HL Deb 10 March 1862 vol 165 cc1233-43
LORD CAMPBELL

rose to call attention to the blockade of the ports of the Confederate States of America, and to move an Address for Copies of any Correspondence upon the subject which might have taken place since the date of the Papers which had been laid before Parliament. The noble and learned Lord said the object of the Motion is not to impugn the conduct of the Government or to show that the blockade ought before now to have been opened, or that now some measure in that direction should be taken, but to establish that the attitude in which we stand with one of the belligerents suspends, if it does not violate, neutrality, and that some further action is required in order to restore the neutrality we aim at. The belligerent in question is the Southern or insurrectionary power, and our attitude towards it arises out of a transaction very easy to recall, and a despatch with which the world is perfectly familiar, that of the Foreign Secretary to Lord Lyons, dated February 15th. The transaction was an appeal on our part to the Government of Richmond, through our Consul at Charleston, to accept the principles of public law laid down at Paris in 1856. The whole narrative appears in Paper No. 3 of the series on America. The negotiator with the Government of Richmond was not our Consul in person, but a gentleman of South Carolina, whom he chose to represent him. It was clearly open to the Government of Richmond to decline the proposition, not upon its merits, but on the ground that they could not hold intercourse with the agent of a power which had not yet recognized the place they claimed in the society of nations. Such a refusal might have easily been made on grounds of policy, as well as grounds of dignity, because if they consented to negotiate with countries which denied their claim to recognition, they might seem in the eyes of some to compromise their right to urge, or at least to reduce their power of extorting it. And it is well known that, among the leading men of Richmond, there was a difference of opinion on the conduct which became them. However, not only did they consent to hear our negotiator, but they determined to embrace his proposition. On the 13th of August last year the President of the Southern Congress signed the Resolution which that Congress had arrived at, accepting all the rules laid down at Paris in 1856, except that which relates to privateering, and which we had not asked them to adopt. But the President was not so weak as to refrain from telling our negotiator that he looked for something in return for the concession he was making, and that the return he hoped for was a rigorous adherence, on our part, to the principles we had laid down as to blockades. We gained our point on such an understanding. So much for the transaction with the Government of Richmond. We now came to the despatch of the 15th of February, in which the Foreign Secretary, so far as the papers show, in reply to no question, in obedience to no demand, and in fear of no emergency, volunteers his approbation of the blockade as carried on at Wilmington and Charleston. It is perfectly notorious to all by whom these papers have been studied that at Wilmington and Charleston the blockade has been less effective than at any other portion of the seaboard from the north of Virginia to the extremity of Texas. The effect of the despatch, therefore, is to relieve the Government of Washington from the necessity to maintain at any part a higher or stricter type than that which Wilmington and Charleston have illustrated. Wherever it exceeds that type which the Foreign Secretary has selected for encouragement they are at liberty to weaken and abate it. It is unnecessary to prove its inefficiency at other ports, since its state at these two has been accepted as the standard. How far is such a measure, upon our part, consistent with the engagements we incurred in August to the Government of Richmond. It should never be forgotten that our Government were not forced to choose between the opposite alternatives of raising the blockade or of giving it in its weakest points a conspicuous and irrevocable sanction. They might, in a despatch so public and mo- mentous, have sanctioned not its weak points, but its strong ones, if any such could be discovered; they might at least have gone on without a pointed declaration, and only so far recognised it as they had during the autumn. On what ground were they required to blazon a manifesto in its favour, which must offend and startle one of the belligerents who had a right to look to a very different conduct from us, who had: a right at least to hope, that when we quitted silence, it would not be for language inconsistent with our pledges to him? How can it be shown that this uncalled-for manifesto does not violate neutrality by a departure from the principles which we urged upon the Government of Richmond, and should have urged in vain, had it been thought that we were ready to abandon them? It can be shown, in one way only—namely, by disproving the evidence which this book presents on Wilmington and Charleston. Happily the witness to be heard is that very Consul whom the Government urged to negotiate with the Southern Power on the point which I referred to, whose previous character is shown, by the appointment to so delicate a trust, and whose fitness to receive it was proved by the rapid and successful close to which he brought the business. The jurisdiction of Mr. Bunch extended over both these harbours—one of them in North, the other in South Carolina. It is not necessary to rely on the evidence which the Southern envoys have adduced. It is not necessary to rely upon the circumstance that the harbour of Charleston has been barbarously choked up, which would not have happened could access to it have been otherwise prevented. It is not necessary to rely upon the circumstance that now ships may be insured at fifteen per cent between Liverpool and Charleston, whereas fifty per cent would be required, as shipowners inform us, in a really adequate blockade. Our Consul had no motive for leaning one way or the other, although the Northern Government have now deprived him of his office by taking away his exequatur. In support of this view the noble Lord then read copious extracts from the despatches in question. The noble Lord, in continuation, said—Such was the blockade at these ports in which it has received so unlooked-for and so astonishing a sanction. But does it, therefore, follow that the conduct of the Government is open to exception? On the contrary, it only follows that further cor- respondence is required to throw some light wholly wanting now upon the reasons which directed them. Further papers may show that they were forced to make a declaration on these particular localities by an embarrassment which could not be disposed of, or an inquiry which could not be adjourned. They may show us that the French Government had already acted in this manner, and that it was necessary to keep up the concert of the two upon American affairs. They may show us that further evidence was in possession of the Government to rebut that of our naval officers and consuls. They may show us that an explanation has been offered to the Government of Richmond with which we have communicated once and may communicate again, calculated to remove the sting from a proceeding which must appear to them so adverse. But if no further information is extended, the irresistible conclusion will present itself that we owe a debt to one of the belligerents which ought to be discharged, although not by raising the blockade, a course after their despatch impossible for Government. If no further information is extended; until that debt has been discharged in one form or another, neutrality may be upon the lips of official men, but has lost its place among their counsels. The noble Lord concluded by moving— An address for copy of any correspondence on the subject of the blockade of the ports of the Confederate States of America, subsequent to the papers presented to this House.

LORD ABINGER

begged to congratulate Her Majesty's Government on the judicious manner in which the recent negotiations relative to the Trent with the United States Government had been conducted, and on the spirit of prudence, dignity, and conciliation which had been displayed, and which had met with the approbation of all classes of the people of this country. He had by no means anticipated so easy a solution of the difficulty. Some four years ago he spent some time in the United States, and he was received with such friendly kindness by all classes of the people there that he confessed this miserable contest conveyed a personal feeling of deep sorrow and regret to his mind. He thought it might be unadvisable, under existing circumstances, to raise the blockade of the Southern ports. Were they to attempt to raise the blockade, our cruisers would inevitably be brought into contact with the Federal squadron, which would not admit our right to interfere, and a collision would thus be brought on between the two nations. He so much approved of the policy of non-interference which had been adopted by the Government that be should be sorry to see any system inaugurated which would lead to difficulties and complications on this subject. The whole question turned, in his opinion, upon the determination of the South to maintain their own independence. Had they seen any flagging on the part of the Confederate States in carrying on war against their former associates? He thought they had not. He apprehended that those States would maintain their separate existence, and be confessed his sympathies were with that gallant people who were struggling for their independence against immense difficulties. He admitted that the Northern States were superior in men, material, and treasure and he did not undervalue the importance of their recent successes, but he believed, notwithstanding, that the subjugation of the South was an impossibility. The determination of the Southern States to maintain their independence must be admitted by all, and when once that was the case it was time to consider whether a recognition of their independence was not a measure which we ought to take to save bloodshed, and to put an end to the war. He hoped that some independent Member would make a Motion to that effect, or, failing that, that the subject would he taken up by some noble Lord on that side of the House.

EARL RUSSELL

I quite admit the right of the noble Lord to call in question the conduct of the Government with respect to the blockade which has been established by the Northern States of America; nor, indeed, should I complain if any noble Lord had called in question the whole of the conduct of the Government with respect to the unfortunate division which has taken place in America; for I an convinced that the policy we have pursued is not only founded on reason, and justified by argument; but also that it has the general approval of the country. With respect to this particular question—and I will not detain your Lordships by entering into any other—it was, of course, a matter of consideration for Her Majesty's Government from time to time in what manner this blockade should be regarded. There are various questions with regard to the blockade which they had to consider.

Firstly, was there sufficient authority for instituting a blockade? Lord Stowell says, that a blockade must be the act of a sovereign authority; and this blockade is the act of the President of the United States, who, on the 19th of April last year, issued his Proclamation, declaring that a blockade was about to be instituted. That act was followed by different armed ships of the United States blockading the various ports and warning vessels off the coast. Therefore, there can be no question as to the authority by which the blockade exists. Then, with regard to the means which the President of the United States, as the organ of the Government, employs. Of course those means were very deficient at first; but I think these papers show, and everything which we have beard shows, that the Government of the United States has been most desirous so to augment their squadron, and so to employ their ships, that there might be a sufficient force to maintain an effective blockade. It was, in fact, a matter of the greatest importance to them—it was a vital point of their policy; therefore we cannot doubt that they used every means in their power. We find that as early as the 15th of July, when complaints were made in some of the New York papers that the blockading squadron was not sufficient, that the Government had then sent on that service 34 men-of-war, of 56,000 tons, with 726 guns, and 10,113 men. This showed that the Federal Government made great efforts to render the blockade efficient. It might be said, again, at the commencement of the blockade, that it was too extensive, and that it was impossible, owing to its extent, that it could be efficient. But we must recollect that we ourselves, in our American War, instituted a blockade extending over 2,000 miles of coast; and the difference between 2,000 and 3,000 miles of coast is not so great as to authorize us to raise any objection to the blockade on that account. With reference to the blockade of 3,000 miles of coast, although such as we proclaimed ourselves and such as the law of nations allows, it is obvious that with several large ports and many smaller ones to watch there will surely be irregularities in the conduct of it. But, nevertheless, we find, generally speaking, that there has been an intention to station ships at those ports, and that those ships have been regularly stationed. We find that the blockade of Charleston was instituted on the 11th of May by the Niagara, the blockade of Penascola on the 13th of May; that of the Mississippi was effective on the 26th or 27th, and that of Savannah on the 28th of May; in each case with sufficient ships for the purpose. The noble Lord (Lord Campbell) says that the blockade of Charleston was interrupted on some day of May but resumed at the commencement of June; and the noble Lord himself has read a letter, which showed that on the 5th of June the blockade was resumed by authority. There was also an account of another ship being added on some day in July or August, and there is no reason to suppose that there had been no ships of war before that port, and the whole question that arises is as to the interruption of the blockade between the 15th or 23rd of May and the 4th of June. If any ship had been taken at that time into a Prize Court, it might well have been argued by the owners that there was an interruption, and that no blockade at the time existed; but that does not affect the general question of the blockade of the Southern coast of America. And let it be remembered, above all, that if there were an ineffectual blockade, the last place in which we should hear of it would be in the American Prize Courts. When a merchant vessel had been taken into one of those Courts, it would be quite competent for the owners to plead that there was no effective blockade, and that therefore the vessel, not having broken it, could not be legally condemned. No one will say that there are not Judges in America quite competent to decide questions of international law,—Judges who have inherited the precepts and doctrines of such men as Chancellor Kent and Justice Story,—quite competent to pronounce judgment according to law, and who, I believe, would not have departed from the law in their decisions in such cases. But I do not find that there has been any real discussion in the Prize Courts of America, except perhaps in one or two instances, with respect to the efficiency of the blockade. I must confess to the noble Lord that the many instances which are given by Consul Bunch and others of the vessels which have run the blockade induced me to consider the whole of this question with a view to deciding what the course of the Government should be. But, in saying that many vessels have run the blockade, I think there is great exaggeration, and there is great misapprehension, when lists of vessels are given which are, in fact, vessels belonging to the Southern ports, which run out of creeks and creep through shallow waters in order to, reach another port on the same coast. These are mostly small vessels of from 50 to 350 tons, and it is stated in one of these letters that they cannot be regarded as vessels of such size and importance as to argue that the blockade was inefficient which allowed them to escape. Your Lordships know very well that in 1806 the Government of this country announced a blockade extending from Brest to Dunkirk; but during that and other blockades which we instituted on the French coast there were many coasting vessels which went from one port of France to another, entirely evading the blockade. But would that have justified either America, or any other neutral Power in saying, "This blockade is ineffective, and we will not acknowledge it, and we require you to give up the vessels which you have seized for breach of blockade"? It certainly would not have justified such a course. But there is another consideration. Has the Southern coast had a free and uninterrupted communication with Europe? Have your Lordships heard that cotton has arrived there in its usual quantities from the Southern coasts of America, and that the manufactures of Great Britain and France have arrived freely at the ports of the States which are now in a state of civil war? On the contrary, the intelligence which we have received—the intelligence which all the world has receive— shows that there has been no such uninterrupted intercourse, but that great inconvenience has been suffered by the inhabitants of these Southern States, owing to the existence of that blockade which is said to be ineffective. As I thought that this question of the efficiency of the blockade was of the utmost importance, I deemed it desirable to consult the law officers of the Crown; and after having done so I wrote the despatch to Lord Lyons, which the noble Lord has quoted, stating that— Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion that, assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create an evident danger of entering or leaving it, and that these ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact that various ships may have successfully escaped through it will not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by international law. This was the deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's Government on the subject. I cannot give the papers to which the noble Lord refers, on the very ground on which he asks for their production. He says, perhaps there may be papers that may show the blockade he thinks ineffective may really have been effective. There are no such papers; there are no papers that can make the case stronger for the Government than those which have been given; the Government is willing to leave your Lordships to judge the case from the whole effect of the papers that have been already printed, and whether they tend to the outside or the other your Lordships must judge. As to any representations from the Government of France that it considered the blockade ineffective, I must state that no such communication has ever been made to Her Majesty's Government. Nor have we ever had any communication with the Government de facto in Richmond with respect to the point which the noble Lord has referred to, and which I really think has nothing to do with the question at issue. At the commencement of the out break we asked whether the Government of the South were willing to acknowledge the second, third, and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris, and they expressed their readiness to do so. This was a great advantage to both the belligerent parties, but we entered into no engagement with the Southern States. It was our duty to see that the Declaration of Paris was adhered to independently of any such engagement: it is our duty with regard to all neutral nations, and with regard to the peace of the world. The noble Lord (Lord Abinger) who spoke second, spoke with feeling of his intercourse with the people of both the North and South of America. It would have been a great misfortune if, owing to circumstances, we should have thought ourselves obliged to take a course in such a quarrel that would have made us become partisans either of the North or South. It was my object and the object of every member of Her Majesty's Government, from the very beginning of the conflict, to watch the course of events, with the determination to act in an impartial spirit and preserve a strict neutrality between the two Powers. Sometimes our course—as when we acknowledged the Southern Stales as belligerents—may have been considered as having an injurious effect on the North. On the other hand, when forbidding privateers to carry their prizes into any British port, it may have been considered to have had an effect unfavourable to the South. But we did not consider the tendency of these acts. We only considered whether they were just in themselves and becoming the character of this country. If we had been obliged to take part either with one side or the other, it would have been a misfortune and calamity for the world, and for the people of America especially. On this subject I have seen lately a very interesting account—I believe an official report—published in American newspapers, from a person who was sent to superintend the negroes of Port Royal. The person making the report describes the condition of those negroes, how ready they were on the promise of some small wages to continue their work, and he ends by saying:—"Although I have done everything I could to dissipate the assertions, as calumnious as they are false, as to the Government of President Lincoln, I carefully abstained from exciting the slaves to rise against their masters." If by any misfortune, if owing to the necessity to vindicate our honour, if owing to persuasion that this blockade could not be legally acknowledged, we had been obliged to take part in this war, any thought of ending this great question of slavery by peaceable means would, I am persuaded, have vanished—the North would have proclaimed a general emancipation and liberation of the slaves. It is our earnest wish that the sin and stain of slavery may cense, yet there is nothing which I should look to with greater horror than a sudden insurrection of 4,000,000 of slaves, the devastation they would cause, and the horrors, murders, and pillage which, in the name of liberty, might have been perpetrated. I trust, therefore, that when this conflict ends, it will end in such a way that, although the cause of the emancipation of negroes will have gained, it will be an emancipation conducted gradually and by peaceable means, and that the slaves of America will in time take their place as free labourers, without the loss of the lives or the destruction of the property of their masters. It is not owing to their masters that slavery now exists in the Southern States of America—it is an inheritance which they have derived from this country. But if we had taken up this subject of blockade, if we had said that vessels condemned in the various prize Courts of America had been unjustly and unlawfully condemned, and the American Government had maintained that they were justly Condemned, I know of no course which would have been open but war with the United States. Having taken a different course, I do trust that within three months—perhaps even soouer—we may see the close of this unfortunate civil war in America. I have not intended by the language I have used to take the part of the one side or of the other. I trust that the contest may so end as to allow to each side a course of happiness and freedom. It will, perhaps, be impossible to renew the old feeling of union between the North and South; and if that be so, I trust that—whatever may be their military successes, whatever may be their naval victories, whatever positions they may capture—that the North will consent to a peaceful separation; and the two States—which may both be mighty—two States inhabited by persons of different education, perhaps with a very different nature, but respecting each other—may each go on in a course of peace and prosperity which will benefit them, not only at the present time, but for centuriest a come. Should this be the case, I shall heartily rejoice; and I shall rejoice above all if during the contest we shall have done nothing to aggravate their misfortunes, whilst we have pursued a firm course—yet one of conciliation—showing that the respect which we entertained for both parties remains undiminished.

LORD CAMPBELL

remarked, that as Government had no further papers in their possession, it would not, of course, be possible to move for them. In the absence, therefore, of any question before the House, he had no desire, no right, to enter into controversy with the noble Lord upon the different points he had referred to.

Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn

House adjourned at half-past Six o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.