THE EARL OF LUCANMy Lords, the defences of the country have become a matter of such general interest, and to many of so much anxiety and concern, that I need hardly apologize to your Lordships for trespassing on you for a short time, whilst I bring before you a question relating to that important part of those defences, the infantry of the army. Until recently such had been the security felt from the superiority and preponderance of the navy, that it may be said that scarcely any army at all has been considered necessary for the 654 defence of this country. Indeed, different Governments have year after year found themselves obliged to defend and justify themselves when bringing forward Army Estimates, and been made to calculate the amount of force chiefly upon what was necessary for colonial garrisons, and the relief of those garrisons. The question of organization was scarcely ever considered, and it may be said that so many regiments were maintained only as a neucleus on which an army could be formed on the breaking out of a war. The circumstances of the country are now totally altered, and I think it will be admitted that, however formidable may become our navy, and I was glad to hear the other evening from the noble Duke the first Lord of the Admiralty that it had greatly increased, and however successful we may be in manning it efficiently, still that no safety can be felt for this country in future, unless it is also defended by a largo and efficient army. The army can no longer be called a colonial army for colonial purposes, but an army whose first duty will be the defence of its own shores. If this be all true, the time has, my Lords, I think arrived when it would be well to consider what organization of the army will give the greatest security to the country in time of peace, and will best meet the exigencies of war at the least charge to the public. On the present occasion I shall confine my observations to the composition of the infantry. Since the peace of 1815 the organization of the infantry has under gone many changes. When I first joined the army it was composed of separate and independent battalions, and at that time regiments on colonial service had no depôts at home. An officer, or perhaps two only, being left to superintend recruiting, and to the forwarding of the recruits to their regiments. I can recollect no objections being offered to this system. No doubt I was very young at the time and inexperienced, but I have asked officers who were senior to me and more competent to form an opinion, and they concur in saying that no inconveniences were felt. In 1824 it was found that reductions had been carried so much too far that it was impossible to carry out the military services of the empire, and a very considerable increase of the army was determined upon. The Duke of Wellington, though not Commander-in-Chief at the time, naturally had much influence on all military questions, and he felt so keenly all the inconveniences and difficulties be had experienced during the 655 Peninsular war, resulting from regiments taking the field without proper reserve battalions at home to recruit them, that he determined upon introducing a totally new system; he well recollected regiments becoming constantly reduced to mere skeletons consisting of officers and a few men, and the necessity of sending them home, not only to be recruited, but to be reformed, and to be replaced by regiments altogether inexperienced in the field.
My Lords, this was a very great evil; no general engaged in war will willingly spare the services of an experienced veteran; so strongly did I myself feel on this subject in the Crimea, that I wrote to Lord Hardinge and urged him in the strongest manner not to send out new regiments of cavalry so long as he was able to reinforce those already there. For the reasons I have already stated the Duke of Wellington in 1824 succeeded in establishing "that no regiment for the future was to leave the country on any foreign service whatever without having a depot at home," and as it would be hopeless to expect that the House of Commons would agree to so large an increase of the army as would be necessary to give all regiments second battalions, it was decided that they should be increased from eight to ten companies, and that upon embarcation they should always be divided into service and depot companies, and in 1826, at the time of the expedition to Portugal, the regiments did all embark six companies of one hundred men each, leaving four companies at home to form small depot battalions.
My Lords, the advantages of such a system in time of war cannot be questioned. It is one founded on sound military principles, and must be approved of by all professional men competent to form an opinion. I do not pretend to say that these four company depôts were always as good and as efficient as could be desired, the numbers voted were insufficient for the purpose; but there were many of them well disciplined and efficient; others, from various circumstances, less so. This system, introduced by the Duke of Wellington, continued with little alteration during a period of thirty years. In 1854, when the Russian war broke out, the Government of that day had made no preparations whatever to meet its requirements. The late Lord Hardinge was thus placed under most extraordinary pressing difficulties, he found it absolutely necessary at once to increase the service battalions from six to eight companies, 656 and to raise the companies considerably in strength. This, as it may be supposed, so thoroughly exhausted the small depot battalions, and in many instances so completely denuded them of officers, that he was driven to consider what was best to do under the circumstances; and, in my humble opinion, his decision was wise; he could do no better at the moment; he consolidated the skeleton and exhausted depôts into provisional battalions, and placed them under Staff's appointed for the purpose. Whether this worked ill or well during the war is not the question. He did the best and the only thing that was practicable under the circumstances. I cannot believe, nor do I believe, that had he continued Commander-in-Chief the consolidated depôts, and more particularly for those regiments on home service, would have been allowed to continue. The Indian mutiny of 1857 may be said to have brought about an entire change in the military position of the country. The greater part, if not the whole, of the disposable land forces of the country had to be sent to India as speedily as possible, and the greatest exertions had to be made to raise men at home. The Government then created many second battalions, and have continued doing so from time to time, until they amounted to twenty-six. The 2nd Battalion of the 25th Regiment was raised as lately as Christmas last, and it has been reported that it was the Minister of War's intention to raise ten more. Whether he still proposes to continue in what I must call this extravagant and mischievous course, appears uncertain, as he has lately in Parliament taken credit to himself for not doing so and of having in lieu increased the strength of companies.
My Lords, in my opinion, and I may say in the opinion of the army in general, no greater mistake was ever committed than the raising of these second independent battalions. I call them independent, because they are not intended to feed or be reserves for the first battalions, or to have any connection with them. All military men well know how necessary it is for the efficiency of an army abroad or in the field, that regiments should have reserve battalions at home, and the opportunity had arrived for creating them by returning to and extending the Duke of Wellington's system, but in lieu of doing so, the consolidated depôts have been continued and added to, as now even the regiments at home are made to contribute to them. 657 Another very objectionable arrangement has been made by which the battalions abroad have been increased from eight to ten companies; for if twelve companies are to be retained with the present low establishment, it would be as much for the advantage of the regiments as it would be for the good of the country that four companies should be always at home ready as a nucleus upon which to form second battalions. This has undoubtedly much aggravated the objections of a system already sufficiently objectionable, and it is only fair to state that it has been done since Lord Hardinge relinquished the command of the army.
Now, my Lords, it is to the whole system that I, with the concurrence of the profession, find fault. In the first instance it obliges all officers and soldiers to go to the depôts and remain there a considerable time before they are allowed to join their regiments, and severing as it does all connection, and, indeed, communication, between the head-quarters of the regiment and its depôt, it strikes at the very root of the regimental system—a system universally approved of; for I can say with truth that no one part of the organization of the British army is more generally approved of, and does more to maintain the character and efficiency of the British army, than the regimental system.
I have said, my Lords, that no communication is allowed between the regiment and the depôt, nor the smallest interference allowed on the part of the commanding officer with his own depôt; this is carried to such an extent that I have heard that in the case of the 10th regiment, with its depôt quartered in the same garrison at Devonport, the commanding officer is made to communicate with it through the Horse Guards in London. I object very strongly to young officers being made to commence their career at these ill-organized depôts, in lieu of being placed at once under their own commanding officers and their own captains, when not unfrequently it happens that their appointment to particular regiments was made at the instance of their friends, who were, from the character of certain commanding officers, or their intimacy with them, anxious to intrust to them their sons.
My Lords, instead of the young officer, at the most critical period of his life, and when exposed to its greatest dangers, being committed to the almost parental care of his own superiors, he is committed to the 658 care of a depôt staff that can feel no interest in one who is only making a very temporary sojourn with them, and he finds himself associated with a quantity of other boys equally inexperienced, and equally exposed to every mischievous temptation. Under the circumstances it is not to be wondered at that they frequently incur debts and get into difficulties most damaging to their professional career.
My Lords, I shall probably be told that these depôts are well and efficiently commanded; I am not saying anything to the contrary, but I do say that it is as unreasonable to suppose, as it would be untrue to say, that the same interest can be felt in young officers by those who are only to know them during a few months, as by the commanding officer, and the other officers with whom they are about to pass much of their lives, and in whose good or ill-fortune they are to share. And, again, with respect to these officers commanding depôts, if I am not much misinformed, the greater part, if not the whole of them, are men with wives and families, and who consequently seldom appear at the mess where their presence and superintendence would be most desirable.
My Lords, are these my opinions alone? I hold in my hand a pamphlet written, as I have only this day learnt, by an officer of very great distinction, and who, if I could but name him, would be considered by your Lordships as most entitled to your respect. I will only say, that upon any military subject whatever, he may be fairly called the highest military authority in this country: observing upon these depôts, what does he say? "They are liable to an oppressive accumulation of the youngest of young officers beyond the influential control of their own commanding officers which must be unfavourable to strict discipline." My next objection to these consolidated depôts is their costly and wasteful character. The correspondence carried on, as I have already explained it to be, between the regiments and their depôts, always through the Horse Guards, must necessarily occasion great unnecessary trouble and expense. The removal of recruits from the recruiting party, perhaps in London to a depôt, possibly at Cork or Belfast, subsequently to be sent to their head quarters at Aldershot, or some other distant quarters, cannot do otherwise than occasion considerable expense. I observe in the Estimates a sum of £200,000 for the removal of troops within the United King- 659 dom. I should feel curious to learn how large a portion of this money is intended for the extravagant marches and countermarches of the recruits before they reach their regiments. Next, what do these depôt staffs cost the country? Why, my Lords, they consist of no less than between fifty-five and sixty field officers, twenty-four captains acting as adjutants, and with the pay of field officers, twenty-four quartermasters, a still larger number of musketry instructors, and an almost innumerable number of surgeons and assistant surgeons, generally three to a battalion.
My Lords, will a system entailing such expenses and such an establishment not be considered costly? I hold it to be as costly—aye, and as wasteful, as I shall soon endeavour to show it to be unnecessary and mischievous. To my mind, it is no small objection to the system, the enormous amount of patronage it creates; to the Commander-in-Chief it must occasion importunities incessant and most annoying: no one could be more interested to be rid of what must bring upon him such never-ceasing applications. I must hero observe that I am informed that purchase has been introduced into these consolidated depôt staffs. If such is the case, I must express my most decided objection to it.
My Lords, I have very recently stated in this House some of the great advantages which, in my opinion, accrue to the army from purchase; and also some of the difficulties and objections which would attend promotion by selection alone. But it never for one moment occurred to me that purchase was to be extended to consolidated depôts. These are properly staff appointments, and the different officers requiring, as they do, peculiar qualifications should be all selected, and should in no instance owe their appointments or their promotion either to purchase or seniority. I hold promotion by purchase in consolidated depôts to be prejudicial to that service, and to be unfair to the army in general; for it gives facilities of promotion to officers already enjoying the advantages and comforts of home service over those undergoing the hardships of the field. It is obvious that one captain, with three field-officers above him, can insure to himself promotion more certain and more rapid than when he is placed in a regiment at the bottom of eleven captains. I entirely disapprove of this ill-advised and unfair extension of the purchase system, and I fear it may have the effect 660 of supplying those unfriendly to it with arguments better founded than those hitherto advanced.
Now, my Lords, I have already stated many objections which, in common with the profession generally, I entertain to the consolidated depôt system; but by much the most serious objection to my mind is the enormous and criminal waste of force it occasions in an army already far too small for the exigencies and the safety of the country. What was the condition of the infantry within the United Kingdom on the 1st of February last? I take that date because my information was acquired at that time, and I believe that no material alteration has taken place since.
Well, on the 1st February these depôts absorbed no less than 28,000 men, of which 17,000 were of detachments of regiments serving in India, and 11,000 of depôts from home and colonial regiments; and it may be stated that when the system shall have been fully developed, that is, when ten of the newly-raised second battalions shall go abroad and form their depôts, the whole consolidated depôts will not amount to less than 30,000 men. These depôts, composed of very young recruits, with the addition, perhaps, of a few invalids left at home to eke out the remainder of their service, include very much the larger portion of the infantry stationed at home; for whilst the depôts consisted of 28,000 men, there were of infantry of the line stationed within the United Kingdom, only 21 whole battalions of 800 men, a force of something like 17,000, and 10 newly-formed second battalions of, perhaps, 9,000 men, a force of infantry altogether exclusive of depôts and exclusive of 5,000 Guards, not exceeding 26,000.
Now, my Lords, will any one say that 26,000 infantry, or rather 31,000, including the Guards, are a sufficient force for the defence of the country, divided, as they must be, between Great Britain and Ireland; and is it all the force the country has a right to be satisfied with, with an expenditure of £15,000,000 on the army? I do not pretend that some use might not be made of the depôts; but it is very certain that no military man would assert for a moment that they could be relied upon to be brought into line against the selected veterans which would be sure to compose an invading army.
I have not seen a consolidated depôt battalion. Through the courtesy of my friend, the Inspector General of Infantry, 661 it was lately kindly proposed to mo to attend his inspection; but I declined, not wishing in this House to discuss the merits of particular corps, but to confine ray remarks to the system generally. It has been said that they would do to garrison a naval arsenal; I do not doubt that this would be their mission, but it is precisely in that description of force, a force to line ramparts and intrenchments, that the country is least likely to be deficient; for the militia and volunteers would serve these purposes very nearly, if not quite as well, and the regular army, by a proper organization, should be all fit to act in the field.
As I have shown, there were on the 1st February, 54,000 infantry within the United Kingdom. I contend, and shall endeavour later to show, that the whole should be made available and effective for recruits in moderate numbers as they would be, in their own regiments under their own officers, would become soldiers in one-fourth of the time that they would in consolidated depôts under strange officers and amassed with boys as inexperienced as themselves.
My Lords, I can again appeal to that high authority I have already quoted in support of this opinion. He says:—
But the battalions destined to bear the brunt and to be first and foremost in the fight, and to give example and confidence when arrayed and united to militia, yeomanry, and organized rifle volunteers; the troops by which the whole defensive machinery is to be brought into use and worked are so deplorably below the mark in respect to numbers, that it is inconceivable in this age of reform that the distribution and formative regimental organization of the infantry of the line should not yet have been constituted on solid principles applicable to every description of service and embracing the ultimate purposes of depots unembarrassed by provisional battalions and the waste of force resulting from their restricted duties.Again, my authority observes, referring to these provisional battalions or consolidated depôts:—These, however, from their construction and abrupt fluctuations in numbers and restrictive local duties can scarcely be called moveable for field service; they are in every respect interior to service companies of regiments, and have not the advantages derived from esprit de corps.My Lords, such are the opinions of the highest military authority living in this country, and I will undertake to say are the opinions of every soldier of knowledge and experience, and I think I do not go too far when I affirm that they condemn 662 the present system of consolidated depôts as one most objectionable and seriously impairing the infantry force of the country. I should not leave this part of the question without remarking that of the force which the War Department so constantly boasts of having for the defence of the country are included 17,000 men composing depôts maintained at the expense of India, when it is so often asserted that no part of the revenues of that country are applied for English purposes, it is difficult to understand why the support of these 17,000 men is not resisted by those who are responsible for the finances of India.My Lords, having condemned the present system of consolidated depôts, and done so, as I have shown, with the concurrence of high authority, I will now submit the system which in my opinion would best meet the military exigencies of the country at home and abroad, in peace or in war. I am the more confident in proposing such a system from the fact that it is only an extension of that introduced by the Puke of Wellington in 1824, and which I have not a doubt he would himself have continued and extended if the opportunities which have occurred since his death had offered previously. I propose that the 101 regiments of infantry of the Line should each have a second battalion, and that no regiment should at present have more than two battalions. The first battalion to consist of 8 companies of 100 men each, at home or in the Colonies, and of 125 men each when in India, or in the field, as was the case in the Crimea. I propose that the second battalions should consist of at least 6 companies or 600 men, and that each battalion should be officered by a lieutenant-colonel and a major, but that a second major should be added to all battalions in the field or in India. I am prepared to maintain that an establishment of five field officers would keep the field battalions far more efficient than does the present system.
This would give a force of 149,400 noncommissioned officers and men, supposing a force of 40,000 infantry in India, whilst in the Army Estimates the infantry of the Line amount to 157,000 men, or near 8,000 men more, it cannot therefore be said that second battalions would create an unnecessary number of men; but one of the great advantages to accrue from this organization would be its capability of contraction and expansion; by giving 8 663 companies to each battalion, a thing much to be desired, as for all military and strategical purposes nothing is better than 8 company battalions, you would have an army of 161,000 infantry of the Line with the power of increasing it to 202,000 by the addition of the 25 men per company I have already explained. This plan has to recommend it not alone the efficiency it would secure under every circumstance, but a great saving of expense. Without troubling your Lordships with minute details, I will only state that 2 battalions of 8 and 6 companies each would require 51 field officers and 429 companies' officers and adjutants, less than the present vicious organization of separate independent battalions recruited by the means of costly consolidated depôts. This system is one that would meet with such general and perhaps universal approbation in the service that it is really difficult to imagine what well-founded objections can be offered. If it is said that such a change would necessitate a reconstruction of the army. My Lords, why not reconstruct the army, if, as I maintain, the altered military position of the country, both at present and for the future, calls for entire new military services, and when changes such as I propose could be effected without the smallest injustice, and with little or no inconvenience to anybody concerned.
My Lords, I would not hesitate to undertake to carry out the whole change in the course of a very few weeks. It may be urged that the services of India and the Colonies take so large a portion of your force that one hundred and one first battalions, if not insufficient, would scarcely leave a first battalion at home: this would be to suppose that the second battalion would not be available for colonial service.
Why, if what I propose were carried out, the second battalions of all regiments at home and in the Colonies would be as efficient as the first battalions, for it is essential for the efficiency of the army that, only in the case of Indian regiments or regiments in the field, should the second battalions be made to feed the first; of course circumstances might arise which might make it necessary to depart from such a rule, but if it was adhered to generally, then both battalions could form part of the same garrison and receive and drill its own recruits; and where could recruits be more promptly made into efficient and trained soldiers than in the Mediterranean fortresses and in other colo- 664 nies? and if these recruits were sent out quarterly, as they should be, their numbers would be so small as in no way to inconvenience or encumber the battalions.
I hope, therefore, it will not be attempted to be said that what I propose would leave this country with only exhausted second battalions. I will admit that to a certain extent the Indian second battalions, from feeding the first in the field, would be less efficient than the others; but there ought really to be more first battalions left for home service in the future than at present, and there would in addition be perfectly efficient and excellent second battalions substituted for the 30,000 inefficient boys amassed in your present provisional battalions.
My Lords, I have now explained to your Lordships the grave objections I entertain and which are entertained by the army in general to the present organization of the infantry. The time has certainly arrived when this important question should be well-considered, and when that system should be established which would best suit the present circumstances of the country, and best meet the exigencies of the future; there should be an end of such constant changes, and of that tinkering and cobbling which has gone on for years, and to which must be attributed that fearful amount of half-pay amounting to above £300,000 which is still saddled upon the country, but which with the enormous increase of the army, and after forty-five years of peace, should have long since been got rid of. It has been said that a large half-pay list belongs to the army of England alone, and that it is a necessary consequence of the purchase system; so much the reverse is the fact, that through this purchase system the whole half-pay list of the army might and should have been expunged for years past.
My Lords, a great change is called for, and necessary if the infantry is to be made as efficient as a proper organization would render it, and as the defences of the country imperatively call for. I have endeavoured to show that the present consolidated depôt system wastes force and is not conducive to discipline; if such is really the case, and I confidently affirm that it is, what subject could be more fitting for inquiry by a Commission? and I hope that the Government will so consider it.
The noble Duke, the first Lord of the Admiralty, observed the other evening, that the navy could be no party question, for that 665 all could only desire its efficiency. So, my Lords, do I feel assured that your Lordships will in no way regard the organization and efficiency of the army as fit for party politics. All who desire the security, position, and honour of their country, cannot but feel the deepest interest in the strength and efficiency of the army. In the observations it has been my duty to offer, I have felt much confidence in the fact that, the consolidated depôt system which I seek to have abolished, is objected to and disapproved of by that high authority from whom I have made several quotations, and the whole profession; and in recommending, as I do most earnestly, the substitution of second battalions, I speak with no less confidence from the knowledge that it was the system recommended and desired by the Duke of Wellington, and which I am satisfied he would have carried out to its fullest extent had he lived to the present time, when present circumstances would have enabled him to do so.
It perhaps may be said by some that your Lordships' House is not the most proper place for such a discussion; but having given much attention to the organization of armies, and believing that my opinions, formed from experience after a long life spent in the service, are sound, and that they are supported by great military authorities and by the army in general, I have felt that I should be wanting in the discharge of my duty as a Peer of Parliament, and should have felt ashamed of myself if I had hesitated in exercising my privilege to bring this very important matter forward for your Lordships' consideration, and through this House for that of the public.
EARL DE GREY AND RIPONsaid, the notice that the noble Earl had placed upon the table was so vague and indefinite in its terms that he had been at a loss to discover to what part of the large subject of the organization of the British infantry he proposed to direct attention. Having now heard the observations of the noble Earl, he must confess that it appeared to him that the subject was so strictly professional and technical in its character that it could not be discussed with much advantage in their Lordships' House. He was not in the least inclined to limit the right of any Member of that House to introduce the subject for discussion, but he could not help thinking that the noble Earl, being himself a General Officer in the service, if he had thought it right to submit his views 666 to the consideration of either the illustrious Duke on the cross benches (the Duke of Cambridge) or to the Secretary of State for War, would have found from them, and from the departments administering military affairs, a perfect readiness to take the subject into consideration; if he afterwards thought that his views had been lightly treated, or improperly dealt with, and that the public interests required an appeal from the decision of the authorities to their Lordships' House, no one could have objected to the course taken by the noble Earl. But under the circumstances in which the proposition was brought before them, he felt it would conduce to the interests of the service if individually he declined to continue a purely professional and technical discussion; and he could only assure the noble Earl that Her Majesty's Government were ever ready to consider questions connected with the organization of the army brought before them by General Officers. The present was a subject to which their attention had been, and would continue to be, directed; but it did seem to him that a discussion on the question at the present moment was not likely to lead to results conducive to the public service. The question was one involving considerations relative to the principles of the army and of a financial character that he thought could hardly be entered on with advantage by their Lordships' House.
§ THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEsaid, he entirely agreed with what had fallen from his noble Friend who had just sat down, and he ventured to think without any disrespect to his noble and gallant Friend (the Earl of Lucan), it would have been more regular if his noble Friend had, in the first instance, submitted his plan for the consideration of this important subject to the military and civil authorities of the War Department for due consideration, instead of first bringing it under the notice of that House. He was quite ready to admit with him, that as a Member of their Lordships' House, he or any other noble Lord was justified in bringing forward in that House any subject on which they thought it right that their views should be made public for the advantage of the country; but he did think that a great question like this, on which so much depended, of the whole organization of the army, and in which so much of finance was necessarily involved, should receive a very different consideration from that which could possibly be given to it in a deliberative assembly 667 like their Lordships'. As, however, there were some technical points to which the noble Earl had adverted, and as certainly the matter fell more immediately within his own province, he was loth to let this discussion end without entering into some explanation, in order to correct the errors that had been fallen into by the noble Earl, and which he was indisposed to permit to go forth to the public. The noble Earl had pointedly remarked on the organization of the army as at present existing, and as it had been carried out more or less during the time that he (the Duke of Cambridge) had been at the head of the army. He begged the noble Earl to understand that the depot system, to which he so much objected, as it now existed was in existence when he became Commander-in-Chief, and he did not deny that during his period of office that it had been consolidated arid extended to the new battalions that had been raised. The noble Earl dwelt very much on the opinions entertained by the Duke of Wellington; and certainly it would be very improper on his part, or on the part of any other military man, to attempt to stand up in opposition to the views of so high an authority. But he had yet to learn that the opinion given was the Duke of Wellington's opinion. He was aware that they had had the four company depôt system established by the Duke, but he had never heard that the Duke had intended to extend that system, and he did not believe that they could arrive at that conclusion, when they recollected that the system had been established as long ago as 1824, and that it had been continued up to the period stated. Therefore he did not exactly understand that they were justified in concluding that the Duke intended to extend the system further. All he could say was that he had had some personal experience in the system. The noble Earl said that he also had; and he (the Duke of Cambridge) did not question that he had; but he was not aware that he had had any personal experience in the military command of the system. But he (the Duke of Cambridge) had, and for five years had commanded a large district in Ireland where there were more four company depots than anywhere in the kingdom. And what was the result? A more lamentable and deplorable system he never saw. He never heard any officer who had had experience of it speak in its praise, even though he might have approved of a double battalion sys- 668 tem. Let them see what that system was. He did not wish to detain their Lordships; but when the noble Earl had gone so much into detail he thought some military man of some authority should officially reply to his statements. What did he find in that system? The system in 1853—which was the last year in which the four company depot system was in force, (and it had not been altered in his time, for it was changed by the late Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hardinge, after the Crimean war broke out) was this:—a regiment was composed of ten companies, divided into two parts; six companies formed service companies and went abroad, and four formed depot companies and stayed at home. The service companies were composed of 25 officers and 540 men, and the depôt companies consisted of 14 officers and 310 men. If all these 310 men of the depôt companies had been efficient, no doubt they would have formed a very respectable reserve; but that never was the case, they were most inefficient. All the refuse of the corps that could not go abroad was left at home, and all recruits were left as well; and he had made inspection after inspection of depot companies, and did not see more than 150 men on parade at one time. Thus they had a regiment consisting, as far as the service companies went, of 25 efficient officers and 540 men, and the depot companies consisting of 14 officers and 310 men. What was the case now? The regiments were composed of 950 rank and file, divided into two portions; 10 companies formed the service companies and two were depôt companies. They had 10 companies, composed of 38 officers, with 800 rank and file, efficient whether at home or abroad, ready to go anywhere at a moment's notice; and they had in the depôt companies six officers and an average of 150 men. Consequently, it would be found that whereas in 1853 there were 10,111 men in the depôt companies, they had with the service companies only 19,701 men, so that one-third of the whole force was at home and inefficient, and two-thirds were abroad; whilst now they had 63 depôts in January, 1860, containing 12,969 men, and 50,455 with the service companies. The latter were all efficient, the duty men with their regiments and were ready to go anywhere. He did not think, therefore, that the noble Earl was justified in saying that they were keeping back a great many efficient men at the depôts, when they kept them as low as they 669 could, and kept the service companies as complete as they could. The noble Earl said he objected to the depôts altogether, and he (the Duke of Cambridge) wished they could get on without them; but in our service it was impossible. Our army was scattered all over the world, it was not a matter of choice, but of necessity, to have depôt companies to get the men together and train them. The noble Earl said, why not send out the men at once to the service companies? Would he have them send out inefficient men? The Commission with reference to the Indian army recommended the not sending out untrained men, and they now never sent men out of the country that were not thoroughly trained, and who had not undergone a complete course of instruction. It was a far better system than sending men out like so much baggage, a dozen at a time in a ship. It was impossible to send the men out in driblets to join their service companies, and if he were to be perpetually going to the Admiralty to have ten men sent to Canada one week, and twenty men to Gibraltar another, the noble Duke opposite would very soon tell him they could not be sent because there was no ship going. The men, moreover, must be forwarded at certain times, and the time of sending them was regulated by various considerations—such as the facilities for procuring tonnage, and the climate of the station to which they were to be sent. The noble Earl talked about 17,000 men in depots, and talked about the Indian depots; but he took a time of year when the depot companies were full, and had he waited until June he would have found it nearer 7,000 men than 17,000; and many of these men remaining at the depôt were broken down in health. The noble Earl said the use of depôts was merely to bring the men together; but they never kept the men in depôt longer than they could help, and they sent them out as circumstances, climate, and arrangements would admit, in order to fill up the service companies. The noble Earl said it was a most absurd thing to have a number of field officers and adjutants in the depôt; but if that were not the case the depôts would be in a most inefficient state. The noble Earl urged that none of these officers should be married men, but that of course was an accident over which the Horse Guards could exercise no control; and there were regulations to meet the case, calling on the field officers to dine once or twice a week at mess, to obviate the in- 670 convenience alluded to by the noble Earl. Another complaint of the noble Earl was, that all the young ensigns were brought together at these depôts. He admitted that there was a certain inconvenience in that; but he had already issued an order that in the case of regiments on the home service, ensigns should join the service companies at once. The noble Earl advocated a complete system of double battalions. Of course, if he could persuade Parliament to consent to the large increase in the army which this would entail, well and good; but he could not conceive how such a system could be established without a large increase. The noble Earl had quoted the authority of the Duke of Wellington in his favour; but he remembered that the reserve depôt at Parkhurst was formed in his time, and he had never heard of the Duke of Wellington expressing disapproval of that step, Parkhurst was the model which Lord Hardinge followed when he established the consolidated depôts. If the noble Earl's system were adopted, the result would be that the home battalions would be nothing better than overgrown depots. All the inefficient men and all the recruits would be sent to the homo battalions, and the consequence would be that though we might have a reserve at home of forty or fifty battalions on paper, there would not be more than four or five fit for anything. That was an unanswerable objection. The noble Earl had said that he did not mean his system to apply to a war establishment, but to a peace establishment. A war establishment was a very different thing from a peace establishment. We could not expect the country to maintain a war establishment in time of peace. In peace we must do the best we could, and he contended that by keeping our regiments as efficient as possible, and our depots as low as possible, we should secure a better establishment than if we were to distribute our force in the manner proposed. In war we must have a second battalion. In that case he would leave the service companies as they stood at present; he would withdraw some of the officers and a staff of sergeants, adding them to the depots, and then he would immediately have a second battalion ready to feed the first. There was another reason for the present arrangement. He was sorry to say that a number of regiments were at present commanded by captains. Officers would not go all over the world without getting leave of absence sometimes—it was impossible not 671 to grant leave; but the system of having captains in command of regiments was a bad one. He had set his face against it, and made every effort to prevent it, but had failed. If he had a larger number of field officers and officers generally with the service companies he would be in a position to give officers leave whether on account of health or for their private convenience, and still keep the regiment in an effective condition. The noble Earl said that he would send out recruits to the West Indies and the Colonies. They did not at present send out a man that ought not to be sent. It was desirable to keep the garrisons at those distant stations as small as possible; but if they were small they must be efficient. None that were sent abroad were inefficient. The regiments at home were also efficient; the depôts were merely for drill and instruction. The only example that he could at present adduce on the double battalion system was the case of a regiment of the Guards. When one battalion of that regiment went to Canada in 1838, one battalion remained at home while the other went abroad. The battalion in Canada was kept up to 895 rank and file, while the one at home, though with the same number of officers, was never of greater strength than 390, and this too when there was no particular drain on the battalion abroad. That was just what would happen in every regiment of the line if they had those double battalions. He hoped their Lordships would admit the force of this argument though he was the last man in the world who would set up his own opinion against that of experienced officers, many of whom he knew took an opposite view of this matter; but he thought those officers were not quite conversant with the way in which the existing system worked. The noble Earl (the Earl of Lucan) had himself acknowledged that he had had no experience of it; and it was a strange fact that when an officer came forward to attack a portion of the military system of the country their Lordships should be told that he had carefully and scrupulously avoided inquiring into its working. He (the Duke of Cambridge) would state the opinion of two distinguished General Officers, whose opinion would, he thought, have weight with the House. The late Adjutant General, Sir George Wetherall, than whom there was no more experienced and excellent officer, had authorized him to say that he had never known the army to work so smoothly 672 and efficiently as at present; and Sir Frederick Love, the present Inspector General of Infantry, though at first opposed to the system, had so far changed his opinion that he had authorized him to say that the officers instructed at depôts were superior to those instructed at head quarters. The fact was that it was the intention of the authorities to make the depots first class schools of instruction, and it was the duty of those in charge of them to give instructions daily, hourly, he might even say momentarily. The noble Earl said that a young officer, or a raw recruit, being kept for six or eight months at one of those depôts, must have his esprit de corps destroyed. He (the Duke of Cambridge) in reply could only say that if that were the case the esprit de corps of the officers and of the regiment generally must be in a deplorable condition. The fact was that an officer entering a good regiment adopted its esprit de corps the moment he joined it. He was aware that the commanding officers of regiments did not like the depôts. He would tell their Lordships why. Because it was by these depôts the Horse Guards discovered the irregularities in the regiments which could not be discovered in any other way. It was in that way they discovered and stopped them. He did not blame those officers. Every man had some hobby —something of his own which he liked himself; but at the same time these things could not be allowed to go on under the sanction of authority. He had frankly and fairly stated to their Lordships why he thought the system a good one. At the same time he would he the last man to say that a change ought not to take place if a better system could he laid down. He did not say that the depot system was the best that could be devised; but he had not yet seen any better system propounded; and while this was so he hoped their Lordships would do all that lay in their power to maintain the present one.
LORD DE ROSexpressed his concurrence in the remarks of the illustrious Duke the Commander-in-Chief. It appeared to him that a great deal more merit was due to this system than to the former system at the depôts, and he trusted it would be supported.
§ THE DUKE OF RUTLANDsaid, there was one point to which he was anxious to draw their Lordships' attention, though perhaps strictly it did not come within the present discussion. He alluded to the volunteer system which had been recently 673 established in this country. He wished to speak of it with the greatest possible respect, for he thought the spirit of patriotism shown by the people when it was believed there was some danger to be apprehended from a neighbouring Power was deserving of all praise. What he feared was that the volunteer system would be allowed to interfere with and supersede our regular forces. He found the Militia was not to be embodied, and he also found that the Yeomanry were not to be called out for training this summer; and they were doing this while at the same time they were about to adopt a more direct taxation for an indirect system. What he feared was that year by year any Government that might be in power would be under an almost irresistible temptation to relieve the public purse by a reduction of the army, and fall back upon this volunteer system. He approved of this volunteer force, and thought it a most excellent movement, but he hoped it would be maintained only as an auxiliary force, and in addition to the regular army.
§ House adjourned at Half-past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Half-past Ten o'clock.