THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE, in moving pursuant to notice for a Copy of a Letter to the late Duke of Wellington in relation to the military frontier of Savoy, said, that he had always disapproved of the proposition that Her Majesty's Government should take part in the Conference which it was intended should be held for the purpose of considering the Treaty of Turin, because he believed that such consideration involved a recognition of that treaty as thenceforward part of the public law of Europe. What had since taken place, although it might have diminished, had by no means removed those objections; and he expressed this view with the more regret as it differed from that of the two noble Lords who were more peculiarly responsible for the foreign policy of the country—the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. No man could be a more sincere friend to the French alliance than he was. He regarded it as of the highest importance for both countries, and for the advancement of civilization and for the peace and welfare of Europe, that between the French and English people and between the respective Governments a sincere and cordial amity and a close alliance should exist. But although holding that opinion strongly, he could not shut his eyes to events, nor forget those principles which were essential to the maintenance of peace between nations and to the feeling of general security. The condition of Italy engaged the attention of the Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Paris in 1856, and it was represented that the foreign armies which then occupied her soil could not be withdrawn without lending to disastrous consequences. Now what were the facts of the case to which he was about to invite the attention of their Lordships? The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), speaking as First Minister 1926 of the Crown in February, 1859, happily summed up the condition of Italy when he described it as a standing danger to the pence of Europe. It appeared that in the Autumn of 1858, Sardinia and France entered into confidential communication with a view of taking concerted action in reference to what was known as the Italian question; and on the 1st of January, 1859, public attention was aroused by some words addressed by the Emperor of the French to the Austrian Ambassador. Diplomatic negotiations were entered into, but without effect, and the short but sanguinary war ensued which was terminated by the Peace of Villafranca. In that peace no mention was made of any alteration of the limits of the French Empire. During the whole of these transactions, in fact, not a word was uttered of what was subsequently demanded by French ambition. On the contrary, any views of territorial aggrandizement or peculiar advantage were repeatedly disclaimed. Nevertheless, it was surmised, even in the spring of 1859, that, among the possible consequences of the action which France and Sardinia were about to take, the contingency was contemplated of the increase of Sardinian power rendering it necessary for France to demand an addition of territory. Our Ambassador at Paris was directed to make inquiries on the subject. To these inquiries he received no answer; and in July or August the rumour being revived, Lord Cowley was told that, as the war had terminated in a different manner from that which had been expected, when such a contingency was contemplated, there was no longer any question of an increase of French territory. Lord Cowley himself had told their Lordships that this question of the cession of Savoy had been mentioned in conversation by Count Walewski, but it was only referred to as a subject to be laid before a Congress of the great Powers of Europe. That Congress, it had been supposed, would have been held during the winter; and when the British Parliament met in January, they were told that Her Majesty's Government had been invited to a Congress, but that that Congress had been indefinitely postponed. About the same time the rumours were revived of the cession of territory to France; but so late as the beginning of February the Governor of Chambery was instructed to state, in answer to inquiries which were made from him on the subject, that there was no intention to cede Savoy or Nice. Now, in the Treaty of July it was agreed between Austria and 1927 France that the states of Central Italy should be restored to their Sovereigns. Events prevented this from being carried out, and the Duchies became integral parts of Sardinia. On the 24th of January, after the Duchies had become part of the Piedmontese kingdom, a formal demand was made by France on the Sardinian Government for the cession of Nice and Savoy. This came to us first as a rumour; and a telegraphic denial was received here of the truth of the rumour; it was said that no intention existed of giving up Savoy. However, on the 24th of March a treaty was signed without any Congress, and without the consent of any of the great Powers of Europe, by which the transfer of those territories was agreed on. This was the treaty to which England was called on to accede by entering into a Congress, the foundation of which must be a recognition of a violation of a previous treaty forming a portion of the great international law of Europe. No justification for it had appeared beyond the grounds put forward by the French Government. The King of Sardinia had been much blamed for his share in this affair; but no one who had taken an impartial survey of the events could refuse to acknowledge that such an amount of pressure had been put upon the Sardinian Government as made it a necessity and a duty for them to yield. The Italians did not share in the opinions expressed respecting him by the King's critics in this country, and he could well afford to remain satisfied with their approbation. The question, however, was on what ground could this treaty be accepted as a basis for the deliberations of a Congress. To him it appeared a flagrant violation of the international law of Europe. The ground on which the annexation of Savoy was defended was that it was a geographical necessity produced by the formidable aggrandizement of the Sardinian kingdom. But to what length was this doctrine of geographical necessity to be carried? Why should it not be extended to Genoa, to Geneva, or to a different side of the French Empire? Before going into a Conference some definite principle ought to be laid down as to the extent to which this new doctrine ought to prevail. The aggrandizement of Sardinia was put forward as the reason for this annexation of Savoy and Nice; but it did not appear that France had yet recognized Sardinia's possession of the Duchies, nor had Victor Emmanuel yet been recognized by France as King of that district of Italy. It was well 1928 known that he had never been recognized as King de jure. Yet we were now called upon to recognize the claims of France to Savoy and Nice, both de facto and de jure. And not only this, but he was informed that the agent of the dethroned Dukes had not long ago been officially received at the Tuilieries. The guaranteed neutrality by the great Powers of the treaty of 1815 of the neutrality of Savoy and part of Switzerland had been set aside and disregarded in the most unjustifiable manner. It was almost amusing to observe the shifts to which M. Thouvenel had been driven to make excuses for the violation. It was first said that all the Powers of Europe were to be consulted. They had not been consulted. M. Thouvenel then proposed that those parts the neutrality of which was guaranteed should be ceded to Switzerland. But that proposal was withdrawn, on the ground that the population had been consulted and did not desire it. He did not see the use of going into a Congress with any view to establish limitations, when it might at once be said such points could not be touched because the population had been consulted and declared in favour of annexation to France. M. Thouvenel once more changed his ground, and said to the Swiss Federal Government, the stipulations at Vienna in regard to the neutrality of these districts were not for them, but for Piedmont; that the rest of the Powers of Europe had nothing to do with it; Piedmont was satisfied and therefore Switzerland must be satisfied. This was not the way in which the great Powers of Europe ought to be treated, and he objected to going into a Conference without knowing how far the sphere of their deliberations would extend. The strongest reason for going into a Congress was sympathy for Switzerland. As a matter of European policy, as well as out of regard for the patriotism, the valour, and the virtues of the Swiss, it was necessary that the independence and security of that country should be maintained. He acknowledged that in a Congress for the purpose specified—namely, to reconcile the 2nd article of the Treaty of Turin with the 92nd article of the Treaty of Vienna, some conditions and some stipulations might be framed which would not be without advantage. A frontier for Switzerland might be found possessing strong military positions. Their force was by no means contemptible, and if they had such a frontier and the passes of the Alps were conceded 1929 to them, their security, though deteriorated by the annexation, might be maintained. Arrangements might also be made for extending the neutrality of districts round Geneva and for garrisoning certain parts. But after all, the real advantage to which Switzerland must look was the union and concert of the great Powers of Europe in insisting on a guarantee of the independence and neutrality of that country. No one could deny that there had been a gross violation of the joint guarantee of the Powers which signed the Treaty of Vienna. But it was said that the guarantee was not changed, and that France took Savoy and Nice subject to all the stipulations under which Piedmont held them. It could hardly be said, however, that Switzerland was in as good a position as before, and M. Thouvenel himself had shown how untenable was that argument by proposing that the neutralized portions should be ceded to Switzerland. Looking to the position of Europe and the state of public opinion in Europe he thought that before they went into Congress to sanction what had been done they ought to have previous concert with the other Powers, of which he could find no trace in the papers which had been produced. The serious question was, whether in a Congress means might be taken to restore confidence and tranquillity. Look to the State of Europe. To whom were we to look to restore tranquillity and confidence to Europe and above all to France? What was the present condition of this country? Why, we were become a military nation; we were thinking of nothing but armaments, defences, volunteers, and militia. Why was all this? What was it about? Were the Estimates peace Estimates, and could England be said to be in a condition of peace? He said that neither were the Estimates peace Estimates nor were they in a condition of peace. They were in a position of suspended hostilities, and he wanted to get out of that position as soon as possible. He therefore thought it best to speak openly and frankly to the French Government, and to invite France to give us as well as Germany such assurances—practical assurances—as would tranquillize the public mind. The warlike excitement was not unfounded and the preparations were not unnecessary. They were unnecessary with regard to an invasion, because he was perfectly convinced that no Prince in his senses would think of that, and that an invasion of this country would never take 1930 place. People talked of the Volunteers showing our strength—it might be said ex pede Herculem. But he thought we had yet done nothing to show our real strength, for what were 130,000 or 135,000 men under arms, when, if an invasion were threatened, a million of men would be found on our coasts at forty-eight hours' notice, if the railways could carry them, able to work with their spades or shoot with their guns in the national defence? No man of ordinary sense or capacity would now think of invading England. But he could not deny that, looking to the general state of Europe, they were under the necessity of making preparations and bringing the expenditure to an amount not characteristic of a state of peace but of a state of suspended hostilities. What was the meaning of the Imperial visit to Baden? This meeting of crowned heads ought not to have been necessary. The motive assigned for the meeting of the Emperor of the French and the Princes of Germany at Baden was that the Emperor desired to render personally such assurances as would tranquillize the public mind of Europe, and remove the commercial stagnation which prevailed. That might be well; but what was the cause of the general uneasiness and apprehension? Notoriously it was this very treaty for the annexation of Nice and Savoy to France that had surprised and alarmed Europe, and caused every one to ask what was to happen next. Where a Government undertook the censorship of the press it could not avoid being responsible for the cone which that press assumed; and in the language of the French newspapers and pamphlets of the day would be found one of the chief causes of the excitement and anxiety which prevailed as to the future policy of France. The writer of La Prusse en 1860 assigned to Prussia the great task, of establishing national unity in Germany. In La Question Irlandaise it was admitted that this might not be just the moment for European intervention to restore to Ireland her national position; but, at the same time, Ireland was assured that her cause deserved sympathy, and significantly re minded that the interest of France was wherever there was a just and civilizing cause to be assisted. In another pamphlet the writer warned England that it was only by an intimate alliance with France that she could hope to preserve her maritime grandeur; and hinted that, if she objected to justice being done to France upon the 1931 Rhine, the result would be an alliance between the Emperor and the Czar, which would he fatal to our naval power. The remarkable feature in all these productions was that the men who wrote them never seemed for a moment to imagine that things could be allowed to continue as they were, and that France and England could remain quiet. No one could forget how useful had been the good understanding with France that had existed for the last thirty years; and if France would only be content to leave what was moderately well alone, and abandon the idea that her interest was to meddle wherever a civilizing cause required assistance, tranquillity would be restored to Europe, and the alliance between France and England would become as cordial and intimate as could be desired. But it was impossible for England to go hand in hand with France when we were asked to enter on a course of policy which set at nought the security of treaties and the good faith of nations, and which might lead us to the subversion of all existing arrangements. He maintained that before we entered any Congress we ought to have a distinct understanding as to the tone which was to be assumed and the principles which were to be recognized. There was a recent example which warranted us in demanding some assurance on this subject. He did not ask the Ministers on the Treasury bench to confirm the truth of what he was about to relate, but he should be surprised to hear any of them contradict it. He had it, not from an official source, but upon authority so good that he could not doubt it. He was informed that when the Emperor of the French proposed to meet the Prince Regent of Prussia in Germany, the Prince with that candour and sincerity which was a part of his personal character, as it was also, he believed, of his public policy, at once made it a condition of the proposed meeting, that if any political propositions or considerations were to be deliberated upon, no change of territory whatever should be proposed to him during his stay at Baden. In the same way England had a right to insist upon knowing the principles which were to regulate the proceedings of any Congress to which she was invited. It was for the interest of Europe, and far more for the interest of France, that the present alarm and distrust should cease. There could be no doubt that in effecting the annexation of Savoy and Nice France had committed a serious blunder, and, instead of aug- 1932 menting, had lessened her influence. No one who compared the influence which the Emperor of the French possessed last December, or even twelve months before, and that which he possessed at this moment, could doubt that it had been weakened by this transaction. If the Emperor wished to recover and increase his influence, he could not do so more effectually than by reassuring Europe as to his future policy, and putting an end to the painful disquietude which prevailed. The noble Lord concluded by moving—
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Copy of the Letter addressed by the Foreign Office to the Duke of Wellington in 1816, concerning the Military Frontier of Savoy, referred to in Lord John Russell's Despatch to Earl Cowley of April the 24th.
LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, that there was no objection to produce the paper to which his noble Friend's Motion referred, but it would be necessary to alter the terms of his Motion, as no despatch from the Foreign Office existed on the subject. The paper to which his noble Friend referred was a letter from the representative of the Swiss Government to the British Plenipotentiary at the Congress of Vienna. It was unnecessary to follow his noble Friend in detail through all the topics of his speech, since a great portion of it consisted of an account of events well known to their Lordships, and the despatches of his noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office contained a clearer and more authoritative exposition of the policy of the Government than he could possibly give. The main object of the speech of the noble Marquess was to express the objection he felt to a Conference. That being the main point he should confine his observations to it. It was necessary to bear in mind the circumstances under which Her Majesty's Government had consented to enter into a Conference, and it was singular that his noble Friend, with his knowledge of the subject, had omitted the most important consideration of all, namely, the wishes of Switzerland herself. No doubt this country was bound to consult the interests and maintain the independence of Switzerland, both as a country in which from the character of her people we took a great interest, and also because her neutral and in-independent position was necessary as a part of the general arrangements of Europe, and because Great Britain had engaged with other Powers to guarantee her inde- 1933 pendence. Under these circumstances the first question in regard to the Conference was, what were the views of the Swiss Government itself? The Government of Switzerland had given no dubious answer to this question. They sent despatches to all the great Powers of Europe, demanding, in the most emphatic language, that a Conference should assemble. In asking for that Conference they could appeal not merely to the advantage of Conferences in dealing with questions affecting treaties by which the state of Europe was regulated, but they could appeal also to special stipulations as to the manner in which these treaties were to be observed, and these Conferences carried on. The latter point was so important to be borne in mind, that he would trouble their Lordships with an extract from the Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle, dated November 15, 1818, under which these regulations were made. It stipulated that whenever any of the questions mentioned before, namely, questions affecting the treaty concluded at Vienna, or any discussion between the different Powers occurred, there should be a Conference of the kind now proposed. Article 4 ran thus:—
Que si pour mieux atteindre le but ci-dessus énoncé, les Puissances qui ont concourus au present Acte jugeaient nécessaire d'établir des réunions particulières, soit entre les augustes Souverains eux mêmes, soit entre leurs Ministres et Plénipotentiaires, respectifs, pour y traiter en commun de leurs propres intérêts, en tant qu'ils se rapportent à l'objet de leurs delibérations actuelles, l'époque et l'endroit de ces réunions seront chaque fois préalablement arrêtés au moyen de communications diplomatiques.The article referred to the Treaty of Vienna already spoken of; and the Protocol concluded as follows:—Et que dans le cas où ces réunions auraient pour objet des affaires spécialement liées aux interêts des autres Etats de l'Europe, elles n'auront lieu qu'à la suite d'une invitation formelle de la part de ceux de ces Etats que les dites affaires concerneraient, et sous la reserve expresse de leur droit d'y participer directement ou par leurs Plénipotentiaires.Their Lordships would therefore see that the Protocol distinctly contemplated that when any of the States of Europe more particularly concerned demanded a Conference it should assemble. Switzerland, thus, demanded not only on grounds of general expediency that a Conference should assemble, but also on positive stipulations founded upon the Treaty of Vienna that expressly provided that mode of settling the dispute. That being the 1934 case, it would not be treating Switzerland with proper regard, and it would be lowering her still further than she had unfortunately been lowered in the eyes of Europe, if, when she appealed to the great Powers to consider her affairs they should reply that although she might think her interests required a Conference, it was not convenient for them to assemble. That, in point of fact, was the view taken by Her Majesty's Government, and these were the reasons why Her Majesty's Government at once stated that they were ready to meet the other Powers of Europe in a Conference. He might, perhaps, confine himself to what he had now stated; but his noble Friend had pointed out some of the inconveniences that might attend a Conference, and although he could not deny that some inconvenience might arise, he thought he might remove from the minds of their Lordships some misapprehensions that prevailed on this subject. His noble Friend had insisted on the necessity of making previous conditions before entering upon a Congress; and what were the previous conditions he required? Neither more nor less than that Her Majesty's Government should concert with the different Powers of Europe, excepting only France, to impose on France a particular policy. It was, however, obviously impossible for a Conference to lead to any good result if it were preceded by a condition such as that. If, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government agreed with France as to the conditions on which the Conference should be held, that would be begging the whole question, and such a Conference would be merely a court for registering the decrees that had been already settled. His noble Friend said, that the whole fabric of European treaties had been shaken and disturbed by the change now made in the territorial arrangements fixed by the Treaty of Vienna; and he said he wanted to know why conditions were not obtained from the French Government previous to entering upon the Conference, by which that Government should bind itself to make no more such territorial changes, and especially that no changes should take place on the particular grounds and reasons alleged for this change of territory. He begged to tell his noble Friend, however, that if Her Majesty's Government were in a position to exact such a condition it would be the greatest mistake to do so, because what possible guarantee could they have more complete and efficient 1935 than the treaties that already existed? The present territorial arrangements of Europe rested not upon Conferences, but upon the express conditions of treaties, and what Her Majesty's Government and all the Powers of Europe had a right to ask was that these treaties should be maintained and observed, and it would be a matter of great regret if any other interpretation were given to these treaties. His noble Friend did not deny that guarantees might be given to Switzerland, that changes might be made in the distribution of her territory, that stipulations as to the occupation of a portion of the Swiss territory of Savoy might be taken into consideration, by which the position of Switzerland, if not entirely secured, might yet be materially improved. But his noble Friend went on to say that the true security of Switzerland was in the union of all the Powers to maintain the guarantee of her independence. He agreed with his noble Friend that that was her true security, and if that union had been maintained their Lordships would not now be discussing the question. But the difficulty was to maintain that union. Some of the other Powers of Europe, moved by other considerations, might not take the same view of the affairs of Switzerland that they had hitherto done. That was the case with the Russian Government, which, speaking through Prince Gortschakoff, thought the matter of less importance than Her Majesty's Government held it to be, and declared it was a matter of comparatively little consequence whether Switzerland had a little more or less territory. His noble Friend said, and he entirely agreed with him, that the position of Switzerland, as regarded other Powers, was based on the treaty by which her neutrality and independence were guaranteed. Still, there were supports and props that might assist in that basis being maintained, and these were that Switzerland should be in such a position that no Power should lightly attack and destroy her before any of the other Powers could interfere for her defence. In fact, the independence and neutrality of Switzerland were strengthened by the Treaty of Vienna, by the territorial position that was secured to her on her frontiers. The question had been so much discussed both in and out of Parliament that it would be familiar to their Lordships; but he would venture to point out what the position of Switzerland really was. One argument used to show that the position of Switzerland was not 1936 materially weakened was singular. It was said that she was weak on one of her frontiers, and that it would not weaken her by altering her position on the south. It was perfectly true that the frontier of Switzerland was not satisfactory on the side of Gex, and anybody who looked at a map would see that whereas the Lake of Geneva was formerly exposed on one side only, now it was exposed on both sides. No one could affirm that by entering the Conference such concessions would be obtained as would secure for Switzerland all that she required, or that the friends of that country might desire for her; but, at all events, an opportunity would be given for complete and free discussion, and if it should unfortunately happen that no agreement was come to, Switzerland would be in no worse position than she was now in. His noble Friend said by going into the Conference they would do nothing more than ratify the treaty. He (Lord Wodehouse) did not see why it should be assumed that they would ratify the treaty by meeting in Conference.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEexplained that he did not say that they "would," but that they "might" ratify the treaty.
LORD WODEHOUSEcertainly understood his noble Friend to say that they would ratify the treaty; but he was prepared to say they would do no such thing by such a meeting. The French Government put the matter in this point of view. They said the Conference must meet to reconcile the 92nd Article of the Treaty of Vienna with the 2nd Article of the Treaty of Turin. Some people said that this was too narrow a basis of discussion; but if these two articles were to be considered they would open the whole question, and there was nothing whatever to prevent the Powers represented at the Conference making any proposal they might think fit. He thought he had explained that there were some good reasons for going into the Conference; and he could not see those dangers ahead which his noble Friend had pointed out. He would refer to what might be the alternative. His noble Friend had spoken at some length of the disquiet that unfortunately existed, not in this country only, but in other countries; and he seemed to think that that disquiet would be increased by this Conference. But he (Lord Wodehouse) thought that if such changes were to take place as had been made by this treaty between France and Sardinia without there 1937 being any discussion of them by the other Powers of Europe who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna, it was very possible that the disquiet would increase. Persons might naturally say there had been one change, and the Powers of Europe had not taken any steps with regard to it, and therefore other changes might take place with the same result. He did not mean to say that, supposing the Conference were to meet and separate without any such result as was desired, that would be a convenient or satisfactory position to be in; but he maintained that not to go into a Conference would be as dangerous as it would be impolitic, and would be to disregard the expressed wishes of Switzerland. His noble Friend spoke of the understanding which had been entered into before the late war, and he traced the course of events which had followed. It was not for him to praise the despatches of his noble Friend under whom he was happy to serve, but he was glad to find that the views taken by his noble Friend were approved by the noble Marquess. All he could say was that his noble Friend had shown us by his despatches that he was sensibly alive to the gravity of this question—that he felt the importance of maintaining the territorial position of Switzerland, and also felt that a serious inroad had been made on the territorial arrangements of Europe. It was useless to discuss what were the motives of the different actors in this matter; but one thing was perfectly certain—that the treaty which had been concluded, and by which Savoy had been transferred to France, had altered—materially altered—the position of Switzerland and greatly diminished the safety of that country, while it had given a precedent of a dangerous and unsatisfactory character to Europe.
THE MARQUESS OF NORMANBYsaid, he thoroughly concurred in one observation made by the noble Lord who had just spoken, that some attention ought to be paid to the wishes of Switzerland on this question; but he could not concur in the observation that the position of Switzerland was worse than before. On the contrary, he believed that the gallant stand made by her had raised her in the estimation of Europe. While however he said that he was inclined to go into a Conference, he by no means meant to say that any good would come from a Conference. He would not dispute the eulogium that had been passed on the skill and talent of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, as 1938 dislayed in his correspondence on this question; but he must say it was the misfortune of the noble Lord that in none of his despatches did he exhibit any settled plan of action, and that they did not carry conviction to the mind of any person to whom they were addressed. He thought there was an unreasonable amount of alarm as to the point which referred to the south side of the Lake of Geneva. Had this entire question been taken up when the option to do so was offered by Count Walewski last year, the Government would have been better able to meet the difficulties of the case than they were now, because at that time there had been no vote on the subject, whereas now there had been two votes which showed the feelings of the population—the first for the election of Members to the Sardinian Chambers, when five out of the six Deputies were in favour of annexation; and the other the vote by universal suffrage in favour of the annexation. He would not be suspected of thinking that any settled form of Government should be changed by any sudden ebullition of popular feeling and universal suffrage. The Government had, however, encouraged this mode of procedure in certain parts of Europe, and surely they would not say that an appeal to universal suffrage was only to be adopted in cases when it was directed against existing Sovereigns in Italy, and not to be applied to the case of Piedmont? The noble Marquess praised the despatches of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, but he would tell him that the despatch which in his opinion most merited praise was that in which he stated that if the King of Sardinia bargained away and sold the ancient cradle of his illustrious race it would for ever remain a blot on his escutcheon. He wished now to refer to some dates. On a former occasion, when he had put a question to his noble Friend opposite (Earl Granville) with reference to the rumoured annexation of Savoy to France, the answer was that the Government were in possession of no information on the subject, while it appeared that on that very day, the 27th of January, the first convention for the transfer of Nice and Savoy to France was signed. Now, if that were so, the act had been done some days previous to that on which Count Cavour made that unfortunate declaration to the effect that Sardinia would never either sell, barter, or exchange any portion of her territory. He might add that Earl Cowley, in his despatch of 1939 the 5th of February, stated that Count Walewski had informed him that if Sardinia were aggrandized by the acquisition of the Duchies, it must be at the cost of Savoy. He had, however, never been able to obtain any satisfactory explanation why that despatch did not arrive here until the 8th of February, thus taking three days instead of twelve hours to reach London from Paris. He had, however, put that question when our Ambassador was present in his place. He wished further to observe, that a despatch had been received at the same time from Sir James Hudson which contained a statement to the effect that he had had a conversation with Count Cavour, in the course of which Count Cavour had intimated that the Government of Sardinia had not the slightest intention of exchanging or selling Savoy. Now, that being so, he wished to know how his noble Friend (Earl Granville) had been enabled, in his observations in reply to a Motion which he (the Marquess of Normanby) had submitted to their Lordships on the 7th of February, to state the purport of a despatch from Turin which did not reach London until the following day?
§ EARL GRANVILLEI may have got the intelligence by telegraph; but of this I am perfectly sure, that the information which I gave must in some way have reached the Government.
THE MARQUESS OF NORMANBYI should like to have some explanation with respect to the delay which occurred in the case of Earl Cowley's despatch of the 5th of February, which did not arrive until the 8th.
LORD WODEHOUSEobserved that Earl Cowley frequently dated his despatches two or three days before he transmitted them to London. It should also be borne in mind that messengers did not start every day for the purpose of conveying them. The despatch was certainly received on the 8th.
THE MARQUESS OF NORMANBYHe was at a loss to understand why upon the particular occasion to which he alluded—and that a most important one—a delay should have occurred of which he believed there was no similar instance. But, passing from that point, he wished to observe that, however anxious he might be to see the independence and neutrality secured, the despatch of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Earl Cowley on the 15th of May did not quite meet his 1940 views on that important subject. He, therefore, hoped that if Her Majesty's Government entered into a Conference they would not insist upon a solution of the question, in advocating which it was evident they would not be supported by the other European Powers. As this would probably be the last opportunity which their Lordships would have of discussing the subject before Parliament re-assembled, he would say that he did not think Her Majesty's Government had approached this question in a proper manner, or at the proper time. In the autumn of last year they were engaged in endeavouring to abrogate the Treaty by which the peace of Europe had been established, and later on their action in their dealings with France was not a little embarrassed by the proceedings of the Financial Minister, whose schemes had for a time met with support, but now that the truth was known, they had been emphatically condemned by the country.
LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid the subject which had been brought under the consideration of the House by the speech of the noble Lord who introduced the Motion, and of the noble Lord on the Ministerial Bench, was admittedly one of the most extensive and important that could engage the attention of their Lordships. He was nevertheless inclined to think that no disposition existed to entertain it at any considerable length; no one had yet risen from the Opposition benches, and nothing had occurred to give to the Debate a comprehensive character. What little he had to say might have been postponed, if that were not, as his noble Friend had just remarked, the last opportunity which would probably be offered of expressing an opinion with reference to this question in the present Session of Parliament. He admitted the force of some of the observations which had fallen from the noble Lord the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in support of the view taken by Her Majesty's Government; but at the same time the subject was so much beset with danger, in everything connected with it there were points of such great delicacy, and so little certainty existed as to the results of the Congress, that he must confess he should have been more gratified if he had learnt that there was an intention of coming to an understanding with France before any further steps were taken. On going into a Congress we should be exposed, by the line which we adopted, to the painful 1941 alternative either of appearing to give our sanction to the annexation of Savoy to France, or of increasing that coolness and estrangement which had lately taken place—he regretted to say, on very sufficient grounds—in the alliance with France, and thereby expose ourselves to inconveniences and incur hazards to which the country could not be blind. The nation was bound, as far as was consistent with the maintenance of its own interests and dignity and honour, to preserve that state of peace and friendly feeling which at present existed between this country and France; but he was unable to go to the same extent as his noble Friend, who, in opening the discussion, said that it was for the permanent advantage of this country to maintain a close alliance with France. If any receipt existed for producing constant quarrels in Europe it was, he believed, the attempt to bind together in bonds of constant alliance two countries, however connected their interests, which differed so widely in character and had such distinct aims and associations. In proportion to the endeavours made to keep up a constant, close, and formal alliance the tendency would inevitably be towards its severance. A consistent disposition to conciliate to the extent permitted by the honour and interest of both nations would, he conscientiously believed, be much more conducive to a lasting good understanding than such a close and intimate alliance as was contemplated by the noble Lord. The attitude to which he alluded did not prevent, and need never prevent, such occasional understandings as existed at this moment with regard to the course to be pursued in a distant part of the world, or which might exist with reference to another part of the globe not so remote, but still distant from this country. But it was his firm conviction that strict alliances were neither for the interest of England nor of France itself; a state of amity and mutual co-operation according to circumstances and the changes effected by time, would be a policy much more highly deserving of commendation. A Conference was stated to be required in the interests of Switzerland with a view to restore that country to that state of political security and neutrality which was guaranteed to it in the settlement of Europe in 1815. No man could admire more than he did the conduct of that distinguished confederacy. Connected as he had been in former times with that country, and having then had the opportunity of re- 1942 marking the historical virtues of the people perpetuated through so many generations, and so nobly shown on every occasion when their rights or independence were assailed, he could not but feel satisfaction at the reasonable nature of their demand, and he trusted, therefore, that we should not overlook the obligations we had for stepping forth in defence of her rights, and for extending, as far as we properly could, consistently with the principles of non-intervention, the countenance of this country to the position which Switzerland had taken up. Though her name had been mentioned in the course of the Debate with respect and friendly feeling, he did not think justice had been done to the position in which she stood, or to the great qualities which her inhabitants had shown, partly from their own zeal and energy of purpose, and partly from the complicated situation of European affairs, in exposing themselves to positive danger. When they saw a country with such a limited population bringing forward 100,000 men ready to take the field, with a proportionate amount of artillery, (respecting the existence of which there could be no doubt, as not many years had elapsed since it made its appearance), and when they learnt on good authority that the Swiss were prepared to support that force if necessary by a fresh demonstration of equal magnitude, it was impossible, considering the extent of their means and the dangers to which they were exposed, not to entertain the highest opinion of that country. They were but exhibiting in the present day the same heroic firmness and the same attachment to their principles which centuries ago led them to place themselves in opposition to the enormous armies of Austria, to vindicate their independence, and to establish that confederacy which, in its long duration, had never failed to command the respect of Europe. It was impossible to deny that, in addition to the efforts of the Swiss, and to the prepossession we might have in their favour, the neutrality of Switzerland as guaranteed by the Treaties of Vienna was intimately connected with the interests of Europe. Undoubtedly the acquisition of Savoy by Prance altered the position of Switzerland towards Europe, and compromised the great European interests which were connected with her safety. He had never acquiesced in the opinion, formerly expressed in that House, that the acquisition of Savoy by France was a light matter, especially considering the degree 1943 of power to which France had attained—a degree of power which, if not exercised with the greatest discretion and with a regard for public principle, must place Europe in a state of jeopardy and alarm. Nothing which occurred to alter the relative proportion of one country in Europe to another could be so esteemed, and such annexation tended to keep Europe in a constant state of fever and anxiety. It was estimated that the population of Savoy was about half a million; such an addition to the population of France would not of itself affect the general interests of Europe; but the addition of a country like Savoy to France, the manner in which it had been carried out, and the motives assigned for it, undoubtedly gave grounds to Europe for mistrust and apprehension, lest similar projects might be entertained, and fully justified the alarm which Switzerland had expressed. Under these circumstances, all men naturally looked for some means for removing the causes of European anxiety, for giving security to Switzerland, and, if he saw any prospect of a conference bringing about those objects, he should be one of the first to support it. There was sufficient ground for apprehending, however, that whatever might be the hopes of the Government, and however anxious they might be to carry out their European policy, the result might be one which would increase the difficulties and complications of the situation. It might be that the alternative would be presented to us either of losing what remained to us of our friendly position towards France, or of appearing to give our sanction to an arrangement which would lead to the evil consequences he had already described. Before entering into a Conference we ought to have an understanding with France, that, if it should unfortunately be found impossible to effect an arrangement which would give security to Switzerland, at least we should not be taken to give our sanction to the principles on which the annexation of Savoy had taken place.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, he entirely approved the decision of the Government to enter into a Conference. He had always expressed his disapprobation of this annexation, from its origin in a war without a pretext and without a justification to its accomplishment; and, though he allowed that the Savoyards and the Nizzards had the fullest right to manage their own affairs, to have what sovereign they chose without foreign interference, yet that was 1944 a very different thing from admitting their right to annex themselves to a foreign Power, even by an unanimous vote fully and fairly taken, which he could not allow had been the case in this instance. Nothing would be worse than that the annexation should take place against the wishes of the people; but their wishes for it gave no ground for other Powers agreeing to that annexation. He did not believe that France had gained any such additional strength, either strategical or territorial, as need give any material ground to the other Powers for objecting to it; nevertheless, the assent of the other Powers ought to be sought, and the means of giving it would, no doubt, form a fit subject for discussion in the Conference. Much complaint was made on the other side of the water of France being suspected; but the best way for a country to avoid being suspected was to pursue a course of conduct which was not auspicious. A constant good understanding between France and England was the greatest blessing which could happen to both countries and to the peace of the world in general. A strict alliance between them was a very different matter, though there might be occasions when it would be of the greatest importance that they should act in alliance with each other. He hoped nothing would interfere with the present peace of Europe, but the best course to render that peace secure was a cordial understanding between those countries which suspected a certain other Power, or felt it necessary to be on their guard against it, and in each of those countries at home an unceasing, vigilant, and strenuous preparation for the worst that might happen.
§ Motion agreed to.