§ Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
§ Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.
THE EARL OF CARNRVONsaid, that before this Bill was read the third time, he wished to say a few words upon a subject that was somewhat akin to the measure, and of which he had given the noble Duke notice. A few days since a right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) made a statement in the House of Commons which attracted considerable notice both within and without the walls of Parliament. That right hon. Gentleman called attention to the great disproportion that existed between the English and the French navies in respect of iron-cased ships. The pith of the right hon. Gentleman's statement was this—that while we might have by the close of the year six or seven of those vessels, the French Government would have a number little if anything short of twenty-six. He (the Earl of Carnarvon) ventured to think that BO far from his right hon. Friend's statement having been overdrawn, he had rather underrated the strength of the French navy in iron-cased ships—he might have added that within the last two months the French Government had issued orders for the construction of a large number of 904 steel or iron boats, which were capable of being taken to pieces and put together again with great rapidity, and afforded remarkable facilities for disembarking troops upon an enemy's coast. Now, it was true that France might be engaged in war with many continental nations, but it was obvious that in a war with these nations steel launches of this description would be totally useless. Most of the warlike operations of France would be land operations, and, as experience of the Italian war had shown, there would probably be facilities for a disembarcation in a friendly country. However that might be, and ingenious as this scheme might be, it was hardly applicable to a state of war between France and any other continental State. That, however, was not the point to which he wished to call the attention of the Government. He understood that the French dockyards, both public and private, were at this moment occupied not solely in constructing French ships of war. He understood that both the Italian and the Spanish Governments were having iron-cased ships built in France, and he was further informed that there were at this moment building near Toulon two sister ships to La Gloire, which had been ordered by the Italian Government, and which were rapidly approaching completion. It was stated, moreover, that two other ships of the same character had been ordered, and the lines were already laid down. By the side of the naval preparations in France it must not be forgotten that in the Italian dockyards, measures had been taken to accelerate the construction of vessels of war as much as possible, and the workmen employed on them were working extra hours with a view to their speedy completion. The Spanish Government also was understood to be taking similar measures, and four ships had been already commenced, while negotiations were pending for the construction of others. It had been calculated, as he conceived upon very reasonable grounds, that before the close of the year there would be a great accession of strength to the naval forces of Spain and Italy in the shape of iron-cased vessels. No one could feel any jealousy at this accession of strength on the part of those countries regarded by themselves; but if the supposition of a combination of those Powers with France were admitted, the question was at once changed, and such a state of things must be regarded 905 as pregnant with danger, at least to our naval position in the Mediterranean. But while, on the one hand, foreign Governments had been proceeding cautiously, silently, and steadily, in the work of augmenting their naval strength, we, on the other, had been making no proportionate progress, partly owing to our precipitation and partly to our vacillation in our plans and policy in constructing our ships. He himself recollected that within the last seven or eight years there had been four distinct changes of policy on the part of the Admiralty. Before the Crimean war large ships of war were held up as the great safeguards of the country. But at the commencement of the Crimean war a cry arose for gunboats, and gunboats were built in large numbers, only, in many instances, to rot in the dockyards of Ports-mouth. The gunboat fever then died out, and large ships were again resorted to, until within the last two years, when the policy of the Admiralty was changed in favour of building ships encased in iron. He understood, however, that within the last few days some invention had been discovered by Sir William Armstrong by which his guns could be brought to bear with such force and accuracy that the strongest iron plate would be pierced or pulverized by it. He knew that every system of naval architecture must be subject to changes of circumstances, and that new rules of construction must be devised conformable to them. It, would, therefore, be idle to suppose that what was suitable in one state of circumstances must be the best adapted to every other. In saying, therefore, that the Admiralty had frequently varied the forms and principles of naval architecture. He did not intend to condemn necessarily all change or thereby to impute misconduct to the Admiralty. But what he did complain of was a wasteful expenditure which sometimes occurred under the administration of that Board, which seemed to be governed by none of those rules of common prudence which any man in private life would be deemed little less than a madman if he did not observe. He would not weary the House by quoting cases, but as an instance within his own knowledge he would mention the circumstances connected with a dock at Malta. About thirteen or fourteen years ago the Admiralty ordered the construction of a dock in that island, at a cost of about £60,000 or £70,000; but it was built on the worst possible place, at 906 the extremity of a creek, and exposed to the wash of the sea, in some of the most tremendous storms of the Mediterranean. Then, again, it was constructed, not on Crown land, but upon private property, and was surrounded by houses, so that in the event of war or disaffection it would be in the power of an enemy to destroy it. The work itself was bad, the stones after a short time opened, the whole dock settled, and it became evident that its ruin was only a question of time. It might naturally be asked, did not the Admiralty inquire into these facts? They did inquire, and were told that the mischief was attributable to an earthquake that had occurred at Malta. Now it was true that there had been an earthquake, but the collapse of the work took place two or three years before the earthquake happened. At this moment the dock was in such a state of decay that the first heavy gale might bring down the whole of the masonry. But this was the least part of his complaint. About two years since the Admiralty, seeing that this dock had been built for ships of a smaller size than we now used, determined to construct a second dock. For that purpose £60,000 was taken in the Estimates, and another Vote was proposed to be taken this year, which would bring the entire amount to £83,000; but, although they had been warned by the experience of the past—although they had seen the mistakes into which they had fallen in regard to the first dock—incredible as it might appear, they actually constructed the second dock precisely in the same place, and open to precisely the same objections as the first. It was not merely surrounded by private property, but was built through and behind the dock originally erected. There was consequently no access to the larger dock except through the outer and smaller one, and, therefore, a ship could not be admitted to or released from the inner dock until the one in the outer dock had been removed. Thus, a large part of the additional space thus obtained was literally useless. No ship could enter the inner dock if it was too wide for the outer, and if in a severe tempest the work fell in, the whole of these two docks would be completely closed for five or six months; and that, perhaps, at a period of war or of extreme emergency. The steps of the new inner dock had been projected to such a width that when the work was done no large-bottomed vessel could rest there.
907 Last winter the workmen were engaged in undoing the work that had been done at a sacrifice of the public money. It was proposed at first to separate these two docks l>y a sliding caisson; but representations having been made to them against that plan, the Admiralty gave way, and substituted, an order to erect the usual dock-gates. Suddenly, however, without rhyme or reason, while the workmen were employed in constructing the gates a counter-order was issued one fine morning, and the plan for a sliding caisson was restored. In the event of a war with France—which God forbid!—and still more if Trance were supported by Italy and Spain, it was morally certain that there must be a great naval engagement in the Mediterranean. In that case, unless our arms were crowned with one of those overwhelming victories of which there were some instances in our history, both fleets must obviously put back to their respective ports for repairs. The French fleet could go to Toulon, and would, perhaps, be again afloat in three weeks. The Italian could refit at Genoa, La Spezzia, or some other harbour on their own coast; while the Spaniards could conveniently do the same at Carthagena or elsewhere. But what would be the case with our own fleet? With the works at Malta in the ill-arranged, and, perhaps, ruinous state which he had described, we might not have a dock in the Mediterranean ready to receive a single ship of war, and we should have to send our fleet across the Bay of Biscay to be repaired at home. Observe the danger that must thus ensue to ships disabled, and, perhaps, in a half sinking condition, the risk of their being intercepted on the way, and the certainty of the enemy obtaining the command of the Mediterranean in our absence. These were matters which must suggest themselves to every reasonable mind that reflected at all on this subject. He trusted he had said quite enough to draw the attention of the Government to the dangers of our position; if these had been secret facts he should have been the last to publish them, but they were known and patent to all Europe. He did not wish to impute any special blame to Her Majesty's Government or to the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty, but he ascribed the evils to which he had called attention rather to the vicious system of incessant change and weak vacillation which characterized so much of the naval administration of this country.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETMy Lords, the noble Earl first called your Lordships' attention to the question of iron cased ships, and referred to a speech lately made in the other House, founded on information furnished to the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich by Admiral Elliot. Admiral Elliot went to France, and applied, through the English Minister at Paris, for leave to visit the dockyards of that country, in the same way as French officers have often applied for leave to visit our dockyards. His request was acceded to with the courtesy and civility which the French authorities always desire to show in such a case. They said, that they should always be anxious to afford every facility for the inspection of their establishments to any officer accredited by the British Minister. Admiral Elliot went and saw all that was going on in those establishments; but I must repeat that, under the circumstances, I sincerely regret the course which he took on his return to England. If I myself had given a French officer permission to view our dockyards, and I afterwards found that he took the first opportunity of publishing in the French Chambers a minute statement of the proceedings in our dockyards, such as had been made in the House of Commons on the authority of Admiral Elliot, I certainly should not think he had done a very friendly act. At the same time all the information brought by Admiral Elliot was only what we knew before. We were well aware of the progress that had been made in regard to the building of iron-cased ships in France; and we had taken some measures, since our accession to office, for the construction of iron ships ourselves. The House is aware that the French had a considerable start of us in this respect. The late Government was in power in 1858, when it was perfectly well known what France was doing in the way of building iron-cased vessels; but they took no step in the same direction till May, 1859. Certainly some time was lost in these operations, which was all the more important because the opportunity of making actual trial of this class of ships was delayed. We have not yet been able to make trial of the first iron-cased frigate, although in a few weeks one will be in commission, and we shall then have more practical results than any we have yet obtained. When the present Government came into office we found only one of those vessels laid down, and a sum taken in the Estimates for another.
909 We ordered this second vessel to be built; and, not satisfied with that, although Parliament was not then sitting, I brought before the Treasury the necessity of at once ordering two more. I did not wish to go on building these ships until their effect had been tested; but, seeing the progress made by other countries, I thought we ought not to be unprovided with this class of vessels. Although we were necessarily ignorant on many points of detail, I subsequently proposed to build three more, which, accordingly, have been commenced. We have, therefore, now seven of these ships in the course of construction. We are now preparing some of our wooden ships for plating with iron. I do not think they will be very efficient; but these ships will be at least as good as the French. My opinion is that we ought to construct our ships of iron to be afterwards iron-plated; but the whole subject is one of very great difficulty. Every day brings out new points and new difficulties. When I came into office two things came upon us at once—novelty in shipbuilding and novelty in the construction of our guns. When I came into office in 1859, the late Government had ordered the Warrior to be built, but had calculated that she would carry the old style of arms. She was not calculated for the new style of rifled guns, but for the old style of arms. When I came into office my attention was naturally called to these subjects. With regard to iron ships, I saw various persons; naval men having a knowledge of engagements at sea and men of great experience in shipbuilding—with the view of acquiring all the knowledge that could be had on the subject. They said their opinion was that we should build ships of iron and plate them with such iron plates as would keep out shell though they might not resist solid shot, before doing this we wished to have some experiments tried. We had some experiments at Portsmouth, and one of the first was upon an iron target of less than an inch thick. The result was that round shot in striking the iron broke into pieces, but passed on into the vessel, and no less than 700 pieces of iron were picked up inside the ship. That showed that round shot produced as bad an effect as any shell. It seemed, therefore, that merely to case ships with thin iron would be to expose men-of-war to as great destruction as possible, while such ineffective would load the ship with unnecessary weight. We had no end of suggestions and recommenda- 910 tions. Some people recommended India-rubber, others a thick matting of hemp, others chain armour. The answer I sent to these gentlemen was that, if they would send their inventions to Portsmouth, we would try them. I myself saw chain armour which had been tried, and the very first shot destroyed it. India-rubber and hemp were equally ineffective. Last year it was said we should slope the sides of vessels, and shot striking at an angle would glide off; but when we came to try flat-headed bolts, the slope made no difference at all. That was the last answer I received from Sir William Armstrong. Then it was said that the iron should be 4½ inches thick. I was rather doubtful whether that would be sufficient, and I ordered the vessel to be laid down at Chatham to have such flotation that she might carry at least six inches of iron. I thought six inches tolerably safe. I now find that Sir William Armstrong's guns have fired through 8-inch iron with the greatest facility. In building these iron vessels it is a great problem where we are to stop. Thin iron will not do; thick iron is very little better. It is, therefore, very difficult to say how we are to make our vessels safe. One fact, however, is clear, and to that we have chiefly addressed ourselves—namely, if we cannot make our vessels so secure as we could wish, at least we should arm them with as good weapons of offence as possible, and by ordering that our ships should be armed with Armstrong guns we felt that we were taking a course which would produce the greatest effect, while, at least, it would be a safe mode of proceeding. With regard to these different experiments, the noble Earl says the Admiralty have always been changing their policy. Why, my Lords, the reason is obvious. The world is changing; alterations are going on everywhere. So far from the Admiralty vacillating, from the time we came into office we have gone on in the course which I believe your Lordships will say was the right and proper course for us to adopt under the circumstances. My noble Friend the other day said we were going on building three-deckers and laying down wooden ships of war; but what is the fact? The last three-decker ordered to be built was in January, 1855. It is quite true that two three-deckers were launched in the course of 1859, but these three-deckers had been nearly finished for a long time; their engines and everything had been or- 911 dered; it was, therefore, thought better that they should be launched, and thus whilst we obtained two wooden ships of great power we also made room for other work to be gone on with. Well, then, it was said why do you go on with two-deckers? Now, we have not been going on with two-deckers. The last two-decker ordered was by the late Government in 1859. The present Board have ordered none. But it is said the Admiralty is going on ordering new large wooden ships. Nothing of the kind. It is quite true that we have converted sailing ships of the line into steam-ships, and we have ordered small vessels—corvettes, sloops, and some frigates and gun vessels; but if you mean to keep up the maritime power of this country we have not yet arrived at that forward state in which we can leave off building. We have been building the vessels what we thought would be most useful, and we have ordered them all to be armed with the new guns, and, instead of carrying the large number of guns they formerly used to do, our vessels will carry few guns, but guns of great power. The noble Earl referred to our gunboats, which he said were rotting in harbour; but if these were armed with an Armstrong 100-pounder they would be most formidable vessels, and would serve most materially to defend our coasts in case of hostile aggression; while being themselves small they would present a very slight object of attack for the enemy. With regard to what we ought to do in the way of preparation, there are two or three courses that might be adopted. If there was any immediate necessity or alarm, we could readily cut down some of the three-deckers and case them in iron. I have had calculations made as long ago as in 1859, and I find if you were to cut down, say the Royal Albert, and case the vessel in iron, it might bear 41 inch iron; but it would not then be a very effective ship—the ports would be too near the water, and it would not be so good a sea-going ship as I should wish the Admiralty to build, unless there was any pressure. Next year we ought to have better ships than three-deckers cut down would give us. Another course might to some extent be adopted. We have frames cut out for certain line-of-battle ships. We can easily add to the length of vessels and make effective wooden ships, which we can use hereafter as wooden frigates or as iron-cased ships.
912 Another course would be to order frames of iron ships to be prepared with a view to ease them with thick iron. Then comes the question of what iron they ought to be constructed, and the best mode of fastening the iron plates. Every day new questions arise. I am unwilling to advance too fast, because I feel that we can advance much more efficiently by waiting a little longer. It is only a few days since the last of these experiments took place with 8-inch plates. I had previously considered that 6-inch plates would afford sufficient resistance, and I ordered 6-inch plates. I have great doubt whether the mode of fastening the plates is satisfactory. On that account, therefore, we thought a trial should be made before we laid down new iron ships on a large scale; and that done, we felt we might rely on the power we have in building iron vessels if the country once takes it in hand. We know what the private yards in this country can do. We could soon produce a fleet of iron ships far greater than all the other Powers of Europe besides. It is true, as the noble Earl has stated, that France is not the only country which is building wooden ships to be covered with iron. There are some being built for Russia. I do not know where the contracts were taken, but contracts are in course of execution for Russia and also for Spain. One wooden ship covered with iron has, likewise, been built for Sardinia. Austria is adopting a similar system. The French ships are for the most part wooden ships covered with iron. I believe the best ships will be found to be those which are built of, as well as covered with, iron. Ours are iron ships with two coverings over a large portion of the ship—one of teak twenty-six inches thick, and one of iron four and a half inches thick. That is how the Warrior is built, and I have no doubt it will offer great resistance to shot and shell. Complaints have been made that the Admiralty are going on buying large quantities of timber. We must do so, and especially we must continue to purchase considerable quantities of teak, if we persist in building our ships with teak coverings. Teak, I need hardly say, is the best timber for that purpose, because it is of all woods the least liable to decay. I hope I have made a satisfactory statement in answer to the remarks of the noble Earl.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONThe noble Duke has said nothing of the two ships 913 built at Toulon for Italy, or of the two more which are ordered.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETI cannot say what is doing in the French dockyards. I know there was an iron-cased ship built for the Sardinian Government in France, but I believe it was built, not in any Government dockyard, but by a private builder at Marseilles. I know nothing of the second ship, but the noble Earl may be correct in his statement. All I can say is, that in the fact that iron-cased ships have been, and are being, built for Italy and Spain, I see no great cause for alarm. It is very natural that other Powers should desire to advance as well as France and England, and we have no reason for believing that either the Italian or the Spanish ships are meant to attack us. At the same time, it is our duty—and especially the duty of the Admiralty—to watch the progress that is making, to follow our own course, and to apply to Parliament if Parliament be sitting, and if not then to take measures on the responsibility of the Government—to make such preparations for maintaining the maritime position of this country as may seem to be necessary. For that I am quite prepared. The noble Earl, in referring to the works going on at Malta thought it expedient to go back six or seven years. What has been brought to my notice since I have been at the Admiralty with respect to Malta is that we want more harbour accommodation there, not merely dock accommodation, but accommodation in the harbour for our vessels, for our ships-of-war being now built so much larger than they formerly were cannot ride where they used formerly to be moored. On that subject I communicated with my noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Office, and through him with the local Government at Malta. The conclusion we came to was that the Imperial Government and the local Government should each pay half the expense of deepening the upper part of the Great Harbour at Malta, that the merchant vessels should be put in that portion of the harbour, and that the lower part should be given to us as the place most convenient for our fleet. We have sent out vessels to dredge the upper part of the harbour accordingly, and operations are now in progress for providing increased accommodation for our large ships. The noble Earl says that in the event of war the French fleet after a battle would go back to Toulon, while we 914 could not repair our ships at Malta. That certainly is so. The French have great advantages over us in the Mediterranean, because Toulon affords much more ample accommodation than we have at Malta, even taking into account the two harbours there. Beyond those two harbours, as every one acquainted with the ground knows, it would be impossible to extend the accommodation, and they will hardly suffice for the fleets of England, if we must have great fleets in the Mediterranean. There must be difficulties in that respect, but this country has met difficulties before, and I have no fear that we shall be able to meet and overcome them again. At the same time, we have taken care to enlarge the harbour accommodation, and the local Government has met us in a generous spirit, having agreed to pay half the expense. We are cutting out stones for making wharfs and piers connected with the new works, and we have given directions that those stones shall be taken from a place which will eventually form a canal between the two harbours, thus separating the town from the rest of the island by a new channel of water. I have no doubt that the improvements when completed will prove a great advantage, not only to our vessels of war, but also to the local Government and the inhabitants of Malta generally. He hoped he had succeeded in showing to their Lordships that the Government had taken all necessary measures for the naval security of the country, and he trusted their Lordships would not hesitate to pass the Bill.
§ EARL GREYI am sure your Lordships must have heard the statement of the noble Duke with great satisfaction. For my own part, instead of finding fault with the Admiralty for being too fond of change, I am rather disposed to blame them for being too slow in adopting improvements. What I complained of two years ago was not that we were adopting new inventions, but that when new inventions had been tried, and found to a great extent successful, we still went on building ships of the line which it was morally certain would never be used. I objected to that in 1859, and I think I was right in doing so. I did not mean to censure the present Board of Admiralty, because I was ignorant as to what they were about. We have now heard from the noble Duke what is the course he is really pursuing. I believe that course is the proper one— 915 not to hurry on too rapidly with new inventions until they have been fairly tried; but, on the other hand, when there are new inventions which bold out every prospect of being successful, not to continue spending large sums of money in building vessels which in all probability will be useless; to make arrangements for the rapid creation, in case of necessity, of a large force of that description of vessels which will be most wanted and most serviceable, but not, under the influence of panic, to proceed too fast in the construction of ships which will not be likely to answer. Let me add that I was extremely glad to hear what the noble Duke stated with respect to gunboats and the smaller class of vessels. It is obviously not wise, in the face of the extraordinary improvements which are constantly being made in modern artillery, to build enormous ships in which a very large number of men would be exposed to certain destruction. I think the smaller kind of vessels, armed with Armstrong guns, will prove the most useful we could have; and in a recent visit to Portsmouth nothing gave me so much satisfaction as to see our fine fleet of gunboats in such a state of preparation. In the event of any sudden attack there is no force on which we could so safely rely as upon these gunboats, armed with rifled guns.
§ Motion agreed to; Bill read 3a accordingly; Amendments made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.