. Without going into any other question, he thought it was right that they should understand as a matter of fact how the case stood. Had the British Government proposed or supported any terms for an armistice or for a peace, and how far were we committed by the expression of any opinion upon the conditions or provisions which it would be desirable to adopt in the present position of affairs? He would be glad if the noble Earl at the head of the Government would give them some explanation.

THE EARL OF DERBY

I should have thought that the noble Marquess ought to have addressed himself, in the first instance, to the noble Earl opposite (Earl Russell) by putting a question founded on the speech said to have been made by the noble Earl on a recent occasion, and as to which I shall be glad to ask the noble Earl whether he is correctly reported to have made use of these words— No doubt the Emperor of the French, anxious for peace—desirous to restore peace to Europe—acted, I have no doubt, with the best motives when he proposed an armistice on that occasion to Italy and to Prussia. But the terms did not look promising; they could not but be distasteful to Italy, and, for my part, I regret that, however commendable on the part of the Emperor of the French that offer might be, an English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have gone shares in that proposition, and should thus have done that which must be offensive to the Italian people. Perhaps the noble Earl will have the goodness to say whether that is a correct report of what he said.

EARL RUSSELL

Yes, that is a correct report of what I said. I may as well state, in explanation, that I did not understand at all that the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department had said the Government were parties to any proposed terms of peace, but only to proposals for an armistice. The words used by Lord Stanley clearly expressed the meaning that the Government, while assenting to the proposal that they should join in asking for an armistice, did not pledge themselves with regard to any terms of peace.

THE EARL OF DERBY

I confess I can hardly reconcile the interpretation given by the noble Earl with his statement that what has been read is a correct report of his speech. He therein expresses his regret that a British Secretary of State should have given his sanction to terms which he knew must be offensive to the Italian people. Under the circumstances in which this speech was made, I should not have taken notice of it, notwithstanding the high authority from which it comes, if it had not been for the question put by the noble Marquess. That speech was made at a species of political picnic, which was held on Saturday last, for the purpose, in the first instance, of doing honour to the memory of the late Mr. Cobden, and, in the next place, of inaugurating a club to be called the Cobden Club. From the names of those who were present, and more especially from the names of those who were to form the committee, it appeared to me that the Club consisted, in conjunction with Mr. Gladstone and the noble Earl, chiefly of the most advanced section of Liberal politicians. By that audience the noble Earl's health was drunk; and in returning thanks he thought it necessary to deal with the matter with regard to which the noble Marquess has put his question. The circumstances of the case are briefly these:—On the first day upon which we accepted office—even before we had returned from Windsor from accepting office—the French Ambassador called at the Foreign Office, and had communicated to the Under Secretary of State an arrangement which had been made between France and Austria and gave him copies of the letter which the Emperor of the French had addressed to the Kings of Prussia and Italy, communicating to them the fact of the cession of Venetia to France. That was accompanied by no observations at all. Later in the day Count de Latour d'Auvergne called at the Foreign Office and stated that he had received a telegraphic communication from the Emperor, in which he requested that we would unite our good offices to his through our Ministers at Berlin and at Florence, for the purpose of obtaining an armistice and stopping the effusion of blood. That telegram was communicated to us immediately after our return from Windsor on the first day we took office. In conformity with the determination we had come to not to interfere in any manner with regard to any terms, we simply complied—as we thought it was our duty—with the application made on the part of the French Government, and instructed our Ministers at Berlin and Florence to co-operate with the French Government to obtain, if possible, an armistice, and endeavour to ascertain whether any terms of ultimate peace could be agreed upon. I need not say that, in dealing with the proposal of an armistice, we expressed no opinion whatever with regard to any political questions; but, having received the simple intelligence that the cession of Venetia to France was a fait accompli, we did not think it was consistent with our duty to make any representation to Austria or France that Venetia ought to have been ceded to Italy or that France ought not to have accepted it from Austria; nor did we consider whether the mode adopted by Austria of ceding Venetia was or was not likely to be agreeable to the Italian people. I do not hesitate to say I can easily imagine that the mode which was adopted of ceding Venetia by giving it to France and not to Italy, was not likely to conciliate the people of Italy, and that they may feel their amour-propre considerably wounded at finding that they have obtained that which they desired to obtain by their own arms rather by the aid of the arms of Prussia and the diplomacy of France. But that was a question into which, as it seemed to us, we had no right to enter. Our object was simply and solely, if possible, to stop the effusion of blood and to prepare the way for a peaceable agreement between the belligerents. It is perfectly well known that that endeavour on the part of France and ourselves failed in its object—an armistice was not agreed to; and from that time to the present the whole attempt at mediation has been solely and entirely in the hands of the Emperor of the French. We have taken no part whatever in the proposition of any terms nor in the giving of any advice. We have not been asked for advice, and we have not offered any. We have taken no part whatever in the negotiations which have taken place between the Emperor of the French and the various belligerents. We have simply stood aloof, waiting for any opportunity which might occur to interpose our good offices, if they should be required, towards the restoration of peace; but we have had nothing whatever to do with any terms which may have been offered or accepted between any of the belligerents. That is the state of the case at present. The Emperor of the French has taken upon himself to mediate between the contending parties; at one time his mediation did not seem likely to be successful; but it affords me the greatest satisfaction to be able to say that we received a telegram last night which said that, since the five days' armistice had been agreed upon, preliminaries of peace had been accepted both by Prussia and Austria. The telegram, however, did not state precisely what were the terms of those preliminaries of peace. This morning we have a fresh communication which states that Baron Ricasoli had returned perfectly satisfied and ready to accept the conditions offered to Italy. I, therefore, think we may venture to entertain the sanguine expectation that the horrors of the war are now over. I can only hope and trust that diplomacy may effect, upon whatever terms, at all events a peaceable if not an altogether satisfactory solution of a question which at one time threatened to involve Europe in a very long and a very sanguinary war.

EARL RUSSELL

I must repeat that what I said on Saturday night had reference to the statement made by Lord Stanley respecting an armistice, and had no reference whatever to the terms of peace. Venetia had been ceded to France, and an armistice was proposed; but it seems to me it is illusory to propose an armistice without preliminaries of peace, and it is not likely that the King of Prussia would stop in his victorious career upon a mere request for an armistice without any agreement as to the preliminaries of peace. If I have understood the noble Earl correctly, that the preliminaries of peace have been so far accepted as to give hopes for the restoration of peace, no one can rejoice more that I shall at the event.

THE EARL OF DERBY

The authority upon which I state that preliminaries of peace have been accepted is a telegram received from Lord Cowley after direct communication with the Emperor of the French. With regard to the observations of the noble Earl, I confess I do not see their force. I do not understand how, if it were commendable for the Emperor of the French to offer these propositions it can be a matter for regret that the English Secretary of State should have endeavoured to give effect to the views of the Emperor.

EARL RUSSELL

The noble Earl will perhaps permit me to explain somewhat further. I think that the Emperor of the French having made a proposition for an armistice it was very natural and proper for the King of Prussia to reply, "I cannot accept this armistice, which is merely to give time to my enemy to recruit his forces and recover strength; but if the proposal for an armistice were coupled with other proposals, to serve as satisfactory preliminaries of peace, I could then agree to an armistice." I have just read, before coming down to the House, an account of the proceedings of the Emperor Napoleon the First, after the battle of Austerlitz. It states that the Emperor of Austria and Napoleon met, and, after conversing for two hours, they agreed at once to an armistice, and the result was that peace was concluded in a few days. It is perfectly conceivable that, preliminaries of peace having been agreed to, an armistice was possible, in the hope that peace would be concluded in a few days; but it is not conceivable that two belligerents, one being victorious over the other, should have agreed to an armistice without preliminaries of peace having been arranged.