LORD CAMPBELLrose to call the Attention of the House to the Correspondence upon Denmark and Germany which has been presented to Parliament; and to move—
That, in the Opinion of this House, if the Demand made by Denmark for Mediation, according to the Principle laid down in the Protocol of Paris, 1856, had been more decidedly supported by Her Majesty's Government, the Bloodshed and the other Evils already occasioned by the War in Denmark might have been prevented, and there would have been less Danger than there now is of a more extensive Disturbance in the Peace of Europe:That, in the Opinion of this House, a Conference upon the Danish Question in order to lead to a practical Result ought to be accompanied by such Steps as may convince the Powers of Europe that Her Majesty's Government adhere to the Treaties in which the Duchy of Schleswig has been guaranteed to Denmark by Great Britain.My Lords, before adverting to the Resolutions I have put upon the paper, I cannot but thank the noble Earl on the cross benches (Earl Grey), for the declaration he elicited from the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary on Thursday last. I shall venture also to congratulate that noble Lord himself, on having, by what he then said, withdrawn, so far as it depended on him, all obstacles to Parliamentary debate upon this question. At no time, looking to the facts, was debate more practical and called for. A Conference impends. The very day is mentioned. As things stand, all the world proclaims its uselessness, and counts upon its failure. And it is certain that nothing will be done to give it better prospects of succeeding, unless Parliament is brought to bear on the Executive. Can it be said that Parliament by interfering will embarrass a proceeding which is doomed to fail, unless Parliament in some degree controls it. We cannot forget either that debate was long averted because the papers were not all completed; that the last of the series has only just been given to us at the very moment that the Conference is mentioned. If, under such circumstances, the Conference were made a pretext for arresting all discussion, it might well appear to be intended for that purpose; unequal as it seems to the accomplishment of any other.723 My Lords, the first Resolution merely recites that, if the principle of arbitration laid down in the protocol of Paris 1856 had been insisted on more gravely by Great Britain, the existing bloodshed might have been prevented. And it cannot be denied, that the Danish Government impressed that principle upon our own. They did so in a despatch from Bishop Monrad, the First Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Bille, the Danish representative in London, dated January 5, 1854, to be found at page 523, of No. 4 in the correspondence. It cannot be said from what appears before us—it might, perhaps, from what is hidden —that Her Majesty's Government have acted on the doctrine so enforced. The despatch of Bishop Monrad is given both in French and English, and, therefore, we have no excuse for overlooking it. My Lords, this Resolution would not, I trust, appear an exaggerated tribute to the principle laid down in the Treaty of Paris. It cannot escape the House that that principle has never yet been recognized in action. There seems to be a steady disposition to overlook and to ignore it, whenever any opportunity occurs of giving it effect. The second Resolution states what is very obvious, that some further steps are necessary to give the Conference the prospect of succeeding it does not now enjoy. But in order to pave the way for such a proposition, it seems but natural and just to pass a guarded and a moderate opinion on the past diplomacy which this transaction has elicited. Had that diplomacy been one unbroken scene of tact, of energy, and of achievement, it might be uncalled for in the House to betray solicitude about the issue of the Conference. Unless what has lately happened afforded topics of regret, it might seem harsh to give an admonition on the future. Abrupt and irrelevant advice no doubt verges upon censure, at least it claims superiority. At the same time—harmonizing as they do—the Resolutions are independent of each other. The second may commend itself to those whose feelings are a bar to the reception of the other, and as the second bears upon the vital question of what ought to be done, my subsequent remarks shall be exclusively directed to it. And the very first point to be remarked is that the Conference abounds in elements of failure. What Power goes into it with any disposition to assist us? Austria and Prussia no longer profess a regard for the Treaty of 1852. 724 The Cabinet of St. Petersburg is too much allied with those of Berlin and Vienna to be counted on. Prince Gortschak off has declared in the very papers now before us, that they are acting, and that they ought to act in concert. All Europe recognizes the alliance, and sees that Poland is its victim. While Austria and Prussia are essential to the Czar, as regards the insurrection he is struggling with, he is not likely to control them. Can we rely on France when the language of its Government has more than once discouraged any Conference as useless; when they disclaim adherence to the Treaty of 1852, and point to universal suffrage in the Danish Duchies as the means of a solution? Sweden, no doubt, may be faithful to the objects we pursue. But it is clear, in spite of her support, that if France and Prussia and the German Powers are adverse or indifferent, the burden of the Conference is thrown upon Great Britain. The burden might not be too great, if the other Powers were convinced of her unalterable loyalty to the treaties which were framed to secure the integrity of Denmark. But can they do so at this moment? The language of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, in this House on February 15, and his despatch of February 19 about the guarantee of Schleswig, make it utterly impossible. They may he chosen from a mass of evidence converging to the point that Her Majesty's Government, although they are not ready to dispute the obligations of the treaties, are not obedient to their spirit, or prepared for their demands. But as a crowning test of how far a satisfactory solution can be expected from the Conference, have we any reason to suppose that the Danish Government anticipate it? Are there not abundant signs of the despair with which they enter it? And do they not correctly represent the Danish people in that feeling. The temper of that people is not a melancholy or desponding one. Hope seems to have a larger place than fear in their complexion. But in all climes and all societies, men fighting against odds, and overwhelmed by embarrassments, will catch at frail, inadequate, and evanescent means of a deliverance. The scepticism with which the Danish Government and people look upon this measure augurs badly for its efficacy; since they would be the first to overrate the chances it includes. It is not irrelevant to ask, therefore, will the obligations of Great Britain be answered by an unsuccessful 725 Conference? The obligations of the country, no doubt, are founded upon treaties. But these books contain facts which seriously heighten them. It is now seen that the despatch of September, 1862, raised the German spirit of encroachment, and acted in a manner most disastrous to the interests of Denmark. It is seen that the Danish Government were eager for the Congress which the Emperor of the French proposed, and to which Great Britain was an obstacle. In deference to our views, and in reliance on our action, the Danish Government revoked the proclamation upon Holstein of March 30, and made concessions well remembered by the world. The attack of the noble Lord on the Danish Constitution of November 18, and which is found in a despatch to Lord Wodehouse dated December 17, could not but do much to aggravate their difficulties, and to encourage their assailants. It certainly appears a harsh and also a gratuitous proceeding, since the question is most intricate, is altogether Danish, and one on which the Foreign Office has no mission to decide. Can it be said that we have any measures in reserve to provide against the failure of the Conference? And if it cannot, will an unsuccessful Conference fulfil the obligations which the treaties have imposed and circumstances have extended. But will the dignity of the country bear an unsuccessful Conference, Our diplomacy has now gone through a series of reverses on this question, which it would be invidious to enumerate and dangerous to increase. The Conference is not a French, a Russian, a German, or a Danish, but a British proposition. The reluctant and desponding Powers are dragged into it, not indeed by British force, but British importunity. Its failure will not be divided. But there is also this to be considered. To meet the Austrian and Prussian representatives, while the aggression we denounce is still proceeding to its climax, while Schleswig is disorganized and trampled on, while Sönderburg is under a bombardment, is not entirely consistent with the attitude of protest and remonstrance. It verges more upon indulgence of the crime which is going on. Success is indispensable to requite Great Britain for the loss of pride she undergoes in entering the Conference, and to guard against the new misfortune which its failure would imply.
But will the tranquillity of Europe lose nothing by an unsuccessful Conference? If no result arises from it, the war in 726 Denmark only seems to have a choice of dangerous terminations. If it ends in the dismemberment of that ancient monarchy, Europe receives a blow, the balance of power suffers, and new causes of hostility arise. If France or Russia intervenes, no man can calculate the limits of the struggle. Again, unless it ends in a solution, a Conference—according to the reasoning of the noble Lord upon the project of the Emperor—must leave behind it seeds of animosity and discord. An unsuccessful Conference would therefore seem to menace the general tranquillity of Europe, as well as to run counter to the duties and impeach the honour of this country.
My Lords, I have already ventured to advert to the conditions of succeeding— namely, that as all depends upon Great Britain in the Conference, the other Powers should be convinced of her unwavering adherence to the treaties by which Schleswig is maintained. And there is more than one mode by which the condition may be satisfied. A diplomatic manifesto, wholly different in its spirit from that of the noble Lord on February 19th, or an instruction to the British representatives at Berlin and Vienna, similar to that which Lord Westmoreland received in 1848, might very possibly inspire the necessary confidence. But after the despatches which have already gone abroad, such expedient would hardly be admissible. At least, the presence of the noble Lord as Foreign Secretary, would be a fatal bar to their effect. The noble Lord is now associated with the despatch of September 1862, which all the world regarded as a German one in spirit— with the despatch of February 19th, which tries to evade the guarantee when Denmark had insisted on it—with the attack upon the Danish Constitution, which he hurled against it in December—with the refusal of the Congress, at which the whole of Germany rejoiced. Right or wrong, the noble Lord is not regarded as the friend of Denmark on the Continent of Europe. Diplomatic measures would not, therefore, have the necessary influence. But does it follow that the noble Lord ought to deprive the country of his assiduous services and well meaning exertions? Another course presents itself. A British fleet appearing in the Baltic—although the noble Lord was still the Foreign Secretary—would make the powerful impression which is wanted, assure the world that our engagements to Denmark had not been forgotten, and so pave the way for the results 727 to which the Conference aspires. But having barely indicated such a course, I would ask leave to guard myself against absolute concurrence in all that has been said in this House and elsewhere upon the subject. Some noble Lords have recommended, that in order to protect Sönderborg, a fleet ought to be despatched into the Baltic. It has also been advanced that the Austrian and Prussian ships, if they appear, ought to be watched, pursued, and hindered, in those waters. Intelligent observers out of doors have held that a naval force established in the Little Belt would be a proper step to guard the island of Funen. By some who have lately quitted it, it is thought that Flensburg might be usefully selected as a maritime position for our vessels. But all these measures are attended with a hazard of collision. Such a remark would not be applicable to the presence of a British fleet in the port of Kiel, unless the Danish Government objected to the proceeding. No one will deny, that were this course pursued, Great Britain would command a higher aspect at the Conference than belongs to her at present. But there is also this distinct consideration. It is known to every one conversant with the subject, and it is clear too from these papers, that Prussia has been drawn into this war, in some degree by other motives, but in a great degree by maritime ambition, to which Kiel is indispensable. As soon as it is seen that that point is wholly unattainable, maritime ambition ceases to prolong the strife; the motives which govern Prussia no longer exceed the motives which govern Austria; both the German Powers are impelled against Denmark by the fear of a popular opinion, which gradually exhausts itself. Neither are lured on by the hope of a material advantage, which sentiment would otherwise remain. The upshot appears to be, that Great Britain would rise in power to control the war, as much as Prussia sank in aspiration to pursue it. The Conference would then have, what it now appears to want, the prospect of succeeding. Would such a mode of acting lead to war? As I contend, it would be more likely to avert it. Those who raise a pacific cry the moment any naval demonstration is suggested, assume this paradox as granted —namely, that timid counsels always lead to peace, and that decisive measures always tend to conflagration. Would such a paradox if nakedly advanced, instead of co- 728 vertly assumed, be tolerated for a moment? Have not the events of our own time sufficiently refuted it? If timid schemes, or fair spoken despatches, or amiable remonstrances were a security for peace, why is Northern Europe now in flagrant war, and Southern Europe looking for it? Can we forget that, in 1826, Mr. Canning and his colleagues averted war by sending an expedition to the Tagus? Can we forget that the reserve and hesitation, not unconnected with sagacity which in 1853 withheld the fleet from the Black Sea when Colonel Rose demanded it, never led to the advantages they counted on; and that the ships of the Allies were only in the Bosphorus when the disaster of Sinope made war with Russia unavoidable. No one who reflects upon American affairs and the constant risks to which their civil war exposes us, and which in 1862 were narrowly escaped, could recommend a step adapted to involve Great Britain in a war upon the Continent. But to send a fleet to Kiel may have a very different operation. Suppose, in consequence of our slackness and inertness, the German Powers, indirectly sheltered by the Czar, were to gain possession of that harbour. Regard to interests and treaties would forbid Great Britain to acquiesce in such an occupation, and war would then be necessary to dislodge it. But would the step be open to exception as regards public law and international propriety? Can it be an act of illegality or violence to despatch a fleet into the harbour of a Power which is friendly, of a Power which is outraged, of a Power you have guaranteed, of a Power which invokes the aid it is entitled to receive from you? Day by day we are initiated in the secret that it is not an act of illegality or violence to plant a devastating army in his territory. If Austria and Prussia are entitled to a material possession upon land in order to pursue a shadowy and doubtful right, has Great Britain no title to a material possession on those waters, in order to discharge a clear and undisputed obligation? If they, without making war, may overrun a line of defence, revolutionize a Duchy, besiege Duppel, and force the Danish army into Alsen; if in a friendly spirit and with a peaceable design they can dismiss the servants of the King of Denmark, arrest his subjects, forbid his currency, bombard his towns, insult his flag, and alienate his revenues, might not either France or Great Britain, or the two together, irreproachably possess a single harbour on the Baltic, with the sanction 729 of the Power it belongs to. Except as regards material possession, the cases would not have indeed a similarity. They have moved through the path of wrong, of spoliation, and of bloodshed to gain a maritime position on that coast; Great Britain would move in the path of law, of policy, and treaties to prevent them.
I have but a further view to submit upon this measure; and it addresses itself in no way to the sympathies but to the coldest calculations of the House. A few ships in the Baltic might enable Great Britain to become a party to arrangements which European interests may sanction, and which existing difficulties may require, but which she could not entertain unless her faith to treaties and her loyalty to Denmark had been previously asserted. Supposing it were found essential as a safeguard against future wars to make the Eider the southern boundary of Denmark, and to form a clearer line than is observed between the German and Scandinavian territories, our present attitude disqualifies us for going into such questions. If Great Britain had a certain status on the Baltic, she would have the power to resist, and power to concede; at present, she has neither. At the same time, my Lords, although such a course appears to be the one which circumstances indicate, the Conference requires and the guarantee imposes, these Resolutions in no way bind the House to an approval of it, should any other line of action be preferred as safer or as more effectual. They only ask your Lordships to affirm that the principle of 1856 might have been usefully insisted on with greater firmness and tenacity, a proposition few as yet have ventured to dispute. But should it be deemed unnecessary or imprudent to declare it; at least no difference of opinion can well exist upon the second—namely, that the Conference does not meet under just auspices, or promise satisfactory results, while Europe doubts our loyalty to those treaties of which Schleswig has been so long and so conspicuously the object. With equal truth it might be said, perhaps, that in such circumstances a Conference is likely to bring on Denmark further wrongs, on Great Britain new humiliations, and on Europe darker clouds than those which menace its horizon. The noble Lord concluded by moving to resolve:—
That, in the Opinion of this House, if the Demand made by Denmark for Mediation, according to the Principle laid down in the Protocol of Paris, 1856, had been more decidedly supported 730 by Her Majesty's Government, the Bloodshed and the other Evils already occasioned by the War in Denmark might have been prevented, and there would have been less Danger than there now is of a more extensive Disturbance in the Peace of Europe.That, in the Opinion of this House, a Conference upon the Danish Question, in order to lead to a practical Result, ought to be accompanied by such Steps as may convince the Powers of Europe that Her Majesty's Government adhere to the Treaties in which the Duchy of Schleswig has been guaranteed to Denmark by Great Britain.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, that before proceeding to the discussion of the noble Lord's Motion, he wished to call their Lordships' attention for a few moments to the circumstances under which it was brought forward. The other evening his noble Friend on the cross bench (Earl Grey) asked the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, whether the same objections which existed before Easter to a discussion of the Dano-German question still applied. To that the Foreign Secretary replied that he had no wish to interfere with the discretion of the House. Under the circumstances, no other reply could have been given; but it was a great mistake to suppose that it was ever either the desire or for the advantage or the interest of a Government, for its own sake, to interfere with a Parliamentary discussion on a question such as that now brought under their Lordships' consideration. The Constitution of this country gave to the responsible executive Government the most formidable power which could be given to any body of men— the power of committing the honour and the credit of the country, either for peace or war, without the previous know ledge or consent of Parliament; and not only did the executive Government possess the power, but Parliament had occasionally shown itself jealous of any attempt on the part of the Government to cast off that responsibility. On the very first night of the Session, the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) had declared that it was the business of a Government to have a policy of their own, and not to seek one from Parliament; and in that doctrine he (the Duke of Argyll) fully concurred. The Government, therefore, were bound in these matters to exercise the greatest amount of caution and circumspection, and it was no hardship, but an immediate advantage to the Government to have a discussion of these questions before Parliament; and his noble Friend (Earl Russell) had always courted, rather than deprecated, discussion on matters of public interest. Still, the 731 Government were called on to enter into this discussion under circumstances very disadvantageous to themselves. In a few days they were about to meet in conference the representatives of Europe, called together by themselves, for the purpose of restoring peace to the North of Europe. It would be inexcusable, therefore, for them to appear as partisans either of one side or the other, or to say one word which would lessen the chances of peace. There must be, then, many parts of the subject on which the Government were bound to hold their peace, or to speak with the greatest caution. The history of the noble Lord's Resolution seemed a curious illustration of the Darwinian theory of development. Some days ago the Notice on the paper was "to call attention to the Correspondence recently presented to Parliament." On Thursday last the second Resolution, having reference to the Guarantee of 1720, made its appearance in the paper; and the day following, after the conversation of that night, the full-blown Resolution, as it was now placed before their Lordships, appeared. On the subject of the Guarantee of 1720, the noble Lord had already addressed their Lordships some weeks ago—that subject was his own, and no doubt the second Resolution, which had reference to that question, was his own. But in the first Resolution he had not the least hesitation in saying he recognized the hand of his noble Friend near him (Earl Grey). With regard to the speech and Motion of the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) he had some difficulty in following all his arguments, because the greater part of them referred to the future —to the manner in which the Conference was to be conducted. Now he (the Duke of Argyll) was of opinion thatit was the duty of the Government, under the circumstances, as far as possible to avoid a discussion of the future, and confine themselves to the discussion of the past. As to the second Resolution—his noble Friend's own Resolution —the wording of it was not quite correct, for the Guarantee of 1720 was not a guarantee of the whole of Schleswig, but only of that part of it which then belonged to the Sovereign of Denmark. It would hardly, therefore, be for the interest of Denmark that instructions should be given to the Government to insist upon that guarantee. His noble Friend to whom he attributed the drawing up of the first Resolution (Earl Grey) had on various occasions spoken very freely of the conduct of 732 the Government. He had given the House what was called "a bit of his mind" on the subject, and he wished very much that he would give them the whole. He was anxious to hear what his noble Friend meant by more decided action in support of the Protocol of 1852? What did the noble Earl mean by "more decided" measures? He had no doubt that the noble Earl meant that the Government might have prevented the war altogether, if, in fact, they had only threatened to take part in it. The question put was, Why did not the Government prevent the war? but the real question which his noble Friend wished to put was, Why had not the Government taken part in it? The critics of the Government had always one story; they never avowed that they were in favour of a war policy; but they said, that if the Government had done this or the other, they would have prevented war. But it was equally open to the Government to say, that if they had adopted a different course they would have increased the chances of bloodshed and the miseries that have resulted. He maintained that it was sufficient for the Government to show that they had adopted and had adhered to some definite line of policy, which they were able to support and maintain in that House of Parliament and to justify before the country. He submitted that the Government had a ready answer to the charge made against them, because they had not prevented war, or since they could not prevent it that they had not taken part in it. He protested against the doctrine that, primâ facie, there was any case against the Government of this country for not preventing a continental war, even supposing it might have broken out under circumstances of much injustice. England had a great position in Europe—the noble Earl smiled—England had a great position in Europe, not only on account of her material power, but from the just impression which prevailed that, on the Continent at least, she had no selfish interests whatever to serve; and that so far as our interests, which were principally commercial, were concerned, they were bound up with the prosperity of the whole world. But England was not the general arbitress in the quarrels of continental nations. There might be wars under circumstances of the greatest injustice waged there; but that was not a primâ facie case against the English Government for not having interfered in them. He would take the 733 case of the Italian war. It so happened that at that time the Liberal party were not in office, but rather a party more opposed to the objects of that war than we were; yet the noble Earl then at the head of the Foreign Office (the Earl of Malmesbury), did everything in his power to prevent that war; and he believed that no Minister ever acted more earnestly or faithfully as far as that object was concerned. The hand of the noble Earl was hardly ever off the telegraphic wires; his messages jostled each other on their way to the various capitals of Europe. And not only did he exercise all his influence in deprecation and remonstrance, but the noble Earl then at the head of the Government (the Earl of Derby) also made a powerful speech in their Lordships' House, in which he went very near to threaten that the power of England would be brought into action, if that war broke out. Noble Lords now present would doubtless remember the intimation conveyed in that remarkable speech to France and to the Government at Turin, that if we were to be neutrals we must be in a position of armed neutrality; and that England had interests in the Adriatic which they were determined to defend. Noble Lords would remember that this speech was received with cheers from both sides of the House. But what was the effect? The language ended in nothing— and the war took place in spite of all their efforts. He (the Duke of Argyll) never heard that the noble Earl felt any humiliation at having failed to prevent that war, though it was one which in its circumstances was considered by them to be unjust. Then he maintained that it was no primâ facie case against the existing Government that they had not prevented the present war, and any case against the Government must arise from special obligations in respect to the position of Germany and Denmark. Consequently, in order to see whether there was any case against the Government, it was necessary to refer to the documents in which the obligations of the English Government were defined. Now, if noble Lords would look into the documents, they would find that we were under no such obligations, He was surprised that the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) should have said that those obligations were mainly to be found in the guarantee of 1720. He (the Duke of Argyll) denied that, and asserted that they were to be found in the Treaty of 1852, which was not a treaty of guarantee, 734 but simply of recognition, signed not by England alone or even principally. It was a treaty in which we were co-signataries with all the great Powers of Europe, and some of the smaller Powers, There was, indeed, a passage in the preamble which referred to a question of policy, and announced as a principle that the existence and integrity of Denmark formed a necessary part of the balance of power; but to that declaration all the other Powers were signataries. Therefore the duties and obligations of the English Government, arising from that treaty, are duties and obligations which run exactly parallel with those of the other Powers; and nothing in that document could compel or induce the Government to go in advance or in front of the other Powers, or to act independently of them. This, then, was the principle on which Her Majesty's Government founded their policy—to rally the other Powers to act with them in this matter, but not to advance before them. He asked the House whether they could conscientiously say that the Government had failed in this duty? His noble Friend (Earl Grey) said yes—he (the Duke of Argyll) called upon him to prove it. Without troubling the House with a mass of quotations from the blue-books, he would direct attention to a few facts, which would prove that the Government had done all they could to ally themselves with the other great Governments of Europe, and induce them to act along with this country in preventing the war. Those who had attended to the Schleswig-Holstein quarrel must know that one of the transactions which had most tended to complicate the matter, and to render war almost inevitable, was the resolution of the German Diet to assume authority, not merely with respect to Holstein, but also with respect to Schleswig. This Resolution was dated the 25th March, 1852, at a time when public attention was very little directed to the subject. The moment that his noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office was aware of that, he addressed to the great Powers a despatch directing attention to this Resolution of the German Diet, and soliciting a joint protest against that assumption of power. This communication was sent to the two great non-German Powers—France and Russia—and it expressed a hope that an intimation would be conveyed from them to the German Diet respecting the gravity of the step they had taken. That attempt on the part of his noble Friend failed, 735 because France and Russia declined to join in the proposed protest, which Russia, at least, thought might seem to assume somewhat of a threatening nature. Therefore, if that joint action failed, it was not owing to want of vigilance on the part of his noble Friend. In November last occurred the death of the King of Denmark; and then arose the question about the right of succession. It was mainly due to the exertions of his noble Friend that the principle of the Treaty of 1852 had been recognized as a surviving principle by the two great German Powers, in spite of the disputes which had arisen. No one who had read the papers could doubt or deny that there were the gravest apprehensions that the two great German Powers were about to retreat from their former position and call in question the Treaty of 1852, and, on the other hand, that it was mainly owing to the remonstrances of his noble Friend, seconded no doubt by the Emperor of the French, that these two great Powers had admitted that the principle was still in force. In the present year his noble Friend made still greater efforts to avert any hostile action on the part of the German Powers. He would refer the House to the propositions made to the Russian and French Governments on the 5th, 10th, and 18th of January. The answer of the French Government was given on the 19th of January, and in still greater detail on the 30th; and though he did not wish to cast any blame on the French Government for declining to co-operate, because they had the right if they chose to keep the issues of peace and war in their own hands, yet he could not help thinking that if the two great non-German Powers had accepted the proposals of his noble Friend, the danger of war would have been averted. It would be admitted by any candid person who read the correspondence, that if Her Majesty's Government had been ready, to use the language of his noble Friend, to take any "more decided measures"—if they had thought it their duty to threaten, that in the event of the German Powers crossing the Eider a casus belli would arise, they would have had to make that declaration alone, and we should have involved ourselves in the danger of war with the whole of Germany, and especially with the two great military Powers, Austria and Prussia, without any ally to fight on our side. He would not waste the time of the House in pointing out the many objections which militated against 736 many of these. Such a course would readily occur to the mind of every noble Lord. With respect to the assumption that such a declaration would have prevented war, it should be remembered that we were not dealing with the Governments of Germany alone. We were dealing to a great extent with forces which took their origin in the revolutionary passions which were now existing on the Continent; in short, he did not believe it would be too much to say that we were dealing with two fanatical democracies. These were not Powers accessible to reason; and he was therefore convinced, in spite of the arguments of his noble Friend, that if we had taken that course, we not only should not have averted war, but we should have been forced to join in the war, should have increased the bloodshed, and brought on new and complicated dangers. It would be admitted that any course which isolated us from France would be very dangerous. As long as both countries went together there were few things which they could not secure in the way of peace; but if isolated action were once adopted by either, there were contingencies which might impel them more and more in opposite directions, and might lead to the greatest perils to the peace of Europe. He should be guilty of great affectation if he were to say that he apprehended any danger to the Government from these Resolutions. The aspect of the benches opposite did not indicate that the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) had any intention of giving a very active or warm support to the Motion, unless, indeed, the noble Earl's forces had been routed by General Garibaldi. But whatever opinion might be expressed by the House upon the Resolutions, he hoped that one opinion only would be expressed by every Member who might speak that night upon one part of the subject, and that was the lamentable bloodshed which was now taking place. He was sure it was with feelings of absolute affliction that every Member of the House read the daily accounts of the cruel and useless slaughter which was going on. It was absolutely certain that every object sought by the war might have been obtained by negotiation. During the last ten years we had witnessed three great wars in which there had been great bloodshed, but in respect of all three great issues had been at stake. In the case of the Russian war, in which we were parties, the question was whether the same 737 Sovereign should reign at St. Petersburg and Constantinople. In case of the Italian war the question was whether one of the greatest nations in Europe, with an ancient literature and a noble history, and the highest capacities for political life, should continue to be for ever nothing but the favourite camping ground of German soldiers. With regard to the war now raging on the other side of the Atlantic, however they might deplore it, extending as it did over such a vast territory, and as yet giving no indications of its approaching end, no man could deny that there were great issues raised, all of which probably could only be settled by the results of war. But, in contrast to these, the war in Denmark had for its object issues that could certainly be settled by other means. What was the object set before them by the German Powers? He did not depreciate to the Schleswig-Holsteiners the value they set upon their liberties; they had as good a right to their liberties as we had to ours; but was there a single object in respect to them which could not be as well obtained by negotiation and without any effusion of blood? We were going to the Conference with three great objects. The first was to restore peace to the North of Europe; the second to secure the legal rights of the Duchies; and, the third, to reconcile with those rights the integrity and independence of Denmark. There was one argument which might be fairly urged against taking what was called a "more decided course," and that was that there was some doubt as to the merits and justice of the original quarrel. He would not dwell upon the weak points of the Danish case. The Danes were a gallant people, more sinned against than sinning. But those who had read the papers must remember that we had been compelled to make admissions on the subject of the constitution which was the immediate cause of the war—admissions which raised some doubts as to whether the Germans might not have had some fair grounds of dispute with the Danish people. But feeling the duty of impartiality in the present position of the Government, he was much more disposed at present to point to just grounds of complaint against the German Powers. He did not know whether many noble Lords had read the engagements of 1851–2, which Denmark was accused of having broken. In those engagements, Denmark had made two promises to the German Powers, the one that a common constitution should be 738 provided for the whole monarchy, the two Duchies included; and the other, that certain local liberties should be guaranteed to the people of Schleswig and Holstein. There was also a third, that Denmark should not incorporate, or take any steps to incorporate, Schleswig. It had been vehemently asserted by Germany that the Danes had broken those three engagements. But what he wished to direct the attention of the House and the country to was this—that, in his opinion, it was equally demonstrable that the promises made by Germany to Denmark had not been faithfully adhered to. The Germans said that the correspondence of 1851–2 constituted a series of diplomatic engagements. If they were diplomatic engagements, however, they were equally binding on both parties. He had selected three distinct promises made to Denmark, all of which had been more or less violated. The first promise went to the whole root of the matter, and it was this— that what was called the theory of Schleswig-Holsteinism should be abandoned. That declaration was not only conveyed by Germany to Denmark in general terms, but was also made in the most explicit manner. He would ask whether the Germans had abided by that promise? Was it not the fact that the theory of Schleswig-Holsteinism had been made a perpetual engine against Denmark from day to day, and was it not the real cause of most of the difficulties that had occurred? Another most solemn promise had been given by the Emperor of Austria, to which he was anxious to direct their Lordships' attention. It was to the effect that the Austrian Government would never allow the Federal Power to be exercised in Holstein in any manner in which it might not be equally exercised in every other part of the Confederation. Her Majesty's Government had admitted, and indeed could not deny, the legal right of the German Diet to put in "execution"in Holstein; but he would ask the German Powers to say whether, in the circumstances which had occurred, they had faithfully adhered to the promise of the Emperor of Austria? That execution took place by way of securing to the people of Holstein certain local privileges and rights. But were there not in other parts of the Gorman Federation local privileges and rights which had been violated, and did the German Diet exercise their power in respect to those rights? Why should the Diet enforce against the Duke of Holstein powers which they did not dare to enforce against 739 the King of Prussia? So long as they acted unequally and unfairly in this respect they not only violated their promises, but also the fundamental principles of all Federal Constitutions. The object of the Federation was the mutual defence of its members; but if the power of the majority was always to be brought to bear against the weaker members, then the Federation would become the means of anarchy, and the Great Powers would be setting the most dangerous precedent against themselves. The third promise was a distinct and emphatic repudiation of any right or competence on the part of the German Diet in the Duchy of Schleswig, The Diet had, however, now asserted its competence. In all these respects Germany had violated the promise of 1851–2 more certainly and more clearly than the Danes. It was the desire of Her Majesty's Government to go into the Conference, not as partisans of one side or the other, but impartially. They desired nothing but to restore peace to Europe—no doubt compatibly with the local rights of the two Duchies, and consistently if possible with the integrity of the Danish monarchy. They wished the balance of power in Europe to be maintained, and the rights of all the parties to be preserved. These were the objects which Her Majesty's Government had in view in times past; and in their efforts to avert war he believed they had had the approbation of the country, and would have the support of Parliament.
§ EARL GREYsaid, his noble Friend who had just sat down (the Duke of Argyll), had taken very unnecessary trouble to prove what he (Earl Grey) had no wish to deny or conceal, that he had advised the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) to add the first Resolution to that which he had originally proposed to move, and he would now state why he thought their Lordships ought to agree to it. In doing so, it would be necessary for him to give some slight account of the proceedings which had led to the war now going on, but he would do so as shortly as possible. Fortunately, he need not weary their Lordships with the long and complicated question, as to what were the respective rights of Germany and Denmark and of the Duchies themselves with reference to the matters in dispute; it was sufficient to say that, on the 1st of October last, the dispute had arrived at such a point that the German Diet thought it necessary to adopt a resolution for 740 enforcing its demands against Denmark by what was called "execution," which meant the military occupation of Holstein. In the interval before this decree was carried into effect, Her Majesty's Government exerted themselves strenuously to avert its being acted upon; nor had he any fault to find with that part of their proceedings. It seemed not impossible that they might have succeeded in their efforts when, unfortunately, the death of the late King of Denmark occurred. That event produced an immediate change in the state of affairs. A violent agitation arose in Germany with respect to the right of succession in the Duchies, and a large party insisted that Prince Frederick of Augustenburg was the rightful heir. Into that question, however, he was happy to say it would not be necessary for him to enter; but, whatever might be the truth on the subject, it was clear that the Austrian Government, at all events, held that the title of the present King of Denmark was a good one; because their Lordships would find in the papers a very remarkable diplomatic correspondence between the Governments of Austria and Bavaria, in which the former Government showed—or considered that it showed — by reference to various documents, that the present King of Denmark was the rightful Duke of Holstein, not by virtue of the Treaty of 1852, but by virtue of a law legally passed by the late King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein, regulating the future succession to the Duchy. The Austrian Government went on to say that the validity of this law was by implication recognized by the Diet itself. He would farther remark, that to the present moment the German Diet— the only competent authority in Germany —had never decided against the right of the present King of Denmark to the Duchy of Holstein. When it ordered the federal troops to occupy Holstein, it professed to do so under the resolution of the 1st of October, which had decreed "execution" for the purpose of enforcing the performance of his engagements by the King of Denmark, with an express declaration that his rights to the Duchy were to be maintained. But, though these were the professions of the Diet, what was done was little in accordance with them. There was a good description of what had taken place in one of the despatches of Sir Augustus Paget. He stated that, when the German troops entered Holstein, the Federal Commissary declared that they did so to enforce 741 certain orders of the German Diet, that they did not intend to interfere with the rights of the Sovereign, that those rights were reserved, and that eventually his power was to be restored. Notwithstanding this, the Federal troops entered Holstein with bands playing the revolutionary air; they allowed the Augustenburg colours to be displayed in all directions, while they removed the arms of Denmark from the public buildings and took away every symbol of Danish authority; and while nominally prohibiting any attempt to assert the rights of the Pretender, they allowed the proclamation of the Prince Augustenburg, as Duke of Holstein, to take place in the presence of the Federal Commissary and of the Federal troops. He confessed that he regarded these proceedings as utterly irreconcilable with good faith. At the same time, he was not sure that it would have done much harm to Denmark had matters stopped here, and certainly there would have been no war if the German measures of spoliation had been confined to Holstein, because the Danes, acting upon our advice, had wisely determined not to resist by force the occupation of that Duchy, and as the Federal troops advanced those of Denmark retired. But, unfortunately, before the Federal troops entered Holstein another cause of quarrel had arisen. His noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll) had informed their Lordships that one of the main subjects of dispute was as to how a joint Legislature for the different divisions of the Danish monarchy should be established. After the failure of many attempts to form such a Legislature, the King, in the year 1855, established such a body under the name of the Rigsraad. His authority to do this in the manner in which he did it was contested; but the Assembly continued to meet, and until the year 1858 members from Holstein, as well as those from Schleswig and Denmark, sat in it, and the Rigsraad did practically act for the whole of the Danish Monarchy. In that year the representatives of Holstein withdrew, but the Rigsraad continued to he the joint Legislature for Denmark and Schleswig. Holstein was thus practically separated, so far as legislation was concerned, from the rest of the kingdom. In the beginning of last year the late King of Denmark determined formally to establish this state of things, and he issued the patent of the 30th of March, which separated Holstein, for legislative purposes, from 742 the rest of the monarchy, and gave it power to manage its own affairs. Great objections were raised to this measure, but he need not discuss the question of its justice or injustice, because the patent was ultimately revoked. Later in the year the patent was followed by the presentation to the Rigsraad of a Bill for altering the constitution of that body. This Bill made no change in the respective functions of the Rigsraad and the provincial assemblies; it left to the States of Schleswig, and the Legislature of Denmark Proper, precisely the same powers they had previously exercised, and made no alteration or increase in those assigned to the Rigsraad in acting for the common interests of these two divisions of the kingdom. All it did was formally to sanction the exclusion of the Holstein members from the Rigsraad, and to make important changes in the manner in which the members of that body were appointed. The Bill, which was in fact a Reform Bill, was introduced in the autumn of last year. It underwent considerable discussion, but with some difficulty the necessary majority of two-thirds—that is, the majority necessary to authorize a constitutional change— was obtained, and at the death of the late King it had been read a third time, and only required the signature of the Sovereign to make it law. The King died on the 15th of November; and on the 16th the Prussian Envoy presented to the Danish Government a despatch protesting against this law being allowed to come into force. It could only be stopped by the refusal of the Royal Assent, and that assent was not refused. On the 17th of November the new King signed the Bill, and on the 18th it was proclaimed as the law of the land. It was acknowledged on all hands that the King of Denmark had practically no option in the matter. When in a constitutional country a measure of reform has after much debate passed the Legislature, it is no easy matter for the Sovereign to refuse his assent. Every one knew that in 1832 William IV. had practically no power to withhold his assent from the Reform Bill, and the King of Denmark was equally precluded from refusing his sanction to this Bill. If he had done so, the result would have been an immediate revolution and his expulsion from the country. Was that the reason for the presentation of the Prussian dispatch? We could not look into men's hearts and see what were their motives; but if we 743 were to judge the motives of the Prussian Government by their acts we could hardly resist the conclusion that the reason why this protest was presented at that particular moment was that Prussia desired to pick a quarrel with Denmark, which she could not escape. What were the facts? The Bill had been under discussion for six weeks, and all that was going on was perfectly well known at Berlin, and yet not a hint of an objection had previously been let fall. Nay, more; only three weeks before the protest was delivered, M. Bismark held language which induced both the English and Danish Envoys at Berlin to believe that this Bill was the very thing that he desired. Sir Augustus Paget, in his despatch of the 18th of November, reported distinctly that his opinion was that this Bill would carry into effect precisely the arrangement which M. Bismark described as most desirable—namely, a free and united Denmark up to the Eyder, and a free Holstein beyond that river. Having thus allowed the Bill to pass, not only without objection, but with implied approval, no sooner was it known that the power of arresting the measure, except by refusing the Royal signature, was gone by, and that in Copenhagen the greatest excitement had been created by the mere doubt that the King might refuse his assent, than the Prussian Envoy presented a peremptory and overbearing despatch protesting against the law coming into force. Was it possible to understand this conduct otherwise than as intended to produce a rupture? Sir Augustus Paget, in his despatch of the 18th of November, reported that he had had a conversation with the Prussian Envoy, and that when he pointed out how inconsistent his protest was with the previous conduct of the Prussian Government, he did not attempt to deny the accuracy of this statement, but said that he must act upon his instructions. There could be no doubt what those instructions were. They must have been to keep back the objections to this Bill until it was out of the power of Denmark to deal with them, and when the power to yield had passed away to press them with the greatest possible violence. That was what took place. From the moment that the despatch of November 16 was presented, Prussia continued to urge this demand upon Denmark. Somewhere about the close of December the first intimation of which he found any notice in the papers was given to Den- 744 mark that those demands would be enforced by an armed occupation of Schleswig. On the 28th of December a formal motion to that effect was made in the German Diet by Austria and Prussia, and was referred to a committee. It was again brought before the Diet on the 14th of January, when the proposition of Prussia and Austria was rejected; but these Powers declared they would proceed with the measure they contemplated, notwithstanding the decision of the Diet, and that Schleswig would be at once taken possession of as "a material guarantee." Much negotiation took place before that measure was carried into effect. These negotiations were continued until the beginning of February, when the German army crossed the Eyder; and in the course of them Denmark applied for the mediation of England and other friendly Powers under the Protocol of 1856. Their Lordships would no doubt remember that, during the Congress of Paris in 1856, the representatives of the European Powers recorded in a Protocol the wish of these Powers that in future, when serious differences arose between nations, an attempt should be made to settle them by the good offices of a friendly State before appealing to arms. Referring to this Protocol, Denmark asked for the mediation of England and other European Powers. The noble Duke who had just spoken (the Duke of Argyll) indeed disputed the accuracy of that statement; but if he referred to the papers he would find that they contained a despatch addressed by the Prime Minister of Denmark to the Danish Envoy in this country, dated the 5th of January, and communicated to his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the 13th of that month, in which there was distinct reference made to the Protocol of 1856 and application made under that Protocol for the mediation of England. A similar despatch was also sent to France. Her Majesty's Government supported the application, and proposed that a Conference should take place, and that in the meantime no appeal should be made to force. The proposal was, however, rejected—he might almost say contemptuously rejected —by Austria and Prussia. Then followed an application that if the German Powers would not consent to that, time, at least, should be given to Denmark, in order that she might obtain a legal repeal of the law that had given so much offence; but that proposal was also summarily rejected, al- 745 though Her Majesty's Government had gone so far as to tell Prussia that the continuance of friendly relations with this country would be endangered by the rejection of the proposal. But the Prussian Government, having apparently a very just notion how little real resolution was implied by these big words, treated the remonstrance with utter disregard, and proceeded with their preparations for the invasion of the Duchies. While these preparations were going on, there was a whole series of despatches from his noble Friend opposite, not, he thought, written in a tone which became a Minister of this country. The British Minister complained in a tone of great irritation of the conduct of the German Powers, but, at the same time, made it clear that no interference on the part of England would take place. In the meantime, Her Majesty's Government had been pressing hard upon the Danes in order to induce them to repeal the law of November 18, which afforded the pretext for the threatened invasion. His noble Friend whom he saw on the bench below (Lord Wodehouse) was instructed to inform the Danish Government that, if they did not accede to what was proposed, they could not look for support from us. Now, if it had been intended to aid Denmark in the event of her adopting our advice, his noble Friend the Secretary of State would no doubt have been perfectly justified in laying before her the terms on which that aid would be granted. He might have said to her, "We intend to take up your quarrel; but there are certain weak points in your case, and we should wish to see them removed before we can give you our support." That, however, was not the course which his noble Friend had taken, and he (Earl Grey), for one, could not think it either generous or just towards a little nation like Denmark, unwarrantably attacked by two great Powers, unless we meant to assist her in the end, to embarrass her by such advice as we had given, and to place her at the moral disadvantage of having communicated that advice to Germany, thus encouraging Germany to proceed by telling her that Denmark was in the wrong. The reply of the Danish Minister that the law afforded no just ground of complaint to Germany, as it made no substantial alteration in the relations of Schleswig and Denmark, was, he might add, in his opinion, quite unanswerable. He did not mean to say that it was prudent on the part of Denmark to pass the law of November, or 746 that Her Majesty's Government might not very fairly have represented to her that it would be well to repeal it; but it seemed to him that the argument of the Danish Government, to show that this law gave no valid ground of complaint to Germany, had never been answered, and, at all events, even if the law were one to which Germany might, in the first instance, have fairly taken exception, the fact that no objection had been made to it at the proper time, that on the contrary the Prime Minister of Prussia had used language implying his approval of it, destroyed all claim on the part of the German Powers to insist on its immediate repeal. It was, therefore, most extraordinary that, while this country was acting as the self-constituted friend of Denmark, and while we were professing to give her our assistance, that by far the strongest point in her case had never been adverted to. When his noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) passed through Berlin in his way to Copenhagen, on his special mission, he had a long conversation with M. Bismark, of which he has given a very able Report. In this conversation, respecting the demands made upon Denmark by the German Powers, not the slightest allusion was made by his noble Friend to the remarkable statement in Sir A. Paget's despatch of the 18th of November, as to the implied assent given by Prussia to the new law until it was practically irrevocable, nor is this statement noticed in any of the other communications between our Government and the German Powers that he could find recorded in the papers. He repeated, it was neither just nor generous towards Denmark thus to play the part of an over-candid friend, to give up in argument with her opponents the strong points in her case, to make the admissions most damaging to her, to force her to act against her own judgment, by saying that if she refused to follow our advice she must not look for our support; and then, after all, when she had taken our advice, and when the German Powers still persevered in their aggression—an aggression which we had declared to be an outrage—to refrain from raising a single finger in her defence! If we were determined to give Denmark no aid beyond words, it would have been far better for her that we should have abstained from interfering at all; that we should have imitated the wise and dignified conduct of France, whose Minister, when congratulating the King of Denmark on his accession, told him frankly that France 747 did not intend to go to war for his protection, and that they had no advice to give except that Denmark should act in a conciliatory manner. It would have been better for Denmark, and still more would it have been better for our own dignity, if Her Majesty's Government had taken that course. Instead of this, after holding language towards Prussia, going to the very verge of threats—indeed, the Prussian Government said we had gone beyond the verge—we passively looked on while the outrage we had condemned was perpetrated, and this country had thus been lowered in the eyes of the whole civilized world. The effect of such conduct had been the more damaging to our reputation, because the Prime Minister, in his place in the House of Commons, had said in the last Session of Parliament that, if Denmark should be attacked by Germany she would not find herself alone. His noble Friend who spoke last (the Duke of Argyll), had defended our policy on the ground that we could not have acted differently without the risk of war. He could not admit this argument to be sound; he was convinced there was a course open to us by which we should have escaped all the indignity we have endured, and have prevented the oppression of Denmark, without incurring so much danger of being involved in war as we are now exposed to by the consequences of the policy that has been pursued. Denmark, as he had mentioned, had claimed the application to the disputes between herself and Germany of the rule laid down by the Congress of Paris, that in case of differences arising between nations an attempt ought, in the first place, to be made to settle them by the good offices of a friendly State. We supported this demand, and proposed that the differences should be referred to a Conference, all hostile operations being in the mean time suspended. We might have made this proposal in such a manner as to command respect, instead of to invite rejection. We should have been fully entitled to say that this was a case which came directly within the rule laid down by the Congress of Paris; and that looking to the great interests involved, and to the great importance of preserving the peace of Europe, we required of the German Governments that no hostile operations should be commenced until the good offices of friendly Powers had been tried. He was quite aware that we could not have held that language without being prepared for action. We must, of course, have been 748 prepared, if the necessity for it had arisen, to send a British force to the Eyder to assist the Danes in defending their territory. But he utterly denied that any such contingency was probable. Such a policy could only have led to hostilities in the almost impossible event of Germany being insane enough to make an offensive war against England. All that was necessary was that we should have made Germany clearly understand that if she attempted to cross the Danish frontier she would find that frontier defended by English troops. There would have been no difficulty in defending that frontier. It was less than fifty miles in extent, strong by nature, and strengthened by strong fortifications; and though the Danes were not able to man those fortifications themselves, no great force would be necessary on our part to enable them to defend them. Nor would England have been alone in the matter. For even if no other great Power had joined us, Sweden was prepared to do so. In these papers there were several despatches in which the Swedish Government state that, though they were unable to protect Denmark themselves, they were perfectly willing to stand by the side of any great Power in doing so; and he was persuaded that a force such as England, Denmark, and Sweden could have easily raised, would have been amply sufficient to defend the frontiers of Schleswig against any force that Germany could have employed. The seat of war was but two days' steam from the mouth of the Thames, and unless our naval and military establishments were in a very different state from that in which they ought to be, considering the very large grants Parliament had made for their support, and very different also from that in which he trusted they were, there would have been no difficulty in sending out a force amply sufficient for the purpose. It would have been an easy operation compared with that undertaken by Mr. Canning in 1826, when he met a threatened aggression on Portugal by Spain by sending, at a very brief notice, a British expedition to Portugal, which had the desired effect. But, in truth, there never would have been the slightest chance of a war. It would have been sufficient to make Germany clearly understand that if she attacked the Danes she would find the warning of Lord Palmerston made good, and that she would not have to fight with them alone. He was quite persuaded that the statesmen of 749 Austria would have thought twice before they sent a larger part of their army than had been necessary to contend with Denmark only, (and a much larger force would have been required) to so great a distance from their own territory to attack a British army upon the Eyder. They would have reflected that the first shot fired at a British army would necessarily have been the signal for the appearance of a British fleet in the Adriatic. They would hare remembered that the whole population of Venetia is ready to rise as one man to seize the first favourable opportunity to throw off the yoke of this new champion of nationality; that the army of Italy now raised to 300,000 men, is panting with impatience to assist in freeing their fellow-countrymen from their galling bondage; that the whole Italian nation,—King, Parliament, and people,—are burning with desire for the moment when prudence will allow them to release this gallant army from the restraint which now prevents its rushing forward to drive the hated foreigners from the soil of Italy; that a state of siege is necessary in Galicia; that Hungary is discontented; and that the Austrian finances are in such a state that the first sound of a war with England would have produced a national bankruptcy. In such a state of things, he firmly believed that prudence would have prevailed, and that the rulers of Austria would not have been so reckless, and so deaf to the dictates of common sense, as to commit an act of aggression obviously unjust and in direct violation of the understanding of 1856. And if Austria would not have acted thus, he thought it was pretty certain that Prussia would not have done so single-handed. Neither the internal nor the external situation of Prussia were such as to encourage her to enter upon such a contest, and she would hardly have ventured, under such circumstances, to send her army to conquer for the people of Schleswig those constitutional rights which she refused to her own people. These considerations convinced him, that even without other assistance than that which was offered by Sweden, we had it completely in our power to protect Schleswig from invasion without any real risk of war. But he must add, that the correspondence laid before them left little doubt in his mind that we might have obtained the support of France. He was aware that when General Fleury was sent to compliment the new King of Denmark on his accession, he was instructed to say that France did 750 not intend going to war for the protection of Denmark. He was also aware that when the French Government was asked by our own to concur in giving a vagne assurance of material aid to Denmark in certain circumstances very obscurely described, this request was refused, and it would have been matter of surprise to him if any different answer had been returned to such an application by so sagacious a ruler as the present Emperor of the French. But he did not find in these papers that France was ever asked to join with us in requiring both parties to adhere to the understanding come to by the Powers of Europe in 1856, and to postpone, at all events, an appeal to arms till an attempt had been made to settle the dispute by friendly mediation. This he thought was all that there was any occasion for asking, or that it would have been right to ask. He was no such partizan of Denmark as to pretend that she stood altogether free from blame in the controversy that had led to the war. On the contrary, he believed that if from the year 1852 to the present time Denmark had governed the Duchies more wisely, and in a more conciliatory spirit, the circumstances never would have arisen which gave Germany a plausible pretence for interfering; but as the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) had observed, if Denmark was wrong, Germany was still more wrong, especially in insisting on deciding this question by the sword. The more clear it was that there were faults on both sides, the more clearly was the case one for the interference of friendly Powers; and if France had been asked to join in prohibiting hostilities till endeavours had been made to settle the dispute in a peaceable manner, he thought she would have done so, and that we should have succeeded in preventing war. He wished to call their Lordships' attention to some facts bearing upon that point. They would find a remarkable despatch from Lord Cowley, bearing date the 5th of January, in which his Lordship recounted a conversation he had had with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had been instructed to ask the French Minister to join him in making a strong remonstrance against a resort to arms. In the course of their conversations, M. Drouyn d'Lhuys asked, "If the Germans refuse, what then?" Lord Cowley must hare been deeply mortified that his instructions did not allow him to answer that question as it ought to have been answered. But, of 751 course, he was bound by his instructions, and all that they enabled him to say was, "In that case it seems to me further deliberations will become necessary; but why anticipate difficulties which may never he realized?" That answer was characteristic of the policy of Her Majesty's Government throughout the whole of these negotiations. "Why anticipate difficulties?" Was it not the great object of a statesman's life to anticipate possible difficulties? He made or ought to make no move whatever without considering what counter moves might be made on the other side. To talk of a statesman not anticipating difficulties, was as if one talked of a chessplayer not anticipating difficulties, but always making his moves on the supposition that his opponent would not endeavour to defeat them. Not a whit more senseless would be the conduct of a statesman who should not attempt to foresee the possible consequences of the policy he adopted. He was not in the least surprised that after receiving such an answer, M. Drouyn de Lhuys dropped the conversation and said he would report it to the Emperor. A few days afterwards the conversation was renewed, when M. Drouyn de Lhuys reminded Lord Cowley of the answer which France and England had received in the case of the remonstrances they addressed to Russia in reference to the Polish insurrection, when having represented to Prince Gortschak off that if Russia did not adopt a certain policy towards Poland, she would be held responsible, the Prince replied that Russia accepted the responsibility before God and man, and the French minister added that he was not willing to again expose himself to such a rebuff as that. He must say he thought M. Drouyn de Lhuys was right, and he was surprised that his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, when he determined to abstain from all serious measures, did not at the same time give up writing the sort of despatches they found in the papers. Why go on making proposal after proposal to the German Powers and remonstrance after remonstrance, which only served to provoke answers, in which sneering contempt is hardly concealed by the mere form of diplomatic politeness. It was clear beforehand all this writing would be fruitless, for to do the Prussians justice they had been candid, and had never concealed their real objects. M. Bismark told his noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) in so many words, that there never could 752 be a good feeling between Prussia and Denmark while the latter maintained her democratic institutions, and he therefore recommended a coup d' êtat. In another conversation with Sir A. Buchanan he said that the honour of Prussia would not be satisfied till she had proved that she was not afraid to draw the sword, thus clearly avowing that a peaceable settlement was not the object of Prussia. But to return to the question as to how far France would have been disposed to join us in restraining the German Powers from the use of force against Denmark, he would remind their Lordships of a further conversation between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Cowley on the 19th of January, in which the former, after saying in reply to Lord Cowley that France had already used diplomatic means to maintain the integrity of Denmark, and would continue to do so, proceeded to ask—
Does your proposal go further, and have you the application of force in contemplation? We must reserve our answer; we do not say no, but we cannot say yes. We are not hound by any guarantee to maintain the stipulations of that treaty. For instance, if we have to choose between its modification and the commencement of a war, uncertain as to its duration, and dubious as to its results, to speak frankly we prefer the former alternative.This was a judicious answer, and certainly did not imply that we should have met with a refusal if the proposition then submitted to the French Government had been the one which, he (Earl Grey) contended, ought to have been made. What in his opinion this country ought to have asked France, was to join in saying to Prussia and Austria, "We think this is a case for compromise, and we insist on it that there shall be no fighting until an attempt has been made to bring about a peaceable settlement." He believed there would have been no danger of war if that course had been taken. But who could say there was not much danger to Europe in the present position of affairs? A war commenced in bad faith had been carried on in a manner which could only be described as savage. The pretence had been that Schleswig was to be taken as a guarantee; Austria had had the hypocrisy to say that it was taken in the interest of Denmark; and then, because Denmark resisted with our concurrence, (for their Lordships must remember we had expressly disclaimed offering her any advice against resistance to the invasion), they proceeded to treat Schleswig as a conquered country, and 753 to remove in that Duchy, as they had done in Holstein, every semblance of Danish rule. They removed all the local officers who were loyal to the Danish Crown, and they warred even against the dead, pulling down the monument erected to the Danes, who had in the former war fallen in the service of their country. This was a perfectly wanton and gratuitous outrage to the feelings of the population. They invaded Jutland and went beyond the sternest rules of war in cruelty and violence, compelling the inhabitants to support the troops by whom they were oppressed, levying large contributions not only of food and forage, but of money, and enforcing the payment by arresting and threatening to shoot the principal inhabitants of the villages if the contributions were not paid. Nothing more marked the spirit with which the war was carried on by the Prussians, than an account he read in the newspapers the other day, describing the manner in which they had revenged themselves for a military disadvantage on the unarmed population. By a well planned and well executed surprise a small detachment of Prussian cavalry was captured by a Danish force, and this feat of arms, as fair as it was bravely done, the Prussians, by their own account, punished by burning the farms and laying waste the property of the inhabitants of the district where it occurred, because the troops by whom it was effected were beyond their reach. Was that the way in which honourable soldiers carried on even a just and necessary war? Then, again, there was the bombardment of Sönderborg, which his noble Friend (the Earl of Shaftesbury) denounced the other evening in just terms; and he perceived that the second edition of that day's Times contained a letter describing the atrocious barbarity of that bombardment, and the wanton cruelty inflicted thereby on the unarmed and peaceful population as having been even worse than his noble Friend supposed. It was now said that the Austrian fleet was to go to the Baltic; but were the Germans to be allowed to use their forces both by land and by sea to the absolute destruction of Denmark? He believed that a little moderation and firmness in the first instance might have prevented affairs reaching their present condition; but now, when the passions of the contending parties have been inflamed, and all the difficulties increased by the German troops being in possession both of Schleswig and Holstein, it was 754 difficult to see how, without the actual use of force, it would be possible for this country to arrest or limit the barbarous war that was going on, before it had led to consequences most dangerous to the general peace of Europe. This danger is greatly increased by the fact that those transactions have had a most unhappy effect on the opinion entertained of this country in the world. A great nation cannot forfeit her reputation for courage, and for a determination to maintain her rights and her honour—cannot become suspected of irresolution and timidity, without provoking wrongs and insults which she cannot always continue to endure. He could not, therefore, believe it to be of good augury for our permanent enjoyment of the blessings of peace, that the conduct of our Government as to Denmark, following so closely what had occurred with respect to Poland, should have created, as it notoriously had, a general impression on the Continent of Europe, that this country is no longer animated by its old spirit, and is so afraid of the pecuniary losses and sacrifices which war would impose upon it, that it would prefer submitting to almost any wrong or any insult rather than appeal to the sword. No doubt this impression is a false one— there cannot be a more complete misconception of the real feeling of the nation, but unhappily the mischief such a belief may do depends little upon its being correct, and that it generally prevails at this moment among foreign nations is too certain to admit of doubt. Thus the timid and vacillating policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government in their too great fear of war, is directly calculated to bring upon us in the end the very evil they have been anxious to escape, and which a more manly policy would, in all probability, have averted.
§ EARL RUSSELLMy Lords, it now appears clearly, I think, from my noble Friend's speech, that we are arraigned, not for not having prevented the war between Austria and Prussia, and Denmark, but for not having ourselves joined in it. The real substance of my noble Friend's arraignment is, that we are now at peace. My noble Friend has read most discreetly the papers laid before Parliament, referring only to those parts which told in favour of his own views, and omitting to notice anything which militated against them. My noble Friend began by saying that he would not enter into a long discussion of 755 what is called the Schleswig-Holstein question; but I must say that without a consideration of that question it would be difficult to say why the German and Danish Powers should now be at war. It has been my task to attend to this question. In the year 1862 I offered proposals for the settlement of that question, which if they had been accepted would, I believe, have prevented the possibility of the war which is now being waged. But I was then told that it was really a matter which had no danger or importance, and that I was interfering in a question which might very well be allowed to sleep for a century, or half a century, without the fear of disturbing the present state of affairs. My Lords, I never took that view of the subject. I always thought it was a serious matter, which, unless satisfactorily disposed of in time, might lead to deplorable eventualities. In looking into the history of this question, it seemed to me that the arrangements made in 1851 between Prussia and Austria on the one side, and Denmark on the other, were most unfortunate and almost contradictory. They gave not only to Austria and Prussia, but to the Powers of Germany, either a right, or, at all events, a pretext for interference in the internal and domestic concerns of the Danish Monarchy, which, unless perfect good temper and a spirit of the greatest conciliation were shown on both sides, could not but engender discussion and controversies of the angriest kind, and perhaps the ultimate outbreak of war. That, my Lords, has been the history of these transactions for the last ten years. For my own part, looking carefully at this subject, I will say that with regard to this matter, as with regard to other matters of great importance in which this country has been interested, I have deemed it my duty, holding the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to divest my mind of all partisanship, to endeavour to view the question, between the Powers at enmity with each other, with a fair and impartial mind, so as, if possible, to form a clear and just judgment upon it. Nothing, I think, would be more discreditable to English statesmen than to rush at once into a strong decision on the one side or the other, without carefully investigating all the circumstances of the case. Now, with regard to this treaty, the Danish Government promised, in 1851, that it would hold Schleswig very much as a separate State—that it should have separate provincial Estates 756 for its own affairs, and a representative body; that it should have a Minister, and that its administration should be conducted solely in Schleswig. It was very difficult to keep to all these engagements; Denmark had entered into them in a moment of necessity, when foreign troops occupied part of her soil. I will not now, in this time of her distress, point out in detail where I think that her promises were not fulfilled. Instances of it are to be found in the papers on your Lordships' table, and I will not further refer to them. But Germany, on the other side, took the most unfair advantage of what was done in detail by Denmark, on every occasion putting forward propositions to which it would have been impossible for Denmark to accede, because they would, in fact, have set up a German authority at the very seat of her rule, and thus would have destroyed not only the nominal integrity, but the real independence of Denmark. Well, my Lords, such being the unfortunate state of affairs, neither party, I think, having been entirely in the right, and neither being able to say that it was free from all blame, the dispute went on until, on the 1st of last October, Germany resolved on a Federal execution in Holstein. That decree for Federal execution, according to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Diet had a right to issue, on the ground of the Federal pact. But whatever might have been the previous difficulties on that subject, they were aggravated tenfold on the death of the late King of Denmark. It might have been supposed — those who thought favourably of the pretensions of Germany might well suppose—that the late King, having been governed by counsellors of what might be deemed ultra-Danish principles, and having himself not only a great love for his country but taking a somewhat prejudiced view of the question with respect to Danish and German interests, might have judged partially on these matters. But the new King was not liable to that suspicion; and I am persuaded even to this moment, that if Germany had temperately urged the claims of the German subjects of the King of Denmark to certain rights and privileges which Denmark had agreed to maintain, King Christian IX. would have so governed and so administered his dominions that all real ground of complaint would have been removed by fair discussion and reasonable concession. But the course taken was very different, and I confess it appears to me, as it has been argued by my noble 757 Friend who has just sat down, that the Powers of Germany did seem rather disposed to excite a quarrel than to exhibit a conciliatory temper. Well, as we wished above all to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe, it was our object so to counsel both parties that an amicable settlement might be arrived at. My noble Friend finds fault with the advice that we gave to Denmark to abolish the November Constitution; but as the engagement of Denmark was such as I have just stated to your Lordships—namely, that Schleswig should have a separate Constitution, and should not part with that Constitution unless with the consent of her own Estates, it appeared to us, upon study and examination, that the November Constitution was inconsistent with the obligations which Denmark had taken to Germany. My noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) who proceeded to Copenhagen, and who had no prejudice in favour of Germany and against Denmark, came to the same conclusion, and urged it, as his own opinion as well as the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, on the Government of Denmark, Surely, even in befriending the cause of Denmark by negotiation, it was our part to see that she was in the right. We could hardly go to Germany, to Prussia, and Austria, and say, "Denmark is quite in the wrong, but we beg you not to insist on her doing right." We could not urge that course; and, therefore, to enable us to make due representations to Germany we proposed that that Constitution should be revoked. My noble Friend found great fault throughout his speech with our making representations without being at once ready to commence hostilities. It is clear that where your honour is attacked, and the representations you make are not listened to, you must defend your honour. If you have great interests at stake, and wish to prevent their being sacrificed, you must defend those interests. But where you only seek to pursue the benevolent design of maintaining peace between other Powers, and enabling each State to maintain its own sovereign rights, I cannot think there is any humiliation; indeed, I think there is a decided advantage, in urging over and over again as we have done by friendly advice, that peace should be preserved, and that those Powers should not injure one another. Well, my Lords, in viewing this subject, it seemed to me that unless we were prepared alone to make ourselves the defenders of the liberties of Europe, 758 unless we were to take a course which no great statesman who had adopted a European policy for England has ever advocated, we were bound on a question of European policy to endeavour to obtain allies. Now, the allies to whom we naturally looked were France and Russia. I am now maintaining that it would have been unwise for the Government of this country to have committed itself to hostilities without having the aid and assistance of other European Powers. My noble Friend read part of the correspondence which we carried on with other Courts; and he read up to the 5th of January, when he found that Lord Cowley, having been asked by M. Drouyn de Lhuys what more we proposed besides a Conference, stated that he was unable to answer that question, and that it was unnecessary then to consider more than the present proposition. But as we heard that the French Government desired to know what it was that Her Majesty's Government proposed to do, I immediately wrote a despatch conveying the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. I also wrote a similar despatch to Russia. What I said in effect was this:—There is a project evidently conceived in Germany for depriving Denmark of the States of Holstein and the Duchy of Schleswig. Supposing that project is persevered in, will you, France, will you, Russia, agree with us in giving material assistance to Denmark? That is my answer to my noble Friend's reproach. The very thing which he blamed us for not doing, if he had had the good ness and the patience to read a few pages further on, he would have found that we actually did.
§ EARL GREYI expressly mentioned that despatch, and said its terms were so vague that the application could have had no other answer than that it received.
§ EARL RUSSELLMy despatch referred distinctly to a plan conceived for the dismemberment of Denmark, and went on to say, that to prevent the execution of that plan we sought the co-operation of France, of Russia, and of Sweden, in order to give material assistance to Denmark in resisting that dismemberment. My noble Friend calls that vague, and says that we did not propose to give material assistance. Certainly we did not specify the number of troops and ships that we proposed to give, but what we did propose to give was material assistance. It appears to me that nothing could be more clear and plain than 759 the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, and the French Government so considered it, because M. Drouyn de Lhuys spoke at great length to Lord Cowley on the subject, and stated that the Emperor of the French expressed his approval, and more than that, he wrote a long despatch, of which you will find a summary in the papers; but the answer of France was to this effect, that France was not opposed to the integrity of Denmark, but she thought it might be that some change would, perhaps, be preferable to the maintenance of that integrity, just as in 1831 it appeared to the British Government that the setting up of Belgium, as an independent country, was preferable to the maintenance of the integrity of the Netherlands. It went on to say that the question of war with Germany was a very serious question for France, and that France would prefer to keep herself at perfect liberty as to any future measures she might take if the balance of power were actually in danger; but, at present, she did not think it necessary to give the assistance required. My noble Friend then makes a most extraordinary supposition. He says, that if instead of asking France whether she would assist us in preventing the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy, she had been asked whether she would give material assistance in preventing the Austrian and Prussian troops from entering Schleswig, we should have obtained her aid. A more extraordinary, a more wild or unfounded supposition I never heard made in this or the other House of Parliament. The answer of Russia was not so plain and distinct, but the effect of it was clear— that she wished to preserve her liberty of action; that she wished to know exactly what the proposition of England was, but she did not feel at present that her means and resources would admit of the policy of giving material assistance to Denmark. And then the question comes to this— which, however, my noble Friend never put—whether England, France, Russia, and Sweden having made a treaty, by which they did not guarantee or agree to guarantee the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, but to respect and acknowledge the Prince who was to succeed to the throne of all the Danish states and dominions, we alone, without France and Russia, should take upon ourselves to maintain the integrity of Denmark. Now observe, our object was to maintain the balance of power and the peace of Europe; 760 but the balance of power and the peace of Europe are questions of as serious importance to France and Russia as to England, and, therefore, it was not the business of England alone to undertake their defence. But when I heard my noble Friend explain the manner in which this was to be done, I own I was much more impressed than before with the danger of the alternative course which he thinks we ought to have pursued. In the first place, my noble Friend thinks that in the month of January we should have sent a squadron to the Baltic. We might have done so in the month of March, for in that month we sent an expedition to Copenhagen, and in the Crimean war we sent a fleet to the Baltic; but if you were to send a fleet to the Baltic in the month of January, you would have destroyed your ships and lost your fleet. My noble Friend also says that Venetia was panting to go to war with Austria, that Gallicia was disturbed, and that Hungary was disaffected. But, my Lords, only consider in what a state Germany was. It was in a state of violent enthusiasm, bent upon having Schleswig and Holstein separated from Denmark, looking to that end above all, not caring much, perhaps, about the Prince of Augustenburg, but putting him forward to serve as her instrument for that purpose. This was also to be taken into account— that Prussia and Austria, afraid of altogether thwarting the wishes of Germany, were executing them in such a way as they thought would be still conducive to peace and order in Germany, while they made Denmark suffer from their attacks. Well, then, we should have had on one side Germany, carrying, at least, Prussia, if not Austria, along with her, invading Denmark, and we there to defend it; we should have had Venetia making war in the Adriatic, and should have had the people of Hungary rising in delight that England was at war with Germany; and every violent and revolutionary plot coming to its completion under English auspices. And all this disturbance in Europe—this general war—a general war was to be undertaken in the name of peace, and in order to prevent Schleswig from being invaded. Not the least consideration in this matter was that France was taking a very different view from ours. While we looked to the integrity of Denmark, France was looking to the interests of nationalities, and what should be done for the people of Schleswig and Holstein. I do not blame 761 France for that, but that was another element of danger; for, while we were supporting nothing but Denmark, and supporting her right or wrong in the things which she maintained, France might have taken an opposite view, and then these two nations, whose united action is of so much importance to Europe, might have been brought into collision, though having no interests that were rival, but, on the contrary, the utmost interest in living at peace. Well, that is the prospect which my noble Friend holds out; and I can only rejoice the more that we have not thrown the firebrand into Europe, and not caused the extensive conflagration which my noble Friend has indicated. Now, my Lords, it is necessary to consider a little what we have effected. All those representations which my noble Friend holds so cheap, and which he says produced no result, as they have not prevented the war from breaking out, have, at all events, produced this effect—that on the 31st of January, before they went into Schleswig, those Powers who had been constantly thinking and suggesting that the maintenance of the Constitution of November had dissolved the Treaty of 1852, and set themselves quite free to take any course they liked — the Powers who held these views did, on the 31st of January, inform England, France, and Russia that they held to the Treaty of 1852, and respected the integrity of Denmark. Well, that, I think, is a very great point gained. It appears to me that, instead of the total dismemberment of Denmark, we can now go into the Conference with every Power except the Confederation, clearly bound to respect the Treaty of 1852, and clearly bound to respect the integrity of Denmark. We have made great steps in advance since the month of January. I own when I heard the language talked in London, and still more at Berlin, I was constantly afraid that the King and Government of Prussia would declare that the Treaty of 1852 was at an end. But by the firmness and moderation of our language, we have obtained from them the declaration that they will maintain that treaty, and in the Conference will consider that as the object to be always kept in view. My noble Friend has contrasted the position we are now in with that of Mr. Canning in 1826. Well, there is a very great difference between the power of Spain in 1826 and that of Germany in 1863. Austria and Prussia and the whole of Germany, with 44,000,000 of people, are very different from Spain 762 at that time. But, besides this, England was bound by treaty to defend Portugal as if she were England, and Mr. Canning felt under that treaty, and very justly felt, that the honour of England required that she should send her troops there, and that where the English standard was no invasion should come. He was perfectly justified. With regard to Spain, I recollect perfectly well hearing Mr. Canning say, "I am told that we must have war sooner or later. If that be the case, I say later." My noble Friend says just the reverse. He says, "We must have war sooner or later, and I say sooner." I say with Mr. Canning, "later," and I am quite content to abide by that. As the Conference is to meet on the 20th of this month, I know not that I need enter—or, indeed, that it would be right for me to enter—upon the questions that must there be agitated. The object of England is, and, I think, ought to be, to modify the extreme pretensions and, if possible, abate the animosities of different nations. I hold that to be a fitting object for England to endeavour to attain; but if I wish to do that, I must not begin by laying severe blame on the different parties to this war. With regard I to the conduct of this war by Austria and Prussia, I entirely agree with much that has been said by my noble Friend. But we have already stated in our despatches our opinion on this point, and my noble Friend at the head of the Government has declared that this is an iniquitous aggression on the part of Austria and Prussia, and that the resistance of Denmark is justified by the conduct of Austria and Prussia, I know not that anything stronger could have been said, even by my noble Friends opposite. With regard to the whole subject, I must consider the many interests we have spread over the whole face of the globe, and the danger that if we were at war with Germany that other wars might spring out of it, that our commerce might be intercepted by privateers sailing under any name or flag, and scouring the ocean to destroy our commerce. It may be a low and unworthy consideration in the eyes of my noble Friend, but when I reflect on the exposition made by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other night of the magnificent situation of this country, I am not inclined to hazard and imperil that situation without a clear case of honour, or without great and mighty interests being at stake, calling for our armed intervention. Also, we must con- 763 sider that by the side of that exposition of flourishing trade, and of the improvement of our finances and all our material interests, there remains the fact, which was stated then, and must be stated every year, that there is more than £26,000,000 interest of debt to pay, and that that £26,000,000 interest of debt has been caused almost entirely by war, the greater portion of it having been caused by the two last wars which this country undertook. In 1764 the interest of our debt was £4,600,000; it is now £26,200,000. May we not be unwilling —may we not fairly be cautious—before we add to that debt? One of those wars, the American war, was one which no man in these days will defend. The other of those wars, the father of my noble Friend (Earl Grey) most eloquently opposed as unjust and unnecessary. Whether these wars were justified or not, the cost and burden of them have been immense; and, while that is no reason why we should desert any cause in which we are bound to go forward, or why we should abandon any friend whom we have obligations to support, they are reasons, I think, why we should pursue a pacific, and not a warlike course. I confess, for my own part, that while I have the authority and adopt the policy of the great men to whom I have referred, and who held that the balance of power ought to he maintained, I likewise agree with them when they sought alliances in order to support the balance of power, and in thinking that the destruction of one of the States of Europe is not only a great outrage, but a peril to the independence of all the other States. But at the same time, I do think that a policy the least hostile that we can make it, and the least disposed to make a quarrel where it can be avoided, ought to be pursued by this country. I cannot, therefore, agree with my noble Friend in his Motion, that, "in the opinion of this House, if the demand made by Denmark for mediation, according to the principle laid down in the Protocol of Paris, 1856, had been more decidedly supported by Her Majesty's Government, the bloodshed and the other evils already occasioned by the war in Denmark might have been prevented." Now, I do not believe that that is the opinion of this House, and I shall, at all events, feel it to be my bounden duty to oppose that part of the Motion. With regard to the other Resolution of my noble Friend, "that such steps ought to be taken as may convince 764 the Powers of Europe that Her Majesty's Government adhere to the treaties," it is unnecessary to attempt to convince them that we adhere to the treaties. The Treaty of 1720 is, indeed, one which has been disputed by persons of great learning, and we are not called upon to assert the validity of that treaty. But, with regard to the Treaty of 1852, it is our object to maintain that, and to have it recognized by the Powers of Europe. I trust that will be the result of the Conference. With respect to the policy of France, I shall say this one word — that we were not ready last year to adopt the course proposed by France—namely, to send an identical note to Russia, and afterwards to concert measures in case Russia did not agree to our proposal. We were rather satisfied with the terms proposed by Austria, and which would leave upon Russia the responsibility of her refusal. We did not think it wise to go to war with Russia in the cause of Poland, and we therefore informed France of our determination not to do so: the French people have great sympathy with the Poles. There is besides the tie of religion, which makes a close connection between France and Poland. With regard to Denmark again, we have a great feeling with a gallant people—a maritime people like ourselves, professing the same religion with ourselves, and constantly connected with us by maritime commerce. Therefore, while France sympathized more with Poland, the sympathies of England have been more with Denmark; and while we refused to join France in the proposal regarding Poland, she refused to join us in the proposition with regard to Denmark. We have no reason to find fault with France on that ground; but still I must say, that if we are to interfere—if we are to defend Denmark on the grounds of the interests of Europe and the balance of power, the Powers of Europe ought to go together, and not to leave that great task to be undertaken by us alone. There are other matters requiring consideration. My noble Friend alluded to one—that of the Austrian fleet going to the Baltic. That is a question on which Her Majesty's Government have made representations to the Austrian Government. At present, the Austrian Government have promised that they have no intention to send their fleet into the Baltic. They say they are about to send their fleet into the North Sea to protect the commerce of the German Powers, which is very extensive. That is a legiti- 765 mate object. England is quite free to act in such cases; and, while we will not act without it is absolutely necessary, and while I am fully conscious of the power of England, yet we do not wish to hurry into war without necessity. And, for my own part, I think that a pacific policy is our true policy.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, as this discussion has turned upon the policy and conduct of the Government, and as many Peers are absent from town, I think it is a matter of regret that the noble Lord (Lord Campbell) did not give longer notice of his intention of bringing forward this subject. But I apprehend — and I am confirmed in my opinion by the state of the House—that it is not the intention of the noble Baron to ask the House to pronounce any opinion, but that his object was to express his own individual opinion, and to enable any other Members of your Lordships' House to express their opinion, on the policy and conduct of the Government as they appear from the voluminous papers on the table. That being the case, I apprehend that the peculiar wording of his Motion is a matter of minor consideration, and in the few words which I shall I address to your Lordships I will confine myself not to the terms of that Motion, but to a consideration of the state of affairs as they now stand. I have gone through the dreary waste of these interminable papers; I have plodded through them with the greatest possible patience; I have gone through the greater part of the 800 and odd pages which comprise those extracts which Her Majesty's Government have been pleased to lay before us from the correspondence which has taken place upon this subject during the past year; and I can assure the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) that the last accusation which I should think of making against the Secretary of State is one of want of diligence—because I perceive that the noble Earl has during the last year written, exclusive of duplicates, no less than 170 despatches upon the subject of Denmark and Germany. And although certainly I have not been struck with admiration of the style of these despatches—although I have seen them characterized by what I consider a most forcible weakness—I must say that I have been struck with astonishment and admiration at the persevering industry with which the noble Earl has gone on spinning day after day thread by thread his political cobwebs, utterly regardless of every single thread 766 being swept away one after another—spinning, spinning, spinning on, but at the same time not making the slightest progress towards the completion of his web, and not having been able to catch a single diplomatic fly. I have no great fault to find with the tone and character of the noble Earl's speech, and I have no wish to increase the difficulties of the position, great and serious as they are, in which Her Majesty's Government and Europe are placed. I entirely concur in what the noble Earl has said with regard to the policy of this country being essentially a peace policy —a policy of avoiding the horrors of war; but I think that the noble Earl placed that policy on the lowest and humblest ground when he rested it simply upon pecuniary considerations. There are considerations which impress me with a greater horror of war than does the risk of impairing the flourishing state of Her Majesty's Exchequer; and although I consider war a great and grievous evil, yet there are evils greater than war, and among them are the sacrifice of the honour of the country and the abandonment of the interests of a friend who has placed himself in your hands. The question is, what is a warlike policy? Is the course which Her Majesty's Government has pursued under the auspices of the noble Earl more likely to aggravate the danger or to remove from us the evil of war? I am afraid that the course which the Government have pursued is one which in the end is more likely to lead to serious complications and a general disturbance of the peace of Europe, than if they had in the first instance taken a more decided, a more straightforward, and a more determined course. It is, of course, impossible, looking back at these negotiations, to say that a particular course taken at a particular time would have produced this or the other effect, It is, of course, open to the noble Earl to hold his opinion, that if we had made stronger remonstrances, with the view, of course, of acting upon them, we should have been more likely to incur danger of war; and, on the other hand, it is open to the noble Earl on the upper bench (Earl Grey) to argue that if we had adopted a more resolute tone, the probability is that it would have imposed upon Europe the obligation and necessity of maintaining peace. But, my Lords, that of which we do complain, and which we feel to be the course least creditable to this country, is that of holding out menaces, threats, and remonstrances to 767 foreign countries, and at the same time conveying to those countries and to Europe generally the impression that they may safely set at defiance our representations, our threats, and our remonstrances, because nothing will induce us to give any material aid, or to take any part further than these querulous remonstrances with which the noble Earl is assailing every Court in Europe. I admit fully the great danger of the position, and I admit what was stated by the noble Duke—and it is a consideration which ought not to be lost sight of—that its dangers are greatly aggravated, because they are not under the control of statesmen and monarchs who act under the guidance of reason, but are under the control of democratic influences and revolutionary parties, who are acting not upon reason, but from passion, who are desirous of driving all matters to extremity, and who, I am afraid, are exercising great influence at the present time. I admit that there is something of that same feeling on both sides; but what is the mainspring of the course of action which is pursued by Austria and Prussia? It is not that Prussia and Austria—certainly it is not that Austria—desire to pursue an aggressive policy; but, it is this, that there is a revolutionary party abroad who are anxious to create disturbance throughout Europe for the purpose of their own selfish and revolutionary ends. They are exercising an influence upon the minor Powers of Germany, partly of persuasion, partly of ambition, partly of fear; and these minor Powers, carried away by a torrent which they are unable to stem, have placed themselves in a perilous position for their own interests at the head of the democratic movement, fomenting and encouraging plans which can only be fraught with the most imminent danger to themselves. Well, but two great Powers like Austria and Prussia might, one would think, safely defy this revolutionary influence. They might, but there are many motives which operate with them. Prussia may have—we know she has—motives of personal ambition to be gratified by the extension of her possessions and the acquisition of a naval harbour. Prussia also entertains great jealousy of Austria; and Prussia desires to take the sting out of the democratic movement by placing herself at the head of it, and, strange to say, placing herself at the head of that movement, being herself a despotic country, for the purpose of putting down the liberties 768 of a neighbouring country which she considers too democratic. That is the anomalous position of Prussia; what is that of Austria? Why, Austria fears that if Prussia is allowed to take this lead, Prussia will, in point of fact, be the ruling Power, and maintain a paramount influence in the Confederation over these minor Powers, and that she herself will be hereafter compelled to play a subordinate part. Therefore, it is first the power of the revolutionary party acting on the small States; next, the small States acting on the mutual jealousies of Austria and Prussia; and lastly, those jealousies themselves which will not allow either to take a single step in which the other shall not go side by side with her. These are the circumstances which really constitute the great and imminent danger to the peace of Europe, whatever course of policy any Government may pursue. I do not quarrel with the way in which the noble Earl has spoken of the case as between Denmark and Germany, nor will I enter into a discussion of the Schleswig-Holstein question, which I think he has stated very fairly. There have been violations of the engagements entered into on both sides; neither party is free from blame, and any British Minister is perfectly justified in holding the balance evenly between the two, and not throwing himself and the weight of his authority exclusively into the scale of either. With respect to the obligations entered into by Denmark, I recollect that the noble Earl on a previous occasion used the expression that it was not open to Denmark to use the argumentum ab inconvenienti, because if she had entered into these obligations she was bound in honour to fulfil them. But if Denmark has entered into engagements which, taken in the sense put upon them by Germany, places her in a state of absolute paralysis as to her internal condition, and practically subordinate the whole Monarchy to one portion which happens to be a part of the German empire, it is not an argumentum ab inconvenienti, but there is a manifest impossibility of fulfilling to the letter the conditions entered into. Denmark has made many efforts to relieve herself, with justice to her subjects, from the painful position in which she has been placed; but every one of her propositions has been rendered futile by the positive refusal of Holstein to enter into any compromise whatever, and the persistent manner in which Prussia has backed Holatein 769 in these extreme views, and has maintained that, without her assent, no arrangement can be entered into. What can be more absurd than that there should be four portions of one monarchy—one of which contains 1,500,000, and the other three about 500,000 inhabitants — but that each of these several divisions should have an equal voice in the administration of the affairs of the whole monarchy, and that upon the ground that no one of these divisions should be made wholly subordinate to another? I am glad to see that the noble Earl recognizes the monstrous injustice of that proposition; but here is another, which is not less impracticable—that is to say, that if Holstein (or Lauenberg, which would be a stronger case) if Holstein refuses her assent in any one of these four assemblies to any measure passed by Denmark, or the other three portions of the monarchy, for the general advantage of the whole country, not only shall that measure not take effect with regard to the whole country, but it shall not take effect with regard to those three divisions which have passed it and adopted it, because the fourth refuses to accept it; and that fourth claims that there shall be one constitution for the whole; the consequence of which is that every measure, great or small, must be based upon the separate convenience of the four several divisions. If that is the case, Holstein, as a fief of Germany, exercises an absolute prohibitory influence on all legislation in Denmark. Denmark is placed at the foot of Holstein, and Holstein is at the foot of Germany. Now, my Lords, I care not that that may be the literal or technical interpretation of engagements entered into. No court of equity would say that such engagements could be supported to the letter. It is obviously a case not for intervention by arms, but for friendly negotiation by a friendly Power; and that is the course which Germany ought to have taken. I will not repeat what the noble Earl has said this evening with regard to the ungenerous way in which Germany availed herself of the increasing difficulties which pressed upon Denmark, with a view to cause her to accede to conditions with which it was impossible that she could legally comply. I think the course taken by Germany in that respect was wholly unjustifiable. But the question with which we have now to deal is the effect which was produced by the policy which Her Majesty's Government pursued in the en- 770 deavour to prevent or mitigate the danger which threatened Denmark, and the position in which our influence and interests stand in Europe, owing to the positive declaration made by the noble Earl of pacific principles. In looking through those papers, I find that to almost every country we have addressed successively representations, remonstrances, and threats, going almost to the length of a warning that non-compliance with our recommendations would be followed by a war. We have gone to the very verge of saying to Denmark, "if you act on our recommendations"—as she studiously did—"you will have our material aid." We went thus far, I maintain, by putting the converse to her, and telling her that if she did not obey our instructions we could render her no assistance. Now, would it not, I would ask, have been more generous and fair, and candid to say to Denmark, "We advise you, as friends, to take such a course; but, at the same time, you will adopt that which, in your own judgment, you consider the best; for you must bear in mind that from us you are to expect nothing more than our moral influence." I entirely concur with the noble Earl in the opinion that we were not bound by the terms of the treaty to come forward to protect and maintain Denmark, or called upon to support the integrity of an instrument which our co-signataries were not prepared to uphold. But, then, we ought not to have held out to Denmark the expectation that it was our resolve to see that the treaty was preserved, and the Prime Minister ought not, in his place in Parliament, to have stated that in the event of her territory being invaded she would not stand alone. By making that statement the noble Earl conveyed something more than an intimation; he gave a distinct and direct pledge, on which the Danes placed reliance; and from that moment they said to themselves, "No matter though there are 40,000,000 against two; we know the power of England: we have the promise of the Prime Minister of England that that power will be exerted in our defence in the case of exigency. The honour of England has hitherto been held inviolable, and we have the utmost confidence that it will be so on the present occasion." When, however, we look to the other Powers of Europe, we find that they do not judge us quite so favourably as Denmark. Here are a few of the representations made by the noble 771 Earl opposite, and of the answers which he received. On the 31st of August, 1863, he writes as follows:—
I have caused M. Katte to be informed… that if Austria and Prussia persist in advising the Confederation to make a Federal Execution now, they will do so against the advice already given by Her Majesty's Government, and must be responsible for the consequences, whatever they may be."—Correspondence, No. 2 (1864), p. 123."Responsible for the consequences" seems to be a favourite phrase of the noble Earl's; but the States of Europe have learnt to regard it as nothing more than a mere brutum fulmen, which he is on every occasion ready to launch. The noble Earl is informed, in answer to his representation, that the matter was in the hands of the Confederation, that Austria and Prussia would not further interfere, and that execution would go on. The next application is one in which still stronger language is used, and in which the tone assumed is of a more warlike character. It is addressed to the Diet, and a copy of it was ordered to be presented officially to the President of the Diet on the part of Her Majesty's Government. In this despatch the noble Earl says—Her Majesty's Government could not see with indifference a military occupation of Holstein, which is only to cease upon terms injuriously affecting the Constitution of the whole Danish monarchy…. Her Majesty's Government could not be indifferent to the bearing of such an act upon Denmark and upon European interests. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, earnestly entreat the German Diet to pause."—Correspondence, No. 2 (1864), p. 145.Now the phrase, "Could not see with indifference" is one which in diplomatic language assumes very serious import; but the German Diet nevertheless treated it with profound indifference, because they quietly say in reply, that "they are not in a position to take any action on the communication of Her Majesty's Minister," and request the President to communicate a copy of their decision and of the report of the Committee in answer to it. Such is the simple reply of the Diet which amounts to this—that they did not deem it necessary to take any notice of the noble Earl's communication. On the 9th of November the noble Earl writes—As matters now stand, Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion, that it is inexpedient for them, at least for the present, to make any further proposal to the Diet.…. At present Her Majesty's Government can only leave to, Germany the responsibility of risking a general war in Europe, which the Diet seems to be so bent 772 on provoking. —Correspondence, No. 3 (1864), p. 199.Again, we have the noble Earl writing as follows to the Government of France:—If the Government of the Emperor of the French are of opinion that any benefit would be likely to follow from an offer of good offices on the part of Great Britain and France, Her Majesty's Government would be ready to take that course. If, however, the Government of France would consider such a step as likely to be unavailing, the two Powers might remind Austria, Prussia, and the German Diet that any act on their part tending to weaken the integrity and independence of Denmark would be at variance with the Treaty of the 8th of May.M. Drouyn de Lhuys having a lively recollection of the case of Poland last year, when the French Government had joined us in making strong representations— [Earl RUSSELL: Joined in the proposals with Austria.] Yes; but they took the step conjointly of throwing upon the Emperor the responsibility of the course they were about to take; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, no doubt bearing all this in mind, replies to the noble Earl that the offer of good offices would, in his opinion, be useless. He adds—The second mode of proceeding suggested by his Lordship would be in a great measure analogous to the course pursued by Great Britain and France on the Polish question. He had no inclination to place France in the same position with regard to Germany as she had been placed with regard to Russia. The formal notes addressed by the three Powers to Russia had received an answer which literally meant nothing, and the position in which those three great Powers were now placed was anything but dignified; and if England and France were to address such a reminder as that proposed to Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation, they must be prepared to go further, and to adopt a course of action more in accordance with the dignity of two great Powers than they were now doing on the Polish question.[Earl RUSSELL: That has reference to Poland.] He draws a contrast between the case of Poland and that of Denmark. France has strong Polish sympathies, as I have already observed, and England has strong Danish sympathies; and if we did not show ourselves inclined to join France with regard to Poland, it was not unnatural that France should show a disinclination to join us with reference to Denmark. Now, I never did call upon the noble Earl to make war for Poland; but then I think that when one great Power calls upon another and demands the fulfilment of treaty obligations, which was what the noble Earl did last year in reference to Poland, that Power must naturally expect 773 either to be called upon to give effect to its menaces, or to withdraw them under such humiliation as the noble Earl's policy on that, as on too many other occasions, has entailed on this country. There is another paragraph in the document to which I have referred that does not relate to Poland, but to the great Powers and I am surprised, after the rebuff which he had received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the noble Earl should again have pursued precisely the same course. As to what the noble Earl said about "the heavy responsibility," if by any precipitate measures the Powers should break the peace of Europe, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observes that he has not forgotten that when the case of Russia in reference to Poland was under the consideration of France, Great Britain, and Austria, she was warned of the "heavy responsibility," and that Prince Gortschakoff replied that he was quite ready to accept that responsibility; and that he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) did not wish to provoke another such answer, or to be again treated with such indifference. I do think M. Drouyn de Lhuys has shown a much truer sense of what is due to a great country than the noble Earl has, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said—I will anticipate a difficulty; I will look forward and see what is to take place in the event of an unfavourable answer, and if I can see that you will continue your course notwithstanding an unfavourable answer I will act with you; but if in the event of an unfavourable answer you are to get out of the strait and leave me in the difficulty, I must say—though you may not think much of it, because you are so used to it, yet that I do not look upon it in the same light.Now as to the amount of influence which this country has, under the noble Earl, exercised in Europe, let me say that a good deal of light is thrown upon this subject by a despatch of Sir Andrew Buchanan. When the noble Lord, whom I see in his place (Lord Wodehouse), left Berlin on his way to carry out his hopeless negotiations, Sir Andrew Buchanan was left behind, and received some instructions as to applications to be made to the German Powers in obedience to the noble Lord. Sir Andrew Buchanan says—I regret also, with reference to representations which I have made by your Lordship's order to M. Bismark during the last fortnight, on other subjects connected with the question, that I have failed in obtaining compliance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government. I was instructed to suggest that time should be given to Lord Wodehouse to negotiate with the Danish Government before the Federal execution is carried into effect. The execution will take place within six days of 774 his Lordship's arrival in Copenhagen. I was instructed to express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that no disputed territory on the frontier of at Rendsburg would be occupied. Rendsburg will be occupied, with the exception of that portion which is on the north side of the Eider.And here I must remind the noble Earl that his geography is rather weak, and that the mouth of the Eider is not in the Baltic.
§ EARL RUSSELLI never said it was.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYI beg the noble Earl's pardon. My noble Friend near me had been speaking of the ease with which a British fleet might be sent to the Eider; and the noble Earl replied that it was impossible to do that because of the extreme difficulty of sending ships into the Baltic at this time of year. Sir Andrew Buchanan then went on to say—
I was instructed to state that the execution should only take place for Federal obligations violated. The execution will take place in virtue of a decree of the German Diet, against which Her Majesty's Government have formally protested at Frankfort, by a despatch communicated officially to the Governments of Austria and Prussia. Lastly, I was instructed to request that the Prussian Government would consult with that of Austria, and state to Lord Wodehouse precisely what Austria and Prussia will require to bring about a friendly disposition on both sides, but they have declined to give any explanation of the arrangements which they would accept from Denmark.Here, then, are four or five points on which the noble Earl has desired Sir Andrew Buchanan to make strong representations in the hope of staying the war, every one of which is contumeliously rejected by the German Powers. And here I find two lines on which I think it would have been wiser if the noble Earl had employed his scissors, which have been so freely applied in other parts of the papers. I find Sir Alexander Malet writing thus to the noble Earl from Frankfort—There is an absolute persuasion that England will not interfere materially, and our counsels, regarded as unfriendly, have no weight.I think the noble Earl did succeed in frightening for a moment one Minister— the Prussian Minister. On the 14th of January the noble Earl thus describes, in writing to Lord Bloomfield, what had passed between him and Count Bernstorff—I had spoken on a former occasion in the sense that Denmark would resist such an occupation (of Schleswig), and might be aided by Great Britain. He wished to have an explanation. It is to be observed that, in speaking to Count Bernstorff on the occasion referred to, I had expressly declared that I could not say what the decision 775 of the Government might be, as the Cabinet had not yet deliberated, and consequently not submitted any opinion to the Queen; but that, judging from the general current of feeling in Parliament and in the nation, I thought an invasion of Schleswig by Germany might lead to assistance to Denmark on the part of this country……Her Majesty's Government could not wonder that the King of Denmark was ready to defend Schleswig, and to consider its hostile occupation as a fatal blow to the integrity of his dominions. But I could not doubt that he would be assisted by Powers friendly to Denmark in that defence.— Correspondence, No. 4 (1864), p. 534.Now the charge made against the Government is that, being without any decided policy of their own, they came to Parliament for a policy, and without having formed any judgment of their own, they deliberately resolved to be guided by the apparent views of Parliament and the country. Here is a statement which throws the strongest light on this charge. We have the noble Earl informing the Prussian Minister that Her Majesty's Cabinet had not consulted on the subject, and that consequently they were not prepared to recommend any policy to the Queen. To Denmark, therefore, we have the noble Earl holding out expectations that if she complied with certain advice she will obtain material assistance, and to Prussia we have him saying—and he caused this apprehension in the mind of the Prussian Minister—that in the event of Schleswig being occupied, Denmark would find herself assisted in her defence by friendly Powers. The Prussian Minister seemed rather startled at first, having in the course of the correspondence pressed upon the noble Earl the special evils of Germany. To that the noble Earl replied that he was quite aware of that; but that Germany had had plenty of time to consider that, and must take all the responsibility. As soon as Count Bernstorff heard the old familiar words, "take all the responsibility," he was relieved at once, and drew the very natural conclusion—England will never interfere, and will content herself with throwing on us the responsibility. So it has been throughout all these transactions. Step by step the measures protested against in the strongest terms by the noble Earl and his Government, are adopted; the modest application for delay that the King might do that legally which he could not do otherwise, was rejected; the Federal execution grows into a material guarantee, and at last into an invasion and occupation of the country without a declaration of war, and accompanied with 776 scenes of barbarity and ferocity almost unparalleled in civilized war. I regret to find that that spirit of destruction is not yet extinct in the Prussian army, which caused so much anxiety to the Duke of Wellington in 1814, and which he had so much difficulty in restraining. The bombardment of Sönderborg is an act of unparalleled ferocity if it be true, as I have heard, that after the bombardment had once ceased, and the inhabitants were tempted to return to seek among the ruins for the remnants of their property, they found themselves in a trap, and the bombardment was again opened on them. I hope the noble Earl will be able to tell us, that from the information forwarded to him he knows that this atrocious story is not true, or, at least, that it is greatly exaggerated, and that the Prussians have not drawn upon their arms the ineffaceable stain which would rest on them if this atrocity had been committed. I wish I could see in the proposed Conference any prospect of a prosperous issue. It certainly does not assemble under the most favourable auspices. The two principal parties concerned come out with declarations diametrically opposed to each other. One party declares that she will not listen to any proposal for the abrogation of the Treaty of 1852, and the others insist that Denmark shall perform the engagements of 1851–2, yet say that they will be by no means satisfied to leave Denmark in so desirable a position as she was left in by that treaty. Now the engagements of 1851 and 1852 were different. [Earl RUSSELL: They were one arrangement.] No; the arrangement of 1851 was between Russia, Austria, and Denmark; whilst that of 1852 was between all the great Powers, and did not make the slightest reference to the previous arrangement. Besides, one was a treaty, and the other was a sort of agreement, sanctioned by a correspondence of a very loose character, capable of various interpretations, and by no means a sound basis for such an important matter. Therefore, while I hold that the engagements of 1851–2 are very fair and legitimate grounds for conference negotiation, and mediation if necessary, they must never be confounded with the Treaty of 1852, the sole and only object of which was to settle the succession, and to ensure the continuance of the Danish dominions under one sovereign. I was glad to hear that the noble Earl used the expression which showed that he did not 777 confine himself to what should be done to maintain the integrity of Denmark, but that I the object was also to ensure the independence of that country. I can conceive that, there might he arrangements to secure the dominions under the same sovereign, and i yet those arrangements might be such that: the independence of Denmark might be altogether sacrificed. From the statement of the noble Earl we are entitled to hope, that England will go into this Conference with no undue preference for either party, and that her whole endeavour will be to secure fair and equitable terms for both sides. I wish I could feel the same confidence with regard to some of the other Powers, and in the motives and objects with which they will enter into the Conference. Above all, I wish the Conference had not been delayed so long, and that if i an armistice could not have been obtained before the Conference assembled, it had been determined that at its first sitting, and as a preliminary, terms should be proposed by which an end would be put to this bloodthirsty war. I do justice to the motives which have actuated the noble Earl throughout the whole of this correspondence. I cannot, however, conceal from myself my conviction that, by the strength of his remonstrances, and the; feebleness of his acts, he has confirmed the impression so prevalent throughout Europe, that we have ceased to be a great Power, that our military and naval position has been made subordinate to our trading and commercial interests; and that, however England may bluster, and however loudly she may talk, there is not the slightest danger of her interfering materially to exercise the slightest influence or control in the affairs of Europe.
LORD WODEHOUSEMy Lords, as I have been referred to several times in the course of this debate for the part I have taken in some part of these transactions, I must be allowed to say a very few words by way of explanation, without wishing to enter at length into the discussion which has taken place. The noble Earl who has just sat down referred several times to the assurances which, he said, though they might not have been directly given, were to be inferred from the language which I held at Copenhagen — assurances that the Danish Government might expect the material support of this country if they followed our advice. The noble Earl said that care had been taken not to give direct assurances. Now, I 778 think the best proof that the Danish Government have not understood my language in this sense, is to be found in a despatch written by Sir Augustus Paget to the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, on the 22nd of December. In that despatch you will find that the Danish Minister had never inferred that such a promise was given to him, for Sir Augustus Paget mentions that in the interview he had with M. Hall, immediately after the joint interview M. d'Ewers and myself had with him, M. Hall complained that "there was no promise of support if Germany continued her aggressions; there was no prospect even of the execution being arrested," My instructions, certainly, were not to give any such promise, and if I had done so, I should not have obeyed my instructions. I think a conclusive proof that no such assurances were given, is to be found in the constant complaints of the Danish Government that Her Majesty's Government would not give them a promise of support, although they advised them to make certain concessions to Germany. I wish to say a word or two on another point. My noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has said, I not only advised that the Constitution should be revoked, but he thought my own opinion was the Constitution ought not to be carried into effect. In that supposition he is quite correct. My noble Friend, knowing that my sympathies were not very strong with Germany, asked me to examine carefully the Constitution of November, and, having done so, I came to the conclusion that it was expedient for the Danish Government to revoke it. My sympathies were with the Danes, and I would not have undertaken the mission which Her Majesty was pleased to confide in me, if I thought the advice which I was authorized to give was not such as Denmark ought to follow. I think no advice was given to her which it would not have been for her advantage to follow; but, though she did ultimately consent to follow the advice we gave her, unfortunately she consented too late. Throughout those negotiations—not only those which took place while I was discharging my mission, but throughout the whole of them—all the concessions made by Denmark have invariably been made when they were too late. I pressed that very strongly on the Danish Government. I said, "If you make concessions, make them early;" but I cannot conceal from myself, while no man admires more the 779 courage and constancy of the Danish people, that they have not been well advised by the Government which has presided over their destinies. In the first place, the Danish Government attempted more than Denmark could accomplish; they attempted to bring Schleswig into closer union with Denmark, in order to consolidate the kingdom, but not remembering that, however desirable, as regards Denmark, that might be, they had entered into engagements with Germany, the non-fulfilment of which, however onerous and inconvenient they might be, must lead to a very unequal contest. The opinion which I held when I was advising the Danish Government I now, viewing matters with the light of subsequent events, hold more strongly still. I think that it would have been far better for the Danish Government, by making timely concessions, to have entered into negotiations, while in the possession of Schleswig, than to have provoked a war and been compelled to enter into them with Schleswig in the hands of the German Powers. It may be very fairly said in reply, that the conduct of the German Powers has been bad. I admit that it has been marked by great duplicity as well as violence; but I still think that if Denmark had pursued another course, she would have had a fair chance of obtaining a Conference before Schleswig passed out of her hands. My noble Friend (Earl Grey) expressed his surprize, that in my conferences with M. von Bismark, and others, I did not make use of an argument which he suggested. I am exceedingly sorry that it did not occur to me, as perhaps it might have produced more effect than those which I did use. I used a great many arguments, but, I regret to say, they appeared to make very little impression upon M. Von Bismark. I think the fact is that the Prussian Government materially changed their policy at the last moment. When the death of the late King of Denmark took place, the Prussian Government, alarmed at the strong democratic feeling of the, party which was making use of this Schleswig-Holstein question for its own ulterior purposes, thought that the best way out of the difficulty was to attack Denmark. Having acquiesced in the proceedings of Denmark with regard to the new constitution up to the King's death, Prussia found out suddenly that she could not acquiesce in them for a single day longer. The noble Earl who has just sat down (the Earl of Derby) pointed out most 780 truly that it would be a complete mistake and most impolitic to admit that the engagements of 1851 were to be connected with the Treaty of 1852. The engagements of 1851–2 were entered into by Austria and Prussia with Denmark, and the other Powers of Europe were not parties to them; whereas the treaty of 1852 was a European engagement, entered into by the Great Powers, in which no reference was made to the engagements of 1851–2. It might be all very well for the German Powers to argue, that it was because they entered into certain engagements in 1851–52 that they signed the Treaty of 1852. That might have been in their minds; but it was not in the treaty, and by that treaty they were bound. I now wish to say one or two words with respect to the difficult question as to what ought or ought not to have been done to prevent the war. In alluding to that subject, I must say that I cannot conceal from myself that the position of the Government has been materially injured by the policy pursued with respect to Poland. When that policy was under discussion in your Lordships' House, I abstained from saying anything on the subject; but it then seemed to me from the first that serious consequences must follow if, after entering into a diplomatic correspondence with Russia in conjunction with Austria and France, the Government should be compelled to withdraw — wisely, I admit, but under circumstances which could not but weaken, to some extent, the good understanding which exists between this country and France; an understanding which I deem essential, particularly in the present state of Europe, to the maintenance of treaties and the balance of power. At the time, I thought it not probable that Russia would give way to any mere remonstrances with respect to the Poles; and that being so, it would in my opinion have been far better if our Government had confined itself to a protest and had not exposed itself to that rebuff. I hope that in the case of Denmark this country will have again the full cooperation of France, without which I despair of seeing this question satisfactorily and speedily settled. If this co-operation should not be obtained, and if the Conference should unfortunately fail in settling the question, a grievous shock will be given to the whole system under the protection of which the treaties of Europe exist; because these treaties exist and are preserved by the concert and understanding which 781 exist among the Great Powers of Europe; and if that understanding be permanently impaired, Europe will he thrown into a state of anarchy. I do not agree with my noble Friend (Earl Grey), that it would have been better to have attempted, by a display of force, to prevent the attack by the German Powers on Schleswig, and I concurred in all that has fallen from the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as to its not being obligatory on this country to interfere alone. It may be said that the despatch of a body of British troops to the scene of action would have stopped the German invasion but a wise statesman would consider what must have been the result if that policy failed. Neither the interest nor the honour of this country was engaged in such a manner that the Government ought to have incurred so great a risk as a war with Germany. It is, of course, possible that we might have averted the war by announcing our determination to take a part in it if it should be commenced by Germany; but we had no right to presume that such a result would have followed; and the Government were quite right not to come to any such resolution upon the mere chance that it would have saved us from responsibilities which we were not absolutely prepared to encounter. The position in which this country, France, and Russia are now left inspire me with considerable doubt as to the expediency of such treaties as that of 1852, which, although they have not directly the character of guarantees, are quasi-guarantees, the non-fulfilment of which casts a certain amount of discredit on those Powers who are parties to them. The reputation of this country on the Continent has been referred to, and I entirely concur in the remark that this country should not unnecessarily interfere in the various affairs of Europe. My opinion is that the British Government should interfere in them as seldom as possible; but, if led to interfere, it should be in a manner to make the country respected.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, when my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs appealed the other night to the discretion of this House, I own it appeared to me that on this question there was one of two courses to be taken. If the House were of opinion that the present Ministers have so entirely neglected the interests and honour of the country in the negotiations which have been carried on, and are likely to neglect them for the future, then the House should take some strong mea- 782 sure for the purpose of removing them from office; but if the House were not of that opinion, the other course, obviously, is to endeavour to strengthen their hands in the Conference in which they will have to meet the representatives of the other Powers. The speech of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) gave me in many respects great satisfaction. The noble Earl certainly showed a desire not to raise difficulties in the way of the success of the Conference; but, at the same time, I must say I think the noble Earl would have done better if he had abstained from throwing doubt on the probability of the Conference terminating successfully. I must express my satisfaction at hearing the noble Earl declare that he had read the whole of the papers laid on the table. We all know what an acute eye the noble Earl has to discover a flaw, and, therefore, it was very satisfactory to find that the blame attributed to my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, and to the Government, was so very small. The noble Earl opposite began with the regular cut and dry phrase about my noble Friend's style, and then he gave my noble Friend credit for diligence; and, though the noble Earl spoke with something like contempt of the continued attempts of the Government to prevent the war and bloodshed which have taken place, and to stop it for the future, I think that he would have expressed great indignation if it had appeared that we had not used every exertion in our power to prevent so unfortunate a state of things. The noble Earl says we are perpetually spinning cobwebs and never catching flies. I entirely deny that, and I say we have caught some flies. In the first place, we secured those declarations from Austria and Prussia with regard to the Treaty of 1852, and the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Denmark which, I think, are of very considerable importance. By our endeavours we also got Austria and Prussia to agree to an armistice, although Denmark, for reasons of her own, declined to accede to that armistice. Moreover, chiefly, I believe, owing to the exertions of my noble Friend, seconded as he has been by France and Russia, we are going in a few days into a Conference, and it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, and the opinion, also, not only of France and Russia, but of Prussia and Austria, that one of the first objects of the Conference should be to secure an armistice. The noble Earl has tried to pick out the plums from an enor- 783 mous cake; but he has sought to draw some inferences from these papers which I entirely dispute. He says he could not find in them anything to show that we had given any pledge of assistance to Denmark. That is sufficiently disposed of by the speech of M. Hall, to which my noble Friend has referred. With regard to another most important point—namely, that we had given the Germans to understand that by no means and on no score would we go to war on this question, I defy the noble Earl to point out any passage in the papers before Parliament, indicating that we have given any such assurance whatever. On the contrary, these papers show that we actually pledged ourselves that, if France and Russia would agree with us, we would render material aid to Denmark. That was a species of combination which, I believe, would have tended entirely to avert the existing difficulties. The noble Earl (Earl Grey), speaking certainly without any evidence derived from the papers, thinks that France was prepared to give material aid. Now, I believe that France was quite determined from the beginning to do nothing of that kind; and when the noble Earl says that we ought to have used menace, and grounded his opinion principally on the assumption that that menace would have been effectual for its purpose, I must say I cannot at all concur with him. How has this war been decided upon by Germany? It is a remarkable fact that various reasons, some of them aristocratic, and some democratic, have combined to carry away these States into a war which is deeply to be deplored, but which I think it would have been impossible for any statesman to prevent; and I am not in the least convinced that the menace of sending a few men to Denmark and ordering a squadron to cruise outside —for it would not have been able to go into—the Baltic would itself have sufficed to stop all chance of war, especially when the States of Germany were intoxicated with delight at finding that there existed one subject on which there was perfect union among them; and when, moreover, they knew that France was determined not to join us, and that Russia, too, was unwilling to separate herself entirely from Austria and Prussia. Then the noble Earl (Earl Grey) told us that this country has lowered itself in consequence of its unwillingness to go to war.
§ EARL GRANVILLEThe noble Earl in a previous debate gave me a similar contradiction to this, and I found afterwards, on looking at the report of his speech, that I had correctly quoted him. Now, I cannot help feeling struck by the contrast presented by the language held by the noble Earl on this question and that which he has for many years held with respect to the policy which ought to be adopted by this country. If any Member of this House has more strongly than another condemned menaces of war, or uttered more eloquent denunciations against the Quixotic idea of England's undertaking to redress injuries and injustice throughout the world, it is the noble Earl himself. I have heard him argue that this country was all the stronger not only for abstaining from going to war, but even for not spending her money to prepare the armaments necessary for war; yet now, he comes down and twits us because we have acted in consonance with the language held by every statesman who has governed this country for close upon half a century, every one of whom having announced in the clearest way to Europe and the world that, although they should always be prepared to uphold the honour and interests of the nation at all hazards, said that nothing but urgent necessity should draw them into war. The noble Earl referred to Mr. Canning's conduct in respect to Portugal. In the very speech in which he defended the expedition to Portugal I think Mr. Canning distinctly stated, that but for the necessity imposed by treaty engagements, he would not have gone into that war—that he felt that war ought not to be undertaken because it was just, but, to justify entering into it, it must also be urgent and expedient. The noble Earl's father, whether in Opposition or in office, clung on every possible occasion to the policy of maintaining peace. Lord Aberdeen's earnestness in the same endeavour is well known; and the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) and his Colleagues when in power exhibited equal anxiety in their foreign policy for the preservation of peace. I am surprised, then, at the noble Earl coming down to the House and holding up the Government to derision for having hitherto kept their hands quite free, as I maintain they now are, to take any part in European matters which they may think fit. By our carefully avoiding to involve ourselves in war up to this moment, I believe that much advantage is gained to the country and to 785 Europe. We wish it to be understood that we are desirous for peace; that we are unfettered by any engagement which could prevent us from taking any course that we might deem expedient; but that as long as we can see any chance of securing our object without war, we will not depart from a policy which has been perfectly consistent both before and since the meeting of Parliament.
§ EARL GREYwished to explain. His objection to the policy of the Government was, that it was a policy of expedients, which could lead to no useful result. He held that if we had taken a more decided part in the first instance we should have rendered an attack unlikely, and have been in a position to speak to the Powers of Europe with greater weight and authority.
§ EARL RUSSELLwished to say a few words relative to the bombardment of Sönderborg. There was no doubt as to the fact of that bombardment; the only question was as to the notice given. It was stated by the Prussian Government that they had given a general notice—I think, some weeks ago—that Sönderborg being part of the fortress of Duppel was liable to bombardment. It appeared to him that that justification—if so it was called—was perfectly insufficient, because the people of Sönderborg naturally would not act on a general notice, but supposed they would have received, according to the usages of war, a special notice of twenty-four hours.
LORD CAMPBELLsaid, he could not expect to gain the indulgence of the House at so late an hour, as they were not expecting a division and none was likely to occur. The remarks of a noble Duke, now absent from his place (the Duke of Argyll), called imperatively for a word of observation, or he (Lord Campbell) would be silent. The noble Duke, a Member of the Cabinet, had openly endeavoured to overthrow the guarantee of Schleswig, as bearing only on a portion of that duchy. It was true that in one of the instruments containing it, it was confined to that part of Schleswig "now in the possession" of the King of Denmark. But in other instruments there was no such limit. And those who had referred to this ancient point were of opinion that the whole mainland was in possession of the King of Denmark in 1720 Beyond this, it was admitted on all hands that the guarantee applied to the southern portion of the Duchy. It came into force, therefore, the moment that the Eider was crossed by an invader. If the position of 786 the noble Duke was tenable, the guarantee would not have found fifteen years ago, in the First Minister and Foreign Secretary of the present day, unreserved and unhesitating champions. Whatever the noble Duke had urged, if applicable now, was applicable to that period. As regards the debate, he (Lord Campbell) saw no reason to regret it. Not one noble Lord had answered his remarks as to the necessity of further measures to give the Conference a prospect of succeeding. And neither the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, nor the noble Lord the President of the Council, had objected to the specific course which he proposed, namely, that of occupying Kiel by British vessels.
§ Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
§ House adjourned at a quarter before Eleven o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.